THE BRITISH JOURNALOFCRIMINOLOGYVol. 36Autumn1996No. 4THELIMITSOFTHESOVEREIGNSTATEStrategiesofCrimeControl inContemporarySocietyDAVIDGARLAND*Thearticle offers adescriptiveanalysisofstrategiesofcrime control incontemporaryBritainandelsewhere.Itarguesthatthenormalityofhighcrime ratesandthelimitationsofcriminal justiceagencies have created anew predicament for governments.Theresponseto this predicament hasbeenarecurringambivalencethathelps explainthe volatileand contradictorycharacterofrecent crimecon-trol policy.Thearticleidentifiesadaptive strategies(responsibilization,definingdeviancedown, andredefiningorganizational success) and strategiesofdenial(the punitivesovereignresponse), as wellasthedifferentcriminologiesthataccompanythem.One insightthatFriedrichNietzsche shares withEmile Durkheimperhapsthe onlyinsight shared by these very differentthinkersis that strong political regimes have noneedtorely uponintenselypunitive sanctions.Punitivenessmaypose as asymbol ofstrength, but it should be interpretedas a symptom of weak authorityandinadequatecontrols (Nietzsche1956: 205; Durkheim1973: 199).The most visible andstriking phenomenon of recentpenalpolicy in Britain andtheUSA is the punitiveness whichhas come to characterizeprominentaspects of govern-mentpolicyandpoliticalrhetoric.Inwhatfollows,Iwillseektoidentifytheweak-nesses and limitations that motivate this display of punitiveness and to point to some ofthe problems of power andauthority that lie behind it.Ialsowanttodescribesomequitedifferentstrategiesofcrimecontrolthathavebeen prompted by these same weaknesses, and that are emerging;rather less visiblyalongsidetherecurringrecoursetopunitivedisplay.Thissecondsetofstrategiesisquite differentin characterfromthe punitive currentandbears a complex relation to*Profeuor,Centre for Law and Society,University of Edinburgh. An earlier venion of thiipaper wai delivered as the10th AnnualLecture of the SouthamptonUnivenityInstitute of Criminal Justice on1March1995. I am gratefulto Pro-fessor Andrew Rutherfordand Dr Penny Green for their comments nd hospitality on that occasion.I am also gratefultoJamaB. Jacobs,RichardSparks,StanleyCohen,Pt CTMalley, JoannaShapland,PaulRock,ChrisHimsworthandPeter Msung for comments on earlier draft! of this paper.445 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from DAVIDGARLANDit.Iwillcharacterizethesestrategiesasadaptations tothecurrentpredicamentof crimecontrol,whereasthepunitivestrategywillbedescribedasasymbolicdenialofthatpredicament.Iwillgoontosuggestthatthis dualistic,ambivalent,andoftencontra-dictorypatternof crimecontrolis underpinnedby a similarly dualisticandambivalentpatternofcriminologicalthinking,involvingasplitbetweenwhatIterma'crimin-ologyoftheselfanda'criminologyoftheother'.Myargumentwillbethatthisisacontradictorydualismexpressinga conflictatthe heartof contemporarypolicy,ratherthanarationallydifferentiatedresponseto differentkinds of crime.Itakeasmypointofdeparturethepredicamentofcrimecontrolinlatemodernsocietyandthereactionstothispredicamentonthepartofstateagencies.Iwanttofocusontheproblemof crimecontrolas itis perceivedandmanagedbytheagenciesandauthoritiesinvolved,andtotracehowtheseperceptionsandadministrativestrat-egieshavechangedovertime.Thatbroadersocialandculturalforcesplayapartinshapingthe'problem'andits'perception'istakenforgrantedandlargelyun-exploredinthepresentpaper(onthis,see Garland1990). Myanalysiswill bebasedupontrendswhicharediscernibleinGreatBritain,althoughthereis evidencetosug-gestthatsimilartrendsarealsopresentintheUSA,Australiaandelsewhere(seeFeeleyandSimon1992; O'Malley1992).HighCrimeRatesas a Normal Social FactInthecourse of thelast30 years, highcrime rates have becomeanormalsocialfactinBritain,justastheyhaveinmostcontemporarywesternsocieties.Ratesofpropertycrimeandviolentcrimewhicharehistoricallyunprecedentedinthemodernperiodhavebecomeanacknowledgedandcommonplacefeatureof socialexperience.Sotoohavelinkedphenomenasuchasawidespreadfearof crime,pervasivemediaandcul-turalrepresentationsofcrimeandthepoliticizationofcrimecontrol.Depitethefactthatcrimehasanunevensocialdistribution,andthathighriskvictimizationisverymuchapocketed,concentratedphenomenon,crimeis widelyexperiencedas apromi-nentfactofmodernlife.Formostpeople,crimeisnolongeranaberrationoranunexpected,abnormalevent.Instead,the threatof crime hasbecome aroutinepart ofmodernconsciousness, aneverydayriskto be assessedandmanagedinmuchthesamewaythatwe deal withroadtrafficanothermodern dangerwhich has beenroutinizedand'normalized'overtime.Highratesofcrimehavegraduallybecomeastandard,backgroundfeatureofourlivesatakenforgrantedelementoflatemodernity.Advertisementsforsecuritylockswhichtellusthat'acartheftoccurseveryminute'makethe point quite wellcrime formspart of our daily environment,as constantandunremittingas timeitself.Idonotintendtogo intothe causes of this phenomenonhere.Iammoreinterestedinthequestionofhowgovernmentsandotheragencieshaverespondedtothisnewsocialfactandtotheproblemswhichitentailsforthem.Myclaimisthatthenor-malityof highcrimeratesinlatemodernsocietyhaspromptedaseriesoftransforma-tionsinofficialperceptionsofcrime,incriminologicaldiscourse,inmodesofgovernmentalaction,andinthestructureofcriminaljusticeorganizations.(Thesechangesare, in turn,linkedto broaderreconfigurationsof social andpoliticaldiscourseandpolicy,thoughIwillnothavespaceto discusstheseconnectionshere.)Whatfol-lowsis athumbnailsketchof theseemergingtransformations.446 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from THELIMITS OF THESOVEREIGN STATEChangesinOfficialDiscourseOfficialdiscourseoncrimeandpunishmentinBritainhasundergoneamarkedchange since the early1960s. In1964 a governmentpolicydocumententitledTheWarAgainst Crimeacknowledged'theupsurgeincrimeanddelinquency'whichhadcon-tinuedunabatedsincethemid-1950s,butsawnoneedtoquestiontheframeworkofactionwhichhadbeengraduallyassembledovertheprevioushalfcenturyaframe-workwhichIhave describedelsewhereas the'penal-welfarestrategy'(Garland1985).Likeitsimmediateforerunner,PenalPracticeinaChangingSociety(1959),theWhitePaperof1964confidentlyassertedthatthepenal-welfarestrategyformedtheappro-priateframeworkforaction,andthatvigorouspolicingandcorrectionalpenalmeas-ures,guidedbyresearchstudiesintothecauses of crimeandtheeffectivenessof penaltreatments,wouldbegintostemtherisingtideof post-warcrime.Totheextentthatthesemeasuresseemedtobefailing,thiswasseenasaproblemofresourcesandknowledge,orofmethodsandimplementation,andplanswerelaidforfurtherresearch,increasedfundingandtheexpansionof childwelfareservices.Therewasnodoubtaboutthestate'scapacitytodealwiththeproblem.Onthecontrary,theimpliedpromiseof thestatementwasthatthestatewouldwinthewaragainstcrime,justasthewarfarestatehadvanquishedits foreignenemiesandthewelfarestatewasnowattackingthesocialproblemsof peacetime.Intheperiodsincethe1960s, officialdiscoursehasgraduallymovedawayfromtheconfidentpositionsetoutinthesedocuments.Thereisnowmuchlesstalkofa'waragainstcrime".Thereisalsolesscommitmenttothepenal-welfareframework.Thestate'sclaims in respectof crime controlhavebecome more modestandmorehesitant,at least in certaincontexts andwhenaddressing certainaudiences. Thereis a new senseof the failureof criminal justiceagencies,anda more limitedsense of the state'spowerstoregulateconductandprohibitdeviance.Attentionisbeingshiftedtodealingwiththeeffectsofcrimecostsandvictimsandfearfulcitizensratherthanitscauses.Aboveallthereisanexplicitacknowledgementof theneedtorethinktheproblemofcrimeandthestrategies formanagingit.Thefirstsigns of whatIhavedescribedelsewhereas 'thecrisisof penalmodernism'(Garland1990:7)tookquitespecificandlocalizedforms.Officialreportsfromthe1960sonwardsbegantoregisterdoubtsabouttheefficacyofcriminal justiceinstitu-tions.Thelimitationsofprisons,borstals,probation,individualizedsentencing,deter-rentlawsandtraditionalpolicingwereincreasinglyexposednotleastbytheHomeOffice'sowncriminologicalresearchuntilthewholepenal-welfarestrategybegantounravelinthefaceof thescientificmonitoringwhichithaddoneso muchtopromote(seeBrody1976;ACPS1974;HomeOffice1978;Croft1978;BurrowsandTarling1982; Heal*/a/.1985).1 When the 1964 White Paper called for a'fundamentalreview'and the setting up of a RoyalCommUiion on the PenalSystem, it was notto question the penal-welfareframework,but rather to refineitAre our existingpenalmethods pro-ducing good enough results?. . .Are we doing enough to devise and experiment with new methods of treatment? Are weconcentrating overmuch on seeking to improve the traditionalmethods? To these questions there is no simple answer, butinthepresentupsurgeof crimeand delinquencythey oughtto beasked*(HomeOffice1964: 13).Inthesameyear,theKilbrandon Reportperhaps the quintessentialpenal-welfare documentstated that the object of 'the machinery for thetreatment of juvenile delinquency' must be 'to effect,so far as can be achieved by public action,thereduction and ideallythe elimination of delinquency*(ScottishHome andHealth Department1964: para. 12).447 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from DAVIDGARLANDThe'NothingWorks' slogan, which gainedso muchattentioninthe1970s andearly1980s, mightberegardedas asomewhathystericalandtemporarysymptomof amoresoberandabiding sense of thelimits of criminal justice,whichhas since becomeapartof criminologicalcommonsense. These limitationshave become increasinglyapparent,andhavebeguntobeopenlyacknowledgedinofficialdiscourse.Fromthemid-1980sonwards,ithasbecomecommonforBritishgovernmentpolicydocuments,ChiefConstables'reports,andevenpoliticalparty manifestos,to emphasizethatgovernmentagenciescannot,bythemselves,succeedincontrollingcrime(seeHomeOffice1986;CommissionerofPolicefortheMetropolis1987;ConservativeParty1987).Modestimprovementsatthemargin,thebettermanagementof risksandresources,reductionofthefearofcrime,reductionof criminal justiceexpenditureandgreatersupportforcrime'svictims,havebecomethelessthanheroicpolicyobjectiveswhichincreasinglyreplacetheideaof winninga'waragainstcrime'.TheMythof SovereignCrimeControlThisstateofaffairsisquitenew,andhasledtosomesignificantdevelopments.Inparticular,theperceivednormalityofhighcrimerates,togetherwiththewidelyacknowledgedlimitationsof criminal justiceagencies,havebeguntoerodeoneofthefoundationalmythsofmodernsocieties:namely,themyththatthesovereignstateiscapableofprovidingsecurity,lawandorder,andcrimecontrolwithinitsterritorialboundaries.Thischallengetothestate'slawandordermythologyisallthemoreeffective,andallthemoreundeniable,becauseitoccursatatimewhenthewidernotionof'statesovereignty'isalreadyunderattackonanumberoffronts(seeHirst1994,LashandUrry1987).Sovereigntyisofcourse,likeallhistoricallydevelopedpoliticalconcepts,acomplexandmuchcontestednotion.Strictlydefined,itrefersinBritishconstitutionallawtothecompetenceoftheQueeninParliamenttomakeorunmakelawswithoutchallengebyotherlaw-makingauthorities.Butthetermhasawidermeaningwhichrelatestothesovereign'sclaimedcapacitytoruleaterritoryinthe faceof competitionandresistancefromexternalandinternalenemies.Overtime,thecontrolofcrimeandtheprotectionofcitizensfromcriminaldepredationshavecometoformapartof thepromisewhichthestateholds outto itscitizen-subjects.2Thenation-stateswhichemergedinearlymodernEuropelaidclaimto amonopolyoflegitimate,organizedviolencewithintheirborders,andovertimemostofthemachievedlevelsofpacificationandauthoritywhichgavesubstancetothisclaim(seeElias1982).Manyofthesestatesalsoinheritedthemythof sovereignpowerfromtheroyalautocracieswhichprecededthemarulingself-conceptionwhichclaimedtheright,andtheability,toexerciseaplenitudeof powerovereverysubjectandcircum-stancewithina definiteterritory(see Hirst1994: 28; Hinsley1966). Thenotionthatasingle sovereignpowercouldgovernallsociallife was enhancedinthemid-nineteenthcenturybythecreationof astrongstateapparatus,andinparticular,bythedevelop-mentofapublicpoliceforcewhichcametoberegarded,howeverinaccurately,ashavingaprofessionalmonopolyoverthefunctionofcrimecontrol.Foratime,1A primary responsibility of any government at home ii to take action to protect people from crime. . .tht guaronttt oflaw and ordtr(originalemphases)is essentialto the British way of life.' Speech bythePrimeMinister, 9 September1994(see Major 1994).448 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from THE LIMITS OF THESOVEREIGN STATEparticularlyinthelastdecadesofthenineteenthcentury,thenewstateforcestogetherwiththeinstitutionsofcivilsociety,suchasfamilies,neighbourhoods,churches,tradeunionsandvoluntaryassociationssucceededinreducingcrimeandmaintainingahighdegreeof order,asuccesswhichhelpedentrenchtheimageofaneffectivesovereignstate(seeGatrell1992andClarke1987). Thestate'sclaiminthisregardwaslaterfortifiedbythedevelopmentofareformativepenal-welfareapparatus,whichaugmentedsovereignpowerwithanextensiveapparatusofsocialregulationandengineering. By themid-twentiethcentury,the state was promisingnotjustto punishlegal violations,andquell internalunrest,butactuallyto governin wayswhichwouldcurborcurethesocialproblemof crime.Forall its importancein guiding state formationandstrategies of rule,this notionofstatesovereigntyprovedunsustainable(seeHirst1994),andthelimitationsofthestate'sabilitytogovernsociallifeinallits detailshavebecomeevermoreapparentinrecenttimes.Sohavingtakenovercontrolfunctionsandresponsibilitieswhichoncebelongedtotheinstitutionsof civil society,the state is now facedwithits owninabilitytodelivertheexpectedlevelsofcontrolovercriminalconduct.Moreover,itnowoperatesinacontextwherethesocialcontrolfunctionsof'private'agenciesandorganizationshavebeenmuchreducedoveralongterm,partlythroughthedis-organizingprocessesassociatedwithlatemodernity,partlythroughthemonopolizingtendenciesof thestateapparatus.4ThePredicamentofCrimeControlThepredicamentforgovernmentstoday,then,isthatthey(i.e.ministers,officials,agencyexecutives etc.)see the needto withdrawor at least qualifytheirclaimto be theprimaryandeffectiveproviderof securityandcrimecontrol,buttheyalso see, justasclearly,thatthepoliticalcostsofsuchanmovearelikelytobedisastrous.Thecon-sequenceisthatinrecentyearswehavewitnessedaremarkablyvolatileandambiva-lentpatternof policydevelopment(see ReinerandCross1991; AshworthandGibson1994; Faulkner1993; Windlesham1993).Ontheonehand,therehas beenanattemptto faceuptotheproblemanddeveloppragmaticnewstrategiesthatareadaptedtoit(seebelow).Butalongsidethesediffi-cultadaptationstotherealityprinciple,therehasalsobeenarecurringtendencytowardsa kindof hystericaldenial,andthe emphaticreassertionof the oldmythof thesovereignstate. Thelastdecadehas seentheemergenceof a series of carefullyplannedpolicy initiatives(mostnotablytheCriminal Justice Actof1991 andtheprisonreformprogrammethatfollowedtheWoolfReport)whichhavebeensuddenlyundercutbyshiftsofpoliticalmood.Ithasseenthecoexistenceofquitecontradictorydiscoursesandstrategiesinrespectof'thecrimeproblem'.Andconcertedattemptstoreducethecostsofcrimecontrolexpenditurehavesuddenlybeenundercutbypunitivepro-3The itate never succeeded in gaining control of all crime complaints. Other formj of (private) crime control remainedin existence, ome of them ancient, tome of them modern(tee Robert1989 and Shearing and Stenning 1983,1987, Johnion1992).Butforthematsofthepopulation,thestateusuallyintheformofthepublicpolicecametobeviewedasresponsible for crime control,and the state's own ideology sustainedthis situation.It is precisely becausethe punishmentof offendersis under effectivestate controlthatitwas,for tolong,presented as themosteffectivemeans of controllingcrime.4On thedisorganizingprocesses of late modernity,particularly as they relate to crime control, see Bottoms and Wiles0994).449 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from DAVIDGARLANDnouncementsonthepartofgovernmentministersthatthrowthewholeprocessintoreverse.Likeallmyths,the mythof thepenalsovereignandits 'lawandorder'powersistoodeeplyinscribed,andtoopoliticallypotent,tobeeasilydismantledbyrationalcritiqueandadministrativereform,andwewillcontinuetoobserveitsinvocation.Whathaschangedisthatitnolongerframesallaspectsof policyandpracticeinthisarea.AdaptationsIndescribingthepenalstate'sresponsestothispredicament,IwillfocusuponanumberofdevelopmentswhichItaketobefairlynovel.Itshould,however,beemphasizedattheoutsetthatthesearebynomeansthemostprominentormostnumericallysignificantaspectsofpresent-daypenality.WriterssuchasMathiesen(1990)andChristie(1993)arerightto directourattentionto the massive expansionofincarcerationwhichis currentlytakingplacethroughoutmostof the developedworld,sinceinpoliticalandsociologicalterms,this is of primeimportance.Butalongsidethegrowthofimprisonmenttherearedevelopmentsoccurringwhichtendinadifferentdirectionandoperateaccordingtoadifferentkindof rationality.Thesenewdevelop-mentsmightbest be describedas newmodes of governing crime. Theyeachentailnewkindsofobjectives,newcriminologicaldiscoursesandformsofpracticalknowledge,andnewtechniquesandapparatusesfortheirimplementation.As yet,mostareatanearlystageoftheirdevelopment,existingas reformprogrammesandproposalsratherthanfullyestablishedstrategies.However,thesenewmodesarealreadychangingthewaysinwhichcrimeisadministered,andareliabletobecomemoreimportantinthefutureasgovernmentsseektoreconfiguretheirstrategiesandadaptthemtothecon-ditionsof latemodernity.Thenewcriminologiesof everyday lifeThemostexplicitexpressionandtheorizationof this new stateof affairsis tobefoundinanewgenreof criminologicaldiscourse whichhas become increasinglyinfluentialinUKgovernmentcircles since the mid-1970s. This genre is composedof a set of cognatetheoreticalframeworks,including rationalchoice theory, routineactivitytheory,crimeasopportunityandsituationalcrimepreventiontheoryasetwhichmightbecollectivelydescribedas'the new criminologiesofeverydaylife'(seeClarkeandCornish1986;Felson1994;HealandLaycock1986;ClarkeandMayhew1980). Thestrikingthingaboutthese criminologiesis thatthey eachbegin fromthe premise thatcrime is anormal,commonplace,aspectofmodernsociety.Itisaneventorratheramassofeventswhichrequiresnospecialmotivationordisposition,no pathologyorabnorm-ality,andwhichis writtenintotheroutinesof contemporarysocialandeconomiclife.Incontrasttoearliercriminologies,whichbeganfromthepremisethatcrimewasadeviationfromnormalcivilizedconduct,andwasexplicableintermsofindividualpathologyorebefaultysocialization,thenewcriminologiesof everydaylifeseecrimeascontinuouswithnormalsocialinteractionandexplicablebyreferencetostandard5Theworkofthefollowingscholar! haiinformedmy understandingof thedevelopmentsexaminedhere:O"Malley0992,1994, nd),fteleyand Simon0992,1994), Simon0993), Stenson(1993; 1995), Shearing0994), Bottoms0990), Bottomsand Wiles0994)and Peters 0986).450 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from THE LOOTSOF THESOVEREIGNSTATEmotivationalpatterns.6Crimebecomesarisktobecalculated(bothbytheoffenderandbythe potentialvictim)or anaccidentto be avoided(Poyner1986), ratherthanamoralaberrationwhichneedsto be speciallyexplained.7Itisclearthatthiscriminologicalapproachemergesinacontextwherehighcrimerates aretakenas a given, andwhere the dataof self-reportand victim studiestestifytothenormalityofcrime.Theseperspectivesarenotincompatiblewitholdercrimino-logieswhichfocusuponthepathologicaldispositionof theindividual,andtheyexpli-citlyacknowledgetheneedforsuchtheoriesinasmallminorityof cases.Butwhatisinterestingistheextenttowhichthenewcriminologiesofeverydaylifehavebeentakenupby policymakers to reorientgovernmentactionandto createnewtechniquesforactingupontheproblemofcrime.Inparticular,itis significantthatmanyoftheprogrammesofpracticalactionwhichflowfromthesetheoriesareaddressednottostateagenciessuchas thepolice,thecourtsandtheprisons,butbeyond thestateappa-ratus,totheorganizations,institutionsandindividualsofcivilsociety.Thetheoriestakeitforgrantedthatthestatehasa limitedcapacity,andtheylooktotheeverydaylifeworldtobringaboutchange.If these projectsare differentin the agents they intendto empower,theyarealsodif-ferentinthetargetsthattheyaddress. Thenewprogrammesof actionare directednottowards individual offenders,but towards the conduct of potential victims, to vulnerablesituations,andtothose routines of everydaylife whichcreatecriminalopportunitiesasan unintendedbyproduct.8 This is, in effect,'supply side criminology', aiming tomodifythe everyday routines of social and economic life by limiting the supply of opportunities,shiftingrisks, redistibuting costs, and creating disincentives. It aims to embed controls inthefabricofnormalinteraction,ratherthansuspendthemaboveitintheformofasovereigncommand(cf.ShearingandStenning1984).Insteadofrelyinguponthethreatof deterrentsentences, or the dubious ability of the police to catch villains, it setsaboutreplacingcash withcreditcards, building locks intothe steering columns of cars,employingparkinglotsupervisersandcitycentreclosecircuitTVcameras,co-ordinatingthe closing times of rival discos, laying on late nightbuses andspecialroutestoandfromfootballgames,advisingretailersaboutsecurity,encouraginglocalauthoritiestoco-ordinatethevariousagenciesthatdealwithcrimeand,ofcourse,encouragingcitizens to set up NeighbourhoodWatchschemes.Incontrastto traditionalcriminology,this approachno longertakes the state anditsagenciesto bethe primaryor proximateactors inthe business of crime control.Andtothe extentthatit depicts a criminal subject,this figureis no longer the poorlysocializedmisfitinneedof assistance, butinsteadanillicit,opportunisticconsumer,whoseaccesstosocialgoodsmustbebarred.Thiscriminalfiguresometimesdescribedas'situa-tionalman'(CornishandClark1986a:4)lacksastrongmoralcompassorany6Untilrecently,officialdiscourseabout crimeandmostacademiccriminologyviewedthe problemof crime fromthepointofviewofthecriminal justicesystem,seeingcrimeasaproblemofindividualcriminals,andcriminalsastypifiedby those in captivity. The officialendorsement of the new criminologies of everyday life representsa shiftin per-spectiveof major significance.Explaining how and why that shift came about is an importanttopic for research.7"Crime maybeseenas arisk to bemanaged1(HomeOffice1993: 2). The(forward-looking)perspectiveof pmtntiontends to view offendingas an aggregate risk, while the (backward-looking)perspectiveof punishment views offendingasanindividualwrongdoingShiftingfromoneperspectivetotheotherthereforehassignificantmoralconsequences,cf.Fedey andSimon1992 and 1994.* As Nigel Wilker puts it Thepotential offendersare numerous and by no means always recognisable.By contrast, wedo at least knowwhat property we want to protect,and where it is'(Walker198& p.v\451 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from DAVIDGARLANDeffectiveinternalcontrols,asidefromacapacityforrationalcalculationandawilltopleasure.Inthehandsofotherwriters,thismightbeintendedasaformofculturalcritiqueoracommentaryoncontemporaryconsumeristmores. No suchsignificanceisconveyedbythecriminologicaltexts.TheresponsibilizationstrategyThesenewcriminologiesarefarfrombeingfullytranslatedintogovernmentpolicy,butalreadyonecantracetheemergenceof newstrategiesandtechniqueswhich flowfromthisframework.Inparticular,therehasdevelopedanewmodeofgoverningcrimewhichIwouldcharacterizeasaresponsibilizationstategy.Thisinvolvesthecen-tralgovernmentseekingtoactuponcrimenotinadirectfashionthroughstateagencies(police,courts,prisons,socialwork,etc.)butinsteadbyactingindirectly,seekingtoactivateactiononthepartofnon-stateagenciesandorganizations.Thisisthe essence of the new crime preventionapproachdevelopedby the UKgovernmentinthelast10years.11Itskeyphrasesaretermssuchas'partnership','inter-agencyco-operation','themulti-agencyapproach','activatingcommunities',creating'activecitizens','helpforself-help'.Itsprimaryconcernis todevolveresponsibilityforcrimepreventionontoagencies,organizationsandindividualswhicharequiteoutsidethestateandtopersuadethemtoactappropriately.Theresponsibilizationstrategyinvolvesanumberofnewtechniquesandmethodswherebydiestateseekstobringaboutactiononthepartof'private'agenciesandindividualseitherby 'stimulatingnew forms of behaviour'or by 'stoppingestablishedhabits'(RileyandMayhew1980:15).Thefirststepis'toidentifypeopleororgan-izationswhichhavethecompetencetoreducecriminalopportunitieseffectively,and. . .toassessbothwhetherthosehavearesponsibilitytodosoandwhetherthisresponsibilitycanbeenforced.'(Houghetal.1980:16).Anumberoftargetsandtechniquesof persuasionare identifiedby such analyses. Thesimplestof these,butalsothemostwide-ranging,is the publicitycampaign,targetedatthepublicasawholeorelsespecificgroupsof potentialvictimsoroffenders.Thesecampaigns,whichinvolveextensivemass mediaadvertisingorelse themass leafletingof households,aimtoraiseconsciousness,createa sense of duty,andthus changepractices.Similarly,expertsup-portandencouragementhasbeenofferedtocitizenself-helpgroups(suchas'Neigh-ComishandClarke(1986&15)do,however,posethefollowingquestion:'Ifcriminalbehaviourisportayedasrational,normaland commonplace,what willbethe effectupon everydaythinking and moralizing about crime?110See Pat CMalley,unpublished paper on 'Post-KeynesianPolicing' which describes how contemporary police policiesseekto shiftthe responsibilityfor crime prevention on to the individual and the marketSee also CMalley1992 and 1994whichlocatesthis,and the rise of situationalcrime preventiondiscourses,withina broader 'nco-liberaJ' politicalforma-tion. As CMalleypoints out, similar shifts of responsibility from the state to the private sector are occurring in areas suchas pensions,welfareand healthcare.Crimepreventionisnot,ofcourse,anewconcernof government.Butwhenthegovernmentandpartypoliticalreports of the1960s(LabourParty 1964; HomeOffice1964; ConservativeParty1966)mentionedcrime prevention,theycalledfor comprehensivestateaction,andfor theco-ordinationof the various state agenciesinvolvednotforthe acti-vationofprivateorganizationsandindividuals.Andtheircrimecontrolprogrammesweretargeteduponcriminaloffenders,not upon criminalevents and the victims of crime.acf.EngstadandEvans(1980): 'It ismost unlikelythatthe group or corporatebodyto whomresponsibilityis beingshiftedwillimmediatelyacknowledgethattheirpropertyoroperationsaregeneratingasubstantialstraininpoliceresources,acceptthat they have a duty,up to their competence,for the control of crime, andtake appropriateaction.Inourview,thefailureof many...crime controleffortscan beattributedto theabsenceof somemeansof ensuringthatmembers of the communityinvolved acceptedand effectivelydischarged their responsibilities.1(pp. 6-7).452 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from THE LIMITS OF THE SOVEREIGNSTATEbourhoodWatch'),whichhavebecomeacentralplankof governmentcrimepreven-tionpolicy,andserveasamodelformoreambitiousandmoreeffectiveformsof co-operationbetweenthepublicandtheprivaterealms.Thegovernmenthasalsoestablishedaseriesof organizationsandprojectssuchasCrimeConcernUKandtheSaferCitiesschemes,theremitof whichistosetupcrimepreventionprojectsandtoestablbh local non-state or semi-state structures which will help govern crimeproblemsbymeansofinter-agencyco-operationandtheactivationoflocalinitiatives.Withinthestateagenciesthemselves,organizationalchangehasbeenintroducedtofurthertheseends,withthepromotionofstrategicplanning,inter-agencyco-operation,andshareddecisionmakingbetweendepartmentswhichwerepreviouslyquiteseparate.ThemostprominentoftheseistheMinisterialGrouponCrimePrevention,estab-lishedin1986topromotehighlevelco-operationbetweendepartments,butthestrategyofmovingbeyondthetraditionalcrimecontroldemarcationsisnowbeingreplicatedatall levels of government.Therecurringmessageofthisapproachisthatthestatealoneisnot,andcannoteffectivelybe,responsibleforpreventingandcontrollingcrime.14Propertyowners,residents,retailers,manufacturers,townplanners,schoolauthorities,transportman-agers,employers,parents,andindividualcitizensallofthesemustbemadetorecognizethattheytoohavearesponsibilityinthisregard,andmustbepersuadedtochangetheirpracticesinordertoreducecriminalopportunitiesandincreaseinformalcontrols.Ineffect,centralgovernmentis,inthisfieldofpolicyasinseveralothers,operatingupontheestablishedboundarieswhichseparatetheprivatefromthepublicrealm, seeking to renegotiatethe question of whatis properly a state functionandwhatis not.Sometimesoutcomesareachievedmerelythroughgovernmentalexhortation,aswherecarmanufacturersarepersuadedtobuildingreatersecurityintheirproducts,orinsurancecompaniesareencouragedtogivediscountsinareaswhereNeighbour-hoodWatchschemesoperate.Sometimespersuasiontakestheformoftheanalysisofinterests,forexamplewhereretailersandcity-centrefirmsareshowndataonthefearofcrimeandhowthisaffectstheirtrade,inordertoencouragethemtoadoptimprovedsecuritypracticesandco-operatein jointinitiatives.Increasinglypreventiveactiontakestheformof establishingco-operative,inter-agencystructureswhichbringtogetherpublicandprivateorganizationsinordertoinitiatelocalprojects.Occasion-allytoo, moreforcefulmethodsareproposed.Ithas beensuggested,forexample,thatthe governmentmightmake retailfirmsdo moreto reduceshopliftingandretailcrimebythreateningtoshiftthecostsofretailtheftprosecutionsontotheretailersthem-selves(seeHoughet al.1980:14). Thisideaofrevertingtoasystemof privateprose-cutionshowshowtheresponsibilizationstrategymergesneadyintostrategiesofprivatizationandpublicexpenditurereductionwhichcommandedsuchsupportfromconservativegovernmentsinthe1980s and1990s.15aTheimportanceofNeighbourhoodWatchandrelatedsurveillancescheme*suchai'cabwatch' and'hojpitalwatch'asexemplarsofthegovernment'sprojectfor devolvedcrimecontrolisdemonstratedbythefactthatpoliticalcommitmentto these schemafar outruns their level of success in preventing crime(see Jones tl al.1994).MOne might say that governmentpolicy has begun to acknowledge what sociologistshave always known to be truenamely, that the processes which produce order and conformityare the mainstreamsocial processes, not the backgroundthreat of legalsanctions,forinstance, see Croft(1980: p. v).aFor a vivid example of howthese strategies can be combined, see OsbomeandGaebler (1993).453 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from DAVIDGARLANDItshouldbe emphasizedthatthe responsibilization strategy does not entailthe simpleoff-loadingofstatefunctions.Noris itsimplythe'hivingoff*orthe'privatization'ofcrimecontrol,althoughoneofitsmajoreffectshascertainlybeentostimulatethemarket for private security (see Johnson1992). Rather it is a new form of governance-at-a-distance,which represents, in this field at least, a new mode of exercising power. It is anewmodeof governingcrime,withits ownformsof knowledge,its ownobjectives,itsowntechniquesandapparatuses.16Thestatedoesnotdiminishorbecomemerelyanightwatchman.Onthecontrary,itretainsallitstraditionalfunctionsthestateagencies haveactuallyincreasedtheirsize andoutputduringthe same periodand,inaddition,takesonanewsetofco-ordinatingandactivatingroles,which,intime,develop into new structures of support,funding,informationexchange orco-operation.Where it worksand one should not underestimate the difficultiesinvolved in making itworktheresponsibilizationstrategy leaves the centralized state machine morepower-fulthanbefore,withanextendedcapacityforactionandinfluence.Atthesametime,however, this strategy serves to erode the notion of the state as the public'srepresentativeandprimaryprotector.Itmarkswhatmaybethebeginningofanimportantre-configurationofthe'criminaljusticestate'anditsrelationtothecitizen.Otherdevelopmentssuchastheriseofthevictims'movement(seeRock1990)andtheenhancedrolenowaccordedtovictimsinthecriminalandsentencingprocess,orthedevelopmentofreparationandmediationschemesonthefringesofthesystem(seeWrightandGalaway1989)reinforcethe viewthatsucha reconfigurationmaybe inthe process of occurring.Theideaof aresponsibilizationstrategyimpliesthatthestate is takingonanambi-tiousnewrole,notmerely'passingthebuck','gettingoffthehook'or'takingabackseat'.Itisexperimentingwithwaysofactingatadistance,ofactivatingthegovern-mentalpowersof'private'agencies,of co-ordinatinginterestsandsettingupchains ofco-operativeaction,allofwhichpresentmanymoredifficultiesthanthetraditionalmethodofissuingcommandstostateagenciesandtheirfunctionaries.Itis seekingtoimplement'social'and'situationaPformsofcrimepreventionwhichinvolvethere-orderingoftheconductofeverydayliferightacrossthesocialfield.Andalthoughmanyof these projectsare modest,low-keyand localizedin theirgoals, theprogrammeis,inprinciple,muchmorewide-rangingandambitiousthanwasthepenal-welfareprojectof reformingoffenders.Wherethe stateoncetargetedthedeviantforintensivetransformativeaction,it now aims to bringaboutmarginalbut effectivechanges inthenorms,theroutines,andtheconsciousnessof everyone.As arecentgovernmentdocu-mentputsit,crimepreventionshouldbecome'partof theroutinedaytodaypracticeandcultureof allagenciesandindividuals'(HomeOffice1993: 16).Thepracticalproblemsinvolvedinthisnewrolearenowthesubjectofdozensofgovernmentresearchpublicationswhichdetailtheobstaclestomulti-agencyworking,theresistanceitisliabletoencounter,andthebestmeansofmanipulatingdiverse16 On governmentat a distance, see Rose andMiller(1992). On the cultural and social conditions which make possiblethis newform of governing,and give it wide extensionat every level of authority,from central governmentto family andworkplacerelations,seeA.deSwaan(1990).deSwaanelaboratesacontrastbetweenmanagementbycommandandmanagementby negotiation,and describesthe recent culturalshifttowards the latter in all spheres.17 Onsimilar developmentsin otherareas of government-socialinteraction, seeKooiman(1993). See alsoEUmomy andSocitiy (1993). Nikolas Rose (1993) and others use the term'advanced liberalism' to discuss similar patterns of governance incontemporary states. See also CMalley(1994 \For a discussion of nineteenth century examples of action at a distance inrespect of child welfare,seeDonxelot(1980).454 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from THE LIMITS OF THESOVEREIGN STATEinterestsintocrimecontrolalliances(secEngstadandEvans1980;Gladstone1980;Hope1985; HealandLaycock1986a;LiddleandGelsthope1994a,b). A need fornewexpertsin'co-ordination'and'inter-agencyworking'hasbeendiscovered,heraldingthedevelopmentofastrangenew'specialism'whichwillbedennedbyitsintersticialroleandits interdisciplinaryskills(Hope1985: 42; HealandLaycock1986a:132). Atthesametime,anewformofknowledgeisbeingassembledwhichwillsupportandextendthisstrategyinthesamewaythatpositivistcriminologyoncesupportedstrategicsof rehabilitationandindividualcorrection.And,likethatearlierknowledgeofthecriminalindividual,whichgrewupquietlyintheroutinesofinstitutionalpractice,thisnewknowledgeisdevelopinginoutofthewayreportsandresearchstudies whichreceivelittlepublicattentionorscrutiny.Adapting to failureForthestateagenciesof criminal justicethatis tosay,forthepolice,thecourts,theprisons,probation,andsoonthenormalityofhighratesofcrimeincontemporarysociety presents new problemsof legitimacyandnewproblemsof overload.Thefailureof crimecontrolis experiencedas afailure,aboveall,of thepolice,thecourtsandtheprisons,andhasledtoareformulationof objectivesandprioritiesintheseorganiza-tions.Theincreasesinrecordedcrimehavealsohadthepracticaleffectofmassivelyincreasingthe'throughput'ofthecriminaljusticeprocess,withsteepincreasesincrimes reportedto the police, prosecutions brought,cases triedandoffenderspunished.Oneconsequenceisthattheorganizationshavehadtoexpandandtransformtheirpractices inordertokeeppacewiththeirnewworkload.Oneresponsetotheproblemofoverloadhasbeentodevelopnewstrategiesofsystemintegrationandsystemmonitoring,whichseektoimplementalevelof processandinformationmanagementwhich was previously lacking(see Morgan1985; Moxon1985;Lygo1991).ThissystematizationofcriminaljusticewhichhasbeenlargelysponsoredbytheHomeOfficehaspermittedagreaterlevelofco-ordinationandplanningtotakeplace,andhasbeenusedtobringaboutparticularpolicyobjectives,suchas thereductionintheuse of custodialpenaltiesfor juvenileoffenders(seeCava-dinoandDignan1992: 211-20).Arelated developmentisthewidespreadmovementtowardsamoremanagerialist,business-likeethos whichemphasizeseconomy,efficiencyandeffectivenessin the use ofcriminal justiceresources.CentralgovernmentinitiativessuchastheFinancialMan-agementInitiativehavebeenappliedtoallpublicservices,including(belatedly)thepolice,thecourts,theprisonsandcommunitymeasures,andhaveledtothedevelop-mentofclearlyspecified'performanceindicators'againstwhichtheorganization'sactivitiescanbemeasured,as wellasanemphasisuponstrategicplanning,lineman-agement,devolvedbudgetsandfinancialresponsibilitywithintheagencies(seeRaineandWillson1993; Humphrey1991).Themostpublicizedaspectsof thishavebeenthevariousmeasuresofprivatizationwhichhavetakenplace,transferringspecificcriminal justicefunctionstocommercialconcernsinanewformof contractprovision(Young1987; HomeAffairsCommittee19876).Alsoimportanthowever,isthetransformationofstatedepartments(suchastheprisonservice)intosemi-autonomousagencies whichareallocatedabudgetandapolicybrief,butaresupposedlygivenindependentcontrolofinternalissuesofman-455 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from DAVIDGARLANDagementandpolicyimplementation(Jordan1992). Theintroductionof largernum-bers of volunteergroups(e.g. specialconstables, volunteerprobationofficers,etc.)andthe'civilianization'of manytasks thatwere previously undertakenby trainedpolice orprisonofficershavealsohelpedreduceexpenditure(Joneset al. 1994: ch. 4).Thisnewethos also entails aconcernwith whatmightbe called'customerrelations'.Stateagenciesincreasinglyredefinetheirmissionintermsofservingparticular'con-sumers'(suchasvictimsandtheirfamilies,oreveninmates)andbeingresponsivetotheirexpressedneeds,ratherthanservingthemoreabstract,top-downnotionofthepublicgood.Hencethepracticeof conductingsurveysoftheviewsof consumersandthedevelopmentof objectivesandprioritieswhichseektorespondtothese(See Woz-niak1994; ScottishPrisonService1992; Commissionerof MetropolitanPolice1987).Defining deviancedownPerhaps the major system adaptation to high crime rates and high case loads has been thetendency of the criminal justice agencies to limit the level of demand placed upon them byresort to a variety of devices which effectively'definedeviance down'(Moynihan1992),eitherbyfilteringitoutof thesystemaltogether,orekeloweringthedegreetowhichcertainbehavioursarecriminalizedandpenalized.Thisprocess occursatthe'shallow'andhencelessvisibleendofcriminaljusticeandcan,therefore,developlargelyun-announcedby way of discretionarydecisions taken by police andprosecutors wellawayfromthe gaze of the mediaandpoliticalactors.(The lack of scrutinythatfacilitatesthe'definingdown' strategy also facilitates its pathologies, such as the dilution of due processand the production of'convictionrecords' which are not subject to legal proof (see Cohen1985)).Thisstrategyhasbeenmadepossiblebyaculturalcontextinwhichthecrim-inalizationof minorviolationsis oftenviewedas counterproductive,andbyabureau-cratic context in which such criminalization is viewed as unnecessarily expensive.The 'defining down' process has a number of aspects. It includes the widespread use ofcautioninganddiversion fromprosecution,andthe developmentof fixed penaltiesandsummaryhearingsforoffencesthatwerepreviouslyprosecutedatmoreseriouslevels(Ditchfield1976; HomeOffice1985; Dahrendorf1985).Itincludestheuse of commu-nityandmonetarypenaltiesforcrimesthatwouldoncehaveattractedcustodialsen-tences,andthedecriminalizationofbehavioursthatwereonceroutinelyprosecuted(Bottoms1983).Italsoincludesdecisionsbythepolicethattheywillnolongeruseinvestigative resources on certain offences which have a low likelihood of detection and alow priority forthepublic, in orderto conserve resources forthose crimes whichcanbetargetedandinvestigatedeffectively.Thistendencyhasbeendevelopingsincethe1970s,butithasrecentlybecomemorevisible,andhencemorecontroversial.ThedevelopmenthasbeenendorsedbytheAuditCommission(1993),butithasalsometcriticismfromvictims of the manyoffenceswhich now fallbelowthethresholdof policeinterest.Theimpactof'definingdown'is,ineffect,theoppositeofthe'net-widening'ten-dencythatisfrequentlyattributedtocontemporarycrimecontrolpractices.Itscon-cernis to letminoroffencesandoffendersfallbelowthethresholdof officialnoticetoIwouldargue that this strategy of'definingdeviance down' iiindeed a "strategy1 which upatterned, systematic andresource-driven. The developments describedhere are not limpjy the effectsof historically changing cultural views aboutoffenceseriousness,though of course atttudes and practice! tend to reinforceeach other over time.456 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from THELIMITSOF THESOVEREIGNSTATEallow themto slip a'net'thatis in dangerof bursting atthe seams. Inthisdevelopmenttheradicalforceatworkis notthecriticalcriminologyof writerslikeStanCohenandNilsChristie,whoarguethatcriminalizationisoftenanevilinitself,butinsteadtheAuditCommissionandthegovernment'sFinancialManagementInitiatives,whoseconcernistofindwaysofreducingpublicexpenditureandimprovinggovernmentperformance.ThusinarecentReport(1989), theAuditCommissionwarnedthattheProbationServiceshouldguardagainst'net-widening',asitcalledit,notbecauseitpullsmorepeopleintothesystemandincreasesthenetofpenalcontrol,butsimplybecauseit is deemedto befinanciallywasteful.Inthe lightof these developmentsandin view of thetendencytothinkof thestateas foreverseekingtoextendthetentaclesof controlweshouldremindourselvesthatCohen'stheoryof net-widening(seeCohen1985: ch.2)is originallyastorynotaboutexpansionism,butratheraboutafailedrcductionism.Net-wideningisgenerallytheunplannedcorollaryofattemptstoscaledownorinformalizepenaltystructures.Whereitoccurs, itis usuallyunderstoodas thecovertachievementof the variouspro-fessionalgroupswhohaveastakeinthesocialcontrolbusiness(Cohen1985: ch.5).Whatis tooeasily forgottenisthattherearealsootherinterestsatworksuchastheinterestsof theTreasuryandlocalauthoritybudgetholdersthatareopposedtotheunplannedextensionof controlmeasuresonthegroundsof cost(nottomentionthosecriminal justiceprofessionals,whoareopposedonprincipletotheovercriminalizatdonoftheirclients)andwhichcanbeeffectiveinavertingsuchoutcomesbythecarefulmonitoringofpolicyimplementation.Ifthereisatendencyto'net-widening'intheBritishpenalsystem,itseemsprobablethatthisisamarginalandcontradictoryaspectthoughonewhichisimportantforthoseinvolvedofamorefundamentaltendencytowardstherelaxationof penalcontrolsinrespectof minorviolationsofthecriminallaw.19Despitethesewell-documentedtendenciestodefinedeviancedown,thenumbersprocessedthroughthestatesystemhavecontinuedtoexpand,inpartbecauseofthegrowing levels of crime, in partbecause the tendencies describedso farhave beenoffsetbyapunitivecounter-tendencywhichIwilldescribeinamoment.20Wearethusexperiencingasituationrathermorecomplexthan'net-widening'oneinwhichthestateagencies of criminal justicehave been steadily increasingin size, in'productivity',andin the numbers of cases processed,atthe same time as they have beenreducingtheextentto whichtheyprocessandpenalizeminoroffencebehaviour.19AJ farasI amawaretherehaibeennoresearchwhichcompare!overtimethesizeof thecriminal justice'net' in theUKin a waywhichis sensitiveto thechangingratesof criminalcases.(Andofcourse,thefactthatmanyoffencesdo notnowresultin officialactionmakessuchcomparisonshighlyproblematic).Thetimeperiodschosenwould,of course,becrucialto theanalysisforexample,the'net1 of penal-weliarecontrolover juvenilesinEnglandand Walesseemstohaveexpandedduringthe1970s,beforecontractingagaininthe1980s(seeGelsthorpeandMorris1994).For somediscussion ofthemethodologyrequiredforempiricalstudiesof 'net-widening" seeMacMahon(1992).20The'WaragainstDrugs'andthe escalationof penalizationthatthishas involvedin the UK and the USAare acentralelementin thispunitivecounter-tendency.Heredeviancehascertainlybeendefinedup(thoughpossessionofsoftdrugshasbeendifactodecriminalizedin someregions),as it has beenin respectof somesexualandsomeviolentoffenceswherethethresholdsof tolerancehaveundergonechange(seeKrauthammer1993).FeeleyandSimon(1992)andSimon(1993)haveoutlinedkeyaspectsof changingpolicyandorganizationaladaptationsastheyhaveoccurredintheUSA. SeealsoCMal l e y(1992).457 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from DAVIDGARLANDRedefining successand failureAmajorwayinwhichstateagencieshavereactedtocriticismisbyscalingdownexpectations,redefiningtheiraims, andseekingto changethecriteriaby whichfailureandsuccessarejudged.Tosomeextent,thisaccordswiththeresponsibilizationstrategydescribedearlier,so thatnowadays policeandprisonauthoritiesarequicktopointtothelimitationsof theircontributiontothecontrolof crime.Thepolice still claimsuccess in detecting serious crime, andinapprehendingseriouscriminals,buttheyholdoutlow expectationsforthecontrolof whattheynowrefertoas' random'or'opportunistic'offending.Similarly,theprisonauthoritiesfocusmoreandmoreupontheirabilitytoholdoffenderssecurelyincustody(andthus'incapaci-tate'them2),andnolongerholdoutmuchprospectofproducingrehabilitativeeffects.Atthesametime,thediscourseoftheseagenciesshiftstheresponsibilityforoutcomesontothe'customers'withwhomthey deal, so thattheinmateis now saidtoberesponsibleformakinguseofanyrefomativcopportunitiesthattheprisonmightoffer,while the police emphasizethatit is the victim's responsibilityto protectpropertyandavoiddangeroussituations.22Increasinglytheseorganizationsseekto beevaluatedbyreferencetointernalgoals,over whichtheyhave neartotal control,ratherthanby referenceto social goals such asreducingcrimerates,catchingcriminals or reforminginmates,allof whichinvolvetoomanycontingenciesanduncertainties.Thenewperformanceindicatorstendtomeas-ure'outputs'ratherthan'outcomes',23whattheorganizationdoes,ratherthanwhat,ifanything,itachieves.Prisonregimesareassessedinterms of thenumberof hourswhichinmatesspendin'purposefulactivity',notintermsofwhethertheseprogrammesreducesubsequentoffending(ScottishPrisonService1993).24Policeforcesasktobejudgedinterms of the numberof officerson the beat,orthenumberof emergencycallsprocessed,or othermeasures of'economyandefficiency',notbythe effecttheseactionshavehaduponrates of crimeorcriminalconvictions(Commissionerof theMetropolis1987).Inmuchthesameway,theshiftof sentencingpolicytowardsa'justdeserts'model,whateverthe other dynamics which have brought it about(see Duff andGarland1994),involvesamoveawayfromautilitarianframeworkinwhichsentencersseektobringaboutasocialoutcomenamelythereductionof crimethroughdeterrentorreforma-tive sentencingto one where the key objective(fittingthe punishmentto the offence)isBThenotionof'incapadtation'ortheuseofcuitodyto preventreofTendingby high-rateordangerousoffender!ii nimportantaspectof the new concerntomanagebothrikand resourcesincoit-effectivewayi(tee Z imring andHawkins1995).Apolicyofselectiveincapadtationaimstokeepconfinedforlongperiodsthoseoffenderswhoareregardedas aseriouscrimerisk,andto uselessexpensivecommunitypunishmentsfor thosewhoare judgedto be lesserrisks. Thereis,of course,a usefulambiguityin themeaningof longsentencesofimprisonment,whichcanberegarded asinstrumentalformsof incapadtationas wellas expressiveformsof punitiveness.Thatlong-termimprisonment'incapac-itates' in otherwaysreducingthesocialandpersonalcapacitiesof theprisoner,andtheabilityto resumenormalsodallifeon releaseisa barelysuppressedpunitiveaspectof thispolicy.acthedevelopmentof'contract'-basedrelationshipsin probation,communi tyservice,andmostrecently,inprisonregimes,whichexplidUyholdtheoffenderorinmateresponsiblefor a courseof prescribedconduct.OnthisseeD.Nelken(1989)andA. E. Bottoms(1994).23I amgratefulto mycolleagueDavid J.Smithforbringingthiswayofphrasingthedistinctionto myattention.24Therapeuti candrehabilitativeprogrammeshavecontinuedtooperatein Britishprisonsduringthe1980sand1990s.Buttheyare nowseenas "specialistservices'ratherthanthe vanguardof agenera]policyof rehabilitation,and theseatypicalregimecharacteristicsnolongerpropup the systemsgeneralideology.Thi schangeheraldsanew realismofrepresentation,butit alsosignalsthewayin whichcriminal justicehasbecomedisconnectedfromideologiesofsolidarity.458 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from THELIMITS OF THESOVEREIGN STATEwell withinthe capacity of the courts, and thus much less likely to 'fail'. The same mightbesaidaboutimprisonment,whichisincreasinglyrepresentedasmerelyameansofincapacitationandpunishment,andalsoaboutcommunitysupervision,whichisincreasinglyrepresentedas an economical formof'punishmentin thecommunity'.Criminaljusticeorganizationsareseekingtobecomemoreself-contained,more'autopoietic'(Teubner1993) and less committedto externally denned social purposesandtosomeextenttheyareachievingthisdefensivenewstatus.Butwhilethecentralgovernmenthasencouragedandcolludedinthesereducedandmorerealisticmissionstatements,partof thecostof failureis thatthese agenciesareno longerpermittedtheprofessionalautonomy and discretion with which they were once entrusted.Increasinglyagencieslikethepolice,probationandprisons,whichwereoncegivenamission,abudgetandadegreeof freedomtogetonwithit,arenow subjecttodetailednationalstandardsset by central government,andare closely monitoredand inspectedto ensurethat practice and resource-use complies with these instructions. The central state may bewideningits rangeof actionandinfluencethroughthe indirectmeans describedabove,butit has also tightenedits grip upon its own agencies andemployees.25Bythesevariousmeans,thecrimecontrolagenciesofthestatehavebeguntorep-resentthemselves in ways which suggesta more modest, andmore self-containedremit.Thepromisetodeliver'lawandorder1andsecurity forallcitizensis nowincreasinglyreplacedbyapromisetoprocesscomplaintsorapplypunishmentsina just,efficientandcost-effectiveway.Thereisanemergingdistinctionbetweenthepunishmentofcrime, whichremainsthe business of the state(andas we will see, becomes onceagain,asignificantsymbolofstatepower)andthecontrolofcrime,whichisincreasinglydeemedtobe'beyondthestate'insignificantrespects.DenialasaReactiontothePredicamentUptothispointIhavebeendescribingaseriesofgovernmentalandorganizationalresponsestowhatItermedthepredicamentofcrimecontrolinlatemodernsociety.Whateveronethinksof them,thesestrategiesarecertainlymarkedbyahighlevelofadministrativerationality,andadegreeoforganizationalcreativity.However,theyformonlyoneaspectofaverycontradictoryresponse.Atthesametimethattheadministrativemachineof thestatehasbeendevisingstrategiestoadapttoitslimita-tionsinrespectofcrimecontrol,andthuscometotermswiththeuncomfortablerealities, the politicalarmof the statehas frequentlyengagedin a formof denialwhichappearsincreasinglyhystericalintheclinicalsense of thatterm.33This teenuto throw some doubt on the claimmade by Bottoms and Wiles(1984)that a 'hollowing out of the state' isoccurring in respect of crime control.28In Reudianterms, 'denial' is a psychic defencemechanismby means of whichsome painfulexperienceorreality isrefusedaccessto consciousness. 'Hysterical' behaviouris conductentailing 'conversion-symptoms' which disguisethe psy-chicproblem whichlieattheirroot Theimplicationisthatthe observedphenomenashouldnot betakenattheirfacevalue and that they are intended to draw or distractattention(Rycroft1968). The distinctionsuggestedhere between thepoliticalandthe administrativeaspects of the state is clearlyundertheorized.Idealtypically,it seeks to capture the dis-tinctionbetweenthe conductand discourseof elected politicians,directedtowardspopularpoliticalaudiences, andtheconduct of state officials,directed towards the rational and efficientpursuit of policy goals. Politics and administration do,of course,intersectand interact,but to specifythismorepreciselywouldrequiremore empiricaldetailthan can be pre-sented here.See for instance the account of victim policy formationin theHome Officein Rock(1990).459 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from DAVIDGARLANDInthefaceofevidencethatcrimedoesnotreadilyrespondtoseveresentences,ornewpolicepowers,oragreateruseofimprisonment,theBritishgovernment(likeotherselsewhere)has frequentlyadopteda punitive'lawand order'stancethat seeks todenyconditionswhichareelsewhere acknowledgedandto reassertthe state'spowertogovernbyforceof command.Sometimesthepunitivepronouncementsofgovernmentministersarebarelyconsideredattemptstoexpresspopularfeelingsof rageandfrus-trationinthewakeofparticularlydisturbingcrimes,suchasthenewpowersofimprisonmentwhichfollowedtheconvictionof youthsforthemurderof JamesBulgerin1993.Usuallypunitivepoliciescanalsoclaimaninstrumentalrationale(asinpoliciesofcustodialincapacitation,theprisonbuildingprogramme,andthenewpowerstopassverylongsentencesoncertainoffenders)whichlinks punitivenesswitheffectivecrimecontrol,howevercontroversialthismaybe.Buttogetherwiththeirexpressiveorreductionistobjectives,these 'lawandorder'policies frequentlyinvolveaknowingandcynicalmanipulationof the symbols of state powerandof the emotions offearandinsecuritywhichgivethesesymbolstheirpotency.Suchpoliciesbecomeparticularlysalientwhereamoregeneralinsecurityderivingfromtenuousemploy-mentandfragilesocialrelationsiswidelyexperiencedandwherethestateis deemedtohavefailedinits effortsto delivereconomicsecurityto key socialgroups.MichelFoucault(1977),inhisdescriptionoftheexecutionofRobertDamiens,showedingraphic detailhow harshpunishmentshave beenusedas public displays of aruler'spower,designedtoreaffirmtheforceofthelawandreactivatethemythofsovereignty.Andthough JohnMajoris hardlyLouis XV,wheneverhe orhisministersadopttheposture of being 'toughon criminals','condemningmoreandunderstandingless',andensuring' thatcriminalsarefrightened,notthelaw-abidingpublic'(see,forexample,Howard1993, Major1994),andwheneverthey flourish new powerstosendoffenderstobootcamps,ortosupermaxprisons,ortolifeimprisonment,theyaredeliberatelydeployingthesamearchaicstrategy.Ashowofpunitiveforceagainstindividualsisusedtorepressanyacknowledgementofthestate'sinabilitytocontrolcrimetoacceptablelevels.Awillingnesstodeliverharshpunishmentstoconvictedoffendersmagicallycompensatesa failureto deliver security to the populationatlarge.Thispunitivenesshascomplexroots.Itisbynowadeep-rootedaspectofourculture,embeddedinthecommon-senseofthepublic,thepoliceandthejudiciary(Garland1990).Deliberateattemptsbygovernmenttomodifythiscultureforinstanceinthestrategyof'punishmentinthecommunity'inthelate1980shaveshowntheresilience of the demandforharsh, custodialpenalties. There is alsopressureupongovernmenttorespondtocriticismsoftheadaptivestrategiesdiscussedabove,particularlywhentheadministrativetendencytodefinedeviancedownproducesresults whichsections of the public andthe media find unacceptable.(Recentexamplesincludeprisonsecuritybreaches;'bailbandits',violentoffenderswhoareparoledandthenreoffend;young repeatoffenderswho appearto have immunityfrompunishment,andsoon.)Buttheessentialattractivenessof thepunitiveresponseis thatitcanberepresentedasanauthoritativeinterventiontodealwithaserious,anxiety-riddenproblem.Such17The Home Secrettry announced in October1993 that he would introduce legislation to set up secure centra" for 12-14 year olds, and would double themaximum lentence for persistent juvenileoffenders(Howard 1993).See Wrong(1994)on fear of violence and insecurity as a motivating factor in political action.460 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from THELIMITS OF THESOVEREIGNSTATEactiongivestheappearancethat'somethingisbeingdone'here,now,swiftlyanddecisively.Likethedecisiontowagewar,thedecisiontoinflictharshpunishmentexemplifiesthesovereignmodeof stateaction.Noneedforco-operation,nonegotia-tion,noquestionof whetherornotitmight'work'.Punishmentis anactof sovereignmight,aperformativeactionwhichexemplifieswhatabsolutepowerisallabout.Moreover,itis asovereignactwhichtendstocommandwidespreadpopularsupport,andhereatleastStuartHall's suggestionof'authoritarianpopulism'tendsto ringtrue(Hall1988).Noris itmerelyagesturewithoutbroadereffects.Inasociety whichmanifestsdeepsocialandracialdivisions,whichexperienceshighcrimeratesandlevels ofinsecurity,wherewelfaresolutionshavebeenpoliticallydiscredited,andinwhichadevelopingcommercialsectorencouragesandfacilitatestheexpansionof imprisonmentinotherwordsinsocietiessuchastheUSAortheUKapunitivepoliticalandlegalculturesoongives rise tomass incarceration,withallof its socialandfinancialconsequences.Criminologies of the Other/Criminologiesof theSelfAccompanyingthese punitive policies is a certaincriminologythat looks quitedifferentfromthecriminologiesofeverydaylifethatinformthepreventiveandde-escalatingmeasuresdescribedabove. Whereasthelatterdepicttheoffenderas arationaloppor-tunist,littledifferentfromhisorhervictim,thecriminologyinvokedbythepunitivestrategyis oneofessentializeddifference.Itisacriminologyofthealienotherwhichrepresentscriminalsasdangerousmembersofdistinctracialandsocialgroupswhichbearlittleresemblanceto'us'.Itis, moreover,a'criminology'whichtradesinimages,archetypesandanxieties,ratherthanincarefulanalysesandresearchfindingsmoreapoliticizeddiscourse of the unconsciousthana detailedformofknowledge-for-powcr.Punitivepoliciesarepremiseduponcharacterizationsofoffendersas'yobs','pred-ators','careercriminals','sexbeasts',as'evil','wicked',ormemberof an'underclass'(Coward1994)eachofthesebeing'suitableenemies'(Christie1986)forarulingculturestressingfamilyvalues, individualenterprise,andthelimitsof welfarism,eachofthemexamplesof whatMaryDouglasterms'thepoliticaluses of danger'(Douglas1992).Inthisrhetoric,andinitspolicyeffects,offendersaretreatedasadifferentspeciesof threatening,violentindividualsforwhomwe canhaveno sympathyandforwhomthereis no effectivehelp. The onlypracticalandrationalresponseto suchtypesistohavethem'takenoutof circulation'fortheprotectionofthepublic,whetherbylong-termimprisonment,as intheUK,orelse by judicialkilling,as is increasinglythecase in the USA.So, atthe same time thatshallow-enddeviance is defineddown,moreseriousoffencesaredealtwithinamuchmorepunitivemanner,withincreasesintheproportionateuseofcustodyforadultoffencesandintheaveragelengthofprisonsentencesduringthe1980s(see ReinerandCross1991: 2-3).Wethushaveanofficialcriminologywhichisincreasinglydualistic,increasinglypolarized,andincreasinglyambivalent.Thereisacriminologyofthe self,thatchar-acterizesoffendersasrationalconsumers, justlikeus;andthereisacriminologyof theother,ofthethreateningoutcast,thefearsomestranger,theexcludedandtheembit-tered.One is invokedto routinize crime, to allay disproportionatefearsandtopromotepreventiveaction.Theotheris concernedto demonizethecriminal,toexcitepopularfearsandhostilities,andtopromotesupportforstatepunishment.Theexcluded461 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from DAVIDGARLANDmiddle-groundhere,ispreciselytheonce-dominantwelfaristcriminologywhichdepictedtheoffenderasdisadvantagedorpoorlysocializedandmadeitthestate'sresponsibilityinsocialaswellaspenalpolicytotakepositivestepsofaremedialkind.Onemightsaythatweare developinganofficialcriminologythatfitsoursocialandculturalconfigurationoneinwhichamorality,generalizedinsecurityandenforcedexclusionarecomingtoprevailoverthetraditionsofwelfarismandsocialcitizenship.Inthelightof theopeningcommentsof thisarticle,itis worthnotingthatpunitiveoutburstsanddemonizingrhetoricshavefeaturedmuchmoreprominentlyinweakpoliticalregimesthaninstrongones.Significantly,itwasthepowerfulandconfidentthird-termgovernmentofMrsThatcherwhichintroducedradicallegislationtocutcrimecontrolcostsandtode-escalatepenalties.Withinayearoftakingoffice,MrMajor'sgovernmenthadreversedthesepoliciesandreaffirmedacommitmenttothepunitiveuseofimprisonment.Similarly,itwastheClintonadministrationwidelyperceivedatthattimeasweakandfalteringwhichmadeitaprioritytointroducetheUSCrimeActof1994,withitsextendedpowersofcapitalpunishmentandnewmandatorylifesentencesforrepeatfelons.Overthelasttwodecades,punitivepoliciessuchasthesehaveaccompaniedandcontradictedthestrategiesofnormalizingcrime,responsibilizingothersanddefiningdeviancedown.Whereasforonesetofgovernmentalcalculations,highratesofimprisonmentrepresentamajorproblemofcostandineffectivenessthatmustbetackledbyreductionistmeasures(see HomeOffice1988), foranother,theyrepresentapositivesymbolof thestate'swillingnessto use forceagainstits enemiesandtoprotectitsloyalsubjectsbywhatevermeansare'necessary'.Statesovereigntyovercrimehasthusbeensimultaneouslydeniedandsymbolicallyreasserted.Thelimitsof policeandpunishmentarerecognizedinonepolicyonlytobe ignoredinanother.Andalthoughthiscontradictionis sometimesrationalizedasa'policyof bifurcation',30itsrealrootslieinthepoliticalambivalencewhichresultsfromastateconfrontedbyitsownlimit-ations.Inconsequence,thereis nowarecurringgapbetweenresearch-basedpolicyadviceandthepoliticalactionwhichensues.Forexample,thetwomostradicalBritishdevelopmentsof the1980sand1990stheprisonbuildingprogrammeandthepolicyofprisonprivatizationwereinitiatedintheabsenceof anysubstantialsupportfrompenalexpertsorpractitioners(HomeAffairsCommittee1987a,b).Whereasthe'pre-ventive'strategies describedabove are premisedupon consolidatedresearch resultsandclearadministrativerationalities,the'punitive'strategyisdrivenbyapoliticaldynamicratherthanapenologicalone.Onestrategyadaptsitselftotherealityprin-ciplewhiletheotherstrivestodenyit.(Inrespectoftheprison-buildingandprivat-29ThereisatheoreticalpointtobemadehereinrespectoftheworkofMichelFbucaultandhisfollowers.Thedis-cussionshowsthattheanalysisof strategiesandtechnologiesofpowermustalwaysbeaccompaniedbyananalysisofthepoliticsoftheirexercise,andofthecountervailingforcesrangedagainstthem.Theexerciseofsovereignpenalpowertendstointerrupttheoperationofgovernmentalstrategies,oftenforshort-termpoliticalpurposes.Thisexacerbatesthetensionbetween"thepassionate,morallytoneddesiretopunishandtheadministrative,rationalistic. . .concerntomanage'(Garland1990:180).3 0'Bifurcation' isapolicy optionwhichdifferentiatespenalresponseonthe basisof risk andresourceassessments,assetoutforexampleinthe1991Criminal JusticeActandthepolicypapersleadinguptoit.Bifurcationasarationallydiffer-entiatedpolicyresponseshouldnotbeconiusedwiththecontradictoryandconflictedpoliciesbeingdescribedhere.Onbifurcationasapolicy,seeBottoms(1983).462 at Universidade do Porto on October 13, 2014http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from THE LIMITS OF THESOVEREIGN STATEizationexamplesgiven,oneshouldaddthattheywerealsodrivenbywhatonemightcall'thepenal-industrialcomplex'thenetworkof commercialandcapitalistinterestswhichsurroundsandfeedsoffthecontemporarypenalsystem, justasthearmamentsindustryfeedsoffwarfare(seeChristie1993).Norarcthesetwodivergingstrategiessimplythetwinprongsof aconcertedpolicyforthe controlof serious crime on the one hand,andminor crime onthe other.Foronething,theyoperateonquitecontradictoryassumptionsaboutthecharacterofoffendingandthepossibilitiesforcriminaljusticeinterventions.Foranother,therhetoric,perceptionsandemotionsinvokedbythepunitivestrategyhavetheeffectofunderminingthepreventive,responsibilizingstrategy,andmakingitmore difficultforthosecommittedtothe latterto carrytheirpoliciesthrough.TheEclipseof the SolidarityProjectThedevelopmentswhichIhavedescribedabovebothpreventiveandpunitivehavecalledintoexistenceanaccompanyingcriticaldiscoursewhichhasbeguntoidentifytheproblemsentailedinthisnewschemeofthoughtandaction.Asfortheobjectionstoarevivedpunitiveness,thesehardlyneedtoberecountedasthesehaveformedthebasisofliberalpenologyforthebestpartofacentury.Butthecriticalcommentaryregardingthenewermodesofgoverningcrimeisimportantsinceitidentifiesdangerswhichmightnotbesotransparent(seeBlagget al.1986;Bottoms1990;Kinsey