getting aegis to sea: the aegis ships

Getting AEGIS to Sea:The AEGIS Ships& Randall H. Fortune, Captain Brian T. Perkinson, USN (Ret.) and Robert C. Staiman

IntroductionWhile combat system engineers developed the

AEGIS system, ship system engineers and naval

architects invented, developed, engineered, and

designed the ship systems and ships that took

AEGIS to sea. Their efforts included studies to

evaluate new construction alternatives and

modifications to existing designs, engineering to

address ship system developments, and work to

solve unique integration issues. It began with the

challenge of integrating the AEGIS Weapon Sys-

tem Engineering Development Model-1 in USS

NORTON SOUND for initial at-sea testing of

AEGIS, and continued through the evolution of

the AEGIS Combat System from Baseline 1 to

Baseline 7, special AEGIS BMD modifications,

and the ongoing modernization of the fleet.

Overall, their efforts have spanned nearly 40

years and may continue for years to come.

AEGIS inUSSNORTONSOUND (AVM-1)USS NORTON SOUND (AVM-1), a World War

II CURRITUCK-class seaplane tender, was used

as the initial test ship for the AEGIS Weapon

System. The ship had served as a guided missile

trials ship since 1948; and, in 1973, was outfitted

with a single SPY-1 array (forward, starboard), a

Mk 99 fire control illuminator, a Mk 26 Mod 0

twin-rail guided missile launching system, and a

rudimentary combat direction system. An AN/

SPS-40 radar was substituted for the existing

AN/SPS-52. Her ammunition included the

STANDARD Missile (1 and 2). Figure 1 shows

the arrangement of the ship as converted.

AEGIS Shipbuilding Significant Events

1967 Major Fleet Escort Study proposes ‘‘Family of

Ships’’—DX, DXG, DXGN

1970 DX becomes DD 963, and Litton wins con-

tract to build entire SPRUANCE class

1975 Preliminary Design for DDG 47 begins

1976 Contract Design for DDG 47 begins

May 1978 DDX Study Group Convenes to Define Op-

erational Requirements and Characteristics

for Future Surface Combatant

Sept 1978 Detail Design & Construction Contract for

DDG 47 signed with Litton Ingalls Shipbuild-

ing Division

May 1981 CG 47 Christened USS TICONDEROGA—

Nancy Reagan is Sponsor

May 1982 USS TICONDEROGA Sea Trials Begin

Jan 1983 CG 47 Commissioned in Pascagoula, MS

1983 Contract Design for DDG 51 Begins

1985 Detail Design and Construction Contract for

DDG 51 signed between USN and Bath Iron

Works

Sept 1985 First cruiser with vertical launcher, USS

BUNKER HILL (CG 52), C, commissioned

Jun 1987 First Bath Iron Works-built AEGIS Cruiser,

USS THOMAS S. GATES, CG 51 Commissioned

Feb 1989 First AEGIS Cruiser with AN/SPY-1B radar

commissioned USS PRINCETON (CG 59)

Jul 1991 DDG 51, USS ARLEIGH BURKE Commissioned

Dec 1991 CNO Endorses DDG 51 Flight IIA Configura-

tion, starting with last FY94 ship

Mar 1993 First Japanese AEGIS Ship Commissioned,

JMSDF KONGO (DDG 173)

Jul 1994 Final (27th) AEGIS Cruiser, USS PORT ROYAL,

Commissioned

Sept 2002 First Spanish AEGIS Ship Commissioned,

ALVARO DE BAZAN (F-101)

& 2009, American Society of Naval Engineers

DOI: 10.1111/j.1559-3584.2009.00208.x

The Story of AEGIS &155

One particularly important ship integration is-

sue required calculating the relative stiffness and

mutual alignment of the SPY-1 array, Mk 99

illuminator, and the Mk 26 launcher, since the

radar and illuminator were located amidships,

forward atop the superstructure, while the

launcher was recessed into the fantail. In 1979,

ship designers faced similar challenges in plan-

ning for the installation of the Mk 41 Vertical

Launching System (VLS) to replace the Mk 26

dual-rail launcher, when USS NORTON

SOUND was designated the ship for all VLS at-

sea firings and tests. The modifications to USS

NORTON SOUND were successful and she

fired dozens of missiles in support of VLS and

AEGIS engineering tests. Her configuration was

changed again in the 1980s when a second AE-

GIS array was added to test the AN/SPY-1B/D

radar upgrades.

TheHunt for the ShipAlthough AEGIS was a research and develop-

ment project in the early 1970s, the debate over

the ship classes in which it would reside began

almost from the project’s inception. The Ad-

vanced Surface Missile System (ASMS) Study in

1965 had addressed notional ship sizes and

classes. Part of this effort included defining the

ship impacts of the proposed elements of ASMS,

including internal volume, topside arrange-

ments, weight, stability, electrical power,

cooling, and other parameters. In 1967, a ‘‘fam-

ily of ships’’ concept, in which the US Navy

would build related DX, DXG, and DXGN

classes, had been promoted in the Major Fleet

Escort Study. The DXG and the DXGN were to

be cruisers, and the DX a destroyer. The Navy

wanted cruisers, armed to deal in an uncertain

future as part of the nation’s strike forces. The

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), on the

other hand, saw only the need for destroyers

armed to engage submarines. OSD won out, and

the DX program began in the 1960s, albeit using

the top-level requirements for a cruiser, with a

lot of space and weight margin for future sys-

tems. Ultimately, DX became the DD 963 class,

with the lead ship, USS SPRUANCE, put under

contract in 1970 (close to the time of engineering

development contract signing for AEGIS). AE-

GIS was planned for initial employment in the

DXGN (later DLGN,1 and even later CGN 38),

with 30 ships proposed. By the spring of 1971,

this plan had been scrapped, and no nuclear

powered ship was projected to be armed with

AEGIS. The ‘‘Family of Ships’’ concept had not

yielded an AEGIS ship.

At the end of 1971, Chief of Naval Operations

(CNO), ADM Elmo Zumwalt proposed to put

AEGIS in a DG ‘‘austere ship’’—a single-mission

ship armed solely for anti-air warfare, weighing

Sept 2004 USS TICONDEROGA, 1st AEGIS Cruiser, De-

commissioned

Apr 2006 First Norwegian AEGIS Ship Commissioned,

FRIDTJOF NANSEN (F310)

Dec 2008 First Korean AEGIS Ship Commissioned, KING

SEJONG THE GREAT (DDG 991)

Oct 2009 USS WAYNE E. MEYER Commissioned,

named for the ‘‘Father of AEGIS’’

Figure 1: AEGIS Engineering Development Model-1 in USSNORTON SOUND. Although the ship appeared to have tworadar arrays, the port array was a blank piece of steel

1In this time period, DLGNs were nuclear powered frigatesand DGs were to be conventionally powered destroyers.

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 2009156& The Story of AEGIS

Getting AEGIS to Sea: The AEGIS Ships

no more than 5,000 tons and costing no more

than $100 million. ADM Hyman Rickover and

the nuclear power lobby intervened. At their

prompting, Congress amended Title VIII of the

1975 Defense Authorization Act in August 1974

to require that all new construction major com-

batants would have nuclear propulsion. This

legislation ended the DG as proposed by Zum-

walt, and the program once again became

focused on a nuclear-powered ship—a strike

cruiser, CSGN. In the midst of this process, the

decision was made to take AEGIS through an-

other round of development. A new engineering

development model (EDM), EDM-3C, was un-

derway by 1975. Its aim was to incorporate

lessons from the USS NORTON SOUND and

remove weight from the system. This develop-

ment ultimately reduced the weight of the

topside phased arrays and illuminators by al-

most 20 tons. Initially driven by the now

cancelled DG design, EDM-3C made AEGIS an

option for smaller ships.

In its 1974 hearings on the Fiscal Year 1975

budget, Congress made continued AEGIS fund-

ing dependent on, ‘‘Definition and approval by

both the Navy and the Department of Defense of

the platform(s) for AEGIS . . .’’2 From then until

1978, the Navy, OSD, and the Congress debated

this issue. Numerous studies, budget requests,

and Defense System Acquisition Review Council

decisions were made. In general, the Navy was

seeking strike cruisers; OSD was seeking DDG

47s built on the DD 963; and Congress was

advocating the conversion of USS LONG

BEACH in addition to the other options. The

numbers and timing of the shipbuilding program

varied almost on a daily basis. The Project Office

had to invent novel tracking methods just to

keep up. Some of the issues that were addressed

included single-mission versus multi-mission

ships, nuclear propulsion, and cost caps. Ulti-

mately, by the end of the Ford Administration,

only funds for converting USS LONG BEACH

had been appropriated. Unfortunately, President

Ford’s final budget request for Fiscal Year 1978

proposed rescinding even those funds. DDG 47s

and CSGNs were programmed for later years.

The resolution of AEGIS shipbuilding fell to the

Carter Administration.

President Carter’s Fiscal Year 1978 revised bud-

get request not only rescinded the USS LONG

BEACH funds, but also killed the strike cruiser.

In the CSGN’s place, a new nuclear cruiser, CGN

42, to be built on the existing CGN 38 hullform,

was substituted, and long lead funding for the

nuclear plant was requested in Fiscal Year 1978

for a Fiscal Year 1979 ship start. The budget also

requested $930M for the first DDG 47. Con-

gress approved both of these requests.

Later, as part of the Fiscal Year 1979 budget

workups, CGN 42 was killed. Thus, after years

and years of work on AEGIS ships, only one

class had emerged—DDG 47. Ultimately, class

planning settled at 27 ships—two for each Car-

rier Battle Group (12) and one for each Surface

Action Group (3). In 1980, the DDG 47 class

was redesignated a cruiser class, CG 47.

ShipFeasibility StudiesThe debate over what the first AEGIS ship

should be was supported by numerous ship fea-

sibility and ship design studies. In 1972–1973,

those studies were carried out under the general

nomenclature of ‘‘DG AEGIS’’—the Zumwalt

ship. These studies considered various options

including split versus consolidated AEGIS deck-

houses, single and multiple Mk 13 single-rail

launchers versus Mk 26 twin-rail launchers, and

various self-defense gun systems and helicopter

facilities. Figure 2 shows one of the variants

considered, which included a consolidated

deckhouse, two Mk 13 launchers, two self-

defense guns, and a hangar for a single helicop-

ter. One of the ship integration issues with this

particular design was that the helicopter had to

fly over the aft launcher to land.

The studies led to a final DG configuration

that was 488 feet long and displaced 5,884 long

tons. It was powered by two FT-9 gas turbines

2Congressional Record, House of Representatives, July24, 1974.

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 2009 The Story of AEGIS &157

driving twin controllable pitch propellers; how-

ever, as discussed above, support for the DG was

lacking and the preliminary design was cancelled.

As mentioned previously, in 1975 Congress di-

rected definition and approval by Navy and

DoD of the platform(s) for AEGIS. This led to a

long series of feasibility studies. One was aimed

at backfitting AEGIS into the existing CGN 38

class. Installation was not technically feasible,

however, without significant changes to the ship

and the estimated costs proved prohibitive. A set

of studies aimed at a CSGN and later CGN 42

were also undertaken.

In 1974, Ingalls Shipbuilding, now Northrop

Grumman Ship Building, proposed installing the

AEGIS system in a DD 963 hullform and pre-

sented it to the Navy and then CAPT Wayne E.

Meyer, the AEGIS Project Manager. The Navy

engineering review of the Ingalls studies led to

rejection of the option, as it did not meet all of

the Navy’s new ship design criteria and service

life margins. Meyer, through RCA Moorestown,

NJ, then contracted with the naval architecture

firm of John J. McMullen Associates (JJMA) to

perform an independent feasibility study of in-

stalling AEGIS in the DD 963 hull. The Navy

ship engineering community participated in the

review of the JJMA studies. These studies used

the DDG 993 (USS KIDD class) as the baseline,

and showed that it was feasible to install the

AEGIS Weapon System in such a hull, provided

there were significant changes to the DD 963

design, combined with a relaxation of certain

new ship design, construction, and service life

margins. It was treated as a ‘‘modified repeat

design,’’—something called a ‘‘forward-fit con-

version.’’ This study moved the DDG 47 option

to center stage as the earliest practical path for

deployment of AEGIS.

DDG47TOCG47 CLASS (CG 47^73)DDG 47 was to be a modified repeat of the DD

963 class and incorporate the AEGIS Weapon

System with four AN/SPY-1A array faces; four

Mk 99 illuminators; two Mk 26 twin-rail

launchers, each with a 44 missile magazine;

UYK-7 and UYK-20 computers and UYA-4 con-

soles; two quadruple-tube HARPOON missile

launchers; two PHALANX Close-In weapon

systems; two 5 inch/54 caliber guns; as well as

the sonar and hangar of the DD 963. The only

changes were to be those necessary to install the

AEGIS Weapon System. Figure 3 illustrates the

configuration of DDG 47. The preliminary de-

sign for the DDG 47 began in 1975, followed by

the contract design in 1976. The detail design

and construction contract was let in September

1978. In 1980 during detail design, the ship was

re-designated a cruiser—‘‘CG 47.’’ The DD 993

was the baseline for the design since several of

the design changes already made to the DD 963

class were applicable to the CG 47. There were a

number of design issues to resolve however, in-

cluding the impact on stability, freeboard and

Figure 2: 1973 Art-ist’s Rendition of the‘‘DG AEGIS’’—A Sin-gle-Mission Destroyer

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 2009158& The Story of AEGIS


hull girder strength of the significant increase in

displacement (over 1,100 tons) relative to the

DD 963; the large increases in 60 and 400 Hz

electrical power; the topside design changes

needed to land the AEGIS array faces while ac-

commodating the existing port and starboard

gas turbine intakes and exhausts; new masts to

carry other topside antennas; and design im-

provements to resolve existing DD 963

deficiencies and upgrades to some of her ship

systems. The AEGIS Weapon System required

significant increases in electrical power and the

three existing DD 963 60 Hz generators were

upgraded from 2,000 to 2,500 kW, each; and

solid state 400 Hz converters and a 400 Hz dis-

tribution system were added. The increased

electrical power also increased the heat loads

above those on DD 963 and required additional

cooling capacity. The DD 993 design had al-

ready added a fourth air conditioning plant to

the DD 963 and these units were further up-

graded to accommodate the increased heat loads

from the AEGIS Combat System. In order to in-

stall the AEGIS array faces, the pilot house was

raised two deck levels and the forward/starboard

arrangement was adopted to avoid significant

changes to engine rooms, gas turbine installa-

tions, turbine uptake routings, and other interior

ship arrangements. The forward missile direc-

tors were arranged port and starboard on top of

the pilothouse to avoid blockage of other sensors

on the forward mast. The helicopter hangar was

enlarged to accommodate two Seahawk SH-60B

helicopters and structurally redesigned to allow

a two-level AEGIS equipment room containing

the after AEGIS array faces. These faces were

installed in an aft/port orientation to provide the

ship with 3601 radar coverage. The aft missile

directors were arranged in a traditional fore/aft

configuration on top of the hangar. The split

deckhouse arrangement of the AN/SPY-1A radar

had many system components installed high in

the superstructure creating survivability and sta-

bility issues. The installation of the forward

AEGIS array faces and the raising of the pilot

house significantly increased the sail area of the

ship and further impacted stability.

Ship stability was a major DDG 47 design issue.

Numerous enhancements were added to improve

the ship’s stability condition. The bulkhead

deck and V lines were raised to increase reserve

Figure 3: DDG 47 Configuration


buoyancy and increase the limiting center of

gravity, or KG. Lighter weight, high-strength

steel was incorporated into certain areas of the

hull. The external propulsion shafting was rede-

signed to increase weight low in the ship. All gas

turbine exhaust silencers were eliminated and the

gas turbine generator exhaust tubes were rede-

signed with lighter weight materials.

The aluminum superstructure of the DD 963 had

to be retained for stability reasons despite the

Navy’s ban on the use of aluminum after the se-

vere superstructure fire damage to USS

BELKNAP (CG 26) following the 1975 collision

with USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67). The

need to retain aluminum raised concerns relative

to fire protection and distortion between combat

system elements due to hull/deckhouse bending

and torsion. These concerns were recognized

and extensive structural and survivability ana-

lyses of the deckhouse were performed.

Significant improvements were installed, includ-

ing advanced lightweight fire protective

insulation.

Combat system design and integration issues in-

cluded alignment of the split array faces in the

separated AEGIS deckhouses as well as having

the arrays facing port and starboard/forward

and aft. The issues of relative alignment between

arrays and directors and waveguide runs were

studied extensively. Inclusion of a Unit Com-

mander on the ship and providing necessary

consoles and equipment spaces in CIC as well as

in other areas created significant issues in the

combat system design and CIC arrangement. In

order to ensure full operational and maintenance

capability of the combat system, nondeviational,

contract design arrangements for all critical

spaces were developed.

Contract design completed in 1977 and the lead

ship contract was awarded to Ingalls Shipbuild-

ing in September 1978. To permit ship detailed

design and combat system development (which

was underway at the CSED site in Moorestown,

NJ) to proceed in parallel, the Design Budgeting

concept was employed on the lead ship contract.

Design Budgeting established limits on services

and arrangeable volumes of all combat system

equipment and scheduled release of detailed in-

terface data of the combat system components to

the shipbuilder on dates after contract award.

Combat system developers could not exceed the

specified budgets for services or arrangeable

volumes and the shipbuilder could not start de-

tailed design in the Design Budgeted areas of the

ship until the Navy provided the detailed inter-

face data. The interface data was released to the

shipbuilder on preset dates and the shipbuilder’s

detailed design approach was scheduled to ac-

commodate these post contract award releases.

Design Budgeting permitted an additional year

of combat system development, eliminated the

numerous change orders that would have oc-

curred without the Design Budgeting

constraints, and saved the Navy considerable

money and schedule time.

During construction, the ship weight and center

of gravity increased despite the numerous weight

reduction efforts. CG 47 was commissioned in

January 1983 with 110 tons of solid ballast. She

is shown in Figure 4 on the battle line off Leba-

non in 1984, having deployed just 9 months after

commissioning. CG 48, the second ship of the

class, also built by Ingalls, was commissioned in

July of 1984 and had the same tight weight and

stability margins that CG 47 experienced.

The contract design of CG 49, the third ship,

was undertaken as a modified repeat of CG 47

with several significant design changes. The

LAMPS Mk III helicopter with a Recovery

Figure 4: USSTICONDEROGA Offthe Coast ofLebanon in 1984

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 2009160&The Story of AEGIS


Assist, Secure and Traverse (RAST) system was

included in the design. This and other directed

systems resulted in a 35 long ton weight increase

in CG 49 over CG 47. However, there were other

design changes, which reduced the overall weight

of CG 49. These primarily came from a program,

which was later called TOTS, which stood for

Take Off Tons Sensibly. The TOTS Program was

led by a group of senior leaders from PMS 400,

NAVSEA 05, RCA and Ingalls, detached from

their normal responsibilities and co-located in

Pascagoula, MS. Several hundred weight and

vertical center of gravity reduction proposals

were evaluated, authorized for concept explora-

tion, approved, and incorporated into

subsequent ship designs. All of the AEGIS

Weapon System electronics cooling water sys-

tems were relocated lower in the ship. The 04

level in the forward deckhouse was deleted and a

new structure on the 03 level was incorporated

into a new tripod main mast design. Other sig-

nificant weight reduction efforts were the

increased use of high strength steel in the hull;

the use of advanced lightweight marine power

cabling, and substitution of light-weight corro-

sion resistant honeycomb in the main engine

exhaust ducting. These weight reductions com-

bined with improved shipbuilding practices

allowed CG 49 to ultimately be delivered 180

tons lighter than CG 47—and no ballast was re-

quired. These improvements were also applied to

CG 50 at Ingalls and, later, in CG 51—the first of

the cruisers to be built at Bath Iron Works.

The other force driving TOTS was the Navy’s

decision to install the Mk 41 VLS in CG 52 and

all subsequent ships in the class. The substitution

of VLS for the Mk 26 launchers increased the

missile capacity from 88 to 122 and accommo-

dated the installation of TOMAHAWK cruise

missiles. The ship impact of this change was over

225 long tons of increased displacement and a

0.2 feet increase in the height of the ship’s center

of gravity. In order to accommodate the VLS, the

TOTS team addressed major weight and ship

center of gravity reductions beyond those imple-

mented on CG 49. The goal was to deliver CG

52, with VLS, without ballast and with increased

service life margins. The TOTS team achieved

this by redesigning major ship structures—in-

cluding the aft superstructure, relocating four

critical combat system spaces lower in the ship,

relocating or eliminating more than 35 spaces,

redesigning the helicopter hangar to reduce the

height of the aft AEGIS array faces, and signifi-

cantly changing other service systems on the

ship. As a result of the continuing TOTS weight

reduction program, CG 52 was commissioned

with VLS installed, increased service life mar-

gins, and no ballast.

The success of TOTS and the leadership,

engineering, organization, dedication, and

focus which it exemplified made it possible

for the CG 47 class to incorporate profound

new warfighting capabilities as it was being

constructed and to achieve its promised

weight reduction goals. Ultimately, while

from a combat system perspective the cruisers

were commissioned in Baselines (1–4), the

ship class from a naval architecture perspective

can be viewed as CG 47-48, CG 49-51, and

CG 52-73.

DDG51FLIGHT I (DDG51^71)The 1975 decision to put AEGIS to sea in the

DDG 963 hullform turned out to be an expedi-

ent thing to do. It may have saved the AEGIS

program and certainly got AEGIS to sea in a

warship sooner than almost any other alterna-

tive. However, as with all ship conversions or

major modifications, it did not result in an opti-

mum total ship design. The Navy did not give up

on the concept of an AEGIS ship designed from

the hull up. After the award of the CG 47 con-

tract to Ingalls another series of concept design

studies, called DDX/DDGX, were performed

between 1978 and 1982. These further evalu-

ated AEGIS combatants with VLSs, helicopter

facilities and other combat system upgrades, as

well as a wide range of hull, mechanical and

electrical (HM&E) options. The DDX Study

Group convened in 1978 to define the opera-

tional requirements for future surface

combatants, followed by a series of feasibility

studies in 1979 including five baselines and 27


variants. These led to a selected variant of 7,000

tons displacement at a cost of $550 million. Af-

ter it had received initial support from OPNAV,

the Vice CNO raised several issues with this de-

sign. This resulted in a number of redesign

cycles. Major input from fleet operators was also

integrated into the designs. This led to a recom-

mended ship of 9,100 tons.

At this point a Request for Proposal was issued to

industry for the contract design, with options for

detail design and construction of a lead ship for a

new DDG 51 class. Responses were received

from five shipbuilders and a Source Selection was

held in late 1982. However, before the contract

could be awarded, the Source Selection was can-

celled by the Secretary of the Navy. In February

1983, NAVSEA was ordered to take the contract

design of DDG 51 in-house before further bids

were requested from industry. Bringing the con-

tract design in-house was a challenge. Since the

days of Total Package Procurement, a 1960s

Secretary of Defense-mandated plan to contract

for construction and design with industry, fewer

and fewer contract designs had been done by the

Navy. In order to accomplish the design in-house

a large Navy team was assembled in a building

near PMS 400 and NAVSEA, augmented by se-

nior participants from Ingalls, Bath Iron Works,

Todd Shipyards, RCA, and ship designers in-

cluding Gibbs and Cox, JJMA, M. Rosenblatt &

Son, and Designers and Planners.

The contract design used AEGIS Combat System

configurations similar to earlier baselines in-

stalled in the cruisers. Figure 5 is an artist’s

rendering of the DDG 51, incorporating split

AEGIS arrays located relatively low in the su-

perstructure, with a VLS, 5 inch gun, and two

PHALANX close-in weapons system (CIWS).

This design did not include a helicopter facility.

A number of other baselines examined the im-

pact of adding both helicopter landing facilities

as well as full helicopter support (hangars, mag-

azines, maintenance facilities, air detachment

berthing, etc.). Because of the impact of full he-

licopter facilities on ship size and cost, as well as

the large number of helicopter-capable ships in

the Navy at the time, the Navy decided to pro-

vide a landing zone but no hangar or other

facilities in the DDG 51 Flight I design.

Early into the process, the first ship of the new

class was named for a former CNO, ADM

Arleigh A. Burke. Burke had been a famous

destroyerman in World War II, and was affec-

tionately known as ‘‘31 Knot Burke.’’ The

ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG 51) class was con-

ceived as the first totally new design for AEGIS,

suitable for the threats of the 1990s and beyond.

It was to replace several classes of ships that

would reach the end of their service lives as

DDG 51s commissioned. As a destroyer, it was

to be nominally less capable than a cruiser. A

displacement limit of 8,300 long tons was estab-

lished and a lead ship not-to-exceed cost limit of

$1.1 billion was edicted from the Navy Secre-

tariat. Follow ships 6 through 10 were to

average $750 million per ship. The cost goals

were in Fiscal Year 1983 dollars. Like the CG

47s before, the class was to be designed and built

with increasingly capable combat and ship sys-

tem baselines. Significant upgrades to the class

were to be called ‘‘Flights.’’

The DDG 51 class incorporated a number of

unique features to increase combat system per-

formance, improve survivability, and reduce

ship signatures. Except for the aluminum mast,

these ships are all steel, including the ship’s

superstructure. Its ‘‘seakeeping’’ hullform,

with a relatively wide beam and smaller than

traditional length-to-beam ratio, was selected to

Figure 5: DDG(X)Concept, 1984

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 2009162 &The Story of AEGIS


allow the ship to make high speeds in high sea

states before the onset of ship slamming. This

seakeeping hullform was selected to enable the

class to maintain speed with Soviet ships in the

North Atlantic. However, the stocky shape of

this hullform required greater horsepower for a

given speed than the slender hullform in the CG

47s. The stated operational requirement was for

a top speed in excess of 30 knots. Yet early

model basin tests showed that a top speed of

only 29 knots would be achieved with the

80,000 shaft horsepower installed in the CG 47s.

Consequently, the DDG 51 class LM 2500 ma-

rine gas turbine engines were up-rated 25%

from those aboard CG 47 to deliver 100,000

shaft horsepower to the propellers.

Significant passive ship survivability features

were also incorporated into DDG 51. Full

chemical–biological–radiological protection,

topside shaping to reduce radar cross section

(RCS), reduced radiated noise and infrared sig-

natures, and extensive armor to protect vital

spaces were key features of the ship’s design. The

Combat Information Center and Radio Rooms

were located inside the hull, rather than in tra-

ditional superstructure locations. Increased

resistance to nuclear blast overpressure was de-

signed into the ship’s structure.

The combat system represented a reduction in

capacity compared with CG 47. The DDG 51

class included one less illuminator (3 versus 4)

(one forward; two aft, one above the other), one

less 5 inch gun, no helicopter hangar, and no ro-

tating air search radar. The 5 inch gun fire

control system employed the AN/SPY-1D and

AN/SPS-67 radars to detect surface targets.

There were also two VLS Mk 41 MOD 0 (29

missile cells forward, 61 cells aft for a total of 90

cells compared with 122 cells in the CGs), two

PHALANX CIWS on the ship’s centerline (one

forward and one aft), and two 4-canister HAR-

POON launchers.

The first six ships of the class were built with the

Baseline 4 AEGIS Combat System, the same sys-

tem that was designed, installed, tested, and

delivered in the last new construction CG 47s.

The AEGIS SPY-1D system included four arrays

in a consolidated deckhouse called the Vital

Tower with the faces at 451 to the centerline, and

a smaller transmitter than the CG 47. The Vital

Tower permitted the ship’s design to include one

set of AEGIS transmitters and receivers versus

the two sets required by the fore/aft separated

arrays in CG 47’s design. The coverage of the

four arrays from the Vital Tower was enabled by

locating the marine gas propulsion turbine up-

takes on the ship’s centerline versus to port and

starboard, above the turbines, as in CG 47’s de-

sign. This configuration introduced two bends

into the uptakes not found on CG 47. These

bends as well as the uptakes themselves were

designed to minimize pressure drop in the tur-

bine exhaust so that the Main Propulsion

Turbines could perform at full power.

During contract design, several studies on the

impact of adding a helicopter hanger were con-

ducted, but the increases in ship cost and

displacement exceeded the Secretariat’s goals.

Thus, the Navy decided to provide only a land-

ing zone and in-flight refueling for SH-2 and SH-

60 helicopters. Figure 6 illustrates the configura-

tion of USS ARLEIGH BURKE and DDG 51

Flight I ships. As a result of Congressional pres-

sures to increase helicopter capability in the

class, a small torpedo rearming magazine and

on-deck helicopter refueling was added in DDG

52 and follow ships.

The topside configuration of DDG 51 was stud-

ied extensively during preliminary design. The

superstructure shape required special design at-

tention to avoid interference with the AN/SPY-

1D array beams, which overlapped the center-

line by 51 and depressed 51 below the horizon.

Avoiding radar side lobe effects also drove top-

side configuration. These requirements resulted

in locating the Vital Tower high enough for the

aft beams to clear the transom and aft decks. The

centerline stack shrouds were trapezoidal in

shape, with the aft stack narrower than the for-

ward stack, to clear the beams in the crossover

position. The minimum height above baseline


for the arrays was based on the desired radar

horizon.

The Design and Construction contract for

ARLEIGH BURKE was awarded to Bath

Iron Works in April 1985. As with CG 47,

Design Budgeting was employed in the DDG

51 contract. This again permitted an additional

year of combat system integration and develop-

ment before release to the shipbuilder for

incorporation into the ship. Design Budgeting

reduced the risk, cost, and time required to

integrate the AEGIS Weapon System into the

DDG 51.

The DDG 51 design goal to significantly reduce

RCS resulted in a radically different ship pro-

file—where all the hull and superstructure sides

were sloped in a way not normally seen on pre-

vious warships. However, the original ship’s mast

was a conventional ‘‘pole’’ mast with many stan-

dard structural shapes forming a stiffened four

legged mast. This abrogated much of the RCS

reduction obtained from sloping the superstruc-

ture and hull. The actual mast configuration was

issued as a ‘‘guidance’’ drawing in the shipbuild-

ing contract; only the locations of the equipment

on the mast were ‘‘nondeviational.’’ As a part of

the Navy’s first comprehensive post award engi-

neering effort to reduce ship signatures

(especially RCS), PMS 400, along with NAVSEA

05, the Office of Naval Research, Bath Iron

Works and their design agent, Gibbs and Cox,

studied available geometric shapes and arrange-

ments capable of meeting the mast equipment

locations and strength requirements while effect-

ing a dramatic reduction in RCS. The new mast

was also required to meet the same shock, vibra-

tion, and strength requirements of the original

mast concept. Several mast configurations with

sloped or tapered structural elements were inves-

tigated. One approach was a trussed square mast

trunk. This approach allowed sufficient support

for platforms and placed yardarms in the correct

locations, but did not gain the RCS reduction

desired. A further iteration turned the faces of the

mast trunk with the points forward and aft and

toward the beam and increased the mast slope.

This distinctive mast design chosen by the AEGIS

Project Office met the RCS goals, as well as

structural and antenna location requirements.

The unique topside appearance in DDG 51

prompted a shipbuilder’s comment to ADM

Burke and his wife Roberta that the ship,

‘‘appeared to be making 31 knots while tied fast

to the pier.’’ Admiral and Roberta Burke are

shown at the DDG 51 commissioning, July 4,

1991, in Figure 7.

Figure 6: DDG 51 Flight I Configuration

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 2009164 & The Story of AEGIS


The large number and locations of topside emit-

ters required extensive evaluation to avoid

radiation interference between emitters as well

as radiation hazards to personnel and ordnance.

The location of the VLS cells required analysis

of missile fly out patterns, particularly for

TOMAHAWK missiles, to avoid excessive

heat and pressure against the deckhouse struc-

ture and topside equipment. The close

working relationship between the combat

system engineer (RCA), Bath Iron Works, and

Navy laboratories, fostered by AEGIS Project

Office leaders, made this complicated task

successful.

DDG51FLIGHT II (DDG 72^78)To meet program cost and ship displacement re-

quirements, the Navy decided during Flight I

preliminary design that the Shipboard Signal

Exploitation System (SSES) would not be incor-

porated into DDG 51. The logic behind this

decision was the same as the decision not to in-

corporate a helicopter hangar, namely other

battle group ships such as the DD 963s had this

capability. However, as the DD 963s reached

their midlife, the Navy realized that planned

early retirements of these ships would affect

SSES assets and decided to incorporate the ca-

pability into the DDG 51 class. OPNAV

approved the plan to incorporate SSES and other

new capabilities into the last ship authorized in

Fiscal Year 1992 and named this configuration

DDG 51 Flight II.

The Flight II upgrade added Combat DF, the lat-

est SSES version. Of all the changes in Flight II,

this had the largest impact on the ship since, in

addition to numerous sensors that were inte-

grated into the ship’s topside, it required

accommodations for nine additional crew to

maintain and operate the system. Other changes

included the addition of the Joint Tactical Infor-

mation Distribution System or JTIDS, AN/SLQ-

V(3) (versus the V(2)), track initiation processor

(TIP), and reverse osmosis desalinators. To in-

troduce these upgrades in the midst of serial ship

construction, Fiscal Year 1991 Advanced Pro-

curement Funds were used to initiate detailed

design at the shipyards a year before the first

Flight II ship was appropriated. This allowed in-

troduction of the upgrades in the last Fiscal Year

1992 ship and eliminated the cost and schedule

Figure 7: ADM Arleigh and Roberta Burke atDDG 51 Commissioning, July 4, 1991


risk of concurrent design and construction.

DDG 72 was the first Flight II ship. Since the

impacts of all but Combat DF were relatively

minor, the first Fiscal Year 1992 ship, DDG 68,

actually received all of the other Flight II up-

grades.

DDG51FLIGHT III (PROPOSED)In April 1988, OPNAV tasked NAVSEA to in-

vestigate the cost and feasibility of incorporating

various upgrades into the DDG 51 class begin-

ning in 1994 or 1995 without disrupting serial

construction at either the Bath Iron Works or

Ingalls building yard. Based on CNO guidance,

the following priorities were established for

Flight III: (1) commonality with Flight II; (2)

upgraded combat system capability; (3) man-

ageable risk; (4) survivability; (5) Battle Group

interoperability; (6) speed and endurance; (7)

design flexibility and growth; and (8) habitabil-

ity. Three levels of major concepts were

developed:

&Level I with limited combat and HM&E sys-

tem upgrades and maximum commonality

with Flight II DDG 51s;

&Level II with increased hull length and the ad-

dition of 32 vertical launch cells, a helicopter

hangar and maintenance facilities, Warfare

Commander and additional combat system

upgrades;

&Level III which expanded on the Level II up-

grades by incorporating the AN/SQQ-89(I)

Block 3 sonar and integrated electric drive.

NAVSEA took a six-step approach to define the

most affordable and capable alternative for

Flight III:

&The entire NAVSEA R&D Master Plan was

reviewed and meetings between PMS 400 and

developers of candidate systems were held to

evaluate risk and determine their readiness for

integration into Flight III.

&A risk assessment process was employed to

define development and integration risks and

to permit risk ranking of all candidate up-

grades.

&Bimonthly, face-to-face meetings with an

oversight flag panel, including OP-03,

were held to keep the evolving design in

line not only with the operational require-

ments but also the cost and schedule

requirements.

&Engineering of Flight III was performed by

NAVSEA in close cooperation with the AEGIS

Shipbuilding Program.

&Warfighting assessments of both active and

passive systems proposed for candidate Flight

III configurations were conducted at the Battle

Group level and Flight III upgrades were

ranked by their contribution to Battle Group

success.

&NAVSEA 017 provided all cost and price

evaluations.

A total of 16 alternative configurations were

considered, across the spectrum of Levels I, II,

and III. OPNAV selected the Level II configura-

tion as the most capable and affordable

alternative. This configuration incorporated a

helicopter hangar for two LAMPS Mk III heli-

copters, an additional 32 VLS cells, added

Warfare Commander facilities, and other com-

bat system upgrades. The final configuration

was generally recognized as an approach toward

achieving the long sought strike cruiser, sans nu-

clear power.

The Flight III, Level II ship concept was 40 feet

longer than Flight II. The hangar required 28 feet

and the added VLS cells forward required 12 feet

of hull lengthening. While many hull lengthen-

ing alternatives were studied, the so-called

‘‘Plug and Slide’’ concept was adopted. This

concept added a shell plug at the hull’s maxi-

mum station where the hull lines are parallel to

the ship’s centerline and baseline. Forward and

aft of this parallel midbody, the lines were iden-

tical to Flight II. To provide arrangeable volume

where the hangar and missiles were to be lo-

cated, existing subdivisions were relocated

within the lengthened hull and the new

arrangeable volume was located exactly where

required. Figure 8 depicts the ‘‘Plug and Slide’’

technique.



The 28-foot added length and the hangar struc-

ture aft of the ship’s vital tower created blockage

of the aft facing SPY arrays. The aft SPY faces

were raised one deck level to eliminate this

blockage and provide beam clearance for the

extended hull and hangar. This innovative solu-

tion eliminated the need of a major redesign of

the ship’s vital tower.

Figure 9: DDG 51 Flight III Proposed Configuration

Figure 8: ‘‘Plug and Slide’’ Technique for DDG 51Flight III Concept


PMS 400 and NAVSEA created a complete

feasibility design for the Flight III Level II ship,

Figure 9, and presented it to the CNO’s Ship Char-

acteristics Improvement Board (SCIB) in spring of

1989. The ship was approved by the SCIB but

with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991,

the Navy decided not to build Flight III ships.

DDG51FLIGHT IIA (DDG79^112)As the result of changing world and threat con-

ditions in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet

Union, the CNO initiated the Destroyer Variant

(DDV) study in 1991 to evaluate a wide range of

destroyer designs from low-end non-AEGIS

ships to high-end ships similar to DDG 51

Flight III. Ten ship variants were developed and

assessed. They covered a range of capabilities

from 8 to 128 VLS cells. One of this article’s

references, Scott and Moak (1994), describes

these variants in more detail. The study resulted

in direction from the CNO to design and con-

struct DDG 51 class Flight IIA ships beginning

with the last ship appropriated in Fiscal Year

1994 to meet the Navy’s peacetime forward

presence and warfighting requirements of the

21st Century. Flight IIA was to be based on the

Flight II configuration.

The specific CNO direction for Flight IIA ship

characteristics was as follows:

&Aviation Facility: Add a dual helicopter facil-

ity including hangar and ammunition stowage

compatible with existing flight deck arrange-

ment and capable of Level I/Class I handling

of two SH-60B helicopters (one ASW LAMPS

Mk III SH-60 and one general purpose armed

SH-60).

&Combat Systems: Remove the HARPOON

weapon system and AN/SQR-19 passive

acoustic array and associated equipments.

Delete the CIWS mounts, and replace with

Evolved NATO SEA SPARROW missile if its

development progress permits. Maintain the

ability to reconstitute the SQR-19 and HAR-

POON if needed.

&HM&E: Make appropriate and affordable

changes from the candidates identified in the

DDV study, which included shifting to fiber

optics where appropriate.

As a result of CNO’s direction, the AEGIS Ship-

building Program and NAVSEA created a

contract design for Flight IIA with the following

specific changes from Flight II:

&Added dual helicopter facility with mainte-

nance and ammunition stowage capable of

Level I Class 1 handling for two SH-60B heli-

copters.

&Extended the transom 5 feet to enlarge the

flight deck.

&Raised the aft Vertical Launcher one deck

level and positioned the launcher hatches flush

with the top of the hangar.

&Added the RAST System and a Landing Sta-

tion Officer station.

&Added an enclosed Helicopter Control Station.

&Raised the aft facing SPY arrays 8 feet, as in

Flight III.

&Added a stern flap extending aft of the tran-

som, to regain the speed lost from added

weight.

&Reduced superstructure scantlings and in-

creased ship bottom scantlings to lower ship’s

center of gravity.

&Added five blast-hardened bulkheads in the

midship area.

&Added DC Wirefree Communications.

& Shifted from copper to Fiber Optics Data

Multiplexing System.

&Redesigned the electrical distribution

system to a zonal electric distribution config-

uration.

&Eliminated one collective protection system

zone.

&Removed at-sea missile handling systems in-

cluding VLS strike-down cranes and

associated handling equipment.

&Replaced existing air conditioning and refrig-

eration units with non-CFC units.

&Upgraded the solid waste management sys-

tem.

&Removed HARPOON weapon system

and all associated equipment

(reconstitutable).



&Removed the AN/SQR-19 passive acoustic

array (reconstitutable).

&Retained both CIWS mounts because verti-

cally launched Evolved SEA SPARROW

missile was not ready.

The ‘‘foundation move’’ that made Flight IIA

feasible and affordable was eliminating reduced

radar coverage aft created by the hangar struc-

ture by merely raising the aft facing SPY arrays

one deck level. This relocation gives the Flight

IIA ships their distinctive profile with the for-

ward and aft facing arrays at different heights.

This approach, shown feasible during the Flight

III study, enabled the Navy to add the helicopter

hangar to the ship without an extensive redesign

of the ship’s arrangements or combat system ar-

chitecture.

Detailed design of Flight IIA began 2 years be-

fore the ship construction contract was signed.

Advanced procurement funds financed the ship-

builder’s detailed design beginning in 1992 and

eliminated design and construction concurrency

in the first Flight IIA ship, DDG 79, USS OSCAR

AUSTIN, shown in Figure 10. All DDG 51 class

ships that follow DDG 79 are Flight IIA ships.

However, a variety of combat and HM&E

upgrades have been incorporated into these

ships since.

InternationalAEGISProgramsThe capability of the AEGIS Weapon System to

defend itself and the battle group, the measured

evolution of the system in baselines of higher

levels of performance and the success of the

US AEGIS shipbuilding programs were recog-

nized by our allies as achievements to be

incorporated into their own navies. In 1988,

Congress approved the first sale of an AEGIS

Weapon System to the Japanese Maritime Self-

Defense Force. Since that time, Foreign Military

Sales programs have resulted in the sale of

AEGIS to navies in Spain, the Republic of Korea,

Norway, and Australia.

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has

built four KONGO-class AEGIS destroyers,

Figure 12: Spain’sALVARO DE BAZANAEGIS Frigate in Syd-ney Harbor

Figure 11: Japan’s1st AEGIS Ship, theDestroyer JDSKONGO

Figure 13: Nor-way’s FRIDTJOFNANSEN AEGIS Frig-ate

Figure 10: USSOSCAR AUSTIN, theFirst DDG 51 FlightIIA Ship


shown in Figure 11, which are quite similar in

appearance to DDG 51. The Spanish Navy is

building the ALVARO DE BAZAN (F100)

AEGIS frigates, Figure 12. The lead ship entered

service in 2002 and the sixth ship is scheduled to

enter service in 2012. The Royal Norwegian

Navy has authorized five FRIDTJOF NANSEN-

class AEGIS frigates, Figure 13, to enter service

between 2006 and 2010. These ships are deriva-

tives of the Spanish Navy F100. The Republic Of

Korea has authorized the KDX III destroyers,

which are similar in appearance to DDG 51. The

first ship, KING SEJONG THE GREAT, Figure

14, was commissioned in 2008, with three ships

to follow and options for three more. The Royal

Australian Navy Air Warfare destroyer, recently

announced as a variant of the Spanish Navy

F100, will incorporate AEGIS and provide the

Royal Australian Navy with a greatly enhanced

air defense capability. An artist’s concept is

shown in Figure 15.

ConclusionBuilding the AEGIS ships required an evolution

in organization and processes to match their un-

precedented integration of ship and combat

systems. Each of the project’s partners was given

responsibility and accountability for their role in

getting AEGIS to sea. OPNAV was an active

participant throughout and even had its own

AEGIS Program Office code, ‘‘PMS 400Z.’’

Contracts rewarded excellence and cooperation.

Doing the difficult job of systems engineering up

front avoided classical problems commonly en-

countered in major shipbuilding programs. The

‘‘cradle-to-grave’’ charter and organization of

the AEGIS project instilled the long view in all

players. The AEGIS Project Office was unques-

tionably in charge, and was the final arbiter of

disputes between the shipbuilders and combat

system developers. The decisions made were ul-

timately what were best for the nation, not any

single contractor or government organization.

As stated by the Honorable Sean Stackley, As-

sistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,

Development, and Acquisition (himself a retired

naval officer with shipbuilding experience), at

the October 17, 2008, Christening ceremony of

USS WAYNE E. MEYER:

At the peak of this Cold War, our Navy sought to

put to sea a weapon system that would command

the seas, wherever East met West. So, after having

served his Nation with distinction for over a quar-

ter-century, Wayne E. Meyer was given the task of

bringing this vision—AEGIS—to reality. And for

the next 13 years, RADM Meyer would lead

America’s best and brightest and would turn our

great industrial might into great military might.

RADM Meyer’s goal was to deliver a 100% war-

ready ship to the fleet on schedule, within bud-

get, manned by a trained crew, and supported by

the Navy. This monolithic goal inculcated ev-

eryone on the project. The processes developed

and efforts exerted by the project, including its

developers and constructors, and led by the AE-

GIS Project Office, made this goal a reality. It is

worth remembering how and why these pro-

cesses and organizations were brought about

Figure 14: Korea’sKING SEJONG THEGREAT AEGISDestroyer

Figure 15: Artist’sConcept for Austra-lia’s Air WarfareDestroyer, WhichWill Carry the AEGISWeapon System

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 2009170 &The Story of AEGIS


when embarking on future shipbuilding pro-

grams, lest those assigned have to relearn

decades worth of lessons by trial and error.

AcknowledgmentsThe authors would like to acknowledge the con-

tributions of Robert Scott and Jerry Fee in

writing this article, and those of Jerry Fee in ed-

iting this article.

ReferencesBaker, A.D. III, Combat Fleets of the World 1998–1999,

Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1998.

Couhat, J.L., Combat Fleets of the World 1980/81,

Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1980 (English

translation by A. D. Baker III).

Defense Update. ‘‘Israel’s Littoral Combat Ship Program

(LCS-I),’’ November 14, 2007.

Federation of American Scientists website. Available at

http://www,fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/arsenal_

ship.htm, accessed March 2009.

Scott, R. and Moak K., ‘‘Studies of helicopter capable

DDG 51 variants,’’ ASNE Naval Engineers Journal, Vol.

106, No. 5, p. 33, September 1994.

Shackleton, D., ‘‘Choices and consequences-choosing

the AWD design,’’ Australian Defense Magazine, Febru-

ary 2007.

Sims, P., ‘‘Bulging merchant ships,’’ Naval Engineers

Journal, Vol. 119, No. 3, 2007.

Stepanchick, J. and A. Brown, ‘‘Revisiting DDGX/DDG 51concept exploration,’’ Naval Engineers Journal, Vol. 119,

No. 3, 2007.

AuthorBiographiesRandy Fortune was born in Richmond, VA, and

attended Virginia Tech where he received Bach-

elor and Master of Science degrees in

Engineering Mechanics in 1968 and 1970, re-

spectively. In 1971, Mr. Fortune began his Navy

career at Naval Ship Research and Development

Center, Carderock, MD, where he developed

and applied total ship survivability assessment

techniques to early stages of surface ship design

to improve battle survivability. In 1980, he

joined RADM Meyer in PMS 400 as Design

Budget Manager and Ship Systems Engineer

during design, construction, and testing of

CG47, USS TICONDEROGA. In 1983, Mr.

Fortune transferred to the DDG 51 Program

where he was PMS 400’s systems engineer dur-

ing contract design of the lead ship of the DDG

51 class. Following award of lead ship to Bath

Iron Works, he led all navy participation, con-

trol, and monitoring of the shipbuilder’s detail

design. In 1989, Mr. Fortune was selected as

Deputy Program Manager of the Arleigh Burke

Shipbuilding Program where he led the Navy

enterprise in design, construction, test, delivery,

and commissioning of 46 of the 62 ships in the

DDG 51 class. He introduced several innovative

shipbuilding acquisition strategies, including

Negotiated Allocation, Competitive Allocation,

and Multi-Year contracting. He established and

executed procedures to monitor and control all

shipbuilder detail design and construction ef-

forts in the DDG 51 program while introducing

three flights and seven combat system baselines.

In 1999, Mr. Fortune was awarded the ASNE

Gold Medal for his sustained leadership of the

DDG 51 Program and introduction of Flight

IIA. Mr. Fortune retired from civil service in

2005 and joined AMERICAN SYSTEMS as

Vice President of Integrated Shipbuilding

Programs.

Captain Brian T. Perkinson, USN (Ret.), was

born and raised in Waterbury, CT. He graduated

from the United States Naval Academy in June

1963 and retired from active duty in June 1993.

He joined Northrop Grumman Ship Building on

March 1, 2000 as Director of the Washington

Technical Office. In May 2003 he was promoted

to Deputy Program Manager, DDG 1000

Program.

He reported to his first ship, USS SOLEY

(DD 707), in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, serving as

Communications and Electronics Officer.

After graduation from the Naval Destroyer

School in 1965, he was assigned to USS

HARLAN R. DICKSON (DD 708) as Chief

Engineer. He was reassigned to Commander

Destroyer Squadron 24 in 1967 as Staff


Engineer and was selected as an Engineering

Duty Officer in April 1969.

Attending the Naval Postgraduate School in

Monterey, CA, he was awarded a Master of

Science in Mechanical Engineering in 1972 and a

Master of Science in Financial Management in

1973. He then reported to Supervisor of

Shipbuilding, USN, Newport News, VA as the

Surface Ship Engineering and Quality Assurance

Officer. He subsequently transferred to the Staff,

Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet, Pearl

Harbor serving as Maintenance Plans and Policy

Officer. Reporting to the AEGIS Shipbuilding

Project, Naval Sea Systems Command,

Washington, DC in August 1979, he was

assigned as Production Officer for CG 47 Class

AEGIS ships. In October 1983, he reported to

the staff of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy

(Shipbuilding and Logistics) as Deputy Director

of Shipbuilding. In January 1986, he was reas-

signed as the AEGIS Destroyer Program

Manager responsible for the design and con-

struction of the ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG 51)

Class. After its commissioning (DDG 51) on

July 4, 1991, he was reassigned as the Security

Assistance Program Manager, responsible for all

foreign military sales in the Naval Sea Systems

Command.

Captain Perkinson was awarded the Legion of

Merit with Gold Star, the Meritorious Service

Medal with Gold Star, and the Navy Commen-

dation Medal. He is also a registered

Professional Engineer (Mechanical) in the State

of California.

After retiring from the US Navy, Mr. Perkinson

joined a naval architectural firm as Director of

Programs and was responsible for their USN and

international programs.

Robert C. Staiman graduated from the Univer-

sity of Florida in 1960 with a Bachelor’s Degree

in Mechanical Engineering. In 1966, after 6

years with the Army Corps of Engineers, Mr.

Staiman began his Navy career in the Machinery

Systems Division of the Naval Ship Systems

Command. At the Naval Ship Systems Com-

mand he worked in various engineering

positions before becoming the Machinery Sys-

tems Engineer for the IIN DDG 998 Ship

Design in 1974. In 1976 he was assigned as the

Deputy Ship Design Manager and Systems En-

gineer for the DDG 47 Ship Design

(redesignated as CG 47). In 1980 he was named

CG 47 Ship Design Manager and was respon-

sible for the design of follow-on flights, the

monitoring and approval of the shipbuilder s

detail design and construction, as well as pro-

viding support for ship trials. In 1987 he was

selected as Division Director of the Combatant

Ships Design Management Division where he

was responsible for the technical supervision of

all Combatant Ship Design Managers, including

the CG 47 and DDG 51 Ship Design Managers.

While in this position Mr. Staiman was also

assigned as the US Design Director for the

NATO Frigate (NFR 90) Project from 1989 to

1990. In 1991 Mr. Staiman transferred to the

Amphibious, Auxiliary and Special Ships Design

Management Division as Division Director with

similar ship design manager responsibilities. Mr.

Staiman retired from the Naval Sea Systems at

the end of 1993 and joined John J. McMullen

Associates (JJMA) as a Program Manager re-

sponsible for the technical management of all

design contracts with NAVSEA. Mr. Staiman

retired from JJMA in 2003 and became a private

consultant working with JJMA on the DDG

1000 Program. He retired for the third time in

July 2004 and now resides in Virginia and

spends the winters in South Florida.

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 2009172&The Story of AEGIS


getting aegis to sea: the aegis ships

Documents