georgian dilemmas- between a strong state and democracy

7/31/2019 Georgian Dilemmas- Between a Strong State and Democracy

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Marek Matusiak

29

GeorGian dilemmas

Bwn ong nd dMoccy


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NUMBER 29WARSAW

JULY 2012

GeorGian dilemmasBEtWEEN A StRoNg StAtE ANd dEMocRAcY

Marek Mausak


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cpyrh by orek Suw Wshnh

m. Marka Karpa / cenre fr Easern Sues

cnen ers

Aam Eberhar, Krzyszf Sraha

Er

Anna abuszewska

c-peran

Kaarzyna Kazmerska

translan

oSW

c-peran

Jm t

graph esn

PARA-BUcH

dtP: grupMea

Phraph n ver use by kn permssn f he vernn pary

n gera, he Une Nanal Mvemen

PUBLiSHERok stuw Wchch . mk Kp

cenre fr Easern Sues

ul. Kszykwa 6a, Warsaw, Plan

Phne + 48 /22/ 525 80 00

Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40

sw.waw.pl

iSBN 978-83-62936-12-0


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Ce

ExECutivE summary/5

introduCtion /7

I. GEorGia aftEr thE rosE rEvolution /11

1. se g /12

2. Ecc e /13

3. Ec e /15

II. thE politiCal systEm /18

1.te g g /18

2. Gece cce e ecc /19

3. o e /24

4.a ew c e /265. oe c c /29

III. QuEstions about GEorGias futurE /33

1. new eg ee /33

2.te ce e eec /35

3.te e e pee

/36

4. uc ce /38

5. sc ecc e /39

IV. futurE ChallEnGEs /42

1. Cege Geg /42

2. Cege e We /45


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ExEcutivE summary

Sincethe2003RoseRevolution,GeorgiahasbeenthemostspectacularexampleofasuccessfulexportoftheWesternpo-

liticalandeconomicmodeltoapost-SovietcountryotherthantheBalticStates;anexampleofacountrythathasmanagedtodevelopstrongrelationswiththeWest,aswellasecientandmodernstatestructureswhichdidnotcollapseundertheburdenofthelostwarwithRussia.

ThestrengthoftheGeorgianstateliesinitsyoung,pro-West-ernanddeterminedelitewhich,thankstothesubstantialaidprovidedbytheUSAandtheEU,hasmanagedtoreformthestatethoroughlywithinashorttimeframe.Atthesametime,however,themergingofthepoliticalelitewiththestate,andthepersonalisationofstateinstitutions,havecreatedaseriesofproblems,underminingdemocracy,weakeningstateinsti-tutionsandwideningthedistancebetweenGeorgiaandtheWest. Today, Georgias weaknesses mainly manifest them-

selvesthroughthedefectsofitsdemocracy.However,inthefuturetheycouldalsounderminethecountrysrelationswiththeWest,itsstability,andthesocialandeconomicbasesoftheGeorgianstate.

GeorgiawillholdparliamentaryelectionsinOctoberof2012andpresidentialelectionsin2013.Thesetwovoteswillcome

asamultidimensionaltestforthestatethatwasbuiltoverthelastdecade,especiallyitsstability,theconditionoftherulingeliteanditsabilitytoreconciletheparadigmsofastrongstateanddemocracy,aswellasthepoliticalmaturityoftheGeor-gianpublic.

Reformingthecurrenteconomicmodelwillbeanadditionalchallengeinthecomingyears.AftertheRoseRevolution,theGeorgianeconomyunderwentthoroughreformsaimedatlib

-

eralisationandderegulation,thankstowhichGeorgiagained


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dynamiceconomicgrowthandinternationalrecognitionasoneofthewordstopeconomicreformers.However,structuraleconomicandsocialproblemssuchaspoverty,unemploymentandthebreakdownofagricultureremainedunsolved.Inad-

dition,Georgiaisheavilydependentonforeignassistance.Itwillbeadauntingtaskfortherulingelitetodevelopaneco-nomicmodelthatwillallowsustainabledevelopmentwithoutrelyingonforeignaid.

Georgia is facing its political and economic challenges inacomplicatedinternationalsituation:ithastomaintaincloserelationswiththeEUandtheUSA,andisalsofacingthreatsfromanunstableregionalenvironmentandRussiaspolicy,aswellastheglobaleconomiccrisis.Nevertheless,theoutcomesofitsinternalprocesses,includingthedilemmasrelatedtotheupcomingelectoraltests,dependprimarilyontheGeorgianrulingeliteandpublic.


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introduction

WiththerisetopowerofPresidentMikheilSaakashviliandhiscircleintheaftermathofthe2003RoseRevolution1Georgiaen-

teredapathofdynamicreformswhichwereunprecedentedintheCIS;thesewereaimedintheinternaldimensionatcreatinganecientandmodernstate,andintheexternaldimensionatan -choringthecountryinEuropeanandEuro-Atlanticpoliticalandsecuritystructures,withaviewtopermanentlybreakingawayfromtheRussiansphereofinuence.

Thewiderangeofsuccessfulinternalandforeignpolicydevelop-mentswhichculminatedinthepromiseofafutureNATOmem-bership extended to Georgia at the Bucharest summit in April2008wasrstunderminedbytheinternalpoliticalcrisisintheautumnof 2007 (thesuppression of massanti-government pro-tests),whichadverselyaectedGeorgiasimageasthebeaconoflibertyamongthepost-Sovietstates;andevenmoreimportantly,bythewarwithRussiainAugust2008.

ThewaropenedanewchapterinGeorgiasrecenthistory.Mos -cowsrecognitionofAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiasindependenceandthedeploymentofsignicantmilitaryforcesintheirterrito -ries,combinedwiththedevelopmentofmilitaryinfrastructuresinthearea,hasindenitelypostponedtheprospectofGeorgiare-storingitsterritorialintegrity.

Intheinternationaldimension,thewardemonstratedtotheWestthatRussiawasdeterminedtodefenditsinterestsintheCISarea.

1 Themasspublicprotestsagainsttheriggedparliamentaryelectionof2No-vember2003,andmorebroadlyagainstthecorruptionandineciencyofthestateandGeorgiaseconomicbreakdown,whichledPresidentEduardShevardnadzetostepdownon23November2003.IntheaftermathoftheRoseRevolution,abroad,pro-Westerncoalitionofoppositionforcestook

over power, led by Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania and Nino Bur-janadze. On 4 January 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected as the new

presidentofGeorgia,winning96%ofthevotes.


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ItalsounderminedthecredibilityofGeorgiaspoliticalleadershipwhichinthemoreforgivingvariantwasaccusedofanimpru -dencethatallowedGeorgiatobedrawnintoaRussianprovoca-tion,andinthelessfriendlyvariantwasdeemedresponsible

fortheoutbreakofthearmedconict.ThesetwofactorsclearlydiminishedtheWesternstatesappetite 2forsignicantpoliticalandmilitaryinvolvementinGeorgia,isolatedTbilisiinternation-allyand,apparently,undidGeorgiaschancesofjoiningNATOformanyyearstocome.Thewaralsotriggeredadramaticdeclineinforeigninvestmentswhich,combinedwiththeonsetoftheglobalcrisis,hittheGeorgianeconomypainfully,and itsperformancehasstillnotreturnedtopre-warlevels.Atthesametime,how -ever,theconictwithRussiademonstratedtheresilienceoftheyoungstate,whichdidnotcollapseinthefaceofmilitarydefeat,andthestrongpositionofMikheilSaakashvilihimself,whoheldontooceandevenreinforcedhispopularity,contrarytotheex-pectationswhichRussiahadopenlyexpressed.

InthelightofthecrisisofGeorgiasbigpoliticalprojects(tore-

storethecountrysterritorialintegrityandintegratewithNATO,whichhadbeenguidingtheleadershipsinternalandforeignpol-icy),andduetotherelativelylowlikelihoodofanewconictwithRussia3,theneedforanewwaveofinternalreformshasbecome

2 ThischangeinattitudetowardsGeorgiawasthemostevidentinthecaseofthepatronofGeorgiasreforms,theUnitedStates.Between2004and2008,PresidentGeorgeW.BushhadmetPresidentMikheilSaakashvilivetimes:theUSpresidentvisitedTbilisiononeoccasion(May2005),andtheGeor

-

gianpresidentmettheUSleaderattheWhiteHousethreetimes.Inthepe-riod20092012,afterthewarandthechangeofadministrationintheUSA,PresidentBarackObamametSaakashvilithreetimes,butonlyoneofthosemeetings,on31January2012,wasanocialvisitbytheGeorgianpresidenttotheWhiteHouse(theremainingtwoencounterswerebehind-the-scenesmeetingsontheoccasionoftheNATOsummitinLisboninOctober2010,andthefuneralofRichardHolbrookeinWashingtoninJanuary2011).

3 Thelikelihoodofanewwarseemslowbecauseofsuchfactorsasthepres-enceoftheEUMMmonitoringmissionintheconictregions,Tbilisiscau-

tiouspolicytowardstheseparatistregions,andthecomingwinterOlym-picsinSochiin2014.However,itisdiculttoestimatehowthesituation

concerningAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiawillbeinuencedbythedynamics


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evident.Thisconcernsreformsinareaswhichhavehithertore -ceivedlittleattention(fromboththegovernmentandlargesec-tionsofthepublic)inter aliabecauseofthesheerscaleofthechal-lengesrelatedtotheprimaryobjectiveofensuringstatesecurity

andthoroughlyrebuildingthestateinstitutions,theneglectofwhichhasformanyyearsexposedtheSaakashvilicamptocriti-cism.Inparticular,thoseareasincludedemocratisingthepoliticalsystemtoensurethatallpoliticalgroupswillvieforvotersupportonalevelplayingeld;thatthestateisfoundedontheruleoflaw,itsinstitutionsareapolitical,anditspubliclife(includingthatofthe business and media) transparent. The social and economicsituationalsocallsfordecisivereforms.Despiteitsgoodmacro -economicperformancesincetheRoseRevolution,Georgiasecon-omyhaslaggedbehindonmodernisation4:itischaracterisedbyanarchaicemploymentstructure,highunemployment,aninef-cientagriculturalsector(whichintheSovietperiodusedtobealeadingsectoroftheeconomy),aheavydependenceonimportsand,mostimportantly,foreignaidandinvestments.

Inthissituation,theupcomingelections,toparliamentinOctober2012(therstgeneralelectionssincethewar)andthepresidencyin2013,andthequestionsaboutthefutureofPresidentSaakash-vili,thepoliticianwhohasinfactbuiltthenewGeorgiaandispersonallyresponsibleforbothitssuccessesanditsfailuresandshortcomings, willbe crucial to the countrys future. The elec-tionswillbeamultidimensionaltestofthestabilityandmaturity

oftheGeorgianstateandpoliticalsystem,inwhichthegovern-

mentsrealcommitmenttodemocraticideals,publicsupportforGeorgiascurrentpoliticalcourse,theeciencyandimpartiality

oftheinternalsituationinRussia.Alsounknownarethepotentialconse -quencesofpossibleviolenteventsinGeorgiasinternationalenvironment,such as the possible worsening of the Iran situation or a rise in Azeri-ArmeniatensionsoverNagorno-Karabakh.

4 Georgiasmainexportcommoditiesincludeferricalloys(16.7%),re-exportedcars(14.4%)andscrapmetal(6.9%).Cf.GeorgianNationalStudy,April26May4,2011.


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ofstateinstitutionsandmechanisms,theoppositionsreadinesstoparticipateindemocraticprocesses,andthepoliticalmaturityoftheeliteandthepublic,willallbeputtothetest.

Thispaper,whichappearsintherun-uptoallthosechoices,aimsto map out the political and social reality in Georgia today, aswellaspossiblescenariosforfuturedevelopments.Itdeliberatelyleavesout,ormerelysketches,externalfactorsalthoughtheseareundoubtedlycrucialtothecountrysfuturesuchasrelationswithRussia,theUSAandtheEU,regionalstability,theglobaleco -nomicsituation,et al.


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i. GEorGia aftEr thE rosE rEvolution

Inearly2004,thecampoftheRoseRevolutiontookoverwhatwas eectively a failed state: riddled with corruption, unable

toperformitsbasicfunctions,andhavingnocontroloversomepartsofitsterritory(Abkhazia,SouthOssetia)oronlynominalcontrolofothers(Adjara,Javakhetia).TheGeorgianpeoplesatti-tudetowardstheirstateduringtheruleofEduardShevardnadzewascharacterisedbydistrustandindierence.

TheRoseRevolutionawakenedtheirhopesforaradicalimprove-mentofthesituation.Thistranslatedintounprecedentedpopu -larsupportfortherevolutionarycampandespeciallyitsleaderMikheilSaakashvili,whowonmorethan96%ofthevotesinthepresidential election in January 2004. This strong democraticmandateandtheextensivestrengtheningofpresidentialpowersundertheconstitutiongaveSaakashviliandhisaidesde factofreereintoimplementreforms.RadicalchangewasmadepossiblebysupportfromtheWest,especiallytheUnitedStates,whichbecame

notonlythepoliticalpatronofGeorgiastransformation,butalsothemainsourceofthenewleadershipsinspirationindeningthedirectionsandcontentoftheirreforms.BoththeUSAandtheEUprovidedthenewGeorgianleadershipnotonlywithstrongpoliti-calbacking(intensieddialoguewithNATO,includingGeorgiaintheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy),butalsoconsiderablema-terialassistance(multi-milliongrantsandlow-interestloans)5,as

wellasconsultancyandtraining(includingathoroughreformofthearmyunderthepatronageoftheUnitedStates).

5 Intheperiod20042009, Georgia receivedaroundUS$3.137billion inOf-

cialDevelopmentAssistance(WorldBankdata).Theseguresdonotin-cludeallcategoriesofassistance,andtheyexcludealargeproportionofthe

post-warassistancepackageworthUS$4.5billion.


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1. State building

Buildingamodern,sovereignstatewasthetoppriorityforthenewleadership,ataskwhichtookupmostofthenewrulersenergy

andmaterialresources.Tothisend,athoroughreorganisationoftheentirestateapparatusatcentralandlocallevelswaslaunched.Characteristically,thechangeswerefocusedontheconsolidationofthestateandissuesofsecurityandpublicorder,whichmanifest -editselfinthetwokeyreforms:theInteriorMinistryandthearmy.

Despitetheconsiderablesocialcosts,stemmingmainlyfromjobcutsandreshuesinthepublicsector,thereformsweresuccessfulinmanyrespects.Themostfrequentlycitedachievementsof theSaakashvilicampincluderestoringcontroloverAdjara,ensuringpublicorder,almostcompletelyeliminatingcorruptionfromeve-rydaylife6,upgradingtheinfrastructure,ensuringelectricityandgassupplies,andpunctualpaymentsofsalariesandbenets.

ThestateapparatusofEduardShevardnadzesGeorgia,andthe

stateinstitutionsbuiltbythenewleadershipoverjustacoupleofyearswithconsiderabletrainingandmaterialassistancefromtheWest,wereworldsapartintermsofeectiveness,transparency,thecompetenceofcivilservants,andthematerialandtechnicalbase.Thequalityofservicesforthepeoplealsoincreasedradi -callyascorruptionwaseliminated,redtapecutandthestateof-cescomputerised.

Thereformsboostedthepeoplesrespectforthestateandtheircondence inits institutions. Thepoliceand the armyare cur-rentlythemosttrustedinstitutionsinGeorgiaaftertheGeorgianOrthodoxChurch7.Thestateisalsoanattractiveemployer,whose

6 GeorgiamoveduptheTransparencyInternationalrankingfrom133rdplace(2004)to64th(2011),aheadofsuchEUmemberstatesasSlovakia(66th),Italy

(69th

),Romania(75th

),Greece(80th

)andBulgaria(86th

).7 Cf.GeorgianNationalStudy,April26May4,2011, InternationalRepubli-canInstitute,BalticSurveysLtd./TheGallupOrganizationTheInstituteof


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appealrestsnotonlyongoodsalariesandtheprospectsfortrain-ingabroadandquickpromotions(at44,thepresidentisoneoftheoldeststateocials),butalsotheprestigeofthecivilserviceandthestrongethosofagroupofpeoplewhoarebuildingmodern

Georgianstatehoodfromscratch.Inthisway,publicadministra-tionmanagestoattractalargeproportionofthebesteducatedand

mostdynamicprofessionalsinGeorgia.

2. Economic reforms

Thecentralisationofpowerandconsolidationofthestateafter2003coincidedwithoppositeprogressincertainspheres:aten -dencytowardsliberalisation,deregulationandeventhecompletewithdrawalofthestatefromcertaindomains.Thenewleader -shipadoptedastrictlyliberaleconomicpolicyaimedatcreatinganeconomicclimatethatwouldbeasinvestment-friendlyaspos-sible8,andavoidingpracticesthatcoulddistortmarketmecha-nisms9.Inpractice,thismeantthatthestatesroleintheecon -omywasreducedconsiderably,redtapewascut,alltaxeswere

lowered and simplied, custom duties were almost completelyabolished,mostsupervisoryandregulatorybodiesweredisman-tled,andthelabourlawwasradicallyliberalised10.TheGeorgian

PollingAndMarketing,p.54.http://www.iri.org/sites/default/les/2011%20June%2028%20Survey%20of %20 Georgian%20Public %20Opi nion,%20

April%2026-May%204,%202011%281%29.pdf(lastaccessed14.11.2011).8 IntheWorldBanksDoingBusinessreport,Georgiaranked12thin2011intermsofeaseofdoingbusiness(upfrom112thin2005).Inthesamerank-ing,Polandwas70thandRussia123rd.Cf.http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB11-FullReport.pdf(lastaccessed16November2011).

9 Forexample,thepolicystatementbyPMLadoGurgenidzeofOctober2008ontheGeorgianeconomicmodelhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-BM-SjuRckqw(lastaccessed16November2011).

10 The InternationalLabour Organisation (ILO) has criticised the Georgian

labourlawsforyears.Inits2010report,theILOexpressedconcernaboutGeorgiasfailuretoimplementconventionsontherighttoorganiseandtherighttocollectivebargaining,amongotherprovisions.


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leadershipalsostoppedpursuinganysectoraleconomicpolicies.Thestatealsowithdrewfromthewelfaresphere,andundertookalarge-scaleprivatisationofstateproperty.

Table 1.Georgiasmacroeconomicindexesin20032010

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

GDP(US$billion) 3.99 5.12 6.41 7.74 10.17 12.79 10.76 11.67

GDPper capitaPPP

(US$thousand)

2.9 3.2 3.6 4 4.7 4.9 4.8 5.1

GDPgrowthrate 11.1% 5.9% 9.6% 9.4% 12.3% 2.3% -3.8% 6.4%

Foreigndirectinvestments(US$billion)

0.33 0.49 0.45 1.17

1.75(Geo-stat:2.01)

1.56 0.65 0.81

Taxrevenue(GELbillion)

1 1.53 1.98 2.64 3.67 4.72 4.39 4.87

Unemployment - 12.5% 13.8% 13.6% 13.3% 16.5% 16.9% 16.3%

se:WB,IMF,Geostat

Thankstothispolicy,combinedwithaneectiveghtagainst

corruptionandthegreyeconomy,Georgiaexperienceddynamiceconomic growth, very good macroeconomic performance andrecognition abroad for several years after the revolution. TheGDP and foreign direct investments were growing rapidly (seeTable).However,thewarwithRussiaandthenancialcrisishittheGeorgianeconomybadly:foreign investmentsdropped dra-matically,theeconomycontractedbynearly4%in2009,andun-employmentincreased.Apost-warpackageofinternationalaidworthUS$4.5billionallowedthecountrytoavoidadeeperslumpandrestoregrowth,albeitatamuchslowerratethanbeforethe


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war.Anumberofstructuralsocialandeconomicproblemshavealsoremainedunsolved(seebelow).

3. Education reforms

Thereconstructionofthestateafter2003wasaccompaniedbyamajoreorttopromotesocialmodernisation,withspecialfocuson education. Education spending increased substantially aftertheRoseRevolution11,andaneducationreformprogrammewaslaunchedwithaviewtobringingtheorganisationoftheeducationsystemclosertoWesternstandards(includingthroughagradualimplementationoftheBolognasystem),increasingtransparency(uniedcentralentranceexamsforuniversities,exchangeofex-ecutivecadresinalluniversities)andimprovingtheinfrastruc -turalbase.Muchemphasiswasplacedonpromotingtheknowl -edgeofEnglishamongpupilsandstudents,attheexpenseoftheteachingofRussian 12.ThecapitalcitysIliaUniversity,whichwasestablishedaccordingtoAnglo-Saxonprinciplesofliberaledu-cation,iscurrentlythebestuniversityintheentireregion,and

asymbolofthosechanges.

Educationhasbeenoneofthemostimportantareasforexperi-mentationandunconventionalprojectsfortheGeorgiangovern-ment.In2010,aprogrammecalledTeachandLearnWithGeorgiawaslaunched13,withtheobjectiveofinvitingtenthousandforeign

11 From2.1%oftheGDPin2003to3.2%oftheGDPin2009,whiletheGDPitselfwasgrowingrapidly.Forcomparison,theEU-27countriesspentaround5%onaverageoftheirGDPoneducationin2008.

12 Asa measureof the eectiveness of the governmentseorts to promoteEnglish, during the 2010 high-school leaving exams 70% of pupils choseEnglishastheforeignlanguage,comparedto20%whochoseRussian.Cf.InterviewwiththeGeorgianministerforeducation,DmitryShashkin,onEkho Moskvy radio on 9 July 2011, http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/790284-echo/(lastaccessed16.11.2011).

13 Cf.http://tlg.gov.ge/.AccordingtotheMinistryofEducation,around1500teachersareexpectedtoarriveundertheTLGprogrammeduringtheschoolyear20112012.


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teachersofEnglishtoGeorgiaby2014,whowouldteachthelan-guageinschoolsalloverthecountryforlodgingsandpocketmon -ey.Inanotherinitiative,thegovernmentdecidedtogivemobileeducationalcomputerstoallrst-graders(60,000suchcomput-

ersaretobedistributedtopupilsthroughoutGeorgiaduringtheschoolyear2011-12)14.

Thesetwoprogrammesarecharacteristicofhowthenewleader -shipandthepresidentpersonallyprefertooperate.Ontheonehand,theydemonstratethenewleadersenergyandcreativityinmodernisingGeorgia,andontheothertherevolutionaryfaith,typical of the Saakashvili camp, that the countrys structuralproblemsanditscivilisationalbackwardnesscanquicklybeover-comethankstodeterminationandgoodideas.

ThereformsimplementedbytheSaakashvilicamphavecreatedaunique,statist-liberalstatemodelinGeorgia,whichisunlikethemodelsfoundintheotherformerSovietrepublicorthoseintheEuropeanUnion.Inasituationwherethepost-Sovietsociety

waspassive,theprivatesectorunderdevelopedandthecivilso-

cietyinstitutionsweak,thenewGeorgianstateledbyagroupofpeoplewithaclearsenseofdirectionandconsiderableforeignassistancehasbecomethemostimportantvehicleformodernis-ingthecountry,inbothmaterialandsocialdimensions.

HarassmentfromMoscowputtheresilienceoftheGeorgianex-

perimenttoatestintheyearsthatfollowedtheRoseRevolution.Georgiahaslargelymanagedtoenditsdependenceonnaturalgas and electricity supplies from Russia15,whichthelatterhad

14 ThecomputerswereassembledinGeorgia,atanewly-openedfactorybuiltinco-operationwithIntel.Inthefuture,thefactoryisexpectedtoassembleuptoonemillioncomputersayearforexport.Cf.http://www.mes.gov.ge/content.php?id=2543&lang=eng(lastaccessed16November2011).

15 In2005,Georgiaimported100%ofitsgasfromRussia;currentlyitimports

80%fromAzerbaijanand19%fromRussia(partlyaspaymentoftransitcharges for gas sent by Russia to Armenia). Georgia also used to importelectricityfromRussia,butcurrentlyitexportselectricitytoallfourneigh-


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previouslybeenusedasinstrumentsofpoliticalpressure.Despitesignicantlosses,GeorgiaalsosurvivedtheRussianembargoonitsexportsofwineandmineralwater 16.ThenaltestcamewiththewarofAugust2008,inwhichGeorgiawasdefeatednotonly

militarily,butalsopolitically,and consequentlythefundamen-talassumptionsofTbilisispost-revolutionarypolicywerecalled

into question. The war considerably reduced Georgias chancesofreintegratingAbkhaziaandSouthOssetia,andofcloserinte-grationwithNATO;exposedthelimitationsofthealliancewiththeUnitedStates,leadingtoalooseningofmutualties(inwhichthechangeofadministrationintheUSwasalsoafactor);under-minedMikheilSaakashvilisreliabilityintheeyesofhisWesternpartners;andnally,dentedtheprestigeofthearmy,therecon-structionofwhichhadbeenoneofthesymbolsofthepost-2003reforms.Yetinspiteofallthis,Georgianeithercollapsednorwentintoapoliticalcrisis.Asoneauthorandcriticofthegovernmenthasadmitted,intheaftermathofthewarGeorgiahaslostsometerritoryandgainedsomerefugees.Otherthanthat,nothingofsignicancehaschanged17.

bouringcountries.Source:GeorgianEconomyOverview,April2011.16 In2005,Georgianwineexports were worthUS$81.3million. In 2011, the

valueofexportsfelltoUS$54.1millioneventhoughthequalityofwinehadimprovedandGeorgiahaddiversieditsexportmarkets.Source:Geostat.

17 Czekajc namesjasza,interview withZaza Burchuladze,Rzeczpospolita,9 September 2011. http://www.rp.pl/artykul/714696.html (last accessed19November2011).


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ii. thE political systEm

1. The ruling group

TheRoseRevolutionopenedupanewchapterinGeorgiashis-tory,andlaunchedawaveofprofoundchangesinnearlyallar-

easofsociallife.Thegroupofreformersbroughttopowerbytherevolution,especiallyitsleaderandsymbol,PresidentMikheilSaakashvili,havehadacrucialsayindeterminingtheshapeandcontentofthosechangesforovereightyears.Sincehetookof-ceinJanuary2004,Saakashvilihashadadecisiveinuenceontheformationofthethestateapparatus,thepoliticalsystem,thebusinessenvironment,themedialandscape,andmore.Asthemainarchitectofandtheexecutiveforcebehindthereforms,thepresidenthasdominatedpubliclifeinGeorgia,bothinthepersonaldimension(mostpublicinstitutionsandthemedia,aswellaslargesectionsoftheeconomyandbusinessarestaedwiththepresidentscurrentorformeraides)andatthelevelofideas (setting the agenda, dening the directions of develop-

ment).Asaresult,fullpowerinGeorgia,formalandinformal,hasbeenconcentratedinthehandsofPresidentSaakashviliandanarrowcircleofhisclosestaides,whichhasremainedrela-tivelystabledespiteanumberofspectaculardefections.Despitethelongdurationofhistenure,thediculteconomicsituation,thesuccessiveinternalcrises(theoppositionprotestsof2007,2009and2011)and,mostimportantly,thelostwarwithRussia,

PresidentSaakashvilistillholdsastrongpopularmandate.Ac-

cordingtopublicopinionpollscommissionedbytheNationalDemocraticInstituteandpublishedinOctober2011,theheadofstateenjoysanapprovalrateof64%18.

18 Cf.http://pik.tv/ru/news/story/21405-reyting-ndi-partiy-gruzii(lastacces-sed19October2011).ThepollwasmostprobablyconductedbeforeBidzinaIvanishvilideclaredthathewasstartinghispoliticalactivity(seebelow).


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ThispredominanceofthepresidentialcampoverallaspectsofpubliclifeinGeorgiahasledtothedevelopmentofanarbitrarymodelofstatemanagement.Keydecisionsaretakenbythepresi-dentsinnercircle,oftenwithoutinvolvingtheformalstructures

and mechanisms of the state (and nearly always without con-sultingthepublic),andwithvisibledisregardfortheopposition,

whichtherulinggroupperceivesaseitherincompetentorcollab-oratingwithRussia.Withtheexceptionofahandfulofministers,theprimeministerandthegovernmentinfactstayonthemar-ginsofthedecision-makingprocess19.Likewisetheparliament,dominatedbythepresidentsUnitedNationalMovement,hasnosignicantsay,anditsvotesanddebatesonlyservetoformallyendorsedecisionsthathavealreadybeentaken.

2. Governance practice versus democratic standards

Thepresidentand the politicalcampof his supporters came topowerpledgingtorepairthestate,restoreitsterritorialintegrityanddemocratisethepoliticalsystem.Despitethereformsimple-

mentedsince2004toexpanddemocraticfreedoms,theformertwoobjectiveshaveclearlybeenthepriorityforthenewleader-shipsincethestart20.Theweaknessofthesystemofchecksandbalances(theopposition,independentmedia,civilsociety),thefocusonstatebuilding,stabilityandsecurity,andconsequentlythe considerable centralisation of power, have all led rstly toaslowdownofpoliticalreform,andthentotheriseofphenomena

whichclearlydepartfromthestandardsofademocraticstateandtheruleoflaw.

19 BetweentheRoseRevolutionandthebeginningof2012,Georgiahadveprimeministers,sixforeignministers,sixnanceministersandsevende -fenceministers.

20 ThoseaspirationsfoundtheirsymbolicexpressioninMikheilSaakashvilisoathatthetombofkingDavidtheBuilder,whosereigninitiatedtheperiodoftheGeorgianstatesgreatestpowerbetweenthe11thandthe13thcenturies.

Intheoath,takenontheeveoftheinaugurationofSaakashvilisrsttermaspresident,thenewheadofstatepromisedtobuildastrongandunitedGeorgiaandrestoreitsterritorialintegrity.


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Themostimportantofthosephenomenainclude:

a)Noclearseparationbetweentherulinggroupandthestateap -paratus

Since 2004, President Saakashvilis camp has had a free reinindeciding how thestate apparatus shouldbe organised, andwhoshouldbeappointedtopostsatalllevelsoftheadministra-tion.ManyinstitutionswerebuiltfromscratchaftertheRoseRevolution,andareinextricablyconnectedwiththepeoplewhowereinchargeoftheirreform.Moreover,manycivilservantsarealsomembersoftherulingparty.Thisblurstheboundariesbetweenpoliticalstructuresandthestate,createstheriskofthestatebeingappropriatedbyonepoliticalgroup,and leavesthestatepronetoexploitationforpoliticalends.DuringtheJanu-ary2008presidentialelections,thescaleofirregularities(con -sistinginactiveuseofthestateapparatusduringthecampaignandthevotingitself)wassuchthatitledtocriticismfromin -ternational institutionsandallegationsofelectoralfraudfrom

theopposition(whosemembersaccusedthepresidentofhavingaddedseveralpercentofvotestohisshowinginordertoavoidasecondroundofvoting).ThelocalelectionsinMay2010gen -erallyreceivedpositiveassessmentsfrominternationalobserv-ers,althoughnumerousirregularitieswerealsoreporteddur-ingthatballot.AccordingtoareportbytheGeorgianbranchofTransparencyInternational,largenumbersofpublicocials,

whowereformallyonleaveatthattime,wereinvolvedinthecampaignandusedtheiroces,ocephonesandcarsforcam -paignpurposes.21

21 Cf.TransparencyInternationalGeorgia.The Use of Administrative Resourc-

es for Election Campaign 2010. Local Self-Government Elections Final Report.http://transparency.ge/sites/default/les/post_attachments/Final%20Re -port%20on%20AAR_ENG_0.pdf(lastaccessed13October2011).


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b)Informalgovernmentswayoverthemedia

FreedomofspeechisassuredinGeorgia:thereareindependentnewspapers,radiostationsandonlinemedia.However,asinthe

otherformerSovietcountries,televisionremainsthemainsourceofinformationfortheGeorgianpublic.Theprivatetelevisionsta-tionsRustavi2andImedi,theonlyTVchannelswithnationalreachapartfromthepublicTVChannel1,arethemostpopu-lar,andtheytakeaclearlypro-governmentline22.EventhoughbothRustavi2andImediareformallyindependentofthestate,inpracticetheownershipofbothtelevisionsisunclear(Rusta -vi2isownedbytwocompaniesregisteredintheVirginIslandsandtheMarshallIslands).This,combinedwiththeirclearlypro-governmentcharacter,hasledtospeculationthatthesechannelsare covertly controlled by the ruling camp (Imedis CEO GiorgiArveladzehasformerlyservedas theministerforeconomyandhasworkedasapresidentialaide)23.Criticsoftherulinggroupareallowedverylimitedaccesstothosemediaoutlets.

c)Elitecorruption

One of the greatest achievements of the Rose Revolution hasbeentoeradicatecorruptionalmostcompletelyfrom theevery-daylivesofcitizens.InMay2011,97%ofrespondentsrepliednotothequestionDidyouhavetopayabribetoobtainanadmin -istrativedecisionorserviceduringthelast12months? 24.Atthe

22 InanopinionpollcarriedoutinApril2011,thenewsservicesofthedierenttelevisionstationsweredeemedclearlypro-governmentby53%(Rustavi2),43%(Imedi)and48%(Channel1)ofrespondentsrespectively.Cf.TheCaucasusRe -searchResourceCenters,GeorgianModelasseenbyGeorgians,May2011.

23 TransparencyInternationalGeorgia, Television inGeorgiaOwnership,ControlandRegulation,20November2009;http://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/Media%20Ownership%20November%202009%20Eng.pdf(lastaccessed20November2011).

24 Cf.GeorgianNationalStudy,26April-4May2011,InternationalRepublicanInstitute,BalticSurveysLtd./TheGallupOrganization,TheInstituteofPollingAndMarketing,p.9.


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same time, however, there is much speculation about corruptpracticeswithinthepowerelite.Suchpracticesallegedlyincludecloselinksbetweentherulinggroupandbigbusiness25,aswellasundisclosedcontrolbymembersoftherulingeliteofimpor-

tantGeorgianenterprises.TheopaqueownershipstructuresofmanyimportantenterprisesinGeorgia,whichareoftenownedbycompaniesregisteredintaxheavens,favoursuchspeculation.AccordingtoamemberoftheGeorgianbranchofTransparencyInternational, quoted in a report by the Carnegie Endowment,Onceyougetaboveacertainlevel,youalwaysseemtoendupinCyprusoraP.O.boxintheBahamas26.

d)Lackofafullyindependentjudiciary

Eventhoughanumberofregulatorychangeshavebeenenactedto buttress theindependence of the judiciary (judgesare nownominatedforlife,attemptstopressurethejuryarepenalised,andjudgessalarieshaveincreasedseveral-fold),theindepend-enceofjudgesinGeorgiaremainsproblematic.Largesections

of the public (43% of citizens, according to a May 2011 poll27)perceivethecourtsasmoreorlesspoliticallyavailable.Ontheonehand,thisperceptionstemsfromtheexistenceofinstru-ments with which thegovernment is able to discipline judges(aftertheirnomination,judgeshavetoserveathree-yearpro-bationperiod,andmaybepermanentlymovedfromtheircur-rentposttoanycourtinGeorgia,withoutbeingconsultedabout

itandwithouthavingtogiveconsent28

);andontheother,from

25 Cf.forexamplePoliticalParty.FinanceReport,TransparencyInternation-alGeorgia,Tbilisi2011.http://transparency.ge/sites/default/les/post_at-tachments/TI-G-PartyFinance-ENG.pdf(lastaccessed20November2011).

26 Quotedafter:ThomasdeWaal,Georgiaschoices.Chartingafutureinun-certaintimes,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace2011.http://car -negieendowment.org/les/georgias_choices.pdf(lastaccessed20.11.2011).

27

Cf.TheCaucasusResearch ResourceCenters, GeorgianModelasseenbyGeorgians,May2011.28 Cf.JusticeinGeorgia,GeorgiaYoungLawyersAssociation,Tbilisi2010.


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thejudgestendencytoguessthegovernmentswishes29,espe-ciallyincaseswithapoliticalcontext.

e)Excessiveroleofthesecuritystructures

ThenewsecuritystructuresestablishedaftertheRoseRevo-lutionhavefromthebeginningbeenamongthemosteectivestatebodies,andhavebeenthemostdevotedtothecauseofre-buildingGeorgia.Atthesametime,theyhavealwaysprovideddirectbackingtotherulingcamp,andasaresultofthenationalinterestbeingconatedwith theinterestof theruling group,theyhavealsobeenusedforpoliticalends.TheroleoftheIn-teriorMinistrysstructuresintakingcontrolovertheopposi -tionTVchannelImediintheautumnof2007mayserveasanexample.

Anotherproblemconcernsthelackofdemocraticoversightovertheactivitiesofthesecuritystructures,andthelackofpoliticalresponsibilityforthis.Inthiscontext,theJanuary2006murder

of a 28-year-old banker Sandro Girgvliani by o-duty InteriorMinistryocers,inwhich,accordingtospeculation,topMinis -tryocialsmayalsohavebeenimplicated,isasymboliccase.TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshasruledthattheinvestigationintothatcasemanifestlylackedtherequisiteindependence,im-partiality,objectivityandthoroughness30.

Thesignicantroleplayedbythesecuritystructuresinthecoun-

tryssocialandpoliticallife,thelackofanyoversightoftheiractivi -ties,theeasewithwhichtheauthoritiesresorttoforcefulmethods

29 Interviewwitha memberoftheinternationalanalystcommunityduringastudyvisittoGeorgiainMay2011.

30 EuropeanCourtofHumanRights,CaseofEnukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia,

applicationno.25091/07,Judgment,Strasbourg26April2011,http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&sessionid=79655442&skin=hudoc-en(lastaccessed25November2011).


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toresolveinternalcrises,aswellastherestrictiveregulations31andthewillingnessoftheenforcementbodiesandcourtstousethem32,allaecttheatmosphereofpubliclife,andhavegivenrisetoallega-tionsthatGeorgiaisturningintoapolicestate.

3. Opposition parties

In Georgia there are a number of opposition political groupswhosetraditionsdatebacktothe1990s,oreventheperiodbeforethebreak-upoftheSovietUnion.However,thebulkoftodaysoppositionemergedasaresultofschismsthatoccurredwithinthecampoftheRoseRevolutionsince2003,andmanyofthemostrecognisableoppositionpoliticianswereMikheilSaakash -vilisclose aides inthe past (NinoBurjanadze, Irakli Alasaniaandothers).

Havingcontestedtheresultsofthe2008parliamentaryelectionsduetoallegedfraud,theoppositioninGeorgianowfunctionsout-sideparliament.Formallyaparliamentaryoppositiongroup,the

ChristianDemocraticMovementiscommonlyregardedasasys-

temicoppositionwhichdoesnotquestionthepresidentialcampsmonopolyonpower33.Morethanadozenmoreorlessactiveop-positionpartiesaredispersedoutsidetheparliament.Whattheyhaveincommonislimitednancialandhumanresources,poorlydevelopedstructuresoutsidethecapital,andnoaccesstothema-

jormedia.Thisputstheminapositionwhichisclearlyinferiorto

31 TheGeorgianCodeofAdministrativeMisdemeanourprovidesforthepos-sibilityofadministrativedetentionofupto90days,amongothermeasures.Cf.AdministrativeError.Georgiasawedsystemofadministrativedeten-tion, Human Rights Watch 2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/les/reports/georgia0112ForUpload.pdf(lastaccessed29January2012).

32 Georgiahasoneoftheworldshighestprisonpopulationsper100,000in-habitants.Cf.forexampleWorldPrisonPopulationList8thedition,http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th_ 41.pdf

(lastaccessed10December2011).33 Cf.forexampleLeakedCable:CDMMayoralCandidateEncouragedbyGovttoRun,http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23898(lastaccessed10December2011).


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thatoftherulingelite,withitsextensiveadministrative,humanandnancialresourcesandaccesstothemedia.Personalconictsdividetheopposition,makingthesituationevenmoredicult.

The opposition principally emphasises the authoritarian traitsoftheSaakashvilicampsruleandthepooreconomicsituationofthegeneralpublic.Ithascriticisedtherepressivebehaviourofthesecurityapparatus,thearroganceofpoweranditsdisconnectionfromthe realities of Georgian life(thisparticularly pertains tothepresidentpersonally),andtherandomandsupercialnatureofmanyactions34.However,theoppositionhasnotbeenabletoformulateapositivealternativevision.Asaresult,criticismstendtobepersonal,andfocusoncallsforMikheilSaakashvilitoberemovedfrompower.

Sinceideologicalissuesareoflittleimportance,themaincriteriabywhichtheoppositiongroupsdierentiatethemselvesconcerntheirchoiceofmethodsforpoliticalstruggleandtheirattitudestowardsRussia.PoliticianssuchasNinoBurjanadze(theformer

parliamentaryspeaker),arereadyformoreorlessopenco-op-

erationwithMoscow,andadvocateremovingSaakashvilifrompowerthroughmassstreetprotests.GovernmentpropagandahasconsistentlyaccusedthissectionoftheoppositionoflinkstoRus-sian secret services, including through Georgian oligarchs liv-inginRussiaandWesternEurope,andmembersofthecriminalunderground35.Mostoftheotheroppositionparties(suchasOur

Georgia/FreeDemocrats,runbyGeorgiasformerambassadortotheUNIrakliAlasania,ortheRepublicanParty)seektoremoveSaakashvilisgroupfrompowerthroughelections,andadvocate

34 TheprojecttoenhanceGeorgiasagriculturalstandardsbyinvitingwhitefarmersfromSouthAfricatosettleinthecountryisaclassicexampleoftheauthoritieshighcreativity,whichneverthelesshasproducedlittleconcreteeect.Cf.http://www.boers.ge/(lastaccessed12December11).

35 Cf. for example Robert Coalson, Burjanadzes husband, becomes focus of

Georgiapoliticalintrigue,RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty,26March2009,http://www.rferl.org/content/Burjanadzes_Husband_Becomes_Focus_Of_Georgian_Political_Intrigue/1563251.html(lastaccessed13December2011).


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acontinuationofthepro-Westerncourse.Nevertheless,therul-inggrouphasinfactmonopolisedtherhetoricofmodernisationandintegrationwiththeWest,whichmakesitevenmoredicultfortheoppositiongroupstoreachandbenoticedbytheelectorate

outsidethebigcities.

Becauseofitsfragmentationandreactiveapproachtothegovern-mentsmoves,theoppositionenjoysonlylimitedpublicsupport.Even though the potential for discontent is signicant (mainlybecauseofsocialissuessuchasunemployment,poverty,growingsocialinequalitiesetc.),thepublic,fatiguedbythefutilityofanti-governmentstreetprotestsinpreviousyears,perceivestheop-positionasunconstructive,bereftofideasofhowtocarryonthepoliticalstruggle,andessentiallyunpreparedtotakeoverpowerinGeorgia.

4. A new political player

AnewplayerontheGeorgianpoliticalsceneisBidzinaIvanish-

vili,therichestmaninGeorgia,withassetsworthanestimatedUS$6.4billion(correspondingtomorethanhalfofGeorgiasan-nualGDP),whounexpectedlyannouncedhisentryintopoliticsinOctober2011.Unliketheoppositionparties,hehasthepotentialtochallengetherulinggroupsmonopolisticposition 36.Hisambi-

36 AsintheotherformerSovietcountries, theactiveinvolvementoftheso-called oligarchs in politics is not a new phenomenon in Georgia. Badri(Arkadi)Patarkatsishvili,aGeorgianbillionairewhooperatedinRussiainthe1990s,isagurewhoresemblesBidzinaIvanishviliinmanyrespects.BecauseofhiscloselinkstotheRussianoligarchBorisBerezovsky,whowasinconictwithVladimirPutin,PatarkatsishvilireturnedtoGeorgiain2001whereheusedhisimmensewealth(estimatedatUS$12billion)todeveloplarge-scalebusinessandcharitableactivities.DissatisedwiththereformsimplementedaftertheRoseRevolution,whichunderminedhisbusinessinterests,PatarkatsishvilimovedovertotheoppositionagainstSaakash-vili;henancedtheanti-governmentprotestsinautumn2007,amongotherventures,andharshlycriticisedtherulinggroupinhismedia(mainlyIme-

ditelevision).HealsochallengedMikheilSaakashviliasapresidentialcan-didateintheelectionsofJanuary2008.Thankstohishugewealth,personal

inuence,linkstotheRussiangovernmentandbusiness,andthefactthat


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tionistodefeatthepresidentsUnitedNationalMovementintheupcomingparliamentaryelectionsandformanewgovernment.Ivanishvili intends the newly founded Georgian Dream publicmovementandtheGeorgianDreamDemocraticGeorgiaopposi-

tionpartytobehispoliticalvehicles.

IvanishviliearnedhismoneyintheopaquebusinessenvironmentofRussiainthe1990s.BeforereturningtoGeorgia,hecarriedoutlarge-scaleactivitiesinthebanking,metallurgicandothersectorsinRussia.AftertheRoseRevolutionhewasawardedGeorgiancitizenshipbyPresidentSaakashviliandresettledinGeorgia,al-thoughhekeptsomeofhisRussianassets.Accordingtouncon-rmedreports,IvanishvilisupportedtheauthoritiesnanciallyformanyyearsafterreturningtoGeorgia,which,iftrue,wouldmakehimtthepatternwherebythenewGeorgiangovernmentamnestiedGeorgianoligarchsinreturnfortheirnancialsup -port. The billionaire has gained recognition and popularity inGeorgiathankstohislarge-scalecharitableactivitiesandhissup-portfortheGeorgianOrthodoxChurch,eventhoughIvanishvili

hasconsistentlyavoidedthemediaormakinganypublicstate-

ments,andhasbeensurroundedbyanatmosphereofsecrecy.HeisbelievedformanyyearstohavenancedgrantsformembersoftheGeorgianintelligentsiawhowereimpoverishedasaresultofthetransformation.Accordingtounconrmedreports,hehasalsonancedtheconstructionoftheHolyTrinityCathedral,thelargestreligiousbuildingintheSouthernCaucasus,whichrises

aboveTbilisi.

WhenIvanishvilideclaredthathewasenteringpolitics,opposi -tiongroupsstartedtoseekhisfavourandopportunitiestoco-operatewithhim.Theauthoritiesalsorespondedimmediately:IvanishviliwasstrippedofhisGeorgiancitizenship,asaresultof

hepossessedhisownmedia,PatarkatsishviliposedthegreatestchallengetotheSaakashviligroupsincetheRoseRevolution.InFebruary2008,heunexpectedlydiedofaheartattackinLondon.


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whichhecannotlegallyengageinpoliticsornanceparties37,andtheNationalBankofGeorgiaopenedaninvestigationintoallegedmoneylaunderingbyhisCartuBank.Meanwhile,membersoftherulinggrouphavestartedtopubliclyaccusethebillionaireofact-

ingonordersfrom,andintheinterestof,Russia.

Little is known about Ivanishvilis views. His statements sug-gestthathesupportsbothapro-Westernorientation, includingGeorgiasfutureaccessiontoNATO,andcloserrelationswithRus -sia.However,hispolicydeclarationshavebeenverygeneralandpopulistinnature.Thepoliticalpartieshehaschosenashismainpartners,theRepublicanPartyandAlasaniasOurGeorgia/FreeDemocrats,represent thepro-Westernoptionandarerecognis-ableandreliablepotentialpartnersfortheWest.However,Ivan-ishviliscirclealsoincludessomemembersoftheoldregime,fromtheperiodofEduardShevardnadzesrule.Moreover,thefactthatIvanishvilihaslongbeendoingbusinessinRussia,andthescaleofhisbusinessactivities,engenderspeculationsthathemightbeimplicated in murky business and political relations in Russia.

Thus,thenewpoliticalforcethatthebillionaireisbuildingupisinmanywaysnon-transparentandunpredictable,bothwithre-gardtoitspolicyissuesandthequestionofwhowillultimatelyhavethedecisivesayinit.

ItsdiculttosaywhyIvanishvilihasmadethissuddenturn.Hisactionssofardemonstratealackofpoliticalexperienceorany

clearstrategyofaction.Nevertheless,hisemergenceonthepoliti-

calsceneposesaseriouschallengetotherulinggroup.AnumberoffactorspredisposeIvanishvilitoplayamajorroleinGeorgianpolitics, either personally ifhe regains his citizenship, or indi-rectlyifnot.Thesefactors includehishugenancialresources,

37 Ivanishviliwasstrippedofhiscitizenshipunderthepretextthat,alreadyacitizenofGeorgiaandRussia,hehadrecentlyadoptedathird,Frenchciti-

zenship,asheannouncedinoneofhisstatements.Accordingtothelegalinterpretationpresentedbytheauthorities,thisautomaticallyentailedtheexpiryofhisGeorgiancitizenship.


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apositivepublicimageandgoodrelationswiththeGeorgianOr-thodox Church.Knowledgeabout therelationsand connectionswithintherulingeliteisalsoanimportantassetinIvanishvilispoliticalcapital,whichheisusingbysendingsignalstokeymem-

bersoftherulinggroupthathecouldoerasafealternativetoMikheil Saakashvili. The billionaire also benets from the ex-pectationsoftheEUandtheUnitedStatesthatthecampaignandvotinginthenextparliamentaryelectionsshouldpresentmajorprogressintermsofdemocraticstandards,whichlimitsthecur-rentGeorgianleadershipsroomformanoeuvre.

5. Other public actors

a)TheOrthodoxChurch

TheGeorgianOrthodoxChurch,andespeciallyPatriarchIliaIIwhohasbeenleadingtheChurchsince1977,areveryimportantactorsinGeorgiaspoliticallife,eveniftheyseldomtakethelimelight.Or -thodoxChristianityisaconstitutiveelementofGeorgiannational

identity,andtheimportanceofreligioninsociallifehasbeengrow-

ingsteadilysinceGeorgiaregainedindependencein1991.

The Orthodox Church and the Patriarch are the most trustedpublicinstitutionsandenjoygreatauthority.AsthePapalNun-cioClaudioGugerottiallegedlysaid,Ifthepeopleareforcedtochoose,theywillchoosethechurchoverthegovernment38.The

specialstatusoftheOrthodoxChurchisregulatedbyanaccordconcludedin2002betweenthestateandtheChurch(commonlyreferredtoastheconcordat).

Thechurchisostensiblyconservativeonmoralissues,openaboutitsaversiontootherconfessions,anddistrustfuloftheWest39.Be-

38

Georgia: impossibletogovernwithoutGodandBible,http://www.wikile-aks.org/cable/2008/12/08TBILISI2269.html(lastaccessed14.12.2011).

39 Cf. for example the patriarchs call to refrain from sending children to


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cause of the growing importance of the church in Georgiasso-ciallifeinrecentyears,manyobserversclaimthattheeectivemodernisationofthestateafter2003hasbeenaccompaniedbyatraditionalistbacklashinsociallifeandpublicmorals.Atthe

sametime,churchorganisations(suchascharities)remainthemostimportantplatformofsocialactivityfortheGeorgianpublic.

Thegreatauthorityenjoyedby the church isvisible inthe factthatduringthecountrysmajorpoliticalcrises(suchasthemassoppositionprotestsin2007and2009),thegovernment,theop-positionandamajorityofthepublicturnedtothePatriarchformediationandassistanceinresolvingthetensions.

Whilethechurchisnotdirectlyinvolvedinpolitics,ithassofartakenthesideofthe status quo duringcrises,ineectthesideofthegovernment.However,thechurchhaspreservedastrongandindependentpositiontowardstherulinggroup,andhasvocallyexpressed its discontent wheneverit sawt.Thechurch is theonlysocialinstitutionwhoseopinionthegovernmenthastotake

intoaccount,andwhosefavoursitactivelyneedstoseekbecausethesecannotbetakenforgranted,asdemonstratedbythePatri-archsappealforBidzinaIvanishviliscitizenshiptoberestored.

BecauseofitstraditionallycloserelationswiththeRussianOr -thodoxChurch,criticsoftenconsidertheGeorgianchurch(oratleastaconsiderableproportionofitshighclergy)tohavelinksto

RussiaoreventorepresentRussianinterests.Atthesametime,however,thechurch,andIliaIIpersonally,haveclearlydistancedthemselvesfromRussianpolicyandadoptedastanceontheis-sueofreintegratingSouthOssetiaandAbkhaziawhichisclosertothatoftheGeorgiangovernment40.

schoolsabroadbecause,beingimmature,theycouldbeinuencedbythewrongrolemodels.Patriarch:RefrainfromSendingKidsAbroadforEdu-

cation,03October10,http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22722(lastaccessed14.12.2011).40 For example, the jointvisit in August 2006 by the Presidentand the Pa-


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ThefactthatIliaIIsstancetowardsGeorgiasEuropeanandEuro-AtlanticaspirationsismoderatelyfavourabledespitehisandhischurchsdistrustofWesterncultureandvaluesisavaluableas-setfortherulinggroup.Thereforethequestionofwhowillsuc -

ceedIliaII(whoisnow79yearsold)asleaderofthechurchwillbeveryimportantforthecountrysfuture.Ifananti-Westernandpro-Russiancleric becomes the nextpatriarch then, even ifhedoesnotenjoyasmuchauthorityasIliaII,itwillbemoredicultfortheGeorgianleadershiptocontinueitspro-Westerncourse.

b)Thethirdsector

UnderEduardShevardnadze,Georgiahadanextensiveandac-tivethirdsectorwhichplayedamajorroleintheRoseRevo-lution.WhenMikheilSaakashvilicametopower,non-govern-mentalorganisationsbecameahumanresourcepoolforthenewauthorities,andmanyprominentmembersoftherulinggroupenteredtheworldofpoliticsfromtheNGOsector.TheoutowofqualiedindividualsfromNGOstothestateadministration,

and the decrease in funding available to them (many donorstransferredtheirfundstogovernmentalprogrammesaftertherevolution)haveconsiderablyweakenedtheeectivenessoftheNGOsectorinGeorgia.AlthoughNGOsinGeorgiaarenumerousandenjoymuchbetterconditionsthaninanyotherneighbour-hoodpost-Sovietcountry,infacttheyoperateonamuchsmallerscaleandaremarkedlylessactivethanbeforetherevolution.

GiventheweaknessandfragmentationoftheGeorgianopposi-

tion,theweaknessoftheNGOsectorposesanadditionalprob -lemforGeorgiandemocracy41.

triarchtothevillageofChkhaltaintheKodoriGorge;untilAugust2008thiswasapartofAbkhaziacontrolledbyTbilisi,andtheseatoftheloyalistgovernmentoftheAutonomousRepublicofAbkhazia,analternativetotheseparatistauthoritiesinSukhumi.

41 AnextensivereportonthecurrentconditionofGeorgiasNGOsectorcanbe found here: http://www.cipdd.org/les/40_631_536365_Civicus-Geor-giaACR-eng.pdf(lastaccessed14December2011).


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c)Informalgroups

Itremainsanopenquestionhowmuchpowerandinuenceisinthehandsofinformalgroups,especiallytheoligarchswhom

Saakashvili forced into emigration, leaders of the organisedcriminalunderground,andformerhigh-rankingstateocials,includingsecret service ocerswhom thegovernment hasre-peatedlyaccusedoftryingtodestabiliseGeorgia.AttemptsbysuchgroupstoinuencethesituationinGeorgiahavebeende-scribedbytheGermannewspaperFrankfurter Rundschauinanarticle which quoted a condential report from the Austriancriminalpolice.ThisdocumentshowsthatGeorgiancriminalor-ganisationsoperatinginWesternEuropeareco-operatingwithIgorGiorgadze,theformersecurityministerofGeorgia(1993-5)whonowlivesinMoscow,todestabilisetheinternalsituationinGeorgiawithaviewtotopplingthecurrentleadership.Georgiancriminalorganisationsallegedlysupportedtheoppositionstreetprotests in the spring and summer of 2009, and bribed high-rankingstateocials42.

42 Andreas Frster, Georgiens Maa plante Umsturz,Frankfurter Rundschau,22 June 2011, http://www.fr-online.de/politik/wiener-ermittler-georgiens-maa-plante-umsturz,1472596,4481758.html(lastaccessed14December2011).


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iii. QuEstions about GEorGias futurE

ThenextparliamentaryelectionswillbeheldinGeorgiainOc-tober2012.Theballotwillbetherstnationalelectionssincethe

war withRussia. It will oer the voters an opportunity to callthegovernmenttoaccountforthe2008conictandforthefour-yearpost-warperiod.TheywillalsoendthestagnationwhichhasprevailedinGeorgiaspoliticalscenesincethewar,andwillstartaperiodofintensepoliticalstrugglethatwillonlyendwiththepresidential elections in 2013 and Mikheil Saakashvilis depar-turefromoce.

1. New legal realities

Theelectionswilltakeplaceinanewlegalreality:underanewelectoralcode,andwiththeprospectofaconstitutionalamend-mentcomingintoforcethatwillaltertherelationshipbetweenthedierentbranchesofgovernment(itwillbecomeeectivein2013, after Saakashvili leaves oce and during the new parlia-

mentaryterm).

BothlegislativechangeshavebeenenactedaspartofthenewwaveofdemocratisationannouncedbythePresidentafterthewar,andarebeingpresentedbythegovernmentasmilestonesintheprocessofbringingGeorgiaclosertoWesterndemocraticstandards.

The new electoral code implements a number of recommenda-tionspresentedbyinternationalinstitutions,andmeetssomeofthedemandsvoicedbytheopposition.TheOSCEOceforDemo-craticInstitutions&HumanRightsandtheVeniceCommissionoftheCouncilofEurope,whichhaveexpressedopinionsonthedraft,havestatedthatitisconducivetodemocraticelections,andincludesmanypositiveelements.However,theyhavealsocriti-cisedGeorgiaforfailingtoenacttheanticipatedchangestothedenitionofsingle-mandateelectoraldistricts,whichaccountfor


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almosthalfoftheseatsintheparliament.Thegeographyofthosedistricts,whosesizevariesfromseveralthousandtolittlelessthanonehundredthousandvotersinsomecases,clearlyworksinfavourofthestillverypopularrulingparty,whichwonin71of

the75single-mandatedistrictsinthe2008elections.

With the constitutional amendment of October 2010 (adoptedpartlyinresponsetocallsfromtheinternationalcommunitytolimitthepresidentspowersandstrengthentheprerogativesoftheparliament43),Georgiawillmovefromapresidentialsystemof government towards a parliamentary-cabinet arrangement.When the reform comes into force, the president will remainthe head of state, but many of the presidential powers will betransferredtothegovernment,whichwillbecomethesupremeexecutiveauthorityforbothinternalandforeignpolicy.Undertheamendedconstitution,thepresidentwillnolongerhavethepowertoarbitrarilydesignatecandidatesforprimeminister(thecandidatewillbedesignatedbythepartywinningtheelection),approvethenominationsofministers,dismissthegovernment,

appointthedefenceandinteriorministers,orsuspendandrepealthegovernmentsdecisions.Theprimeministerwillhaveexclu-siveinuenceoverthenominationsofgovernorsandthepowerto countersign presidential nominations of army commandersand ambassadors, and presidential decrees. Overturning thepresidents veto will require an absolute majority of votes, in-steadofthequaliedthree-fthsmajorityrequiredcurrently.As

anuance,theamendedconstitutionwillprovideforanunusuallycomplexandlongprocedureforavoteofnocondence,inwhichthepresident,ratherthantheparliament,willinfactplayakeyrole44.Thissuggeststhattheprojectedchangestothesystemof

43 StrengtheningtheparliamentspowerswasrecommendedintheEU-Geor-giaActionPlanadoptedin2006,amongothers.

44 Cf.Finalopiniononthedraftconstitutionallawonamendmentsandchanges

totheconstitutionofGeorgia,adoptedbytheVeniceCommissionatits84 thPlenary Session (Venice, 15-16 October 2010), http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-AD%282010%29028-e.pdf(lastaccessed16December2011).


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governmentwillmainlyshiftpowersbetweenthedierentex-ecutive authorities, while preserving the executives privilegedpositionregardingthelegislature.

2. The importance of the elections

TheupcomingparliamentaryandpresidentialelectionswillbeatestofthestabilityandmaturityoftheGeorgianstateandpo-liticalsystem,whichwillprobethegovernmentscommitmenttodemocraticideals,theimpartialityofstateinstitutions,pub-licsupportforGeorgiascurrentpoliticalcourse,theoppositionsreadinesstoparticipateindemocraticprocesses,andthepoliticalmaturityofthegeneralpublic.

BeforetheoligarchBidzinaIvanishvilimadehispoliticaldebut,the outcome of the parliamentary elections in October seemedtohavebeenalreadydecided;theoppositionwasweakanddis-persed, and lacked popularity despite the signicant potentialforpublicdiscontent,whereastherulinggroupwasconsolidated,

possessedsignicantresourcesandwasperceivedashavingnoalternativetoit,despitethegrowingfatiguewiththeSaakash -vilicamp.Theonlyunknownwaswhethertheleadershipwouldreallyoptforaqualitativebreakthrough,intermsofabidingbydemocraticstandardsduringthecampaignandduringtheballot.ThechallengeIvanishvilihasposedhasradicallychangedthesit-uation;anewplayerhasappearedonthestagewithconsiderable

assets, including impressive wealth, considerable social capitalbuiltupthroughhischarityactivities,andanextensivenetworkofcontactsinGeorgia,RussiaandtheWestandwithwhomthecurrentleadershiphastoreckon.Thus,theoutcomeoftheelec -tionsisnolongeraforegoneconclusion.

If the political movement created by Ivanishvili takes part intheelections,itwilllikelyposeaseriouschallengetothePresi-dentsUnitedNationalMovement,withgoodchancesofsuccess

-

fullymobilisingandwinningoverthosesectionsoftheelectorate


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whichdonotsupportthegovernment.However,sincetherulinggroupstillenjoyswidepopularity,andIvanishviliclearlyhasnopoliticalexperienceorvision,thelikelihoodthathewilldefeatthepresidentialcampseemslow.Itseemsthatthemosttheop-

position could achieve would be to deprive the ruling party ofitsabsolutemajorityintheparliamentwhich,inthecontextoftheconstitutionalamendments,wouldforceittoseekacoalitionpartnerthatis,tosharepower.

3. The future of the President

Saakashvilisdecisionastowhatrolehewillassumeafterleavingocein2013willbeofdecisiveimportanceforGeorgiasfuture.Thesolutionsenvisagedintheconstitutionalamendment,andthefactthattheywillonlycomeintoforceaftertheendofhissecondterm,havebeenfuellingspeculationsthathemaybeintendingtofollowVladimirPutinsfootstepsandbecometheheadofgov-ernment,thuseectivelymanipulatingtheprincipaldemocraticmechanisms.

ThePresidenthimselfhasadmittedthatthiswastheoreticallypossible,buthasrefusedtodeclarehisintentionsclearly,claim-ingthatifheannouncedhiswithdrawalfrompoliticstwoyearsaheadoftheendofhisterm,thiswouldunderminehispositionandposeathreattotheplannedreforms45.Saakashvilisage(hewillturn46in2013),hispopularity,andtheabsenceofanypoliti-

cianwithenoughleadershipandcharismatoreplacehim,mightconvincehimtostayinpower.Somemembersoftheelitealsoar-gue that maintaining the currentpoliticalcourseforaslong aspossibleshouldbetheprioritywhiletheRussianthreatremainsimminent.

45 Cf.forexampleinterviewsforEuronewsandtheUkrainian1+1channel.http://

www.euronews.net/2011/05/31/saakashvili-the-west-is-only-option/ (last ac-cessed16December2011)andhttp://tkachenko.ua/video/vypuski/?media_

id=383432334(lastaccessed16December2011).


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However,suchastepwouldleaveGeorgiafacingaknotofprob-lems typical of authoritarian countries: the declining popularlegitimacy of the ruling group, international isolation, and en-trenchmentofthepathologiesofpower.Saakashvilisdecisionto

stayinpowerwouldalsothreatentoescalatetensionswithintheelitebecause,accordingtounconrmedreports,anumberofkeymembersoftherulinggroupopposethisstep.

An alternative scenario could be for the President to cease ac-tiveinvolvementinpolitics,whilekeepingthepositionofamen -torandinformalarbiter.SincetherulingpartyislikelytoretainitsdominantpositionontheGeorgianpoliticalsceneafter2012,suchadecisionwouldopenthewaytoseniorstateocesforothermembersoftheelite.Forexample,thepopularmayorofTbilisiGigiUgulava(whoenjoysgoodrelationswiththechurch),orthecurrent parliament speaker David Bakaradze have been men-tionedaspotentialcandidatesforpresident.ThisscenariowouldalsostrengthenthepositionoftheinteriorministerIvaneMera-bishvili,whoisalreadycommonlyregardedasbeinginchargeof

theday-to-dayrunningofthestate.

A third possible scenario, which is currently being speculatedupon in Tbilisi, envisages the President assuming a prominentpublicpostotherthanthatofprimeminister,suchasthespeak-erofparliament,ortheheadofgovernmentintheAutonomousRepublicofAdjara.Intheshortterm,suchamovewouldenable

SaakashvilitoretainconsiderableformalinuenceonGeorgiaspolitics, and would probably cause less controversy than if hebecameprimeminister.Inthelongterm,however,thiswouldalmostinevitablyleadtotensionswiththefutureprimeminis-terandpresident,andineecttopoliticalcrisesandevensplitswithintherulingcamp.Additionallythepresidentwouldsurelyfaceinternationaland internalaccusationsofmanipulatingthedemocraticmechanisms.


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4. Unconstitutional scenarios

ConsideringthecomplexityofGeorgiasinternalandexternalsit-uation,unconstitutionalscenarioscannotberuledout.

MassprotestsarethestaplemethodofpoliticalstruggleinGeor-gia.Atthemomentthepublicappearstobetiredofthiskindofstreetpolitics,althoughintheeventofadeteriorationofeconomicconditionsortheappearanceofpost-electioncontroversies,anewwaveofprotestsisentirelyconceivable.Eventhoughthegovern-mentisexperiencedindealingwithmassprotests,suchcrisesareasaruleunpredictable,andpotentiallydangerousforthecoun -trysstability.

A separate issue concerns the inuence of Georgias northernneighbour on the countrys internal situation. Moscow has boththenecessaryinstrumentsandalongtrackrecordofinterferingwithGeorgiasinternalaairs.Moreover,itisinRussiasstrategicinteresttostrengthenitspositionintheSouthCaucasus(including

bysubordinatingGeorgia),becauseofitsneedtocontrolthetransitroutesforCaspianenergyresources,amongotherobjectives.

MoscowandTbilisihavehadnodiplomaticrelationssince2008,andformallyremaininastateofwar46.TheRussiangovernmentdoesnotrecognisethecurrentGeorgianleadershipasrepresent-ativeofthecountry,andbothociallyand,presumably,uno-

ciallyhasbeensupportingitsopponents47

.

TheGeorgianauthoritiesandthemediaassociatedwiththemhaveregularlywarnedaboutthepossibilityofaRussian-inspiredter-rorattackorcoup.Overthelasttwoyears,mysteriousexplosions

46 Russiaiscurrentlyoccupyingaround20%ofthecountrysinternationallyrecognisedterritory(Abkhazia,SouthOssetia).Theonlyformaldocument

endingthe2008waristheMedvedev-Sarkozyceasereagreement.47 Cf. ,http://www.civil.ge/rus/article.php?id=20746(lastaccessed15December2011).


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havebeenreportedinvariouspartsofGeorgia,includinginthevicinityoftheUSembassyinTbilisi.Thesecuritystructureshavealsorepeatedlyreportedfoiledattemptsatbombattacksoractsofsabotage48.InMay2009,amutinytookplaceatthetankbat-

talionstationedintheMukhrovanibasenearTbilisiwhilemassoppositionprotestswerebeingheldinTbilisi,whichtheauthori-tiesdescribedasanattemptedcoup.AccordingtotheGeorgiangovernment,allthoseincidentswereorganisedbyRussiansecretservices, operating primarily from the territories of AbkhaziaandSouthOssetia49.

WhileRussianinterferenceinGeorgiasinternalaairsislikely,andmayincludesupportfortheoppositionaswellasactsofsabo -tage,itshouldalsobenotedthattheGeorgianleadershiphasbeenexploitingtheRussianmenaceinordertomobilisepublicsupportanddiscredittheopposition.ATVprogrammeairedbyImediinMarch2010,whichdepictedanewRussianinvasion,theestablish-mentofapro-RussiangovernmentandthedeathofSaakashviliinabroadcaststylisedaslivecoverage,mayserveasanexamplehere.

Airedwithnowarningsthatitwasactionalprogramme,thepro-

grammegaverisetopanicinGeorgia,andledtoharshcriticismofthegovernmentbothdomesticallyandabroad.

5. Social and economic problems

The condition of the economy will aect how the situation in

Georgia,includingthepoliticalsituation,develops.Georgiasgood

48 Cf. for example http://police.ge/index.php?m=8&newsid=2304, http://po-lice.ge/index.php?m=8&newsid=3101(lastaccessed20.02.2012).

49 Tbilisis version is corroborated by a series of articles in the WashingtonTimesofJuly2011,accordingtowhichthequestionoftheexplosioninthevicinityoftheUSembassywastwiceraisedduringmeetingsbetweentheUSsecretaryofstateUSAHillaryClintonandtheRussian foreignminis-terSergeiLavrovinthecourseof2011.Cf.EliLake,Clintonraisedissueof

aRussianlinktobombinginGeorgia,Washington Post,28July2011;http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/28/clinton-raised-issue-of-a-russian-link-to-bombing-/?page=all(lastaccessed16December2011).


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macroeconomicperformanceafter2003hasscarcelytranslatedintobetterstandardsoflivingforthepeople.Foryears,massun-employmenthasremainedthemostimportantproblemforGeor-giansociety50(theocialunemploymentrateis16.3%,butuno-

ciallyitismuchhigher).Nosignicantprogresshasbeenreportedintheghtagainstpoverty,whichaects27.8%ofthepeopleinGeorgiaaccordingtoEUgures51.Shouldtheeconomicsituationdeteriorate,standardsoflivingwoulddominatethecomingpo-liticalseasonandcouldbringpeopleintothestreets.

These problems expose the limitations of the liberal economicmodelwhichuntilnowhadbeenimplementedaseconomicor -thodoxy,andrequirecorrectionstoit.TheforeigninvestmentswhichtheauthoritieshopedwouldbringdynamicdevelopmenttoGeorgiaareoftendestinedfortherealestateandthenancialsectors(15%and16%respectivelyofGeorgiasFDIin2010)anddonotgeneratemanyjobs,or,inthecaseofinvestmentsintransportand communication (35%), consist of large, one-o infrastruc-tural projects nanced with funds coming from international

aid,amongothersources.ThepresenceoftheVirginIslands,theUnitedArabEmiratesandCyprusamongthetop-teninvestorsinGeorgiasuggeststhataconsiderableproportionofFDIconsistsinspeculativecapital,orGeorgiancapitalreinvestedinGeorgiaviataxhavens.

After2003Georgiastoppedpursuinganysectoraleconomicpoli-

cies,exacerbatingthebreakdownoftheagriculturalsector,whichhadbeenindeclinesince1991.Currently,agriculturenominallyaccountsfortheemploymentofover50%ofthoseactiveinthela-bourmarket,yetgeneratesonlyslightlyover8%ofGDP 52.Georgia

50 Cf.GeorgianNationalStudy,26April4May2011.51 2009gures.Source:ImplementationoftheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPol-

icyin2009:ProgressReportGeorgia,http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2010/sec10_518_en.pdf52 Cf.http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=428&lang=eng


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importsanestimated8090%ofitsfood.Tocompare,inSoviettimesagricultureprovided25%ofalljobsandgenerated32%oftherepublicsnationalincome 53.

AnotherproblemconcernsGeorgiasdependenceoninternationalassistance.AftertheRoseRevolution,alargestreamofloansandgrantsstartedowingintoGeorgiafrominternationalaidorgan -isations: theInternationalMonetaryFund,theWorldBank,theEuropeanBankforReconstructionandDevelopment,etc.,aswellastheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanCommission.AccordingtoWorldBankestimates,between2004and2009GeorgiareceivedaroundUS$3.137billionofODA(OcialDevelopmentAssistance).Thosegurescertainlydonotincludeallcategoriesofaid(suchasmilitaryaid),andexcludeamajorpartofthepost-warassis-tancepackageworthUS$4.5billion.TheinuxofforeignaidhascontributedconsiderablytoGeorgiasrapidtransformation,butatthesametimehasmadeTbilisideeplydependentonapermanentstream of external nancing. Ocial gures demonstrate thatin2010over20%ofbudgetspendingwascoveredbyaidfunding

grants,lowinterestloans,etc54.Accordingtounconrmedin-

formation,Georgiawillreceiveanotherlargepaymentofinterna-tionalaidin2012asrecompenseforwithdrawingitsobjectionsto Russias accession to the WTO. Nevertheless, aid to Georgiawillprobablystartshrinkinginthecomingyears,posingamajorchallengebecauseofGeorgiaslackofeconomicself-suciency.

53 GlennE.Curtis,ed.Georgia: A Country Study.Washington:GPOfortheLi-

braryofCongress,1994. http://countrystudies.us/georgia/43.htm(lastac-cessed20January2012).

54 Cf.GeorgianEconomyOverview,April2011.


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iv. futurE challEnGEs

1. Challenges for Georgia

SincetheRoseRevolution,Georgiahasbeenamostspectacularpoliticalexperiment,whichhasinspiredenthusiasmintheWestforyearsandhasbeenadmiredbythepro-WesternelementsofsocietiesintheotherCIScountries.

Yet despite the unquestionable achievements of PresidentSaakashvilisteam,thewarwithRussiahasexposedthesystemicweaknessesandlimitationsoftheGeorgianmodel,aswellastheneedforthoroughreformswhicharenecessarynotonlytokeepmodernising the country, but also to maintain what has beenachievedsofar.Preservingthestatus quo,inpoliticsandintheeconomy,willnotonlymakeitimpossibletoeliminatethesys-temsinherentfaults,butwillalsoleadtoariseinauthoritarianpracticesandsocialandeconomicproblems.

Changesarealsonecessaryinviewoftheinternationalsituation,whichisunfavourableforTbilisi.Becauseoftheseriouseconomicproblems in the eurozone and the United States, the changingbalancesofpowerbothgloballyandwithinEurope,aswellasthedynamism,depthanduncertainoutcomesoftheupheavalsintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,interestinGeorgiawillprobablywaneoverthecomingyears,especiallyifthereformsanticipated

bytheWestdonotmaterialise,andmostcertainlyifdemocraticstandardsdeteriorate.

In this situation, Georgias most important and most dicultchallengeistotrulydemocratisethecountry,whichwillrequirethedepoliticisationofthestateapparatus,thedevelopmentoffreemedia,anindependentjudiciary,transparencyinpubliclifeandtheruleoflaw;ensuringthelattermaywellprovetobethemostdicult task.Thefollowing statementbyPresidentSaakashviliisnoteworthy,ashehasadmitted,Wevebecomeamodernstate


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basedlessoninstitutionsandmoreonpersonalities;nowweshouldmakeamodernsocietybasedonruleoflawandinstitutions55.IfGeorgiaistocontinuedeveloping,itwillneedtoabandontherev -olutionarymodelofstatemanagementbasedonimprovisation

andarbitrarydecisionsbyanarrowcircle.Itwillhavetobuildupinstitutionsanddevelopproceduresthatcanoperatesmoothlyir-respectiveofthepersonalitiesinpower,andbeyondtheeventualchangeofleadershipthroughelections.

ContinueddevelopmentwillalsorequireaclearanswertothequestionaboutGeorgiasidentityandaspirations.DuringGeorgeW.Bushspresidency,Georgiaclearlytendedtofollowandimi-tateAmericanmodelsinsuchdomainsastheorganisationofthestate,economyandculture.AfterthewarwithRussiaandthechange in US administration, when Tbilisis relations with theUnitedstatescooledo,integrationwiththeEUbecamethepre-eminentaim.However,seekingrapprochementwiththeEUhadlongbeenmoreofanexpressionofTbilisisgeneralaspirationstobepartof theWest in thecivilisationalandcultural sense,and

lessofarealcommitmenttoadoptthespecicpoliticalandeco-

nomicmodel.Georgiasliberally-mindedpoliticaleliteshavebeenobjectingtotheprospectofhavingtoimplementthecomplicatedEUregulations.ThefollowingstatementbyPresidentSaakashviliillustratesthispointwell:

ItisdiculttoworkwiththeEuropeans.Thisisahugebureau -

cracy,andtheydonotalwaysunderstand.Wehaveeliminated90%ofallthosesanitaryandreprotectioninspectors,thephy-tosanitaryservices,etc.and90%ofallthelicencesandpermitsthatexistedbefore.Oursystemisverysimple.ButwhenyoutalkwiththeEuropeans,theyalwaysaskifwehaveanocialdealingwiththegivenissue,likeinEurope.Andwedonothavethem,towhichtheEUpeopleimmediatelysaythatwewillhavetocreate

55 Saakashvilionhisrolemodel,CivilGeorgia,31December2008,http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20221(lastaccessed17December2011).


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suchoces.Andthenwereplythatwhenwehadallthoseo-cials,theyextortedmoneyandsuckedpeoplesblood,andwedonotmissthem56.

Yet despite Georgians scepticism and long-held reluctance toadoptEUregulations,Georgiaundertookanumberofreformsin2011whichledtotheocialinaugurationinJanuary2012ofnego -tiationsconcerningtheestablishmentofaDeepandComprehen -siveFreeTradeArea(DCFTA)betweenGeorgiaandtheEU.TheDCFTAisthekeyelementofafutureAssociationAgreement(AA).Itprovidesfortheabolitionoftarisandquotasinmutualtradeofgoodsandservices,aswellastheeliminationofnon-taribar-riers,andwillenableGeorgiatointegratewiththeEUmarket.

Eventhoughthenegotiationswillprobablytakeseveralyearstobeconcluded,theveryfactthattheyhavebeenopenedisasuc-cess. The launch of negotiations had long hung in the balance,bothbecausetheEUhadsetverystrictpreconditions(concerningsanitaryandphytosanitarystandards,competitionpolicy,tech -

nicalbarrierstotrade,intellectualpropertyprotection,andla-

bourlaw57),andbecauseofreluctanceonTbilisispart.

Commentingonthestartofthenegotiations,PresidentSaakashvilisaidthattheyear2011hadbeenaturningpointinTbilisisrelationswithBrussels,andthatithadbroughtGeorgiaclosertomember-shipintheEU.AllowingforthePresidentstypicaltendencyto -

wardshyperbole,itseemsthatGeorgiasattitudetowardstheAs-

sociation Agreement negotiations indeed underwent realchangeduring2011,andthecountryisnowmorecommittedtotheprocessand more willing to implement European regulations.However,

56 http://tkachenko.ua/video/vypuski/?media_id=383432338(lastaccessed13Octo-ber2011).

57 Cf.AnAppraisaloftheEUsTradePolicytowardsitsEasternNeighbours:

The Case of Georgia, Brussels 2011 http://www.ceps.eu/book/appraisal-eu%E2%80%99s-trade-policy-towards-its-eastern-neighbours-case-geor-gia(lastaccessed13October2011).


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thischangewascertainlymotivatedmainlybythedisappointmentwiththedowngradeofUS/Georgiarelationsafter2008.

2. Challenges for the West

Georgias pro-Western transformation after the Rose Revolu-tionhasbeenoneoftheWestsgreatestinternationalsuccessesofthelastdecade.Theroadfromafailedstatetoafullyfunctionalstate,whichGeorgiatraversedinjustafewyears,notonlydem-onstrates thebenetsoftheWesternpoliticalandcivilisationaloer,butalso,moreimportantly,provesthatWesternstandardscantakerootalsobeyondCentralandEasternEurope,whichwashistoricallyboundmorecloselytotheWest.

BysupportingthetransformationinGeorgia,theWesthasdem-onstrateditsabilitytoinuencepoliticalrealitiesinareaswhereithasvitalinterests.Post-revolutionaryGeorgiaisinmanyre -spectsasymboloftheWestsambition,determinationandcapa-bilityintheinternationalarena.

ShouldtheGeorgianprojectstagnate,orworse,becomederailedasaresultofrisingauthoritariantendencies,aneconomicbreak-downoranewwar,thiswouldbeapainfuldefeatfortheWest,andwouldexposeitsinabilitytoinuencedevelopmentsinitsclose neighbourhood and to retain its holdings. This, in turn,couldunderminetheachievementsofmanyyearsofWesternin -

volvementnotonlyinGeorgia,butthroughouttheCIS.

Areal qualitativebreakthroughinthefunctioningofGeorgiandemocracy,whichwouldcomewithfreeandfair,pluralisticpar-liamentaryandpresidentialelections,andapossiblechangeofgovernmentbyelectoralmeans,wouldbeanunquestionablesuc-cess forthe West,since fair electionsremain arare and excep-tionaloccurrenceintheformerSovietarea.


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It therefore appears that, despite the immensity of other chal-lengesandtheapparentGeorgiafatigue,theWestshouldbevi-tallyinterestedinthecontinuationofthecountryspro-Westerntransformation.Inordertosucceed,however,itneedstopresent

anattractiveoertoTbilisibyprovidingpolitical,economicandexpertsupport,inordertodemonstratethatGeorgiasfutureislinkedwiththatoftheWest,whileatthesametimestrictlyabid -ingbytheprincipleofconditionality,underwhichanyassistanceshoulddependonthegenuineprogressofinternalreforms.

marEk matusiak

Text completed April 2012