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Iraq the Vote: Retrospective and Prospective Foreign Policy Judgments on Candidate Choiceand Casualty ToleranceAuthor(s): Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, Peter FeaverSource: Political Behavior, Vol. 29, No. 2, Special Issue: The Iraq War and the 2004 PresidentialElection (Jun., 2007), pp. 151-174Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4500240 .

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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174

DOI 10.1007/s11109-007-9029-6

Iraqthe Vote: Retrospectiveand ProspectiveForeign

Policy Judgmentson Candidate Choice and

CasualtyTolerance

ChristopherGelpi?Jason Reifler*Peter Feaver

Publishedonline:13 March2007

@ SpringerScience+BusinessMedia,LLC2007

Abstract In this article,we model the effect of foreign policy attitudes on

both vote choice andcasualty olerance,usingsurveydatacollectedduring he

2004 election.We show that prospective udgmentsof the likelihoodof suc-

cess in Iraqandretrospectiveudgmentsof whetherthe war in Iraqwasrightare significantdeterminantsof both vote choice and casualtytolerance. The

prospective udgmentof success is key in predictingcasualtytolerance,whileretrospectivejudgmentof whether the war was right takes precedence in

determiningvote choice. In addition,there is an important nteractionbe-

tween the twovariables, o the effect of one is conditionalon the value of the

other.We believe this is compellingevidence thatforeign policymatters,and

that it matters n reasonableways.

Keywords Votingbehavior-Casualty olerance

Introduction

At firstglance,the parallelsbetween the 1992and2004 Presidentialelections

appear striking.Both elections featured an incumbentnamed George Bush

who had enjoyed tremendouspublic supportafter launchinga war in Iraq.Despite the high levels of support, both President Bushes soon found

C. Gelpi- P. Feaver

Departmentof PoliticalScience,Duke University,Durham,NC 27708,USA

J. Reifler(R)Departmentof PoliticalScience,Loyola UniversityChicago,6430N. Kenmore,Chicago, L

60626,USAe-mail: [email protected]

Springer



152 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174

themselves deadlocked in the polls against surprisingly obust Democratic

challengers,who were buoyed by widespreadperceptionsof a weakeconomyandskyrocketinghealth care costs. Yet Bush"43"eventuallywon reelection,while Bush "41"met defeat. What can explainthis changein electoral for-

tunes? There are many possible and complementaryexplanationsfor why

Bush 43 won despitefacinga dauntingelectoral environment. n thischapter,we focus on one explanationthat has been the subjectof extensive publiccomment: he role of the ongoing Iraqwar.

Punditsreconcile the different atesby statingthat "Commanders-in-Chief

do not lose elections in wartime." For this law-like aphorism to hold,incumbentsmust actuallybe able to obtain their party'snomination.HarryTrumanandLyndonJohnsonwere so unpopular-due in large partto publicdisenchantmentwith American participation n the Korean and Vietnam

wars-they abandonedtheir efforts to run for reelection.' Moreover, the

belief thatAmericanswill not oust incumbentPresident'sduringwartime liesin the face of the even more well-entrenchedview that Americans will not

tolerate casualties in war. The war in Iraq was barely a week old when

observersbegan to worrythat news of combat fatalitieswould cause public

support o collapse (Elder&Nagourney,2003, Purdum, 003;Ricks,2003). ByOctober of 2004, as Presidential elections loomed, more than 1,100 U.S.

militarypersonnelhad been killed in Iraq fightingagainstan insurgency hat

continued more or less unabated. Had most punditsforeseen this turn of

events,they surelywouldhavepredicteda complete collapseof publicsupportfor the Bush Administrationand for the warin Iraq.Moreover,they would

have predicteda lopsided electoral defeat for the Presidentin November.With these competingviews of how the warin Iraqwouldplayout politically,

punditsand politicalobservershad inadvertentlypitted the irresistible orce

(the effect of casualtieson public opinion) against the immovableobject

(an incumbentPresidentduringwar).The relationshipbetween the war in Iraq, Americancasualties,and the

Presidentialelection is-to saythe least-somewhat conflicted. n thisarticle,

we seek to make sense of these contradictoryexpectationsby providingamore systematicand nuancedargument inkingattitudes towardthe war in

Iraq, tolerance for U.S. militarycasualties,and Presidentialvote choice in

2004. We do so by unitingtwo distinctliteratures, oreign policy voting and

supportfor using the military/casualtyolerancewithin a single theoretical

frameworkderived fromFiorina's(1981) theoryof retrospectivevoting.The

economic voting literaturehas long examinedthe relativeweight of retro-

spective versus prospectiveevaluationsin explaining presidentialapprovaland vote choice. The literatureon supportfor the use of force andcasualty

tolerance literature s also keenly interestedin comparing he weight of ret-rospective and prospective evaluations. However, little work has tried to

1 Trumanwas eligibleto run but withdrewafterlosingin the New Hampshireprimaryo Estes

Kefauver.Johnsonannouncedhis decision not to runfor reelection afterthe Tet offensivein

Vietnamprompted hallenges rom Eugene McCarthy nd Robert Kennedy.

I Springer



PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 153

integratethese two literatures.This paper is an effort to examine the con-

tributionof retrospectiveandprospective foreign policy evaluationsto both

votingandcasualty olerance.Moreover,ouranalysisbalances he importanceof normative udgments(retrospectiveevaluationsof the "rightness"of the

war) against empirical udgments(prospective udgmentsof the war's even-

tual success).We arguethat the willingnessof the publicto pay the costs of war and to

reelect incumbent Presidentsduringwartime are dependent on these two

attitudes and the interactionbetween them. In particular,we show that ret-

rospectivenormativeevaluationsof whether President Bush "did the right

thing"in attackingIraqand empiricalprospective udgmentsabout whether

the U.S. will ultimatelybe successfulin Iraq are two critical attitudes for

understandinghow foreign policy judgmentsaffect vote choice and one's

tolerance for casualties.Further,we show that the retrospectivenormative

judgmentsserve as a more powerful predictorfor vote choice, while the

prospectiveempiricalevaluationsof mission success betterpredictcontinued

supportfor the war in Iraq. These claims are consistent with the broaderliteratureon how foreign policyinfluencesvotingbehavior,and the literaturethat examines the public'sresponseto warand casualties.We also show thatthese retrospectiveand prospective judgmentsare interactive-a person'sattitudeon one conditions he effectof the other. Thisinteractionoperateson

"political"support (vote choice) as well as "mission"support (casualtytol-

erance).To our knowledge, no other work integrates political support for the

Presidentandsupport orAmericanwar efforts ntoa singletheoreticalmodeland uses the same predictorvariables to explain the separate dependentvariable measuresof vote choice andcasualtytolerance. This articlebridges

importantgapsin the literatureby usingone theoretical ramework o connecttwo separateresearchquestions:(1) whetherand how foreignpolicy affects

politicalevaluationandchoice,and(2) the conditionsunder which Americancitizens will bear the financial and human cost of militarymissions.To us,

these two questions seem inherently linked-support for missions shouldconnectto the Commander-in-Chiefesponsible or executingsuchmissions.Thesejudgmentsare connected,yet withimportantdifferences.We findthatthe retrospectivenormative udgmentsare more importantfor vote choice,and the prospectiveempirical udgmentsbetterexplain casualtytolerance.

LiteratureReview

Foreign Policy and Political Behavior

Scholars have long been troubled by Americans' inability to answer survey

questions "correctly." Poor performance on surveys has led observers to view

the American public as an ill-informed lot with little ability to think coher-

ently about the substance of politics (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes,

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154 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174

1960; Converse 1964), with issues playing a small to non-existent role in

shapingcitizens'votingdecisions.Foreign policy evaluationswere viewed as

among the least likely to affect political choices. When formingattitudesabout the performanceof the economy,citizens have their personal experi-ence to fall back on. But foreign policyis so removedfrom the everyday ives

of most citizens, it was argued,that it is simplyunreasonable o think thatwhathappenedbeyondU.S. borderswould have a large mpacton Americans'

politicalbehavior.In supportof this claimmanystudiesshowed,at best,weak

evidence thatforeignaffairsaffected the votingdecision(e.g. Almond, 1950;

Stokes, 1966). As Almond writes "Foreign policy attitudes among most

Americans ack intellectualstructureandfactualcontent."

Overthe pasttwo decades, however,two reinforcingines of researchhave

suggested that foreign policy judgmentsmay have a greater influence on

political behavior than previouslythought.First, John Hurwitz and Mark

Peffley (Hurwitz& Peffley,1987a,1987b;Peffley& Hurwitz,1993) demon-strate that citizens have reasonablystructuredattitudesconcerningforeign

policy. Moreover,their researchdemonstratesthat public attitudestoward

foreign policy affect political evaluations,and citizens respond in under-

standablewaysto changingworld events.Suchevidenceof a "rationalpublic"

regarding oreign affairs is widespread(Holsti, 1997;Shaprio& Page, 1988;

Wittkopf, 1990). Aggregate opinion on foreign and defense policy is

remarkablystable and changes "have seldom, if ever, occurred... without

reasonablecauses,such as the actionsof

foreignfriendsor enemies or

changesin the United States'positionin the world"(Shaprio& Page, 1988,pp. 220-

221). ChristopherWlezien (1995, 1996) shows additionalevidence that thatthe public's preferences or changesin defense spendingrespondwell to ac-

tual levels of spendingon defense, as well as to feelings about the Soviet

Union.

Second,not only does the publichave well-structured ndrelativelystable

attitudes about foreign policy, but mountingevidence suggests that these

attitudeshave an impacton politicalbehavior.It has long been known that

economic evaluationshave an effect on presidentialapprovalandvote choice(e.g. Kiewiet, 1983,Kinder & Kiewiet,1979,1981).An increasingamountof

evidencehasemergedshowing hatforeignpolicyjudgmentsmatteras well as,and in roughly equalmagnitude o, economic evaluations.For example,in a

timeseriesof aggregatequarterlypresidentialapprovaldata,Nickelsburgand

Norpoth (2000)showthatthe President s asmuch"Commander-in-Chief"s

"ChiefEconomist."Adding major oreignpolicyeventsaspredictorvariables

to theirmodel,these international vents matterat least as much as economic

evaluations.Using individualevel data from several nationalrandomsample

surveysconducted rom 1983 to 1987,WilcoxandAllsop (1991)findapprovalof Reagan's foreign policy is consistently a good predictor of Reagan's overall

approval, though its strength relative to domestic issues does depend on the

salience of economic or foreign policy issues. Taking one step further in the

causal chain linking attitudes and vote choice, Nincic and Hinkley (1992)

demonstrate that foreign policy attitudes influence candidate evaluations in

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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 155

the 1980 and1984presidential ampaigns.Similarly,n an analysisof the 1980

and 1984Presidentialelectoralchoice,Aldrich, Sullivan,andBorgida (1989)find that foreign policy issues were just as powerfula vote determinantas

domestic issues. The impactof foreignpolicyon electoral choice does appearto wax and wane with the flow of currentevents. This pattern s hardlysur-

prising.As we note below, survey responses regardingthe nation's "mostimportantproblem"suggestthat the economyis nearlyalwayssalientin theminds of voters,while concernaboutforeignaffairsvariessubstantially.

In sum,we pointto threewell-supported indings oncerning oreignaffairs

and political behavior:(1) Citizen attitudesabout foreign policy are well

structured,2) Foreignpolicyevaluationsmatter orpresidentialapprovaland

presidentialvote choice, and (3) Citizen attitudes are generallystable, and

changesin attitudesreflectchangesin the internationalarena.

Whileanalystsgenerallyagreethatpublic opinionis stable andresponds o

events, substantialdifferences of opinion exist concerningwhether citizens

respondto the internationalevents themselves,or if foreignpolicy attitudesare mostlymediatedby elite rhetoric andframing.Of course,American cit-izens are (mostly)incapableof witnessing nternationalevents without themfirstbeingmediatedby the press.Thus,the press certainlyhas thepotentialto

uniformlyshape opinion-as long as the reporting rom different bureaus s

substantially imilar-regardlessof how well the reportingreflects the realityon the ground.If the presssystematically eports nternationalevents differ-

entlythanthey occur,then we shouldexpectcitizenopinionsto reflectmediacoveragemore than the "events themselves."The Tet Offensiveduringthe

Vietnam Warmay be a classicexampleof where the media were unifiedin

theirreporting,but where the reportingarguablydifferedsufficientlyrom the

actual events. Thus the resulting changes in opinion were moved by the

reporting,ratherthan the event. More specifically,while Tet was a tacticalfailure for the attackingCommunist orces, it was reportedto the American

public as a disaster for the U.S. and evidence of a stalemate (Johnson&

Tierney, 2006).

Even if thepress accurately eports nternational vents,politicalelitesmaybe able to control howthepublicunderstands he issues.Looking againto the

public'spreferencesfor changesin spendingfor defense,Witko (2003)finds

exactlythis-the publicdoes not respondto what the Soviet Union does, butrather to how policy elites talk aboutthe Soviet Union. Thisaccount is sub-

stantially n accordwith Zaller's(1992)account of mass opinionandattitude

change being drivenprimarilyby elites and in many ways. Berinsky (2007)goes one step furtherto arguethat responsesto internationalaffairsare pri-marilyendogenousto politicalpredispositions.

Importantquestionsremainthat we hope scholarswill address.First, towhat extent is presscoverageof militaryconflict"accurate"and how wouldwe measure such accuracy?Second, how much latitude do elites have toreframe press coverage of militaryconflict and how influential can their

framingefforts be? Third, to what extent are perceptionsof internationalaffairs endogenous to political predispositions?A similar debate recently

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156 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174

startedtaking shape on whethereconomicperceptionsare endogenous(e.g.Evansand Anderson2006,Lewis-Beck2006).Whilepolitical predispositionsare likely to play a role in shapingindividual evel attitudes about interna-tional events (see Nyhan & Reifler, 2006; Reifler, nd for individual level

evidenceconcerningresponding o informationaboutinternational vents in

the context of IraqiWMD), it is also clearat the aggregate evel thatpeopleupdate their perceptionsin reasonableways. For example, over time the

percentageof thepublicwho believethatIraqhad an activeWMDprogramat

the time of the U.S invasion has greatlydecreased.

Fortunately, or our purposeswe do not need to resolve these debatesin

order to proceed with our analysis.Our central focus is the impactof per-

ceptionsof the war in Iraqboth on the willingness o continuefighting n Iraqand the propensity o vote for Bush. We remainagnosticon the questionof

whethertheseperceptions eflect"reality"or elite rhetoric, houghas we note

in our conclusion,we think that our researchfocuses new attention on the

importanceof addressinghis debate.The endogeneityof foreignpolicyviews,on the otherhand,is more of a concern and we return o thisquestionin the

discussion.

Buildingon EarlierResearch on WarandPublicOpinion

Ever since the VietnamWar,policymakershave worriedthat the American

publicwill

supportmilitaryoperationsonlyif the human costs of the

war,as

measured in combat casualties, are minimal. Mueller (1973) argued that

public supportfor the Vietnamand KoreanWarsdroppedin proportion othe log of casualties.In Mueller's words:"While [the Americanpublic]did

wearyof the [KoreanandVietnam]wars, hey generallyseemto havebecome

hardened o the wars' costs:they are sensitive to relativelysmall losses in the

earlystages,butonlyto largelosses in laterstages."Casualtiesdrainedpublicsupport,but only slowly.

This complex finding-that casualtieshave a more corrosive effect on

public supportearly in the war than they do later-gradually became sim-plified n the conventionalwisdomto the view thatthe publicwillnot tolerate

casualties.EdwardLuttwak ummarized he conventionalwisdomwell: "The

prospectof highcasualties,which canrapidlyunderminedomesticsupport or

anymilitaryoperations, s the key politicalconstraintwhen decisionsmustbe

madeon whichforcesto deployin a crisis,and at what levels"(Luttwak,1996,

p. 36).In otherwords,Muellerarguedthat the publicwas casualty ensitive.But

the conventionalwisdom,pushedin partby missions ike Somalia,translated

Mueller'sclaim into a convictionthat the publicwas casualtyphobic (Hyde,2000; Klarevas, 2000; Lane, 1998; Luttwak, 1994; Moskos, 1995; Record, 2000;

Sapolsky & Shapiro, 1996). Casualty sensitivity recognizes the human toll as a

cost of war;casualty phobia refers to a sensitivity so great that it amounts to an

unwillingness to support a military operation if even very low human costs are

incurred (Feaver & Gelpi, 2004). We hope to revise this conventional wisdom

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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 157

by demonstratinghat the public'swillingness o pay the humancosts of war

and its propensity o punish ts leaders n the votingboothforusingforcevary

dependingon specificattitudesaboutthe war.

Casualty ensitivity s, to put it crudely,one'spricesensitivity o the human

cost of war. As with other formsof price sensitivity,some members of the

public are more sensitive to the costs than others. We see in the public acontinuumof casualtysensitivityranging rom the minimally ensitive-thosewho view casualtiesas a necessarycost of war and not a determiningactor n

shaping support-all the way to maximallysensitive,or those who supportonly militarymissions that guaranteevirtuallyno casualties.2Over the pastdecade,manyscholarshave worked to debunkthe mythof a strictlycasualtyphobicpublic.

While the view that the public is casualty phobic is widely entrenched

among policymakersand the elite (Destler & Kull,1999),somethingclose to

the oppositeconsensus has emergedin academicstudies of Americanpublic

opinion.Bruce Jentleson (Jentleson& Britton,1998;Jentleson,1992) finds

that the publicis "prettyprudent,"andwill supportpayingeven costlymili-

tary operationsprovidedthe mission rationaleconforms o certainstandards.Eric Larson(1996) argues hatthe publicuses a rationalcost-benefitmodel inwhich the public depends very heavily on elite cues; when there is an eliteconsensus(definedas congressionalsupport)in favor of a militarymission,casualtiesare not highlycorrosiveto support.James Burk(1999)showsthat

publicsupport ormissionsdidnot collapsewithcasualties,even in the "hard"cases of Lebanon 1983 and Somalia 1993. Destler andKull (1999)show that

public casualty oleranceeven in "unpopular"missions ike peace operationsin Bosniais muchgreater hanpreviously hought;moreover,publictoleranceof casualties s particularly functionof "international lite consensus" n theform of multilateral upportfor the militaryoperation.

Of course,even if the publicas a wholeis not casualtyphobic, t stillmaybethe case that some people are. Feaver and Gelpi (2004) argue that there is

significantvariationwithinthe publicregarding he use of force. They show

that publicattitudestowardthe use of force fit a quadripartite attern:solidhawks (roughly 30-35%) who will support virtuallyany militarymission

regardlessof the costs;solid doves (roughly10-30%)who will oppose almost

any missionregardlessof cost;casualty-phobics roughly 15-20%) who sup-port a missionprovided t is extremely ow cost;and defeat-phobics roughly15-40%) who supporta mission,despite mountingcosts, providedthat themissionis likely to succeed, but who turn on a mission if it looks like it isdoomedto failure. The quadripartite atternallows for variation n the pro-portionin each category,dependingon the specificsof any given mission.

Whilemanyfactorsmatter-stakes, elite consensus, ypeof mission,andsoforth-Feaver and Gelpi (2004) give pride of place to "expectationsof

2Some members of the public might also be insensitive to casualties because they are opposed to

the use of military force regardless of the number of U.S. casualties-that is some portion of the

public opposes the use of force even it results in no U.S. casualties. We account for this possibilityin our measurement of casualty tolerance.

Springer



158 PolitBehav 2007) 9:151-174

success."When membersof the publicthinkvictory s likely, theywillsupport

payingthe human costs of war.When they thinkvictoryis not likely, evensmall costs will be corrosiveof publicsupport.In a comprehensiveanalysisof

aggregatepublicopiniontrendsfrom1981through2004,RichardEichenbergcomes to a similar conclusion:"successfulmilitaryoperations enjoy high

support,regardlessof other factors thatmay be present" (Eichenberg,2005,p. 11).

Bringingthe two literatures ogether-the role of foreign policy and the

impact of casualties on public opinion-produces the following baseline

expectation: mountingcasualtiesshould not by themselvesjeopardize the

politicalfortunesof an incumbent,but the Presidentdoes not have a blank

check.Instead,public support or the warandthe presidentwilldependupon

specificattitudesabout the war. The publicis able to reasonably ncorporateinformation rom the internationalarenainto its judgments,and thesejudg-ments affect presidentialapproval and vote choice. The public demandssuccess when its president goes to war, and it demandsthat the presidentprovidea good reason for the fighting.Neither of these factors-most espe-ciallyperceptionsof success-are entirelyunderthe control of policymakers,whichbringsus to the election of 2004.

ForeignAffairs as Salient Concern

If foreign policyjudgmentsaregoingto matter n decision-making,hen those

attitudesneed to be accessiblefor the decision-maker Aldrichet al. 1989).Not surprisingly, oreign policy was a salient issue duringthe 2004 election

campaign.After all, duringthe four years that had elapsed since the 2000Presidentialelection,the U.S. experienceda startlingdomesticattackfrom a

foreignenemyand the U.S. embarkedon high-profile onflicts n Afghanistanand Iraq. Lookingat the Gallup poll's most importantproblemover the lastseveralpresidentialelections,foreignaffairsdramatically tands out as more

salient in 2004. The Gallup survey reports that in 2004 roughlythe sameproportionof voters state internationalconcerns(22%) as economic issues

(26%)as the "mostimportantproblem."While 22%for foreignaffairs s the

highestsince1984,the economystilltrumpednternational oncernsby a 2-to-

1 margin (47% to 23%) in Reagan's reelection. In the three presidentialelections from 1992to 2000,mentionsof international ffairswere 5% or less.3

Pollingwe conductedalso showsthatrespondentsreport foreignaffairsas

an importantconcern in the voting decision. In six separatesurveysfrom

3 Gallup does not have apples-to-applesdata for 1988. In most years, the "most importantproblem" question allows respondentsto mention more than one problem, i.e. the same

respondentcould say both "the economy" and "foreignaffairs." Because of the multipleresponses, he cumulative otal of the marginals xceeds100%,sometimesby a widemargin. n

1988,Gallupused a singleresponse ormat. n the singleresponse ormat,9% mentionsomethingrelated o foreignaffairsor defensepolicyas the mostimportant roblem.Thisproportions stillmore than double what wasreported n the multipleresponse ormatduring he 1990s.

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Polit Behav(2007)29:151-174 159

Table 1 Mostimportantssue

3/5-3/18 3/19-4/2 4/3-4/16 4/17-4/29 6/18-6/28 10/21-11/1

Foreignpolicyissues like Iraq 16% 19% 20% 24% 26% 30%

and heWaronTerrorismEconomic ssues likejobs and 72% 70% 67% 63% 61% 59%

taxesSocial issues like abortion 10% 9% 11% 11% 11% 10%

andgay marriageN 930 889 881 899 900 1,125

March 2004 to November 2004, we used a closed ended question to ask

respondentswhich issue (economy, foreign policy, social issues) was most

importantto them personallywhen choosingwhich candidate to vote for.4Becausewe onlypolledin thiselection,we cannot makeinferencesabout the

importanceof foreign affairscomparedto other years based on this dataalone. However,Table 1 shows that the proportionstatingforeign policy as

the most important ssue doubledbetweenthe conclusionof the Democratic

primarycampaignsand the generalelection in November.In the 2004election, then,foreignpolicywas a salientconcern.The warin

Iraqwas shapingup to be, in the wordsof Secretaryof Defense Rumsfeld,a

"long,hardslog"-with a mountinghumantoll, makingthe election of 2004an ideal place to examine the electoralpoliticsof war.

The Model

We build on Fiorina's(1981) model of retrospectivevoting to constructamodelthat uses the sameantecedentattitudesaspredictorsof vote choice and

casualty tolerance. Fiorina's landmark work successfully synthesizeswhat

manysawas the irreconcilableraditionsof behavioralism nd rationalchoice

by creatinga generalizedvoter's calculuscontainingthree distinctcompo-nents: (1) political predispositions, (2) retrospective evaluations of the

incumbent,and (3) prospective udgmentsor futureexpectations.We arguethat twologicallydistinctattitudes-one's willingness o continue

to pay a humancost in the war in Iraq and one's vote choice in the 2004election-are functionsof retrospectiveandprospective udgments,as well as

one's politicalpredispositions PartyID). Retrospectively,votersarejudgingwhetherthe decision to invadeIraqwas the rightone. Prospectively,votersarejudgingwhether the warin Iraqwill turnout to be successful.

The impact of these attitudes on vote choice and casualtytolerance are

stronglyintuitive. If the decision to invade

Iraqwas

wrong,then it makes

4 The surveyswereconductedby KnowledgeNetworks,whichmaintainsa panelof respondentsrecruited hroughRandomDigit Dialing (RDD), who are equippedwith WebTVandcompletesurveysonline. Detailed sampling nformation s availablefrom the companywebsite, http://www.knowledgenetworks.com.tudies have found that the Knowledge Networks samplingmethodology yields representative amples (Couper,2000; Krosnick & Chang, Unpublishedtypescript),withresultscomparableo RDD telephonesurveys.

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160 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174

sense to elect a leader who would make (or would have made) different

choices. Thus we expect retrospectivenormative attitudes about whether

attacking Iraq was the "right thing" to matter most in determiningvote

choice. If the war is hopeless, why continue to pay a price?Thuswe expect

prospectiveattitudes about the likelihood of success to have the greatest

impacton casualtytolerance.We expound on this intuition two steps further:we argue that (1) the

interaction of the retrospective (normative) and prospective (empirical)

judgmentsdeterminesvote choice andcasualty olerance,and(2) the relative

weight assignedto retrospectiveor prospective udgmentsdiffers,dependingon whetherit is vote choice or casualtytolerance that is in question.

We additionallyarguethat the effect of these two attitudeson vote choice

and casualtytolerancewill be interactive.Accordingto the logic outlined

above,we wouldexpectattitudesaboutwhetherattacking raqwas the "right

thing"to have little impacton casualtytolerancefor respondentswho feelthat success s unlikely.If victory s unlikely, he initialwisdomof the decision

to use force has little impacton the expectedbenefits(andthusthe tolerable

costs) of the war. But if victory s likely,then attitudesaboutwhether he war

was the "rightthing"should have a substantialmpacton the expectedben-

efits fromthe conflict and influencecasualtytolerance.

Similarly,he likely prospects or successshould have little impacton one's

judgmentaboutthe wisdomof usingforce if one does not believe thatusing

forcewas the "right hing" n the firstplace.However, f one believesthat theinitial decision to use force was the "right thing"to do, then one's attitude

about the likelihood of success should have a significant mpact on one's

judgmentof the overallwisdomof U.S.policy,and thuson one'swillingness o

reelect the President.

Data and Methods

We proposehere a latent variableapproach n place of an explicitlyspatialmodel. Rather thanutilityfunctions of competingcandidates,we see "Bush

support"and "casualty olerance"as underlyingattitudesexpressedas latent

variables.Individualspossess an amount of "Bush support"or "casualtytolerance",whichwe model as

Yi* =xif

+ Ei (1)

We keep this compatiblewith Fiorina(1981) by usingindependentvariables

consistentwith hisgeneralized

voter's calculus.We includeseparate

evalua-

tions for political predispositions (long-term past experience), political past

experience (near-term experience under an incumbent), and future expecta-

tions, which yields the following equation:

yi*= PIDi + RJi + PJi + ei (2)

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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 161

Table 2 Dependentvariablemarginals

Vote choice Casualtyolerance

Kerry 40.5% Opposewith0 deaths 23.0%LeanKerry 6.6% Support ith0 deaths 23.7%Undecided 2.2% Supportwith1,500deaths 20.3%

Lean Bush 4.8% Supportwith5,000deaths 17.2%Bush 45.9% Supportwith50,000deaths 15.9%

In Eq. (2), yi* is how much "Bush support"or "casualtytolerance" one

possesses.The variablesxi are expressedgenerallyas the long term political

past experience (party ID or PID), political past experience under an

incumbent(retrospectivejudgmentsor RJ), and future expectations (pro-

spectivejudgmentsor PJ).Our Vote Choice and Casualty Tolerance dependent variables are both five

point ordinal scales. The data we analyzecome from polling we conducted

immediatelypriorto the November 2004 election. Table 2 reportsmarginalsand full question wording s available n the appendix.

Because we areusingordinalscales to representunderlyingatentattitudes,ordered logit is an ideal estimation technique.We estimate the followingmodels for both vote choice andcasualtytolerance:

yi* = o + 1PartyID + 32RightThing+ /3Success(3)

+ 23RightThing* Success + ei

yi *=o/ + /1Party ID + 32RightThing+ /3Success + /23RightThing * Success

+fl4Age

+ /5Education + /6Female + /37Minority+ ei (4)

PartyID is a standardpartisan dentificationquestion,coded as Democrat

(-1), Independent(0), and Republican(1). RightThingand Successare both

four-pointLikert scales.RightThingasks respondents f they approveof theoriginaldecisionto usemilitary orceagainstIraqand is coded from"StronglyDisapprove"(0) to "StronglyApprove"(3). Success asksrespondents f theythink theU.S. is likelyto succeedin Iraq,and is coded from "Not at all likely"(0) to "Very likely" (3). The independentvariablesare coded so that wewouldexpectto see positivecoefficients n the ordered ogistic regressions. notherwords,we expect a one unit increase n the independentvariableto beassociatedwith a respondentpossessinga greaterquantityof the underlyingattitudeunderinvestigation,whethervoting for Bush or casualtytolerance.

Table 3 showsthe estimates fromEqs. (3) and (4) for both VoteChoice andCasualty Tolerance.

As expected RightThings a significantpredictorof the both vote choiceand casualty tolerance-dependentvariables,as is Success. Also as hypothe-sized, there is a significant interaction term.

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162 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174

Table 3 Orderedogisticregression esults

Vote choice Casualty olerance

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model4

PartyID 1.60*** 1.60*** 0.33*** 0.21*

(0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08)Iraq RightThing 0.53** 0.54** 0.06 0.12

(0.19) (0.20) (0.13) (0.13)Likelihoodof Success -0.06 -0.03 0.51*** 0.66***

(0.19) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13)RightThing * Success 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.29*** 0.25***

(0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06)Female 0.33 -0.30*

(0.17) (0.12)Minority -0.31 -0.60***

(0.23) (0.17)

Age 0.04 0.11**(0.05) (0.04)

Education -0.09 0.28***

(0.09) (0.06)Pseudo R2 0.43 0.43 0.18 0.19

Log-Likelihood -645.15 -641.49 -1363.81 -1333.51

Log-Likelihoodx2 964.72 972.05 583.68 644.28

N 1,007 1,007 1,037 1,037

* p < .05

** p < .01

***p < .001

Because logit coefficients are extremely difficult to interpret directly, we

use predicted probability graphs to show the relationship between variables

and the importanceof the interaction erm.Figures1 and 2 show predicted

probabilitiesof voting for George W. Bush (estimated from Model 2).Consistent with our expectations (following from Fiorina) respondents'

PredictedProbabilityof VotingorBush

.e..-...-.--

Strongly Somewhat Somewhat StronglyDisapprove Disapprove Approve Approve

IraqWas RightThing

Likelihoodf Success inIraq

VeryLikely SomewhatLikely--- NotVeryLikely NotLikelyAt All

Fig.1 Vote choicepredictedprobabilities y RightThingestimated rom Model2)

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PolitBehav 2007) 9:151-174 163

PredictedrobabilityofVotingorBush

Likelihoodf Success

Iraq Right ThingStronglyApprove --*- SomewhatApprove

SomewhatDisapprove StronglyDisapprove

Fig.2 Vote choicepredictedprobabilities y Success estimated rom Model2)

retrospective udgmentson whetherattackingIraqwas the "rightthing"has

the greater mpacton vote choice. Figure1 shows how the predictedproba-

bilityof votingfor Bushchangesacrossvaluesof RightThing, nd the course

of this change dependson the values of Success.Althoughit can be hard to

discerndirectly rom Table 3, the graphshows thatRightThing lwaysmatters

in predicting he probabilityof votingfor Bush.Certainly,RightThingmatters

more as one ascendshrough

Success rom"Not at alllikely"

to"Very ikely."When we graph he predictedprobability f votingforBush as a functionof

Success (Fig.2), we find that this variable does not always matter. When

RightThing s "StronglyDisapprove,"Successhas little to no effect on the

predictedprobability fvoting or Bush(this s thegraphicalwaytointerprethe

non-significantoefficient orSuccess n Table 3 inModels1 &2).Theeffect ofSuccess s significantor all other values of RightThing.When we examine the

predictedprobabilityof votingfor Bush acrossthe valuesof Success,andseehow thechange s affectedbydifferentvaluesof RightThing,we see muchmore

modest differencesnthechangeacrossSuccess,but muchgreaterdifferencesnthe predictedprobabilityat the lowestpointin the scale("Notat all likely").Figures3 and4 show a nearlyidenticalpattern,but in reverse.Consistent

with ourexpectations,whenpredictingwhetherone will tolerate at least1,500casualties n Iraq,Success becomesmore importantand RightThing xplainsless of the action. When Success is "Not at all likely," the probabilityof

tolerating1,500casualties s equally owregardlessof thevalue of RightThing.(Again,this is the graphicalwayto interpret he non-significantoefficient or

RightThingn Models 3 & 4.) Success, however,is always significantand is

responsible or a big change n the predictedprobabilityof supportinghe warin Iraq,even if the U.S. suffers1,500casualties.

So what is the substantive ignificance f these attitudesand the interactionbetween them?Peoplewho holdboth beliefs-that the war wasrightand thatthe U.S. willwin-indicate thestrongest upport orcontinuingmilitaryactioneven in the face of mountingcasualties and for reelectingPresident Bush.

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164 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174

PredictedProbabilityofToleratingt least 1500Casualties

------------------------------

Strongly Somewhat Somewhat StronglyDisapprove Disapprove Approve Approve

IraqWas Right Thing

Likelihood f Success in Iraq

VeryLikely-- SomewhatLikely

-------NotVeryLikely ----- NotLikelyAtAll

Fig.3 Casualty olerancepredictedprobabilities y RightThingestimated rom Model4)

PredictedProbabilityofToleratingt least 1500 Casualties

C- * - omwt.....o.-.S......g....y.p... . i

SomewhatDisapprove StronglyDisapprove

At ~ ~ ~ ~ "lkl ikl Lkl

Lieioo fSucs

IraqRihtThnStronglprv oewa prv

Somwhtspprve----Stongy isppov

Fig.4 Casualty olerancepredictedprobabilities y Success estimated rom Model4)

Likewise,people who hold the opposite view-that the war was wrongand

thatthe U.S. will lose-have the strongestoppositionboth to payinganymore

humancost and to reelectingBush.Think of the former as the "Bush Base"

and the latter group as the "VietnamSyndrome"crowd. The intermediate

attitudes-the "Noble Failure"view that the war was rightbut we will lose,andthe "PotteryBarn"view (youbreakit, you fixit) thatthe war waswrong

but we will win-operate in surprisingways.5The PotteryBarn crowdis, onaverage, more likely than the Noble Failure crowd to stomach continued

militaryaction. In contrast,the Noble Failure subgroup ndicatesstronger

supportfor Bush.

5 We adoptthe "PotteryBarn" abelfrom Friedman.

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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 165

Table4 Predictedprobabilities

Vote Bush Support1,500+casualties

Bush Base (49%) 83% 89%

Noble Failure(8%) 53% 34%

PotteryBarn(15%) 26% 40%

VietnamSyndrome 29%) 13% 21%

What cantheseresultstell us aboutwhyBush 43was able to winreelection

despitea costlyand controversialwar?The war did not helpBush 43 because

the publicreflexivelyrefusesto oustthe Commander-in-Chiefuringwartime.After all, a significantproportionof the publicwas stronglyopposedto the

war andsoughtvigorously o remove the Presidentasa result.Instead, he war

probablyhelpedthe President o win reelection andmaintainsupportfor the

war because he was able to persuadea majorityof the publicof two simplepoints:(1) attackingIraqwas the "right thing"to do, and (2) the U.S. will

ultimately ucceed n Iraq.Specifically,we foundthat49%of ourrespondent'sfell into the "BushBase"categorydescribedabove,while15%were identified

as "PotteryBarn," 8% as "Noble Failure,"and 29% as in the "Vietnam

Syndrome" ategory.Support rom Bush Base and Noble Failurevoterskeptthe President in office, while Bush Base and Pottery Barn respondentsmaintainedpopularsupport or the war(see Table4).6 Of course, t is difficult

to say for certainwhetherthe war"helped"Bushwinreelection because theappropriate ounterfactuals not obvious.

To probethe robustnessof our results,we re-runthe analysesjust amongthosewhosay foreignpolicyis the mostimportantssueandamongthosewho

say economics s the mostimportantssue.We find that the issuerespondents

report as being most importantslightly changes the relative strength ofour predictorvariables,but that the overall causal story remains intact:

RightThings a betterpredictorof the vote,while Success s a betterpredictorof casualtytolerance(Table5).

Restrictingour analysisto just those respondentswho cite economic con-cerns almost perfectly reproducesour findings (which should be expectedgiven their preponderancen the dataset).Goodness-of-fit tatistics,such asmaximum ikelihood analogsto R2, drop.But this should also be expected;those who do not identify foreignpolicy as their primaryconcernought tohave less varianceexplainedwithmeasuresof foreignpolicy attitudes.

Replicating he ordered ogitsamongthe subset of respondentswho reportforeignpolicy as the most important ssue, we are able to explaina greaterproportionof the variance.If we are makinga claim about the explanatorypower of foreignpolicy attitudes, t stands to reasonthat our model shouldperformbetter amongthose who considerforeign policy the most important

6 The results nTable4 areestimated rommodelsnot presentedhere(thoughavailableonline).In thesemodels,we condense he fourpointscales nRightThingndSuccess o dummyvariables,and use the dummyvariablesas predictors.Resultsaresubstantivelydentical.We explainthesechoices in more detailin the discussion ection.

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166 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174

Table 5 Logitmodelsby most importantssue

Dependentvariable Economymostimportant Foreignpolicymost important

Vote Casualty olerance Vote Casualty olerance

PartyID 1.65*** 0.19 1.63*** 0.35*

(0.15) (0.11) (0.35) (0.17)IraqRightThing 0.70** 0.15 0.24 0.27

(0.25) (0.17) (0.52) (0.27)Likelihoodof Success 0.10 0.61*** 0.01 0.98***

(0.25) (0.17) (0.43) (0.27)

RightThing * Success 0.29* 0.21* 0.87** 0.12

(0.13) (0.09) (0.31) (0.12)Female 0.27 -0.58*** 0.24 -0.07

(0.21) (0.15) (0.46) (0.21)Minority -0.13 -0.49* -0.85 -0.96**

(0.27) (0.21) (0.62) (0.34)

Age 0.11 0.18*** -0.25 -0.00(0.07) (0.05) (0.13) (0.06)

Education -0.09 0.25** -0.01 0.19

(0.11) (0.08) (0.24) (0.12)PseudoR2 0.36 0.15 0.62 0.24

Log-likelihood -437.90 -788.01 -104.22 -379.70

Log-likelihood 2 493.40 283.41 333.07 233.83

N 590 605 305 313

*p < .05

**p < .01

*** p < .001

issue. In explainingvote choice, the Pseudo R2 jumps.The interactionbe-

tween RightThingand Success continuesto be significantwhen we are pre-

dicting vote choice. However, when we examine casualty tolerance, the

interaction erm loses its significance.Droppingthe interaction erm fromthe

model leaves both RightThingand Successas significantpredictorvariables,withthe latterhavinga coefficientmorethan two and a half timesas largeas

the former.While the interaction erm is no longer significant,he relatively

greater importanceof Success as a predictorvariable conforms with our

overallstoryandexplanationof howdifferentattitudesaffectvote choiceand

casualtytolerance.The more one cares about foreignpolicy, the more one

focuseson the likelihoodof successas the critical actor n decidingwhether o

supporting he continuationof the war.

Discussion

While we are stronglyconfident n the strengthof our results,we would be

remiss if we did not also point potentialproblemsin our analyses.We see

three main threats to our inferences:(1) collinearitybetween our predictorvariablesof theoreticalinterest,(2) an underspecifiedmodel, and (3) prob-lems of endogeneity.Below we addresseach of these concerns.

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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 167

Multicollinearity

As one might expect,people who see the warin Iraqas the "right hing"and

also more apt to believe it will be successful.Similarly, hose who thinkthat

warwasthe wrongthingare less optimisticaboutsuccess. Somemayview the

variablesassimply wo different ndicatorsof the same construct. f thatis thecase, then our coefficientsmay not be well estimated,leading us to positdifferingcausalsignificance o variables hat are not actuallydistinct.

The Success and RightThingvariables are highly correlated(rho = .66).While high, there is still a substantialamount of variationbetween the two.

Table 6 reportsthe correlationsbetween all of the independentvariableswe

use in the models above. As shouldbe expected,SuccessandRightThingbothcorrelatestronglywiththe interactionmade fromthose two variables.Table 7

presentsvariance nflationfactor(VIF) scores for several differentcombina-

tionsof ourindependentvariables.The VIFs are all below the standard ule-of-thumb hresholdof 10 for excessivecollinearty,except for the interactionof the four-pointLikertversionsof Success and RightThing.Of course, theinteraction should exhibit more collinearityas it is a function of the two

Table6 Correlations etween variables

RightThing Success RightThing Female Minority Age Education* Success

RightThing 1

Success 0.6599 1

RightThing 0.9004 0.8303 1* Success

Female -0.0810 -0.0453 -0.0724 1

Minority -0.2269 -0.1177 -0.2053 0.0061 1

Age -0.0253 -0.0560 -0.0171 0.0009 -0.1609 1Education -0.0226 -0.0416 0.0002 -0.0329 -0.1453 0.0131 1

Table 7 Variance nflation actor(VIF)values

Without With Without nteraction Withinteractioninteraction interaction term(dummy term(dummyterm term variables) variables)

RightThing 1.86 6.20

Success 1.78 3.78

RightThing*Success 11.25

Female 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01

Minority 1.11 1.11 1.12 1.13

Age 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.03Education 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.03

RightThing (dummy) 1.49 4.02

Success dummy) 1.41 2.43

RightThing*Success (dummy) 2.52

MeanVIF 1.30 3.63 1.18 2.43

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168 Polit Behav (2007) 29:151-174

variables.It is importantto note that the predicted probabilitiesreportedabove in Table 4 are calculated from a model using the dummyvariable

versionsfor two reasons.First, the four named sub-populationsare simplyeasier to calculatewithdummyvariables.Second,we arereportingpredicted

probabilitiesn which even the interaction erm has a VIF below the standard

rule-of-thumb utoff of 10.Does the level of multi-collinearityhreaten our inferences? We firmly

believe thatit does not. Our corearguments thatretrospective valuationsof

the rightness of the war better predict vote choice, whereas prospective

judgmentsof success betterexplaincasualty olerance.If we rerunthe model

without the interaction,we find even strongeroverallsupportfor the claim

that Success is a more powerful predictorof casualty tolerance and that

RightThings a betterpredictorof vote choice.As notedabove,we obtainthis

same resultif we model our interactionwiththreedummyvariables which n

effect represent the "Bush Base," "Noble Failure," and "Pottery Barn"subgroups).This specificationcapturesthe interactionargumentwith a sub-

stantiallylower level of multicollinearity-albeit without some theoretical

nuance-and yieldsthe sameempiricalresult.Thus the overallargument hat

success trumps rightnesswhen it comes to casualtiesis very stronglysup-

ported,as is the claim thatrightness rumpssuccess when it comes to voting.Table 8 presentsresults of our modelswithoutan interaction erm, and the

Table 8 Models without interaction terms

Vote choice Casualty.tolerance

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Party ID 1.57*** 1.57*** 0.35*** 0.21*

(0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08)

Iraq RightThing 1.30*** 1.29*** 0.54*** 0.53***

(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)Likelihood of Success 0.63*** 0.64*** 0.94*** 1.03***

(0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09)Female 0.32 -0.31**

(0.17) (0.12)

Minority -0.35 -0.65***

(0.22) (0.17)

Age 0.10 0.20***

(0.08) (0.06)Education -0.08 0.30***

(0.09) (0.06)Pseudo R2 0.42 0.42 0.17 0.19

Log-likelihood -654.87 -650.60 -1374.81 -1333.51

Log-likelihood x2 945.29 953.82 583.68 644.28

N 1,007 1,007 1,037 1,037

* p < .05

** p < .01

*** p < .001

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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 169

resultssupport he same substantiventerpretation-RightThingmattersmore

for vote choice and Successmattersmore for casualtytolerance.

Under SpecifiedModel

Another possible critiqueof the resultspresentedhere is that we have un-derspecifiedmodels. Certainly,there are many additional causes of votechoice that one could include-ideology, opinionon importantdomestic is-

sues,candidate raits, hermometer atings,perhapseven spatialplacementofthe competingcandidates or other NES-typevariables.We fully agree and

recognizethat testingalternatespecificationswith these additionalvariables

could lead to stronger nferences.Unfortunately,we do not have those data

and are unable to test other model specifications.Our principalaim duringdata collection was to test the public'swillingness o "pay"the cost of casu-

alties as the "body bags startedcominghome." As such,we elected to askfewer questionsand draw additionalsamplesat differentpointsin time (andtherefore at increasingcasualtynumbers).Clearly,this is a difficult radeoff.We believe that we have made the correct choice since the questionof the

public'sresponse to casualties and war in the context of an election is ofcentral concernto scholarsand policymakers at this time.

While we did not ask about candidateplacement or traits, we did ask

respondentsabout whether they believed that Bush or Kerrywould do a

better job handlingthe economy and social issues. We retained our morelimitedspecification,however,because we were not sufficiently atisfied hat

responses o questionsabout whichcandidatewouldhandle ssuesbetterwere

conceptuallydistinctfrom our vote choice question.Nonetheless,the resultsin Table 3 remainrobust even when we controlfor candidatepreferencein

handling he economyandsocial issues.Rememberalso that when we restrictour basic models only to those who say that "foreignpolicy"was the most

important ssue,model performancemproves.Anotherpossibleform of underspecificationoncernsthe extension of our

results to other warsand elections. In Feaver,Gelpi, andReifler(2005/2006),we presentaggregate evel results that the importanceof successin shapingcasualty tolerance is also present in other wars. We would acknowledge,however,that the impactof warson elections is likely to varydependingoncandidates'positions on the war in question. Brody and Page (1972), for

example, find that attitudes towardVietnam had little impact on electoralchoice in 1968becauseHumphreyandNixon differed ittle on this issue. Al-drich(1977),on the otherhand,findsthatVietnamhad a significantmpacton

votingin 1972becauseof the distinctpositions akenbyNixon andMcGovern.

TheIraqwar n 2004falls into the lattercategorybecauseBush andKerry ookdiffering positions on whether the war was-in retrospect-the "right thing" to

do (Kerry's initial vote for the war notwithstanding). If candidates do not take

different positions on the "rightness" of a war-or do not otherwise differ-

entiate themselves along some other prominent war dimension-we would not

expect public attitudes toward the war to influence vote choice substantially.

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170 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174

Endogeneity

Finally,one of the problems nherent n attitudinal esearch s that the causal

directionis unknown-the dependentvariablemay be influencing he inde-

pendent variables.Choosingto vote for Bush or Kerry,for example,could

affect how one views the Iraq war. It is possible that the causal directionactually beginswith voting,and ends with evaluationsof war (or other pre-dictors in the model). In other work, we present additionalanalysesusinginstrumentalvariablesto try to isolate the causal influenceof perceptionsof

success and whether the war was the "right thing" to do. Moreover,we

conductexperiments hat allow us to identifythe causalimpactof success on

casualtytolerance.We have not yet been able to conductsuch experiments

regardingretrospectivejudgmentsof the "rightness"of the war and vote

choice, but we agreethat such research s importantand we hope to investi-

gate this issue in the future.It is worthnoting,however,that we controlfor partyidentification n our

analyses,which we would view as causally prior to vote choice. Thus our

estimated coefficientsalready account for any relationshipbetween parti-

sanshipand voters' prospectiveand retrospectiveevaluations of Iraq.As a

result, if vote choice created the coefficientswe observe for "success" and

"rightthing,"it must have been some aspect of vote choice beyond party

preferencethat did so.

FutureResearch

Perhaps the most pressingissue for future researchis to develop a more

refinedanswer o the question"how do citizens udgesuccess?" and perhapseven more importantly-"are citizensusingthe correct metrics n evaluating

success?").To a large extent, the argument presentedhere is agnostic to

whethercitizensmakedirect udgmentsaboutthe war(or,at least as direct as

possible giventhatthey areonly exposedto what the mediais able to report),

or whether citizens are mostly unawareof the "real" situationand simplyfollow elite level debate.We tend to come down moreon the side thatcitizens

follow what happensabroadvia the news and can formjudgments ndepen-dent of simplyparrotingwhat theirpreferredelite says.But the resultspre-sentedhere are not affectedby thispriorquestionof whereperceptionscome

from.

Nonetheless, two logical next steps that flow from our research are: (1)

developinga better and more complete accountingof how citizensprocessinformationabout internationalaffairs,and (2) developinga better under-

standingof how new pieces of informationabout foreign policy (includinghow they are framed) affect judgments. We believe there is some exciting

work in this area, especially in the use of experiments (e.g. Berinsky, 2007;

Boettcher & Cobb, 2006; Tomz, 2007).

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Polit Behav(2007)29:151-174 171

Conclusion

The presidentialelection of 2004 was profoundly nfluencedby judgmentsabout the warin Iraq.But the publicdid not reelectthe Commander-in-Chief

simplybecause therewas a waron. Instead,the public appears o be drawing

carefullyreasoned and reasonable udgmentsboth about the war and aboutthe election.Ouranalysis ndicates hat a singletheoreticalmodelcan be usedto describeboth American'swillingnessto supportcontinuedfightingandtheir willingnessto reelect the President.Specifically,we identify two atti-tudes-one prospectiveandthe otherretrospective-as key factors n shapingopinion.Consistentwithpreviouswork on electoral behavior(Fiorina,1981),we find that retrospective udgmentsabout the President'sdecision to useforceare most influentialn determining ote choice. Consistentwithpreviousworkon casualtytolerance(Feaver& Gelpi,2004),we find that prospectivejudgmentsabout the likelihood of success in Iraq are most importantin

determining upportfor continuing o fightin Iraq.

Acknowledgments This work is supportedby grantsfrom the CarnegieCorporation nd theNationalScienceFoundation.The authorswould like to thankan anonymous eviewer, he edi-tors of PoliticalBehavior,John Aldrich,and seminarparticipants t Duke University or their

helpfulcomments.

Appendix

MostImportantssue:Respondentswere asked "Whenchoosingforwhom to

vote, which of the followingissues are most important o you personally?"Answer categorieswere "Foreignpolicy issues like Iraq and the War on

Terrorism,""Economic issues like jobs and taxes," and "Social issues likeabortionand gay marriage."

RightThing:Respondentswere asked,"We wouldlike to know whetheryouthinkPresidentBush did the

rightthingby using militaryorce

againstIraq.Would you say that you stronglyapprove,somewhat approve,some what

disapproveor strongly disapproveof his decision?"[Stronglyapprove= 3,Somewhatapprove= 2, Somewhatdisapprove= 1, Stronglydisapprove= 0].

Success:Respondentswere asked,"Regardlessof whetheryou thinkthat thePresidentdid the rightthing,wouldyousaythatthe U.S. is verylikelysucceedin Iraq,somewhatlikely to succeed,not very likely to succeed,or not at all

likely to succeed?" [Very likely to succeed= 3, Somewhat likely to suc-ceed = 2, Not very likely to succeed = 1, Not at all likely to succeed = 0].

Vote: Respondents were asked "If the general election for President were held

today and the candidates were: George W. Bush, the Republican, John Kerry,the Democrat, Ralph Nader, the Independent for whom would you vote?" If

undecided, respondents were asked "Toward whom do you lean?" [Bush = 4,Lean Bush = 3, Undecided = 2, Lean Kerry = 1, Kerry = 0].

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172 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174

CasualtyTolerance:To measurecasualtytolerance,we askedrespondentsa

series of questions, ncludinga split sampledesignto assessif the numberof

dead andwounded affectsopiniondifferently hanjustthe numberdead.We

foundno differenceby including nformationaboutthe numberwoundedin

addition o those killed.In the questions hatfollow,the extrawording or the

split sampleis included n parentheses.All respondents eceived the statement,"Regardlessof whetheryou thinkthe

Presidentmade the rightdecisionin attackingIraq,as you know the United

States is engaged in an ongoing military operationthere and has suffered

about 1,000militarydeaths(and over 7,000militarywounded)."

Respondentswere then asked, "Wouldyou supportcontinued U.S. militaryactionin Iraquntila new Iraqigovernmentcan take over if it resultedin no

additionalU.S. militarydeaths?"[If they said no CasualtyTolerance= 0, if

they said yes they were asked] "wouldyou supportcontinuedU.S. militaryaction in Iraquntil a newIraqigovernment an takeoverif it resulted n up to

1,500totalU.S. militarydeaths(andover 10,000militarywounded)?" Iftheysaid no CasualtyTolerance= 1, if they saidyes theywere asked]"Wouldyou

supportcontinuedU.S. militaryactionin Iraquntil a new Iraqi governmentcan take over if it resulted n up to 5,000total U.S. militarydeaths(andover

30,000militarywounded)?"[If they said no CasualtyTolerance= 2, if theysaidyes theywere asked]"Wouldyou supportcontinuedU.S. militaryaction

inIraq

untila newIraqigovernment

an takeoverif it resulted nup

to50,000total U.S. militarydeaths(andover300,000militarywounded)?" If theysaid

no CasualtyTolerance= 3, if they saidyes CasualtyTolerance= 4].

Age:Sevencategoryvariable[18-24 = 0, 25-34 = 1,35-44 = 2, 45-54 = 3, 55-

64 = 4, 65-74 = 5, 75+ = 6].

Education:Four categoryvariable[Highschool or less = 0, High school di-

ploma = 1, Some college = 2, Bachelors degree or higher = 3].

Female:Dummyvariable[Male= 0, Female = 1].

Minority: Dummy variable [White Non-Hispanic= 0; Black, Hispanic or

other = 1].

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