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McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC GENERAL PRACTITIONER’S UPDATE 2012

CUSTODY UPDATEI. PennsylvaniaLegislativeChanges:

A. AmendmentstoConsiderationofCriminalConvictions.EffectiveJune11,2012,23Pa.C.S.A.§5329willbeamendedtoaddressthefactthatmanyPennsylvaniacountiesarerequiringpartiestoacustodyaction,whohavecommittedanenumeratedoffense,toreceivecounselingfromamentalhealthprofessionalpriortobeingpermittedtoexerciseanycustodyrights.

Section5329entitled“ConsiderationofCriminalConviction”identifiesseveralPennsylvaniacriminaloffenses,andifapartytoacustodyaction,oramemberofthatperson’shousehold,hascommittedoneoftheseoffenses,thecourtshallconsiderwhetherthepartyoramemberoftheparty’shouseholdposesathreatofharmtothechildbeforemakinganorderofcustody.Section5329(c)statesthatthecourtshallprovideforaninitialevaluationtodeterminewhetherthepartyorhouseholdmemberwhocommittedtheoffense(a)posesathreattothechild,and(b)whethercounselingisnecessaryforthepartyorhouseholdmember.

AtleastafewPennsylvaniacountieswereinterpretingthisstatutetomeanthatifaparty,oramemberoftheparty’shousehold,hascommittedoneoftheseoffenses,theparty,orthememberoftheparty’shousehold,wasrequiredtoreceiveanevaluationbyamentalhealthprofessionalpriortothecourtawardingthatpartyanyrightsofcustody’.Forexample,ifapartyhadbeenexercisingprimaryphysicalcustodyofachildfortenyearsandthatpartyhada20yearolddrivingunderinfluenceoffense,thecourtwouldnotawardcustodytothatpartyuntilthatpartyreceivedanevaluationfromamentalhealthprofessional.

Inanefforttoaddressthisconcern,Pennsylvanialegislatureaddedlanguagetosection5329thatstates,“Attheinitialin-personcontactwiththecourt,thejudge,conferenceofficerorotherappointedindividualshallperformaninitialevaluationtodeterminewhetherthepartyorthehouseholdmemberwhocommittedanoffenseunderSubsection(A)posesathreattothechildandwhethercounselingisnecessary.The initial evaluation shall not be conducted by a mental health professional.”TheadditionclearlygivesJudgesandconferenceofficerstheauthoritytograntcustodialrightstoindividualswhohavebeenconvictedofoneoftheenumeratedoffenseswithoutfirsthavingamentalhealthprofessionalconductanevaluation.Additionally,thenewlanguageprovidesabroadgroupofpersonswhomayconducttheinitialevaluation.Therefore,nomatterwhatprocessacountyhasadoptedforacustodylitigant’sinitialcontactwiththecourt,thecourt,conferenceofficerorotherappointedindividualisauthorizedtodeterminewhetherapartyoramemberofaparty’shouseholdposesathreatofharmtothechild.AttachedheretoasExhibit AisacopyofSenateBillNo.1167settingforththeamendmentstosection5329.

B. CustodyProceedingsDuringMilitaryDeployment.

EffectiveJune11,2012,thePennsylvanialegislatureamendedsection5338(modificationofexistingorder)tolimitthecourt’sauthoritytomodifythecustodyrightsofcertaineligiblemembersofthearmedforcesbycrossreferencing51Pa.C.S.A.§4109relatingtochildcustodyproceedingsduringmilitarydeployment.Priortotherecentamendments,Section4109(a)hadprovidedthatnocourtmayenteranordermodifyingoramendingapreviouscustodyorderwhileaneligibleservicememberisdeployed,exceptthatacourtmayenteratemporarycustodyorder.Thenewamendmentsaddedsection4109(a.1),relatingtoaservicemember’sabilitytoassignhisorhercustodialrightstoafamilymember,andsection4110relatingtoanexpeditedhearing,wherethecourtispermittedtoconductan“electronichearing.”


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Section4109(a.1)providesthatifaneligibleservicemember“hasreceivednoticeofdeploymentinsupportofacontingencyoperation,acourtmayissueatemporaryordertoaneligibleservicemember…includingatemporaryordertotemporarilyassigncustodyrightstofamilymembersoftheservicemember.”Toassignthecustodyrights,theservicemembershalljointhefamilymembertothepetitionandincludeaproposedcustodyscheduleforcareofthechildbythefamilymember.Thestatutelimitstheextentofthefamilymember’srightstocustodytotherightsgrantedtotheservicememberineffectatthetimeofthefilingofthepetition.

Section4110providesfor“anexpeditedhearing”anduponmotion,permittheeligibleservicemembertopresenttestimonyandevidencebyelectronicmeanswherethemilitarydutiesoftheeligibleservicememberhaveamaterialeffectonhisorherabilitytoappearinpersonataregularlyscheduledhearing.

Theeffectofthisstatuteincreasestheclassofpersonswhohavetherighttoseekcustody,andevidencesourculture’srecognitionofanexpandedfamilyunit.Asgrandparentsweregrantedstandingtoseekcustodialrights,nowany“familymember”ofadeployed’sfamilyisgrantedstandingtojoinwiththeservicemembertofileapetitionforcustody.“Familymember”isdefinedas“spouses,parentsandchildrenorotherpersonsrelatedbyconsanguinityoraffinity.”

Duringthetimeinwhichthefamilyofaservicememberisassignedcustodialrights,andpotentiallyprovidingsignificantcareforachild,thatfamilymembermaybegainingstandingnotasa“familymember”,butstandingthrough“in loco parentis.”Pursuanttosection5324oftheCustodyAct,apersonwhostands“in loco parentis”hasstandingtofileforanyformofphysicalorlegalcustody.Therefore,anadditionalpartymayhaverightstoseekcustodyofthechildevenaftertheservicemembercompleteshisorherdeployment.

Theimmediateeffectofthisstatuteensuresthataparty’schildisgiventheopportunitytomaintainarelationshipwiththeservicememberthroughhisorherfamily.However,theremaybealonglastingeffectofthecustodyscheduleafterdeploymentifthefamilymemberisabletoestablishin loco parentis.AttachedasExhibitAisacopyofSenateBillNo.1167thatsetsforththeadditionalrightsforaservicememberandhisorherfamilymembers.

II. Case Law Updates:

A. PennsylvaniaSupremeCourt.

CUSTODY–COUNSELINGREQUIREMENT–PRISONER’SREQUESTFORVISITATIOND.R.C.v.J.A.Z.,31A.3d677(Pa.November23,2011).

Issue: Under the old custody statute, was theDepartmentofCorrectionsrequiredtoprovidecounselingtoincarceratedindividualswhohavebeenconvictedofoneoftheoffensesenumeratedinthecustodystatutesothattheycanexercisetherighttoprisonvisitationofaminorchild?

Holding:No.ThelawdidnotrequiretheDepartmentofCorrectionstoprovidecounseling,andthestatute,ineffectatthetimethiscasewasinitiated,doesnotrequirecounselingasaprerequisitetoacourtengaginginanevaluationastowhetheritisinthechild’sbestintereststoparticipateinprisonvisitation.

Facts:OnFebruary19,2004,D.R.C.,Sr.(“Father”)filedacustodycomplaintinYorkCountyCourtofCommonPleasseekingvisitationofhisminorsonatthestatecorrectionalinstitutioninHuntington,Pennsylvania,whereFatherwasservingalifesentenceforfirstdegreemurder.J.A.Z.(“Mother”)opposed

prisonvisitsfortheminorchild.

OnJuly6,2005,thetrialcourtdeniedFather’srequestforvisitationandFatherappealed.TheSuperiorCourtvacatedthisorderandremandedtoholdahearingconcerningFather’srequestforvisitation.Onremand,thetrialcourtissuedapre-trialorderdirectingFathertopresentevidencethathenolongerposesathreatofharmtothechild.FathersubmittedtherequestedevidencetothecourtconsistingofFather’sswornaffidavitandpagesoftestimonyandcharacterwitnessesfromhisfirstdegreemurdertrial.

OnJune26,2008,thetrialcourtheldatelephonehearing,whichMotherandFatherappeared,aswellasalicensedpsychologistmanageratSCIHuntingtonandacorrectionscounselorattheprison,whotestifiedregardingtypesofcounselingFatherreceived,orwaseligibletoreceiveattheprison.Uponreceiptofhistestimony,thetrialcourtdismissedFather’spetitionforvisitationbecauseFather“neverreceivedthecounselingmandatedbythecustodystatute.”ThetrialreasonedthatitdidnothaveauthoritytoordertheDepartmentofCorrectionsto“design,construct,andadminister”aprogramofcounselingthatwouldmeettherequirementsofthecustodystatute.ThetrialcourtalsoreasonedthatitdoubtedithadtheauthoritytoappointanoutsideprivateindividualandtoordertheDepartmentofCorrectionstocooperatebyprovidingaccesstoboththecorrectionalinstitutionandtheinmate.

FatheragainappealedthisorderandtheSuperiorCourtfoundthetrialcourterredbynotappointingaqualifiedprofessional.TheSuperiorCourt,inthis2009Opinion,foundthattheDepartmentofCorrectionsandtheindividualprisonsemploythetypesofqualifiedprofessionalsthatthelegislatorintendedtoprovidecounselingevaluationsasdirectedbythecustodystatute.

Onsubsequentremand,thetrialcourtdirectedtheDepartmentofCorrectionstochooseaqualifiedprofessionalandevaluateFather,andonMay7,2009,theDepartmentofCorrectionsfiledapetitiontointervene,amotiontostay,andamotionforreconsideration.ThetrialcourtgrantedtheDepartmentofCorrections’petitiontointerveneanddeniedtheDepartmentofCorrections’motiontostay.

TheDepartmentofCorrectionsfiledanoticeofappealtotheSuperiorCourtastoitsmotionforreconsiderationandthetrialcourtstayedtheproceedingsuntiltheresolutionoftheDepartmentofCorrections’appeal.TheSuperiorCourtaffirmedandtheDepartmentofCorrectionsappealedtothePennsylvaniaSupremeCourtforconsiderationofwhethertheDomesticRelationsCoderequirestheDepartmentofCorrectionstoprovidecounselingtocurrentlyincarceratedfelonssothattheymayobtainrightsofcustody,partialcustody,andvisitationandwhetheracustodycourtcanordertheDepartmentofCorrectionstoprovideandpayforcustodyrelatedcounselingforastateinmate.

Conclusion:ThemajorityopinionexaminedthestatuteanddeterminedthateveniftheGeneralAssemblyintendedanevaluationofaparty,whocommittedanenumeratedoffense,priortoprovidingrightsofcustody,thestatutewasnotclearastowhethertheGeneralAssemblyintendedthissectiontoapplytooffendingparentswhoremainincarcerated.TheMajorityopinionstatedthatitappliestopersonswhohave“beenconvicted”butdoesnotidentifywhetheritappliestopartieswhoareincarcerated.

Asthestatuteisambiguous,themajorityopinionlookedtolegislativehistorytodeterminelegislativeintent.Inreview,“Thepurposeof[thisprovision]wastomakecertainthatwhereaparenthadbeenconvictedofaseriouscrime,theconductunderlyingthatcrimewillbeevaluatedasanadditionalfactoralongwithmanyotherfactors.”Thelegislature“soughttoremedythereintroductionofanoffendingparentintothechild’slifewithoutanassessmentofthatparent’spotentialthreattothechildincustodyandvisitationarrangements.”The


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courtstatedthatthecustodystatuteregardingcriminaloffenses“couldbeappliedtocurrentlyincarceratedfelons,butsuchaninterpretationwouldbeunreasonable.”Thecourtfoundthatthelegislativehistoryintendedtoprevent“theplacementofachildinto the homeofanoffendingparentwithoutfirsthavingengagedinariskofharmassessment.”

InrelianceontheDepartmentofCorrections’argumentsthatapersonwhoisincarceratedisconstantlysupervisedandprisonpoliciesprecludeanyonefromhavingunsupervisedvisitationandprohibitcertainsexoffendersfromhavinganyphysicalvisitswithminors,theGeneralAssembly’sintentfortheseprovisionsofthecustodystatutedonotapplyforprisonvisitation.Thecourtstatedthat,“Duetothestricturesoftheirconfinementandtherulesofthepenalinstitution,incarceratedparentsareunabletoengageinthetypeofphysicalinteractionfearedbythedraftersofthislegislation.”

Concurring and Dissenting (Justice Saylor, in which Justice Todd joins):Dissentingopiniondisagreeswiththemajority’sholdingthatthereisanyambiguitywiththestatuteanddisagreeswiththemajority’sapplicationsofthestatute.TheDissentingopinionfindsthatcounselingisappropriateforaprisonertoobtainvisitationwithaminorchild.Thisopiniondoesaddresstheissueof“whomustpayfortheservices”ofprisoncounseling.TheopiniondoesnotidentifywhoshouldpayforthecounselingbutthisopinionstatesthatthereisnobasistorequiretheDepartmentofCorrectionstoprovidethecounseling.

Legislative Update:Theversionofthestatuteanalyzedinthisopinionhasbeenamended.TheissuesraisedbythisprovisionareaddressedinthenewCustodyAct,andamendedasecondtimewiththeadditionoflanguageeffectiveJune11,2012.Inlightofthenewlanguageaddedtothecriminalconvictionprovisionwherebytheinitialevaluationisconductedattheinitialin-personcontactwiththecourtincludingajudge,conferenceofficerorotherappointedindividual,apartywouldonlyberequiredtoobtaincounselingifdeterminedattheinitialin-personcontact.

TERMINATIONOFPARENTALRIGHTS-INCARCERATION

InRe:R.I.S.andA.I.S.,36A.3d567(Pa.November23,2011).

Issue:Whetherincarcerationcanserveasgroundsfortheinvoluntaryterminationofparentalrightswhenanincarceratedparentmakesfulluseoftheopportunitiesthatareavailabletohiminprisonandcomplieswiththereunificationplan?

Holding: No.Aparent’sabsenceorfailuretosupporthisorherchildduetoincarcerationisnot,initself,abasisforadeterminationofabandonment.

Facts: InJune2008,C.S.(“Father”)wassentencedsuchthathisearliestreleasedatewasJune2012andhislatestreleasedatewasinJune2016.FatherservedhissentenceinastatecorrectionalinstitutioninErieCounty.InJanuary2009,YorkCountyChildrenandYouthServicesfiledadependencyactionandthechildrenwereplacedinatemporaryfosterhome.

OnMarch2,2010,ahearingwasheldwherebyafamilyserviceplanidentifiedagoalforFatherofreunification.Father’sgoalsincludedcooperatingwiththeserviceplan,signingnecessaryreleases,remainingincontactwithChildrenandYouthServices,andprovidingdocumentationregardinghisinvolvementintherapeuticprisonprogramsandmaintaininggoodprisonconduct.EvidencewaspresentedthatFathermeteachofthesegoalsandcooperatedwiththeserviceplan.Fatherhadmaintainedwrittenandtelephonecontact


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withChildrenandcommittednoincidentsofmisconduct.Fatherrequestedvisitationwiththechildren,butwasdeniedduetothedistancebetweenYorkandErie,Pennsylvania.Fatherrequested“virtualvisitation”,butwasdeniedbecauseChildrenandYouthServicesdidnothavevideoconferencingcapability.Fatherpurchasedapre-paidphonecardandmadeseveralattemptstocallthechildren,butthefosterparentsrefusedthecallsfromFather.

WhenthecourtsummarizedFather’sprogress,itstatedthat“therewasnothingthathedidn’tdoorthattherewasn’tsomesatisfactoryreasonforhimnotbeingabletodoit.”

ChildrenandYouthServicesfiledapetitionforgoalchange,fromreunificationtoadoption,andfiledapetitiontoterminateFather’srights.Followingthehearing,thetrialcourtdeniedthegoalchangepetitionanddeniedinvoluntarytermination.ThetrialcourtconcludedthattheChildrenandYouthServices’petitionseekingterminationwasbasedsolelyonthelengthofFather’sincarceration.Withrespecttothepetitionforgoalchange,thetrialcourtconcludedthatreunificationshouldremainthegoalandthetrialcourtstatedthatthepetitiontochangethegoalwassimplyanotherwaytomakeanargumentregardingtheirpetitionfortermination,therefore,thecourtneednotprovidefurtherresponse.

ChildrenandYouthServicesappealedtotheSuperiorCourtandtheSuperiorCourtreversedthetrialcourtandheldthatFather’sincarcerationisevidenceofhisincapacitytoparentinthathis“failuretocomplywiththelawsoftheCommonwealthcreatedasituationandenvironmentthathasleftChildrenwithoutproperparentalcare.”TheSuperiorCourtalsostatedthat,“ThelengthofFather’sprisonsentencesupportstheconclusionthathecannotremedytheparentaldeficienciesthatledtothechildren’splacement.”TheCourtnotedthatwhenFatherwasinprison,thefirstchildwasnotyetbornandtheotheronewaslessthanoneyearold.UponFather’srelease,thechildrenwouldbe5and6yearsoldattheyoungest,or9and10yearsoldattheoldest.

Conclusion: “Therighttoconceiveandraiseone’schildrenhaslongbeenrecognizedasoneofourbasiccivilrights.”AsnotedbytheSupremeCourt,“Aparent’sabsenceorfailuretosupporthisorherchildduetoincarcerationisnot,initself,conclusivelydeterminativeoftheissueofparentalabandonment.”TheCourtmustinquirewhethertheparenthadutilizedthoseresourcesathisorhercommandwhileinprisontocontinueandpursueacloserelationship.

TheSupremeCourtfoundthattheSuperiorCourtimproperlysubstituteditsjudgmentforthatofthetrierfactandthus,shouldbeoverturned.TheCourtreiteratedthestandardandstatedthat,“incarcerationaloneisnotpersayevidenceofparentalincapacityorthatitrepresentssufficientgroundsforinvoluntaryterminationofparentalrights.”TheSupremeCourtfoundthatthetrialcourtimproperlydismissedthepetitionforgoalchangeinthatanorderrequireddiscreetinquirieswithananalysisofinterestsseparatefromthosereviewedrelevanttoinvoluntarytermination.Therefore,theSupremeCourtremandstothetrialcourtforanexaminationofthepetitionforgoalchangefromreunificationtoadoption.Concurring (Justice Saylor, in which Chief Justice Castille joins): JusticeSaylor’sconcurringopinion,althoughinsupportofthemajority’sfinding,makesitclearthatthereareinstanceswherethelengthoftheparent’sincarcerationwillpreclude“thecourtfromunifyingtheformerprisonerandthechildonatimelybasis,”andthatachildisentitledtoapermanenthome.Therearecaseswherethelengthofasentence,standingalone,“shouldanddoesmeetthelegalcriteriaforinvoluntarytermination.”Theconcurringopinionnotedthatitisincumbentuponthejudicialsystemtobechildfocused.“Regardlessoftheheartbreaktoaparent,childrenare


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entitledtoeveryopportunityforasuccessfullife,andapermanent,lovingparentalrelationshipgenerallyfostersthatopportunity.”

Dissenting Opinion (Justice Orie Melvin): TheopinionwrittenbyJusticeOrieMelvinagreeswiththeSuperiorCourtandnotesthatnotonlymustFather’sprisonsentenceend,Fathermustovercomeadditionalhurdlesbeforebeingabletocareforthechildren,includingobtainingappropriatehousing,employmentandfulfillingtheconditionsofparole.

Thedissentingopinionconcurswiththegeneralpremisethatincarcerationalonedoesnotprovidegroundsfortermination,however,thelengthofFather’sprisonsentencedoessupporttheconclusionthathecannotremedytheparentaldeficienciesthatledtothechildren’splacement.Thedissentingopinionstatesthatthemajorityimproperlyappliesthelawthatifanincarceratedparentmakeseveryefforttomaintainaparent/childrelationship,thecourtmaynotterminatehisrights.Thedissentingopinionstatesthatalthough“anincarceratedparentmaybedoingeverythingrequiredofhimwhileinprison,thechild’sneedsforconsistentparentalcarecannotbecastasideorputonhold.”ThedissentingopinionagreedwiththeSuperiorCourt’sopinionthatFather’suncertainprospectsregardinghisabilitytoparentcombinedwithalackofbondwiththechildrenoutweighFather’seffortstomaintainapresenceinthechildren’slives.Thedissentnotestherealitythatthereisadifferencebetween“incapacity”toparentanda“desire”todoso.

B. PennsylvaniaSuperiorCourtCases.

CUSTODY–FAILURETOCONSIDERCUSTODYFACTORSINSECTION5328–RESTRICTIONSONVISITATIONRIGHTS

J.R.M.v.J.E.A.,33A.3d647(Pa.Super.December5,2011).

Issue: Doesatrialcourterrwhenitdoesnotengageinafactspecific,casespecific,analysisofthebestinterestsfactors?

Holding: Atrialcourtisrequiredtoengageinaspecificanalysisofthebestinterestsfactorsandshallconsiderallofthefactorslistedin§5328(a)whenenteringacustodyorder.TheSuperiorCourtalsoaddressedthetrialcourt’sauthoritytoplacerestrictionsonaparty’speriodsofphysicalcustodyandstatedthatarestrictionwillbeimposedonlyifthepartiesagree,orifthephysicalcustodywouldhaveadetrimentalimpactonthechildintheabsenceoftherestrictions.

Facts: AfterMotherandFatherweredatingforapproximatelyonemonth,MotherandFatherbecameengagedtobemarried.Twomonthsaftertheirengagement,Motherwaspregnant,butbythattime,MotherandFatherwereexperiencingtroubleintheirrelationshipandtheyseparated.Aftertheirseparation,FatherlivedapproximatelytwohoursawayformMother,andFatherbeganarelationshipwithhisex-wife,whowasnowhisfiancé.Aftertheirbreakup,thepartieshaddifficultycommunicating,andasaresult,MotherdidnotinformFatherwhenthechildwasborn.

UponFatherlearningthatthechildwasborn,MotherhadarrangedforFathertocontactMother’semployertoarrangeforvisitationwiththechild.Father,“grudgingly”arrangedvisitsthroughMother’semployerandbegantovisitwiththechildatvariouslocationswithMother’semployeroranotherindividualpresent.Inanticipationofreceivingovernightcustody,FathersetuparoominhishomefortheChildtoexerciseovernightcustodyvisit.


CUSTODY UPDATEMotherfiledacustodycomplaintonDecember10,2010,andFatherfiledacustodycomplaintonDecember14,2010.Thepartiesattendacustodyconciliationconference,whichdidnotresolvethedispute,andthepartiesagreedintheinterimthatFatherwouldhavepartialcustodythreedaysperweek,foratwohourtimeperiod.FatherexercisedtheseperiodsofcustodyinMother’schurch.AlthoughFatherwasaloneintheroomwiththechild,MotherwaspresentinthechurchduringFather’speriodsofcustody.

OnMarch25,2011,thetrialcourtenteredanorderandfindingsoffact,wherebyMotherwasgrantedprimaryphysicalcustodyandFatherwasgrantedpartialphysicalcustodythreedaysperweek,forthree,threehourperiods.Duringtheseperiodsofcustody,Motheroranyothersuitablecaregiverwastobeinthearea.Inthecourt’sfindingoffact,thecourtdoesnotaddresseachofthesection5328factors,ratheritaddressesthecommunicationbreakdown,thedistancebetweentheparties,andMother’sbreastfeeding.

Fatherfiledatimelyappealraisingtwoissues,(1)Didthetrialcourterrinfailingtoengageina“fact-specific,case-specific”analysisofthebestinterestfactssetforthinsection5328,and(2)didthetrialcourterrinplacingrestrictionsonFather’speriodsofcustody,suchthatMotherorasuitablecaregiverwasrequiredtobepresent.Conclusion:TheSuperiorCourtheldthatthattrialdiderrin“failingtoconsiderthefactorsitwasrequiredtoconsiderinrenderingitscustodydecision.”Thetrialcourtmerelymentionedthreeissues,andfailedtoaddressanyotherfactor.“All ofthefactorslistedinsection5328(a)arerequiredtobeconsideredbythetrialcourtwhenenteringacustodyorder.”WithrespecttotherestrictionsonFather’scustody,theSuperiorCourtheldthat“anawardofcustodygenerallydoesnotcontainanyrestrictions...[andwillonly]beimposedifthepartieshaveagreedtoarestrictionorifthepartyrequestingarestrictionshowsthatwithoutit,partialcustodywillhaveadetrimentalimpactonthechild.”AsthetrialcourtmadenofindingoffactthatFatherwasunfitorunabletocarefortheChildonhisown,andinfact,Fatherandhisfiancéwerepreparedtoexerciseovernightswiththechild,thetrialcourtshouldnothaverestrictedFather’speriodofphysicalcustody.

CUSTODY–FALSECLAIMSOFABUSE

M.O.v.F.W.,___A.3d___,2012PASuper49(Pa.Super.February28,2012).

Issue:(1)Mayatrialcourtenterintoevidenceapriorcustodyevaluationreport,whenthepreparingexpertdoesnottestify?(2)DidthetrialcourterrinenteringatemporarycustodyorderwhichawardedMothersolelegalandphysicalcustodyoftheChild?Holding:(1)Yes.Eventhoughthepreparingexpertdidnottestify,whenapriorcustodyevaluationwasmadepartoftherecordinapriorproceeding,andthepartywhoobjectstothepriorcustodyevaluationisthepartytoaddresstheconclusionsofthepriorcustodyevaluation,atrialcourtmayenterapriorcustodyevaluationreportintoevidence.(2)No.ThetrialcourtdidnoterrinenteringatemporaryawardofsolelegalandphysicalcustodytoMotherwherethetrialcourtfoundthatFatherexhibitedrecentpoorjudgmentthatcreatedariskofharmtothechild.

Facts:ThechildwasbornonJune13,2007,andcustodylitigationbeganbeforethechildwasborn.InSeptember2008,thepartiesreceivedaprivatecustodyevaluationfromDr.StevenCohen.OnNovember2,009,byagreement,anorderwasenteredgrantingthepartiessharedlegalcustodyandMotherprimaryphysicalcustodysubjecttoFather’speriodofphysicalcustody6outof14overnightsinatwoweekcycle.

OnJanuary7,2011,FatherfiledaPFApetitionallegingMotherandherboyfriendwerephysically,emotionally,andpsychologicallyandsexuallyabusingtheChild,andFatherfiledanemergencypetitiontomodifycustody


CUSTODY UPDATEonJanuary20,2011.Father’spetitionrequestedthatthecourtgranthimsolephysicalandlegalcustody“untilsuchtimeastheChildiscapableofevadingphysicallyandemotionallyabusivesituationswithMotherandherParamour.”MotherfiledacontemptpetitionallegingthatFather’sallegationsofabusewerefalseandthatFatherhadsubjectedtheChildtoevaluationswithoutMother’sknowledgeandconsent.

ThetrialcourtheldahearingoversevendaysinAprilandMay2011.OnJune9,2011,thetrialcourtenteredatemporarycustodyordergivingMothersolelegalandphysicalcustodyoftheChild.ThetemporaryorderrequiredFather’svisitstobesupervisedtopreventFatherfromsubjectingtheChildtoadditionaldoctorsvisitsorphysicalexaminations.Thecourtnoted“Iamnotgoingtohavethischildstrippedeverytimeshecomesfrommother’shouseandexamined...Ijustdon’twantemergencytripstothedoctor.Idon’ttrustFather’sjudgmentonthisanymore.”

Afterhearingextensivetestimonyandreviewingnumerousexhibits,thetrialcourtenteredanorderwherebyMotherwasgrantedprimaryphysicalcustodyandFatherwasgrantedtwo,two-hoursupervisedvisitswiththeChildeachweek.ThecourtfoundthatallevidenceofabusewhiletheChildwasinMother’scustodywascompletelyunfounded,andtherewasnoevidencetosubstantiateFather’sclaims.Father’s“heinousattempttowrestcustodyfromMotherand,ineffect,terminateherrelationshipwithherdaughter,issodetrimentaltothechild’swelfarethatthecourtwasleftnooptionbuttolimithiscontactwithhisdaughtersoastopreventanyfurtherattempttopoisonhermind.”

Onappeal,Fatherraisedfiveissues(1)DidthetrialcourterrbyawardingMothersolelegalandprimaryphysicalcustodyoftheChild,(2)whetherthetrialcourtabuseditsdiscretionbydenyingFather’sMotiontoRemovecounsel,(3)whetherthetrialcourtabuseditsdiscretionbydenyingFather’sAmendedMotionforrecusalandmistrialbasedonbiasandprejudice,(4)whetherthetrialcourterredbyadmittingintoevidenceapriorcustodyevaluationreport,withouttestimonyfromthepreparingexpert,and(5)whetherthetrialcourterredbygrantingatemporaryorder,priortoenteringthefinalorder,whichawardedMothersolelegalandphysicalcustody.

Conclusion:TheSuperiorCourtaddressedissues(1)-(3).Inrelianceonthetrialcourt’sopinion,thetrialcourt“thoroughlyandcogentlyaddressedtheissuesregardingwhythecustodyorderisinthebestinterestoftheChild...[i]nfact,wecommend[thetrialcourt]forrefusaltoallowsuchablatantattemptofforumshoppingtooccurduringahotlycontestedcustodybattle.”

Withrespecttoadmittingthe2009custodyevaluationreport,thecourtnotedthatexpertreportsmaynotbeusedincustodyactionsunlesstheauthorofthereporttestifiesandissubjecttocrossexaminationbythepartyadverselyaffected.Therightofalitiganttoin-courtpresentationofevidenceisessentialtodueprocess.Eventhoughtheexpertdidnottestifyregardingthe2009custodyevaluation,thecourtreliedonseveralreasonswhytheadmissionwasnotaviolationofdueprocess:(1)anumberofwitnesses,includingFather’switnesses,hadtestifiedaboutthereport’sconclusions,andtheexpert’sallegedbias,(2)Fatherhiredanexperttorebutthe2009report’sconclusions,(3)Fatherreferencedthe2009reportinhistestimony,(4)Fatherhiredtheexpertwhopreformedthe2009Report,and(5)thecustodyreportclarifiedtherolethattheexpertplayedintheinthehistoryoftheparties’custodydispute.Underthesecircumstances,Fatherwasnotdenieddueprocesswiththeadmissionofthe2009report.

Withrespecttothelastissue,whetherthecourterredinenteringthetemporaryorderwhileittookthetimetoreviewtherecordinenteringacustodyorder,thetrialcourtdidnoterr.BasedonFather’sactionsofsubjectingthechildtonumerousinvasiveanddegradingphysicalexaminations,inadditiontohavingherstripeverytime


CUSTODY UPDATEhereceivedcustodyofherfromMother,thetrialcourt’sordersaremorethanreasonable.

CUSTODY-RELOCATION–SIGNIFICANTIMPAIRMENTOFCUSTODIALRIGHTS

C.M.K.v.K.E.M.,___A.3d___,2012PASuper76(Pa.Super.March27,2012).

Issue:(1)Doesapartywhofilesanoticeofproposedrelocation“tacitlyconcede”thataparties’proposedmoveisa“relocation”?(2)Wastheproposedmove,approximately68milesfromwhereFatherresides,inthechild’sbestinterest,whenFatherhasmaintainedarelationshipwiththechildandFatherexercisescustodyalternatingweekends,withamidweekvisit.

Holding:(1)No.Apartywhofilesanoticeofproposedrelocationpursuanttosection5337doesnot“tacitlyconcede”thataparties’proposedmoveisa“relocation”asdefinedinthestatute.Apartywhofilesanoticeofproposedrelocationisentitledtoahearingtolitigateallissues,includingwhetherthemoveitselfconstitutes“relocation.”(2)No.AlthoughFatherexercisedpartialcustodyonalternatingweekends,withamidweekvisit,theproposedmovewasnotinthebestinterestofthechildwhenthemovewouldimpairFather’sabilitytoparticipateinweekdayeventswiththechild,includingattendingschoolandsportingevents,andtheChild’sbondwithFather’sfamilywouldbeaffected.

Facts:MotherlivesinGroveCity,MercerCounty,Pennsylvania,withthechild.FatherlivesinGroveCity,MercerCounty,Pennsylvaniawithhisgirlfriendandher13year-oldchild.MotherandFatherwerenevermarried,butresidedtogetherfromJanuary2004toJuly2008,inGroveCity.WhenMotherandFatherlivedtogether,theybothwereactiveinthecareofthechild.

InNovember2008andMay2010,Motherfiledcustodycomplaints,bothofwhichresultedinagreementswhereMotherwasgrantedprimaryphysicalcustodyandFatherwasgrantedpartialphysicalcustody.CommencinginMay2010,Fatherexercisedcustodyonalternatingweekends,withamidweekvisit.ThecourtnotedthatinadditiontoFather’spartialcustody,Fatherwasinvolvedinthechild’sschoolandsportactivities.Additionally,theChildhadestablishedagoodfamilialsupportnetworkwithFather’sfamilyintheGroveCityarea.

OnJune2,2011,MothersentanoticetoFatherwithaproposedrelocationtoAlbion,Pennsylvania(68milesfromFather’sresidence).Motherstatedthatshepreviouslyresidedinthisarea,herfamilywaslocatedthere,shehadtheopportunityforimprovedhousing,andshehadjobprospectswiththepossibilityofbecomingapartownerinabusiness.

Aftertherelocationhearing,thetrialcourtfoundthatMother’sproposedmovemetthedefinitionof“relocation”becauseshe“tacitlyconceded”themovewasarelocationduetoherNoticeofProposedrelocation.Inthealternative,thetrialcourtheldthatMother’smovewouldsignificantlyimpairFather’srighttoexercisecustody.Inreviewofthefactorsrelevanttoaparties’abilitytomove,thetrialcourtdeniedMother’spetition.Conclusion:TheSuperiorCourtheldthataNoticeofProposedRelocationwasnot,initself,sufficienttoprovidethatMother’sproposedmovewasa“relocation”pursuanttothestatute.Thecourtnotedthatapartywhofilesanoticeofproposedrelocationisentitledtoahearingtolitigateallissues,includingwhetherthemoveitselfconstitutes“relocation,”andnor“diditraiseapresumptionthat[a]proposedmoveconstitutedrelocation.”

Relocationoccurswhenaproposedmovewouldsignificantlyimpairaparties’abilitytoexercisecustodialrights.AlthoughtheSuperiorCourtrejectedthetrialcourt’sfindingthatMother’sNoticeofProposed


CUSTODY UPDATErelocationequatedtoanadmissionthatMother’smovewasa“relocation,”theSuperiorCourtupheldthetrialcourt’salternativefindingthatthemovesignificantlyimpairedFather’sabilitytoparent.TheSuperiorCourtreliedonFather’scontinuedmidweekinvolvementintheChild’slife.

Inreviewingthetrial’sanalysisofthefactorsinsection5337(h),theSuperiorCourtnotedseveralfactorsinsupportofthetrialcourt’sorderdenyingMother’sabilitytorelocate,including:(1)ChildandFatherhaveastrongsupportsysteminGroveCity,(2)theChildhasdinnerwithFatherandpaternalgrandparentseveryWednesdaynight,(3)Motherhascontinuedtohavecontactwithpaternalgrandparents,(4)thechilddoesnothaveanequallystrongsupportsystemwithMother’sfamily,(5)the“advantagesoftheproposedmoveareminor,atbest,”includingMotherearningapproximatelythesameamountathernewemploymentandonlyaminimallylesserrent.Additionally,thetrialcourtfoundthattheChildwouldhavelittletogainwiththerelocation.Combiningallofthesefacts,andfindingthatMother’sclaimsthatFatherhadabusedherwerelessenedbythefactthatMotherhadreconciledwithFatheraftertheincidentsofabuse,supportedthetrialcourt’sdenialofMother’sPetitiontoRelocate.

TERMINATIONOFPARENTALRIGHTS–INABILITYTOUNDERSTANDENGLISHLANGUAGE

InreP.S.S.C.andP.D.S.C.,32A.3d1281(Pa.Super.November29,2011).

Issue: WastheresufficientevidencetoterminateFather’sparentalrightsconsideringthatFather’sinabilitytospeakorreadEnglishmadeitimpossibleforhimtounderstandandactuponhisparentalrights,andhefailedtohavecounseluntilimmediatelypriortotheterminationhearing?

Holding:No.WhenFather’s“languagebarrierandlackofcounselmadeitimpossibleforhimtounderstandandactuponhisparentrightsandresponsibilitiesregardingtheterminationprocess,”therewasinsufficientevidenceontherecordtosupportterminationofFather’sparentalrights.

Facts:FatherisSpanish-speaking,andhischildrenwereborninPuertoRicoin1999and2001,andlivedtherewithFatherandMother.WhenFatherwasincarceratedinaPuertoRicoprisonin2005,MothertookthechildrentoLebanon,Pa.,andinDecember2006,MotherabandonedthechildreninLebanontoreturntoPuertoRico.LebanonCountyChildrenandYouthServicestookcustodyofthechildren.Atthistime,LCCYShadcontactwithMother,butMotherdidnotprovideFather’saddress.

InMay2007,LCCYSobtainedFather’sprisonaddressandsentcopiesofgoalsandnoticeofreviewhearings,writteninEnglishonly.NoattemptwasmadebyLCCYStodetermineifFatherspokeorreadtheEnglishlanguageorifhereceivedthenotices.FatherdidattempttocontactLCCYS,butdespiteFather’sefforts,thegoalwaschangedtoadoptionin2008.

InDecember2009,Fatherwasreleasedfromprisonandrefusedtosigntheterminationpapers.InMarch2010,FathermovedtoTexas,andcontinuedtocallLCCYStospeakwiththeChildren.FatherfinallyobtainedalegalaidapplicationnearlyfouryearsafterLCCYStookthechildrenintocustody.

FathertraveledtwicetoLebanonCountytoattendterminationhearings,andonMay10,2011,thetrialcourtheldthefinalterminationhearing,whereaninterpreterappearedandtranslatedthetestimony.FathertestifiedthatallpapershereceivedfromLCCYSwereservedinEnglishandthatFatherwasundertheimpressionthathewasnotallowedtohaveanycontactwiththeChildren.ThetrialcourtterminatedFather’sparentalrights,andalthoughthecourtsetforththereasonsforterminatingMother’srights,therewerenosuchreasonsidentifiedforFather.


CUSTODY UPDATE

Conclusion:Thecourtnotesthatitiswellestablishedunder23Pa.C.S.A.2511(a)(1),“incarcerationalonecannotsupportterminationduetoaparent’sfailuretoperformparentalduties...[and]aparent’sabsenceandfailuretosupportachildduetoincarcerationisnotconclusiveontheissueofwhethertheparenthasabandonedthechild.”Acourtmustdeterminewhethertheparentutilizedthoseresourcesavailableinprisontocontinuearelationshipwiththechild.

FatherattemptedtousetheresourcesavailablethroughLCCYS,buttonoavail.TheresourcesandaidetoFatherwhilehewasincarceratedwere“completelyinadequateforanunrepresentedSpanish-speakingindividualwithoutaccesstoaninterpreter.Inessence,theservicesorassistancereasonablyavailabletoFatherbyLCCYSweresimplynotavailableinlightofthelanguagebarrier.”

Thecourtdistinguishedthiscasefromthe1986case:AdoptionofBabyBoyAv.CatholicSocialServices,wherethecourtterminatedtheparentalrightsofanilliterateandincarceratedindividual.InAdoptionofBabyBoyAv.CatholicSocialServices,althoughfatherwasilliterateandthishinderedhisparticipationinthechild’slife,theparentmadeessentiallynoefforttofindoutinformationregardingthechild.Inthiscase,Fatherhadmadeseveralattemptstospeakwiththechildren.

Thecourtheldthatalthoughthisisa“closecase,”“thereisinsufficientevidenceintherecordtoconcludethatFathercouldactuallyreadthevariousnotices,plans,andpetitionsregardingterminationofhisparentalrights[andthis]tipsthescaleinfavorofFather.”ItisnotclearfromtherecordthatFatherevidenceda“settledpurposetorelinquishhisparentalrightsorwasunable,unwilling,orincapableofperforminghisparentaldutiesbaseduponhisapparentlimitation—notunderstandingtheEnglishLanguage.”

C. PennsylvaniaTrialCourtCases.

CUSTODY–GRANDPARENTS--ORALAGREEMENTBEFOREOPENCOURT–DURESS/COERCION

Morgantiv.Morganti,104BerksCo.L.J.40(C.C.P.September27,2011).

Issue: Doesaparty,representedbycounsel,havearighttorecantanoralagreementthatwasagreedunderoathbasedontheassertionthatthepartywas“inanunfitstateofmind”andthattheparty“panicked”?

Holding:No.Whenthereisnothingintherecordtoshowduress,coercionorunderinfluence,aparty,representedbycounsel,doesnothavetherighttorecantanoralagreementthatwasagreedunderoathandmadepartoftherecord.

Facts:OnDecember16,2006,theplaintiffs,MaternalGrandparents,commencedacustodyactionagainstMotherandFather.Followingahearing,MaternalGrandparentsweregrantedsolelegalandprimaryphysicalcustody,andMotherwasgrantedextensiveaccesstoMaternalGrandparentshomestoaccesstheChild.OnMay24,2009,FatherdiedinanATVaccident.

Throughaseriesofotherfilings,MaternalGrandparentsmaintainedprimaryphysicalcustodyuntilMarch14,2011,whenMotherfiledapetitionforprimaryphysicalcustody.OnMay11,2011,theCustodyMasterfiledhisreportgrantingMothersolelegalandprimaryphysicalcustody.MaternalGrandparentsfiledexceptions,bothpartiesfiledpre-trialmemoranda,andthepartiesattendapretrialconference.


CUSTODY UPDATE

OnAugust5,2011,“inopencourtwiththebenefitofcounsel,thepartieswereswornandenteredintoanoralcustodyagreementontherecord”forMothertohaveprimaryphysicalcustody.ThecourtacceptedtheAgreementofthepartiesandenteredtheagreementasacourtorder.

Fourdayslater,onAugust9,2011,MaternalGrandparentsfiledaPetitiontoRecantOralAgreement,statingthattheywere“blindsided”byMother’spretrialmemorandumandthatthey“panicked.”MaternalGrandparentsstatedthattheywere“emotionallyupset,stunned,confused,andtotallydisillusionedbecauseMaternalGrandparentshadneverheardtheseallegationsinthepast.”

Conclusion:DespiteMaternalGrandparentsarguments,thetrialcourtnotedthattheMaternalGrandparentswererepresentedbycounsel.Allpartieswereswornandstoodbeforethecourtwheretheattorneyspresentedtheagreement.Thecourtdeniedthepetition,statingthat“thereissimplynothingtosuggestthatthisAgreementwastheproductofduress,coercionorundueduress,andtothecontrarytherecordindicatesthatMaternalGrandparentsfreelyadoptedtheAgreement.”CUSTODY–BESTINTERESTOFCHILDREN–SLEEPDISORDER

Hopperv.Hopper,61CumberlandCo.Leg.J.14(C.C.P.December1,2011).Issue: Whetherfatherwaspermittedtoexerciseinterimperiodsofpartialcustody,afterthefirstdayofhearing,despiteMother’sassertionthatFatherwasunfittoreceiveunsupervisedcustodyduetoreasonsthatincludeanallegedsleepdisorder.

Holding:Yes.Asthecourt,duringthefirstdayofhearing,heardtestimonyfrombothpartiesandFatherofferedtestimonyofapsychologistthathewasnotadangertohimselfandtothechild,Fatherwasentitledtoperiodsofunsupervisedphysicalcustody.

Facts:ThepartiesweremarriedonAugust21,2004andseparatedonMay23,2011.FatherfoundthatMotherhadtakenthechildrenandwasmovingoutofthemaritalresidence.Afterseparation,MotherrefusedtoallowFathertoseethechildren.FatherfiledacustodycomplaintonJune10,2011.

Followingpre-trialmemorandafiledbybothparties,thecourtidentifiedthatthehearingwouldtakeseveraldays,andinordertoallowthecourttofashionaninterimorder,thepartiesagreedthatthecourtwouldhearevidencefromMotherandFatheronthefirstday.MothertestifiedthatFatherhadasleepdisorderthatmadeitdifficulttowakeFather.Fatherstatedthathissleepdisorderdidnotdisrupthisemploymentasapharmacistandheofferedtheopinionofapsychologistthathewasnotadangertohimselforothers.

Afterthefirstdayofhearing,thecourtenteredatemporaryorderwherebyMotherwasgrantedprimaryphysicalcustodyandFatherwasgrantedalternatingweekendsfromFridayuntilSunday.Motherfiledanappeal,arguing,amongotherpositions,thatthecourtshouldhaveacceptedherpositionthattheChildrencannotbeleftalonewithFatherduetohissleepdisorder.

Conclusion:Thecourtstatedthatitanticipatedthehearingtotakeseveraldays,andtoreachaninterimorder,thecourtwouldhearfrombothpartiesonthefirstdayofhearing.Afterthefirstday,thecourtstated“thecourtisnotobligedtoacceptthemostalarmistpositionofeitherparty.”TheminimalperiodsoftemporaryorpartialphysicalcustodygrantedtoFatherdonotrepresentathreatofharmtothechildren.


CUSTODY UPDATE

CUSTODY–COURTREJECTSHOMESCHOOLING–SPECIALNEEDS

SKv.TO,C.P.NorthumberlandCounty,No.98-1793(C.C.P.November21,2011).

Issue: ShouldaChildwithspecialneedsattendpublicschool,whichpossessesindividualstrainedtoworkwithchildrenwithspecialneedsandbehavioralissues,inlightofMother’salternativetohomeschoolthechild?Holding:Yes.Althoughthecourtstatedthatitisnotagainsttheoptionofhomeschooling,theChild,withspecialneeds,shouldattendpublicschoolwhenthepublicschoolhasindividualstrainedtoworkwiththeChild,andMother’speriodofhomeschoolingcausedconcernfortheschoolandthecourt.

Facts:ThecustodyactionwascommencedinJuly9,2009,andMotherandFatherdidnotagreeonschooling.MotherbelievedthatsheshouldcontinuetohomeschooltheChild,whohadlearningandbehavioralissues.FatherbelievedtheChildshouldattendpublicschool.OnJuly26,2011andSeptember12,2011,thecourtheardtheissueofschooling.

Motherpresentedahomeschoolingportfoliofortheprioracademicyear.Inresponse,theShamokinAreaSchoolDistricthadconcernsabouttheportfolioandrequestedthechildtoundergoare-evaluation.Thecourtnotedthatachildwithspecialneedsshouldbeevaluatedeverytwoyears,andthechildhadnotbeenevaluatedsince2006.WhileunderMother’sdirectionofhomeschooling,theChilddidnotreceiveservicesforherspecialneedssince2007.AttheShamokinAreaSchoolDistrict,therewereindividualstrainedtoworkwithchildrenwithspecialneedsandbehavioralissues.

Conclusion:ThecourtfoundthatpublicschoolwasintheChild’sbestinterest,andtherewasnothingintherecordthatshowsMotherhadobtainedspecialneedsservicesinthehomeschoolsetting.Thecourtheardtestimonythat“thechildisautistic...andinsteadofgettingtheChildtheservicesthatarespecializedforherneeds,Motherremainsinactive.”Thecourtstatedthatitwas“notagainsttheoptionofhomeschooling,andlooksateverysituationonacasebycasebasis.”TheShamokinAreaSchoolDistricthastrainedprofessionalsandservices,andsinceMotherisnotprovidingfortheseservices,itisintheChild’sbestinteresttoattendpublicschool.

Motherarguedthattheminor’sbehaviorimpededtheChild’seducationalprocessandwasadangertotheChildandothers.Inresponse,thecourtheardtestimonyfromtheChild’spriorpublicschoolteacher,andtheteacherindicatedthattheissuesraisedbyMotherarenotuncommonforchildreninpublicschoolwithbehavioralissues.Therefore,consideringMother’sinactionandtheservicesavailableatpublicschool,publicschoolisintheChild’sbestinterest.

J. PAUL HELVY 717.237.5343 n [email protected]

ANTHONY M. HOOVER 717.237.5477 n [email protected]

HOUSE AMENDED

PRIOR PRINTER’S NOS. 1399, 1604 PRINTER’S NO. 1947

THEGENERALASSEMBLYOFPENNSYLVANIA

SENATE BILL

No. 1167 Session of2011

INTRODUCED BY BAKER, SOLOBAY, BRUBAKER, RAFFERTY, FOLMER, GORDNER, GREENLEAF, HUGHES, COSTA, MENSCH, ERICKSON, ORIE, SCHWANK, TARTAGLIONE, TOMLINSON, WAUGH, WILLIAMS, YUDICHAK, FONTANA, BOSCOLA, FARNESE, BROWNE, FERLO AND ROBBINS, JUNE 21, 2011

AS AMENDED ON SECOND CONSIDERATION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 7, 2012

AN ACT

Amending Titles 23 (Domestic Relations) and 51 (Military Affairs) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, further providing for CONSIDERATION OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION, FOR modification of existing orders and for child custody proceeding during military deployment; and providing for assignment of custody rights during military deployment and expedited or electronic hearing.

The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby enacts

as follows:

Section 1. Section 5338 of Title 23 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated

Statutes, is amended to read:

SECTION 1. SECTIONS 5329(C) AND 5338 OF TITLE 23 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA

CONSOLIDATED STATUTES ARE AMENDED TO READ:

§ 5329. CONSIDERATION OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION.

* * *

(C) INITIAL EVALUATION.‑‑[THE COURT SHALL PROVIDE FOR AN EVALUATION TO

EXHIBIT A

DETERMINE WHETHER:

(1) THE PARTY OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBER WHO COMMITTED AN OFFENSE UNDER

SUBSECTION (A) POSES A THREAT TO THE CHILD; AND

(2) COUNSELING IS NECESSARY FOR THAT PARTY OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBER.]

AT THE INITIAL IN‑PERSON CONTACT WITH THE COURT, THE JUDGE, CONFERENCE

OFFICER OR OTHER APPOINTED INDIVIDUAL SHALL PERFORM AN INITIAL

EVALUATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PARTY OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBER WHO

COMMITTED AN OFFENSE UNDER SUBSECTION (A) POSES A THREAT TO THE CHILD

AND WHETHER COUNSELING IS NECESSARY. THE INITIAL EVALUATION SHALL NOT BE

CONDUCTED BY A MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL. AFTER THE INITIAL EVALUATION,

THE COURT MAY ORDER FURTHER EVALUATION OR COUNSELING BY A MENTAL HEALTH

PROFESSIONAL IF THE COURT DETERMINES IT IS NECESSARY.

* * *

§ 5338. Modification of existing order.

(a) Best interest of the child.‑‑Upon petition, a court may modify a

custody order to serve the best interest of the child.

(b) Applicability.‑‑[This] Except as provided in 51 Pa.C.S. §§ 4109

(relating to child custody proceedings during military deployment) and 4110

(relating to assignment of custody rights during military deployment) §

4109 (RELATING TO CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS DURING MILITARY DEPLOYMENT),

this section shall apply to any custody order entered by a court of this

Commonwealth or any other state subject to the jurisdictional requirements

set forth in Chapter 54 (relating to uniform child custody jurisdiction and

enforcement).

Section 2. Section 4109(d) 4109 of Title 51 is amended to read:

§ 4109. Child custody proceedings during military deployment.

* * *

(A) RESTRICTION ON CHANGE OF CUSTODY.‑‑IF A PETITION FOR CHANGE OF

CUSTODY OF A CHILD OF AN ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER IS FILED WITH ANY COURT IN

THIS COMMONWEALTH WHILE THE ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER IS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT

OF A CONTINGENCY OPERATION, NO COURT MAY ENTER AN ORDER MODIFYING OR

AMENDING ANY PREVIOUS JUDGMENT OR ORDER, OR ISSUE A NEW ORDER, THAT CHANGES

THE CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT FOR THAT CHILD THAT EXISTED AS OF THE DATE OF THE

DEPLOYMENT OF THE ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER, EXCEPT THAT A COURT MAY ENTER A

TEMPORARY CUSTODY ORDER IF IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD.

(a.1) Temporary assignment to family members.‑‑If an eligible servicemember has received

notice of deployment in support of a contingency operation, a court may issue a temporary order to

an eligible servicemember who has rights to a child under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323 (relating to award of

custody) or former 23 Pa.C.S. Ch. 53 Subch. A (relating to general provisions), including a temporary

order to temporarily assign custody rights to family members of the servicemember. In the case of

temporary assignment of rights to family members of the servicemember, the following shall apply:

(1) THE SERVICEMEMBER MAY PETITION THE COURT FOR A TEMPORARY

ORDER TO TEMPORARILY ASSIGN CUSTODY RIGHTS TO FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE

SERVICEMEMBER. THE SERVICEMEMBER SHALL BE JOINED IN THE PETITION BY THE

FAMILY MEMBERS TO WHOM THE SERVICEMEMBER IS SEEKING TO ASSIGN TEMPORARY

CUSTODY RIGHTS. THE PETITION SHALL INCLUDE A PROPOSED REVISED CUSTODY

SCHEDULE FOR CARE OF THE CHILD BY THE FAMILY MEMBERS. THE PROPOSED

REVISED CUSTODY SCHEDULE MAY NOT INCLUDE CUSTODY RIGHTS WHICH EXCEED

THE RIGHTS GRANTED TO A SERVICEMEMBER SET FORTH IN THE ORDER IN EFFECT

AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION TO GRANT TEMPORARY CUSTODY

RIGHTS TO FAMILY MEMBERS.

(2) THE COURT MAY ISSUE A TEMPORARY ORDER WITH A REVISED CUSTODY

SCHEDULE AS PROPOSED BY THE SERVICEMEMBER AND THE FAMILY MEMBERS OR

ANOTHER REVISED CUSTODY SCHEDULE AS THE COURT DEEMS APPROPRIATE, IF THE

COURT FINDS THAT A TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF CUSTODY RIGHTS TO FAMILY

MEMBERS OF THE SERVICEMEMBER IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD. IN

NO CASE SHALL A TEMPORARY ORDER GRANTING CUSTODY RIGHTS TO THE FAMILY

MEMBERS OF A SERVICEMEMBER EXCEED THE CUSTODY RIGHTS GRANTED TO THE

SERVICEMEMBER SET FORTH IN THE ORDER IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE FILING

OF THE PETITION TO ASSIGN TEMPORARY CUSTODY RIGHTS TO FAMILY MEMBERS.

IN THE CASE OF ANY OTHER TEMPORARY ORDER ISSUED UNDER THIS SUBSECTION, THE

COURT MAY ISSUE A TEMPORARY ORDER IF IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE

CHILD.

(B) COMPLETION OF DEPLOYMENT.‑‑IN ANY TEMPORARY CUSTODY ORDER ENTERED

UNDER SUBSECTION (A) OR (A.1), A COURT SHALL REQUIRE THAT, UPON THE RETURN

OF THE ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER FROM DEPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF A CONTINGENCY

OPERATION, THE CUSTODY ORDER THAT WAS IN EFFECT IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE

DATE OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER IS REINSTATED.

(C) EXCLUSION OF MILITARY SERVICE FROM DETERMINATION OF CHILD’S

BEST INTEREST.‑‑IF A PETITION FOR THE CHANGE OF CUSTODY OF THE CHILD OF

AN ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER WHO WAS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF A CONTINGENCY

OPERATION IS FILED AFTER THE END OF THE DEPLOYMENT, NO COURT MAY CONSIDER

THE ABSENCE OF THE ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER BY REASON OF THAT DEPLOYMENT IN

DETERMINING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD.

(d) Failure to appear due to military deployment.‑‑The failure of an

eligible servicemember to appear in court due to deployment in support of a

contingency operation shall not, in and of itself, be sufficient to justify

a modification of a custody [or visitation] order if the reason for the

failure to appear is the eligible servicemember’s active duty in support of

a contingency operation.

* * *

(E) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS.‑‑NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISION OF

LAW, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION SHALL BE APPLIED WITH REGARD TO CHILD

CUSTODY ISSUES RELATED TO ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBERS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.

(F) DEFINITIONS.‑‑AS USED IN THIS SECTION, THE FOLLOWING WORDS AND

PHRASES SHALL HAVE THE MEANINGS GIVEN TO THEM IN THIS SUBSECTION:

“CONTINGENCY OPERATION.” A MILITARY OPERATION THAT:

(1) IS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AS AN OPERATION IN

WHICH MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ARE OR MAY BECOME INVOLVED IN MILITARY

ACTIONS, OPERATIONS OR HOSTILITIES AGAINST AN ENEMY OF THE UNITED STATES

OR AGAINST AN OPPOSING MILITARY FORCE; OR

(2) RESULTS IN THE CALL OR ORDER TO, OR RETENTION ON, ACTIVE DUTY

OF MEMBERS OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES UNDER 10 U.S.C. § 688 (RELATING TO

RETIRED MEMBERS: AUTHORITY TO ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY; DUTIES), 12301(A)

(RELATING TO RESERVE COMPONENTS GENERALLY), 12302 (RELATING TO READY

RESERVE), 12304 (RELATING TO SELECTED RESERVE AND CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL

READY RESERVE MEMBERS; ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY OTHER THAN DURING WAR OR

NATIONAL EMERGENCY), 12305 (RELATING TO AUTHORITY OF PRESIDENT TO

SUSPEND CERTAIN LAWS RELATING TO PROMOTION, RETIREMENT, AND SEPARATION)

OR 12406 (RELATING TO NATIONAL GUARD IN FEDERAL SERVICE: CALL) OR ANY

OTHER PROVISION OF 10 U.S.C. DURING A WAR OR DURING A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

DECLARED BY THE PRESIDENT OR CONGRESS.

“ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER.” A MEMBER OF THE PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL GUARD

OR A MEMBER OF AN ACTIVE OR RESERVE COMPONENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE

UNITED STATES WHO IS SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY, OTHER THAN ACTIVE DUTY FOR

TRAINING, FOR A PERIOD OF 30 OR MORE CONSECUTIVE DAYS, IN SUPPORT OF A

CONTINGENCY OPERATION.

“Family members.” As defined in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303 (relating to definitions).

Section 3. Title 51 is amended by adding sections A SECTION to read:

§ 4110. Assignment of custody rights during military deployment.

(a) Petition.‑‑If an eligible servicemember has received notice

of deployment in support of a contingency operation, the servicemember

may petition the court for a modification to an order granting the

servicemember custody with a child under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323 (relating to

award of custody). The modification may include a temporary assignment of

the eligible servicemember’s custody rights to one or more family members

as defined in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303 (relating to definitions). The eligible

servicemember shall be joined in the petition by the relatives to whom the

servicemember is seeking to assign these rights. The petition shall include

a proposed custody schedule with the family members and the schedule shall

not exceed the time granted to the eligible servicemember prior to the time

of filing the petition.

(b) Order.‑‑The court may grant the eligible servicemember’s request

for assignment of custody rights if the court finds that custody on terms as

the court deems appropriate would be in the best interest of the child. An

order granting assignment of custody rights pursuant to this section shall

terminate immediately upon the termination of the eligible servicemember’s

deployment.

(c) Definitions.‑‑As used in this section, the terms “contingency

operation” and “eligible servicemember” shall have the same meanings given

to them under section 4109 (relating to child custody proceedings during

military deployment).

§ 4111. Expedited or electronic hearing.

(a) Expedited hearing.‑‑Upon motion of a parent ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER

who has received notice of deployment in support of a contingency

operation, the court shall, for good cause shown, hold an expedited hearing

in custody matters instituted under sections SECTION 4109 (relating to

child custody proceedings during military deployment) and 4110 (relating to

assignment of custody rights during military deployment) when the military

duties of the parent ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER have a material effect on the

parent’s ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER’S ability, or anticipated ability, to

appear in person at a regularly scheduled hearing.

(b) Electronic hearing.‑‑Upon motion of a parent ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER

who has received military temporary duty, deployment or mobilization orders

NOTICE OF DEPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF A CONTINGENCY OPERATION, the court

shall, upon reasonable advance notice and for good cause shown, allow

the parent ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER to present testimony and evidence by

electronic means in custody matters instituted under sections SECTION 4109

and 4110 when the military duties of the parent ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER

have a material effect on the parent’s ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER’S ability to

appear in person at a regularly scheduled hearing. The term “electronic

means” includes communication by telephone, video teleconference or the

Internet.

(C) DEFINITIONS.‑‑AS USED IN THIS SECTION, THE FOLLOWING WORDS AND PHRASES

SHALL HAVE THE MEANINGS GIVEN TO THEM IN THIS SUBSECTION UNLESS THE CONTEXT

CLEARLY INDICATES OTHERWISE:

“CONTINGENCY OPERATION.” AS DEFINED IN SECTION 4109 (RELATING TO CHILD

CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS DURING MILITARY DEPLOYMENT).

“ELECTRONIC MEANS.” INCLUDES COMMUNICATION BY TELEPHONE, VIDEO

CONFERENCE OR THE INTERNET.

“ELIGIBLE SERVICEMEMBER.” AS DEFINED IN SECTION 4109 (RELATING TO CHILD

CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS DURING MILITARY DEPLOYMENT).

“MATTER.” AS DEFINED IN 42 PA.C.S. § 102 (RELATING TO DEFINITIONS).

Section 4. This act shall take effect in 60 days.

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