AIR FORCE Magazine / June 200166

George Marshall, facing imminent war, acteddecisively to free airpower from the GeneralStaff’s obstruction and delaying tactics.

TheFirstAirStaff

By Herman S. Wolk

Principals in establishingthe Air Staff, Maj. Gen. H.H.Arnold and Gen. George C.Marshall are shown here atRandolph Field, Tex.

IXTY years ago this month, the United States Army created theArmy Air Forces. With that critical June 1941 action came theestablishment of the first American Air Staff. That staff reported

directly to a new AAF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold. Allwere momentous steps in development of airpower.

Creation of the Air Staff stemmed from apprehension about general

S

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made the airman assistant chief ofstaff for operations and training, thefirst airman ever to serve in thisposition. Subsequently, when Mar-shall became Army Chief of Staff,he named Andrews to positions oftheater command in the Caribbeanand the Middle East and as com-manding general of US forces in theEuropean theater. Tragically, in May1943, Andrews was killed in an air-plane crash in Iceland, cutting shorta brilliant career of one of the nation’smost distinguished airmen.

The Luftwaffe’s performance inEurope in 1940 increased Congres-sional pressure for the creation of aseparate Air Force, but Arnold wasconvinced that this was not the righttime to divide the air arm from therest of the Army. Marshall and Arnoldneeded a rapid, efficient expansionof the Air Corps itself to prepare forthe possibility of war. Arnold em-phasized in 1940 that “right at thisminute it looks to me as if it might bea serious mistake to change the ex-isting setup when we are all usingevery facility available in order totake care of the present expansion ofthe Air Corps.” Any serious organi-zational change now might actuallyimpede the buildup.

Fortunately, Arnold and Marshallmaintained confidence in each other,with Arnold agreeing not to pressfor independence. He would, instead,count on Marshall to provide an ap-propriate degree of autonomy dur-ing this period of national emergency.For his part, Marshall was deter-mined to see that the air arm got

expansion plan, envisioning produc-tion each year of 12,000 new pilotsand 54 combat-ready groups.

The Eye-OpenerMarshall, subsequently promoted

to Army Chief of Staff, shared Roos-evelt’s concern and, moreover, agreedwith Arnold that the Air Corps re-quired a stronger ability to plan forexpansion. The Air Corps had foundan invaluable ally in the struggle fora more powerful air force. In 1938,Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, thencommanding General HeadquartersAir Force, had taken Marshall on anine-day tour of air bases, inspect-ing units and meeting senior AirCorps commanders as well as visit-ing the Boeing plant in Seattle.Marshall and Andrews struck a closerelationship. Later, Marshall said thistour had opened his eyes to what airforces could do and what they re-quired. He quickly determined thatairmen best knew how to run the AirCorps and make it work.

On this cross-country trip, Andrewshad taken the opportunity to makeMarshall aware of conflicts betweenthe few airmen and the many groundofficers assigned to the General Staff.In later remarks, Marshall said herealized that “air had almost no rep-resentation on the General Staff,” andmost of the General Staff types “hadlittle interest in the air, mostly an-tipathy, and it was quite marked.”Indeed, Marshall added, “I found ev-eryone on the Staff hostile to Air.”

Marshall was greatly impressedwith Andrews. In August 1939, he

President Roosevelt—hereat an airfield in Sicilytalking with Arnold—

believed the US had togear up for war. He

sought a huge increase inmilitary aircraft and

pilots.

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wars in Europe and Asia—eventsthat sparked calls for an expansionof airpower and reorganization ofthe Army air element. Particularlydisturbing to Arnold and PresidentRoosevelt was the major role theGerman air force played in the de-feat of France in 1940. FDR declared,“Military aviation is increasing at anunprecedented and alarming rate.”Consequently, he and Congresssought a huge increase in Americanaircraft and pilots.

Even before the outbreak of war,Roosevelt was much concerned aboutAmerica’s lack of preparedness. In1938, he sent his confidante, HarryHopkins, on an inspection of US air-craft plants. Hopkins claimed Roos-evelt “was sure we were going to getinto war, and he believed that air-power would win it.”

Shortly thereafter, an airplanecrash claimed the life of Maj. Gen.Oscar Westover, Chief of the ArmyAir Corps. Hopkins, who had the earof the President, suggested he ap-point Arnold to the post, whichRoosevelt did in September 1938.

Roosevelt believed that America’smilitary had to immediately gear upfor war. In mid-November 1938, heconvened a meeting at the WhiteHouse to consider responses to theevents unfolding in Europe and Asia.Present were Arnold, Hopkins, As-sistant Secretary of War Louis John-son, and Brig. Gen. George C. Mar-shall, chief of the Army’s War PlansDivision. Roosevelt directed increasedaircraft production and by August1940 the Air Corps had completed an

AIR FORCE Magazine / June 200168

what it required in organizationalflexibility, as well as equipment. Thismeant that he would have to presenta rationale to the War DepartmentStaff and make organizational changesthat would have credibility with air-men.

The ABC MeetingsThe airmen’s drive to gain more

freedom from the War Departmenthad been boosted early in 1941 whenrepresentatives of Britain’s armedservices came to the US for strategydiscussions, which became knownas American–British Conversations(ABC-1). These ABC-1 meetingsbetween a US staff committee andthe British delegation were held inthe period January–March 1941, andthey ranged over topics as varied asstrategy, joint operations, geographi-cal responsibilities, and commandarrangements.

Air Vice Marshal John C. Slessorrepresented the Royal Air Force, andCol. Joseph T. McNarney sat in forthe Air Corps. The purpose of theconversations was to determine thebest means with which the US andBritish might defeat Germany andher allies “should the United Statesbe compelled to resort to war.”

The Anglo–American represen-tatives agreed that, in event of warin both Europe and the Pacific, themajor effort would first be made inEurope. This would include a sus-tained air offensive against NaziGermany. A strategic defensive

would be mounted in the Far East.Arnold noted that, in early 1941,“We were planning for war, eventhough we were not in it.” In re-sponse to the British request forAmerican–produced aircraft, he em-phasized to Marshall and Rooseveltthat “we must first meet our ownrequirements” and then should giveallies “only such items as they coulduse effectively.”

These talks subsequently led toformal creation in August 1941 ofthe Combined Chiefs of Staff repre-senting the British and US militaryforces—including Arnold, represent-ing American airpower. Arnold, ofcourse, was subordinate to Marshall,Army Chief of Staff. However, itwas necessary for Arnold to be pres-ent when the Combined Chiefs for-mulated grand strategy. Thus, the airforces’ movement toward autonomywas aided by the fact that the RAFhad long ago gained independenceand its opposite American numberneeded to be at the table.

“I often wondered,” Arnold laternoted, “how I came to be included atArgentia [in Newfoundland, site ofthe meeting that founded the CCS].Prior to that time, Air items on a higherlevel had been handled by the Chief ofStaff and by the General Staff. At allconferences, even though an Air rep-resentative sat in, the General Staff orthe Chief of Staff did the talking.”

Subsequently, Arnold learned thatHopkins had insisted on Arnold’sattendance at the conference. Hop-

kins, for his part, continued to pressfor an airpower buildup. “I don’tknow why,” he exclaimed “we areproducing 600,000 automobiles forpleasure-seeking people, when weneed airplanes and engines!”

Bureaucratic BehemothThe Air Corps continued to have

difficulty prompting meaningful ac-tion on air matters from the WarDepartment General Staff. Marshallknew that officers on the GeneralStaff failed properly to support theairmen. As a result, air actions tendedto be postponed and bottlenecks ap-peared. The General Staff, Marshallsaid, had “lost track of its purpose,”becoming, in his view, “a huge, bu-reaucratic, red tape–ridden operat-ing agency.” He added, “It had sloweddown everything.”

In summer 1940, Marshall askedArnold to provide his views on reor-ganization. Marshall was concernednot only about air matters; he believedthat the War Department had evolvedinto “the poorest command post in theArmy.” Arnold responded by propos-ing the appointment of three Armydeputy chiefs of staff—for ground,air, and service forces. However, theWar Department Staff opposed thisstep and remained committed to theidea that the mission of the air arm wasto support the ground forces.

Still navigating between the WarDepartment Staff and the airmen,Marshall in October 1940 namedArnold his acting deputy chief ofstaff for air—responsible for coor-dinating all air matters—and Maj.Gen. George H. Brett as acting chiefof the Air Corps. However, the GHQAir Force was removed from the ju-risdiction of the Office of the Chiefof Air Corps, assigned to GeneralHeadquarters, and placed under thedirect control of the commander ofArmy field forces.

This setback was ameliorated inDecember 1940 when the Secretaryof War, Henry L. Stimson, namedRobert A. Lovett to be special assis-tant to the Secretary of War (redes-ignated in April 1941 “assistant sec-retary of war for air”). Lovett wouldmake the case for airpower directlyto Stimson. A banker well-informedon the subject of aircraft manufac-turing, Lovett surveyed the industrywith an eye to substantially increas-ing production. His main job was toimprove delivery of aircraft over-

Maj. Gen. Frank Andrews had the foresight to take Marshall, then chief of theArmy’s War Plans Division, on a tour of air bases in 1938. Later, Marshall saidthe tour opened his eyes to the capabilities of air and its needs.

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AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2001 69

minded and farseeing as Marshallat the head of the Army.” He added,“No matter how progressive Mar-shall may be himself, the rank andfile of the Army has not changedmaterially.”

Andrews, who did not always seeeye-to-eye with Arnold, nonethelessconsidered him “a good politician”and was confident that Arnold couldhandle this issue.

Taking the StepHaving gotten a green light from

Stimson, Marshall on June 20, 1941,put into effect revised Army Regu-lation 95-5—redefining the organi-zation and functions of the AirCorps—and officially established theArmy Air Forces. It gave Arnold thetitle of Chief, AAF (he continued tobe deputy chief of staff for air), re-sponsible to the Army Chief of Staffand the Secretary of War. Under 95-5, Arnold had the authority to coor-dinate the Office of the Chief of theAir Corps (Maj. Gen. George Brett)and Air Force Combat Command (Lt.Gen. Delos C. Emmons), redesig-nated from the GHQ Air Force andwhich previously had reported di-rectly to Marshall. Combat Command

In October 1940, Maj.Gen. George Brettbecame acting Chief ofthe Air Corps whenMarshall named Arnoldhis acting deputy chiefof staff for air. In June1941, Arnold becameChief of the new ArmyAir Forces, whichincluded the Army AirCorps and Air ForceCombat Command.

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The Air Corps, he said, should be“as modern as the instrument ituses.”

This confluence of thought proveddecisive because Stimson was underheavy pressure from Congress togrant more freedom to the Air Corps.In May 1941, Marshall stepped inand informed Stimson that a revi-sion of Army Regulation 95-5 wasready for implementation. “It thusgave me something with which tomeet the threat of an independentAir Corps created by (Congressional)legislation,” said Stimson.

A leading proponent of indepen-dence was Hugh J. Knerr, who servedas Andrews’s chief of staff at GHQAir Force in the late 1930s. Knerrsubsequently had been relieved andostracized for beating the indepen-dence theme and in late 1938 had leftthe Air Corps. On the outside, hecontinued to agitate for independence.

Another proponent was Andrews,who in early 1941 was commandinggeneral, Panama Canal Air Force.He maintained that the Army’s airarm could not be properly devel-oped “under an organization whichconsiders it an adjunct of surfaceforces, even with a man as broad-

seas while maintaining a balancebetween the needs of foreign clientsand those of the Army air arm.

Marshall wanted all air mattershandled by Arnold, unencumberedby General Staff objections and de-laying tactics. The Army Chief ofStaff emphasized: “I want this pro-cedure put in force without delay.The Air Corps has a tremendous pro-curement program tied in with newdevelopments and now has a tre-mendous personnel problem. ... Theywill be turning out pilots initially atthe rate of 7,000 a year. We have tooperate on a simpler basis than ourpresent system. I desire to proceedon a basis of evolution and generalunderstanding between all.”

In early 1941, Marshall and Lovettmet with Stimson, impressing on himthe need for more freedom and flex-ibility for Army airmen who werebeing asked to build up the air forcesas rapidly as possible. AlthoughLovett favored an independent AirForce, he emphasized to Stimson aneed for a reorganization that wouldprovide tactical independence in atime of crisis.

Auxiliary No MoreStimson evidently found Lovett’s

case to be compelling. He stated,“Air warfare involves not merely anew auxiliary weapon for the groundtroops. ... [I]t is becoming clear nowthat it involves independent actionquite divorced from land and sea.The difficulty is finding just how farto go in freeing them, but it seems tobe my job now to try to solve that. Itis a very big one.” Stimson trulybelieved that “the moment has nowcome” to develop a strong AmericanAir Force.

The issue was how to give theArmy Air Corps sufficient autonomywhile keeping it part of the Army.Brig. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, chief ofArnold’s Plans Division, had beenworking on this problem even asLovett’s staff struggled with thisissue. Spaatz and Lovett agreed thatthe solution lay in revising ArmyRegulation 95-5, which describedthe position of the Air Corps in theArmy. Lovett and Spaatz briefedArnold, who in turn, took the ideato Marshall. Stimson meanwhile,was bearing down on the problem,emphasizing that staff work requireddecentralization, “to permit AirForce autonomy in the degree needed.”

AIR FORCE Magazine / June 200170

would develop air doctrine and plansfor operational training. The Chiefof the Air Corps would superviseresearch and development, supply,and maintenance.

Most important was the fact thatthe revised regulation provided Ar-nold with an Air Staff to formulatepolicy and plans. As one historiannoted, the Air Staff—a title borrowedfrom the British—was created “toencourage more intelligent planningfor the future.” Arnold named Spaatzto be chief of the Air Staff and Lt.Col. Harold L. George as head of thenew Air War Plans Division.

Additionally, the Air Staff in-cluded assistant chiefs of staff forpersonnel, intelligence, and mate-riel, maintenance, and distribution.The Air Staff also included an airinspector and air adjutant general.

It was a major step in the institu-tionalization of the nation’s air-power, but it wasn’t a cure-all. For-mation of the Air Staff failed tobreak Arnold of one of one of hisbad habits—his addiction to callinginformally on trusted individuals tocarry out various assignments. Hesubsequently created a group ofclose personal advisors to reviewcurrent policies and to undertakespecific tasks.

Thus, Arnold’s advisory councilbecame his own personal group of“idea men.” In World War II, thiscouncil at various times includedColonels Jacob E. Smart, Fred M.Dean, Emmett O’Donnell Jr., CharlesP. Cabell, and Lauris Norstad.

Smart recalled that Arnold haddirected him to spend all of his time“thinking” rather than dealing withmundane staff matters. However,Arnold on one occasion had failed toconvince Marshall of something orother, and he admonished Smart:“From now on, you spend 30 percentof your time thinking and 70 percenton how to sell an idea.”

As it happened, the new Air Staffbarely had caught its breath beforebeing faced with a large challenge.The German war machine had ma-jor spectacular victories in Europe,Britain’s plight grew desperate, andthe Roosevelt Administration con-tinued to prepare for war. The ABC-1discussions and the subsequent Rain-bow No. 5 war plan stipulated thatfor the United States the Europeantheater would be decisive.

Following establishment of theAAF with its Air Staff, Arnold di-rected expansion of the Staff’s AirWar Plans Division. He namedGeorge to organize and enlarge thedivision “to develop overall plansfor the Army Air Forces.”

The Barbarossa FactorThe war took a new turn when

Hitler, on June 22, 1941, launchedOperation Barbarossa—a massive,full-scale invasion of the Soviet

Union. In early July 1941, Roo-sevelt—having stressed the impor-tance of air expansion—ordered theWar Department to develop an esti-mate “of the overall production re-quirements required to defeat ourpotential enemies.” The Presidentwanted prompt action. The War PlansDivision of the War Department pre-pared to respond.

However, at the insistence ofSpaatz and George, Arnold recom-mended to the War Department thatthe Air War Plans Division of theAir Staff prepare the air require-ments as directed by Roosevelt. Brig.Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, head of theWar Department’s War Plans Divi-sion agreed, and as a result, the now-famous AWPD-1 air war plan wasborn. Written by George, Lt. Col.Kenneth N. Walker, Maj. LaurenceS. Kuter, and Maj. Haywood S.Hansell Jr., it described requirementsfor wartime victory in the air.

The creation of the Army AirForces and its Air Staff did not, ofcourse, solve all problems of air co-ordination. Marshall demonstratedan understanding of the need forimproved efficiency and coordina-tion between airmen and others onthe War Department General Staff.His close relationship with Arnoldprefigured the sound partnershipbetween the two during the war.Marshall and Arnold, in their ownways, had carried on a campaigndesigned to gain more freedom andflexibility for Army airmen.

Nonetheless, the War Depart-ment’s War Plans Division stillblocked the AAF from a clear, sus-tained role in overall strategic plan-ning. Even greater freedom with com-plete autonomy would have to waituntil early 1942 when the AAF wouldbecome coequal with Army GroundForces and Services of Supply.

By that time, Arnold’s Air Staff hadmade its mark and would continue todo so throughout the war. It shapedArmy Air Forces plans, strategy, andresources. Moreover, with great fore-sight, the expanded Air Staff (at Ar-nold’s direction) created detailed plansto organize an independent Air Forceonce the war was over. ■

Herman S. Wolk is senior historian in the Air Force History Support Office. Heis the author of The Struggle for Air Force Independence, 1943–1947 (1997),and a coauthor of Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the UnitedStates Air Force (1997). His most recent article for Air Force Magazine,“Truman’s War,” appeared in the November 2000 issue.

Secretary of War Henry Stimson (right) with Marshall. Stimson recognized thatthe Air Corps needed autonomy and believed “the moment has now come.”

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