Geopolitics

of Energy Volume 39, Issue 1

January 2017

Editorial Committee Paul Kralovic Dinara Millington Megan Murphy Allan Fogwill Advisory Board Kimble Ainslie Yasser Al-Saleh Anis Bajrektarevic Fred Banks Fatih Birol John Brunton Michael Charokopos Robert Cutler Zachary Cuyler Athanasios Dagoumas Alberto Cisneros Lavaller Napier Collyns Floros Flouros Herman Franssen Ieda Gomes Antoine Halff David Howell Wenran Jiang Larry Kaufmann Mikhail Krutikhin Vadim Loktionov Michael Lynch Keun Wook Paik Petra Posega David Pumphrey Adnan Shihab-Eldin Sutandra Singha Paul Sullivan Eric Switzer Paul Tempest

Geopolitics of Energy was founded by the late Melvin A. Conant of Washington, DC in 1979. Since 1993, it has been published under the auspices of the Canadian Energy Research Institute. All views expressed in this journal are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of the Canadian Energy Research Institute.

Inside this Issue... Environmental Politics: A Case Study of Hydropolitics Between Page 2 Egypt and Ethiopia Over the Nile River Basin Sutandra Singha, Ph.D. Scholar Dr. Singha explores the complicated relationships of the Nile River Basin nations. He points to the multiple uses, sometimes conflicting, between water for irrigation, industrial processes and hydroelectricity. Resolution of some outstanding issues will define how much each country can depend on this water resource for various uses. The Emerging East Mediterranean Energy Province: Page 11 Overview and Prospects Robert M. Cutler Dr. Cutler also explores the context of multination resource development. In this case, it is the emerging natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. The development of this natural gas play may provide an incentive for countries in the region to resolve outstanding political concerns.

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GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY/JANUARY 2017 2

Environmental Politics: A Case Study of Hydropolitics Between

Egypt and Ethiopia Over the Nile River Basin Sutandra Singha

Environmental politics represents a relationship between environmental change and global political forces, with reference to the implications of local-global interactions for the management of environment. The concept of threat posed by environmental degradation to human life was considered as contemporary environmental politics, whereas the modern environmental politics includes political and mass movements, green parties and green ideas. In the recent past, the concept of global environmental politics has come up with some new issues, e.g., water, hydrocarbons and energy, free trade and sustainable development. Among the emerging issues of global environmental politics, the remarkable issues are geopolitics of the water resource among the countries of the Nile river basin of Africa, water conflict among the countries of the Republic of Central Asia over Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, the new Great Game among the US, China and Russia over the natural resources of Central Asian Republics, increasing fuel cost in Ukraine, Georgia and other peripheral states due to limited or intermittent supply of gas from Russia. It is important to mention that transformation of contemporary environmental politics into modern environmental politics is an influence of economic, political, social and cultural forms of globalization. In light of increasing global water demands, trans-boundary rivers are often portrayed both as a source of inter-state conflict (water conflict) and as a catalyst for international cooperation. Water conflicts can be viewed as a type of environmental politics where, riparian1 states fight over water – a natural resource, to pursue specific national interests. In other words, it can be stated that water is shaping the nature of politics not only within the country but also the international relations among or between the riparian countries. Water conflict takes place when the volume of water decreases in the source region due to climate change followed by low rainfall amounts. This creates conflict between upstream and downstream nations on the ground when upstream countries construct dams to maximum utilization of available water, which deprives downstream countries of water (Khan, 2013, p.33). The behaviour of riparian states in shared basins encompasses hydrological connectedness, the overall level of water scarcity, hydroelectric potential, the geopolitical context, and level of economic development. Among the emerging issues of global environmental politics, hydropolitics of the water resource among the countries of the Nile river basin of Africa is worth mentioning. The Nile River is the world’s longest river (6,700 kilometers) flowing through ten countries of northeast Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt (Zayed, 2011). Total population of the Nile River basin is over 450 million, of which more than 200 million people directly rely on the Nile (Swain, 2011, p. 688). In terms of basin area of the Nile (Figure 1), Sudan possesses the largest area of the Nile basin. The Nile hydrological system is of major economic significance to two of its neighbours – Egypt and Ethiopia; its waters could be of economic significance to at least four other nations (Allan, 1999, p.1). Three of the four major tributaries – namely the Blue Nile, Sobat and Atbara – originate from Ethiopia (Zedan, 2014, p. 18). Therefore, Ethiopia enjoys the status of upstream riparian state and Egypt and Sudan are considered downstream countries. In Northeastern Africa, water has become a scarce resource due to climate change and resultant drought.

Introduction

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Figure 1: East Africa and the Nile Basin

Source: State of the River Nile Basin, 2012, p.39

In the past century, a number of external forces have shaped the history of water resource development in the Basin. During the first half of the twentieth century the basin area was influenced by the interests of the United Kingdom which directly and indirectly controlled the political economies of most of the basin except Ethiopia. From the first decade of the twentieth century until World War II, Ethiopia and Eritrea were under the control of a colonial power, Italy (Allan, 1999, p.2). Egypt is fully dependent upon river water because, in the colonial era, England textile factories were fully dependent upon the agriculture of Egypt. The British decision to favour Egypt was mainly due to its strategic importance to the British (Reynolds, 2006); Egypt was the controller of the Suez Canal which was the main passageway from Britain to India (Milner, 2011), but Ethiopia, controller of 85 percent of the total Nile water, was never colonized by that time. After independence, a cold war started between Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt started creating continuous political pressure upon Ethiopia both by creating political instability and by blocking international funding to build any project on the river. However, Ethiopia herself initiated some water projects and is now using Nile water mainly for hydro-electric power generation.

GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY/JANUARY 2017 4

This paper aims to address the reasons behind the Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry over the Nile river basin, the role of environment in shaping the hydro-politics over the river basin and how international players are influencing this rivalry. In order to analyze population growth rate and GDP growth rate for both Egypt and Ethiopia, data have been used from the World Bank. In order to predict future rainfall characteristics of Ethiopia, climate charts from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal of the World Bank have been considered here. Government and NGO reports and new paper articles have also been consulted. With the help of data provided by the World Bank, Simple Line Charts were drawn in order to graph the trend of population growth (1961-2012) and GDP growth rate (1982-2012) for both Egypt and Ethiopia. Figure 2: Population Growth Rate of Egypt and Ethiopia (1961-2012)

Figure 3: GDP Growth Rate of Egypt and Ethiopia (1982-2012)

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Information from the 20 best available climate models capturing the distribution of monthly mean values for the historical (1980 to 1999) and future (2020 to 2039) time period were used to track the nature of climate, especially the water availability in Ethiopia. The Treaties that affected Nile Water Use are as follows: 1. May 15, 1902 Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia stated that Ethiopia, would not allow

any construction work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of their waters except in agreement with Britain and Sudan (Yihdego, 2013). This treaty was aimed to establish the border between Ethiopia and Sudan.

2. May 9, 1906 Treaty, signed between Britain and the Government. of the Independent State of the Congo emphasized that the Government of the Independent State of the Congo undertakes not to construct, or allow to be constructed, any work over or near the Semliki or Isango river (Sehadeh and Vesters, 2014, p.8) which would diminish the volume of water entering Lake Albert except in agreement with the Sudanese Government (Tegegne, 2010). This treaty favored only the downstream states of the Nile River basin and restricted Congo from accessing their part of the Nile.

3. December 13, 1906 Tripartite Treaty (Britain-France-Italy) attempted to protect the interests of Great Britain and Egypt in the Nile Basin (Menelik, 2013) in terms of the regulation of the waters of that river and its tributaries (due consideration being paid to local interests). This treaty, in effect, denied Ethiopia its sovereign right over the use of its own water.

4. May 7, 1929 The Nile Water Agreement between Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan reserved the Nile water flow from January 20 to July 15 (dry season) for Egypt (Menelik, 2013) and Egypt reserves the right to monitor the availability of Nile water in the upstream countries (Lupai, 2007). Egypt assumed the right to veto any Nile River-related construction projects by upstream countries (Mekonnen, n.d.). This agreement gave Egypt complete control over the Nile during the dry season, i.e., when water is most needed for agricultural irrigation (Menelik, 2013), limited the water supply allotted to Sudan and provided no water to any of the other riparian states.

5. The 1959 Nile Agreement between Sudan and Egypt was for full control over the utilization of the Nile waters in terms of equal allotment of annual flow of the Nile, hydroelectric or irrigation construction projects, etc. between Egypt and Sudan (Mekonnen, 1998). The agreement allowed Egypt the right to construct the Aswan High Dam to store the entire annual water flow of the Nile River (Menelik, 2013), Sudan to construct the Rosaries Dam on the Blue Nile and to utilize Nile water for irrigation and hydroelectric power generation purposes.

6. In 1999, a permanent commission was established to manage water resources and works in order to make fair allotment of water among the nine member nations. After independence, South Sudan joined the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in July 2012 and at present it controls almost 28 percent of the total flow of the Nile River.

7. In 2010, a Cooperative Framework Agreement was signed between Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania, seeking more water shares (Carlson, 2013). Egypt and Sudan rejected the agreement because it challenged their historic water rights (UPI, 2009). The 2010 Agreement, which can be regarded as a reaction to this situation, emphasizes the rights of each basin country to equitably utilize the Nile waters.

All of these agreements gave Egypt absolute rights over the river assuming Egypt was more dependent on water. Other basin nations opposed the treaties of 1929 and 1959 because at the time they were colonized and not allowed to represent their opinion. Egypt relies on the Nile for 97 percent of its water requirement of which 86 percent is used for agriculture (Nile Basin Initiative, 2012, p.50). Egypt’s current population of 85 million is growing at a rapid rate of 1.9 percent per annum and is expected to rise to 140 million by 2050. With an increasing population, water demands will grow for household (Nunzio, 2013) and industrial use and to grow the food required to ensure the country’s food security. In order to mitigate this risk

Treaties and Agreements Over the

Nile Waters

Egyptian and Ethiopian Pressure on Nile Water

GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY/JANUARY 2017 6

of food price hikes and import shortages, Egypt has embarked on land reclamation schemes in desert areas, which require large amounts of water and will place further strain on the shares of other agricultural, industrial and municipal water consumers (Nunzio, 2013). Aswan Dam alone supplies a tenth of Egypt’s electricity generation capacity. Egypt’s extreme dependency on the Nile for its water, food and electricity supply is the major source of conflict in the river basin (Rahman, 2011). Ethiopia’s population is growing at a rate of 2.9 percent per annum and economic growth has averaged 7.5 percent per year in the last three years. This is promoting the development of infrastructure projects such as dams, irrigation networks and pipelines along the Nile (Grcheva, 2016, p.40). Ethiopia is constructing the US$4.7 billion Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD), a hydro-electric dam, as a testament to its economic improvement. Planned for completion by 2017, this dam will be the largest in Africa, with a capacity to generate an annual output of 6,000 megawatts (Grcheva, 2016, p.45). It will make Ethiopia a net exporter of electricity to a host of potential buyers in the region, including: Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and possibly Egypt. Egypt has protested the construction of the dam as it could cause the evaporation of around 3 billion cubic meters of Nile water each year which could increase in the near future due to economic growth and demand for water infrastructure projects in the upstream nations followed by reduced flows for downstream countries (Nunzio, 2013). Egypt has a high annual variability in rainfall, the linear trend for seasonal average and decadal variability indicates a reduction (by 2.76 mm/month) since 1960. Records at the Helwan weather station for seasonal average temperatures and inter-annual and decadal variability show a warming of about 0.03°C per century since 1900 (World Bank Group, 2016). Much of the rainfall in Ethiopia is brought on by localized, convective storms. There has been significant increase in the frequency of hot days, and much larger increases in the frequency of hot nights (World Bank Group, 2016). Both spatial and temporal rainfall is highly erratic and generally falls in the form of intensive convective storms influenced by the country’s varied topography. Over the past three decades, Ethiopia has experienced numerous localized droughts and seven major droughts followed by famines (World Bank Group, 2016). Future climate change and variability are expected to worsen these conditions (World Bank Group, 2011, p.2). Ethiopia’s National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) asserts that the agricultural, water resources and human health sectors will be most negatively impacted by climate change. In Egypt, the problems of salinization2 of the Nile delta and water pollution issues already exist (UNDP, 2009). Egypt has already depleted the Nile’s water resources by overdrawing its allocation through projects such as the desert reclamation in the Toshka Depression and the Al-Salam Canal system that reclaims land in the Sinai Desert (Pham, 2010). All these indicate stress on Nile water in the near future, both in the source and downstream regions. Egypt has imposed its control over the Nile since historical times and granted through the 1902, 1929 and 1959 colonial agreements on Ethiopia and other Nile Basin nations (Tadesse, 2012). In 1970, Egypt threatened war over the building of the Fincha Dam in Ethiopia (McGrath, 2014) and, when Ethiopia tried to secure funding from the World Bank, Egypt along with Sudan invoked Article 3 of the 1902 treaty between Britain and Ethiopia. In fact, Egypt threatened to bomb the construction site, claiming that it needed that water to flow northward into the Aswan Dam (Verhoeven, 2013). More recently, Egypt’s response was hostile to Ethiopia’s construction of GERD, 50 kilometers from the Sudanese border. Given the vulnerability of its declining water supplies, construction of Africa’s largest dam is a threat to Egypt’s national security, which is being escalated by internal conflicts and civil unrest (MacDiarmid, 2014). During domestic instability, severe

Potential for Interstate Conflict between

Egypt and Ethiopia

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economic crisis and the dependency on foreign aid, Egypt could not justify costly military operations that threaten the Nile construction works by Ethiopia. Figure 4: Location of Dams over the Nile River in Northeastern Africa

Source: http://www.geocurrents.info/news-map/diplomacy-news/dam-building-in-ethiopia-water-worries-in-egypt

Upstream nations have acquired a greater share of resources and control over the Nile in recent years. The Nile River Co-operative Framework (NRCF), initiated in 1997, came into force as international law when Burundi signed the Entebbe Agreement in March 2011 (Salman, 2014). This allowed riparian countries to undertake dam-related projects and construction, against the restrictions of the colonial treaties. However, Egypt discouraged this agreement saying that the focus should be on refining the NBI rather than making such abrupt changes.

Recent Cooperation

GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY/JANUARY 2017 8

Greater co-operation between Egypt and Ethiopia is the best way forward for Egypt’s water future and regional stability. Ethiopia will continue to lay claim to their rights over the Nile. Egypt is increasingly backed into a corner, as military aid and US$260 million in cash assistance from the United States has been suspended since October, in response to the recent military coup (Nunzio, 2013). Washington also offered significant military assistance to Ethiopia. Recently, Egypt has shown further interest in the GERD’s impact. Ethiopia has welcomed the possible participation of Egypt in the project, which would pave the way for future co-operation over the management of the Nile. A UN-backed plan to optimize the use of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer,3 located underground in the Eastern part of the Sahara Desert, as an alternate of Nile river water has been agreed upon by Egypt, Sudan, Chad and Libya (IAEA/UNDP-GEF, 2014). Through the completion of Libya’s Great Man Made River Project, water extraction from the aquifer has begun; this has the potential to keep the four countries supplied with water for up to 400 years. This projection, however, will change in accordance with the growing North African population. A tripartite meeting of experts and ministers from Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan was held in January 2014 in order to discuss the impact of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) which achieved good results although some sticking points still remained unsolved (Gulhane, 2013). The building of the GERD has caused bitterness in relations between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia over fears that the dam will have a detrimental effect on the water share of the downstream countries (Abdel-Fattah, 2016). Egypt is afraid of the effect of the Ethiopian dam as it might affect Egypt’s current majority share of the Nile water (Alemayehu, 2014). In accordance with agreements signed in 1929 and 1959 Egypt is guaranteed 55.5bn cubic meters of the estimated total of 84bn cubic meters of Nile water produced each year (Elias, 2014). Ethiopia argued that the Grand Renaissance Dam could be good for everyone (Carlson, 2013). They contend that storing water in the Blue Nile Gorge would reduce evaporation and increase water flow downstream (Hammam, 2015). Ethiopia also argued that the new dam will manage flood control and siltation and will be a source of hydroelectric power for the entire region. Both Egypt and Sudan are concerned about Ethiopia’s control over the Nile (Carlson, 2013). When the Grand Renaissance Dam closes its gates on the Blue Nile River, Ethiopia will then have the power to claim its water shares, with the backing of all the upriver states (Hussein, 2016). Egypt and Sudan’s claims to historic water rights will have become hypothetical. In the context of a difficult history, violence is a possibility, but good solutions for all can be achieved through diplomacy and leadership. Currently, any plans made by one of the riparian states regarding the use of the Nile are considered by another as endangering its national security and interests. Egyptian co-operation with other riparian nations, particularly Ethiopia, seems to be its only option at this stage. It would promote regional stability for the strategic and economic benefits of all the nations involved. Egypt and the other Nile countries must consider the engagement of non-state actors, such as farmers, fishermen, lobby groups and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Through these mechanisms, they may find cooperative solutions to potential water conflicts and crises. All the riparian countries should try to minimize the use of Nile water that they need particularly in the agricultural sector. For example, less than 4 percent of Egypt's land accounts for over 80 percent of its total water supply, which suggests that even a small shift in water utilization could effectively save water. Egypt needs to find other sources rather than being totally dependent on an international river system. Taking inspiration from other Arab nations, Egypt might construct facilities for the desalination of sea water. Of course, it would be an expensive option, but will be far better than engaging in a war on water with Ethiopia.

The Future of Egypt-Ethiopia Relations

Based on Nile Water

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Amid the North African population boom, the Nile River Basin acts as the area’s major source for water supply. The river has had a great impact on the international politics of the region. The British decision to grant Egypt the absolute rights over the full use of the Nile’s water has sowed the seeds of potential conflict. In order to promote the cooperation, the 1999 Nile Basin Initiative was agreed to, but ultimately resulted in bitterness and competition among the Nile nations over developments across their respective sections of the Nile. The Nile River Cooperative Framework codified this change in the regional political balance. Though international conflict still presents a risk, several factors, including pre-existing domestic unrest in the region, leave the countries with little option other than co-operation and thus diminish its likelihood. The internationally recognized Entebbe Agreement leaves Egypt outnumbered, while other geostrategic alliances severely limit Egypt’s military options. Preserving regional stability is in the interests of all the riparian nations. About the Author Sutandra Singha, Ph.D. Scholar, Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Campus), India. Email: sutandra.singha@gmail.com Endnotes 1Situated or taking place along or near the bank of a river. 2Increase in the proportion of sodium chloride in the soil. 3Underground bed or layer yielding ground water for wells and springs, etc. References 1. Abdel-Fattah, M.B. (2016, April 02). Will the High Dam be Turned into A Wall? Daily News Egypt. Retrieved

from http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2016/04/02/418014/. 2. Alemayehu, B. (2014, January 05). Egypt, Ethiopia Lock Horns over Mega Dam. Retrieved from http://

addisfortune.net/articles/egypt-ethiopia-lock-horns-over-mega-dam/. 3. Allan, J.A. (1999). The Nile Basin: Evolving Approaches to Nile Waters Management, SOAS Water Issues

Group, Occasional Paper 20, University of London UK. Retrieved from https://www.soas.ac.uk/water/publications/papers/file38363.pdf.

4. Carlson, A. (2013, March). Who Owns the Nile? Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia’s History-Changing Dam, Current Events in Historical Perspective, Columbus. Retrieved from http://origins.osu.edu/article/who-owns-nile-egypt-sudan-and-ethiopia-s-history-changing-dam.

5. Elias, K. (2014, July 02). Egypt invites Sudan, Ethiopia for Tripartite Talks in Cairo, Sudan Vision. Retrieved from http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=237784.

6. Grcheva, I. (2016). Water Urbanism in Transboundary Regions: The Nile Basin and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. (Master thesis, KU Leuven University, Belgium). Retrieved from http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/publications/Master%20Thesis%20KU%20Leuven%20Irina%20Grcheva.pdf.

7. Gulhane, J. (2013, December 10). Sticking Points’ Remain Following Ethiopian Dam Meeting, Daily News Egypt. Retrieved from http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/12/10/sticking-points-remain-following-ethiopian-dam-meeting/.

8. Hammam, H. (2015, May 08). A Legal Analysis of the Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Public International Law Blog. Retrieved from https://law4371.wordpress.com/2015/05/08/a-legal-analysis-of-the-declaration-of-principles-on-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/.

9. IAEA/UNDP-GEF. (2014). Four African Nations Agree to Water Management Programme, International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved from https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/four-african-nations-agree-water-management-programme.

10. Khan, R.N.A. (2013). Indus Water Treaty: A Geo Political Study (Master thesis), University of Kashmir. Retrieved from http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/14384/6/chapter_2.pdf.

11. Lupai, J.K. (2007, May 26), The Jonglei Canal Project in Southern Sudan: Why the hurry and for whose benefit is it? Retrieved from http://www.egyptianagriculture.com/nile_river.html.

12. MacDiarmid, C. (2014, April 21), Egypt to 'escalate' Ethiopian Dam Dispute, Al Jazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/egypt-escalate-ethiopian-dam-dispute-201448135352769150.html.

13. McGrath, C. (2014, March 22), Nile River Dam Threatens War between Egypt and Ethiopia, Common Dreams. Retrieved from http://www.commondreams.org/news/2014/03/22/nile-river-dam-threatens-war-between-egypt-and-ethiopia.

Conclusion

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14. Mekonnen, K. (1998, November 27). Ethiopia: Past Treaties and Agreements on the Nile River Waters.

Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/199811270054.html. 15. Mekonnen, K. (n.d.). The Defects and Effects of Past Treaties and Agreements on the Nile River Waters:

Whose Faults Were they? Retrieved from http://www.ethiopians.com/abay/engin.html. 16. Menelik, I. (2013, June 15). Ethiopia Dam Construction on Blue Nile - Potential Conflict with Egypt.

Retrieved from http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?604580-Ethipoia-dam-construction-on-Blue-Nile-potential-conflict-with-Egypt&p=12937295#post12937295.

17. Milner, L. (2011, March 03). The Suez Crisis, BBC, Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/suez_01.shtml.

18. Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat. (2012). State of the River Nile Basin Report 2012.Retrieved from http://sob.nilebasin.org/pdf/Chapter_2_Water%20resources.pdf.

19. Nunzio, J.D. (2013, November 25). Conflict On the Nile: The Future of Transboundary Water Disputes over the World’s Longest River. Retrieved from http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/conflict-on-the-nile-the-future-of-transboundary-water-disputes-over-the-world-s-longest-river/.

20. Pham, P.J. (2010, February 09). Strategic Interests: Crisis, Conflict, and Opportunity in the Nile Basin. Retrieved from http://worlddefensereview.com/pham020910.shtml.

21. Rahman, M.A. (2014, February 15). The Geopolitics of Water in the Nile River Basin. Retrieved from http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-geopolitics-of-water-in-the-nile-river-basin/25746.

22. Reynolds, P. (2006, July 24). Suez: End of Empire, BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5199392.stm.

23. Salman, M.A. (2014, June 02). Entry into Force of the UN Watercourses Convention – Where are the Nile Basin Countries? International Water Law Project Blog. Retrieved from http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/blog/2014/06/02/dr-salman-m-a-salman-entry-into-force-of-the-un-watercourses-convention-where-are-the-nile-basin-countries/.

24. Shehadeh, A. and Vesters, T. (2013)., Maastricht, Study Guide: Euromun 2014, DISEC Disarmament and International Security. Retrieved from http://euromun.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/disec.pdf.

25. Swain, A. (2011). Challenges for Water Sharing in the Nile Basin: Changing Geo-Politics and Changing Climate, Hydrological Sciences Journal, 56(4), 687-702. http://dx.doi.org/pdf/10.1080/02626667.2011.577037.

26. Tadesse, D. (2012, October 18). Is a War over the Nile Still Imminent? Retrieved from https://www.globalpolicy.org/the-dark-side-of-natural-resources-st/other-articlesanalysis-and-general-debate/52041-is-a-war-over-the-nile-still-imminent.html.

27. Tegegne, M. (2010, April 20). Egypt, I was, I am, & I will be The Nile…!!!, Retrieved from http://www.ethiopianism.net/2539/egypt-i-was-i-am-and-i-will-be-the-nile/.

28. UNDP Egypt Project Document. (2009, June 24). Adaptation to Climate Change in the Nile Delta through Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Egypt. Retrieved from http://adaptation-undp.org/projects/sccf-czm-egypt.

29. UPI. (2009, July 30). Egypt Blocks Nile Water Deal. Retrieved from http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Industry/2009/07/30/Egypt-blocks-Nile-water-deal/88761248969600/.

30. Verhoeven, H. (2013, June 13). Why A 'Water War' Over The Nile River Won't Happen. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/2013612105849332912.html.

31. Water wars intensify between Egypt, Ethiopia by W. Hussein, 03 March 2016, Al-Monitor, Retrieved from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/egypt-ethiopia-renaissance-dam-water-storage-nile-dispute.html.

32. World Bank (2011). Panama Dashboard: Climate Future. Retrieved from http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportalb/home.cfm?page=country_profile&CCode=PAN&ThisTab=ClimateFuture.

33. World Bank Group (2011 April). Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile: Ethiopia, Washington DC. Retrieved from http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportalb/doc/GFDRRCountryProfiles/wb_gfdrr_climate_change_country_profile_for_ETH.pdf.

34. World Bank Group. (2016). Egypt Dashboard: Risk Screening Overview, Retrieved from http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportalb/home.cfm?page=country_profile&CCode=EGY&ThisTab=RiskOverview.

35. World Bank. (2016). Ethiopia Dashboard: Overview. Retrieved from http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportalb/home.cfm?page=country_profile&CCode=ETH&ThisTab=Dashboard.

36. Yihdego, Z. (2013, June 18). The Blue Nile Dam controversy in the Eyes of International Law, GWF Discussion Paper 1325, Global Water Forum. Retrieved from http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2013/06/18/the-blue-nile-damcontroversy-in-the-eyes-of-international-law/.

37. Zayed, D. (2011, July 08), Factbox: The Nile River: Treaties, Facts and Figures. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-nile-fb-idUSTRE76742R20110708.

38. Zedan, B.A. (2014). Nile Water Conflict Management, Advanced Research in Engineering Sciences. Vol. 2(2), 18-36. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281319988_N_Ni_il_le_e_W_Wa_at_te_er_r_C_Co_on_nf_fl_li_ic_ct_t_M_Ma_an_na_ag_ge_em_me_en_nt_t.

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The East Mediterranean energy province is also sometimes called the Levantine or Levant basin, after the historical term for the region, borrowed from the French word for “rising”, in reference to the East, where the sun rises.1 Originally referring to all Mediterranean lands to the east of Italy, it has come to designate the territories of Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey’s Hatay Province; to which is now added the Mediterranean coast of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and the Nile Delta. Because of the geophysical distribution of resources, the “energy province” is generally today taken to refer to the offshore deposits, mainly but not exclusively natural gas, in the maritime Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the named states. Prospects for development of the East Mediterranean energy province centre on natural gas. These must be seen through the lens of anticipated developments in world energy markets in the medium and long term. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2016 projects natural gas to be an important winner over the next 25 years as demand for oil and coal decreases. The IEA’s main scenario sees demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG) rising by 30 percent by 2040. In 2014, long-distance gas trade volumes worldwide were 685 billion cubic metres (bcm), of which 42 percent was LNG, but according to IEA projections this volume will increase by 2040 to 1.14 trillion cubic metres (Tcm), of which 53 percent will be LNG. Thus the long-distance demand in LNG by itself is seen to more than double from 288 bcm to 604 bcm in the next 25 years. The IEA report goes so far as to call this anticipated wave of LNG demand “the catalyst for a second natural gas revolution”.2 The new discoveries in the East Mediterranean basin are most relevant to security of gas supply to Europe. Examination of the European Union’s May 2014 “European Energy Security Strategy” and its February 2015 “Energy Union Package” reveals that the EU’s energy mix will continue to depend significantly on natural gas for which the importance of security of supply will increase, while shale gas extraction in Europe faces an uncertain future.3 In 2014, the EU’s energy mix included 22 percent natural gas, of which 60 percent was imported, a proportion expected to rise to 66% by the end of the present decade, while overall European gas demand is “projected to increase very modestly, with small increases in the power sector offsetting small declines for residential and commercial.”4 Over the last decades, for well-known reasons, energy development in the East Mediterranean basin for export has been nearly non-existent. The acuity of the Israeli-Arab conflict, together with the bipolar international system in place until the early 1990s, simply did not produce a business environment conducive to significant foreign direct investment in the energy sector in the East Mediterranean region. A host of geopolitical and geo-economic changes since then have altered that situation. The most significant of these has been the retreat of American power and prestige from the region that began with the first Obama administration’s attempt at a rapprochement with Iran, continued with a vacillating policy through the Arab Spring that included support for Muslim Brotherhood insurrections in Egypt and Libya, and culminated most notably in its Syria policy. There, President Obama’s abandonment of his proclaimed “red line” over the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria, only confirmed the ascendance of a Russian-Iranian condominum (“joint rule”) in the region from the Sinai Peninsula to western Pakistan and Afghanistan.5 Official Washington rationalized this exit of decades-long American influence from the Middle East by proclaiming it to be part of a “pivot to Asia”. The main effect of this reversal of alliances by the US against its long-time bilateral partners in the region has been to produce a more and more open rapprochement and strategic co-operation amongst Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

The Emerging East Mediterranean Energy Province: Overview and Prospects

Robert M. Cutler

The Geo-economic and Geopolitical Setting for

Evaluating the East Mediterranean

Energy Province

GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY/JANUARY 2017 12

This evolution effectively eliminated state-based threats to Israel’s existence in its immediate neighbourhood, although it still remains under threat from Iran and its non-state clients such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Along with the political disintegration of Syria, these developments removed any potential state-based threats to prospective physical offshore infrastructure, while technical improvements in recent years in assuring infrastructure security have eliminated threats from non-states (e.g., terrorist commando motorboats). Three relatively quick strikes in succession focussed attention on the region. These were: the Tamar field in 2009, about 80 kilometres (km) off the coast of Haifa, Israel, by a consortium of American and Israeli energy companies; the Leviathan field, in 2010 by the same consortium, about 50 km west of the Tamar field, still in the Israeli sector; and the Aphrodite field, in 2011 by some members of the same consortium, 34 km still further west of Leviathan, in Cyprus’s EEZ. In all three cases, the lead company in the consortium is the Houston-based exploration and production company Noble Energy. In 2013, another field was discovered 13 km southwest of the Tamar field and named Tamar Southwest although it is a separate field. It is estimated to contain 20 bcm of natural gas. Negotiations regarding the development of Tamar Southwest are now taking place with the Israeli government. By 2012 the Tamar consortium had already committed between 113 and 136 bcm to six Israeli entities, including a 15-year deal to supply 42 bcm to the Israel Electric Corporation. Noble Energy owns 36 percent of Tamar and 40 percent of Leviathan. Their most recent report sets Tamar’s current capacity at slightly over 12 bcm/y with an upside expansion to almost 21 bcm/y and gross recoverable resources of 283 bcm. The Tamar field has now been in commercial production for over three years and provides fuel for over half of Israeli electricity generation and nearly all its industrial requirements. It replaces natural gas that Israel used to receive from Egypt but which was cut off in 2011 by sabotage preceding the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak. Egyptian gas had represented slightly over one-third of the source for electricity generation in Israel, the remainder coming from coal imported from Russia. The Leviathan deposit, with between 600 bcm and 800 bcm recoverable reserves, is likely to obtain sanction in the next few months, enabling development and production to proceed. In May 2016, the Israeli government approved a deal allowing the Leviathan partners to begin detailed planning. Exports from the Leviathan field are expected to begin by 2019. Initial production levels are projected at 5 bcm/y, with expected sales by 2020 ramping up to between 6.3 and 10.5 bcm/y, and ultimate gross capacity said to be capable of expanding to over 42 bcm/year.6 All these plans were upset in March 2016, when Israel’s Supreme Court rejected the “stability clause” in the original contract with Leviathan, which would have prevented regulatory change in the gas industry for 10 years. This appears to have been mainly politically motivated, as the case was brought by members of parties in opposition to the current government of Benjamin Netanyahu. The Supreme Court gave the government 12 months to revise the contract, which had taken three years to negotiate. The Leviathan consortium now targets the end of 2019, rather than the beginning of the year, for commercial production to get under way.7 More recent discoveries in Israel’s offshore include, in 2014, the Royee field almost 160 km off the coast with a best-estimate of reserves at 90 bcm (with a range of 54 to 140 bcm); and the mutually adjoining Daniel East and Daniel West fields, closer in, with preliminary estimated total reserves of 255 bcm. Neither of these fields has a set date for development to begin.8 All these numbers should be set into the context of Noble Energy’s company analyses, according to which the regional gas deficit stands today at 41 bcm/y and will grow to 93 bcm/year.9 In 2011, Noble Energy discovered the Aphrodite field in Block 12 of Cyprus’s offshore territory. Preliminary estimates indicated that the field contained between 180 bcm and 285 bcm with a gross mean average of 200 bcm, but this figure was lowered in 2013 to 100 bcm to 170 bcm gross resources with a mean of approximately 140 bcm. This would still be enough gas to supply Cyprus

Discovery and Early Development of the East Mediterranean

Energy Province

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for well over a century and a half. Earlier this decade there were projects for energy cooperation between Israel and Cyprus, but these have lain dormant, first because the strikes on both sides were in the end not as large as had originally been thought, although they are still very significant, and second because the peace process on Cyprus stagnated, although it has picked up significant steam since early 2016. The EU has studied a route that carries the gas to Cyprus, from where it would go to either Crete or the Greek mainland, thus enabling exports of Cyprus’s gas as well. In any co-operation between Cyprus and Israel, liquefied natural gas (LNG) is likelier than pipelines to promote exports, but the Cypriot deposit is not big enough by itself to make that worthwhile. That is why co-operation was first sketched involving nearby strikes in the Israeli EEZ in the Eastern Mediterranean. Also, the US firm Noble Energy is the consortium’s major partner and operator on each side. In June 2013, Cyprus signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the planning of an LNG terminal with Noble Energy and its Israeli partners Delek and Avner. Such a terminal, projected for Vasilikos, an industrial area in the island’s south on the coast, would open possibilities to sell to Asian as well as European markets. Nothing has yet to come of this, despite expressed interest from France’s Total, Italy’s ENI and South Korea’s Kogas, which also had purchased drilling rights in various sectors of the Cyprus offshore. That is because the Leviathan consortium was, until earlier this year, still negotiating its way through Israeli legislative politics to determine how much gas would be available for export, before even deciding on the routes and customers. As time has passed, liquefying the gas for maritime transportation is appearing to be more and more uneconomical under evolving market conditions, which do not look like they are changing soon.10 Another possibility on the Israeli side, with or without co-operation with gas from Cyprus, is an undersea pipeline to Turkey. This would have to pass through Cyprus’s EEZ and across its continental shelf, but Turkey still occupies the northern third of the island and is the only state to recognize the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus there. Indeed, soon after the Greek Cypriot administration began exploratory drilling in September 2011, Turkey signed an oil and gas exploration agreement with the Turkish Cypriot administration and sent a seismic research ship into the area in preparation for drilling with a military escort. Nothing ever came of this, but it was enough to cool down interest in energy development in Cyprus’s offshore. The possibility is being talked about again as negotiations between the two sides on Cyprus have acquired momentum this year; there is the possibility of a referendum on both sides of the island on an agreement in mid-2017.11 Israel’s Leviathan and Tamar fields together are estimated to hold 900 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas, of which approximately 150 bcm is tagged for export. Technical studies show that a pipeline to Turkey is the most feasible route. A route from Cyprus to Greece would require an 1,100 km deep-water pipeline, but one to Ceyhan would be under 500 km and the waters of the eastern Mediterranean Sea are relatively shallow. However, recent geophysical studies indicate that, beyond the territorial and EEZ questions concerning the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus, this undersea route would include portions of significantly greater depth, and other geophysical complications, that would significantly increase the costs. Clearing the seabed route for pipe-laying would also be more expensive than first thought, due to unforeseen physical obstacles.12 Discussion amongst Cypriot and Israeli industrial and government circles has nevertheless been underway for some time. The political resolution of the division of Cyprus would open the way for trilateral Cyprus-Israel-Turkey cooperation. Especially given the relatively new energy dimension of relations, certainly this would be a win-win-win situation. Reunification of Cyprus could permit development not only in the offshore Aphrodite field to the south of Cyprus, but also fields off the north of the island, benefiting its whole population.

GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY/JANUARY 2017 14

The US Geological Service estimated total undiscovered reserves in the East Mediterranean basin at 3.5 Tcm of gas in 2010, and 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil.13 This suggests the potential for more finds in the region, but general plans seem to be on hold at present. World prices and anticipated production levels are not conducive to extensive exploration, and the geopolitical situation in the region is still cautionary. In the Caspian Sea, by contrast, the industry knew already where to look after the Soviet Union disintegrated, because Soviet cartographers were world-class and had already mapped in general outline, over the course of decades, all the significant formations under the Caspian Sea. They only lacked the exploration and development technology that Western majors were able to supply once this province opened up competitive foreign direct investment. One would think that Europe would be one of the parties most interested in imports from the East Mediterranean region. It is nearby, so transportation costs would be relatively low. The Arab Spring demonstrated the political unreliability of North African sources, on which Italy and some of its northern neighbours have traditionally depended. Israel and Cyprus could help to decrease EU dependence on Russian gas and, lacking the capital and offshore drilling technology, they would present investment opportunities for European energy exploration and production companies. Cyprus and Greece are EU member-states, and Turkey still has a customs union with the EU. However, for precisely the same reason, Russia is interested too, as it seeks to maintain its market share in Europe, which has increased in each of the last three years: from 23 percent of Europe’s total gas consumption in 2013, to 30% in 2014, to 34% in 2015; and likely to rise again in 2016 when final statistics are available.14 Thus Gazprom signed in 2013 for an option to purchase LNG from the Tamar field, which it would ship to Asia, both because prices are better there and because this would take it off the table for export to Europe. This was followed in December of the same year by SoyuzNefteGaz’s agreement with the Assad regime over rights to explore part of Syria’s EEZ.15 The East Mediterranean would represent a potential “fourth corridor” for natural gas to Europe, the other three being: Russia’s Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea; the Druzhba pipeline system through Ukraine; and the Southern Gas Corridor project that the EU has developed over the last decade for gas from the Caspian Sea basin, meaning Azerbaijan and possibly Turkmenistan or northern Iraq (Kurdistan Regional Government) if deals are ever able to be struck there. However, Russia’s lobbying in Brussels has been more successful this year than in the recent past, and it is using its economic influence on national political executives to persuade the EU that it doesn’t need to look elsewhere. For example, after the European Commission earlier this year effectively denied Gazprom the possibility to build the Nord Stream Two pipeline to Germany, to increase gas dependence, it allowed an exception to monopoly regulations so that existing Nord Stream gas could represent more than 50 percent of the OPAL pipeline that distributes Nord Stream gas into the so-called “Visegrad countries”: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, which inherited significant gas dependence on Russia from their former Soviet-bloc ties and have been struggling since then to diversify their sources of supply. Add to this, the Turkish Stream project under the Black Sea, which would eventually take Russian gas across Greece and under the Ionian Sea to Italy, replacing the defunct South Stream pipeline project to Bulgaria, and it becomes evident that Russia has been playing the long game and is still seeking to catch Central and Eastern Europe in a pipeline pincer-movement, the northern extension of which is already present in Nord Stream.16 Informed European expert opinion concludes that, at the present time, Europe remains an option for East Mediterranean gas exports, due mainly to declining production and the shift away from oil, using natural gas as a “bridge” to greater reliance on renewable energy sources. Despite political pressure from its member-states, the European Union, through the Energy Union driven by the European Commission, still seeks to diversify gas dependence away from Russia. The so-

The East Mediterranean Energy Province in a

Broader Geo-Economic Context

Conclusion

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called “EastMed” pipeline (Israel-Cyprus-Greece) is probably not in the cards, because shipping LNG to Europe would be more cost-competitive. Europe appears to believe that at present it is more likely from Israeli than from Cypriot sources, but the difficulty remains to make this gas deliverable.17 A competing view is the somewhat more idealistic prospect, put forward from an Atlanticist rather than a strictly European perspective, advocating an “East Mediterranean Integrated Gas Structure” (EMIGS). This is a self-consciously “innovative collaborative approach” that sketches the possibility for regional co-operation on infrastructure in case existing political conflicts are stabilized and implicitly appeals to political authorities in the region for their common assistance. Yet it admits that “[d]etailed studies will be required to evaluate the technical and commercial feasibility of an integrated transnational gas pipeline and transmission facilities that would carry natural gas from multiple sources to regional markets.”18 It seems more likely that events on the ground will proceed at their own rhythm, and that piecemeal and project-specific co-operation will develop as needed and as the parties see it in their interest that this should happen. It is more likely that the overall shape of any putative EMIGS will emerge from this manner of proceeding. Indeed, that is exactly what has happened in the Caspian Sea basin over the last 25 years, where reliance on various forms of mainly bilateral co-operation have not prevented significant work from being carried out or significant resources from reaching the world market. About the Author After a dozen years in universities during which he focussed on Soviet foreign and domestic affairs, Robert Cutler decided, in the post-Soviet era, to expand beyond Russia and beyond strictly political issues. He is now best known for consulting and policy analysis as an Energy Security and Geo-economics Specialist. From this standpoint, he has studied oil and gas investment and pipeline projects in Central Asia, Turkey and the Caucasus, and written on European energy policies as well as on global commodity markets. Mr. Cutler is also a Fellow with the Canadian Energy Research Institute. Endnotes 1Online Etymology Dictionary, s.v. “Levant”, retrieved 2 December 2016 from <http://etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=levant>. (All URLs were retrieved on 2 December 2016 unless otherwise indicated.) 2International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2016, London presentation (Paris: IEA, 16 November 2016), slides 3, 9; retrieved from <https//www.iea.org/media/publications/weo/WEO2016Presentation.pdf>. 3European Commission, European Energy Security Strategy, COM (2014) 330 final (Brussels, 28 May 2014) retrieved from <http://eur-lex.europa,eu/legal-content/EU/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN;> and European Commission, Energy Union Package, COM (2015) 80 final (Brussels, 25 February 2015), retrieved from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1bd46c90-bdd4-11e4-bbe1-01aa75ed71a1.0001.03/DOC_1&format=PDF>. 4International Energy Agency, “Executive Summary” Medium-Term Gas Market Report 2016 (Paris: IEA, n.d.) p. 11, retrieved from <https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/MTGMR2016SUM.pdf>. 5Interpretation taken from Robert M. Cutler, “Washington’s ‘Fashoda’ moment: The US reversal of alliances; Comparative perspectives”, Asia Times Online (23 December 2016), retrieved from <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MID-04-231213.html>. 6Dave Stover, NBL: Noble Energy (Jeffries Energy Conference presentation, 30 November 2016), slides 2, 18-19; retrieved from <http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-2D0WMQ/3346385882x0x919370/70D6F6B6-1184-42C8-85D8-5989BDE7775D/Jefferies_Presentation_For_Website_Upload.pdf>. 7Joel Greenberg, “Israel’s Supreme Court Blocks Leviathan Gas Field Deal”, Financial Times (28 March 2016), retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/6dcb6a3a-f4dc-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132>. 8U.S. Government, Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Israel”, retrieved from <http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=ISR>. 9Dave Stover, NBL: Noble Energy (see fn. 6), slide 18.

GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY/JANUARY 2017 16

Publication Date: February 15, 2017

Submit manuscripts and Letters to the Editor to Allan Fogwill at the address below or via email at mmurphy@ceri.ca. Manuscripts dealing with energy and geopolitics, generally between 2,000 and 4,000 words in length, will be considered for publication. Unsolicited manuscripts will undergo peer review by members of the editorial board. Available by subscription for $800 (US) per year; $400 (US) for public libraries universities. For Canadian residents—$800 per year; $400 for public libraries and universities—plus 5% GST. Publisher: Canadian Energy Research Institute, #150, 3512 - 33 Street NW, Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2L 2A6 Telephone: (403) 220-2370; Fax: (403) 220-9579; Email: mmurphy@ceri.ca. Reproduction without permission is prohibited.

10Recent update from Aiswarya Lakshmi, “Cyprus LNG Terminal Non-Starter?” MarineLink (21 April 2016), retrieved 2 December 2016 from <http://www.marinelink.com/news/nonstarter-terminal408479>. 11For further detail, see Robert M. Cutler, “Solving the Cyprus Puzzle Will Help Turkey’s Energy Balance”, Derin Ekonomi (Istanbul, 8 November 2016); published in Turkish translation, English original retrieved from <http://www.yenisafak.com/en/amphtml/economy/solving-the-cyprus-puzzle-will-help-turkeys-energy-balance-2560602>. 12Author’s own sources. 13Chistopher J. Schenk, Mark A. Kirschbaum, Ronald R. Charpentier, Timothy R. Klett, Michael E. Brownfield, Janet K. Pitman, Troy A. Cook and Marilyn E. Tennyson, Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean, Fact Sheet 2010-3014 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Geological Survey, 2010), p. 3, retrieved from <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf>. 14European Council, Eurostat, “Eurostat Statistics Explained: Energy Production and Imports” (Brussels: Eurostat, 21 September 2016), retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports#Imports>. 15Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Shifting Eastern Mediterranean Alliances,” Middle East Quarterly 23, no. 2 (Spring 2016). 16For more on this line of interpretation, see Robert M. Cutler, “The Black Sea’s West Coast Weighs in on Caspian Sea Basin Pipelines”, Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst (Johns Hopkins University, Silk Road Studies Program) 12, no. 15 (19 August 2010), retrieved from <http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12110-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2010-8-19-art-12110.html>. 17Simone Tagliapietra, “Will the European Market Need East Mediterranean Gas?”, pp. 97-108 in Angelos Giannakopoulos (ed.), Energy Cooperation and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Seismic Shift towards Peace or Conflict? (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, February 2016), retrieved from <http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Energy%20Cooperation%20and%20Security%20in%20the%20Eastern%20Mediterranean%20small%20file.pdf>. 18Shaul Zemach, Toward an Eastern Mediterranean Integrated Gas Infrastructure? Foreign and Security Policy Paper No. 2016-20 (Washington, D.C.: German Marshall Fund, 3 May 2016), p. 14, retrieved from <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/toward-eastern-mediterranean-integrated-gas-infrastructure>.