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2AC- Generic K Frontline

1. Framework- The aff has to defend a topical plan and the neg has to defend a textuall and functionall

competiti!e cp. "oting issue #ecause$

A. Ground- Changing the framework for the debate eliminates the 1AC since it was based in policy framework focused

governmental action. There are an infinite number of new frameworks which makes it impossible for the 2AC to predictand generate offense.

%. &oleplaing good'democrac and peace

&A()* 1+++(ohn !awls" professor at #arvard" The $aw of %eoples" p. &'-&)#ow is the ideal of public reason reali*ed by citi*ens who are not government officials+ ,n a representative govemment" citi*ens vote for representatives-chiefeecutives" legislators" and the likenot for particular laws (ecept at a state or local level where they may vote directly on referenda /uestions" which are not usually

fundamental /uestions). To answer this /uestion" we say that" ideally" citi*ens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask

themselves what statutes" supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity" they would think it most reasonable to enact . 0hen

firm and widespread" the disposition of citi*ens to view themselves as ideal legislators and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public

office who violate public reason" forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength andvigor . Thus in domestic society citi*ens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason" while doing what they can to hold government officials to it.

This duty" like other political rights and duties" is an intrinsically moral duty. , emphasi*e that it is not a legal duty" for in that case it would be incompatible with

freedom of speech. imilarly" the ideal of the public reason of free and e/ual peoples is reali*ed" or satisfied" whenever chief eecutives and legislators" and other

government officials" as well as candidates for public office" act from and follow the principles of the $aw of %eoples and eplain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a peoples foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citi*ens" we say" as before" that ideally citi*ens are to think

of themselves as if they were eecutives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to

advance. 3nce again" when firm and widespread" the disposition of citi*ens to view themselves as ideal eecutives and legislators" and to repudiate government officials

and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and e/ual peoples" is part of the political and social basis of peace and

understanding among peoples.

2. !ealism inevitable- the anarchic sstem of international politics ensures that *tates will alwas #e !ing

for power, regardless of their !isi#le intentions

*later + (#annah $ouise" reviewing ohn . 4earsheimer" 5The Tragedy of 6reat %ower %olitics7" 8ovember 2& 299:" http;<<www.shvoong.com<law-and-

politics<politics<1:=:&-tragedy-great-power-politics<)

The Tragedy of 6reat %ower %olitics> by ohn 4earsheimer" outlines his theory of 53ffensive !ealism7. ,t describes what motivates the international system and offershistorical eplanations as well as future predictions.

The book begins with the central tenet of 3ffensive !ealist theory; the international system is anarchic and this causes states to fear each other and

compete for power. A state>s ultimate aim is become a hegemon because this is most secure. Thus states are constantly trapped in securitycompetition" seeking to increase their share of world power . 4earsheimer argues that power is based on military capabilities a state possesses and the

strongest power is the state with the strongest army as only land power can win a ma?or war alone. $atent power @based upon population and wealth" which create largearmies- is significant but not as important as actual power. #esitance about using nuclear weapons means land power remains the key measure of power" while this

hesitance means nuclear arsenals increase stability between great powers. 3ffensive !ealism says configurations of power emerge across regions" affecting fear levels

between states. ear levels determine the intensity of security competition and likelihood of war . Bipolarity> causes least fear and is most stable"

Bunbalanced multipolarity> causes most fear" thus is the least stable configurationD and Bmultipolarity> sits in between. 4earsheimer posits that large bodies of water

profoundly limit the power-pro?ection capabilities of land forces" reducing fear and also eplaining why there is no global hegemon. 3ffensive !ealism says war is

inevitable and the author argues that China and the E are 5destined to be adversaries7 as growing Chinese economic might translates into military might.

4earsheimer adds 3ffensive !ealism to a long tradition of !ealist theory" bringing some of his own ideas and combining others. #e agrees with 0alt*>s

Fefensive<tructural !ealism that international anarchy causes states to engage in security competition. #owever he diverges from 0alt* there saying" like

4orgenthau>s #uman 8ature<Classic !ealism" states will maimise their power constantly" striving ultimately for hegemony . #e adds ideas such as

5the stopping power of water7 and he has striven to ensure his is a workable theory for eplaining the past and predicting the future" making his book a significant

contribution to the canon of ,nternational !elations theory. BThe Tragedy of 6reat %ower %olitics> challenges the $iberal paradigm to a certain etent" but 4earsheimer

does this by using abundant eamples to prove his points" rather than through dissecting $iberal theory. ,nstead he focuses more on criti/uing Fefensive !ealism and

does this throughout the book. 0ith regard to $iberalism" 4earsheimer says that cooperation between states does eist" but only to promote a state>sselfish interests" not for the sake of world peace. ecurity competition remains essential in today>s world which" despite international institutions"

remains anarchic . ,ndeed" such institutions are simply another arena for furthering national interests" he argues. o while 4earsheimer>s book does

refute $iberal ideas" it is not a detailed criti/ue instead concentrating on making the case for 3ffensive !ealism. A fascinating and in-depth addition to !ealist thought"

The Tragedy of 6reat %ower %olitics is a good attempt to reveal what really causes war and conflict in the international system.

1

ropert of /essie Chen, the C0 of Asian e#ate )eague 3 All Cop &ights &eser!ed



4. Turn- &ealism pre!ents war.

&ealism is empiricall pro!en to #e successful and is the #est wa to a!ert war

Gu55ini +6 tefano 6u**ini" enior !esearcher" research units on Fanish and Guropean foreign policy and on Fefence and security" 1::H" !ealism in

,nternational !elations and ,nternational %olitical Gconomy; The Continuing tory of A Feath oretold" I9-I1

The historical contet of 4unich and appeasement gave realism" as opposed to the idealist approaches

prevailing in the inter-war period" an enormous appeal . Carr and 4orgenthau contributed to undermining the basic principles of what was

dubbed idealism (Carr>s Etopianism). 4orgenthau was crucial in securing the ascendancy of realism in the newly founded academic speciali*ation of ,nternational

!elations. Carr used realist scepticism to critici*e a great power of his day" his native ritain. #e debunked the apparently universal harmony of interests as a status /uo power ideology. Jet Carr>s scepticism produces a restless circle of criticism which is" as he acknowledged" self-contradicting. 4oreover" Carr>s scepticism is neither

able to define his eact mi of realism and idealism" nor to positively propose a coherent policy. 4orgenthau" in his attempt to teach the diplomatic lessons of the past"

was torn between his earlier criticism (1:=') of idealists who confounded politics with science" and his own attempt to replace idealism by a claim to the scientific

superiority of realism (1:=H" 1:'9). The result is a theory which must find conceptual bridges starting from the eternal laws of human nature" via the state as a unitary

actor" to a necessary balance of power theory. ,t is much more comple and contradictory than usually acknowledged. To take ?ust one eample" Kenneth 0alt* (1:&:) proposed a famous distinction between three images for understanding the causes of war. The first image is based on human nature" the second on the nature of the

political regime" and the third on the specific characteristics of the international realm (anarchy). 0alt* plainly placed 4orgenthau within the first category. Jet

although 4orgenthau derived power" and hence the essential characteristics of all politics including war" from human nature" he could also /ualify for the other two

images. #e argued that the typical war of the gruesome twentieth century was a result of the democrati*ation" and hence nationali*ation of international politics. Thiswas how he called the shift to mass societies whose rulers have to respond to large constituencies. This is a form of a second image eplanation. And finally" although it

is true that politics is about the struggle for power based on human nature" the specificity of the international realm" what he called multiplicity" eplains why the

warlike struggle for power" while tamed at the domestic level" is endemic to the international level. #ow can Carr and 4orgenthau" so different in style and content" and

whose approaches are filled with so many internal tensions" become ma?or reference points for one school of thought+ 3bviously they were perceived mainly through

what they had in common" the criti/ue of idealism and the priority given to power and politics. #ence" this chapter should also serve as a warning; as much as idealism

was often ideali*ed to allow a realist criti/ue" realism has often been demoni*ed by its adversaries and misused by reactionary friends. The binary opposition of realismand idealism more often serves to provide observers and practitioners with an identity than it does to provide analytical clarity . The realist world-view want

to be pragmatic" not cynical. ,ts main purpose is the avoidance of great war through the management and limitation ofconflicts by a working balance of power supplemented by normative arrangements . 8evertheless" for realists" the struggle for

power will always arise. Conflicts cannot be abolished. or realis ts" foreign policy often brings choices that nobody wants to makeFiplomats might at times have to gamble" but not because they like doing it. 3n the stage of world politics where brute forces can clash unfettered" diplomats

enter a theatre of tragedy. This is the fate of the statesman" who" in the writings of 4orgenthau" but also Kennan and Kissinger"

appears as a romantici*ed heroic figure. 3ften misunderstood also by self-proclaimed realists , realist policy is not the eternal

pro?ection of a military or even reactionary ideologyD it is the constant ad?ustment to a bitter reality. or realists

!ealpolitik is not a choice that can be avoided" it is a necessity which responsible actors have to moderate.

7. ermutation- o the plan and all non-exclusi!e parts of the alternati!e.

&ealism can #e reflecti!e and include reforms from critical theor while maintaining securit. ur

ad!antages are a precondition for their alternati!e.

8urra +9(Alastair" %rofessor in the %olitics Fepartment at the Eniversity of 0ales wansea" !econstructing !ealism)

or the realist" then" if rationalist theories prove so conservative as to make their adoption problematic" critical theories prove so progressive as to make their adoption

unattractive. ,f the former can ?ustifiably be criticised for seeking to make a far from ideal order work more efficiently" thus perpetuating its eistence and legitimating

its errors" reflectivist theory can e/ually be criticised for searching for a tomorrow which ma ne!er exist" thereby endangering the

possibility of establishing any form of sta#le order in the here and now. !ealisms distinctive contribution thus lies in its attempt to drive a path between

the two" a path which" in the process" suggests the basis on which some form of synthesis between rationalism and reflectivism might be achieved. 3riented in its

genesis towards addressing the shortcomings in an idealist transformatory pro?ect" it is centrally motivated by a concern to reconcile vision with practicality" to relate

utopia and reality. Enifying a technical and a practical stance" it combines aspects of the positivist methodology employed by problem-solving theory with the

interpretative stance adopted by critical theory" avoiding the monism of perspective which leads to the self-destructive conflict between the two. Eltimately" it can

simultaneousl acknowledge the possi#ilit of change in the structure of the international system and the need to probe the limits of the possible"

and yet also :uestion the proximit of any international transformation" emphasi*e the persistence of pro#lems after such a transformation"and serve as a reminder of the need to grasp whatever semblance of order can be obtained in the mean time. ,ndeed" it is possible to say that realism is

uni/uely suited to serve as such an orientation. imultaneously to criti/ue contemporary resolutions of the problem of political authority as unsatisfactory and yet to

support them as an attainable measure of order in an unstable world involves one in a contradiction which is difficult to accept. Jet" because it grasps the essential

ambiguity of the political" and adopts imperfectionism as its dominant motif" realism can relate these two tasks in a way which allows neither to

predominate" achieving" if not a reconciliation" then at least a !ia#le snthesis. %erhaps the most famous realist refrain is that all politics are power

politics. ,t is the all that is important here. !ealism lays claim to a relevance across systems" and because it relies on a conception of human nature" rather than a

historically specific structure of world politics" it can make good on this claim. ,f its observations about human nature are even remotely accurate" the problems that it

addresses will transcend contingent formulations of the problem of political order. Gven in a genuine cosmopolis" conflict might become technical" but i t would not beeliminated altogether. The primary manifestations of power might become more economic or institutional rather than (para)military" but" where disagreements occur and

2




power eists" the employment of the one to ensure the satisfactory resolution of the other is inevitable short of a wholesale transformation of human behaviour. %ower is

ultimately of the essence of politicsD it is not something which can be banished" only tamed and restrained . As a result" realism achieves a universal relevance to the

problem of political action which allows it to relate the reformist 5eal of critical theory" without which advance would be impossible" with the problem-

solvers sensi#le caution that" before reform is attempted" whatever measure of securit is possible under contemporary conditions must first be

ensured.

;. Turn- ntological technostrategic discourse is crucial to human existence.Camp#ell, rof <& = >ewcastle? 2k? 4oral pacesD %. &'

19=. ,bid." '-:. $evinas has also argues for a politics that respects a double in?unction. 0hen asked" 5,s not ethical obligation to the other a purelynegative ideal" impossible to reali*e in our everyday being-in-the-world"7 which is governed by 5ontological drives and practices7D and 5,s ethics practicable in human

society as we know it+ 3r is it merely an invitation to apolitical ac/uiescence+7 $evinas>s response was that 5of course we inhibit an ontological world

of technological mastery and political self-preservation. ,ndeed" without these political and technological structures of

organi*ation we would not be able to feed mankind . This is the greatest parado of human eistence; we must use the ontological for

the sake of the other" to ensure the survival of the other we must resort to the techno-political systems of means and ends.7Kearney and $evinas" 5Fialogue with Gmmanuel $evinas"7 2H.

@. Aff outweighs- 0le!ating uman extinction to a real possi#ilit encourages a new social ethic to

sol!e conflicts and gi!es meaning to life.

0pstein and Bhao + L!ichard . Gpstein and J. Mhao" $aboratory of Computational 3ncology"Fepartment of 4edicine"Eniversity of #ong Kong"%rofessorial lock" Nueen 4ary #ospital" #ong Kong. 5The Threat That Fare 8ot peak ,ts 8ame; #uman Gtinction7. %erspectives in iology and 4edicine" volume

&2" number 1 (winter 299:);11'@2&. %ro?ect 4useOinal ends for all species are the same" but the ?ourneys will be different. ,f we cannot influence the end of our species" can we influence the ?ourney+ To do soeven in

a small waywould be a crowning achievement for human evolution and give new meaning to the term civili*ation. nl # ele!ating the topic of

human extinction to the level of serious professional discourse can we #egin to prepare oursel!es for the challenges that lie

ahead. The difficulty of the re/uired transition should not be underestimated. This is depicted in Table I as a painful multistep progression from the 29th-century philosophical norm of Ggo-Thinkdefined therein as a short-term state of mind valuing individual material self-interest above all other considerationsto Gco-Think"

in which humans come to adopt a broader 6aia-like outlook on themselves as but one part of an infinitely larger reality. 8aking this change must in!ol!e

communicating the non-sensationalist message to all global citi*ens that things are seriousD and we are in this

togetherD or" in blunter language" that the road to etinction and its related agonies does indeed lie ahead. Consistent with this prospect" the risks of human

etinctionand the cost-benefit of attempting to reduce these riskshave been /uantified in a recent sobering analysis (4atheny 299). nce complacenc

has #een shaken off and a sense of collecti!e purpose created" the battle against self-seeking anthropocentric human instincts will have only

?ust begun. ,t is often said that human beings suffer from the ability to appreciate their own mortalityan eistential agony that has given rise to the great religions

but in the present age of religious decline" we must begin to bear the added burden of anticipating the demise of our species. ,ndeed" as argued here" there arecompelling reasons for encouraging this collecti!e mind-shift. or in the best of all possible worlds" the reali5ation that our

species has long-term sur!i!al criteria distinct from our short-term tribal priorities could spark a new social ethic to

upgrade what we now all too often dismiss as 5human nature7 (Tudge 1:H:).

9. (e must e!aluate conse:uences- !alue to life arguments are a#solutist and undermine the effecti!eness

of their alternati!e.

<saac 2(effrey" political science professor ,ndiana Eniversity" 5Gnds" 4eans" and %olitics" Fissent 4aga*ine" pring 2992)%ower is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. ,t is the core of politics. %ower is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. %olitics" in large part" involves contests over the

distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world" one must attend to the means that are necessaryto bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop" and to eercise" power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. ,t is to say that power is not reducible to morality.

As writers such as 8iccolo 4achiavelli" 4a 0eber" !einhold 8iebuhr" and #annah Arendt have taught" an unyielding concern with moral goodness

undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable" reflecting a kind of personal integrity" but it suffers from three fatal flaws; (1) ,t fails to see

that the purity of one>s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Ab?uring violence or refusing to make

common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thingD but if such tactics entail impotence" then it is hard to view them as serving any moral

good beyond the clean con- science of their supportersD (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and in?ustice" moral purity

is not simply a form of powerlessnessD it is often a form of complicity in in?ustice. This is why" from the standpoint of politicsas opposed to

religionpacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. ,n categorically repudiating violence" it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent in?ustices with any effectD and

(I) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended conse/uences as it is about intentionsD it is the effects of action" rather than

I




the motives of action" that is most significant. ust as the alignment with 5good7 may engender impotence" it is often the pursuit of 5good7 that generates evil.

This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century; it is not enough that one>s goals be sincere or idealisticD it is e/ually important" always" to ask about the

effects of pursuing these goals and to ?udge these effects in pragmatic and historically contetuali*ed ways. 4oral absolutism inhibits this ?udgment. ,t alienates those who are not true believers. ,t promotes arrogance. And it undermines political

effectiveness .

6. Turn- AE Collapse of the friendenem distinction leads to a glo#al pschosis where war is ine!ita#le

due to our ina#ilit to politicall define enem.

&einhard? 27 (5Towards a polit ical-theology of the neighbor7D http;<<www.c?s.ucla.edu<4ellon<TowardsP%oliticalPTheology.pdf)

,f the concept of the political is defined" as Carl chmitt does" in terms of the Gnemy<riend opposition" the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the

political may have already disappeared" or at least has muted into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the 5us7 and 5them7 binarisms

that flourished as recently as the Cold 0ar is one sub?ect to radical instability" both sub?ectively and politically" as ac/ues Ferrida points out in The

Politics of Friendship; The effects of this destructuration would be countless; it would multiply Blittle wars> between nation-statesD it

would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal strugglesD it would seek to pose itself" to find repose" through opposing still identifiable

adversaries- China" ,slam+ Gnemies without whichQit would lose its political beingQwithout an enemy" and therefore without friends"

where does one then find oneself " qua a self+ ( PF ).

,f one accepts chmitt>s account of the political" the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis; since the

mirroring relationship between Es and Them provides a form of stability" albeit one based on pro?ective identifications and repudiations" the

loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what $acan calls the 5imaginary tripod7 that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-sub?ectivity" until something

causes it to collapse" resulting in full-blown delusions" hallucinations" and paranoia. #ence" for chmitt" a world without enemies is

much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemiesD as Ferrida writes" the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for

5an unheard-of violence" the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground" an unleashing incommensurable in i ts unprecedented- therefore

monstrous- formsD a violence in the face of which what is called hostility" war" conflict" enmity" cruelty" even hatred" would regain reassuring and ultimately

appeasing contours" because they would be identifiable7 ( PF HI).

%E That ena#les nuclear war.

)aclau? 2; (GrnestoD C!; 8ew Centennial !eviewD &;1D 53n B!eal> and BAbsolute> Gnemies7)

A central point of chmitt>s argument is that the hostility of the partisan war recogni*ed a series of limitations. These came" on the one hand"

from the presence of what he calls the 5interested third"7 the friend that makes possible the connection between the regular and the irregular. This is a political

limitation" e.g." the recognition" in the panish case" of that political character of the struggle of the 5Gmpencinado7 by the regular army and by Gngland. ,n the same

way" the telluric character of the partisans> war gives the struggle a mainly defensive character. ut the absoluti*ation of the political nature of the opposition

friend<enemy leads to an e/ually necessary absoluti*ation of the conflict. Clausewit* had already spoken of 5absolute war7 but had never put into the /uestion the

regularity of an eisting tate. 0ith $enin" however" the civil war struggle of a party of a party of professional revolutionaries turns the real enemy into anabsolute one. The %arty becomes the incarnation of an absolute hostility. ,n the same way" the development of nuclear arms in the present age

opens the possibility of a type of conflict that declares the whole adversarial camp a criminal one" which has to be entirely

eliminated. The limits to the criminali*ation of the adversary that had been achieved in the jus publicum europeum have beensucceeded by a total war that transforms the real enemy into an absolute one.

+. Their alternati!e is incapa#le of making material change in the world the lea!e the !ictims of

!iolence helpless and lea!e power where it is in the world

%ooth 2; (Ken" %rofessor of ,nternational %olitics at the Eniversity of 0ales@Aberystwyth" Critical ecurity tudies and

0orld %olitics" p. 29-1" footnote on 2)

%ostmodern<

poststructural engagement with the sub?ect of

security in international relations

has been characteri*ed by some of the

general problems of the genre" notably obscurantism" relativism" and fau radicalism.2' 0hat has particularly troubled critics of the postmodern sensibility has

been the latters underlying conception of politics.2 Terry Gagleton" for one" has praised the Rrich body of workR by postmodern writers in some areas but at the same

time has contested the genres Rcultural relativism and moral conventionalism" its scepticism" pragmatism and localism" its distaste for ideas of solidarity and disciplined

organi*ation" LandO its lack of any ade/uate theory of political agency.R2H Gagleton made these comments as part of a general criti/ue of the postmodern sensibility" but

, would argue that specific writing on security in international relations from postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives has generally done nothing to ease such

concerns. Gagletons fundamental worry was how postmodernism would Rshape upR to the test of fascism as a serious political challenge. 3ther writers" studying

particular political contets" such as postapartheid outh Africa" have shown similar worriesD they have /uestioned the lack of concrete or

=




specific resources that such theories can add to the repertoire of reconstruction strategies.2: !ichard A. 0ilson" an

anthropologist interested in human rights" has generali*ed eactly the same concern" namely" that the postmodernist re?ection of metanarratives and

universal solidarities does not deliver a helpful politics to people in trouble. As he puts it" R!ights without a metanarrative

are like a car without seat-beltsD on hitting the first moral bump with ontological implications" the passengers

safety is ?eopardised.RI9 The struggle within outh Africa to bring down the institutionali*ed racism of apartheid benefited greatly from the growing strength

of universal human rights values (which delegitimi*ed racism and legitimi*ed e/uality) and their advocacy by groups in different countries and cultures showing their political solidarity in material and other ways. Aniety about the politics of postmodernism and poststructuralism is provoked" in part" by the negative conceptuali*ation

of security pro?ected by their eponents. The poststructuralist approach seems to assume that security cannot be common or positive-sum

but must always be *ero-sum" with somebodys security always being at the cost of the insecurity of others. At the same time" security itself is /uestioned as

a desirable goal for societies because of the assumption of poststructuralist writers that the search for security is necessarily conservative and will result in

negative conse/uences for somebody. They tend also to celebrate insecurity" which , regard as a middle-class affront to the truly

insecure.I1

Cut to footnote on page 277—

I1. Gamples of the approach are Fillon " The Politics of SecurityD and Fer Ferian" 5The Salue of ecurity"7 in $ipschut* (ed.)" n Security.

,n the shadow of such views" it is not surprising that the postmodern<poststructuralist genre is sometimes seen as having affinities with realism. %olitical realistsand poststructuralists seem to share a fatalistic view that humans are doomed to insecurityD regard the search for

emancipation as both futile and dangerousD believe in a notion of the human conditionD and relativi*e norms. oth leave power where it is in the

world; deconstruction and deterrence are e/ually static theories.

&




1A& Generic K 0xt- Framework

Alt fails and polic frameworkHs #etter even if fiat’s not real.

%rant I12($evi ryant is currently a %rofessor of %hilosophy at Collin College. ,n addition to working as a professor" ryant has also served as a $acanian psychoanalyst. #e

received his %h.F. from $oyola Eniversity in Chicago" ,llinois" where he originally studied disclosedness with the #eidegger scholar Thomas heehan. ryant later

changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of 6illes Feleu*e" 5Criti/ue of the Academic $eft7"http;<<larvalsub?ects.wordpress.com<2912<11<11<underpants-gnomes-a-criti/ue-of-the-academic-left<)Enfortunately" the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. ,t>s good at carrying out criti/ues that denounce various social formations" yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its ownway" ignoring how networks" assemblages" structures" or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. #ere ,> m reminded by the 5underpants gnomes7 depicted in outh %ark; The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit

that goes like this; %hase 1; Collect Enderpants %hase 2; + %hase I; %rofitU They even have a catchy song to go with their work; 0ell this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. ur plan seems to #e as follows J

hase 1J Eltra-&adical Criti:ue hase 2J hase 4J !evolution and complete social transformation L 3ur problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1

without ever eplaining what is to be done at phase 2. ften the criti:ues articulated at phase 1 are right " #ut there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those criti/ues nonetheless. ,n order to reach phase I" we ha!e

to produce new collectives. ,n order for new collectives to be produced" people need to be able to hear and understand the criti/ues developed at phase 1. Jet this is where everything begins to fall apart. G ven though these criti/ues are

often right" we epress them in ways that only an academic with a %hF in cr itical theory and post-structural theory can understand. #ow eactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only %hF>s in the humanities can understand him+ 0ho are these things for+0e seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the 8aomi Kleins and Favid 6raebers of the world. To make matters worse" we publish our work in epensive academic ?ournals that only universities can afford" with presses that

don>t have a wide distribution" and give our talks at epensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again" who are t hese things for+ ,s it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt" thinking their moreabout an academic industry and tenure" than producing change in the world+ ,f a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it" it doesn>t make a soundU eriously dudes and dudettes" what are you doing+ ut finally" and worst of all" us 4arists and anarchists all

too often act like assholes. 0e denounce others" we condemn them" we berate t hem for not engaging with the /uestions we want to engage with" and we vilify them when they don>t embrace every bit of the doa that we endorse. 0e are every bit as off-putting andunpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the in/uisition ( have people yet understood that Feleu*e and 6uattari>s Anti-3edipus was a criti/ue of the rench communist party system and the talinist party system" and the horrific passions that arise out of

parties and identifications in general+). This type of 5revolutionary7 is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist #ecause the do more to dri!e

people into the embrace of reigning ideolog than to undermine reigning ideolog. These are the people that keep !ush $imbaugh in business. 0ell doneU ut this isn>t where our most serious shortcomings lie. 3ur

most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. (e almost ne!er make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured" for what new

material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced" and !he n !e do" our criti/ue-intoicated cynics and skeptics immediately ?ump in with an analysis of all the ways in w hich these things contain dirty secrets" ugly motives" and are doomed to fail.

ow " , wonder" are we to do anthing at all when we ha!e no concrete proposals 0e live on a planet of ' billion people. These ' billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That

network of production and distribution does involve the etraction of resources" the production of food" the maintenance of paths of t ransit and communication" the disposal of waste" the building of shelters" the distribution of medicines" etc." etc." etc. 0hat are your

proposals+ #ow will you meet these problems+ #ow will you navigate the eisting mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure+ 4ar and $enin had proposals. Fo you+ #ave you even eplored the cartography of the problem+ Today we are sointellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems" ignoring the horror t hey generated" their failures" and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these

horrors in a new system of organi*ation. 0ho among our critical t heorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption" avoiding the problems of planned economy" ie." who is doingthis in a way t hat gets notice in our circles+ 0ho is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that ar ise with party systems (there>s a reason that it was the 8egri V #ardt contingent" not the adiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least thecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because" well" they think ecologically. adly we need something more" a melding of the ecologists" the 4arists" and t he anarchists. 0e>re not getting it yet though" as far as , can tell. ,ndeed" folks seem attractedto yet another critical paradigm" $aruelle. , would love" ?ust for a moment" to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. #ow would he provide for the energy needs of that school+ #ow would he meet building

codes in an environmentally sound way+ #ow would she provide food for the students+ 0h a t would be her plan for waste disposal And most importantly" how would she navigate the school board" the state legislature" the federal government" and all t he families of

these students+ (hat is our plan 0hat is your alternative+ , t hink there are alternatives. , saw one that approached an alternative in !otterdam. <f ou want to make a truly re!olutionar

contri#ution, this is where ou should start. 0hy should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren>t proposing real plans+ ut we haven>t even gotten to that point. ,nstead we>re like underpants gnomes" saying

5revolution is the answerU7 without addressing any of the infrastructural /uestions of ?ust how revolution is to be produced" what alternatives it would offer" and how we would concretely go about building t hose alternatives. 4asturbation. Mnderpants gnomeD

deser!es to be a categor in critical theor? a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. (e need less criti:ue not because criti/ue isn>t important or necessary@ it is @but #ecause we know the criti:ues " we know the

pro#lems . (eHre intoxicated with criti:ue #ecause itHs easy and safe. 0e best every opponent with criti/ue. 0e occupy a position of moral superiority with criti/ue. ut do we r eally do anything with criti/ue+ (hat we need today , more

than e!er, is composition or carpentry. 0!erone knows something is wrong. Gveryone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Gven the Tea %arty knows something is wrong with the economic system" despite having the

wrong economic theory. >one of us, however" are proposing alternati!es . ,nstead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

olic details are ke a#stract rhetoric de!ices ensure failure

Galles + (6ary 4" %rofessor of economics W %epperdine Eniversity" 5The 3range 6rove; 3bama health planD we need

details"7 4arch I" 299:" http;<<www.ocregister.com<articles<details-2&&-proposals-obama.html)<<ghs-SA

The pro#lem with such !agueness is that an informed pu#lic polic decision has to #e #ased on specific

proposals . A#sent concrete details" which is where the devil lurks" no one--including those proposing a NreformN--

can Oudge how it would fare or falter in the real world . o when the %resident wants approval for a proposal which offers too few details

for evaluation" we must ask why. $ike private sector salesmen" politicians strive to present their wares as attractively as possible. Enlike them" however , a

politicianPs product line consists of claimed conse:uences of proposals not et enacted . urther" politicians are

unconstrained by truth in advertising laws" which would re/uire that claims be more than misleading half-truthsD they have fewer competitors keeping them honestD and

they face RcustomersR--voters-- far more ignorant about the merchandise involved than those spending their own money. These differences from the private sector

eplain why politicians Rsales pitchesR for their proposals are so vague. #owever" if !ague proposals are the #est politicians can offer,

the are inade:uate. <f rhetoric is unmatched # specifics " there is no reason to #elie!e a polic change

will #e an impro!ement" #ecause no relia#le wa exists to determine whether it will actuall accomplish

what is promised. nl the details will determine the actual incenti!es facing the decision-makers

in!ol!ed" which is the only way to forecast the results" including the mriad of unintended conse:uences from unnoticed aspects. 0e

must remember that" however laudable" goals and promises and claims of cost-effectiveness that are inconsistent with the incentives created will go unmet. ,t may be

'




that %resident 3bama knows too litt le of his RsolutionR to provide specific plans. ,f so" he knows too little to deliver on his promises. Achieving intended goals then

necessarily depends on blind faith that 3bama and a panoply of bureaucrats" legislators" overseers and commissions will somehow ade/uately grasp the entire situation"

know precisely what to do about it" and do it right (and that the result will not be too painful" however serious the problem)--a prospect that" due to the painful lessons o

history" attracts few real believers. Alternatively" %resident 3bama may know the details of what he intends" but is not providing them to the public. ut if it is

necessary to conceal a plans details to put the best possible public face on it" those details must be adverse. ,f they made a more persuasive sales pitch" a politicianwould not hide actual details. They would be trumpeted at every opportunity" proving to a skeptical public he really had the answers" since concealing rather than

revealing pays only when better informed citi*ens would be more inclined to re?ect a plan. Claiming adherence to elevated principles" but keeping detailed proposals

from sight" also has a strategic advantage. ,t defuses critics. A#sent details, an criticism can #e parried # saing Nthat was not

in our proposalN or Nwe ha!e no plans to do thatN or other rhetorical de!ices. ,t also allows a candidate to incorporate

alternatives proposed as part of his evolving reform" as if it was his idea all along. The new administration has already put vague proposals on prominent display.

#owever" ade:uate analsis cannot rest upon such flims foundations. That re/uires the nuts and bolts so glaringly absent. ,n the private

sector" people dont spend their own money on such vague promises of unseen products. ,t is foolhardy to act any differently when political salesmen withhold specifics"

because political incenti!es guarantee that people would o#Oect to what is kept hidden . o while !agueness

ma #e good political strateg, it !irtuall ensures #ad polic " if Americans welfare is the criterion.

Alternati!e frameworks are potentiall limitless

8earsheimer +; (ohn" %rofessor of %olitical cience @ E Chicago" ,nternational ecurity" 0inter) 8evertheless" critical theorists readily acknowledge that realism has been the dominant interpretation of international politics for almost seven hundred years. 5!ealism

is a name for a discourse of power and rule in modern global life.7 till" critical theory allows for change" and there is no reason" according to the theory anyway" why a

communitarian discourse of peace and harmony cannot supplant the realist discourse of security competition and war. ,n fact" change is always possible with

critical theory because it allows for an unlimited number of discourses" and it makes no ?udgment about the merit or staying power ofany particular one. Also" critical theory makes no ?udgment about whether human beings are 5hard-wired7 to be good or bad" but instead treats people as infinitely

changeable.

Fairness doesnHt Oust matter in the a#stract itHs ke to a #alanced dialogue and de!eloping research,

critical thinking, and decisionmaking skills

Gallowa, 9 @ %rofessor" Communication tudies" amford Eniversity (!yan" 5Finner and Conversation at the

Argumentative Table; !econceptuali*ing Febate as an Argumentative Fialogue"7 Contemporary Argumentationand Febate" Sol. 2H" &-" http;<<www.cedadebate.org<files<299CAF.pdf )<<J

Febate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table" where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice

their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the

argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness re/uirements. 0hile affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the

topic" in fact" the topic selection process is rigorous" taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point ofdeparture. etting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative

demands. The negative crafts disadvantages" counter-plans" and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According

to fairness norms" each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. 0hen one side takes more than its share" competitive e/uity

suffers. #owever" it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. 0hen one side

ecludes the other" it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ghninger" 1:9" p. 119). A pedagogy of

debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to #e fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that

takes the form of a demand for e:ualit of !oice . ar from being a banal re/uest for links to a disadvantage"

fairness is a demand for respect" a demand to be heard" a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months

of preparation" research" and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairnessnorms operate to eclude particular negative strategies. Enprepared" one side comes to the argumentative table

unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to 5understand what Bwent onQ>7 and are left to the whims of time and power(arrell" 1:H&" p. 11=). #ugh Funcan furthers this line of reasoning; 3pponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance

their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. 3pposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. 0e

assume that argument" discussion" and talk" among free an informed people who subordinate themselves to rules of discussion" are the best ways to

decisions of any kind" because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a commoncauseQ,f we are to be e/ualQrelationships among e/uals must find epression in many formal and informal institutions (Funcan" 1::I" p. 1:'-1:).

Febate compensates for the eigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains e/uality for the sake

of the conversation (arrell" 1:H&" p. 11=). or eample" an affirmative case on the 299-299H college topic might defend neither state nor international action


http://www.cedadebate.org/files/2007CAD.pdf





in the 4iddle Gast" and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is

oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. ,nstead of allowing for

the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response" the affirmative subverts any meaningful role tothe negative team" preventing them from offering effective 5counter-word7 and undermining the value of a meaningful echange of

speech acts. Germaneness and other su#stitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical #enefits of

topical ad!ocac.

(ithout predicta#le ground, de#ate #ecomes meaningless and produces a political strateg wedded to !iolence

*hi!el (!uth $essl" Assistant %rof %olitical cience @ Teas AV4 E." %artisan %olitics and %olitical Theory" p. 1H2)The point may seem trite" as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problemati*ed. ,n fact" they

are often very candid about this seeming parado in their approach; the paradoical or RparasiticR need of the subversive for an order to subvert. ut admitting the parado is not helpful if" as usually happens here" its implications are ignoredD or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fiture of human

life. or what the parado should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are" in fact" good for resistanceD and some ought to be fully

supported. As such" it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and

inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. ,t may be that if the ambiguists

wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists" they cannot admit to these implications" for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful

or necessary" is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. %erhaps they might ?ust continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic" but that the irony should not

stand in the way of the real business of subversion. Jet difficulties remain. or agreement is not simply the initial condition" but the continuing

ground" for contest. ,f we are to success fully communicate our disagreements" we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to

debate without attention to further agreements. or debate and contest are forms of dialogue; that is" they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. ,magine" for instance" that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier" in any argument" certain

initial agreements will be needed ?ust to begin the discussion. At the very least" the two discussants must agree on basic terms; for eample" they must have some

shared sense of what gun control is aboutD what is at issue in arguing about itD what facts are being contested" and so on. They must also agreeand they do sosimply by entering into debatethat they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to" and to

be persuaded by" good arguments. uch agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

%asic limits are necessar to effecti!e resistance -- the go!ern deli#erati!e democrac and are essential to pre!ent !iolence

and trann

*hi!el (!uth $essl" Assistant %rof %olitical cience @ Teas AV4 E." %artisan %olitics and %olitical Theory" p. 1H=)

The point here is that in arguing and the point holds e/ually for other forms of contest we assume that it is possible to educate or

persuade one another. 0e assume that it is possible to come to more mutual understandings of an issue and that the

participants in an argument are open to this possibility. 3therwise" there is no point to the eerciseD we are simply talking at or past

one another. At this point" the ambiguists might respond that" even if there are such rules of argument" they do not

apply to the more subversive or radical activities they have in mind. ubversion is" after all" about /uestioning and undermining suchseemingly 5necessary7 or universal rules of behavior. ut" again" the response to the ambiguist must be that the

practice of /uestioning and undermining rules" like all other social practices" needs a certain order. The

subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective ofsubversion" we find that they are roughly the rules of argument discussed above. ,n fact" the rules of argument are

roughly the rules of democracy or civility; the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action

from violence" manipulation and other forms of tyranny. Garlier we asked how the ambiguists distinguish legitimate political behaviors"

like contest or resistance" from illegitimate behaviors" like cruelty and sub?ugation. 0e find a more complete answer here. The former are legitimate because they have

civil or rational persuasion as their end. That is" legitimate forms of contest and resistance seek to inform or convince others by

appeal to reasons rather than by f orce or manipulation. The idea is implicit in democracy because democracy

implies a basic respect for self-determination; a respect for people>s rights to direct their own lives as much as possible by their own choices" to work and carry on relationships as they see fit" to participate in community and politics according to decisions freely

made by them rather than decisions forced on them" and so on. Thus" to say that rational persuasion is the end of political action is

simply to acknowledge that" in democratic politics" this is the way we show respect for others> capacities forself-direction. ,n public debate" our goal is to persuade others with ideas that they recogni*e as true rather than by trying to

manipulate them or move them without their conscious" rational assent.

H




e#ate ine!ita#l in!ol!es exclusions and normati!e constraints---making sure that those

exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessar to foster democratic ha#its which sol!es the

case

Amanda Anderson @" prof of Gnglish at ohns #opkins The 0ay 0e Argue 8ow" II-'

,n some ways" this is understandable as utopian writing" with recogni*able antecedents throughout the history of leftist thought. ut what is distincti!e in

%utlerHs writing is the wa temporal rhetoric emerges precisel at the site of uneas normati!e commitment . ,n the

case of performative subversion" a futural rhetoric displaces the pro#lems surrounding agenc, sm#olic constraint, and

poststructuralist ethics. ince symbolic constraint is constitutive of who we can become and what we can enact" I= there is clearly no way to truly envision a

reworked symbolic. And since em#racing an alternati!e sm#olic would necessaril in!ol!e the imposition of newl

exclusionar and normali5ing norms " to do more than gesture would mean lapsing into the very practices that need to be superseded. ,ndeed" despite

utler>s insistence in eminist Contentions that we must always risk new foundations" she evinces a fastidious reluctance to do so herself. The forward-looking

articulation of performative politics increasingly gives way" in odies That 4atter" to a more reflective" and now strangely belated" antieclusionary politics. $ess

sanguine about the efficacy of outright subversion" %utler more so#erl attends to was we might respond to the politicall and

ontologicall necessar error of identit categories. (e cannot choose not to put such categories into pla, #ut once

they are in play" we can #egin to interrogate them for the exclusions the har#or and generate . utler here is closely following

6ayatri Chakravorty pivak>s position on essentialism" a position utler earlier sought to sublate through the more eclusive emphasis on the unremitting subversion of

identity.1H <f performati!e su#!ersion aimed to denaturali5e identit and thus derail its pernicious effects " here" by contrast"

one reali5es the processes of identit formation will perforce proceed, and one simpl attempts to register andredress those processes in a necessaril incomplete wa. The production of eclusion" or a constitutive outside" is Lbutler /uote startsO 5the

necessary and founding violence of any truth-regime"7 but we should not simply accept that fact passively; The task is to refigure this necessar

outsideD as a future hori5on, one in which the !iolence of exclusion is perpetuall in the process of #eing

o!ercome. %ut of e:ual importance is the preser!ation of the outside, the site where discourse meets its limits " where

the opacit of what is not included in a gi!en regime of truth acts as a disrupti!e site of linguistic impropriet and

unrepresenta#ilit, illuminating the !iolent and contingent #oundaries of that normati!e regime precisel through

the ina#ilit of that regime to represent that which might pose a fundamental threat to its continuit. . . . ,f there is a

violence necessary to the language of politics" then the risk of that violation might well be followed by another in which we begin" without ending" without mastering" to

ownand yet never fully to ownthe eclusions by which we proceed. (T4" &I) Lbutler /uote endsOecause the eclusionary process is productive of who and what

we are" even in our oppositional politics" our attempts to acknowledge and redress it are always post hoc. #ere the future hori*on is ever-receding I& precisely becauseour own belated making of amends will never" and should never" tame the contingency that also begets violence. ut the /uestion arises; does utler ever propose that

we might use the evaluative criteria governing that belated critical recognition to guard against such processes of eclusion in the first place+ 0ell" in rare moments she

does pro?ect the possibility of cultivating practices that would actually disarm eclusion (and , will be discussing one such moment presently). ut she invariably

returns to the bleak insistence on the impossibility of ever achieving this. This retreat is necessitated" fundamentally" # %utlerHs failure to

distinguish e!aluati!e criteria from the power-laden mechanisms of normali5ation. Jet the distinction does reappear

unacknowledged" in the rhetoric of #elatedness, which" like performative thresholdism" ser!es to underwrite her political purism. As

belated" the incomplete acts of 5owning7 one>s eclusions are more seemingly reactive and can appear not to be themselves normatively implicated. 0e can see a

similar maneuver in utler>s discussion of universalist traditions in eminist Contentions. #ere she insists that enhabib>s uni!ersalism is perniciously grounded

in a transcendental account of language (communicative reason)" and is hence not a#le to examine its own exclusionar effects or situated

:ualit (C" 12H@I2). This is, to begin with, a mischaracteri5ation. %enha#i#Hs account of communicati!e reason is

historicall situated (if somewhat loosely within the hori*on of modernity) and aims to Oustif an ongoing and self-critical process of

interacti!e uni!ersalism not merely through the philosophical pro?ect of articulating a theory of universal pragmatics but more significantly through the

identification and cultivation of practices that enable democratic will formation.1: utler then introduces" in contrast to enhabib" an eemplary practice of what she

calls 5misappropriating7 universals (%aul 6ilroy>s The lack Atlantic is cited here). 8ow" it is hard not to see this as a species of dogmatism. ad people reinscribe or

reinforce universals" good people 5misappropriate7 them. enhabib calls for the reconstruction of Gnlightenment universals" but presumably even reconstruction is

tainted. The ke point, howe!er, is that misappropriation is a specificall protected deri!ati!e process, one whose own

#elatedness and honorific diso#edience are guaranteed to displace the !iolence of its predecessor discourse. $et me

pursue here for a moment why , find this approach unsatisfactory. *impl because the activity of acknowledging exclusion or misappropriating universals

is #elated or derivative does not mean that such I' an activity is not itself as powerfully normative as the 5normative political philosophy7 to which utler refers

with such disdain. There is a sleight of hand occurring here; utler attempts to imply that because such activities eist at a temporal and critical remove from 5foundingregimes of truth"7 they more successfully avoid the insidious ruse of critical theory. ut who>s rusing who here+ ecause utler finds it impossible to conceive of

normativity outside of normali*ation" she e!ades the challenging task of directl confronting her own normati!e assumptions.

Qet %utler in fact ad!ocates ethical practices that are animated # the same e!aluati!e principles as communicati!e

ethicsJ the rigorous scrutin of all oppositional discourse for its own newl generated exclusions" and the reconfiguration of

:




debilitating identity terms such as 5women7 as sites 5of permanent openness and resignifiability7 (C" &9). %oth these central practices rel fundamentall

on democratic principles of inclusion and open contestation. Communicati!e ethics does no more than to clarif

where among our primar social practices we might locate the preconditions for such acti!ities of criti:ue and

transformation. y ?ustifying its own evaluative assumptions and resources it aims not to posit a realm free of power but rather to clarify our own ongoing

criti/ues of power. This does not mean that such criti:ues will not themsel!es re:uire rigorous scrutin for har#oring

#lindnesses and further exclusions, #ut neither does it mean that such criti:ues will necessaril #e dri!en #

exclusionar logic. And communicati!e ethics is # no means a merel theoreticalD or philosophicalD proOectinasmuch as it can identif particular social and institutional practices that foster democratic ends. % casting all

attempts to characteri5e such practices as pernicious normali5ing, %utler effecti!el disa#les her own proOect and

lea!es herself no recourse #ut to issue dogmatic condemnations and appro!als.

The impact outweighs'deli#erati!e de#ate models impart skills !ital to respond to existential

threats

Christian 3. )und#erg 1 %rofessor of Communications W Eniversity of 8orth Carolina" Chapel #ill" 5Tradition of

Febate in 8orth Carolina7 in 8avigating 3pportunity; %olicy Febate in the 21st Century y Allan F. $ouden" p. I11The second ma?or problem with the criti/ue that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of

debate is speech capacities. ut the democratic capacities #uilt # de#ate are not limited to speechas indicated earlier" debate builds capacity for

critical thinking, analsis of pu#lic claims, informed decision making, and #etter pu#lic Oudgment. <f the picture ofmodern political life that underwrites this criti:ue of de#ate is a pessimistic !iew of increasingl la#rinthine and

#ureaucratic administrati!e politics" rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citi*enry to comprehend them" and ever-

epanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics" it is a pu**ling solution" at best" to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. ,f democracy

is open to rearticulation" it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate" the citi5enrPs capacities can

change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as 3cwey in The %ublic awl ,ts %roblems place such a high premium on education

(Fewey 1:HH"'I" 1&=). e#ate pro!ides an indispensi#le form of education in the modem articulation of democrac

#ecause it #uilds precisel the skills that allow the citi5enr to research and #e informed a#out polic decisions that

impact them, to sort through and e!aluate the e!idence for and relati!e merits of arguments for and against a

polic in an increasingl information-rich en!ironment, and to prioriti5e their time and political energies toward

policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the contet of

information literacy. ohn $arkin (299&" #3) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum tomatch with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current contet" but perhaps more important"

argues $arkin" for the future of a citi5enr that will need to make e!aluati!e choices against an increasingl complex and

multimediated information en!ironment (ibid-). $arkins study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded

that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use

other 0eb resources; To analy*e the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students" we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of theratings" looking ?ointly at the effect of instmction<no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the

,nstnictional Ldebate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These

findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the

effectiveness of the pro?ect on students self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect" however; After doing ... the

pro?ect" instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Jahoo and 6oogle. ,t may be that thelibrary research eperience increased self-efficacy for any searching" not ?ust in academic databases. ($arkin 299&" 1==) $arkins study substantiates Thomas 0orthcn

and 6aylcn %acks (1::2" I) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly

rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1::2 on the cusp of the eventual eplosion of the ,nternet as a medium"

0orthcn and %acks framing of the issue was prescient; the primary /uestion facing todays student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial /uestion

of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are" without a doubt" a

number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. ut cumulatively" the e!idence presented here warrants

strong support for expanding de#ate practice in the classroom as a technolog for enhancing democratic

deli#erati!e capacities. The uni:ue com#ination of critical thinking skills, research and information processingskills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotl contested

issues argues for de#ate as a crucial component of a rich and !ital democratic life. ,n-class debate practice both aids students in

achieving the best goals of college and university education" and ser!es as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged,

open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possi#ilities of meaningful political engagement and new

articulations of democratic life. Gpanding this practice is crucial" if only because the more we produce citi5ens that can acti!el and

effecti!el engage the political process, the more likel we are to produce re!isions of democratic life that are

necessar if democrac is not onl to sur!i!e, #ut to thri!e. emocrac faces a mriad of challenges, includingJ

19




domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial Oustice? wholesale en!ironmental destruction and the

potential for rapid climate changeD emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism" intervention and new possibilities for great power conflictD

and increasing challenges of rapid globali*ation including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. 8ore than an specific polic or

proposal, an informed and acti!e citi5enr that deli#erates with greater skill and sensiti!it pro!ides one of the

#est hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance" and by etension" one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to

democracy Lin anO increasingly comple world.

&ole-plaing as pu#lic actors shatters apath and political alienation, which is critical to check ine:ualit and

exploitation

8itchell I2K (6ordon" Firector of Febate and %rofessor of Communication @ E. %ittsburgh" 5imulated %ublic Argument As %edagogical %lay on

0orlds7" "rgumentation # "d$ocacy" Sol. I'" 8o. I" 0inter)

0hen we assume the posture of the other in dramatic performance" we tap into who we are as persons" since our interpretation of others is

deeply colored by our own senses of selfhood. y encouraging eperimentation in identity construction" role-play Rhelps students discover

divergent viewpoints and overcome stereotypes as they eamine sub?ects from multiple perspectives...R (4oore" p. 1:9). Kincheloe points to

the importance of this sort of refleive critical awareness as an essential feature of educational practice in postmodern times. RApplying the

notion of the postmodern analysis of the self" we come to see that hyperreality invites a heteroglossia of being"R Kincheloe eplainsD RFrawing upon a multiplicity of

voices" individuals live out a variety of possibilities" refusing to suppress particular voices. As men and women appropriate the various forms of epression" they are

empowered to uncover new dimensions of eistence that were previously hiddenR (1::I" p. :'). This process is particularly crucial in the public

argument contet" since a key guarantor of ine/uality and eploitation in contemporary society is the widespread and uncritical

acceptance by citi*ens of politically inert self-identities. The problems of political alienation" apathy and withdrawal have

received lavish treatment as perennial topics of scholarly analysis (see e.g. ishkin 1::D 6rossberg 1::2D #art 1::HD $oeb 1::=). Enfortunately"

comparatively less energy has been devoted to the development of pedagogical strategies for countering this alarming political trend. #owever" some

scholars have taken up the task of theori*ing emancipatory and critical pedagogies" and argumentation scholars interested in epanding the learning potential of debate

would do well to note their work (see e.g. Apple 1::&" 1:HH" 1::D rit*man 1::1D 6irou 1::" 1:HH" 1:HD 6reene 1:HD 4c$aren 1::I" 1:H:D imon 1::2D 0eis

and ine 1::I). ,n this area of educational scholarship" the curriculum theory of currere" a method of teaching pioneered by %inar and 6rumet (1:')" speaks directly to

many of the issues already discussed in this essay. As the $atin root of the word Rcurriculum"R currere translates roughly as the investigation of public life (see

Kincheloe 1::I" p. 1='). According to %inar" Rthe method of currere is one way to work to liberate one from the web of political" cultural" and economic influences that

are perhaps buried from conscious view but nonetheless comprise the living web that is a persons biographic situationR (%inar 1::=" p. 19H). The ob?ectives of role-play

pedagogy resonate with the currere method. y opening discursive spaces for students to eplore their identities as public actors"

simulated public arguments provide occasions for students to survey and appraise submerged aspects of their political

identities. ince many aspects of cultural and political life work currently to reinforce political pas sivity" critical argumentation

pedagogies that highlight this component of students self-identities carry significant emancipatory potential.

11




1A& Generic K 0xt- &ealism

Group the realism de#ate-

A. 0xtend *later- *tates will alwas tr to maximi5e their power and securit so realism and war are

ine!ita#le. Qes cooperation and multilateralism happen #ut onl when the promote national interests.

ro!es the alt doesnHt sol!e.%. 0xt Gui5inni- &ealism empiricall pre!ents war. A #alance of power helps realism accomplish its goal

of pre!enting great power war. Turns our impact and is a disad to the alt.

C. &ealism is ine!ita#le shift awa collapses into chaos.

8earsheimer 21 Lprofessor of political science at Eniversity of Chicago" The Tragedy of %reat Po!er Politics" pg. I'1O

The optimists claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. ,n fact" all of

the ma?or states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among

themselves for the foreseeable future. Conse/uently" realism will offer the most powerful eplanations of international politics over the net century" and this

will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. ,n short" the real world remains a realist world. tates still

fear each other and seek to gain power at each others epense" because international anarchy-the driving force behind greatpower

behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold 0ar" and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon . tates remain the

principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. or sure" the collapse of the oviet Enion caused a ma?or shift in the global

distribution of power. ut it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system" and without that kind of profound change" there is no reason to epectthe great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries. ,ndeed" considerable evidence from the 1::9s indicates

that power politics has not disappeared from Gurope and 8ortheast Asia" the regions in which there are two or more great powers" as well as possible

great powers such as 6ermany and apan. There is no /uestion" however" that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. till" there is

potential for intense security competition among the great powers that might lead to a ma?or war . %robably the best evidence of that

possibility is the fact that the Enited tates maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Gurope and in 8ortheast Asia for the eplicit purpose of keeping the

ma?or states in each region at peace.

. 0!olution pro!es realism true- 0gotism and omination are ine!ita#le among individuals and the

international sstem

Thaer 2k (radley" political scientist and an associate professor in 4issouri tate Eniversitys Fepartment of Fefense and

trategic tudies" the 4,T %ress" ,nternational ecurity" Sol. 2&" 8o. 2(Autumn 2999)" pp. 12=-1&1" Rringing in Farwin;Gvolutionary Theory" !ealism" and ,nternational %olitics7)

The second ultimate cause of egoistic and dominating behavior is given by 4orgenthau; #umans behave as they do because they possess an animus dominandi.2=

They seek power because human nature is fundamentally egoistic and malignant. Thus conflict and war occur because human nature is bad.2& Thomas #obbes provided the foundation for this second" secular" pillar of realist thought; #umans are ruled by an

insatiable desire for power.2' This lust for power has created a state of war in which humans live in reciprocal and permanent fear of violent death" and in which peace

is always precarious. According to 4orgenthau" the Rdesire for power ... concerns itself not with the individuals survival but with his position among his fellows once

his survival has been secured.... #is lust for power would be satisfied only if the last became an ob?ect of his domination" there being nobody above or beside him" that

is" if he became like 6od.R2 o encompassing is this desire for power that the tendency to dominate Ris an element of all human

associations " from the family through fraternal and professional associations and local political organi*ations" to the state.R2H Two types of behavior are the

proimate causes of the realist argument; ego- ism and domination.2: Ggoism will cause an individual to place his interests before those of others" the interests of

himself and his family before those of more distant relatives" and the interests of relatives before those of his community" state" and so on.I9 The desire to

dominate" realists believe" is inherent and often leads to physical aggression against those who oppose n of the primitive cell into ever larger

components" organs" and so on to create what Fawkins calls Rsurvival machines.R #e eplains ones ob?ectives. tate leaders are epected to mirror

this ordering by putting the interests of their state before those of others or of the world community" and by striving todominate other states. !ealists argue that only by possessing power can individuals attack and con/uer others as well as

deter and defend themselves from attack. The principal result of this process is that balances of power will form and reform cyclically" producing both periods

of stability and intense security competition in international politics

12




0. Transition to the alternati!e guarantees war radical changes in existing securit architecture collapse

threat perception

Qoon 4 @ %rofessor of ,nternational !elations at eoul 8ational EniversityD former oreign 4inister of outh Korea (Joung-Kwan"

5,ntroduction; %ower Cycle Theory and the %ractice of ,nternational !elations7" ,nternational %olitical cience !eview 299ID vol. 2=D p. -H),n history" the effort to balance power /uite often tended to start too late to protect t he security of some of the individual states. ,f the balancing process begins too late" the resulting amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor is often much larger t han if the process

had been started much earlier. or eample" the fate of C*echoslovakia and %oland showed how non-intervention or waiting for the 5automatic7 working through of the process turned out to be problematic. %ower cycle theory could also supplement the structure-oriented nature of the traditional balance of power theory by incorporating an agent-oriented eplanation. This was possible through its focus on the relationship between power and the role of a state in the international system. ,t especially highlighted the fact that a

discrepancy between the relative power of a state and its role in the system would result in a greater possibility for systemic instability. ,n order to prevent this instability fro m developing into a war" practitioners of international relations were to become aware of t he

dynamics of changing power and role" ad?usting role to power. A statesperson here was not simply regarded as a prisoner of structure and therefore as an outsider to t he process but as an agent capable of influencing the operation of e/uilibrium. Thus power cycle theorycould overcome the weakness of theoretical determinism associated with the traditional balance of power. The /uestion is often raised whether government decision-makers could possibly know or respond to such relative power shifts in t he real world. According toForan" when the 5tides of history7 shift against the state" the push and shove of world politics reveals these matters to t he policy-maker" in that state and among its competitors" with abundant urgency. (2) The ,ssue of ystemic tability %ower cycle theory is built on the

conception of changing relative capabilities of a state" and as such it shares the realist assumption emphasi*ing the importance of power in eplaining international relations. ut its main focus is on the longitudinal dimension of power relations" t he rise and decline of

relative state power and role" and not on t he static power distribution at a particular t ime. As a result" power cycle theory provides a significantly different eplanation for stability and order within t he international system. irst of all " power cycle theory argues that

what matters most in explaining the stability of the international system or war and peace is not the tpe of particular

international sstem (!osecrance" 1:'I) #ut the transformation from one sstem to another. or eample" in the 1:'9s t here was a debate on the stability of t he

international system between the defenders of bipolarity such as 0alt* (1:'=) and the defenders of multi-polarity such as !osecrance (1:'')" and Feutsch and inger (1:'=). After analy*ing five historical occasions since the origin of the modern state system" Foran

concluded that what has #een responsi#le for maOor war was not whether one tpe of sstem is more or less conduci!e to

war #ut that instead sstems transformation itself led to war (Foran" 1:1). A non-linear type of structural change that is massi!e,

unpredicted, de!astating to foreign polic expectation, and destructive of security is the trigger for maOor war, not the nature of a

particular tpe of international sstem.

F. &eOecting &ealism is impossi#le'others states wonHt follow

8urra, %rofessor %olitics at the Eniversity of 0ales" 1:+9 (Alastair !econstructing !ealism; etween %ower %olitics and Cosmopolitan Gthics" p. 1H1-2)

This highlights the central difficulty with 0endts constructivism. ,t is not any form of unfounded idealism about the possibility of effecting a change in international

politics. 0endt accepts that the intersub?ective character of international institutions such as self-help render them relatively hard social facts. !ather" 0hat is

problematic is his faith that such chance" if it could be achieved" implies progress. 0endts entire approach is governed by the belief that the problematic elements ofinternational politics can be transcended" that the competitive identities which create these elements can be reconditioned" and that the predatory policies which underlie

these identities can be eliminated. Gverything in his account" is up for gabs; there is no core of recalcitrance to human conduct which cannot be reformed" unlearnt"

disposed of. This venerates a stance that so privileges the possibility of a systemic transformation that it simply puts aside the difficulties which it recognises to be

inherent in its achievement. Thus" even though 0endt acknowledges that the intersub?ective basis of the self-help system makes its reform difficult" this does not

dissuade him. #e simply demands that states adopt a strategy of altercasting" a strategy which tries to induce alter to take on a new identity (and thereby enlist alter in

egos effort to change itself) by treating alter as if it already had that identity. 0endts position effectively culminates in a demand that the state

undertake nothing less than a giant leap of faith. The fact that its opponent might not take its overtures seriously. might not

be interested in reformulating its own construction of the world. or might simply see such an opening as a weakness to be

eploited. are completely discounted. The prospect of achieving a systemic transformation simply outweighs any adverse

conse/uences which might arise from the effort to achieve it . 0endt ultimately appears" in the final analysis" to have overdosed on 6orbimania.

G. Alt doesnHt sol!e elites will alwas make calculations #ased on power

ohn 8earsheimer" %rofessor at Eniversity of Chicago" 21 (The Tragedy of 6reat %ower %olitics" %age 2&)ecause Americans dislike realpolitik" public discourse about foreign policy in the Enited tates is usually couched in the language of liberalism. #ence the

pronouncements of the policy elites are heavily flavored with optimism and moralism. American academics are especially good at promoting liberal

thinking in the marketplace of ideas. ehind closed doors" however" the elites who make national security policy speak the language of

power" not that of principle" and the Enited tates acts in the international system according to the dictates of realist logic. ,n essence" a

discernable gap separates public rhetoric from the actual conduct of American foreign policy.

. &ealism ensures sur!i!al.

ohn 8earsheimer" %rofessor at Eniversity of Chicago" 21 (The Tragedy of 6reat %ower %olitics" %age 11-12)

,t should be apparent from this discussion that offensive realism is mainly a descriptive theory. ,t eplains how great powers have behaved in the past and how

they are likely to behave in the future. ut it is also a prescriptive theory. tates should behave according to the dictates of offensiverealism" because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world. 3ne might ask" if the theory describes how great powers act" why is it necessary

to stipulate how they should act+ The imposing constraints of the system should leave great powers with little choice but to act as the theory predicts. Although there is

much truth in this description of great powers as prisoners trapped in an iron cage" the fact remains that they sometimesalthough not oftenact in contradiction to the

theory. These are the anomalous cases discussed above. As we shall see" such foolish behavior invariably has negative conse/uences. ,n short" if

they want to survive" great powers should always act like good offensive realists .

1I




1A& Generic K 0xt- erm

erm sol!es pro#lems with realism- aka. the residual link.

%arkin 4'h from Colum#ia, Associate rofessor of olitical *cience L. amuel arkin" ep." 299I 5!ealist Constructivism7"

,nternational tudies !eview" Sol. &" 8o. I" pp. I2&" http;<<www.?stor.org<stable<I1H'&I" Accessed; <I9<2911O

To claim that constructivism is an ,! paradigm in the way that realism or liberalism are is misleading" and the tendency to do so in tetbooks is rarely mirrored in thescholarly literature. ,n the latter" constructivism is usually identified as an ontology" epistemology" or methodology. As such" it is usually defined as being distinct fromeither materialism or rationalism. !ecent state-of-the-field eercises (Kat*enstein" Keohane" and Krasner 1::HD !uggie 1::H)" in fact" identified the rationalism-

constructivism controversy as the central debate in contemporary ,! theory. Constructivists who claim their methodology is incompatible with

realism focus on the association between realism and both materialism and rationalism. !ealists who claim their paradigm is incompatible with

constructivism focus for the most part not on the methodology per se but on a perceived tendency for constructivists to be idealists or utopians. 8either

argument" however" holds up to careful scrutiny. Claims by constructivists that realist theory is incompatible with

intersub?ective epistemologies and methodologies are based on either caricatures or very narrow understandings of

realism. And realist critics of constructivism are similarly guilty of inferring from the worldviews of some (perhaps many) practicing constructivists that the

methodology is inherently biased toward liberalism. An eamination of constructivist epistemology and classical realist theory suggests

that they are" in fact" compatibleD not" of course" that good constructivism is necessarily realist" but that constructivistresearch is as compatible with a realist worldview as with any other. The purpose of this essay is to conduct such an eamination. The first

step in doing so is to define terms and to clear up some of the terminological confusion surrounding the discourse connecting constructivism and realism. The second

step is to make the argument that a realist constructivism (or" for that matter" a constructivist real ism) is epistemologically" methodologically" and paradigmaticallyviable. The final step is to discuss what a realist constructivism might look like" and where it fits in the study of international relations more broadly. #aving such

an approach could" among other things" fulfill several useful functions. 3ne function is to clear up a number of debates in

the field in which the protagonists speak past" rather than to" each other. Another function is to clarify the relationship

between" on the one hand" the study of power and the study of ideals in international relations and" on the other" the study

of the social construction of international politics. A final function is to act as a bridge between mainstream approaches tointernational relations and critical and postmodern approaches that view both constructivism and realism as problematic"

albeit for different reasons.

(e must confront threats ke to pre!ent ceding the political does not preclude the transformati!e

potential of securiti5ation

Franke + (Associate %rof of Comparative lit at Sanderbilt 0illiam %oetry and Apocalypse %age :2-:I)Apocalpse prima facie refuses and makes an end of dialogueJ it thunders down in!inci#l from a#o!e. %ut for this

!er reason the greatest test of our dialogical capacit is whether we can dialogue with the corresponding attitude

or must resort to exclusionar maneu!ers and force. 0hat is called for here is a capacity on the part of dialogue not to defend itself but to let itself

happen in interaction with an attitude that is apparently intolerant of dialogue. )etting this possi#ilit #e, coming into contact with it" with the threat

of dialogue itself, ma seem to #e courting disaster for dialogue. ,t is indeed a letting down of defenses. Can dialogue survive

such a surrendering of itself in utter vulnerability to the enemy of dialogue+ 3r perhaps we should ask" can it rise up again" after this self-surrender" in new power for

bringing together a scattered" defeated humanity to share in an open but commonly sought and unanimously beckoned $ogos of mutual comprehension and

communication+ 4ay this" after all" #e the true and authentic endD of dialogue pro!oked # apocalpse or what it is worth" my

apocalyptic counsel is that we must attempt an openness to dialogue e!en in this a#solute !ulnera#ilit and risk. The world

is certainly not a safe place, and it will surel continue not to #e such, short of something $ apocalptic. >eeded" ever

again" is something on the order of an apocalypse" not Oust a new attitude or a new anthing that we can oursel!es simpl produce.

hilosoph itself " thought through to its own end" can hardl resist concluding that onl a god can sa!e usD (8ur noch ein 6ott kann

uns retten). ut can not our attitude make a difference- perhaps make possible the advent of apocalypse beyond all our powers" even those of our own imaginations+ <

will wager an answer to this :uestion only in the operative mood. 8a we #ring a !oice speaking up for mutual

understanding onto the hori5on of discourse in our time, a time marked # the terrifing sign of apocalptic

discourse. 8a we do this not # Oudging apocalptic discourse, #ut # accepting that our condition as humans is as

much to be ?udged as to ?udge and that all our relatively ?ustified ?udgments are such to the etend that they offer themselves to be ?udged rather than standing on their

own ground as absolute. ,n other words" may our discussions remain open to apocalpse" open to what we cannot represent or prescribe #ut can

ne!ertheless undergo in a process of transformation that can #e shared with others @ and that may be genuinely dialogue.

1=


http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186573






The permutation sol!es a com#ination of macro and micropolitics is #est

%est and Kellner in 2 (teven est" prof phil W ET el paso and Fouglas Kellner" prof phil W EC$A

5%ostmodern %olitics and the attle for the uture7 http;<<www.gseis.ucla.edu<faculty<kellner<,lluminaX29older<kell2H.htm)

Jet we would insist that it is not a :uestion of micro !s macropolitics" as if it were an either<or proposition" #ut rather #oth dimensions

are important for the struggles of the present and future.L1&O $ikewise" we would argue that we need to com#ine the most

affirmati!e and negati!e perspecti!es, embodying 4arcuses declaration that critical social theory should be both more negative and utopian in

reference to the status /uo.L1'O There are certainl man things to #e depressed a#out is in the negative and cynical postmodernism of a

audrillard" et without a positi!e political !ision merel citing the negati!e might lead to apath and depression that

onl #enefits the existing order. or a dialectical politics" however" positive vision of what could be is articulated in con?unction with critical analysis of

what is in a multioptic perspective that focuses on the forces of domination as well as possibilities of emancipation (hile postmodern politics and

theor tend to polari5e into either the etremely negative or ecessively affirmative" ke forms of postmodern literature ha!e a more

dialectical !ision. ,ndeed" some of the more interesting forms of postmodern criti/ue today are found in fictional genres such as cyberpunk and magical realism.

Cyberpunk" a subgenre within science fiction" brings science fiction down to earth" focusing not on the intergalactic battles in the distant future" but the social problems

facing people on earth in the present.L1O Cyberpunk writers such as ruce terling and 0illiam 6ibson offer an unflinching look at a grim social reality characteri*ed

by transnational capitalist domination" ocial Farwinist cultural settings" radical environmental ruination" and the implosion of the body and technology" such thathumans become more and more machine like and machines increasingly become like human beings. Jet cyberpunk novels foreground this nightmare world in order to

warn us that it is an immanent possibility for the near future" in order to awaken readers to a critical reflection on technology and social control" and to offer hope for

alternative uses of technology and modes of social life. imilarly" magical realism eamines the wreckage of centuries of Guropean colonialism" but also maintains a

positive outlook" one that embraces the strength and creativity of the human spirit" social solidarity" and spiritual and political transcendence. $ike cyberpunk novels"

magical realism incorporate various aesthetic forms and conventions in an eclectic miture that fuses postmodernism with social criti/ue and models of resistance.

%ut it is also a mistake, we #elie!e, to ground onePs politics in either modern or postmodern theor alone . Against one-

sided positions" we ad!ocate a !ersion of reconstructi!e postmodernism that we call a politics of alliance and solidarit

that #uilds on both modern and postmodern traditions. Enlike $aclau and 4ouffe who believe that postmodern theory basically provides a basis

for a new politics" and who tend to re?ect the Gnlightenment per se" we believe that the 0nlightenment continues to pro!ide resources for

political struggle toda and are skeptical whether postmodern theory alone can provide sufficient assets for an emancipatory new politics. Jet the

0nlightenment has its #lindspots and dark sides Rsuch as its relentless pursuit of the domination of nature" and naive belief in Rprogress"R so we

believe that aspects of the postmodern criti/ue of Gnlightenment are valid and force us to rethink and reconstruct Gnlightenment philosophy for the present age. And

while we agree with #abermas that a reconstruction of the 0nlightenment and modernit are in order, unlike #abermas we believe that

postmodern theor has important contri#utions to make to this proOect)

1&




1A& Generic K 0xt- 8aterialismTechnostrategic iscourse Good

Changing representational practices wonHt alter polic'looking to structures and politics is more !ital

Tuathail, I+@ (6earoid" Fepartment of 6eorgraphy at Sirginia %olytechnic ,nstitute" %olitical 6eography" 1&('-)" p. ''="

science direct)

0hile theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics" the discourse and concerns of foreign- policy

decision- makers are /uite different" so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving" theory-averse" policy-making

subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign

policy and the eercise of power than they really are. This is not" however" to minimi*e the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure

among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. ,n general" , do not disagree with Falby>s fourth point about politics and discourse ecept

to note that his statement-B%recisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken" troops and material moved and war

fought>-evades the important /uestion of agency that , noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action

possible is inade:uate by itself. %olitical " military and economic structures " institutions" discursive networks and eadership are all crucial in

eplaining social action and should be theori*ed together with representational practices. oth here and earlier" Falby>s reasoning inclines towards a form

of idealism. ,n response to Falby>s fifth point (with its three subpoints)" it is worth noting" first" that his book is about the C%F" not the !eagan administration. #eanaly*es certain C%F discourses" root the geographical reasoning practices of the !eagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Falby>s

book is narrowly tetualD the general contetuality of the !eagan administration is not dealt with. econd" let me simply note that , find that the distinction between

critical theorists and poststructuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Falby and others. Third" Falby>s interpretation of the reconceptuali*ation of

national security in 4oscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Gurope is highly idealist" an interpretation that ignores the structural and

ideological crises facing the oviet elite at that time. 6orbachev>s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested" an ultimately futile

attempt to save the Communist %arty and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by imon Falby in his comment are important ones for

all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. 0hile , agree with Falby that /uestions of discourse are etremely important ones for political geographers to

engage" there is a danger of fetishi*ing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the

sociological" the materialist and the cultural" the political and the geographical contets within which particular discursive

strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics" in other words" should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies

Bpoststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrativeD it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

ri!ileging representations locks in !iolence --- polic analsis is the #est wa to challenge power

Taft-Kaufman, H+; (%rof of peech @ C4E" Southern Communication &ournal " '9;I" pring)The postmodern passwords of Rpolyvocality"R R3therness"R and Rdifference"R unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contets of sub?ects" creates a

solipsistic /uagmire. The political smpathies of the new cultural critics" with their ostensible concern for the lack of power eperienced by

marginali*ed people" aligns them with the political left . Jet" despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition" their discourses on

intertetuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, po!ert, and

inOustice. ,n short" as Clarke (1::1) asserts" postmodern emphasis on new sub?ects conceals the old sub?ects" those who have limited access to good ?obs" food"

housing" health care" and transportation" as well as to the media that depict them. 4erod (1:H) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision" will" or commitmentto activism. #e notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities.

%rovoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Fi $eonardo (1::9) echoes 4erod and laments; #as there ever been a historical era characteri*ed by as lit tle

radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours+ 8aundering on a#out therness; phallocentrism or Gurocentric tropes has

#ecome a la*y academic su#stitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of 0estern racial minorities" white

women" or any Third 0orld population. (p. &I9) Clarkes assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the Rsine /ua nonR of critical discussion is an even

stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke eamines $yotards (1:H=) The %ostmodern Condition in which $yotard maintains that virtually all social relations arelinguistic" and" therefore" it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the Rrealm of terrorR and society falls apart. To this assertion" Clarke replies; , can

think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recogni*e the discursive. ,f the worst terror we

can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak" we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. ,t may be the intellectuals conception ofterror (what else do we do but speak+)" but its pro?ection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-2) The realm of the discursive is derived from the

re/uisites for human life" which are in the physical world" rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(=) 8utrition" shelter" and protection are basic human needs that

re/uire collective activity for their fulfillment. %ostmodern emphasis on the discursi!e without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges

from material circumstances hides the comple task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (4erod" 1:H).

Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist" the situation and its conse/uences are not overlooked

by scholars from marginali*ed groups. !obinson (1::9) for eample" argues that Rthe ?ustice that working people deserve is economic" not ?ust tetualR (p. &1). $ope*

1'




(1::2) states that Rthe starting point for organi*ing the program content of education or political action must be the present eistential" concrete situationR (p. 2::). 0est

(1:HH) asserts that borrowing rench post-structuralist discourses about R3thernessR blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 19). Enlike

postmodern Rtextual radicalsN who !abinow (1:H') acknowledges are Nfu55 a#out power and the realities of socioeconomic constraintsR (p. 2&&)"

most writers from marginali*ed groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived eperience. eople whose

li!es form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism o!er the new recognition

of their discursi!e su#Oecti!ities, #ecause such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and

current struggles against racism" seism" homophobia" and economic inOustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are nomore real sub?ects. ,deas have conse/uences. Gmphasi*ing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The

need to look beyond tets to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginali*ed groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how powerworks through political agendas" institutions" agencies" and the budgets that fuel them.

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1A& Generic K 0xt- MtilConse:uentialism

ou#le #ind either no human li!es are e:uall !alua#le, which forces them to pro!e wh the li!es the

sa!e are worth it, or all human life is e:uall !alua#le, which necessitates utilitarianism.

arsani, prof. of economics at MC %erkele, 1+62 (ohn" 5Etilitarianism and eyond7" p. 2'-)

ome further notes on this suggestion will be in place here. irst"it is sometimes alleged that ?ustice has to be at odds with utility. ut if we ask how we are to be ?ust between the competing interests of different people" it seems hard to give any other answer than it is by giving e/ual weight

impartially to the interests of everybody. And this is precisely what yields the utility principle. ,t does not necessarily yield e/uality in

the resulting distribution. There are certainly very good utilitarian reasons for seeking e/uality in distribution tooD but ?ustice is something distinct . The

utilitarian is sometimes said to be indifferent between e/ual and une/ual distributions provided that total utility is e/ual. This is soD bu

it conceals two important utilitarian grounds for a fairly high degree of actual goods (tempered" of course" as in most systems including !awls>s by various advantages that are secured by moderate ine/ualities). The seconthat ine/ualities tend to produce" at any rate i n educated societies" envy hatred and malice whose disutility needs no emphasi*ing. , am convinced that when these two factors are t aken into account" utilitarians have no feefear the accusation that they could favor etreme ine/ualities of distribution in actual modern societies. antastic hypothetical cases can no doubt be invented in which they would have to favor themD but as" as we shall

this is an ille gitimate form of argument.

/ustice re:uires calculation or it ser!es as an ali#i for the worst. &enolds? 2@ (Theory and GventD :;ID

58egotiating the 8on-negotiable; !awls" Ferrida" and the ,ntertwining of %olitical Calculation and Eltra-politics7)This kind of argument about the relation between ethics and politics is part of his recent work more generally. ,n the %reface to one of his final books" !ogues; Two

Gssays on !eason" Ferrida begins by acknowledging that Rno politics" no ethics" and no law can be" as it were" deduced from this thought of deconstruction. To be sure"

nothing can be done with it... ut should we then conclude that this thought leaves no trace on what is to be done @ for eample in the politics" the ethics" or the law tocome+R (! v) Clearly his reply to this rhetorical /uestion is in the negative" and rightly so. Ferrida suggests that his emphasis upon ?ustice to come" democracy to

come" etc." might in fact be considered to be ultra-political (! I:). ,n this tet" Ferrida also continues to insist that R%ure ethics" if there is any" begins with the

respectable dignity of the other as the absolute unlike" recognised as non-recognisable... %ure politics" which begins with the neighbour as like" or as resembling... spells

the end or the ruin of such an ethicsR (! '9). #e goes on to suggest that the political (on this narrow understanding) begins by choosing and preferring the like and that

which is knowable" as well as calculable units of measure and aioms. #owever" it is also important to note that Ferrida continually insists that these kind of technicaland political measurements @ such as calculation and the adding of votes @ are not a problem for the incommensurable (that is" the incalculability of ethics)D rather" such

techni/ues are precisely the chance for the incommensurable. There is no incommensurable without" or apart from" the commensurable and the calculable (! &I)" even

though the calculation inevitably neutralises the singularity to which it paradoically gives access. imilarly" in his now famous essay" orce of $aw" which eamines

the structurally isomorphic relation between calculable law and the incalculable demands of ?ustice" Ferrida insists that Oustice Rand deconstructionE

re:uires us to calculate. (ithout this" he admits that his own persistent references to Oustice Pto comeP might Oust ser!e as an

ali#i for Pthe worstP (F% 2H).

1H




1A& Generic K 0xt- Friend0nem

The friendenem distinction is the ultimate capacit for instilling meaning in life.

"ander "alk? 22 R!ockefeller College !eviewD 1;2D 5Fecisions" Fecisions; Carl chmitt on riends and %olitical 0ill7D

http;<<www.albany.edu<reckefeller<rockreview<issue2<%aper=.pdf)

chmitt uses the language of friendship to describe the political as that which is capable of providing the ultimate eistential eperience and

nourishment. riendship involves choice" and choice re/uires decision. y placing a decision about friends and enemies at the

heart of the political" chmitt imbues the political sphere with a capacity to create meaning in one>s life. This capacity to create

meaning and sustain the values by which individuals conduct their lives has traditionally belonged to the realms of the moral" the religious or the aesthetic. ,n chmitt>s

depiction of the centrality of the friend<enemy distinction" the ultimate capacity for instilling meaning in life" for generating

and instilling certain values over other" rests with the political. ,t will be shown how the moment of decision regarding membership within one>s

group of friends create two relationships" one between friends and enemies" and one between friends" that is to say" between citi*ens" and their sovereign.

The exception is ke to democrac- keeps it ali!e and in motion.

%alakrishnan, rof )aw@ M- Chicago? 2 (The Gnemy; An ,ntellectual %ortrait of Carl chmittD %. 2'I-2'=)

The shrewdest insights into democracy are not always made by friends of the people. The truth in chmitts polar

opposition of liberalism and democracy is historically variable; in others" one term can be seen as the negation of the

other. Fratelli' coltelli( To the etent that neoliberalism is a liberal doctrine" the relationship between these two terms

today is probably about ass comple and antagonistic as it was during the 0eimar !epublic. 4ainstream political

discourse has not acknowledged this because" in the meantime" democracy has shed much of its original" ancient meaning

as a political system in which all power is in the hands of an assembled people. The standard ?ustification for this semantic

corruption is that ancient forms of direct democracy cannot be resurrected in a modern contet of a comple division of

labour and private liberties. ut the significance of chmitts conception of democracy is that it elides this sharp ancient-

modern dichotomy of direct versus representative government. Gven if it is impossible to establish a political system in

which a permanently assembled people govern itself" chmitt suggested that a political system is authentically democratic

to the etent that it is open to periodic emergencies in which the people can swing into action as an independent semi-

legislative power. Femonstrations" gigantic rallies and general strikes are events which keep alive" and in motion" the

original constituent power of the people. Femocracy takes on its real meaning in the eceptional situation. Althoughchmitt was no friend of the council democracy which sprang up in the aftermath of military defeat" the memory and

institutional residues of this revolutionary episode continued to inform his understanding of democracy until the end of the

0eimar era" even as he attempted to give it a more plebiscitarian form. chmitt" following 4achiavelli" recogni*ed the

role of the class struggle in cataly*ing popular government. rom this L2'IO perspective it is arguable that the relentless of

these forms of popular power over the last two decades- and the related decline of belief in the efficacy of public power of

any kind- is a ruinous development for democracy.

&efusing to read *chmitt #ecause he was a >a5i is depolitici5ation- it ele!ates moralit o!er political relations. All

of our impacts are offense to this argument.

8ouffe, rof ol Theor = Mni! (estminster? 2;D 3n The %oliticalD %. =-&

ecause of the rationalism prevalent in liberal political discourse" it is often among conservative theorists that , have found critical insights for an ade/uateunderstanding of the political. They can better shake our dogmatic assumptions than liberal apologists. This is why , have chosen to conduct my criti/ue of liberal

thought under the aegis of such a controversial thinker as Carl chmitt. , am convinced that there is much that we can learn from him" as one of the most brilliant and

intransigent opponents of liberalism. , am perfectly aware that" because of chmitts compromise with na*ism" such a choice might

arouse hostility. 4any people will find it rather perverse if not outright outrageous. Jet" , believe that it is the intellectual force of theorists"not their moral /ualities" that should be the decisive criteria in deciding whether we need to establish a dialogue with their work.

, see the refusal of many democratic theorists to engage with chmitts thought on moral grounds as typical of the moralistic tendency which is

characteristic of the post-political )eitgeist . ,n fact" the criti/ue of such tendency is at the core of my reflection. A central thesis of this book

1:




is that" contrary to post-political theorists want us to believe" what we are currently witnessing is not the disappearance of the political in

its adversarial dimension but something different. 0hat is happening is that nowadays the political is played out in the moral register . ,n

other words" it still consists in a we<they discrimination" but the we<they" instead of being defined with political categories" is

now established in moral terms. ,n place of a struggle between Bright and left> we are faced with a struggle between right and

wrong.

The imperati!e of todaPs uni!ersalist American order is thou shall #e included. An alternati!e to thisproposal is immediatel denounced as e!il as to #e eliminated.

&asch? 24 (Cultural Critique; 54; "Human Rights as Geopolitics: Carl Schmitt and the Legal Form of American Supremacy”)

,n the past" we<they" neighbor<foreigner" friend<enemy polarities were inside<outside distinctions that produced a plurality

of worlds" separated by physical and cultural borders. 0hen these worlds collided"it was not always a pretty picture" but it

was often possible tomaintain the integrity of the we<they distinction" even to regulate itby distinguishing between

domestic and foreign affairs. ,f RtheyR differed" RweR did not always feel ourselves obliged to make RthemRinto miniature

versions of Rus"R to Christiani*e them" to civili*e them"to make of them good liberals. Things have changed. 0ith a

singlepower global hegemony that is guided by a universalist ideology" allrelations have become" or threaten to become"

domestic. The inner<outer distinction has been transformed into a morally and legally determined acceptable<unacceptable

one" and the power eists (or is thought to eist)" both spiritually and physically" to eliminate the unacceptable once andfor all and make believers of everyone. The

new imperative states; the other shall be included. Felivered asa promise" it

can only be received" by some" as an ominous threat.

*chmittPs rele!ance to international relations is o#!ious- states that claim to a#olish war appeal to humanit to

Oustif police operations against outlaw regimes.

%alakrishnan, rof )aw = M-Chicago? 2 (The Gnemy; An ,ntellectual %ortrait of Carl chmittD %. 2'&-2'')

chmitts relevance to commentary on international relations should be even more readily apparent. #ere we leave behind

the world of the rule of law and enter the state of nature- that is" a *one where the fictions of legality can be particularly

pernicious. 4ore effectively than anyone else he called into /uestion the stability of an international order in which allstates are sub?ect to incipient forms of international government" but only to widely varying and often unspecified

degrees; his polemics capture the Kafkaes/ue ring of a ?argon which declares war between states to be abolished" and

invokes the highest L2'&O ideals of humanity to ?ustify police operations and sanction regimes against outlaw

governments.

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