gandomi - lessons from afghanistan - 2008

7/29/2019 Gandomi - Lessons From Afghanistan - 2008

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51Lessons from the Soviet Occupation in Afghanistan for the United states and NATO

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Jonathan Gandomi is a Master of Public Affairs Candidate at the Woodrow WilsonSchool of Public Affairs, Princeton University.

L essons from the s oviet o ccupation in a fghanistan

for the u nited s tates and

nato Jonathan Gandomi

Already in its seventh year in A ghanistan, U.S. and NATOorces appear as i they will approach and likely surpass thedecade-long occupation by Soviet troops. Currently, A ghanistan

is ar rom becoming stable and even reaching the normalcy o developing-nation status. As the Spring 2008 NATO summitillustrated, it represents an important test o commitment orthe trans-Atlantic alliance. This article will examine some o themilitary and political lessons rom the Soviet experience andidenti y those that can be applied to the present period. Drawing on a number o transcripts rom Politburo sessions and othersigni cant Soviet documents rom the 1979-1989 period, thisarticle argues that despite the distinctions between 1988 and2008 a number o common experiences and mistakes emerge.

As the Taliban continues to ght an insurgency campaign andpatience wears thin among A ghans or President Karzais govern-ment and the international community to deliver results, theselessons might be use ul in in orming U.S. and NATO policy.Ultimately, A ghans, especially in rural areas, must be o ered

tangible gains rom siding with the current government, and a political solution must accompany military e orts to overcomethe challenges that con ront A ghanistan and its allies.


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52 Jonathan Gandomi

I ntroductIon

More than six years a ter U.S. orces toppled the Taliban, thrusting HamidKarzai into power rst as the Chairman o A ghanistans Interim Administra-tion and then later as its democratically elected president, U.S. and NATOorces are approaching the duration o the Soviet Union troop presencein A ghanistan, and they appear likely to surpass it. The Netherlands an-nounced its troops will stay in A ghanistan until 2010, the United Statesand United Kingdom continue to increase troop levels, and most NATOorces show no signs o quick departure (Ministry o General A airs o the Government o Netherlands 2007). The question then arises: what

lessons, i any, rom the Soviet occupation o A ghanistan rom 1979-1989can be applied to the present period?

The U.S. and NATO operation in A ghanistan, otherwise known as theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF), chose early on to extendthe work o the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 and operate withinexisting power structures to bring all major power brokers, the Taliban andal Qaeda excluded, under the national government. Consequently, ormermilitia leaders and regional warlords with little experience in nationaladministration now hold key posts in Karzais government. However, thesecurity situation continues to deteriorate with the increased strength o the insurgency in the provinces. The United Kingdom and the UnitedStates are increasing their orce contribution rom 6,000 to 7,700 androm 26,000 to 29,000, respectively, to respond to an upsurge in violencein 2007 (United Kingdom Ministry o De ence 2007). The United Statesis deploying 3,000 more Marines ahead o an expected spring o ensive

by the Taliban (Scott-Tyson 2008). However, most NATO membersshow diminished appetites or increasing troop levels and using already deployed orces or more robust military operations against the insurgency.President Karzai is acing sliding support among A ghans, though he willlikely remain in power past the next presidential elections in 2009 due tothe absence o viable alternatives.

Drawing rom the Soviet experience, this article will highlight military and political experiences that are relevant or the United States and NATO

and areas where policy should be adjusted. The article will avoid normative judgments on the legitimacy o the presence o Soviet versus U.S./NATOorces and instead ocus on speci c challenges and the consequences o some Soviet policy choices during their occupation o A ghanistan.


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B ackground

The Soviet Unions decision to intervene in A ghanistan was made somewhatreluctantly in December 1979 a ter eleven requests rom the communistPeoples Democratic Party o A ghanistan (PDPA) (Central Committeeo the Communist Party o the Soviet Union 1987, 23-26 February). ThePDPA took power rom Mohammad Daouds regime in a coup in April1978 and were unable to quash the armed confict, which subsequently broke out around the country. In addition to preventing the collapse o the PDPA government, the main goal o the intervention was to sup-port the A ghan army with new communist leadership that could ght

the insurgency once Soviet troops withdrew (Weinbaum 2007, 24). TheRed Armys troop levels in A ghanistan peaked at over 100,000, thoughnearly a million Soviet soldiers served during the ten-year intervention(Hammond 1984, 190). The Soviets used brutal tactics to con ront themujahideen and showed little concern or average A ghans. Heavy repower,chemical weapons, and indiscriminate ring killed many civilians during Soviet e orts to root out insurgents. The Red Army razed entire villages inareas where ambushes had occurred, wiping out inhabitants and destroy-ing crops without, ultimately, diminishing the strength o the resistance(Bradsher 1983, 211). The last Soviet soldier le t A ghanistan on February 14, 1989 a ter Mikhail Gorbachev and other Politburo leadership realizedthe U.S.S.R. could not continue to sustain such large nancial and humancosts when the quagmire appeared to have no end in sight. Eight majorlessons emerge rom why they were not able to de eat the resistance andconsolidate power or the PDPA.

L essons from the s ovIet o ccupatIon

Lesson One: A ghan government urgently needed to establishlegitimacy

A ghans would not wait inde nitely or the government to prove its valueand capacity to provide tangible results o the socialist revolution. Thoughsome Soviet analysts predicted the de eat o counter-revolutionary orces

would take no less than ve years even under avorable circumstances,they did not appreciate early on the presence o a tipping point in theminds o A ghans concerning their patience or a oreign occupation andor the establishment o good governance (Shchedrov 1981). In 1986,Chairman Gorbachev spoke to the Soviet Politburo o his intuitionthat they should not waste time in measures directed toward nationalreconciliation, strengthening o the union with the peasantry, and con-


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54 Jonathan Gandomi

solidation o political leadership o the party (Central Committee o theCommunist Party o the Soviet Union 1986, 13 November). His messageis striking because his speech was intended to stimulate the council to take

more decisive action as i it were not already altogether clear that time was running out. In an open letter to De ense Minister Dmitry Yazov,Colonel Kim Tsagolov wrote in 1987 rom A ghanistan that the window o opportunity or the revolution to succeed had already closed. He waslater expelled rom the Red Army or making his criticisms public.

The protracted character o the military struggle and the absenceo any serious success, which could lead to a breakthrough in

the entire strategic situation, led to the ormation in the mindso the majority o the population o the mistrust in the abilitieso the regime. That objectively led to demoralization o themasses, and to the erosion o the social base o the revolution(Lyakhovsky 1995, 344-348).

The lack o support among A ghans or the PDPA had many causes,but none less obvious than the absence o improvement and sometimesdeterioration - in the lives o those in the provinces and rural areas incomparison to the pre-revolutionary period. Soviet policy makers during Politburo sessions called attention to the bene ts o the revolution notreaching the peasants in the provinces, who composed 80 percent o thetotal population: Over eight years o the revolution agricultural produc-tion has increased by only seven percent, and the standard o living o peasants remains at pre-revolutionary levels (Central Committee o theCommunist Party o the Soviet Union 1986, November 13). This is hardly

surprising given the estimate by Politburo member Yuli M. Vorontsov thatonly ve million out o eighteen million A ghans were under the controlo the government.

Lesson Two: Border region with Pakistan played animportant roleTranscripts o Politburo sessions throughout the Soviet occupation revealintense discussion o the role that outside powers were playing in sup-porting the mujahideen. The U.S., Pakistani, and Saudi contributions tothe resistance have since been heavily documented, but at the time theSoviets were unable to prevent this inter erence (Coll 2004). Their concerncentered on the importance o sa e-havens and sanctuaries in Pakistan orthe predominantly ethnic Pashtun insurgents. Yuri Andropov, who playeda key role in the Politburo in arguing or the intervention as head o the


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Committee or State Security (KGB), estimated in 1979 that three thousandinsurgents and religious anatics were being directed into A ghanistan romPakistan (Central Committee o the Communist Party o the Soviet Union

1979, 17-18 March). This number grew over time due to the actions o theSoviet Army, whose tactics in the provinces created millions o internally displaced persons (Hammond 1984, 190). By 1983, an estimated threemillion A ghans had fed their homes to another country. Many re ugees

went to Pakistan and thousands o young men became trained as Islamicmilitants and returned to A ghanistan to ght in the resistance. The Sovietsexacerbated this problem by purpose ully creating impossible conditionsin rural areas so the mujahideen would nd themselves without ood orshelter and thus stop ghting. This policy, also called migratory genocide,led more than one-third o the A ghan population to be displaced romtheir homes by 1985 (Bradsher 1985, 279).

A ghans, including those in the conservative Pashtun tribal belt, arenot naturally inclined toward political Islam (Bart eld 2004, 15-17). Tothe extent that extremism nds root among Pashtuns, it is imported romPakistani madrassas the Grand Central Station o modern Islamic

militancy, as British intelligence experts re er to it (Observer 2007). Thisextremism continued to be imported during the Taliban period by A ghansas re ugees in Pakistan were raised under the infuence o militant DiobandiIslamic orthodoxy (Weinbaum 2007, 25).

Lesson Three: Conventional military tactics were poorcounter-insurgency toolsSoviet troops had absolutely no anti-guerrilla training. Their tanks and

armored cars were highly vulnerable on A ghan terrain. Conventionaltactics that would have been adequate or ghting on the plains o Europe

were ine ective in the mountainous terrain o A ghanistan (Bradsher 1983,203). In a letter toward the end o the confict to all communist party members, the Politburo acknowledged this act:

We do not want to say it, but we should: at that time, we didnot even have a correct assessment o the unique geographical

eatures o that hard-to-enter country. That ound its refectionin the operations o our troops against small highly mobile units,

where very little could be accomplished with the help o modernmilitary technology (Lyakhovsky 1995, Appendix 8).

The strategy o the insurgency was to avoid direct con rontation andconcede territory, only to return to control the area again later once the


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56 Jonathan Gandomi

Soviet troops returned to their bases. Employing tactics o hot pursuito the rebels was intended to remove the base o support or the resistance.However, this drew erce criticism rom the local population because

it meant the destruction o houses, agricultural elds, and the death o many civilians. Even so, it did not change conditions, as the rebels wouldreturn and control the territory again. Use o these tactics meant Sovietsoldiers o ten ound themselves ghting against the civilians they intendedto protect.

One approach that produced positive results in some areas was moving mobile or permanent units o the A ghan army orces closer to those prov-inces. This o ten happened a ter villagers rom regions controlled by therebels approached provincial centers and asked or help in creating units o de ense under the condition that these units would have close protectionrom the retaliatory attacks o the resistance (Shchedrov 1981).

Ultimately, the Soviets proved unable to control the provinces. In a power ul and poignant speech during a Politburo session in 1986, Sergei

Akhromeev, the deputy Minister o De ense, emphasized the signi canceo this ailure:

Military actions in A ghanistan will soon be seven years old.There is no single piece o land in this country which has notbeen occupied by a Soviet soldier. Nevertheless, the majority o the territory remains in the hands o the rebels.There is nosingle military problem that has arisen and that has not beensolved, and yet there is still no result. The whole problem is inthe act that military results are not ollowed up by political[actions]. We control Kabul and the provincial centers, buton occupied territory we cannot establish authority. We havelost the battle or the A ghan people. The government is sup-ported by a minority o the population. It is now in a positionto maintain the situation on the level that it exists now. Butunder such conditions the war will continue or a long time(Central Committee o the Communist Party o the SovietUnion 1986, 13 November).

Lesson Four: Ethnic tensions were underestimated Policy e orts toward national reconciliation oundered due to underesti-mating the role o ethnic tensions within A ghan society. The two mainactions in the PDPA, the Parcham and Khalq, could not overcome theirpreexisting ethnic tensions. Other A ghans did not support national rec-onciliation e orts precisely because they did not support the source, the


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PDPA, which was not established at the village level (Lyakhovsky 1995,344-348). Repression always appeared to be the dominant eature andde ault option o Soviet strategy and the communist regime purpose ully

avoided giving control to traditional centers o power. Only just prior tothe withdrawal o Soviet troops in 1989 did the PDPA in Kabul attempt toco-opt local leaders and ghters by promising representation to the diverseset o ethnic and ideological actions (Weinbaum 2007, 24).

Lesson Five: A ghans were highly intolerant o oreign troopoccupation

When Chairman Leonid Brezhnev and the Politburo were contemplat-ing sending troops into A ghanistan only a small number o voices cameorward to express opposition. Among them was Chie o General Sta Nikolai Ogarkov, who called the decision to send 75,000 to 80,000 troopsreckless due to its insu ciency in being able to stabilize the situation.He also argued among the small Politburo circle o three key members(KGB head Yuri Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and De-ense Minister Dmitri Ustinov) and Chairman Brezhnev that the A ghan

problem should be decided by political means because o the traditionso the A ghan people, who never tolerated oreigners on their soil (Lyak-hovsky 1995, 109-112). Political and military leaders were surprised tolater observe the infuential role that Islam played in A ghan society, whichtreated the Soviets as oreign invaders and in dels rather than a progressiveanti-imperialist orce.

Religious motives aside, the presence o oreign troops and the tollsu ered by the tribes was an a ront to their honor and a violation o

the Pukhtunwali , the Pashtun code or way o li e. The rst and greatestcommandment o the code is badal revenge, which obliges a Pashtun totake revenge or a wrong inficted against him (and by extension againsthis amily and tribe) to de end pride and infict retribution (Spain 1963).Nearly ten years a ter Ogarkovs warning, the Politburo acknowledgedthis cultural and historical actor in the reasons or their withdrawal in

A ghanistan:

In addition, [we] completely disregarded the most importantnational and historical actors, above all the act that the appear-ance o armed oreigners in A ghanistan was always met witharms in the hands [o the population]. This is how it was inthe past, and this is how it happened when our troops entered[A ghanistan], even though they came there with honest andnoble goals (Lyakhovsky 1995, Appendix 8).


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Lesson Six: Soviet solutions or A ghan problems did not work Soviet leaders also realized too late that their advisors working in A ghani-

stan were mistaken in attempting to re-create Soviet society and apply their own solutions to a vastly di erent context. Soviet advisors, who wereaccustomed to orming plans within a society accepting o a centralizedapproach, ailed to appreciate the permanence o the tribal system andits inherent resistance to national administration and organization o basic elements o li e. PDPA leaders, who were lost without a roadmap intheir own country and struggling to remake A ghan society in the Sovietimage, became increasingly reliant on outside solutions that promised todeliver results:

O ten our people, acting out o their best intentions, triedto transplant the approached we are accustomed to onto the

A ghan soil, encouraged the A ghans to copy our ways. All thisdid not help our cause; it bred the eelings o dependency onthe part o the A ghan leaders in regard to the Soviet Unionboth in the sphere o military operations and in the economic

sphere (Lyakhovsky 1995, Appendix 8).

Lesson Seven: Imminent departure o Soviet troops bolstered resistanceThe public announcements by senior Soviet leadership that it planned to

withdraw their troops undermined ongoing e orts or national reconcili-ation. The resistance had little reason then to negotiate and compromise

when it believed it simply needed to wait until the Soviets le t be orethey could have what they wanted. Colonel Tsagolovs letter to De enseMinister Yazov makes this point, At the same time, one has to keep inmind that the counter-revolution is aware o the strategic decision o theSoviet leadership to withdraw the Soviet troops rom the DRA . . .Thecounter-revolution will not be satis ed with partial power today, knowing that tomorrow it can have it all. (Lyakhovsky 1995, 344-348). Plans o

withdrawal were hard to conceal, however, as the process took several yearsto complete. As part o perestroika and glasnost , Gorbachev permitted andeven publicized some public discussion within Soviet society which calledor the withdrawal o troops rom A ghanistan. The resistance interpretedthis as signs o imminent victory and dismissed e orts by the PDPA toreach out to local and regional leaders and win their allegiance throughpower sharing agreements.


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Lesson Eight: A military solution proved to be insu fcient Eventually, Soviet policy makers realized that a military solution to theprotracted confict was not possible and that a solution must be political in

nature. Viktor Chebrikov, a member o the Politburo and head o the KGBrom 1982-1988, made this point to his colleagues during a November1986 session: It is necessary to look or the means to a political solutiono the problem. The military path or the past six years has not given usa solution (Central Committee o the Communist Party o the SovietUnion 1986, 13 November). Earlier in 1985, Gorbachev delivered thissame message to President Babrak Karmal when he in ormed the A ghanleader that he could no longer count on any rein orcements o additionaltroops and needed to take drastic action:

Well help you, but with arms only, not troops. And i you wantto survive youll have to broaden the base o the regime, orgetsocialism, make a deal with the truly infuential orces, including the Mujahideen commanders and the leaders o now-hostileorganizations. Youll have to revive Islam, respect traditions,and try to show the people some tangible bene ts rom the

revolution. And get your army into shape, give raises to o cersand mullahs. Support private trade, you wont be able to createa di erent economy any time soon (Central Committee o theCommunist Party o the Soviet Union 1985, 17 October).

O course, by then the mujahideen wasnt interested in compromisesrom the PDPA and believed they only needed to outlast the Soviet oc-cupation in order to win the confict.

L essons r eLevant for the u nIted s tates and nato

Most observers agree the security situation in A ghanistan is currently deteriorating. The Taliban has a permanent presence in an estimated 54percent o the countrys territory (Senlis A ghanistan 2007). The UnitedStates is responding to an upsurge in violence last year and an expected

spring o ensive by the Taliban by sending 3,000 more Marines, indicating they ailed to draw additional troop commitments rom other NATO mem-bers (Scott-Tyson 2008). Moreover, the United Nations O ce on Drugsand Crime estimated that opium production grew 34 percent rom 2006to 2007. With the exception o China in the nineteenth century, whosepopulation then was teen times larger than todays in A ghanistan, noother country in the world has ever produced narcotics on such a massive


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scale (UN O ce on Drugs and Crime 2007). Most development projectsand reconstruction e orts are located in the North and West under morebenign security conditions than in the East and South. The ethnic Pash-

tuns in the South, while less accustomed to a strong government presencethan ethnic minorities in the North, have traditionally prospered mostrom a relationship with the state (Shahrani 1984). The insurgents haveincreasingly been able to capitalize on grievances, particularly among thePashtuns, who perceive they are being denied the bene ts o reconstruc-tion that others are seen as receiving (Weinbaum 2007, 33). Currently,Pashtun tribes compose the majority o the base o support or the Talibanin A ghanistan.

It is in this context that a number o lessons rom the Soviet experiencehave resonance in present-day A ghanistan.

First, the importance o controlling the rural areas and improving livesin those regions is as relevant in 2008 as it was in 1988. As in the Sovietperiod, the Taliban and other resistance orces take re uge rom NATOin the hard-to-reach rural areas. Seth Jones, a political scientist at RAND,believes history is in danger o repeating itsel :

Russia controlled the cities, not the rural areas. They lost. Thisis the challenge that aces the U.S., NATO, and the A ghangovernment today. Its the ght over the hearts and minds in therural areas. The U.S., NATO, and the A ghan government arelosing. Not in Kandahar City or Kabul. The cities are held by military orces. But there is deep penetration by the Taliban inrural areas. Not many people see that (Godges 2007, 14).

One military o cial rom NATO, who spoke on the condition o ano-nymity, believes the concept o ghting or hearts and minds is misguided.Instead, the main goal should be to de eat the insurgency and build thecapacity o the A ghan government, not to win hearts and minds. The localpopulation will never be completely won over by oreign troops who areoccupying their country (Personal interview 2007, 17 November). However,the challenge remains in the rural areas to hold ground a ter battles, asthe British proved unable to do a ter a 2007 battle in Helmand province.The victory was so decisive that there was not one NATO casualty, butthe resistance has since retaken the lost ground.

ISAFs has attempted to establish a presence in the provinces and rural ar-eas through provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), which are civil-military units that seek to extend the reach o the government in the provinces by initiating development, reconstruction, and political collaboration with


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provincial leaders. The infuence o PRTs in the region was expected toextend outward over time, much like the spreading inkblot metaphor usedin counter-insurgency theory. PRTs, which o ten numbered no more than

50 to 150 personnel, represented an e ort to reach the provinces undertight resource and troop constraints. Critics dismissed PRTs early on asan attempt to provide the ISAF e ect on the cheap, and or providing a alse impression that they were a su cient response to needs (Stapleton2007). Former United Nations envoy to A ghanistan Lakhdar Brahimisaid the expansion o ISAF through PRTs was second best to a straight-orward extension o ISAF, as we have been calling or ever since we ar-rived in Kabul at the end o 2001 (UNA-USA 2004). Though many o the twenty- ve PRTs currently operational in A ghanistan have achievedmeasured success in their initiatives, the personnel working in PRTs andthe resources at their disposal are too small to have more than a marginalimpact on the larger challenges in A ghanistan.Recommendation One: U.S. and NATO orces should seek to move out o the cities and establish a greater presence in rural areas, despite the signifcant logistical challenges.

Second, the issue o limited time and the presence o a tipping point inthe minds o A ghans are crucial and do not su ciently concern mostNATO members. The primary concern o the NATO o cial interviewedis the prospect o the local population deciding that support o the present

A ghan government and NATO countries is joining a losing side (Personalinterview 2007, 13 December). Seth Jones, who has undertaken extensivetravels to nearly all areas o A ghanistan since 2004, shares this concern:

In 2001, there was hope and expectation that the A ghan gov-ernment, with international assistance, could make li e betteror A ghans, bring electricity where there was none, increasethe fow o water to villages, provide essential services that theTaliban government did not do, increase the basic economicand health and other conditions in the country. My biggestear is that the A ghan population will eventually give up on

the governments ability to provide these services. Its already happened in some places (Godges 2007).

Indeed, the number o insurgent initiated attacks in A ghanistan roseby 400 percent rom 2002 to 2006, with a six- old increase observed rom2005 to 2006 (Human Rights Watch 2007). The A ghan government man-ages only 20 percent o oreign aid coming into A ghanistan with the rest


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handled by NGOs and international agencies. An argument can be madethat i the local government managed a larger portion o the developmentaid then they would increase their legitimacy as the primary political ac-

tors and receive more support. But regardless o who is controlling aidmoney, the actual volume o this aid coming into A ghanistan is low by historical standards. Spending during U.S. interventions in Bosnia was$679 per capita, $526 in Kosovo, and $206 in Iraq. In A ghanistan, thegure is $57 per capita and alls ar below the minimum $100 per capita ormulation created by James Dobbins and other analysts at RAND in a comprehensive review o nation building e orts (Dobbins 2005).Recommendation Two: Su fcient resources should be provided or development and assistance projects in the provinces so that villag-ers eel their lives are improving instead o remaining the same or

getting worse.

Third, NATO does not have enough troops and too many troops come with caveats. A ghanistan has a population o thirty-two million peopleand the total security orces number 124,000 including 70,000 A ghan

personnel, 28,000 NATO personnel, and 26,000 U.S. personnel (Scott-Tyson 2008). This amounts to approximately .35 percent o the population. At 54,000 personnel, U.S. and NATO troop presence is approximately .17percent o the population. Soviet troop presence peaked in 1983 at justover 100,000, not including the A ghan army, though some estimated atthe time that it would take at least 400,000 troops to completely elimi-nate the resistance (Hammond 1984, 190). Troop levels in A ghanistanare low by Soviet comparisons, and even lower in comparison with otherU.S.-led cases o nation building. In Iraq, the military presence per capita ratio was seven troops or every 1000 people. This ratio in Kosovo andBosnia is twenty and nineteen, respectively. In a highly complex security environment proximate to the worlds training eld or violent Islamicextremism, it is not di cult to appreciate the challenge o producing a stable security environment with a ratio o 1.7 U.S. and NATO soldiers orevery 1000 people. Moreover, NATO troops o ten come with operational

caveats there are eighty-six in total that preclude them rom taking certain actions and rom being opportunistic in the eld.Dobbins proposes using a gold standard o 20 security personnel

per 1000 inhabitants 2 percent o the population which would mean620,000 troops in A ghanistan (Dobbins 2005). A minimum standard,

where the security situation is relatively stable, could be set at 10 soldiersper 1000 inhabitants, which would still mean 310,000 troops or A -


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ghanistan and ar above present standards. It is hard to imagine currentpolitical realities in NATO countries allowing or 600,000 or even 300,000troops being deployed in A ghanistan, but this does not erase the need

on the ground.Recommendation Three: As the security situation stabilizes inIraq, the U.S. should seek to move available fghting units, police advisors, and other military personnel to A ghanistan in order tobolster troop levels.

Fourth, U.S. and NATO orces ace the same problem o being perceivedas oreign occupiers as did soldiers in the Red Army. There is little com-parison in terms o brutality o orce and tragedy o consequence betweenthe Soviet occupation and the current ISAF mission, but A ghans stillbridle at the presence o even benevolent oreign orces. With the prospecto deploying into some o the more hostile regions, the Government o

A ghanistan and NATO are presented with a di cult trade-o : attemptto increase security through a credible display o orce but risk stretching the already low tolerance or the presence o oreign militaries. Pashtun

tribes have taken up arms against oreign occupiers or centuries; however,they still need assurances o protection against reprisal attacks in order tobe compelled to switch allegiances rom the Taliban to the Governmento A ghanistan.Recommendation Four: To mitigate the problematic optics o or-eign occupiers who are expanding deeper into the provinces, embed

A ghan soldiers within NATO orces to create mixed units. This can serve as a orce multiplier while also acilitating the training o the A ghan Army.

Fi th, the border region in the South and East with Pakistan still plays animportant role by providing a sa e haven or the resistance and a staging ground or supply and training purposes. The Soviet occupation and themillions o A ghans who took re uge in this region le t a legacy wherenow these United Taliban Emirates are the most de ensible terrorist

sa e haven the world has ever seen (Observer 2007). The National Intel-ligence Estimate concluded in July 2007 that the strategy or ghting alQaeda across the A ghan border in Pakistan had largely ailed, and thatsa e havens in Pakistan had allowed it to signi cantly strengthen in thepast two years (National Intelligence Council 2007).

Given the inaccessibility o this territory and the political crisis inPakistan, ew good options currently exist to tackle this problem. Fortu-


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nately, signi cant di erences exist between the Taliban in Pakistan andthe Taliban in A ghanistan. Historically, A ghan mujahideen have takenmoney and arms rom militants in Pakistan but only ollowed orders to

the extent that interests aligned.Recommendation Five: The Government o A ghanistan should at-tempt to strip away the Pashtun tribes rom the Taliban support base through a credible national reconciliation program and an o er o amnesty, supported by the international community.

1988 and 2008: Favorable distinctions

The ve actors described above all cast shadows on the prospects or a suc-cess ul outcome o the present situation in A ghanistan. The applicability o these actors rom the Soviet period to today is worrisome. However,there are several important distinctions between the Soviet and NATOcontexts that provide some measured optimism or the uture. Ethnic di -erences still remain important political actors, but the stakes are lowerand di erences more negotiable as they primarily concern the distributiono o ces and externally provided resources. Absent are the disputes over

possession o great sources o wealth, such as oil, emotionally-chargedsectarian conficts, or ideological divisions refected in radically divergentagendas or A ghanistan, notes Marvin Weinbaum. The deep le t-rightcleavage that was so ruinous to the country rom the 1960s throughthe 1980s is gone (Weinbaum 2007, 29). Also, A ghanistan now has a constitution and the rudimentary oundations or holding democraticelections o a president and national jirga . Madrassas and the Diobandireligious network in Pakistan are nancially backed, in part, by wealthy donors rom Gul Arab states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. However,a major power with sizeable resources is not supporting the resistance, likethe United States actively did against the Soviet Union.

The most committed members o the Taliban and other parts o thearmed resistance will likely seek to wear out the patience o the UnitedStates and NATO, continuing to raise the costs o their presence andprovide no sign o nishing the confict. In a deteriorating security situ-

ation, the Taliban have less reason to accept a political deal o amnesty because it may believe it will eventually be able to retake the country.However, there are signs that some elements o the Taliban are tired o the ghting. A ter winning A ghanistans rst democratic presidentialelection in late 2004, Karzai extended amnesty to ghters and supporterso the Taliban movement so long as they accepted the new constitution,excluding about ty to one hundred al Qaeda members and those who


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have committed terrorism. The rest are welcome to participate in themaking o the country, Karzai announced (Richburg 2004). The olivebranch has largely been rejected, but recently the A ghan government

announced a ormer Taliban commander in the strategically importantHelmand province switched allegiances in exchange or being named thedistricts top government o cial ( Synovitz 2008).The event changed thetenor o A ghan politics, and the Government o A ghanistan is hoping more moderate Taliban members might turn as well.

As mentioned in recommendation ve, NATO members will need toexpress support or a larger reconciliation program in order or this type o deal to be credible. This would be challenging or many NATO heads o state that believe this is tantamount to negotiating with the enemy. PrimeMinister Gordon Brown assured the British Parliament that reconciliationnegotiations would not include the senior Taliban leadership, though Karzaihas admitted to meeting with a number o senior Taliban commanders totry to negotiate a mass de ection (Starkey and Brown 2007). In any case,it appears there is a real prospect o more de ections, and this could bequickened i additional security and development were provided in the

provinces. This would improve Karzais negotiating position and achievethe kind o political solution that proved elusive in the nal years o theSoviet occupation.

c oncLusIon

A ghanistan is one o the poorest countries in the world. Li e expectancy is approximately orty-two years or both men and women. Alliances haveshi ted during the decades o confict. Authority is exercised and justiceis exacted at the tribal level. Optimists predict it will take years, i notgenerations, to trans orm A ghanistan; pessimists say such changes arenot possible. By the time the Soviets realized that only a political solutioncould end the confict they had lost the ability to negotiate. The security situation in A ghanistan is currently deteriorating. Though the U.S. andNATO members may continue to win battles, they will not likely havethe patience necessary to win the war militarily. The prospect o grace ully

orchestrating a political solution between the armed resistance, Govern-ment o A ghanistan, and the international community is real. This e orthas the greatest chance or success i the lessons rom the Soviet experienceand their corresponding recommendations are ollowed. At stake is thelegitimacy o Karzais government, the credibility o the United States andNATO, and the wellbeing o millions o A ghans. The e ort to bring anend to the confict and set A ghanistan on a more positive trajectory must


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66 Jonathan Gandomi

be attempted with an eye toward history and a sober understanding o theconsequences o ailure.

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gandomi - lessons from afghanistan - 2008

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