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Col. G. I. Wilson, USMCR, Sgt. John P. Sullivan, LA County Sheriff's Dept., & Lt. Col. Hal Kempfer,· USMCR

Fourth-Generation WarfareIt's Here, And We Need New Intelligence-Gathering

Techniques For Dealing With It

On 11 September2001, an unthink­

IIblefourth-genera­tion idea moved

from the realm ofthe potential into

the relilm of reality.In II surprisingly

graphic, coordinat­ed, near-simultllne­

ous attack on theWorld Trllde Center

in New York and thePentllgon in

Wllshington, DC, thescourge of global

networkedterrorism brutally

assaulted theAmerican

homeland. Tbeseattacks mirroredthe rage of crimi­nals who use vio-

lence with perceivedimpunity to secure

political and socialends. Distinctions

between militaryand civilian were

suspended as aresult of the natureof tllrgets chosen by

IIIQlleda. We nowfllce a fourth-gener­

IItion opponentwithout II nlltion­

state base.

Our world and the nature of conflict are chang­ing. The ways we wage war and protect thepublic are also rapidly changing. The now-and­

future conflict is transnational and global; it includesthe American homeland and cyberspace and attackson civilians.

This "fourth-generation warfare" is manifesting itselfin highly compartmentalized, cellular, predatoryadversaries operating in networks outside the frame­work of traditional nation-states.

Urban operations, crime, and terrorism are now partof the same operational environment. We are wit­nessing them emerging and mutating into new formsof warfare, blurring distinctions between crime andwar. Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) movesbeyond terrorism, suggesting that terrorism will takeadvantage of that type of warfare's three main char­acteristics: the loss of the nation-state's monopolyon war; a return to a world of cultures and nation­states in conflict; and internal segmentation or divi­sion along ethnic, religious, and special-interest lineswithin our own society.

On II September 2001, an unthinkable fourth-gener­ation idea moved from the realm of the potentialinto the realm of reality. In a surprisingly graphic,

coordinated, nearly simultaneous attack on the WorldTrade Center in New York and the Pentagon inWashington, DC, the scourge of global networkedterrorism brutally assaulted the American homeland.

These attacks mirrored the rage of criminals who useviolence with perceived impunity to secure politicaland social ends. Distinctions between military andcivilian were suspended as a result of the nature oftargets chosen by al Qaeda. We now face a fourth­generation opponent without a nation-state base.

Our new adversaries are diverse and linked in unfa­miliar ways. Loose coalitions of criminal actors, guer­rillas, and insurgents who operate outside the nation­state now challenge national security capabilities thatwere designed to operate within a nation-state frame­work. Beyond that framework, our traditional struc­tures have great difficulties engaging such threats.

As Martin van Creveld noted in The Transformationof War, throughout most of man's time on earth warhas been non-trinitarian. Families waged war, as didclans, tribes, cities, monastic orders, religions, andeven commercial enterprises (e.g., the British EastIndia Company). They fought for many reasonsother than for the state-croplands, loot, women,slaves, victims to sacrifice to their gods, and even for

56 Armed Forces Journal INTERNATIONAL I October 2002

Fourth-Generation Warfare

The world of tod"y"nd tomorrow is

one domin"ted byconflict "nd r"n­

dom violencebetween tbe "b"ves""nd tbe "b"ve nots."

Those witb " con­flicting cu'tur"' or

religious ideology"re likely to cb"'­

lenge our suPeriori­ty Recording to tbeir

rules, not ours.Their modus

oper"ndi blur "ndwill continue toblur tbe distinc-

tions between crime"nd W"r, crimin"'"00 civil, comb"'""nt "nd non-com-

b"t"nt. TheirRetions will seek to

exploit tbe se"ms oftbe modern st"te's

inter_l "nd exter­n"' security struc­

tures. These emerg­ing cb"llengers willembr"ce unconven­

tion"' me"ns not"me_ble to conven­

tio_l responses.

the purity of their race. Often there was no formalarmy with ranks and uniforms set apart from thepeople; every male strong enough to carry a weaponwas a warrior.

CONTINUOUS CONFLICT

War and crime are increasingly interrwined, yieldingethnic enmity, refugees, displaced persons, andopportunities for criminal exploitation. These con­flicts are exploited and fueled by crime bosses, gangleaders, tribal chieftains, and warlords supported bynon-state soldiers (gangs, clans, and mercenaries).This adds to the complexity of threats, blurring thelines among peace, war, and crime.

These recurring bad actors-criminals, irregularrogue bands, warring clans, and gangs-operate large­ly at the low end of the technological spectrum, yet,

as we are increasingly seeing, they are beginning toexploit technology. The access to technology and cy­berspace by bellicose factions is facilitated by moneyfrom organized crime. Transnational criminal organi­zations (TCOs) are nerworked more than ever andcontrol large sums of money. It is not hard to imag­ine these entities going beyond their current co-op­tion of governments to actually capturing a state (andits war-making capabilities) to further their goals.

The world of today and tomorrow is one dominatedby conflict and random violence berween the"haves" and the "have nots." Those with a conflictingcultural or religious ideology are likely to challengeour superiority according to their rules, not ours.Their modus operandi blur and will continue to blurthe distinctions berween crime and war, criminal andcivil, combatant and non-combatant. Their actionswill seek to exploit the seams of the modern state'sinternal and external security structures. Theseemerging challengers will embrace unconventionalmeans not amenable to conventional responses.

Advanced technologies, once largely the sole domainof highly developed nation-states, are now findingtheir way into other hands and rogue nations. Tech­nical sophistication is no longer limited to membersof nation-states. High-tech applications for wagingwar-from advanced software simulation and GPSdata to high-resolution satellite imagery-are com­mercially available. Adaptive terrorist tactics are sur­facing that are central to fourth-generation warfare.

Post-modern conflict may be so ambiguous and dif­fuse that the conventional operational environmentmay all but disappear as a means of describing thissetting of conflict. The distinction berween "civilian"and "military" continues to erode and may-in manysenses-disappear. Actions will occur concurrentlythroughout all participants' depth, including theirsociety as a cultural, not just a physical, entity.Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in jointand coalition operations in a number of simultane­ous theaters of operations, both outside the UnitedStates and domestically within the US,as linesberween responsibility and mission become increas­ingly ambiguous.

MULTIPLE OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

Fourth-generation warfare will be found in a varietyof settings, spanning the spectrum of conflict fromroutine criminal activity and high-intensity crimethrough low- and mid-intensity conflict. Activitieswill often converge wherever one finds adversariesoperating outside the conventions of the nation­state. For example, peacekeeping and peace-supportoperations, humanitarian and consequence-manage­ment missions, counterterrorism, and counter­infowar missions may overlap, erupting in what for­mer Marine Corps Commandant General Charles C.Krulak described in a prescient 1997 speech to theNational Press Club as "Three-Block War."

Where the "three blocks" converge has been and willcontinue to be complicated by varying degrees ofcrime. Ethnic conflict is frequently exploited orexacerbated by organized crime and gangs to furthertheir goals. Warlords and terrorists engage in drugtrafficking to finance their campaigns. This complexmix places significant challenges and demands onindividual military operators and civil police.

Blending civil protection, police, and combat skillsdemands a high degree of situational recognition andknowledge to understand which response isrequired and when it is required. Individuals orsmall units must become adept at this kind of deci­sion-making, which presents large leadership chal­lenges at all ranks. To support the complex range ofactivities required to navigate fourth-generation con­flict, adequate intelligence, surveillance, and recon­naissance (including cultural intelligence and real­time active mapping and sensors) must be availableto skilled operators who can adapt their tactics andthe activities of small, independent-action forces to avariety of missions and circumstances.

INTELLIGENCE NEEDS

Intelligence is the foundation for determining thekind of war we might be entering and thwartingthose who would undermine national and interna­tional security. Simply put: Intelligence needs toprovide indications and warning (I&W), and human-

58 Armed Forces Journal INTERNATIONAL / October 2002

Fourth-Generation Warfare

URBAN OPERATIONS

Much of the potential battles pace of the future willbe urban. USforces, as weIl as those of our allies,will conduct urban expeditionary operations against

Armed Forces Journal INTERNATIONAL / October 2002

As tbe aftermatb oftbe WorldTrade

Center attack graph­ically demonstrates,

urban settings areextremely comPlex.

Tbe urban bat­tlescape or

operational spacepossesses subter­ranean, surface,

building, androoftop features.

Structures, subwaytunnels, enclosed

pedestrian bridges,trolley cars and

trams witb over­bead power, road­

ways, alleys, sewers,tunnels, and park­ing garages allow

multiple avenues ofapproacb, firing

positions, andobstacles. Under tbe

best of conditions,lines of sigbt are

diminisbed, inbibit­ing sensors andcommunications

capabilities. Aftera large bombing orcollapse of a bigb­rise building, ter­

rain recognition isfurtber complicated.

60

source intelligence (HUMINT) needs to discover anddiscern the plans and intentions of terrorists, gang­sters, warlords, and rogue regimes.

Sound intelligence is crucial. It must give us theclearest possible insights into situations, events, play­ers, and hidden agendas, so our leaders can decidequickly how or even if to engage. Intelligence mustbe able to warn of any potential surprises a warfight­er is likely to face.

Lack of situational awareness has long been recog­nized as a major impediment to executing appropri­ate courses of action. This shortfaIl applies not onlyto fourth-generation warfare and terrorism, but alsoto crisis and complex-incident management (Le.,peace operations, urban operations, counterterror­ism, complex humanitarian emergencies, conse-

quence management, and disaster response). \Veneed to anticipate and understand the dynamics ofthese issues, having not only knowledge dominancebut also, more importantly, dominance in understand­ing the context of the action, event, or engagement.

Consider the benefits of understanding the contextin urban operations. For example, the influence ofthree-dimensional terrain features and density arevital pieces of information for a commander facedwith executing a rescue mission, constabulary opera­tion, or providing humanitarian assistance in a thirdworld mega-city inhabited by gangs, criminalenclaves, and sprawling slums. A world of constantchange demands flexibility from intelligence net­works after realistic expectations have been estab­lished for intelligence-gathering operations. Forintelligence personnel, adapting and improvisingmust be a way of life.

terrorists, paramilitaries, and gangsters linked tointernationally networked organized crime. Some ofthese urban operations will be within the UnitedStates, supporting domestic law-enforcement andemergency-response agencies in coalition-type orga­nizational settings.

As history has repeatedly demonstrated, urban opera­tions are complex and brutal. Yet the current andfuture world landscape-not to mention our adver­saries-will make urban operations unavoidable.

As the aftermath of the World Trade Center attackgraphically demonstrates, urban settings are extreme­ly complex. The urban battlescape or operationalspace possesses subterranean, surface, building, androoftop features. Structures, subway tunnels,enclosed pedestrian bridges, trolley cars and tramswith overhead power, roadways, alleys, sewers, tun­nels, and parking garages allow multiple avenues ofapproach, firing positions, and obstacles. Under thebest of conditions, lines of sight are diminished,inhibiting sensors and communications capabilities.After a large bombing or collapse of a high-rise build­ing, terrain recognition is further complicated.

In Heavy Matter: Urban Operations'Density ofChallenges, noted urban operations scholar Dr.Russell Glenn observed that complexity is a featureof all urban operations. Among the factors notedare: compressed decision times, increased opera­tional tempo, and thousands, up to tens of thou­sands, of inhabitants per" cubic kilometer." Thesefactors promise to degrade command and control,complicate decision-making, and challenge intelli­gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts.Density, noise, and clutter make accurate, real-timesituational awareness an elusive goal.

The military and urban civil protection and emer­gency services (police and fire service) stand to gainmuch by working together to better understand theurban environment. As the Russians recently re­learned in Chechnya, urban operations are extremelydemanding and taxing. The World Trade Centerattacks demonstrated the complexity of the urbanenvironment in a modern, western megalopolis. Ourmilitary, police, and fire service will have to operatetogether in this urban environment to protect thepublic and counter terrorist criminals as the FourthGeneration continues to unfold.

INTELLIGENCE FOR 4GW: "EVERYONE'S BUSINESS"

A new intelligence paradigm needs to be crafted thatacknowledges realistic expectations for intelligence­related activities and specifies that intelligence is, infact, everyone's business. Forging this capability willrequire a definition of the threat environment, col­laboration among the military services and a varietyof actors (including the intelligence community andnon-traditional players such law-enforcement agen­cies), experimentation and, finally,implementation.

New tools and approaches are needed to sort perti­nent information from noise. In addition, we mustilluminate the mission-essential tasks of potentialadversaries by exploiting both traditional and nontra­ditional tools and the information infrastructurethrough better use of open-source intelligence(OSINT), deception, and development of cyber-intel­ligence (CyberINT). HUMINTis an essential element

Fourth-Generation Warfare

While many newskills IInd interll­

gency linkages areneeded, efforts tobuild bomelllnddefense will not

require II cold start.On tbe operlltionlll

IInd intelligencefront, innovlltive

structures, sucb liStbe Los Angeles

Terrorism EarlyWarning (TEW)

Group, bave beenbringing togetheremergency respon-

of this approach. Combining traditional tools,HUMINT,OSINT,and CyberlNT can assist in identify­ing the precursors and indicators of violence (suchas group mobilization, criminal exploitation, and pro­liferation of materials for weapons of mass destruc­tion) that may trigger a military (or a combined mili­tary-civil) response. Adopting the concept of "DeepI&W;"that is, extending sensing to capture emergingtrends and potentials prior to recognition of an overtthreat to minimize the foe's advantage, is essential.To do so, sensing, surveillance, and reconnaissanceefforts will require a flexible, integrated analysis andsynthesis component.

CIVIL PROTECTION

Meeting fourth-generation warfare threats to stabilityand security requires a direct and enduring commit­ment to forward-thinking military and civil readiness.

agencies. It is designed to provide the operational in- .telligence needed to quickly develop potential cours­es of action, move through the decision cycle, fore­cast potential events, and craft meaningful courses ofaction for interagency, interdisciplinary response.

Collaboration and partnership, such as interagency,interdisciplinary partnerships with law-enforcementagencies to explore and experiment with novel intel­ligence applications and approaches for the emerg­ing threat environment, should be explored. We needto focus sharply on what lies ahead, seeking ideasabout emerging and future conflict. We need to fur­ther develop and integrate our open-source intelli­gence, HUMINT,and cultural intelligence capabilities.To meet the threat of "now and future" warfare, ourintelligence must focus more on cultural and socialparadigms, not just military orders of battle.

ders from lllwenforcement, tbefire service, DoDentities, and tbe

medical and publicheilith communities

to provide indica­tions IInd wllrning

IInd operlltional netIIssessments for

several years.

While many new skills and interagency linkages areneeded, efforts to build homeland defense will notrequire a cold start. On the operational and intelli­gence front, innovative structures, such as the LosAngeles Terrorism EarlyWarning (TEW) Group, havebeen bringing together emergency responders fromlaw enforcement, the fire service, DoD entities, andthe medical and public health communities to pro­vide indications and warning and operational netassessments for several years.

The TEW model is a hybrid form, combining theattributes of networked organization to the tradition­ally hierarchical emergency-response disciplines. Byintegrating military support to civil authorities intoits on-going efforts, the TEW can speed the processof accepting follow-on military assistance and drawupon military planning skills (from local militaryentities such as the USMCat Camp Pendleton,California National Guard, 9th Civil Support Team) toenhance its process.

The TEW model involves collaboration among local,state, and federal law-enforcement and response

INTERSECTION OF CRIME AND WAR

Our adversaries span the globe. We face a shiftingconstellation of bad actors, competitors, sometimes­allies, non-combatants, and criminal opportunists.We will meet them in settings ranging from humani­tarian stability and support operations to terroristattacks, consequence management for complexemergencies, and ethno-religious cultural violence.

To be sure, our world and the nature of conflict arechanging. The ways we wage war and protect thepublic are also rapidly changing. We are witnessingemerging and mutating forms of warfare, embodiedby the blurring of crime and war, decline of thenation-state, increasingly lethal terrorism, and themanifestation of highly compartmentalized, cellular,predatory, networked adversaries.

We must learn from our experiences to adapt anddevelop new intelligence applications and approach­es to these emerging and evolving fourth-generationthreats at the intersection of crime and war. And wemust do so quickly, because fourth-generation war­fare is already here. !!ill

62 Armed Forces Journal INTERNATIONAL I October 2002