g. klosko - the insufficiency of reason in plato's gorgias

8/12/2019 G. Klosko - The Insufficiency of Reason in Plato's Gorgias

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University of UtahWestern Political Science ssociation

The Insufficiency of Reason in Plato's GorgiasAuthor(s): George KloskoSource: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec., 1983), pp. 579-595Published by: University of Utahon behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/448587.

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THE INSUFFICIENCY OF REASON IN PLATO'SGORGIASGEORGEKLOSKO

Universityf VirginiarT _HE GORGIAS is unquestionablythe most importantof Plato'spoliticaldialogues priorto theRepublic. n this confrontationbetweenSocrates nd threerhetoricians twoofwhom,Gorgiasand Polus,teachrhetoric, nd a third,Callicles,who wishes to employ ttoward the advancement of his politicalcareer - Plato rails at lengthagainsttheSophists nd their eaching,while thepolitical mplications fthisare drawnin full.The connectionsbetweenoratory nd democracyare probed indepth,culminatingnPlato's denunciationof theAtheniandemocracy nd the well-known oliticalfigureswhohad made it what twas: Pericles,Themistocles, Miltiades,and Cimon (esp. Gorg515c if.).Moreover,and more significant or our purposes, in the climactic on-frontationf the workbetweenSocrates and Callicles,notonlydoes PlatosupplyCallicleswith series ofpowerful rguments whichhave beendescribed as "the most eloquent statementof the immoralist's ase inwesternliterature" Shorey 1933: 154) - but he allows Socrates tocounter withstrongargumentsof his own,whichclearlyanticipatethemain politicalteachingof theRepublic.What nterestsmeinthispaper is therelationship etweentheGorgiasand the politicalteachingof theRepublic. n many respectstheconnec-tions re bothclear and familiar ostudents f Classical PoliticalTheory.It ishard todenythesimilarityetweenthecritical ttitude aken towarddemocracyntheRepublic nexttotyrannyheworst orm f state andthe directcriticisms f democracyfound in theGorgias.Similarly, heimmoralism of Callicles is closely related to the view espoused byThrasymachos nRepublic (esp. Rep343b-44c).AsFriedlanderespeciallyhas pointedout,even the basic structure f theGorgias, hreedebates inorder of ascending seriousness and depth, anticipatesthe makeup ofRepublic (1958-69; II, 244-45). In addition,Socrates' eventualdescrip-tion of the truepolitical rt as a moldingof soulsl contains n germthepoliticaltheory f theRepublic.These and other connectionshave beenpointedout manytimes.2It seems,however, hatnotall theways n which heGorgias nticipatestheRepublic ave beenrecognized.The purposeof thispaper is todeveloponewhichhas beenoverlooked.This willbe seen to beimportant, otonlyNOTE: Translations are from Loeb Classics Libraryeditions; thus for theGorgias, useLamb's 1925. For theRepublic use the translation f Grube 1974. Translations areoccusionallymodified lightly.1Esp. Gorg502e-505b; on this, ee Dodds 1959: 327-28; Irwin 1979: 212-17.2 Irwin: The programme or he truerhetor' r truepolitician' oundslike first ketch ortheregimedescribed ntheRepublic. ." (1979: 215); see also Barker 1947: esp. 165-67;Pohlenz 1913: 152-64.

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580 WesternoliticalQuarterlyforhelpingto understand a feature in fact centralfeature of theGorgias hathas generallygone unnoticed,butitwillalso contribute o abetterunderstandingof the developmentof Plato's political theorybe-tweenthe earlySocraticdialogues and Republic.3The Argumenthere is conductedin twoparts. n SectionI, I discussthe place of theGorgias n the sequence of Plato's dialogues, and someimportant hemes n thedevelopmentof Plato'spoliticaltheory. n Sec-tion II the Gorgias s situated in the development of Plato's politicalthought, nd thoseaspectsofthe work wishto examineare explored atlength.

IIt has long been recognized the the Gorgias occupies an unusualposition n thedevelopmentofPlato'sthought. t is commonly lassifiedwith heearly dialogues, and the stylometricvidence seemsto supportthis.4At first ight,the evidence of the work'sdramatic aspects alsosupportsthisview. The openingof theGorgiassthatof a typical ocraticdialogue, and Socratesappears to be up tohisusual tricks, sking ques-tions n order to examine the views of others,rather than expoundingviewsof his own. But the workdoes not end when Gorgias,the initialinterlocutor, as been refuted, nd in thecontinuation f thediscussion

Socratesundergoesa transformation.uringthecourse of hisdiscussionwithPolus,he findshimself nswering uestionsrather hanaskingthem,and fromroughly hispointon theGorgias s devoted to an expositionofSocrates' views.This is takento such an extentthat,whenCallicleswith-drawsfrom hediscussion, ocrates continueson alone, bothaskingandanswering hequestions on thismorebelow),and thework s a wholeisconcluded with n eschatologicalmyth,imilar othatfound atthe end oftheRepublic and that n thePhaedoas well.Thus the Socrates of theGorgiaschanges during the course of the dialogue, from the elencticSocratesoftheearlydialogues,to a figure ecognizable s the Socrates oftheRepublic nd the other middledialogues, expounding a positivedoc-trinewithpassionatecertainty,nd speaking nmythologicalerms boutaspectsof human existenceabout which we cannot possiblyknow.53Forthechronology fthedialogues,seeGuthrie1962-81: IV, 41-56,and thediscussions fthe individualdialogues, in Vols. IV-V. By "earlydialogues" I mean especiallytheApology,rito, ippiasMinor, rotagoras,aches, ysis,nd Charmides.t should be notedthat excludetheEuthyphro,ecause it nticipates hetheory f deas (see below,note9).Forease ofreference, refer o thepolitical heory epresented nthese works s that f"Socrates," nd that ontained n themiddledialoguesas "Plato's."In keepingwith hemajority fscholars, believethat he viewspresented nthedialogues listed bove are

closelyrelated tothose Platoassociatedwith he historical ocrates, nkeepingwithhisintention n these worksof representing he character nd teachingof Socrates. The"Socratic Problem" is well treated along the lines taken in this paper by Guthrie(1962-81: III).4Fora brief ummary f this vidence, eeDodds 1959: 18-19;for hedateof theGorgias,eeDodds: 18-30; Irwin 1979: 5-8; Guthrie1962-81: IV, 284-85.5Dodds is good on thetransformationf Socrates 1959: 16-17; also see Irwin 1979: 6-8.



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The nsufficiencyfReason n Plato'sGORGIAS 581These differences f form re nottheonlyones. The positivedoctrineSocratesexpounds intheGorgias eparts markedly romwhat s found n

theearlydialogues ina numberofimportant espects.Whatconcernsusmost in this context s the new psychologicalviews Socrates begins topresent.As manyscholarsargue, thepsychologicalviewsexpounded inthe middle dialogues, rooted in the tripartite oul, representa sharpdeparturefrom herationalistic,ntellectualisticsychology ound ntheearlierworks.6 t is clear thatthisnew moralpsychology eginstoappearintheGorgias,7 o doubt in conjunctionwith ther doctrines ommon inPlato's middle dialogue whichare also encounteredin theGorgias.8Ac-cordingly, ne reason theGorgias nticipates he politicaltheoryof theRepublic s that the new moral psychologyntroduced n thework eadsPlatoto discuss conceptionofvirtue and consequently conceptionofthemeans ofmakingpeople virtuous that s inmanyways loser to theviewsof theRepublic nd the middledialogues thanto those oftheearlyworks.For thesereasons, think t s clear thattheGorgias ccupies a sortoftransitional lace betweentheearly nd middledialogues in both tsformand its ontent.This is seeninmanyrespects nd iswidely greed upon byscholars insofar s anythingn Platonicscholarship s agreed upon. Itshould be noted thattheGorgias s not theonly dialogue employedthisway.9And it is not the only dialogue in which Plato raises the politicalthemediscussed nthispaper intheparticularwayhe does intheGorgias.Similarthemes re encountered na number ofotherworks,10hough nthispaper I willconcentrate n theGorgias lone. This seems advisable,notonlyforreasons ofspace, butbecause the theme nquestionis moreprominent n the Gorgiasthan in any otherwork,and because of thewidespread recognition ccorded theGorgias s an importantpoliticaldialogue. Thus I willreserve treatment f thistheme n other worksforadditional articles. It should be borne nmind,however, hat eeingthe6See, e.g.,Walsh 1964: chapters and II); Pohlenz 1913: 156-7; Irwin1977: esp. 191-216,328 n.21. For thepsychological iews ontained ntheearlydialogues,see Klosko 1980.7 Irwin 1979) isgoodon non-Socratic lements nthepsychologyftheGorgias; ee hisnoteson 491d4, 493a, 499e-500a, 505bc, 507ab.8 For instance,Orphic and Pythagorean octrines,which re very mportantn themiddledialogues; on this ee Guthrie1962-81: IV, 305-6,wherereferences o other iteraturecan be found; and Dodds 1959: 337-38, 296-99; cf.372-76).9For instance, heMenoand Euthyphro,oth of which re similar o theearlydialogues inmany respects and thePheado as well, nsofar s itconcernsthe death ofSocrates-playtransitional oles nintroducing hetheory f deas. Foranticipations fthetheoryintheEuthyphro,ee Allen 1970.A brilliant ccount of the proleptic"natureoftheearlydialogues is givenbyJaeger 1939-45: II, 87-106).0EspeciallythePhilebus,Meno (thedepictionofAnytus), uthyphrond Symposiumin theencomium ofAlcibiades).The Philebus s a latework;theSymposiums a middleone; Itake the Meno and Euthyphroo be transitional see the last note). Such mattersofclassificationre notoriously mprecise nd controversial, ut it s not unreasonable toassume thatbythetimePlatehad written ll of theseworks,he had come torejectthepoliticalviews of the earlierdialogues.A preliminaryreatment f thistheme n all thedialogues is containedin Klosko 1977.



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582 WesternoliticalQuarterlyGorgias n relation to these otherdialogues (a) would lend strongaddi-tional support to the reading of the Gorgiaspresentedbelow, and (b)would alsohelpto show thedepthof Plato'sconcernwith hetheme raiseand the mportance f tsrole nthedevelopmentof hispolitical hought.The aspectof theGorgias wishtoexploreismost asily ntroducedbyturningto the opening of theRepublic which,we should note,wasreportedlyworkedon byPlatowithgreatcare (Adam 1902: ad loc.;Allan1953: ad loc.).At thebeginningof theRepublic, s Socrates and Glauconhead back to Athensfrom hePeiraeus,they re stopped byPolemarchosand some friends.Polemarchos nitiates he discussion:

"Socrates,t ooks ome s fyouhad tarted nyourway ack othe ity.""Quiteright,"aidI [Socratessnarrating]."Do yousee howmanywe are?" he said."Of course do.""Well," esaid, youmust ither estrongerhanwe re, ryoumusttayhere.""Is therenot nother lternative,"aid , "namelyhatwemaypersuadeyoutoletusgo?""Couldyou," aidhe,"persuademenwhodo not isten?""Notpossibly,"aidGlaucon."Well,youcan take tthatwe arecertainlyotgoing o listen."(Rep327c.)Socrates spersuaded tostay, nd the entire ompanymoves to thehouseof Polemarchos,wherethe rest of the dialogue takesplace.The pointsmade inthis ittle cene arefairlybvious,butthough omehave been noted by previous commentators Sesonske 1961; Strauss1963: 59-60; Bloom 1968: 311-12), I believe thattheyhave additionalimportant mplications.For the situtationdepicted here, Socrates at-tempting o persuade some interlocutor r interlocutorswho are unwil-lingto listen, utsto theheartof Plato'spoliticaltheory. t can be shown

that this motifoccurs in Plato's depictionof Socrates in dialogue afterdialogue (see above,note 10),while as we shallsee, theGorgias speciallydraws its considerabledramaticpower fromSocrates' valiant,doomedattempt o swayan interlocutorwho simplyrefusesto listen.I believe thatthisrepeated failureon thepartof Socrates s takenbyPlatoto be a failureofphilosophy tself, nd that t strikes n importantchord nthedevelopmentof hispolitical heory. hough reasonsofspaceprevent full xplorationofthis nthepresent ontext, believe tcan bedemonstrated that the political theoryof the Republic representstherejection ftheverydifferentolitical heory f the Socratesoftheearlydialogues.The political position of Socrates is rooted in his intellectualisticpsychological views. Put very simply, the Socrates of Plato's earlydialoguesholds thatpeople arebasically ational, hat, nthe wordsof theProtagoras352c), "knowledge ssomethingnobleand able togovernman,and thatwhoever earns what sgood and what sbad willneverbe swayed



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The nsufficiencyfReason n Plato's GORGIAS 583by anything oactotherwise han as knowledgebids."12 t seems clearthatthispsychological iew forms henecessary nderpinningfortheelencticmission to which Socrates devoted his life. For this mission- Plato'sfullest ccout of which s presented n theApology,nd in thepursuitofwhich he depictsSocrates in a number of dialogues - representedanattempt ySocrates to reformhisfellow-citizensypersuadinghem tobevirtuous. Thus Socrates' mission had a politicalobjective the moralreformof his fellow-citizens but itwas "political" n a somewhatre-stricted ense, in that Socrates rejected the use of politicalmeans. nkeepingwith his intellectualistic sychologicalviews,Socrates believedthat uchmeans wereunnecessary. incemen werebasically ational, heycould be reformedthroughthe use of reason and reasoned argumentsalone.In theApology,ocratesdescribeshismission as follows:... I goaboutdoingnothinglsethanurging ou,young ndold,not ocare foryourpersons ryourproperty ore hanfor heperfectionfyour ouls . .(30a-b).. . and goabout rousingndurgingndreproachingachoneofyou,constantlylightingponyou verywherehewhole ay ong 30e-3 a).Socrates directs his message at each of the Athenians in turn. He isindiscriminate,ddressingall individualswho crosshispath,taking achaside "individuallyikea father r an elder brother"Ap3 b), urging achtocare forvirtue.As Cornfordnotes,thismissionmustbe understoodasnothing essthanan attempt oreformhiscityndirectlyyreformingheindividuals who composed it (1950: 59-60). And in the pursuitof thismission,Socratesspentmore thirty earsof his life.13The political haracterof Socrates'mission hould notbe overlookedsimplybecause Socrates rejectstraditionalpoliticalmeans. Both in theApologynd theGorgias, e dissociateshimself rom heAthenianpoliticalprocess,arguing that it is hopelesslycorruptand that an honest manpursuing ustice "withinthe system"would be committing uicide (Ap3 lc-32e;Gorg 12d-19d,47 le-72b). The political haracter fthe missionis explicitly laimed in theGorgias:I think amone of thefew,nottosaytheonly ne,inAthens,whoattemptsthe trueartofstatesmanshiptehos lethosolitikeechne),nd theonlymanof thepresenttimewho manages affairs f state:hence, as the speechesthat makefrom imeto time re not aimed atgratification,utatwhat sbest insteadof what s mostpleasant ... (52 Id).12See Klosko 980.The historicalocratessnotoriouslyssociated ithxtremelyntellec-tualisticsychologicaliews.Asidefrom lato's arly ialogues, hemostmportantevidencesthat fAristotle.his sconvenientlyollectedndtranslatednto rench yDeman 1942:esp.82-116).13 ordatingocrates'mission,ee Burnet 915-16: 38-40. heevents urnet elies pon,esp.Aristophanes'seof ocratesshis hiefophistn heClouds,retaken or rantedbyPlato's ocrates;eeesp.Ap 19c.



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584 Western oliticalQuarterlyTo understandSocrates'mission, hen, ne mustrealize thathe pursuedapoliticalend, the reformof his fellowcitizens,but withoutrecourse topoliticalmeans.He lived and died intheconviction hat ogical argumentsalone were enough to sway people to the pursuitof virtue.If we compare the politicaltheoryof Plato's middle dialogues, fullyexpounded intheRepublic,t sclearthat here re enormous differences.Again reasons of space preclude a detailed discussionof these in thepresentcontext,so theycan only be mentioned.14To put matters ssimply s possible,Plato believesthemethodofSocratesto be inadequate,and he rejects t nthemiddledialogues.He does not see arguments loneas a suitablemeans of moral reform.15 his is what is implied in thepassage fromtheopeningof theRepublic uoted above. In keepingwithhisrejection fSocraticpsychologynfavor fthetripartite sychology fthe Republicand the middle dialogues, Plato is led to reject Socraticpoliticaltactics s well.According to Plato's view in the Republic,persuasion alone is notcapable of reforming orrupt ndividuals.Plato argues throughout hiswork hatvirtue onsists fa combination fpropermoralopinionsand aproperorderingofthepartsofthesoul,while the atter an be achievedonly throughan intensiveprocess of habitation nd conditioning. t isprimarilyhe need to mposethis rderupon hissubjects' ouls thatforcesthephilosophertoseekpoliticalpower.Plato believesthat ndividuals remostmalleable whenthey re veryyoung.Thus themoralreformermustcontrolhissubjects' arlyeducation,whichwouldbe primarily shapingofcharacter, ather han a processofintellectual ducation.16 Moreover,inlight fPlato'sstrong mphasison theeffects fthe social environmenton the souls of the nhabitants,hereformermusthave completecontrolover his entiresociety.He mustbe a kingas wellas a philosopher.Thenature and intendedresultsofmoral education in the ideal stateare ofcourse central themes of theRepublic nd are quite familiar.What isimportant orealizehere s that hisview mplies decisivebreakwith hepolitical actics fSocrates.Though Platobelievesthatthe deal statecanbe brought nto existencebya philosopher-kingRep473c-e; see Klosko1981), he believes that thephilosopherwithoutpower,thephilosopherliving n a corrupt society,must avoid politicalaffairs including aSocratic stylemission of reform.Such an individual "keeps quiet andmindshisown business." Like a manwhotakesrefugeunder a small wallfrom stormof dust or hail drivenbythewind,and seeingothermenfilledwith awlessness, hephilosopher s satisfiedfhe can somehow ive14 he break between theearly nd middledialogues is discussedatlength nKlosko 1977,and morebrieflyn Klosko 1981.15 A sensiblecritique f the SocraticmethodofmoralreformsgivenbyAristotlenBook Xof theNicomacheanthics, n the transition o thePolitics EN 1179a35 ff.).ThoughSocrates s not mentionedbynamehere, t sprobablethathe is thetarget fAristotle'sremarks (as Gulley points out [1968, pp. 135-38]). See also EE 1216b4-25; MM1183b8-18.16Esp.Rep400d-402a; for heshapingof the soulsofthe owest lass nthestate, ee Klosko1982.



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The nsufficiencyfReason nPlato's GORGIAS 585hispresent ifefreefrom njustice nd impiousdeeds, and departfrom twitha beautifulhope, blameless and content" Rep496d-e).

And so, I believe,the politicaltheoryof theRepublic epresentstherejection f theverydifferentolitical eachingoftheearly dialogues,ofSocrates.What I believecan be shown, nd this s the centralconcern ofthis ssay, sthat herejection f Socraticpolitical acticss a majorelementofthepolitical eachingof theGorgias. do not believe thatthishas beennotedbyanypreviousscholar.The reason forthis, s it seemstome, isthat it is not expoundedn the Gorgias,but is illustratedn the dramaticstructure fthe work. think his an be shownquiteclearly, nd infact,thoughunrecognized, s a prominentfeatureof the work. t should alsobe noted that, o theextent that Plato can be seen to be concernedwithSocraticpolitical actics nd their bviousshortcomingsn theGorgias,heaccount of Socrates'mission nd itsrelationship othepolitical heory ftheRepublic,s presentedbrieflynthis ection, sgivenstrong dditionalsubstantiation.II

I think t can be seen thatPlatomanipulatesthe dramatic lementsofthe Gorgiasto make some important points. The work is structuredaround a complex dramatic rony.That Plato employsvarioustypesofironyntheGorgiassclear. To cite n obviousexample,atone pointPolusmakesa lengthy ase forthe ifeof thetyrant, rchelaus, s the best of allpossible ives 470d-471 d). The irony sthatArchelauswas assassinated n399 B.C., and so,bythetimetheGorgiaswaswritten, lato's readers werewellaware ofthe drawbacksto hisparticular ifeofcrime. n fact, n thepseudo-PlatonicAlcibiadesI, Archelaus is cited as someone who led anunenviable life Ac II 141c-e).'7Along similarlines, a recurrentfeature of the Gorgias s Callicles'repeated prophecy hatSocrates'philosophicalwaysmight ne dayresultintraduction nd a trial t whichhewouldbe powerless o defendhimself(486ab; cf.52 lb-22c).This isan obvious dramatic rony, s are allusionstoSocrates'trial nd deathinotherdialogues.18n fact, iventhatnothing sknownof thehistorical allicles, t spossiblethat deeper dramatic ronypervadestheGorgias. f,as Dodds suggests,Calliclesactuallywasa politi-cal manofthekinddepicted n thework, t snot mprobable hat o littlesknownofhimbecause he was killed none of the multitudinous oliticalsquabblesduringthe astyearsof thePeloponnesianWars (1959: 13). Ifthis sinfact hecase,a new ight s cast onCallicles'argumentsnfavor fthepolitical ife,while none of Socrates'remarks anbe detected notherprophecypostventum,s at 519a he tellsCalliclesthat he Athenianpeople17Given that Archelaus was assassinated in 399, the same year in whichSocrates wasexecuted,atwhich ime Alcibiades was somefiveyearsdead, the use ofthis xample inAlc II is a seriousanachronism.sE.g., Tht172d-75b;Rep 494d-e, 517a, 337d (cf.Ap 38b-c).



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586 WesternoliticalQuarterly"will ayhold ofyou, fyou are not on yourguard" - as they urnedonPericles,Themistocles,Miltiades, nd Cimon.19

It is mycontention n thispaper that a more complicated rony lsopervades theGorgias, nd thatthis s used byPlato to movebeyond thepurelySocraticphilosophyof the early dialogues. In order to demon-strate his,however, must ntroduce concept. think tcan be seen thata silent ommentary n Socrates' mission s foundinthe dramatic ctionof a number of different ialogues, in the way Plato manipulatestherelationships etweenhis characters. ut as simply s possible, norder forSocrates to be able to persuade a given interlocutor f the need to bevirtuous,he mustbe able to establish and maintain a certainkind ofrelationshipwithhim,one characterizedbysome degree ofmutualun-derstanding nd trust.This kind of relationshipmust be in existence norder toinsurethat erious discussionof moralquestions spossible, hat,inotherwords, henecessary onditionsforpersuadingthat ndividualtobe virtuous re met. We can refer to thatkindof relationship n whichthese basic conditionsare metas the "dialecticalrelationship."Though it is not easy to sayexactlywhatthe dialecticalrelationshipconsists f, nd it snoteasyto be certain f ucha relationship xists nanygivendiscussionbetweenSocrates and an interlocutor,we need not bedirectly oncerned with these questions. For there are certaincases inwhich t is quite clear thatthe dialecticalrelationshipdoes notexist, ndtheseare all that need concernus here. It is especially pparent thatthedialecticalrelationshipdoes notexistwhen we see various interlocutorseitherrefusing ostatetheir rueconvictions n matters nderdiscussionor simply efusing oanswer Socrates'questions.It follows, hen,that nthesecases,thenecessary onditions or ogical persuasiondo not exist. nsuch cases Socrates cannot possiblysucceed in regard to the avowedpurpose ofhismission, o persuade hisfellow-citizensobe virtuous. naddition, n thesecases, Socrates cannotuse his powersof persuasiontoestablishhenecessary onditions or ogicaldiscussion.Theirvery bsencerenderspersuasionineffective.This series of themes oncerningmoralpersuasioncould be shown tobe a majorcomponentofPlato'sdepictionofSocrates' mission nan entireseries of dialogues. The remainder of thispaper willbe dedicated toshowing hat t sperhapsthecentral omponentof thedramatic ctionoftheGorgias. t willbe seen thatPlato uses thisaspect of theGorgiastodeliver n unmistakablemessageabouttheprospectsfor ocrates' missionofreform. or as Plato swell ware,Socrates sfightinggainstforces hatare too powerfulforhim. Like Sophocles' Oedipus, Socrates s not awareofexactlywhathe isup against;and likeOedipus, he is nevitably estinedto lose.In theGorgias, ocrates s explicitlyaid tospeak notonlyforhimselfbutforphilosophy swell 482a-b). The ironicmessageofthework sthat,inSocrates'hands,philosophy s dealta crushingdefeat. n a dialogue in19The interlocutorsn other works s well e.g., Laches,Charmides,uthyphro,epublic) recarefully hosen for ronicpurposes; see Strauss 1963: 63.



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The nsufficiencyfReason nPlato'sGORGIAS 587which ttempt fter ttemptsmade to setup a dialectical elationship hatwill ast, ocrates s eft alking ohimself, ecause nobodywillreply o hisquestions. In this duel betweena dialecticianand threerhetoricians,nwhichtime and again Socrateschastiseshis opponents fortheexcessivelength f their nswers,he is leftwithno recoursebuttoattempt oreachthemthrough heir wn rhetoricalmeans. In thiswork n whichSocratesexplicitlytatesthatunless he succeeds in convincinghis opponents,hehas accomplished nothing 472b-c),he is eftdiscoursing osomeonewhostilldisagreeswithhim.And ina workwhich bounds with llusionstothetypeoftacticspoliticalmen are able toemploy n theirdefense- a falseaccusation, eading to a trial and a sentence of death - the defeat ofphilosophy n the shattered ealm ofargument sseen to foreshadow hedoom of Socratesin the Atheniancourts.The entiredramatic ctionoftheGorgias annotbe summarizedhereindetail. Nor is thisnecessary.The work,ofcourse,ismade up of threedifferentiscussions, etweenSocrates, nd Gorgias,Polus and Callicles,in turn. Let it suffice o say that Socrates' discussionwithGorgias isgenerally ordial,and he is soon able to engineerhisopponent's refuta-tion.What is strikings theamount of attention ivento discussingthenatureofthediscussion tself, specially heattitudes f theparticipants.Three imesSocrates feels tnecessary o procureGorgias'explicit gree-mentabout the kind of attitudethatshould governtheirdealings.20Toillustrate hegeneral tenorof thismaterial, willquote one of Socrates'speeches at length:Now amafraid o refute ou estyou magine amcontentiouslyeg-lectinghepointnd ts lucidation,ndmerelyttackingou.Therefore,ifyou re a person fthe ame ort smyself,should egladtocontinuequestioningou: fnot, can et tdrop.Ofwhat ort mI? Oneofthosewhowould eglad obe refutedf say nythingntrue ndglad orefuteanyone lsewhomightpeakuntruly;utustas glad,mindyou, oberefuted s torefute,ince regard heformers thegreater enefit,nproportions it s a greater enefitor neself obe delivered romhe

greatestvil han odeliver ome neelse.For consider hat man annotsuffernyevil so great s a false pinion n thesubjects f our actualargument. ow fyou ay hat ou oo reofthatort,etusgoonwithheconversation;ut fyou hink ehadbetterrop t,etus havedonewithtatonceand make n end ofthediscussion457e-58b).Again,itshould be notedthatSocrates feels tnecessary omake similarpointstwice more as well.The debate between Socrates and Polus does not require detailedsummary ither.Onlya fewpointsmust be indicated.First, tshould benoted thatthedebate is filledwith quabbles and strife. romthebegin-ning, this is a recurrentfeature e.g., 466b, 466c, 466e-67b). Polus is20453a-c,54bc, 57e-58b. nemajor ifficultyn nterpretingheGorgiass relevant ereandshould ementioned:hework eems o be structuredround hedepictionf amoreor less formal erbal ompetitionanagan ogon),o theconventionsfwhichSocrates' emarks ere ould,perhaps, ear somerelationship.hiswouldmake heGorgiasimilar othePrt, s discussed nKlosko1979.



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588 Western oliticalQuarterlyfrequentlyeen to be uncooperative, nd Socrates has todraghimalong,almostforcing imto answer 468c,468d). Butwhat nterests s especiallyis the lengthly eries of exchanges which ensues when Socrates finallymanages to drive home his conclusion,forPolus simplydenies it (see467c-68e). As a necessaryprecondition oconvincingPolus of thetruth-fulnessofhisposition, ocrates must nformhim of the nature ofphilo-sophicaldiscussion. n theexchangesthatfollow, ocratesgivesthe mostcompleteaccount of these mattersfound anywhere n Plato's corpus.According to Socrates, he and Polus have been arguing at cross-purposes. Polus is a rhetor,whiledialecticand rhetorichave differentaims. The business of rhetoric s to create beliefs withoutknowledge,generallybefore assemblies of people (esp. 454e-55a). The rhetor isinterested ntheappearance ftruth,nd theproblemSocrates faces withPolus sthathethinks hat hetechniques f rhetoric reused in dialecticaldiscussions s well.Thus Socrates etsoutto nform imofthetruenatureofdialectic.Once engaged in a philosophicaldiscussion, hetorical evicesmustbe leftbehind.Once someone has enteredsucha discussion, ll hisopinionsare suspended.The only tandard of truth s mutualagreement,theonly ruthswhatbothparties cceptas true.Accordingly,heonlywayPolus can refute Socrates is by securinghis assent to the denial of histhesis.The opinionsofonlookers,ofthe entireworldoutsidethediscus-sion,are irrelevant:SOCRATES: .. you attemptto refute me in rhetoricalfashion,as theyunderstandefutingn the aw ourts. orthere,nepartyssupposed orefutehe therwhen hey ring orwardnumberfreputable itnessestoanystatementsheymaymake,whilst his ort frefutations quiteworthlessor ettingt the ruth;ince ccasionallymanmay ctuallyecrushed ythe number nd reputationsf the falsewitnessesroughtagainst im.Andsonowyouwill ind lmost verybody,theniansndforeigners,nagreement ithyouon thepoints oustate,fyou iketobring orward itnessesgainst hetruth f what say: .. (471e-72a).Polus can bring n all the witnesses n the world.Though a jury udgingthe case mightdecide inhisfavor, uch considerationshave no weight nphilosophicaldiscussion:"I, alone here beforeyou,do notadmitit,foryoufailtoconvinceme;you only ttempt, yproducinga numberoffalsewitnesses gainstme, to oust me frommyreality, he truth" 472b).Socratesgoes on to describe theotherformofrefutation,hatprac-ticedbydialecticians,which s a guidingprincipleof his mission:... ifonmypart fail oproduceyourselfsmy ne witness o confirmwhat say, consider have chieved othingf ny ccount owards he

matter f our discussion, hatevertmaybe; nor haveyoueither,conceive,nless act lone syour newitness,ndyouhavenothingodowith ll these thers472b-c).Thus, in contrastto Polus who cites various authoritiesto uphold thevalidity fhisview,Socrates affirmshattruth s tobe discovered withintheboundsofthediscussion,while verythingutsideofthis s rrelevant.



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590 Western oliticalQuarterlywhenpublicmenengage nyour tudies nddiscussions,hey requiteridiculous. he facts,as Euripides as t-Eachshinesnthat, o that ndpresses n,Allottinghere hechiefestart ' theday,Wherein e haply ansurpasshimself... (484d-e).

Calliclesdoes notexpecttowin thedebate. In fact,he cares little orthephilosopher'srealmof argument. t is theworldoutside thediscussionthat nterestshim,and it is thisworld thathe advises Socrates to heed.That whichhappens in theargumentmeans little o him,for he knowsthat he can alwayswalkaway.And ifhe walksawayfromthediscussionunconvinced, lthoughSocratesmayhave wonthedebate proper,he hasnot won much.The only waySocratescan triumph s ifhe can construct dialecticalrelationship ight nough to hold Callicles,and he proceeds to do so. (Socareful s his effort hat toccupiesalmost twopages: 486d-88b.) Socratesoutlines thenecessaryproceduresforthe discussionand insists hattheonly tandardof truth smutualagreement 487d-e). Though theconclu-sionsthat merge mightnotbe true nanyultimate ense,they re thebestpossiblefornow,and mustbe acceptedas true untilbetterarguments anbe found to replace them.Socrates believesthathe and Callicles shouldlivetheir ives naccordancewith he results f the rgument.Callicleshadundertaken to wean him fromphilosophy. If he can prove his case,Socrateswould be happy to comply:For assureyou hatf here sanyfault f onduct obe foundnmy wnlife t snotan intentional rror,butdue tomy gnorance;so I askyounotto break ffnthemiddle fyour ask fadmonishing e,butto makefullylear omewhat t s that ought opursue ndbywhatmeans mayattaint;and ifyoufindme nagreement ith ounow, ndafterwardsfailingodo what agreed o,regardmeas a regular unce andnevertroublenymore o admonishmeagain .. (488a-b).At leasttacitly, allicles too must eitherabide bytheresults f theargu-mentor show himself o be "a regulardunce."Though one mighthavethought hatCallicleswouldattempt o refuteSocrates,thisdoes not happen. Socratesasks thequestionsthroughout,undoubtedly ntending o convertCalliclesto hisviews. t should be notedthatthoughCallicles causes trouble fromthebeginning e.g., 489a), theargument tself ivesSocrates ittle rouble. After ixquick questions,hehas Callicles n a contradiction488b-89b),but Callicles rebels: "What aninveteratedriveller the man is Tell me, are you not ashamed to bewordcatchingtyourage, and ifone makes a verbalslip,to take that s astrokeof luck?" 489b-c).Callicles shiftshis ground and the discussionbegins again, but thegoing s farfrom mooth.Socrates can'tpinCallicles down. At east threetimes n as manyquestionshe has to ask himto clarifywhat he means(489d, 489e, 490b). As forCallicles' attitude:



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The nsufficiencyfReason nPlato's GORGIAS 591You referto food and drink and doctors and drivel: I mean somethingdifferent490c-d).What have clothes to do with t? 490d).Shoes - what have they o do with t? You keep on drivelling490e; andsee 490e-91a).

Socrates struggles along, upbraiding Callicles forcontinually shiftinghisground (491b-c). He finallysucceeds in drawing out the implications ofCallicles' views, forcing him to assent to a version of hedonism so extremehe could not possibly hold it.Callicles, however, does not allow himself tobe contradicted: "Then, so that my statement may not be inconsistentthrough my saying they are different, I say they are the same" (495a).Before continuing, Socrates secures Callicles' assurance that the view inquestion is his actual view, and this is the basis for the ensuing discussion(495c).Socrates unveils the firstof a matched pair of complex arguments(495c-97a). Callicles answers the questions grudgingly, but stillcommit-ting himself to the results of the argument (495d, 496c, 496d). However,when Socrates winds the argument to a close, Callicles refuses to acceptthe conclusion:CALLICLES: cannot followthesesubtleties f yours,Socrates.SOCRATES: ou can,butyouplaythe nnocent,Callicles.Justgo on a littlefurther....CALLICLES: cannot tellwhatyou mean. (497a-b.)

At this point Gorgias must intervene. As in other works,21 t is only theintervention of onlookers that keeps the discussion here from breakingdown.GORGIAS:No, no, Callicles,youmustanswerhim,forour sakesalso, thatthe argument maybe broughtto a conclusion.CALLICLES:But Socratesis always ikethis,Gorgias; he keeps on askingpetty, nimportant uestionsuntilhe refutesone.GORGIAS:Why,whatdoes thatmatter oyou? It is not foryoutoestimatetheirvalue;22so ust permit ocrates to refuteyou in such manneras hechooses.CALLICLES: Well then, proceed with those littlecramped questions ofyours, inceGorgias is so minded. (497b-c.)

The last exchange is revealing. Though Callicles can be induced to con-tinue, the debate means nothing to him, and it s only in the realization ofthis that he allows it to go on. Though Callicles will continue to answerSocrates' questions, his compliance is purely formal. He has no stake in theargument, and even this degree of cooperation will not last long.Thus we see the fundamental ironic tension built into the structure ofthe Gorgias. The work is constructed around contrasting progressions.Philosophically it reveals a constant deepening and intensification: from21 E.g., Protagoras335a if.);HippasMinor 373a ff'.); epublic344d).221incorporateDodds' revisionsof the text ntothe translationhere (see 1959, ad loc.).



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592 Western oliticalQuarterlythe natureofrhetoric,o a criticismf rhetoric n moralgrounds, o an indepth analysisof the moral argumentsthemselves,while the dialogueconcludeswith heachievementofheightsnotreached in anyof Plato'searlierworks, n the first f Plato's eschatologicalmyths.The dramaticactionof the workportrays carefully orrelatedcontrasting evelop-ment: from ome measureofcourtesy nd restraintntheargumentwithGorgias,to frequentoutbreaksof hostilitywithPolus, to the completecollapseofthediscussionwithCallicles.These diverging rogressions remanifestedmost clearlyfrom this point onward. Once the discussionresumes, we will see Socrates' relationshipwithCallicles deterioraterapidly,while t thesame time hesubjectmatter fthedebatecan be seento riseto the supreme heightsof moral philosophy.23

Callicles resumes answeringquestions,and Socrates attackswithasecond highly omplicated argument 497c-99b). Though Callicles con-tinues oanswer, gain thegoing s notsmooth 497e), and when Socrateshas completedhisrefutation, alliclesreactswith a shamelessvolte ace"(Guthrie1962-81: IV, 291). He neverheld the extremepositionhe hadearlier maintained- and repeatedlydeclared to be his true position(499b). Knowing full well what he is up against, Socrates gathershisstrengthobeginanew: "it eems must, s the old sayinggoes,e'en makethebest of what have got,and accept ust anythingyou offer"499c).But the worst s notbehindSocrates.Shortly fter hedebateresumes,itcollapses entirely.Callicles is unwilling o participate ny longer:CALLICLES: Whynot name ityourself, ocrates?SOCRATES: Well, fyou prefer t, will; nd do you, f seemtoyoutonameitrightlyay o; ifnot,youmust efutemeandnot etme havemyway.(504c.)

Socrates carries on virtuallylone. At theconclusion of each long ques-tion,heasks, Is this rue?" yesor no?"orsomething imilar, nd Calliclesmechanicallyyields an affirmativeesponse (504c-505c). But Calliclesdoes not remaineven thiscompliantfor ong.He expresseshiswishthatthedialogue end: "I have no idea whatyouare referringo,Socrates;doask someone else" (505c). And so thediscussionhas brokendown. Soc-ratescannotcontinueuntilhe can restore hedialecticalrelationship,ndhe cannotrestorethe dialecticalrelationship, ecause Callicles is simplyno longerinterested:SOCRATES: erygood. So now,whatshallwedo? Break off ur argumentmidway?CALLICLES: You mustdecide thatforyourself.SOCRATES: Why, hey ayone does wrongto leave off ven stories n themiddle; one should set a head on the thing, hat tmightnot go aboutheadless. oproceedwith he est fyournswers,hat ur rgument aypickup a head. (505cd.)23See Duchemin1943: 280-83. Notethesimilar tructureriedlander iscerns n theEuthydemus958-69: I, 183-84.



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The nsufficiencyfReason n Plato's GORGIAS 593Callicles is no longer biting."How overbearingyou are, Socrates " hereplies. Take my dvice and let this rgumentdrop,orfind omeoneelseto argue with" 505d).Given the presentcompany, Socrates has only one possible inter-locutor eft;he is forcedto continuetheargument lone, replying o hisown questions. Socrates attemptsto outline a new frameworkfor thediscussion 505e-506a), but the result s almost a parody of itself.TheproceduresSocratessuggests re those basic todialectic,butin thiscon-text,whenCallicles nunwilling oreply o thequestionsand nobodyelsevolunteers o take hisplace,there s no chance that heprocedureswillbeimplementedproperly.The patternwe have seendominatesthedebatebetweenSocratesandCallicles. At one pointCalliclesdoes seem to change. As theend of thedebate approaches, suddenly,almost inexplicably,Callicles appears toweaken: "It seems tome, I cannottellhow,thatyourstatements right,Socrates,but I share the common feeling. do not quite believe you"(513c). Socrates knows thereason forthis: "Because the love of Demos,Callicles, s there n yoursoul to resistme: .. ." (513c). But thoughSoc-ratesrealizes thathe has competition orhissubject's oul,hisfaith nhismethodis unshakeable. He is certain that he willeventuallyprevail: "ifhaplywe come to examine these same questionsmore than once, andbetteryou will believe. . ." (513c-d).But Callicles'weakening stemporary514e-15c),and there s ittleefttotell. Callicles s entrenched n hisviews, houghhe can neitherdefendthem nor criticize ocrates' position.Though, as Socrateshas said, theargumentstandsfirm fastened . . withreasonsof steeland adamant"(509a), and Callicles cannotbegin to undo thischain, thas no effect nhim.As we wind to a conclusion,Callicles' choice of howhe isgoingto iveis the same as it has alwaysbeen: he willpursuethepolitical ife 52 la-b),and he has no defense forhis position, xcept that Socrates'wayof lifemay one day result n his being triedon some false charge,withdireconsequences (52 c).It is the cruelestof ironies that theGorgias nds with thedialecticalrelationship estroyed, nd with tany possibilityfreasoned argument.Leftwithno otherrecourse,Socratesconcludesthediscussionwith taleofthetransmigrationf souls and an impassionedrhetorical xhortationforCallicles to follow hepathof the conclusions thathave come to light(527e).The Gorgiascould be called the tragedy of philosophy. Havingexplicitlymade thepointthathisopponentmustbeconvinced fhe is tobeaccountedsuccessful, ocrates s unable to convinceCalliclesofanything.Having gone toenormouspains tooutline theproceduresfordiscussionand constructdialecticalrelationship fter dialecticalrelationship,he isforcedto see thediscussioncollapse, and has to finish talone. And thispointcannot be overstated, ocrates,who assertsthathe is speakingnotfor himself ut forphilosophy, n thisconfrontationwiththreerhetori-cians,concludes the encounterwith a rhetoricalplea.



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594 Western olitical QuarterlyAlthough technically, having been leftunrefuted, Socrates is victori-ous in thediscussion, it s a hollow victory ndeed. It is limited to the realm

of argument and can have no repercussions in the outside world. ThusPlato's ironic message in the Gorgias sounds the death-knell for Socraticpolitics.As the preceding summary shows, this s nothing less than a majortheme of the work, and Plato's meaning is clear. Reason is unable toovercome those who refuse to listen to reason. To reach such individuals,the philosopher must resort to other means.To conclude, then, the problems Plato depicts concerning Socrates'inabilityto prevent discussions frombreaking down are not logical prob-lems. The very breakdown of the dialectical relationship, which is theproblem logic must overcome, renders its use ineffective.They are politi-cal problems. The philosopher cannot force people to listen,unless he hasthe means to force them. The slender hold of the dialectical relationshipmust be replaced by the might of the state.24

REFERENCESAdam,J. 1902. TheRepublic fPlato. 2 vols.Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.Allan, D. 1953. Plato:Republic ook . London: Methuen.Allen,R. E. 1970.Plato'sEuthyphrond the arlierTheoryfForms. ondon: Rout-

ledge and Kegan Paul.Barker,E. 1947. Greek oliticalTheory: lato and His Predecessors.ondon: Met-huen.Bloom, A. 1968. TheRepublic fPlato. New York: Basic Books.Burnet,J.,ed. 1900-07.PlatonisOpera.5 vols. Oxford: OxfordUniversity ress.Burnet,J., 1915-16."The SocraticDoctrine of the Soul." Proceedingsf heBritishAcademy: 235-59.Cornford, F. M. 1951. The Unwrittenhilosophynd OtherEssays.Cambridge:Cambridge University ress.Deman, T. 1942. Le temoignage'AristoteurSocrate.Paris: Les Belles Lettres.Dodds, E. R. 1959. Plato:Gorgias.Oxford: Oxford University ress.Duchemin,J. 1943. "Remarques sur la compositondu Gorgias."Revue desEtudesGrecques 6: 265-86.Friedlander,P. 1958-69. Plato. 3 vols. H. Meyerhoff, r. Princeton:PrincetonUniversity ress.Grube,G. M. A., tr. 1974. Plato'sRepublic. ndianapolis: Hackett.Gulley,N. 1968. ThePhilosophyfSocrates. ondon: Macmillan.Guthrie,W. K. C. 1962-81. A History fGreekPhilosophy. vols. Cambridge:

Cambridge University ress.Irwin,T. 1977. Plato's Moral Theory. xford: Oxford University ress.. 1979. Plato:Gorgias.Oxford: Oxford University ress.24Note on texts: ll quotations rom lato re based on the standarddition, f Burnet1900-07.Alldeparturesrom his re noted.



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The InsufficiencyfReason in Plato's GORGIAS 595Jaegar,W. 1939-45. Paideia. 3 vols. G. Highet, tr. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.Klosko,G. 1977. "The Politicsof Philosophy:The Origin and DevelopmentofPlato's PoliticalTheory." Ph.D. Dissertation,Columbia University.. 1979. "Toward a Consistent nterpretation f theProtagoras." rchiv urGeschichteerPhilosophie1:125-42.. 1980. "On theAnalysisofProtagoras 51B-360E." Phoenix 4: 307-22.1981. "Implementingthe Ideal State."Journal oPolitics 3: 365-89.1982."DemokiteretentheRepublic." istoryf olitical hought. :363-81.Lamb,W. R. M., tr.1925Plato:Lysis, ymposium,orgias.London: Heinemann.Pohlenz, M. 1913. AusPlatosWerdezeit.erlin: Weidmannsche.Sesonske,A. 1961. "Plato'sApology:Republic ." Phronesis .Shorey,P. 1933. WhatPlatoSaid. Chicago: University f Chicago Press.Strauss,L. 1963. TheCity ndMan. Chicago: University f Chicago Press.Walsh,J. 1964. Aristotle'sonception 1Moral Weakness.New York: ColumbiaUniversity ress.

g. klosko - the insufficiency of reason in plato's gorgias

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