getting tough with the dragon? the comparative correlates of …repository.essex.ac.uk/17240/1/int...

Getting tough with thedragon The comparativecorrelates of foreign policyattitudes toward China in theUnited States and UKThomas J Scotto1 and Jason Reifler2

1University of Essex Colchester UK and 2University ofExeter Exeter UKEmail tomscotto77btinternetcom

Accepted 1 May 2016

Abstract

A large body of research suggests mass publics are capable of thinking

coherently about international relations We extend this body of research

to show that domain relevant postures ndash in our case more abstract be-

liefs about foreign policy ndash are related to how tough of a line representa-

tive samples of US and UK respondents want their governments to take

toward China More specifically we utilize a unique comparative survey

of American and British foreign policy attitudes to show broad support

for toughness toward China Beliefs about the use of the military and at-

titudes regarding globalization help explain preferences for tough eco-

nomic and military policies toward China In the two countries the

relationship between general foreign policy outlooks and the positions

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol 0 No 0 The Author 2016 Published by Oxford University Press in association with the

Japan Association of International RelationsThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution

License (httpcreativecommonsorglicensesby40) which permits unrestricted reusedistribution and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properly cited

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 0 (2016) 1ndash35doi 101093iraplcw008

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Advance Access published June 20 2016 at U

niversity of Essex on July 8 2016

httpirapoxfordjournalsorgD

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citizens take is robust to the addition of a general mediator that controls

for the general affect those surveyed have toward China Finally the

strength of the relationship between these abstract postures and specific

preferences for a China policy are different across the countries

1 Introduction

Over the past three decades political scientists gathered a steadystream of evidence to show that citizens in multiple countries havewell-structured foreign policy attitudes (eg Hurwitz and Peffley 1987[US] Hurwitz et al 1993 [Costa Rica] Chittick et al 1995 [US]Richman et al 1997 [US] Bjereld and Ekengren 1999 [Sweden]Munton and Keating 2001 [Canada] Jenkins-Smith et al 2004 [UK]Noeuroel et al 2004 [Canada] Reifler et al 2011 [UK]) Moreover re-search shows that citizen attitudes respond to changing internationaland domestic circumstances in understandable and reasonable ways(Shapiro and 988 Peffley and Hurwitz 1992 Wlezien 1995Gelpi 2010 Kertzer 2013 though see Baum and Groeling 2010 for amore nuanced and pessimistic argument) In this article we build onthis existing research to show that these structured abstract foreign pol-icy beliefs (or lsquoposturesrsquo) help explain American and British policypreferences toward China Specifically we utilize hierarchical constraintmodels (eg Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) to show that specific attitudesabout China policy flow from foreign policy postures We find thatboth security and economic postures are relevant in explaining supportfor toughness toward China

There are important differences in the salience of China as an issuewhen the US and UK are compared to one another1 In the United

1 By way of illustration we utilized the Factiva database and conducted searches for articleswith the terms lsquoChinarsquo and either lsquoMilitaryrsquo or lsquoEconomyrsquo that appeared in The New YorkTimes (NYT) The Telegraph The Guardian and The Daily Mail over the course of the twoweeks prior to the surveys entering the field (16 Januaryndash31 January 2013) On the militaryaspect coverage in the NYT is much different from what appears in the three large circula-tion (but ideologically distinct) British papers In the former multiple articles focus on thepotential for military confrontations between the United States and China as a result ofChinarsquos territorial dispute with Japan over islands in the East China Sea Other coverage fo-cuses on President Obamarsquos interest in building up US military strength in Asia to counterthe growth of the Chinese military and the potential for China to engage in cyber-attackson US government and businesses In the British papers there was coverage of theChinesendashJapanese territorial dispute and the potential for a USndashChina military confronta-tion but little mention of British military interests or involvement

2 Thomas J Scotto and Jason Reifler

at University of E

ssex on July 8 2016httpirapoxfordjournalsorg

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States issues involving engagement with China ndash from economic andtrade competition to the possibilities of military tension ndash frequentlyappear in the news In the UK less news coverage is devoted to Chinaoverall and in particular there is less news reporting dedicated to theprospect of economic or military conflict between China and GreatBritain This article exploits this difference by comparing the influenceof foreign policy postures on China attitudes across these contexts Wefind foreign policy beliefs of Americans to be more closely linkedto the level of toughness they demand of their Governmentrsquos Chinapolicies However this is not to say that foreign policy postures are ir-relevant for British attitudes toward China postures are significant pre-dictors of China preferences in the UK as well We also find that therelevance of the postures is robust to adding a lsquolikability heuristicrsquo orfeeling thermometer toward China to the model ndash that is these broadbeliefs have a direct effect on preferences for getting tough in two pol-icy domains even after controlling for how these beliefs influence affecttoward China

2 On and Off the Radar China opinion in theUnited States and UK

21 America and China

There is a long history of polling Americans on the issue of China ndashmeasuring American attitudes toward the threat posed by the PeoplersquosRepublic is commonplace in the wake of Maorsquos triumph in 1949 andthe Chinese involvement in the Korean War Moreover trends in

On the economic front the NYT ran two stories mentioning environmental degradationaccompanying Chinarsquos economic rise with one piece mentioning Republican claims thatthe United States could not compete with China economically with stricter environmentalregulations In contrast limited discussion in The Telegraph centered on how Britainrsquostough visa regime hurt the UK economy because it limited tourism students and invest-ment from China and a brief report suggested Mandarin be taught to British schoolchil-dren so that UK businesses could take full advantage of Chinarsquos expansion (25 January2013) At least in the short time period covered the tone of the articles in British paperssuggest that a more open relationship with China might help the UK reap the benefits ofChinarsquos economic rise A more extensive time series analysis would be necessary to convinc-ingly determine whether media coverage drives attitudes toward China However it doesappear that the media messages British and American respondents receive are differentparticularly when it comes to the military threat posed by China

Getting tough with the dragon 3

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American attitudes toward China feature important shifts over timeAmericans view China as a primary threat in the 1950s and 1960s butviews soften somewhat in the 1970s (Kusnitz 1984) However there isimportant variation underneath these more gradual shifts One examplecomes from the Truman Administration Republicans were much morecritical of Sino-American policies likely attributable to the view thatthe Democratic President was responsible for lsquolosing Chinarsquo [andKorea] to the Communists (Wittkopf 1990)

At other points in time public opinion appears to have played animportant role in the policymaking calculus of American leaders Foyle(1997) details how President Eisenhower and Secretary of State JohnFoster Dulles turn against unilateral action in the defense of Taiwanfrom mainland Communist China in the early 1950s because of a per-ception of a divide in domestic public opinion Similarly Rusk andPapp (1990) notes Kennedyrsquos caution in his engagement with theChina issue and attributes this reticence to a fear of negative public re-action toward proposed White House policies

While Eisenhower and Kennedy appear to allow concerns over pub-lic opinion to constrain action vis-a-vis China Steele (1966) sees a pub-lic open to a more flexible and engaged policy during thaws in theCold War By the 1970s the initiatives of Nixon and Carter help to im-prove both relations between the two countries and Americansrsquo viewsof China but attitudes sour considerably after the violent suppressionof student protestors in Tiananmen Square Ultimately Holsti (2004)describes the American publicrsquos reactions to China and the policiesthey want their state to pursue as lsquoevents drivenrsquo and lsquorationalrsquoCitizens cool when China engages in policies that threaten the UnitedStates but warm when elites make overtures toward working with oneanother

Page and Bouton (2006) observe that by the early 2000s Americansoverwhelmingly favor maintaining diplomatic relations with China andbelieve that the United States has a vital interest in engagement withChina In particular the authors note a shift in American priorities to-ward matters of trade and economic commitments Page and Xie(2010) show that Americans see the benefits China can provide interms of the availability of cheap imports but they also believe that theChinese do not play fair when trading with the United States On the


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military front a slim majority of Americans want to work hard to con-tain Chinese military power but only a minority are willing to see theUnited States mobilize ground forces against Chinarsquos large military ifthe latter invades Taiwan (Page and Bouton 2006 Page and Xie2010)

22 Britain and China

Measurements of British attitudes toward China are sparse and infre-quent Early work by Younger (1955) speculates that public opinion isnot as relevant in the UK as it is in the United States in shaping eliteactions when dealing with Communist China With some limited ex-ceptions (eg Hong Kong) the British publicrsquos attitudes toward Chinararely appear as a topic of conversation in media or academic journals(Hoge 1997) In contrast British elites do see the rise of China as alsquodriver of changersquo that will affect the UK in the coming decades Thereare some conjectures that European public opinions toward China canharden if trade moves away from the import of low cost Chinese basicgoods into the European Union and to flooding British and EU mar-kets with high quality goods that rival those produced by domestic in-dustries (Jacques 2009)

British policymakers and their European counterparts also treat therise of China as a military power with less suspicion than theirAmerican allies Like the United States the EU maintains an arms em-bargo on China but opinions as to the appropriateness of maintainingbans on weapons sales is a topic more open to debate amongEuropean policymakers (Dai 2009) The rise of China simply is less sa-lient in Europe than it is in the United States and elites are less likelyat this point in time to view China as an imminent threat Howeverthis may change if more attention is paid to the country by elites iftrade wars heat up or human rights practices by China catch the at-tention of activists in UK and across Europe

Compared with the British Americans hear more about Chinarsquos sta-tus as a growing superpower in the media and the potential challengesthis poses to US dominance (Peng 2004 Stone and Xiao 2007)Studies also find that the BBCrsquos coverage of China is robust but doesnot focus on the impact of Chinarsquos rise on the UK (Seib and Powers2010) This difference and the lack of worry by policymakers suggest


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that British attitudes concerning their countryrsquos China policy will notbe as well formulated and that predictors of the publicrsquos attitudes inthe UK likely will be weak and more difficult to establish

3 Sources of specific attitudes toward China

Our primary interest in this article is to understand better Americanand British attitudes toward China By attitudes we do not just meanhow those residing in these two western states view China generallybut rather the toughness of the policies they want their country to pur-sue in two policy realms most relevant to bilateral and multilateral re-lations ndash trade and military engagement We demonstrate below thatUK and US citizens possess abstract foreign policy attitudes that retainthe same structure in both states A direct linkage between abstractpolicy views and demands for toughness toward China in two differentpolicy spheres is suggestive of higher order thinking both about foreignpolicy in general and the stance people believe their country shouldtake toward China specifically

Suggestive evidence of an even higher level of thinking on the partof citizens occurs if the postures have different relationships to each ofthe citizen demands for tough military and trade policies As there aremultiple substantive factors partisan differences and standard controlvariables that can be related to attitudes toward China we first elabo-rate and justify the independent variables to appear in the multivariatemodels below

31 Our key variables of theoretical interest ndash foreign policypostures

A cottage industry of research shows that American attitudes aboutforeign policy have a coherent multi-dimensional structure The exactnumber and content of dimensions is a function of the available dataand the modelling strategy Nonetheless a dominant theme in thework is that peoplesrsquo beliefs about the strength and proper use of theircountryrsquos military (militarism) is separate from attitudes toward theappropriateness of employing instruments of soft power such as the


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dispersal of foreign aid (liberal internationalism) (eg Wittkopf 19861990)2 Although less well studied these dimensions appear to hold ap-proximately among the UK public as well (eg Reifler et al 2011)

The most relevant forerunner for our present analysis is the seminalarticle by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) on belief systems and foreign af-fairs Dimensions extracted via factor analysis reveal postures or a mid-dle ground between an individualrsquos core beliefs and their positions onspecific policy issues We emulate many features of Hurwitz andPeffleyrsquos analysis ndash we include variables that tap the three postures ofisolationism militarism patriotism (or ethnocentrism as Hurwitz andPeffley call it) and include in the models controls for economic evalua-tions and partisan identification Within this hierarchical frameworkwe make a number of specific predictions about sources of support fortoughness toward China

We first turn to isolationism Isolationists want to avoid unnecessaryentanglements beyond state borders This should lead those high inthis sentiment to shy away from wishing their government to pursuepolicies other states may view as provocative Consequently we expect

H1 Higher levels of isolationism present among respondents from theUnited States and Great Britain co-varies with a reduced propensity tosupport the government pursuing tough military and economic policiestoward China

An isolationism dimension taps respondentsrsquo attitudes for how theywant their state to interact with other countries across a variety of is-sues In contrast a militarism dimension captures citizensrsquo beliefs thattheir countryrsquos military should be strong and ready for action if thecountryrsquos interest requires its use ndash either to keep it secure from attackor project its values and power (Page and Bouton 2006) A citizenry

2 This militarism vs liberal internationalism separation is not the only approach to under-standing key points of conflict in the dimensionality debate Some scholars make the casefor a separate lsquoisolationistndashinternationalistrsquo dimension arguing that militarism and liberalinternationalism dimensions describe how the people think their country should engagewith the world but an isolationism dimension is necessary to tap whether respondents wanttheir state to engage with the world at all (Kegley and Wittkopf 1982 Rathbun 2007p 387) This debate is largely orthogonal to our specific focus which is to show that foreignpolicy postures serve as prominent covariates of citizen demands for tough China policiesfrom their governments


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that thinks more deeply about engagement with China is prone to uti-lize different dimensions when responding to different aspects of theirstatersquos China policy If this higher level of awareness holds empiricalestimations should establish that

H2 Respondentsrsquo positions on the militarism dimension are moreclosely tied to their preferences for a tough state military policytoward China than they are for a tough economic policy toward China

Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) treat preferences for free trade as a spe-cific issue but we contend that attitudes toward globalization are prop-erly thought of as a midlevel posture As is the case with the militarismposture we consider evidence of higher ordered citizen thinking abouttheir statersquos China policy to occur if

H3 Respondent support for globalization has a significant andnegative association with their preferences for a tough state economicpolicy toward China The magnitude of this linkage is larger than therelationship between globalization and preferences for a tough militarypolicy

The three latent variables whose structure and measurement we de-scribe below differ in that isolationism is expected to co-vary signifi-cantly with preferences for both a strong economic and military policyIf citizens think deeply about how their country should react to themultifaceted rise of China preferences for globalization should bemore closely linked to attitudes about the level of toughness of theircountryrsquos economic policy while preferences for militarism should havea stronger association with demands for a tough military policy towardChina

32 Additional variables of interest

Partisanship

We have divergent cross-country expectations about the role parti-sanship should play as a lsquoperceptual screenrsquo (cf Lewis-Beck et al2008) when it comes to shaping citizen preferences toward their coun-tryrsquos international relations with China In contemporary America itseems that on nearly all issues there are noticeable differences in the


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policy opinions of Republicans and Democrats (Jacobson 2010)Consequently we expect this also to apply to the issue of China andwe will observe differences between Republicans and Democrats onpreferences for toughness even after controlling for other variables

This expectation requires further explanation as there is a burgeon-ing debate in the literature concerning the role of partisanship ininfluencing American attitudes toward China Some argue that parti-sanship (and ideology) primarily has an indirect effect on foreign pol-icy preferences by affecting perceptions of threat and more abstractforeign policy goals (eg Page and Bouton 2006 for a general argu-ment and Page and Xie 2010 for a more China specific argument)Peter Gries (2011 2014ab) critiques this approach arguing that parti-sanship and ideology play an important role in shaping Americansrsquo at-titudes far more directly In the case of China the more direct effectsof partisanship are rooted in a greater antipathy toward communismOur expectation is that for the United States partisanship will reachstatistical significance Of course a significant partisanship variable inthe models we present does not necessarily validate or repudiate one orthe other of these competing theoretical accounts However given theubiquity of partisanship in explanations of American political opinionsand behavior we tend to favor an interpretation where partisanshiphas at least some direct influence on the content of both general for-eign policy preferences and China attitudes more specifically

In UK research suggests that there are partisan differences in for-eign policy beliefs ndash those more supportive of the use of force havea higher affect toward the Conservative Party and its leader whilethose who fit the mold of lsquocooperative internationalistsrsquo feel warmly to-ward the Liberal Democrats (Reifler et al 2011) In practice howeverBritish parties have a habit of not differentiating themselves in a clearand meaningful way on foreign policy Even on the salient matters ofmilitary interventions in Libya and Afghanistan the similarity inparty positions limits the ability to observe elite influence (Reifleret al 2014) Consequently we expect that partisan attachments willhave little impact on British preferences for toughness toward China Insummary

H4 The long term attachments of Americans to a political party asrepresented by their responses to a standard partisan identification


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question will significantly influence the degree of toughness they seekfrom their countryrsquos China policiesmdashDemocratic respondents willfavor a softer approach while Republicans will demand toughness InGreat Britain respondentsrsquo partisan affiliations will have little directeffect on attitudes toward the approach the UK government shouldtake toward China

Economic perceptions

A fundamental variable motivating political behavior and voting is citi-zensrsquo perceptions of the state of the economy (eg van der Brug et al2007 Duch and Stevenson 2008) Page and Bouton (2006) note thatAmericans pay attention to their own economic interests when thinkingabout trade and globalization and this leads to our hypothesis that

H5 Economic evaluations affect support for toughness on ChinaThose who have more negative evaluations of the economy orhousehold finances will support greater toughness toward China

Ethnocentrismpatriotism

Classic work in social psychology holds that foreign countries are so-cially acceptable targets for the projection and displacement of anxi-eties (Silverstein 1989) Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) label the belief innational superiority lsquoethnocentrismrsquo and place it as a core value thatpredicts positions on postures and only indirectly influences specificforeign policy issues Given a wider range of indicators available to uswe examine the link between blind patriotism (cf Schatz et al 1999Huddy and Khatib 2007) and preferences for tougher China policiesLike ethnocentrism the measure of patriotism we describe below tapsagreement with a belief in the superiority of onersquos country Howeverour measure also incorporates beliefs about the appropriateness ofblindly following the governmentrsquos policies We expect that

H6 There is a direct and positive relationship between respondentsrsquoagreement that citizens should blindly support USUK policies andthose who want tougher policies toward China


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The likeability heuristic

Recent work by Peter Gries (2014b p 43) asserts that lsquogut feelings to-ward foreign countries serve as a vital mediator between ideological pre-dispositions on the one hand and specific foreign policy preferences onthe otherrsquo Our interpretation of this position is that the immediate ante-cedent to preferences for toughness vis-a-vis China is how warmly onefeels toward China and that other variables influence onersquos warmth to-ward China If this approach is correct then once a feeling thermometeris added to the model as a mediator much of the direct relationships weobserve between postures partisanship patriotism and economic evalu-ations should weaken significantly We depart slightly from Peter Gries(2014b) and examine whether mediation via a China feeling thermome-ter occurs for five key variables in our primary analysis

H7 Respondentsrsquo support for a tough China policy in both theeconomic and military policy realms operates via general affect towardChina

The greater salience of China in the United States compared withGreat Britain leads us to cross-country expectations concerning the ri-val hypotheses presented above

H8 The covariates described in this section will have betterexplanatory power in explaining citizen preferences for tough Chinapolicies in the United States than in Great Britain

H9 Americans will utilize different postures to inform their foreignpolicy preferences toward China in the economic and military domainswhile the influence of the postures will be more even across the twopolicies among the less informed British respondents

4 Data variables and methods

41 Data and dependent variables

In February 2013 1891 British and 1858 American respondents com-pleted the third wave of a YouGov online panel survey explicitly fieldedfor the purposes of better understanding the foreign policy attitudes of


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both publics3 Two outcome variables come from this wave of the sur-vey These are (i) a question asking respondents lsquoThinking about USUK policy toward China do you think it is important to be toughwith China on economic and trade issuesrsquo and (ii) a question askingrespondents lsquoThinking about USUK policy toward China do youthink it is important to be tough with China on military issuesrsquoAvailable responses to these two questions falls along a four point or-dinal scale ranging from lsquoNo not at all importantrsquo to lsquoYes very impor-tantrsquo and the question is similar to one employed by the Pew ResearchCentre in a recent China focused survey4 In the last set of multivariateanalyses below we employ a 101 point lsquofeeling thermometerrsquo as a me-diator This probe provides respondents with a scale ranging from 0 to100 with 0 labeled lsquovery coldlyrsquo and 100 labeled lsquovery warmlyrsquo and

3 YouGovrsquos methodology for ensuring the samples are reasonably representative of targetpopulations differs slightly across the two countries In the United States respondents tothe YouGov survey are drawn by matched quota sampling from a non-probability sampleof over 1 million volunteer panelists who take the surveys in exchange for prizes or cashThe methodology for YouGovrsquos procedures is described in Rivers (2007) and Ansolabehereand Schaffner (2014) report the high comparability of estimations utilizing this method tothose obtained utilizing standard nationally representative RDD telephone interviewing Inthe UK YouGov builds a sample by drawing from its respondent panel of over 350000Britons who have signed up to take surveys in exchange for entries into prize draws orpoints on an account that eventually can be redeemed for a cash prize The methodologyfor YouGovrsquos UK procedures is reported by Sanders et al (2007) to yield multivariate re-sults that are highly comparable to estimates obtained utilizing responses from probabilitysampling with face-to-face interviewing To obtain a sample that approximately is represen-tative of Great Britain (Northern Ireland is excluded from the sampling frame) specificsurveys are opened to a subset of the panel that is representative of the known populationin terms of age gender class and newspaper readership in Britain In the multivariate anal-yses post-sampling weights are employed to bring the sample further into line with thepopulationrsquos known characteristics as derived from either the national census or a largescale probability sample (eg the Current Population Survey in the United States or theNational Readership Survey in the UK) Details on the observed and weighted characteris-tics of the US and UK samples are presented in the Online Appendix but the big differencebetween the observed and weighted demographic characteristics of the panel lie with theunderestimation of youth who participated in both samples Attrition from this demo-graphic mimics what is observed in probability based panel studies as is the underrepresen-tation of minorities and those of lower socio-economic status (see Watson and Wooden2009 and Lipps 2009)

4 Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (2012) The middle categories are lsquoNo Not too im-portantrsquo and lsquoYes Somewhat importantrsquo Donrsquot know responses to the two toughness ques-tions and the thermometer scale are classified as missing cases and modeled as a functionof the observed covariates The order the two toughness questions appear on the surveysrandomly are alternated Fieldwork was funded by a grant to Thomas Scotto from theEconomic and Social Research Council of the UK (ESRC)


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asks them to evaluate lsquoChinarsquo in general ndash not the GovernmentChinese people or in any other context

42 Independent variables

Hypothesized covariates for the multivariate models derive from the in-tervieweesrsquo responses to questions asked on November 2011 and MayJune 2012 waves of the survey To improve the reliability and validityof key independent variables of interest we hypothesize multiple surveyindicators to be reflective of latent factors of each concept Below weemploy Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to ensure that the factorstructure is valid these analyses employ a robust weighted least squaresestimator to enable us to derive the latent variables by appropriatelytreating responses to the agreendashdisagree survey questions as ordinal Abrief description of the indicators follows but for the sake of brevitywe relegate full question wording of the items the wave each item ap-pears on the survey and response distributions to the onlineSupplementary Appendix

43 Latent variables

i Militarism Posture A latent variable where higher scores motivate posi-tive responses to questions asking whether respondents think militaryspending should be increased and agreement with a question as towhether the respondent believes that their country should be willing touse force in the face of expansionist aggression by another state

ii Isolationism Posture A latent variable where those scoring highly onthe dimension are prone to agree with survey questions asking whethertheir country should avoid involvement with other countries whethergetting involved in other states risks the wellbeing of domestic citizensand whether their country should simply mind its own business in itsconduct of foreign policy

iii Globalization Posture A latent variable where those scoring highly havea propensity to believe increases in trade between countries has a posi-tive outcome on the respondent and their families domestic factoryworkers the domestic economy writ large domestic consumers anddomestic businesses

iv Patriotism Respondents high on the negative form of patriotism likelyagree that people who do not back the statersquos policies should live else-where people should support policies simply because they are the


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policies of the country people should avoid saying bad things aboutthe country their state is always correct in matters of international af-fairs and that the country has the moral high ground in policymaking

v Economic Performance Perceptions Respondents scoring high on thisfactor tend to agree to four survey questions asking whether their ownand the countryrsquos economy performed better in the past year andwould do so in the next year

44 Observed variables

i Partisan Identification Dichotomous variables capture whether in theUnited States the respondent is a Democrat or Republican and in theUK whether the respondent is a supporter of Labor the Conservativesthe Liberal Democrats the Greens UKIP or one of the two nationalistparties (Scottish Nationalists or Plaid Cyrmu)

ii Other Controls The estimations below consider or control for the im-pact of the following social-demographic variables on attitudes towardChina age gender university education or not region (South in theUnited States Wales and Scotland in the UK) religious denomination(ProtestantChurch of England Catholic other Christian other reli-gion) income (via dichotomous high and middle income controls) andrace (African-American Hispanic and Asian in the United States non-white in the UK)

45 Methods

Conducting valid cross-cultural multivariate analyses to compareAmerican and British attitudes toward China first requires determiningwhether the factor structure of the hypothesized latent covariates issimilar enough to argue that their meaning is roughly equivalent acrossthe two states (see Davidov et al 2011) Multiple-group analysis in aCFA framework is the method used to establish this validity (Byrne2012)

The second step is for each country to estimate simultaneously viaordered probit the two toughness variables on the factors partisanidentification and control variables One of our key interests is the de-gree to which respondents bring different judgments to bear on gettingtough with China on economic and military matters To examine thisquestion we tested whether the co-variation between independent anddependent variables are statistically equivalent to one another across


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the two policy spaces To more easily see when and where there is (andis not) a discernible difference in how independent variables are associ-ated with the two dependent variables we use equality constraints If anequality constraint is warranted (that is the independent variable hasthe same effect on economic toughness as it does on military tough-ness) the table reports a single coefficient in a country If the indepen-dent variable has an unequal effect on the economic and militarydependent variables the table reports two coefficients By doing thiswe can more clearly see which variables affect support for economicand military toughness differently and where a variable is just generallyassociated with greater toughness toward China5 To foreshadow ourresults most of the time we can impose an equality constraint ndash that isthe independent variable in question affects economic and militarytoughness equally (this is true on all variables for the UK sample andall but three variables for the US sample)

The final step is to determine the degree to which affect towardChina as represented by a feeling thermometer mediates the rela-tionship between postures and policy If citizen attitudes about the pol-icies the US and UK governments should pursue toward China aremostly caused by general affect toward China the addition of the feel-ing thermometer as a predictor should render the coefficients for thedirect paths between the threat variables and substantive variablesinsignificant

5 Results

51 Evaluations of China

The February 2013 surveys ask British and American respondents toevaluate a number of countries on the 101 point feeling thermometerand the average score those in the survey give to each country appears

5 More specifically we are using seemingly unrelated ordered probit (SOP) with equality con-straints In other words we are simultaneously running two ordered probit models and test-ing the equivalence of slopes across these two models SOP models also allow the errorterms of the two ordinal outcome variables to covary Efficiency gains are obtained in si-multaneous estimation (Kennedy 2003)


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in Figure 1 Citizens of both states feel cool toward China Not sur-prisingly they feel warmest toward their own country and generallyfeel more warm than cool toward Canada The European countries inthe feeling thermometer battery receive relatively high scores At theopposite end of the spectrum lay two Arab states in the midst of tur-moil Egypt and Libya Americans rate China lower than Egypt(tfrac14260 Plt 001) while the British are more generous toward theformer than the latter but still cool (tfrac14 909 Plt 0001) In short mostpeoples of both states are not Sinophiles

Respondents from both countries also desire their politicians to pur-sue a lsquotoughrsquo China policy Table 1 provides distributions for the twomain dependent variables of interest Comparing across the two coun-tries the key difference is that Americans are prone to believe thattough China policies in the economic and military arenas are lsquoveryrsquo in-stead of lsquosomewhatrsquo important British responses cluster in the lattercategory and they are slightly more likely than Americans to declarethat tough China policies are lsquonot too importantrsquo

Britons and Americans are slightly more supportive of tough eco-nomic and trade policies toward China than they are of placingimportance on their country taking tough military stances againstthis state However the take away point is that support for toughpolicies pervades both policy realms Although the response distribu-tions are significantly different from one another in both countries thepolychoric correlations are 074 in the UK and 079 in the UnitedStates

52 Factor structure

Before multivariate analyses to test the above hypotheses commence itis imperative to obtain scores of the latent variables that are validwithin countries and functionally equivalent across states Table 2 pre-sents the results of a CFA where the unstandardized factor loadingsand thresholds on the ordinal responses to the survey questions areconstrained to be equal across countries As is evident from the Tablethe standardized factor loadings are strong and the fit of the modelwhile not exact ethv2

WLSMVfrac14 1 541214 P lt 0001THORN approximatelymatches the data structure (RMSEAfrac14 004) even when equality


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Table 1 Thinking about (a) UK and (b) US Policy toward China do you think it is impor-tant to be tough with China on

Economic andtrade issues

Militaryissues

(a) UK

No not at all important 1 2

No not too important 15 16

Yes somewhat important 58 52

Yes very important 26 30

v2frac141264 (3df Pfrac140005) 100 (weightednfrac141468)

100 (weightednfrac141460)

Meanfrac14310SDfrac14066


(b) US

No Not at all important 2 2

No Not too important 6 8

Yes Somewhat Important 41 43

Yes Very Important 51 47





Note Variables treated as ordinal in multivariate analyses

78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK

Figure 1 Average feeling thermometer scores


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Table 2 CFA model of independent variables

Latent factor Indicator UK US

Militarism Strong military to be effective in IR 079 069

Increase military spending 081 087

GlobalizationPositive Effect On

UKUS factory workers 064 077

Respondent and family 081 085

UKUS economy 089 093

Avg UKUS consumer 081 082

UKUS businesses 086 079

IsolationismInternationalism

UKUS interests protected by avoidinginvolvement

081 082

UKUS shouldnrsquot risk citizen happiness byinvolvement

074 074

UKUS mind own business when it comes tointernational affairs

079 082

EconomicEvaluations

Economic performance of country in past 12months

08 089

Personal finances in last 12 months 069 068

Personal finances in next 12 months 075 075

Economic situation of country in next 12months

085 088

Patriotism People who do not support UKUS should liveelsewhere

068 077

I support UKUS policies for the very reasonthey are policies of my country

074 075

There is already enough criticism of UKUSabroad donrsquot say bad things

062 071

In international affairs UKUS virtually alwaysright

074 079

UKUS policies always the morally correctones

077 079

Notes Estimation of ordinal indicators via the WLSMV estimator as implementedin Mplus 73 Factor loadings are standardized unstandardized factor loadings con-strained to equivalence Overall fit of the model v2frac141541214 (338df) RMSEA 004CFIfrac14094 v2 Contribution from UK groupfrac14705568 and v2 Contribution from USgroupfrac14835646


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constraints are placed on the loadings6 This approximate fit suggeststhat the lsquomeaningsrsquo of the latent variables ndash the three postures themeasure of patriotismethnocentrism and economic evaluations arethe same across the two states and valid cross-country comparisons arepossible

Differences in latent means tests suggest that Britons are more milita-ristic (0241) believe that globalization has a positive impact (0244) andsurprisingly more patriotic (0207) than Americans Circa early 2013British economic outlooks however are much more negative (0735)7

53 Direct relationship

For each country the two toughness variables simultaneously are re-gressed on the factors whose valid structure derives from Table 2 aswell as partisanship and socio-demographic controls In a first step theestimations of the magnitudes of the coefficients for the latent and ob-served covariates can vary across the two outcome variables measuringthe importance respondents place on their state pursuing tough eco-nomic and military policies toward China One by one equality con-straints on coefficients and v2

WLSMVdifference tests determine whether

the fit of the model declines when the assumption that the independentvariables have an equal effect on each of the outcome variables is inforce Table 3 presents the standardized coefficients from the finalestimations8

6 Standardized loadings differ slightly across states because the co-variances between the la-tent variables and indicators are allowed to vary freely across countries Notable differencesinclude the fact that Isolationism has a small negative correlation with militarism (009)in the United States but the two latent variables have a small positive association in the UK(019) There is a moderate negative correlation between militarism and economic well-being in the United States but this relationship does not obtain in the UK Full results forthe CFA are available upon request The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation is acommonly employed approximate fit statistic employed in Structural Equation Modelingand scores of below 005 are judged to have very good near fit (Byrne 2012)

7 Factor scores have a range from 2257 to 2304 American latent variable means are fixedto zero to allow for comparisons

8 Interpret the standardized continuous independent covariates such that a one standard de-viation unit change in the covariate associates with a slope change in the underlying latentresponse to the categorical toughness variables For the binary independent variables amove from 0 to 1 corresponds to a slope change in the underlying latent response to the cat-egorical toughness variables Coefficients obtained via the ordered probit WLSMV estima-tor in Mplus 73


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Table 3 Covariates of economic and military toughness UK and United States

Seemingly unrelated probit(with equality constraints)

Predictor UK Economicand MilitaryToughness

US Economictoughness

US Militarytoughness

Militarism 0150 0346

(0038) (0049)

Globalization 0088 0225 0108

(0040) (0040) (0040)

IsolationismInternationalism 0170 0009

(0040) (0035)

Economic Evaluations 0009 0091

(0039) (0036)

Patriotism 0094 0102 0040

(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)

Non-White BritishAfrican American

0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)

Hispanic American mdash 0238dagger

(0136)

Asian American mdash 0633

(0215)

University Educated 0210 0107

(0088) (0070)

Church of EnglandProtestant 0282 0231

(0110) (0094)

Catholic 0300 0175dagger

(0141) (0105)

Other Christian 0116 0173

(0131) (0119)

Other Religion 0356 0092

(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


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Table 3 Continued





South USA ndash 0023

(0071)

High Income 0090 0004

(0115) (0088)

Middle Income 0032 0097

(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)

Conservative (UK)Republican(US) Identifier

0032 0234

(0112) (0080)

Labour Identifier (UK)Democratic(US) Identifier

0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)

Liberal Democrat Identifier (UK only) 0083

(0150)

UKIP Identifier (UK only) 0152

(0155)

Plaid CyrmuSNP Identifier (UK only) 0414

(0284)

Green Identifier (UK only) 0216

(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268

daggerPlt010 Plt0001 Plt001 Plt005Notes Simultaneous unrelated ordered probit estimation via the WLSMV estimator asimplemented in Mplus 73 Latent predictors are indicated in boldface While we are si-multaneously estimating two ordered probit models for each country we only report asingle coefficient when slopes are equivalent across models All UK predictors con-strained to equality US predictors constrained to equality for all variables exceptGlobalization Patriotism and Male UK nfrac141891 US nfrac141859 Difference Test for UKequality constraints (vs unconstrained model) v2frac1424286 (dffrac1423) Pfrac140388 DifferenceTest for imposed US equality constraints (vs unconstrained model) v2frac1414087 (dffrac1417)Pfrac140661 Standardized coefficients displayed


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In UK constraining all coefficients to be equal across the two si-multaneous ordered probit estimations results in a model that fits thedata no worse than does an output where the magnitude of any of thecoefficients vary This suggests that the impact of each of the covariateson the degree of toughness respondents prefer in the economic andtrade and military policy realms is equivalent We discuss the implica-tions of this finding in the section below

Militarists in the UK want the Government to pursue tougherChina policies and although support for globalization and tradeco-varies with favoring softer China policies the militarism latent vari-able is the stronger predictor The most relevant substantive variablehowever is the respondentsrsquo positions on the general isolationism di-mension Those skeptical of foreign entanglements do not want theBritish Government to pursue an aggressive China policy Finallythose scoring high on patriotism find a tougher policy more palatableIn terms of the control variables adherents to the Church of Englandand Catholic faiths as well as those practicing non-Christian religionsare more favorable to a tougher stance toward China than those whodo not belong to a church University educated respondents are lessbellicose than those with less than a bachelorrsquos degree and men want aless confrontational policy toward China both in the military and eco-nomic and trade arenas9 Partisanship is not a significant predictor ofthe level of toughness the survey respondentsrsquo desire Despite their sig-nificance in a number of instances the explanatory power of the pre-dictor variables is modest and the R2 of each of the latent variablesunderlying the ordinal toughness scales are just over 010

The American story has important nuanced differences The magni-tudes of a majority of the coefficients are equivalent across the

9 The large gender gaps suggesting British women to be significantly more likely to want tofollow a tough China policy are curious and a potential area for future research On theone hand much of the feminist literature argues that women are more pacifistic than menbut studies of foreign policy attitude qualify this assertion In her study of DenmarkTogeby (1994) notes that gender gaps in foreign policy attitudes only emerge in the presenceof left wing and feminist mobilization In their comparative study of feminist identitiesHayes et al (2000) note that British women were no more likely than men to support femi-nist issues and were significantly less likely than American women to be classified as femi-nists according to the responses they provided on the cross-national World Values StudiesIn short a potential reason for the above finding that women in Great Britain actually aremore bellicose toward China might be the antipathy toward feminism observed amongBritish women but this is speculative


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economic and trade and military toughness estimations Hawkish be-liefs have the strongest impact on the demand for toughness in bothHowever the impact of believing globalization is a net positive has afar stronger impact on the desire for a less tough US economic policytoward China Favoring globalization remains a significant predictor ofa less aggressive military policy but the strength of this latent variableon this estimation is muted Somewhat surprisingly those high on pa-triotism are slightly less inclined to see an aggressive economic policytoward China but the impact of this latent predictor on military policyis insignificant Finally confidence in onersquos own and Americarsquos eco-nomic condition suggests a desire for tough policies toward Chinaacross multiple policy realms10

Unlike the results for the UK older Americans are far more sup-portive than the young of taking a tough line toward China and theimpact is the same across policy domains Members of all minoritygroups want to see the US pursue softer policies toward China andunlike the UK there appear to be partisan differences in policy de-mands between Republicans and Democrats The former see tough pol-icies as more important while the latter favor less aggressive stancesProtestants and Catholics also want tougher US policies toward ChinaA key difference between the estimations across the two samples is thefact that the covariates included in the American estimations are ableto explain much more variation in the desire Americans have for toughpolicies toward China both militarily and economically

54 Thermometer as a mediator

Given the similarity of the importance the British and American pub-licrsquos place on the toughness of their governmentsrsquo China policies acrossdisparate policy domains it is a fair question to ask whether the re-sponses people give to the two outcome variables of interest simply arereflective of general attitudes toward China To partially test this weregress the two threat variables onto a question asking respondents toevaluate China on a 0ndash100 thermometer scale and the above

10 This finding that economic optimism co-varies with a more aggressive foreign policyserves as a nice companion point to recent research showing that poor economic condi-tions associate with isolationist sentiment (Kertzer 2013) We return to this point in themediation analysis below


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covariates11 To capture indirect effects the feeling thermometer addi-tionally is regressed on the covariates

Table 4 reports the results of the estimations of the two toughnessvariables on the latent covariates in the presence of the feeling ther-mometer acting as a mediator As one would expect some of the ef-fects of our variables are mediated by our measure of affect towardChina Nonetheless our variables continue to exert direct effects onsupport for toughness toward China

Results from the estimation in Table 4 show that only a small propor-tion of the effect of Militarism operates indirectly12 In contrast a muchlarger proportion of the effect of globalization is mediated by the Chinafeeling thermometer Interestingly in the US estimation there is not asignificant direct effect from beliefs about globalization on desires for atough military policy but the direct effect is significant and quite strongwhen it comes down to preferences for a tough economic policy

Another interesting result emerges concerning perceptions of theeconomy ndash the direct and indirect effects run in opposite directionsEven after accounting for standard demographic controls that capturehousehold income those confident about the economy feel warmer to-ward China which depresses support for toughness But positive eco-nomic evaluations maintain a significant and substantively large directeffect for support for getting tough with China In other words morepositive economic outlooks appear to coincide with a more outwardand aggressive looking foreign policy ndash but this is tempered by themore positive feelings toward China that also come with more upbeateconomic assessments

11 We are cautious in stating that we only partially test mediation because there can be anumber of other potential mediators and the extent to which omitted mediators are corre-lated with the thermometer can lead to the overestimation of the importance of the ther-mometerrsquos role as a mediator However a thermometer is broad and all encompassingrequiring less intellectual engagement than more specific questions about the Chinese gov-ernment communism and mediators used in other research (see Gries 2014b) A numberof other challenges exist in testing for mediation see Green et al (2010)

12 Equality constraints are removed in the estimations presented in Table 4 However thesubstantive findings concerning the changes in the magnitude of the direct effects after thethermometer is added hold regardless of whether the model is estimated with or withoutconstraints For example rerunning the estimations presented in Table 3 without themodel constraints yields standardized coefficients for the Militarism variable of 0168 ontoughness on Economics and Trade and 0122 for toughness in military matters in theUK Most of the effect of Militarism is direct regardless of constraints employed


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The direct and indirect effects of partisanship in the United Statesare not described in the table but warrant attention The divide be-tween Republicans and Democrats exists because the former believe itis important for the US government to pursue tougher economic andmilitary policies toward China Democratic partisanship does not di-rectly affect the China policy positions ndash the mediation analysis sug-gests the significant coefficients for Democratic partisanship on displayin Table 3 are an artifact of Democrats feeling warmer toward China

Table 4 Direct and indirect effects of selected predictors on preferences for tough policyvia a china feeling thermometer

Predictor UK economicand trade

UK military US economicand trade

US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035

Notes Standardized coefficients reporteddaggerPlt010 Plt005 Plt001 0001 Coefficients obtained after WLSMV estimationin Mplus 73 Ordered probit estimation of military and economic threat variables ontocovariates Least squares regression estimation of feeling thermometer onto covariatesStandard errors of coefficients and other parameters available upon request


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as a whole Likewise the racial disparities in policy preferences we seein the United States in Table 3 are likely a function of the fact that mi-norities feel warmer toward China rather than any differences in theirforeign policy preferences The effect of age however is mostly directOlder people in the United States place greater importance on the gov-ernment pursuing tougher policies toward China

In the UK most of the effect of gender on policies is direct ndash men wanta more friendly approach toward China Further the demands for atougher approach toward China among religious adherents are not filteredthrough the thermometer The role of partisanship remains insignificant

6 Discussion

This article constitutes a unique opportunity to explore the specific for-eign policy attitudes of Americans and Britons in direct side-by-sidecomparative way The distributions of our key outcome variables citi-zen preferences for tough state China policies in the economic and mil-itary spheres as well as a chosen mediator ndash general citizen affect forChina ndash demonstrates a great deal of concern about Chinarsquos rise as aglobal power Britons and Americans are wont to favor tough policiesthe latter more so Those on both sides of the lsquoSpecial Relationshiprsquoview China coolly in comparison to their western allies With this in-formation in mind we construct a set of rival hypotheses to better un-derstand the root covariates of this skepticism In short we askwhether broad and abstract foreign policy postures coupled with vari-ables standard in models of political choice (economic evaluations andpartisanship) co-vary with the specific attitudes British and Americancitizens have about the level of policy toughness their country shouldexhibit in their economic and military policies for China A summaryof our hypotheses and findings appears in Table 5

In both states there is support for Hurwitz and Peffleyrsquos (1987) coreargument that abstract foreign policy postures can explain variation inthe more specific aspects of foreign policy citizens want their countryto pursue A key posture in the hierarchical model ours and theirsmilitarism associates strongly with British and American demands fora tough response to the rise of China Another isolationism makesBritons shy away from preferences for getting tough with China likelybecause they view such actions as needlessly provocative Support for


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Table 5 Summary of hypotheses and results

Hypothesis Finding

H1 Higher levels of isolationism presentamong respondents from the UnitedStates and Great Britain co-varies with areduced propensity to support the govern-ment pursing tough military and economicpolicies toward China

Supported in the UK

H2 Respondentsrsquo positions on the milita-rism dimension are more closely tied totheir preferences for a tough state militarypolicy toward China than they are for atough economic policy

Not supported

H3 Respondent support for globalizationhas a significant and negative associationwith their preferences for a tough stateeconomic policy toward China The magni-tude of this linkage is larger than the rela-tionship between globalization andpreferences for a tough military policy

Fully supported in the US Significant butweak relationship that is equal across pol-icy domains in the UK

H4 The long term attachments ofAmericans to a political party as repre-sented by their responses to a standardpartisan identification question will signif-icantly influence the degree of toughnessthey seek from their countryrsquos China poli-ciesmdashDemocratic respondents will favor asofter approach while Republicans will de-mand toughness In Great Britain respon-dentsrsquo partisan affiliations will have littledirect effect on attitudes toward the ap-proach the UK government should taketoward China

Fully supported in the UK Mostly sup-ported in the US Strong direct relation-ship between Republican partisanship andpreferences for toughness Relationshipbetween Democratic identification andsupport for tough policies mediated bymeasure of affect toward China

H5 Economic evaluations affect supportfor toughness on China Those who havemore negative evaluations of the economyor household finances will support greatertoughness toward China

Supported in US not supported in the UK(However refer to text and Table 4 for in-teresting countervailing direct and indirecteffects)


Supported in the UK not supported in theUS

H7 Respondentsrsquo support for a toughChina policy in both the economic andmilitary policy realms operates via is afunction of general affect toward China

Mostly supported There are meaningfulindirect effects that operate via general at-titudes toward China However in somecases the direct effect is more powerfulthan the indirect effect via the feelingthermometer There is also an interestingcountervailing indirect effect for economicevaluations in the US

(continued)


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globalization or preferences for free trade also reduce preferences fortough policies in both states

Moving away from examining the role of the foreign policy posturesthat accord with those found in the work of Hurwitz and Peffley(1987) we also find that a key domestic variable ndash partisanship worksas expected The greater level of partisan polarization present in theUnited States leads partisan identifiers in this country to be more di-vided on responses to China than the British A curious findingemerges concerning the relationship between evaluations of personaland economic finances and demands for a tough China policy in theUnited States (the direct and total relationships are insignificant in theUK sample) Americans who are bullish about the economy feelwarmer toward China but also want tough policies instituted towardthis country We believe this makes sense ndash economic prosperity leadsone to embrace a more outward and bold foreign policy (mirroringKertzerrsquos (2013) research showing that economic decline leads to pref-erences for an inward looking foreign policy) At the same time eco-nomic prosperity leads one to view China more favorably whichdecreases support for tough China policies Further research is neces-sary to determine how robust is this finding (there is only minimal sup-port for the indirect relationship in the UK) and whether it is uniqueto situations where citizens have clear preferences and attitudes towardtarget countries The other curious finding that needs further explora-tion is the small but significant positive relationship between patriotism

Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding

H8 The covariates described in this sec-tion will have better explanatory power inexplaining citizen preferences for toughChina policies in the United States than inGreat Britain

Supported

H9 Americans will utilize different pos-tures to inform their foreign policy prefer-ences toward China in the economic andmilitary domains while the influence ofthe postures will be more even across thetwo policies among the less informedBritish respondents

Supported


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and the belief that the United States should not be tough towardChina in the economic and trade policy realm13

Results from testing rival hypotheses and making cross-countrycomparisons also are indirectly suggestive of the level of sophisticationcitizens have when answering questions about specific policies Posturescan be informative shortcuts but only if the postures are well-formulated and citizens can make the association between them andthe specific policy under scrutiny Results from Table 2 suggest citizensin both countries have clearly formulated abstract beliefs about foreignpolicy that are cross-culturally valid That the postures in both stateshave a direct relationship with the toughness variables without a needfor mediation is evidence of higher order thinking But we would be re-miss to not point out that the relationship appears stronger in theUnited States Unlike Britons American respondents also are morelikely to albeit in limited circumstances utilize different postures fordifferent policy aims Although foreign policy often is remote from theday-to-day lives of citizens in both countries the coverage and conse-quences of Chinarsquos rise is more apparent for Americans Thus it doesnot surprise that the postures and other independent variables do abetter job at explaining American responses than they do in the UKand that unlike their British counterparts interviewees from theUnited States utilize different postures in coming to conclusions abouteconomic and military policies toward China

7 Conclusions

This article makes several primary contributions to the literature onpublic opinion on matters of foreign policy First it explores the im-portant area of attitudes toward China in two key Western statesSecond the article moves beyond the American case to explore thesimilarities and differences in opinion formation on matters of foreignpolicy among the British and American publics in the sources of theirattitudes toward China Third this article shows that foreign policyvariables continue to play a powerful role in shaping China attitudes

13 One potential explanation is that uncritical patriots tend to be those who believe theircountry can do no wrong If one is hesitant to criticize onersquos country one might also bereticent to believe that their statersquos policies were too lsquosoftrsquo


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even after controlling for simpler heuristics such as country feelingthermometers partisanship and economic perceptions

Comparing public opinion across countries is difficult because it iseasy to question the cross-cultural validity of the hypothesized con-structs (cf Davidov et al 2011) We show that even though averagescores across countries may differ Americans and Britons con-ceptualize postures or dimensions of foreign policy attitudes (milita-rism isolationisminternationalism and globalization) patriotism andeconomic evaluations in a similar manner This finding helps reassureus that the variables take on a comparable meaning across states andthus has positive implications for future research on opinion formationon matters of foreign policymaking in the United States and UKAlthough the findings presented in Table 2 should be replicated itdoes appear that key foreign policy postures are valid in both coun-tries It remains a question whether the cross-cultural validity we findthe postures to have hold when comparing more dissimilar states suchas Japan to the UK France to Australia and so forth Seeing if thisfinding holds across a larger set of countries is paramount to the cross-cultural study of public opinion on matters of foreign policy

Our argument is that USndashUK differences are rooted in the greatersalience of China as a political issue in the United States Different fac-tors likely contribute to this greater saliencendashthe greater coverage ofthe rise of China in the US media the visible presence of Chineseproducts on the shelves of American stores as well as Britainrsquos lack ofmilitary interests in the Asia-Pacific and concern with the EuropeanUnion This analysis still leaves fundamental questions unansweredand our data alone cannot answer them Is the greater media coverageabout China in the United States the cause of greater China salienceor a consequence of greater China salience Does the USrsquos role as eco-nomic and military role as superpower make China a bigger issue be-cause the United States could choose to challenge her whereas morelimited British resources simply keep this off the table for the UK Ofcourse we expect the opposite as wellndashissues that are higher salience inthe UK should also result in more nuanced and separable evaluationsamong the British public across dimensions that we would find inAmerica (eg reactions to policies of the European Union)

The linking of postures to specific attitudes and noting their points ofvariation across states using the issue of China in two policy realms is


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just the tip of what can be a wider cross-cultural project to link individ-ualsrsquo foreign policy postures to their response to specific and often remoteforeign policy issues In the United States our results show that posturestied to elements of hard (militarism) and soft (globalization) power arekey predictors of American beliefs concerning the importance of theircountryrsquos tough policies toward China in the military and economic pol-icy realms The impact these postures have on specific policies is mostlydirect and contra the results suggested by previous work quasi-ideological postures do not need to work through the simpler heuristic ofgeneral attitudes toward a country to motivate specific policy responsesFor respondents from the United States there is also some (but notmuch) differentiation across the two policy domains under observation Inthe UK where the relevance of China is lower it is the broader postureof isolationism that plays the largest role and the China feeling thermom-eter is more of a relevant mediator More exploration should be done asto whether peoplersquos opinions toward specific aspects of their countryrsquos for-eign policies toward another state are a function of specific or broad pos-tures A separate cross-country concern is the extent to which the differentelectoral systems (one candidate centered one party centered) connect thepublicrsquos China preferences to government policy ndash is there an electoralconnection on the issue of China (see Aldrich et al 2006)

Lastly returning to China the fact that our multivariate models ex-hibit more explanatory power when the American sample is consideredsuggests that American policymakers have a bit less free space to ma-neuverer when it comes to setting policy While it is unlikely that slightshifts in Americarsquos China policy will swing a presidential election amove against the will of the American voters may lead them to questionever so slightly the competence of their leaders In the UK this is lesslikely to be the case but still possible Ultimately a larger research pro-gram will more firmly link citizensrsquo positions on specific postures andthe ensuing positions on specific policy beliefs to behavior and attitudestoward the politicians who make policy This is a small piece in the puz-zle of what hopefully will emerge into a larger research program

Supplementary material

Supplementary material is available at International relations of theAsia-Pacific online


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Ansolabehere SD and Schaffner BF (2014) lsquoDoes survey mode still matterFindings from a 2010 multi-mode comparisonrsquo Political Analysis 22(3)285ndash303

Baum M and Groeling T (2010) War Stories Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Bjereld U and Ekengren A (1999) lsquoForeign policy dimensions a comparisonbetween the United States and Swedenrsquo International Studies Quarterly43(3) 503ndash518

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Byrne B (2012) Structural Equation Modeling with Mplus New YorkRoutledge Academic

Chittick W Billingsley K and Travis R (1995) lsquoA three-dimensional model ofAmerican foreign policy beliefsrsquo International Studies Quarterly 39(3) 313ndash331

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Davidov E Schmidt P and Billiet J (2011) Cross-Cultural Analysis NewYork Routledge

Duch R and Stevenson R (2008) The Economic Vote New YorkCambridge University Press

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Gelpi C (2010) lsquoPerforming on cue The formation of public opinion towardwarrsquo Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(1) 88ndash116

Green D Ha S and Bullock J (2010) lsquoEnough already about rsquoBlack Boxrdquoexperiments studying mediation is more difficult than most scholars sup-posersquo The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and SocialScience 628(1) 200ndash208

Gries P (2014a) ldquolsquoRed Chinarsquo and the lsquoYellow Perilrsquo how ideology dividesAmericans over Chinardquo Journal of East Asian Studies 14 317ndash346

Gries P (2014b) The Politics of American Foreign Policy Stanford StanfordUniversity Press

Hayes B McAllister I and Studlar D (2000) lsquoGender postmaterialism andfeminism in comparative perspectiversquo International Political Science Review21(4) 425ndash439


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Holsti O (2004) Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy Ann ArborUniversity of Michigan Press

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Hurwitz J and Peffley M (1987) lsquoHow are foreign policy attitudes struc-tured A hierarchical modelrsquo The American Political Science Review 81(4)1099ndash1120

Hurwitz J Peffley M and Seligson M (1993) lsquoForeign policy belief systemsin comparative perspective the United States and Costa RicarsquoInternational Studies Quarterly 37(3) 245ndash270

Jacobson GC (2010) lsquoPerception memory and partisan polarization on TheIraq Warrsquo Political Science Quarterly 125(1) 31ndash56

Jacques M (2009) When China Rules the World New York Penguin Press

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Kegley C and Wittkopf E (1982) American Foreign Policy New York StMartinrsquos Press

Kennedy P (2003) A Guide to Econometrics Cambridge MA MIT Press

Kertzer JD (2013) lsquoMaking sense of isolationism foreign policy mood as amultilevel phenomenonrsquo The Journal of Politics 75(1) 225ndash240

Kusnitz L (1984) Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Westport CTGreenwood Press

Lewis-Beck MS Jacoby WG Norpoth H et al (2008) The AmericanVoter Revisited Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

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Noeuroel A Therien J and Dallaire S (2004) lsquoDivided over internationalismthe Canadian public and development assistancersquo Canadian Public PolicyAnalyse De Politiques 30(1) 29ndash46

Page B and Bouton M (2006) The Foreign Policy Disconnect ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press


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Peffley M and Hurwitz J (1992) lsquoInternational events and foreign policy be-liefs public response to changing Soviet-US relationsrsquo American Journalof Political Science 36(2) 431-461

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Rathbun B (2007) lsquoHierarchy and community at home and abroad Evidenceof a common structure of domestic and foreign policy beliefs in Americanelitesrsquo Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(3) 379-407

Reifler J Clarke H Scotto TJ Sanders D Stewart M and Whiteley P(2014) lsquoPrudence principle and minimal heuristics British public opiniontoward the use of military force in Afghanistan and Libyarsquo The BritishJournal of Politics amp International Relations 16(1) 28-55

Reifler J Scotto TJ and Clarke H (2011) lsquoForeign policy beliefs in contem-porary Britain structure and relevancersquo International Studies Quarterly55(1) 245-266

Richman A Malone E and Nolle D (1997) lsquoTesting foreign policy beliefstructures of the American public in the post-Cold War period gross vali-dations from two national surveysrsquo Political Research Quarterly 50(4)939ndash955

Rivers D (2007) lsquoSampling for web surveysrsquo paper presented at the 2007Joint Statistical Meetings Salt Lake City Utah August 1 [cited 1November 2015] available online at httpwwwlaitsutexasedutxp_mediahtmlpollfilesRivers_matchingpdf (5 June 2016)

Rusk D and Papp D (1990) As I Saw It New York Penguin

Sanders D Clarke HD Stewart MC and Whiteley P (2007) lsquoDoes ModeMatter for Modeling Political Choice Evidence from the 2005 BritishElection Studyrsquo Political Analysis 15(3) 257-285

Schatz R Staub E and Lavine H (1999) lsquoOn the varieties of national at-tachment Blind versus constructive patriotismrsquo Political Psychology 20(1)151ndash174

Seib P and Powers S (2010) China in the News A Comparative Analysis ofBBC World Service CNN International and Deutche Welle [online] USCCenter on Public Diplomacy [cited 26 November 2014] available at http


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

uscpublicdiplomacyorgsitesuscpublicdiplomacyorgfileslegacymediaChina_in_the_News_Reportpdf

Shapiro R and Page B (1988) lsquoForeign policy and the rational publicrsquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 32(2) 211ndash247

Silverstein B (1989) lsquoEnemy images the psychology of US attitudes and cog-nitions regarding the Soviet Unionrsquo American Psychologist 44(6) 903ndash913

Steele A (1966) The American People and China New York Published forthe Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill

Stone G and Xiao Z (2007) lsquoAnointing a new enemy the rise of anti-Chinacoverage after the USSRrsquos demisersquo International Communication Gazette69(1) 91ndash108

Togeby L (1994) lsquoThe gender gap in foreign policy attitudesrsquo Journal ofPeace Research 31(4) 375ndash392

Wittkopf E (1986) lsquoOn the foreign policy beliefs of the American people acritique and some evidencersquo International Studies Quarterly 30(4) 425ndash445

Wittkopf E (1990) Faces of Internationalism Public Opinion and AmericanForeign Policy Durham Duke University Press

Wlezien C (1995) lsquoThe public as thermostat dynamics of preferences forspendingrsquo American Journal of Political Science 39(4) 981ndash1000

Watson N and Wooden M (2009) lsquoIdentifying factors affecting longitudinalsurvey responsersquo in P Lynn (ed) Methodology of Longitudinal Surveys pp157ndash182 Chichester England John Wiley

Younger K (1955) lsquoPublic opinion and foreign policyrsquo The British Journal ofSociology 6(2) 169ndash175


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nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13

citizens take is robust to the addition of a general mediator that controls

for the general affect those surveyed have toward China Finally the

strength of the relationship between these abstract postures and specific

preferences for a China policy are different across the countries

1 Introduction

Over the past three decades political scientists gathered a steadystream of evidence to show that citizens in multiple countries havewell-structured foreign policy attitudes (eg Hurwitz and Peffley 1987[US] Hurwitz et al 1993 [Costa Rica] Chittick et al 1995 [US]Richman et al 1997 [US] Bjereld and Ekengren 1999 [Sweden]Munton and Keating 2001 [Canada] Jenkins-Smith et al 2004 [UK]Noeuroel et al 2004 [Canada] Reifler et al 2011 [UK]) Moreover re-search shows that citizen attitudes respond to changing internationaland domestic circumstances in understandable and reasonable ways(Shapiro and Page 1988 Peffley and Hurwitz 1992 Wlezien 1995Gelpi 2010 Kertzer 2013 though see Baum and Groeling 2010 for amore nuanced and pessimistic argument) In this article we build onthis existing research to show that these structured abstract foreign pol-icy beliefs (or lsquoposturesrsquo) help explain American and British policypreferences toward China Specifically we utilize hierarchical constraintmodels (eg Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) to show that specific attitudesabout China policy flow from foreign policy postures We find thatboth security and economic postures are relevant in explaining supportfor toughness toward China

There are important differences in the salience of China as an issuewhen the US and UK are compared to one another1 In the United

1 By way of illustration we utilized the Factiva database and conducted searches for articleswith the terms lsquoChinarsquo and either lsquoMilitaryrsquo or lsquoEconomyrsquo that appeared in The New YorkTimes (NYT) The Telegraph The Guardian and The Daily Mail over the course of the twoweeks prior to the surveys entering the field (16 Januaryndash31 January 2013) On the militaryaspect coverage in the NYT is much different from what appears in the three large circula-tion (but ideologically distinct) British papers In the former multiple articles focus on thepotential for military confrontations between the United States and China as a result ofChinarsquos territorial dispute with Japan over islands in the East China Sea Other coverage fo-cuses on President Obamarsquos interest in building up US military strength in Asia to counterthe growth of the Chinese military and the potential for China to engage in cyber-attackson US government and businesses In the British papers there was coverage of theChinesendashJapanese territorial dispute and the potential for a USndashChina military confronta-tion but little mention of British military interests or involvement


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at University of E


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nloaded from






at University of E


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nloaded from







at University of E


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nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


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nloaded from







Partisanship



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Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from









at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




43 Latent variables






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Dow

nloaded from






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




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Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







Partisanship



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from









at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




43 Latent variables






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







Partisanship



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from









at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




43 Latent variables






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







Partisanship



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from









at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




43 Latent variables






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







Partisanship



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from









at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




43 Latent variables






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







Partisanship



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from









at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




43 Latent variables






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13







Partisanship



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from









at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




43 Latent variables






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from









at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




43 Latent variables






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13









at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




43 Latent variables






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




43 Latent variables






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




43 Latent variables






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13




43 Latent variables






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13






45 Methods




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13



5 Results





at University of E


Dow

nloaded from




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13




52 Factor structure




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13



Militaryissues

(a) UK









(b) US










78

54

69

50

47

42

36

30

29

20

69

85

75

60

58

50

32

58

34

24

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

UK

US

Canada

Germany

Italy

France

China

Israel

Egypt

Libya

US

UK



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13













081 082


074 074


079 082

EconomicEvaluations


08 089




085 088


068 077


074 075


062 071


074 079


077 079



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13











at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13







(0038) (0049)


(0040) (0040) (0040)


(0040) (0035)


(0039) (0036)


(0041) (0047) (0047)

Age 0015 0233

(0053) (0037)


0010 0215dagger

(0096) (0128)


(0136)


(0215)


(0088) (0070)


(0110) (0094)


(0141) (0105)


(0131) (0119)


(0105) (0140)

Scotland 0086

(0122)

Wales 0070

(0167)

(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

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References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

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at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13

Table 3 Continued






(0071)


(0115) (0088)


(0119) (0085)

Male 0251 0052 0082

(0077) (0078) (0075)


0032 0234

(0112) (0080)


0070 0145dagger

(0104) (0086)


(0150)


(0155)


(0284)


(0191)

R2 0107 0274 0268



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

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References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

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at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13







at University of E


Dow

nloaded from








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13








at University of E


Dow

nloaded from





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13





US military

Militarism

Direct 0140 0093 0311 0307

Indirect 0030 0029 0036 0036

Total 0170 0123 0348 0343

Globalization

Direct 0046 0048 0178 0042

Indirect 0043 0041 0056 0055

Total 0088 0089 0234 0097

Isolationism

Direct 0129 0193 0011 0003

Indirect 0008 0008 0003 0003

Total 0138 0201 0014 0006

Econ Eval

Direct 0005 0023 0160 0121

Indirect 0022 0021 0050 0050

Total 0017 0002 0110 0071dagger

Patriotism

Direct 0089 0092 0081dagger 0052

Indirect 0002 0002 0017 0016

Total 0091 0094 0097 0035



at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13



6 Discussion




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13


Hypothesis Finding


Supported in the UK


Not supported











(continued)


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13



Table 5 Continued

Hypothesis Finding


Supported


Supported


at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13



7 Conclusions




at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13






at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13

References


















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13



















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13















at University of E


Dow

nloaded from













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13













at University of E


Dow

nloaded from

lcw008-FN1

lcw008-FN2

lcw008-FN3

lcw008-FN4

lcw008-FN5

lcw008-TF1

lcw008-TF2

lcw008-FN6

lcw008-FN7

lcw008-FN8

lcw008-TF3

lcw008-TF7

lcw008-FN9

lcw008-FN10

lcw008-FN11

lcw008-FN12

lcw008-TF8

lcw008-TF9

lcw008-FN13

getting tough with the dragon? the comparative correlates of …repository.essex.ac.uk/17240/1/int...

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