Nicole Brooks

Gerald R. Ford and the Halloween Massacre

When Gerald R. Ford took over the presidency in August 1974, he promised continuity.

This was to be fulfilled by keeping many of former President Nixon’s staff on as his own,

including Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, the head of the CIA, William Colby, and

Henry Kissinger in his dual roles as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, and Al

Haig as his Chief of Staff. This was meant to keep the country on an even keel through the

tumultuous times of the change that followed Nixon’s resignation. Because of the unique

circumstances under which Ford gained the presidency, he did not have the traditional transition

period to create his own staff. Instead he decided to focus on securing continuity first rather than

creating his own team.

By the end of October 1975 Ford had come to the realization that stability had been

achieved, and he could now shake up the staff to suit his needs. With the added pressure of

California Governor Ronald Reagan’s bid for the Republican nomination Ford took matters into

his own hands, and with little warning to his staff, he fired Secretary of Defense Robert

Schlesinger, CIA Director William Colby, and removed Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from

his second post of National Security Advisor. Ever since the shake up took place people have

wondered who was behind it. Some theorized that it was Henry Kissinger who hoped to

neutralize his rival James Schlesinger; others believed it was either George Bush or Donald

Rumsfeld hoping to further their political ambitions. Now, with the primary source materials and

memoirs available, historians are able to conclude that it was in fact President Ford, himself who

engineered and executed the plan to change his staff in the infamous Halloween Massacre.

The CIA had been experiencing problems throughout the early 1970’s. Congressional

investigations into the agency’s improper dealings both abroad and at home had caused many in

2

the administration to begin looking for someone beyond reproach to lead the agency. Many

within the administration wondered if Colby’s time at the CIA should come quickly to an end.

Ford, Kissinger, and Vice President Rockefeller began to question his judgment and as early as

January 1975 Ford and some of his senior staff were discussing relieving Colby of his duties.

Kissinger mentioned that Colby had brought up Richard Helms’ possible perjury to the

Department of Justice. This caused the vice president to wonder if Colby was lacking good

judgment. The president replied that he had debated that very idea with others, only to decide

that it was not the time to move him.1 Earlier, Kissinger and Ford had discussed the same issue

and had come to the decision that as soon as possible the president should replace Colby with

‘someone of towering integrity’2.

A few months later, in April 1975, replacing Colby came up again in Ford’s National

Security Advisor meeting with Kissinger and his deputy, Brent Scowcroft. This time they were

discussing Colby’s answers to Congress about the CIA’s covert activities. Again Kissinger

complained about Colby’s judgment, this time telling the president that Colby had told

Congressman Braden that he could not deny that the CIA had either plans for or been involved in

any assassinations. The president replied that he agreed, but “it was a matter or who and when.”3

In June Ford got more to the point of why he specifically wanted Colby gone. He,

Kissinger, and Scowcroft were discussing who would replace Colby, and the president explained

that his key requirement was to know if “he is a tough administrator.”4 Ford clearly wanted an

1 Memorandum of Conversation. Ford, Rockefeller, Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Buchen, Marsh, Scowcroft. 1/4/1975, folder “1/4/1976” Box 8, NSA Memorandum of Conversation, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan2Memorandum of Conversation. Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft 1/4/1975, folder “1/4/1976” Box 8, NSA Memorandum of Conversation, Gerald R. Ford Library3Memorandum of Conversation. Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft 4/12/1975 11:45 AM, folder “4/12/1975” Box 10, NSA Memorandum of Conversation, Gerald R. Ford Library4Memorandum of Conversation. Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft 6/6/1976 9:40-10:21 AM, folder “6/6/1976” Box 12, NSA Memorandum of Conversation, Gerald R. Ford Library

3

administrative adjustment that would change the image of the CIA and make it more respectable

in the eyes of Congress and the public.

Whereas Colby had the reputation of being a bit of a bumbler in the administration,

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was brilliant. He was also arrogant. Ford and

Schlesinger did not get along personally, and Schlesinger also failed at least once to follow

Ford’s direct orders.5 The pair also had a disagreement over the evacuation from Vietnam,

concerning who to bring out and how to do it. Although the public was only aware of the

Kissinger-Schlesinger problems, the fact of the matter was that Schlesinger did not work well

with Ford either. The public saw Schlesinger as the only hardliner in the administration against

the Russians. When he was forced out many concluded that it was solely because of his differing

views on détente rather than anything else. Many reporters refused to believe anything less

sinister.

Although removing Schlesinger from his position did not come up in conversations as

Colby did, Ford and Kissinger’s unhappiness with him was readily apparent. Kissinger was

particularly annoyed with what he saw as the Department of Defense’s interference in foreign

policy. In October Ford and Kissinger were discussing a conversation the president had had with

Schlesinger. According to the president,

“Then I hit him on the détente article with Dr. Winifred Joshua a classified analytical paper,

criticizing dente [détente], which I said it was amateurish and shouldn’t have been released. He

agreed. Then I said he hadn’t done his work on the Hill on the defense budget. He said no

organic harm had been done, but I said it was not perceived that way.”6 Ford and Kissinger went

on to discuss the agreement reached with the Soviets at Vladivostok. Kissinger warned Ford that

5 Gerald R. Ford, A Time To Heal (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 2676 Memorandum of Conversation. Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft. 10/16/1975 9:33-10:44 AM, folder “10/16/1975” Box 16, NSA Memorandum of Conversation, Gerald R. Ford Library

4

Schlesinger was going to make it hard for Ford with the more conservative right of the

Republican Party. At the same time moving further right to appease the Reagan supporters would

alienate the liberals during the general election. The president was not yet ready to commit to

major changes and made it clear he wanted to give Schlesinger another chance before he talked

to him again. Kissinger made it clear that he felt the Pentagon should be showing only support

for the president.7 At the end of this conversation Kissinger told Ford that Haig, who had

apparently had a conversation with Kissinger after leaving the administration, believed

Schlesinger wanted to be president, and Scowcroft, who was present and taking notes, left the

tantalizing sentence, “there is discussion of whether or not Schlesinger will resign”8

The disagreement over the defense budget was not the first time that Schlesinger had

ignored Ford’s orders. During the Mayaguez crisis either Schlesinger or someone under him had

ignored Ford’s order to bomb the Cambodian mainland.9 Schlesinger believed that bombing

Cambodia’s mainland would be another step toward a return to Vietnam, something Schlesinger

was firmly against. And while he did not ignore Ford’s orders in the earlier Vietnam evacuation,

Schlesinger certainly disagreed with who should have been evacuated. In his memoirs Ford

wrote that he later found out Schlesinger had flown empty or near-empty planes in and out of

Saigon so it would look like he was doing everything he could to get friendly Vietnamese out,

without actually evacuating them.10 In addition to that, Schlesinger also actively worked against

détente, taking every opportunity to talk to the press about how harmful détente was to American

security.

7 Memorandum of Conversation. Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft 10/16/1975 9:33-10:44 AM, folder “10/16/1975” Box 16, NSA Memorandum of Conversation, Gerald R. Ford Library8 Memorandum of Conversation. Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft. 10/16/1975 9:33-10:44 AM, folder “10/16/1975” Box 16, NSA Memorandum of Conversation, Gerald R. Ford Library9 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 651.10 Gerald R. Ford, A Time To Heal (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 253.

5

The most popular theory that flew around the press was the idea that Kissinger had

engineered these changes and that Kissinger being removed from the National Security Adviser

position was really a farce because Brent Scowcroft would continue to be his stand-in as NSC

advisor. In a memorandum of conversation dated 3 November 1975, just hours before Ford’s

press conference announcing the personnel changes, Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft discussed

that very theory. They spent time deliberating the anticipated reaction of the press, the public,

and the politicians. The president felt justified in his decision because of the fact that either

Schlesinger or the Department of Defense spokesman Laitin, had informed key congressmen

about the personnel changes. Kissinger replied that he felt that it was important people not see

Schlesinger’s firing as a victory for him.11 In their private conversation Ford would have no

reason to lie about who was behind the decision to fire Schlesinger. A bit later in their

conversation Ford and Kissinger discussed the decision to appoint Elliot Richardson then

ambassador to Great Britain, to replace Morton as commerce secretary:

K: As you know I have no use for him.

P: I agree, but with this Nelson thing I had to balance it out with something for the

Liberals. But back to the announcement. I will say I have been concerned about

intelligence procedures and I wanted my own team in the vital national security

area.

K: I think it is important to stay out of personalities so he [Schlesinger] doesn’t

look like a knight in shining armor.

P: I have no intention of allowing that. I will emphasize that this was all my

decision. It was, as you know. I just couldn’t work with Jim any longer.12

Ford and Kissinger knew that the press was going to question motives behind the firings, and

Ford clearly wanted to make sure that the press and the American public knew the personnel

11Memorandum of Conversation. Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft. 11/3/1975 9:20-!0:13 AM, Box 16, NSA Memorandum of Conversation, Gerald R. Ford LibraryLaitin was the press secretary for department of defense. 12Memorandum of Converstation. Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, 11/3/1975 9:20-10:13 AM, folder “11/3/1975” Box 16, NSA Memorandum of Conversation, Gerald R. Ford Library. The Nelson thing refers to the Vice-President’s decision to not be on the 1976 ticket.

6

changes were his decision. But this would be difficult if the main reason for the firing of

Schlesinger, his inability to work with Ford, was kept quiet. It is easy to see how people

hypothesized that Kissinger or Donald Rumsfeld, Ford’s chief of staff, were behind the firing.

The announcement of the staff changes did not go as planned. There were leaks to the

press about Schlesinger being fired. In order to make the announcement before the rumors could

get out of control, Ford scheduled a press conference for Monday, November 3, 1975. Before he

explained his decision to the press, Ford held a senior staff meeting to inform them of the

changes and had another similar meeting with the congressional leadership. During the meeting

with the congressional leaders, Senator Byrd brought up the fear that the firing of Schlesinger

was solely because of his views on détente. Byrd said, “I hope the dismissal of Jim Schlesinger

does not mean that dissent will be stifled. I am concerned.”13 He went on to praise the president’s

decision to remove Kissinger from his dual post. For the most part the leaders were very

supportive of Ford and his right to put into his administration those men with whom he wanted to

work.

Unlike the congressional leaders the press believed the worst. There was also a general

feeling of confusion, and not only on the part of the press. Ron Nessen, Ford’s press secretary,

seems to have been quite unprepared for the questions being asked by the press. These ranged

from basic questions on the status of various staff members, to who leaked the changes, to who

was behind Vice President Rockefeller’s decision to step down from the 1976 ticket. In his

November 4 press briefing Nessen was asked if the president was upset by the leak. He replied

that he would not consider him upset, only that “he planned to do it on a slightly different

timetable – speeded up a couple days.”14 If it had not been leaked the president probably would 1311/3/1975 6:30PM, Bipartisan Leadership Meeting Notes, box 11, Presidential handwriting file, Gerald R. Ford Library 14 Press Briefing, 11/4/1975,folder “Press Secretary Briefings, 11/4/75” Box 14 Nessen files pg 5, Gerald R. Ford Library

7

have made the announcement on Wednesday or Thursday rather than Monday. Nessen was also

asked if he knew how the leak came about or who did it, and he replied that he did not.

Nessen’s confusion over the status of various staff members was pronounced. He was not

sure whether Rumsfeld was going over to the Pentagon before his confirmation, or if Cheney

was already considered chief of staff, or what Under-Secretary of Defense William Clements

was planning to do. The confusion continued regarding the titles and responsibilities of

Schlesinger and Colby. When asked about their status, Nessen gave two different plans for the

men. One reporter asked “What about Colby? Will he be running the CIA until Bush is

confirmed?” Nessen: “As far as I know, yes.” “So that is different than the Pentagon operation.

In one case Schlesinger retains the title but does not function, but Colby retains the title and

continues to function.”15 At this point Nessen tried to backpedal and said that he was going to

check on this, saying that it was Schlesinger’s preference to go on leave rather than stay on at the

Pentagon. There was not a clear message coming from the White House as to what was

happening; the president’s own press secretary did not seem to have a clear understanding of

what had happened. If this had been a conspiracy by Rumsfeld or Kissinger it would have been

better planned. If anyone other than the president had been behind this, he would have preferred

a smoother transition and less public conflict. The fact that the firings were made so publicly

and so quickly and that as the reporters pointed out Colby and especially Schlesinger were not

given the usual chance to submit their own letters of resignation points to the president as the

author.16 Somebody working under the hopes of quietly orchestrating this change would have

tried to make sure that Colby and Schlesinger were placated in the hopes of getting them to go

quietly. 15 Press Briefing, 11/4/1975,folder “Press Secretary Briefings, 11/4/75” Box 14 Nessen files pg 7, Gerald R. Ford Library16 Press Briefing, 11/4/1975,folder “Press Secretary Briefings, 11/4/75” Box 14 Nessen files pg 20, Gerald R. Ford Library

8

The press also continued to question the motives behind the vice-president removing his

name from the ticket. Again this was a concern that was never fully addressed or understood in

the White House. It seems that the president believed, however falsely, that the press would just

quietly accept the vice-president’s decision. However, the vice-president’s leaving happened to

coincide with the firing of Schlesinger and Colby and the three were lumped together. Had the

president been able to stick to the planned timetable, he may have been better able to handle the

controversy around Rockefeller with less drama. Instead, Ford was forced by the actions of

others to change his plans.

At his November 5 press briefing Nessen was still being questioned concerning whether

Rumsfeld, his deputy Richard Cheney and George Bush were qualified for the jobs for which

Ford had nominated them. There were still questions about the status of Schlesinger, Colby, and

Scowcroft. There was, however, a new question being raised and that was whether Bush and

Rumsfeld should be disqualified from their new jobs and the future possibility of the vice-

presidency because of their past political involvement. One reporter asked, “Would it not be less

appropriate for a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to have in mind a continuing

political future while at the agency?”17 The reporters had picked up on the fact that Bush was a

former head of the Republican Party, and both Bush and Rumsfeld had been in Congress.

Immediately, their minds turned to conspiracy, that either Bush or Rumsfeld had orchestrated

these changes to put themselves in line for the vice-presidency. They questioned whether the

president felt that Bush should remove himself from consideration, something Nessen said the

president was not considering.

17 Press Briefing, 11/5/1975,folder “Press Secretary Briefings, 11/5/75” Box 14 Nessen files pg 8, Gerald R. Ford Library

9

Ford could be stubborn and even obtuse sometimes, particularly when it came to a topic

that he felt strongly about. He claimed that no one was being considered for the open vice-

president slot on the 1976 ticket, and he seemed to have believed his word should have been

enough. This kind of naïveté is something that is repeated throughout his administration. Early

on Ford claimed there was no deal with Nixon concerning the pardon and he expected everyone

to believe him18. Later, after his second debate gaffe, when he infamously claimed there was no

Soviet domination in Poland, Ford would refuse to believe he had misspoken and did not want to

take back what he had said.19 His stubbornness in each of these instances lends credence to the

idea that it was truly Ford behind the personnel changes. As Nessen told the reporters, “the

President made each of these changes for a specific reason, which he stated the other night. As

you know, he did them entirely himself, he worked out all the pieces himself and for his own

reasons.”20 He went on to repeat this a couple of times throughout the rest of the briefing. This

argument, however, did not convince the journalists because the press was never told of the

personal conflicts between Schlesinger and Ford. Believing that there was little difference

between Rumsfeld and Schlesinger’s views, they had no reason to think anything other than

conspiracy.

One man who had both the motive and means to orchestrate this personnel change was

Ford’s Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. Kissinger and

Schlesinger were in almost constant conflict, both personally and professionally. They both had

powerful personalities and were extremely bright, but differed in what they thought was the best

course of action in dealing with the Soviets. Kissinger believed in furthering détente, arguing that

a lessening of tension was in the United States’ best interests. Schlesinger was under the 18 Gerald R. Ford, A Time To Heal (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 19 Ron Nessen, It Sure Looks Different from the Inside (New York: Playboy Press, 1978), 274.20 Press Briefing, 11/5/1975,folder “Press Secretary Briefings, 11/5/75” Box 14, Nessen files, Gerald R. Ford Library

10

impression that the Soviets were taking advantage of détente, that the United States was no

longer gaining anything from this policy. There were stories planted in the newspapers by both

of their staffs to make the other look bad. Their bickering was legendary in Washington.

The fact that Kissinger lost his job as Ford’s National Security Advisor was seen merely

as an attempt to appease the far right. Kissinger was replaced by Brent Scowcroft, who was his

own deputy. In the initial days after the changes, the procedure for briefing the president on

national security matters remained the same. This lack of a new plan benefitted Kissinger, who

was still having his daily morning meetings with Ford, during which time NSA affairs were

discussed. Kissinger was still able to influence national security decisions both at these meetings

and in his continuing post as Secretary of State.

Given all of this it might seem plausible that Kissinger was behind these changes, but this

theory does not fit. According to William Hyland, who took over as Brent Scowcroft’s deputy,

Kissinger was shocked or at least surprised at losing his position as National Security Advisor.21

There is also the fact that the transition was not well planned or smoothly carried out. Kissinger

was an extremely smart man, who was also well versed in covert operations, if anyone could pull

off a smooth transition it would have been Kissinger. But the transition was anything but smooth.

Colby and Schlesinger were not given the opportunity to resign quietly, there was no cohesive

announcement coming from the White House about why and how the changes were made. There

is also Ford’s insistence that he was behind the changes, and his refusal to say anything about his

personal conflicts with Schlesinger. Ford had a history of doing things that did not make him

more popular because he believed them to be important. In the thirty plus years since these

changes, Ford never gave any indication that anyone else had anything to do with them.

21 William Hyland, Mortal Rivals: Understanding the Pattern of Soviet-American Conflict (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 148-150.

11

Ford also made it clear in later interviews that he felt the jobs of Secretary of State and

National Security Adviser were too important for one person to hold.22 Ford felt it was important

that Kissinger accept the ‘division of responsibilities.’23 Ford felt that it was important to have

two dedicated individuals in these two posts. There was also the idea that it was important for the

president to hear more than one idea, particularly when it came to foreign policy. With Kissinger

holding both major foreign policy posts this limited the analysis reaching the president.

In looking for people to replace Schlesinger and Colby, Ford decided on men without the

taint of the previous administration, who could bring change to their respective posts. Neither

Bush nor Rumsfeld were in Washington D.C. or in any way closely involved in the drama

surrounding the end of the Nixon administration. Bush was the ambassador to the United

Nations. Rumsfeld was sent to Europe as the Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO). Their youthfulness and the fact that they were relative outsiders were

benefits to creating openness and a new atmosphere.

If Kissinger was behind the changes, he only had the firing of his opponent to gain. Bush

and Rumsfeld on the other hand had higher political aspirations. Both former politicians were

still young and had promising futures. It seems suspicious that George Bush was made the

director of the CIA over more highly qualified candidates. A confidential memo listing possible

candidates to fill the CIA position had listed Bush’s qualifications as,

51 years old; Member of Congress; US Ambassador to the UN and subsequently to USLO Peking; Oil producer; Politician.Pros: Experience in government and diplomacy; generally familiar with components of the intelligence community and their missions; management experience; high integrity and proven adaptability.Cons: RNC post lends undesirable political cast.24

22 Thomas DeFrank, Write It When I’m Gone (New York, Putnam Adult, 2007), 9123 Research interviews and notes, folder “notes on arbruster interviews (pgs 3301-3400)” box 2, James M. Cannon files, Gerald R. Ford Library 24Memo, to Richard Cheney, folder “Appointment of CIA Director” Box 5, Cheney Files, Gerald R. Ford Library

12

This hardly seems like the resume of an ideal candidate for CIA Director. Although he had

relatively strong foreign policy experience due to his ambassadorship, Bush had no experience

with high level administration posts, and no experience with the CIA. Compare Bush to Douglas

Dillon, who was the next name on the list of possible candidates. Dillon had been an executive,

treasury secretary, under secretary of state, ambassador, as well as a member of Rockefeller’s

Commission on the CIA. He was an experienced cabinet member and had much familiarity with

the CIA. In his case there was only one criticism that the Ford administration could lay against

him, his age. The administration felt that at age 65 Dillon would be open to criticism as being too

old.25 With so many more qualified candidates out there, the fact that Bush was recalled from his

post in China for the job seemed suspicious.

Bush would benefit from orchestrating these changes, by having a position in

Washington rather than in far-off China, Bush might be able to influence political matters. He

would also be in Ford’s eye for a possible vice-presidential spot, which would work as a stepping

stone to the presidency. But while he may have motive, Bush lacked the means to create these

changes. There was also the fact that he seemed genuinely surprised by Ford’s offer of the

directorship. In a memo to Kissinger and the president, accepting the nomination, Bush wrote,

“your message came as a total and complete shock.”26 He also made it clear that he believed the

directorship would be the end of his political career, definitely not a job for someone with higher

political aspirations. Also, if Bush was the person behind the firings then why promote

Rumsfeld, who could be seen as a rival for the slot on the 1976 ticket. All this make it appear

highly unlikely that Bush was the person behind the firings.

25 Memo, to Richard Cheney, folder “Appointment of CIA Director” Box 5, Cheney Files, Gerald R. Ford Library26 Memo, George Bush to Kissinger & President, 112/75, folder “George Bush’s CIA Appointment,” Temp. Parallel Box A1, Office of the Asst. to the President for Nat’l Sec Affairs Henry Kissinger & Brent Scowcroft Files (1972) 1972-77, Gerald R. Ford Library

13

Rumsfeld, like Bush had the same motive of higher political aspirations. Also, as Ford’s

chief of staff, Rumsfeld was close to Ford, and it seems possible that he could have persuaded

Ford to make staff changes. Whereas there was a list of other possible candidates for the CIA

job, no such list was made for Secretary of Defense. This could mean either that Ford knew from

the start that Rumsfeld would be his new secretary, or Rumsfeld had coordinated the whole

operation and thus knew which job he wanted. In an interview Ford related the conversation he

held with Rumsfeld and Kissinger on the Saturday before he had talked to Schlesinger. He made

sure that they both understood that it was essential the department of defense and the department

of state cooperate. This did not mean agreeing on everything, but that Ford wanted ‘the

backbiting and nitpicking’ that had been going on to end.27 During their Saturday conversation

Rumsfeld asked whether he should be Secretary of Defense, because he feared it would look like

he had engineered the promotion. Rumsfeld thought he should be put in another cabinet office

that would be more suitable, such as commerce because of his previous experience.28 Rumsfeld

understood the criticism that was going to arise, many believing that he had promoted himself,

but in an interview years later, Ford said “I swear on a stack of Bibles that Don Rumsfeld had no

part in it.”29 Known for his honesty, this does not seem like something President Ford would lie

about. If Rumsfeld had been responsible for the changes, this whole conversation would have

been pointless. Since it was only Kissinger, Ford, and Rumsfeld participating in the

conversation, there was no reason for any of them to lie, and it seems unlikely that Ford would

be complicit in Rumsfeld’s lie to Kissinger that he was not involved. Just as Bush would not

have wanted to promote Rumsfeld to a rival position, neither would Rumsfeld want Bush around

27 Research interviews and notes, folder “notes on arbruster interviews (pgs 3301-3400”) box 2, James M. Cannon files, Gerald R. Ford Library28 Research interviews and notes, folder “notes on arbruster interviews (pgs 3301-3400)” box 2, James M. Cannon files, Gerald R. Ford Library29 Research interviews and notes, folder “notes on arbruster interviews (pgs 2456-2491)” box 2, James M. Cannon files, Gerald R. Ford Library

14

as a possible contender for the vice-presidency. Similarly Ford himself admitted that Rumsfeld

had suggested others for the CIA job, but rather than push them on Ford, he merely made his

suggestions because that was what Ford wanted.

Thus, the evidence points strongly to the conclusion that it was President Ford who was

behind the firings. His personal problems with Schlesinger as well as the hopes of having a staff

that could work together gave him ample motive. Ford wanted a team of his own that would

work together and follow his orders. The CIA was in need of an outsider, who could steer the

agency into calmer waters; bickering between the department of defense and the state department

had made it difficult to gain a consensus on foreign policy, and other countries had noticed,

including the Soviets.30

Overall, the changes were beneficial to the administration. Although they did happen late

in Ford’s term, he was able to put together a team that he felt comfortable with as opposed to the

one he had inherited. If nothing else, this gave Ford more confidence that when he asked for

something or gave an order it would be followed. Within the cabinet the effect of the change

was immediately noticeable. Tensions had relaxed, there was more respect between the

members, and according to Ford, it was an overall smoother working operation.31

Outside the administration the changes were also seen as an improvement. Ted Marrs, a

member of Ford’s administration, was tasked to do a phone survey of various veterans and

military groups to ascertain what their opinions on the changes were. Overall the response was

positive. With the exception of the VFW’s ‘standard negative’, the groups were happy to have

someone more personable heading the Department of Defense.32 They felt that Schlesinger was

30 Memoranda of Conversations, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft , 6/6/76 9:40-10:21 AM, folder “6/6/76”. Box 12, NSA Memoranda of Conversations, Gerald R. Ford Library31 Research interviews and notes, folder “notes on arbruster interviews (pgs 2456-2491)” box 2, James M. Cannon files, Gerald R. Ford Library 32 Memo, Ted Marrs through Bill Baroody Jr. to Don Rumsfeld, 11/3/1975, folder “Administration Personnel Shake-Up” Box 1, John O. Marsh Files, Gerald R. Ford Library

15

too cold and hard to be honest with. Many of the groups looked favorably on Rumsfeld, who was

seen as more people oriented than Schlesinger. Similarly they looked forward to a new period of

openness within the department that had been lacking during the previous administration, and

under Schlesinger.33

Outside the military, reactions were a bit more mixed. Not surprisingly those who

composed the Republican Party’s far right saw Schlesinger’s firing as a strengthening of détente.

Morten Blackwell, who was a fundraiser for Reagan and Wallace, had come to this conclusion.34

The black community, typically a hard win for the Republicans, had no love for Schlesinger, and

so they viewed Rumsfeld’s nomination favorably, particularly because of his experience with the

Office of Economic Opportunity, which portrayed him as a friend of minorities and the poor.

Similarly, they approved Kissinger’s removal from the NSC post because of his lack of

involvement in Africa, as well as his dismissal of Ambassador Beverly Carter, which had created

a feeling of mistrust between him and the black community.35 Overall Rumsfeld had created no

real opposition, in fact he was viewed favorably, with the exception of those with strong pro-

Schlesinger feelings.

George Bush on the other hand was a bit harder sell. Many viewed his experience

running the Republican Party as a negative and felt his lack of administrative experience would

also be a hindrance. The main opposition came from Senate Democrats who felt that Bush

should renounce his claim to the vice-presidential slot on the 1976 ticket. There were none with

any strong pro-Colby feelings, with the exception of Senator Church, who feared Bush would not

33 Memo, Ted Marrs through Bill Baroody Jr. to Don Rumsfeld, 11/3/1975, folder “Administration Personnel Shake-Up” Box 1, John O. Marsh Files, Gerald R. Ford Library 34 Memo, Wayne Valis to Bill Baroody Jr., 11/6/1975, folder “Administration Personnel Shake-Up” Box 1, John O. Marsh Files, Gerald R. Ford Library35 Memo, John Calhoun to Bill Baroody, 11/6/1975, folder “Administration Personnel Shake-Up” Box 1, John O. Marsh Files, Gerald R. Ford Library

16

be as forthcoming during the investigations as Colby had been.36 Most believed that it was time

for Colby to go.

Within the administration, many felt it was important that Bush come back to the states as

soon as possible to begin selling himself to the Senate.37 When he finally arrived in Washington,

Bush quickly met with most of the Senators on the committee in charge of his hearings. After the

drama of the confirmation had subsided, Bush was able to do an admirable job leading the CIA

back into the light. He had the benefit of being an outsider to the organization and was able to

remove the taint of secrecy that had surrounded it. Overall his appointment to the CIA was a

benefit for the administration even if his confirmation process was a bit more difficult than that

of Rumsfeld, which was speedy and unanimous.

The last major change in the administration was Rockefeller’s decision to remove his

name from the 1976 ticket, which although not actually a part of the firings, did get lumped in

with them. While it was Rockefeller’s decision to remove his name, Ford did admit that he had

done little to stop him, realizing that this would help to minimize party squabbles and appease

the Right.38 Although it was true that Rockefeller was a bit too leftward leaning for the hardcore

conservatives, the removal of his name left him in a weak position to campaign effectively for

the president. Also, the timing coming so close to the firings of Schlesinger and Colby caused the

press to assume they were connected, and this removed focus from Ford’s goals as the press

continually theorized about the true meanings behind these personnel changes. Rockefeller

would have done better to wait until closer to the primaries before announcing he would not be

on the ticket. Although his announcement did harm the administration a bit at the time, the

36 Face the Nation Transcripts, Senator Church appearance, 11/9/75, Folder “Face the Nation, 11/9/75” Box 64, Nessen Files, Gerald R. Ford Library37 Memo, William T. Kendall through Max L. Friedersdorf to Jack Marsh, 11/8/75, folder “Administration Personnel Shake-Up” Box 1 John O. Marsh Files, Gerald R. Ford Library38 Gerald R. Ford, A Time To Heal (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 297

17

overall impact of his removal from the ticket is unknown. Ford’s close primary matches with

Reagan make it seem that it did help, but the close general election might have gone the other

way if Rockefeller had stayed on the ticket or at least been able to campaign effectively for the

President.

Overall it seems that Ford was the mastermind behind the so called Halloween massacre.

He had the most to gain, and the best opportunity to initiate it. Furthermore he repeatedly

admitted being behind it. The suspicious nature of the press after Watergate made it difficult for

change to happen without the appearance of impropriety, but Ford’s character and his

consistently unwavering story make it unlikely that he was hiding the truth. Similarly, those

others who have been thought responsible lacked the ability, the opportunity, or the motives to

have done this. Ford was able to put his own stamp on his administration , increasing its

openness.

18

Sources

DeFrank, Thomas. Write It When I’m Gone. New York: Putnam Adult, 2007.

Ford, Gerald R. A Time To Heal. New York: Harper and Row, 1979.

Hyland, William. Mortal Rivals: Understanding the Pattern of Soviet-American Conflict. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988.

Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

Nessen, Ron. It Sure Looks Different from the Inside. New York: Playboy Press, 1978.

Gerald R. Ford Library:

NSA Memoranda of Conversations

Presidential Handwriting File

Ron Nessen Files

James M. Cannon Files

Richard Cheney Files

Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft Files

John O. Marsh Files

19