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Report to LWDC

Supporting Complex Warfighting –

The Future of Doctrine and Developing Army’s Knowledge Domain

July 2005

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SUPPORTING COMPLEX WARFIGHTING DEVELOPING ARMY’S KNOWLEDGE DOMAIN –

ARCHITECTURE AND MANAGEMENT

‘A good doctrine system not only increases the intellectual capital of the military, but also enhances confidence and [the] chance of success in an environment characterised by fear, terror and the fog of war.’1.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In October 2004 the Land Warfare Development Centre (LWDC) presented a paper on the future of Army’s doctrine to the Chief of Army’s Exercise. This recommended a significant shift in the way that Army develops and presents its knowledge. The imperative for the change is the increasing demands on the individual soldier when preparing for, and when on, operations. These growing demands are encapsulated within the concept of complex warfighting. Army is preparing to meet these challenges in a physical sense through its program to achieve a Hardened and Networked Army (HNA). The paper highlighted that knowledge provided the jagged edge of HNA and consequently there was a requirement to move to an electronic based system that incorporates all of Army’s knowledge sources, including doctrine. The key recommendations of this paper were agreed to at the exercise.

This paper briefly recaps and further develops the ideas outlined in the initial Chief of Army’s Exercise document. This includes outlining the broader context of supporting a learning culture within Army. The paper specifically sets out the architecture and management of the doctrine component within a wider knowledge domain. This domain encompasses the major sources of Army’s knowledge including doctrine, Standard Operating Procedures, lessons learnt and concepts among others. The objective of the domain is to create a user centric knowledge portal. A key outcome is that doctrine is responsive, relevant and up–to-date and which supports a wider learning and education agenda.

One of the major recommendations of the paper includes separating tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) from doctrine (while still maintaining the current thread of continuity between them). Doctrine is seen as being more enduring and it should therefore be made available in both hard copy as well as electronically. A key component of developing responsive and relevant doctrine is a robust lessons capability. The proposed model for this capability will maximise the input of operational experience and ensure the orderly analysis and development of lessons, including their endorsement and incorporation into doctrine and TTP.

The user interface for the knowledge domain will be based around a web based interface which includes a powerful search capability. It will allow users to access doctrine in a rich, interactive environment in a familiar way so that they can learn and develop understanding much better than is currently possible. The paper proposes that a modified version of the current doctrine hierarchy be used to organise the doctrine component within the domain. By using a knowledge element approach it

1. Inspector General Division, Doctrinal Development Responsibilities in the Australian Defence Organisation, Canberra, July 2003.

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will effectively reduce the size of the hierarchy through the removal of duplication. This will also allow strong linkages to be made between knowledge elements.

The management of the doctrine component will be built around maximising responsiveness and delegating authority to make amendments at the most appropriate level. While LWDC would maintain a central role in managing the domain, Training Establishments and sponsors would have the ability to modify TTP for which they are responsible.

The paper concludes with a discussion on the implementation issues associated with putting the knowledge domain in place. In particular, it looks at the key risks connected with the undertaking and proposes a number of strategies to mitigate the risk. The issues surrounding technical implementation are addressed in some detail.

Recommendations are made throughout the paper on making the concept a reality. Decision makers are directed to those issues that need to be addressed in the short term.

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INTRODUCTION

‘A perfect general would know everything in heaven and earth.’2

T.E. Lawrence

Reference: A. Land Warfare Development Centre, The Future of Doctrine in Supporting

a Hardened and Networked Army 2004-2012, Paper for Chief of Army’s Exercise 2004, Canberra.

Background The vision proposed for a Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) will result in a significantly altered Army to the one that exists today. The equipment and hardware elements that will form the physical force are, for the most part, either in place or in train. However, it is the intangible elements – the people, ideas and knowledge – that hold the key to success for the transition to a HNA. The role of doctrine and knowledge in contributing to the successful transition to a HNA was articulated in a Land Warfare Development Centre (LWDC) paper presented at the Chief of Army’s (CA) Exercise in October 2004 (reference A). This paper was endorsed by the exercise and LWDC was subsequently tasked to develop a plan to implement the vision.

In endorsing the vision for the future of doctrine, Army has agreed to significantly change the way in which it presents its doctrine. At the heart of this change is a move away from an ‘Industrial Age’ approach towards an ‘Information Age’ approach. This is much more than simply producing an electronic copy of existing doctrine and making knowledge accessible through networks. Rather it is a major change in the way that Army:

• thinks about its doctrine and recorded knowledge,

• allows users to access this knowledge,

• actively seeks to collect insights and knowledge from experience,

• provides opportunities for users to collaborate in sharing and developing knowledge,

• supports users’ understanding and interaction with doctrine and knowledge,

• ensures its doctrine and knowledge is responsive to new developments, and

• manages its doctrine and knowledge.

In particular, this new approach sees doctrine as one, albeit the major, part of Army’s Knowledge Domain (explained on page 5). This domain not only includes doctrine but a range of other related knowledge elements. A key component is that of lessons and the ability for users and sponsors to access observations and lessons.

2. T.E. Lawrence, letter to Captain Basil Liddell Hart, 1933. As quoted in Royle, T., A dictionary of military quotations, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989. p105.

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Scope of Paper This paper seeks to advance the concepts outlined in the LWDC CA Exercise paper by describing the way in which doctrine in particular, and knowledge more generally, is organised and managed. It will provide a general architecture of the knowledge domain but the bulk of the paper details the future shape of the architecture describing the doctrine component. This knowledge domain architecture is not a technical information architecture3 which will be addressed separately, once the overall design is agreed. The paper reviews the management of the doctrine component in detail and makes some general comments on the knowledge domain management. The paper will conclude with discussion on the issues surrounding transition and in particular the technical issues to be considered.

Assumptions In developing this paper the following assumptions were made:

• The system proposed would reach a steady state by 2012.

• Current efforts to remediate Land Warfare Doctrine will continue.

AIM The aim of this paper is to describe the doctrine component of the knowledge domain which is sufficiently agile to meet the demands of a rapidly changing and complex environment.

CURRENT STATE

Drivers for Change Army’s doctrinal system has generally supported training and operations effectively since the Second World War. During this time doctrine embodied much of Army’s knowledge and evolved with changes to Army’s operational focus and the lessons gained from operational commitments. In recent years the ability of this system to keep pace with change and demands has diminished. A key failing of the current system is its inability to deliver highly responsive and up-to-date doctrine, with much of this due to the length of the production cycle for producing hard copy publications (particularly printing times) and lack of linkage with recent operational lessons.

3 Information Architecture is defined as: the art and science of structuring knowledge (technically data), and defining user interactions. In information system design, data modelling is the analysis and design of the information in the system, concentrating on the logical entities and the logical dependencies between these entities. Data modelling is an abstraction activity in that the details of the values of individual data observations are ignored in favour of the structure, relationships, names and formats of the data of interest, although a list of valid values is frequently recorded. It is by the data model that definitions of what the data means is related to the data structures. Source: www.wikipedia.com

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The lag in producing up-to-date doctrine is becoming unacceptable. This is because of the changing nature of military operations and the role that individuals will play within this environment. The challenges that individuals will face in Army’s complex warfighting4 construct will require a more knowledgeable and broadly developed soldier. This requirement is encapsulated in the stated importance of the strategic corporal across the spectrum of operations. At the heart of this concept is the fact that tactical actions at the lowest level can have strategic implications.

The complex warfighting construct highlights the fact that modern technology provides adversaries with significant agility and lethality. Defeating such an enemy will require Army to have people who are able to innovate and adapt to rapidly changing and ambiguous circumstances.

Developing an effective strategic corporal will not occur within a prescriptive and rules based framework. It requires individuals who can make sound judgements, based on understanding developed through not just comprehensive training, but more importantly, through education. While Army has developed outstanding junior leaders through out its history, the demands of future operations are perhaps unprecedented and will therefore require an enhanced approach. The key to this approach is summed up in changing the focus from ‘what to think’ to ‘how to think’.

Achieving this change in focus is not a simple task. Successful change will require adjustments to the many contributing aspects of personnel development. Understanding the linkages between training, education, culture, knowledge and doctrine are an important precursor to making these changes5. In establishing the foundations for this change it is asserted that providing access to relevant and up-to-date doctrine and knowledge is essential. In thinking about Army’s doctrine and knowledge there is a need to move from a ‘need to know’ to a ‘need to share’ mind set. The development of a knowledge domain, including the doctrine component, provides a key building block in making this change.

The Doctrine Puzzle

The LWDC paper for the CA Exercise defined the key drivers that will shape a successful transition to responsive and relevant doctrine to support HNA. These key drivers form the pieces of the ‘doctrine puzzle’. These same pieces apply equally to the broader notion of Army’s knowledge that is described in this paper. To ensure success, Army needs to fit each of these pieces together in a coherent and mutually supporting way. The puzzle is illustrated in Figure 1 and a brief description of each piece is then provided.

4 See Army Headquarters, Complex Warfighting, Canberra, 7 May 2004. 5 For a detailed discussion of the linkages between culture, doctrine, education and training see Smith, Lawes, Ryan (2004) Changing the Army Culture Preparing for the Hardened and Networked Army in Weapons, Webs and Warfighters Land Warfare Conference Proceedings, Melbourne, DSTO, pp 267–278.

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Figure 1: The Doctrine and Knowledge Puzzle

Knowledge Domain. The knowledge domain comprises Army’s knowledge, training, learning and doctrine. Doctrine is a major part, but not all, of Army’s knowledge, being the embodiment of its explicit knowledge. Effective doctrine must draw on all of Army’s knowledge both in an individual and organisational sense. This knowledge will be both explicit and tacit in nature and much of it will already be codified. Exploiting the knowledge domain requires the ability to identify where knowledge resides, both inside and outside of Army, and how to provide it effectively to Army personnel.

Delivery. An appropriate delivery method is required to ensure that doctrine and knowledge is both relevant and responsive to users. Currently doctrine is delivered as hard copy manuals, albeit backed up electronically through the Army Doctrine Electronic Library (ADEL), with the focus being on the publication. An electronic based delivery system will enable users to access doctrine and other knowledge immediately, once changes are authorised. This is an important factor in enabling responsive and relevant doctrine and knowledge.

Technology and Tools. The increasing sophistication of information and communications technology (ICT) provides a range of options for the development, management and dissemination of knowledge. Responsive and relevant knowledge requires a robust supporting infrastructure and useful tools to maximise its value. The infrastructure needed to support the current hard copy based delivery while not insignificant, is based around production and distribution. A transition to electronic based delivery of doctrine is likely to have implications on infrastructure in barracks, training establishments and on operations. Currently doctrine in a published book form provides no valuable tools for users. There is the potential for doctrine to incorporate a range of tools for users that include simulation, training, validation, multimedia and enhanced user interfaces.

ManagementLessons

Delivery

Technology and Tools

Content

Investment

Knowledge Domain

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Lessons. Making doctrine a living body of knowledge will require the more rapid incorporation of the observations and lessons from training and operations. This is key to ensuring that Army’s knowledge remains relevant to all users. The ability to robustly incorporate lessons would see observations and lessons being derived from a wide range of sources.

Content. Doctrine is currently presented in a narrative style with fixed graphics and text with little emphasis on assisting with learning. Training within Army’s schools and institutions is based upon doctrine. There would therefore appear to be a need to more closely link presentation of doctrine contents to the requirements of training. In particular, doctrine could better support individual learning and subsequent application of the knowledge gained.

Management. A flexible and suitable system of management is required to ensure that doctrine and knowledge can be developed to meet Army’s need in 2012. Management of doctrine is currently centrally controlled, although the development is more widely spread. This manifests itself through sponsorship of publications being undertaken by a range of institutions. Central management has the benefit of a single point of accountability, however, it does not cultivate wider ownership of doctrine and resulting commitment to keep it relevant.

Investment. In determining the future shape of its doctrine and knowledge, Army will have to be conscious of the requirement to adequately resource the knowledge development process in an environment of increasing manpower constraints. While contractor support is part of the answer it is unlikely to provide the whole solution. Forward looking, capable and bright people are needed to contribute their talents to developing doctrine. The revitalisation of Army’s doctrine continues and the success of the program is predicated on the allocation of sufficient resources. This will is particularly important as the knowledge being developed by this process will be transferred to the future knowledge domain. The resourcing of HNA appears to contain no component for doctrine or knowledge. A modest investment in knowledge, however, is likely to lead to significant improvements. The absolute amounts required to achieve this would be a fraction of that being invested into the equipment component of HNA.

The preferred option for fitting these pieces together was described in reference A as follows:

Knowledge Domain. Doctrine is supported and in turn supports Army’s training, education, culture and knowledge. This manifests itself through doctrine that is:

• highly interactive;

• tailored to different learning styles; and

• responsive and relevant to the needs of users.

Delivery. Doctrine and knowledge is electronically delivered and is available on both the intranet and internet. It is available on Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) allowing users to personalise and contextualise knowledge.

Technology and Tools. Army’s knowledge makes use of a wide range of multimedia tools to enhance learning and application in training and operations. Users are able to access simulation tools to test their knowledge and assist with practical application.

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Lessons. Army’s knowledge responds rapidly to validated lessons from training and operations. The Centre for Army lessons (CAL) is the agency that undertakes this, but it does so through close linkages with stakeholders.

Content. Army’s knowledge is held electronically in knowledge elements that enable users to pull down, contextualise and personalise knowledge. The emphasis on ‘how to think not what to think’ is pervasive. It reflects current practice but has an eye on the future through the judicious incorporation of emerging concepts and ideas. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are electronically available and are tightly aligned with doctrine but remain a unit and formation responsibility. For users of doctrine, the content actively supports learning and is highly interactive.

Management. Management of doctrine and the knowledge domain remains the overall responsibility of the LWDC including specific responsibility for philosophical and application aspects of doctrine. Relevant Training Establishments (TE) and sponsors have oversight or authority for procedural elements of doctrine. SOP are managed under existing arrangements.

Investment. Army will continue to invest in doctrine and knowledge development and delivery. Importantly it has also ensured that its best people are contributing to doctrine either through it being their primary employment or through collaboration on specific doctrine elements.6

Where Are We Now? The current approach to providing knowledge is not user centric. Knowledge is widely scattered and not easily accessible, particularly outside of training environments. There are few linkages between the various stores of knowledge that Army holds and few of these allow sharing by electronic means. The current model for Army’s knowledge is illustrated in Figure 2.

In specifically reviewing doctrine, it is generally agreed that the doctrine process is delivering a product that meets most of Army’s current needs and expectations. However, it is widely accepted that doctrine is not particularly responsive and does not support a broader learning and development agenda. This is because new ideas and developments can not be quickly and widely incorporated. While the system can be highly responsive (such as when important safety issues arise) this responsiveness is both personnel and resource intensive.

Management of doctrine is currently centrally controlled, although development is more widely spread. This manifests itself through sponsorship of publications being undertaken by a range of institutions. Central management has the benefit of a single point of accountability, however, it does not cultivate wider ownership of doctrine and resulting commitment to keep it relevant.

A management system that enables doctrine to be quickly developed and released will be important in ensuring that doctrine which is released is both valid and timely. It is arguable that the current management mechanism is top heavy and unresponsive. Senior commanders that in many cases have only scant knowledge of, and insufficient time to get to understand complex subject matter, are responsible for its authorisation.

6 LWDC, op.cit., p22.

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LessonsDoctrine

Intranet &Internet

Concepts

SOP

Overseasknowledge

LinkageElectronic Linkage

TrgEstab

Figure 2: Army’s Knowledge – Present7

Army’s Future Approach to Knowledge In order to support the demands of the future operational environment as described in complex warfighting, Army needs to transform its approach to developing, accessing and sharing knowledge. This knowledge has to be made available to support both training and education, and eventually the conduct of operations. In particular it has to support the move from ‘what to think’ to ‘how to think’ and the need for ongoing learning.

The implications of this change are manifold with the most important being:

• the ability to contextualise knowledge;

• tools to support active learning, most notably the use of multimedia;

• the ability to practice and reinforce learning, most notably through simulation and other modelling tools; and

• up-to-date knowledge from a variety of sources.

These challenges are unlikely to be met by Army’s current system for disseminating knowledge. The current system does not provide the depth of support required to trainers, trainees or those preparing for, or on operations. Meeting these challenges requires a change in Army’s approach and notion of doctrine. This change was described in the LWDC paper and its endorsement at the CA Exercise has important

7 Note that the strength of linkage is indicated by the thickness of the line. This model is indicative only.

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and significant consequences. Making these changes will not be simple but they are achievable. The risk of not changing could be a failure to develop Army’s people to meet the demands of complex warfighting.

THE FUTURE ARCHITECTURE

Key Principles The preceding section highlighted the issues of Army’s current doctrine and knowledge system while outlining the aspirations of the future system. This future system can best be described as a ‘user centric knowledge portal’. The aim of a future system is to provide the most up-to-date knowledge to the user in order to assist them in meeting their needs to do their job. Turning this into reality will be guided by the following principles:

• User at the centre – providing the user with knowledge in the form that is best suited to their specific circumstances is the key principle. Aiming to make the users’ access to knowledge the focus rather than administrative simplicity should be foremost in the design of the architecture.

• Electronic based – an electronic based system is most likely to provide the required responsiveness and accessibility. While the system will be electronic based, there will be a requirement for some elements of knowledge to be printed. These will be the more enduring sources of knowledge such as that currently captured in the philosophical and application level of doctrine.

• Knowledge element based – knowledge will be organised and produced in discrete elements. This will allow elements to be linked and for individual changes to be made quickly. It is one the key enablers for developing responsive and relevant knowledge.

• Multiple sources – the system will seek to provide the user with access to as many sources of knowledge as possible. This allows the user to explore and draw upon a variety of valid knowledge sources. This is an important element in supporting the ‘how to think’ requirements of individual education and development.

• Interactive tools – the use of interactive tools will significantly enhance the useability and impact of doctrinal knowledge. It will support retention and the ‘how to think’ requirement. These tools will include imagery, video, simulation tools (including gaming), animation and audio.

• Accessible in all environments – the development of the system should allow access for users, regardless of the environment i.e. during training, in barracks, on operations etc… This is not a simple principle to apply and is likely to be governed by technology considerations.

• Pull and push of knowledge – the system will allow users to ‘pull’ knowledge as is appropriate to their needs. It will also allow knowledge to be ‘pushed’ to users when required. An example of knowledge that needs to be pushed would be changes to weapons handling procedures and safety.

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The Knowledge Domain Army’s knowledge sits within the broader context of Army’s culture and its approach to training and learning. This is illustrated in Figure 3 and while it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these linkages, enhancing this broader context is an important underpinning of the project8.

Doctrine is a major part, but not all, of Army’s knowledge. Doctrine is the embodiment of Army’s explicit knowledge. Knowledge also resides in TE, in other parts of Training Command –Army, with individuals, the many organisations within Land Command – Army, among others. It is crucial to understand the linkages that exist between these knowledge elements such that developments in one area are reflected in all other areas. Without consistent enhancements across all knowledge elements, the impact and effectiveness of initiatives will be limited. Thus focus must shift from doctrine alone to incorporation of all knowledge available and relevant to Army. This body of knowledge is termed the knowledge domain.

This represents a major change for Army and as identified earlier it is an essential change in developing personnel to operate successfully in the future operational environment.

ARMY

CULTURE

LEARNINGTRAINING

KNOWLEDGE

DOCTRINE

Figure 3: Knowledge Domain and its Systemic Relationships

Army’s knowledge domain is defined by the following characteristics:

• sources of knowledge;

8. See reference A for additional discussion on this idea. For a detailed discussion of the linkages between culture, doctrine, education and training see Smith, Lawes, Ryan (2004) Changing the Army Culture Preparing for the Hardened and Networked Army in Weapons, Webs and Warfighters Land Warfare Conference Proceedings, Melbourne, DSTO, pp267–278.

Recommendation It is recommended that Army adopt the seven principles for developing the knowledge domain.

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• users of the domain;

• flows between knowledge sources and between sources and users; and

• tools that are used within the domain.

The broader context of the knowledge domain within the training, operational and development activities of Army is illustrated in Figure 4. The importance of this diagram is that it illustrates that the development of a knowledge domain is aimed at enhancing more than just training outcomes. Rather it is aimed at directly supporting success on operations and contributing to better capability outcomes. This will be achieved not only through the provision of relevant and responsive knowledge gained from operational experience, but through collaboration.

Operations(BMS/BCSS)

Training (DRN)

KnowledgeDomain

CapabilityDevelopment

Figure 4: The Future Knowledge Domain and its Broader Context9

Sources of Knowledge. The sources, flows and relationship of knowledge with the user are illustrated in Figure 5. Not shown in the diagram, but built within the various sources, are the tools that will assist the user with understanding knowledge within the source. This includes the ability for users to be able to exchange ideas and collaborate on projects or areas of mutual interest.

9 BMS – Battle Management System as to be delivered by Project Land 75. BCSS – Battle Command Support System. DRN – Defence Restricted Network.

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PolicyLegislation

Doctrine

www

Concepts

SOP

Overseasknowledge

TrainingMaterial

Lessons SafetyTTP

ADFWC& Other Services

Figure 5: The Future Knowledge Domain Architecture

The sources of knowledge and their attributes envisaged in the future knowledge domain are described as follows:

• Doctrine – Doctrine would now refer to the more enduring and higher level knowledge that mostly resides within the philosophical and application levels of the current hierarchy. It is expected that this knowledge would still be required to be printed in hard copy up to at least 2012. This is principally because this level of knowledge is more enduring and evolves gradually. It can be kept up-to-date using current mechanisms. In addition, hard copy versions will assist those whose learning styles are not adapted to electronic systems.

• Tactics, Techniques and Procedures – TTP are viewed as a separate element to doctrine in this construct, however, TTP are closely aligned to doctrine which provides the basis of their development. Consequently, TTP reside in a tightly linked but separate store. They are managed differently from doctrine (see next paragraph) as they are more responsive to lessons and other developments (such as the introduction of new technology).

• Standard Operating Procedure – SOP are included within the knowledge domain so that they can easily accessed by a networked force. This will support rapid grouping and regrouping as envisioned in complex warfighting10. The electronic linking of doctrine, TTP and SOP will allow formations and units to use the most up-to-date authorised procedures for their SOP. This will enhance the natural linkages between the three closely related elements. It would also ensure consistency within formations, something that is currently lacking. Naturally,

10 The importance of this is articulated within Complex Warfighting ‘The combined arms philosophy institutionalises versatility, agility and orchestration: it accustoms individuals and teams to tailored, task-specific, agile mission groups that can be rapidly reorganised, regrouped and re-tasked as a situation develops’. AHQ, op.cit., pp 16-19.

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management of SOP would reside with commanders. This is expanded upon in subsequent sections.

• Lessons – the role of lessons in the knowledge domain is crucial to developing responsive doctrine and knowledge. A mature lessons capability would provide the following:

o Multi-source – observations would be sourced from operations, training and external sources (such as other armies). Collection would be by dedicated personnel (ideally belonging to the CAL) or by individuals and units The aim should be to maximise the input of observations into the system.

o Observations – observations will be posted on the domain for all to view. Posting can be by individuals, from any sub-unit/unit or organisation with access to the knowledge domain. Importantly they will be flagged in a variety of ways to highlight their status. This would include flags such as ‘unendorsed’, ‘theatre specific’, ‘unit specific’ etc… Once observations are validated as lessons they would be forwarded to the manager of the relevant knowledge source for inclusion or amendment as appropriate.

o Lessons – once analysed and validated the lessons are then available for inclusion in doctrine, TTP and subsequent use in training and operations. Lessons might also be flagged for their level of endorsement or restrictions on their use (for instance they might be theatre specific).

• Policy and legislation – the knowledge domain would provide access to current policy and legislation. These form a small but important part of Army’s knowledge and access to them is highly useful not only in the training environment but also the operational environment. Development of this part of the knowledge domain would be done in conjunction with the responsible agencies within Defence.

• Safety – a broad range of safety issues could be contained within this element of the knowledge domain. This would include not only safety that is currently incorporated within doctrine but broader issues such as Occupational Health and Safety, HAZMAT safety etc. Consideration needs to be given if this is in fact a separate element within the knowledge domain.

• Training Material – a significant amount of knowledge is held by TE. While only a small amount of this might be readily accessible to all users, it would support consistent training across TE and within Land Command units. Most importantly it would ensure that training materials are linked directly with up-to-date doctrine and TTP. It would be built on the existing work being undertaken on Technology Based Training.

• Concepts – the knowledge domain would allow emerging concepts to be viewed in the context of how it may influence existing knowledge. It would allow comment and input from a broader audience including such organisations as Defence Science Technology Organisation (DSTO) and activities such as experimentation. It would also allow capability developers greater access to new ideas and emerging concepts.

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• Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre and other Services – there would be significant advantage in the knowledge domain being able to access the knowledge contained within • Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre (ADFWC). As Army would not seek to duplicate existing joint doctrine this would be an important element. The development of the knowledge domain will therefore require close liaison with ADFWC and potentially the other Services11.

• External Knowledge – the knowledge domain should have the ability to provide direct linkages to external sources of knowledge – most notably allies and coalition partners. To provide this access Army, in conjunction with Defence, would have to work on protocols with allies for the appropriate sharing of knowledge. This might include the ability to access each others lessons capability12.

• World Wide Web – access to the world wide web (www) will provide the ability to review its significant resources. Army will have to decide if it wants to provide password controlled access to this knowledge domain. There is a substantial overhead in allowing universal access to the www but it provides greater flexibility to the user by doing so.

Users. The user will be the focus of the knowledge domain. Users will have a wide range of requirements for the domain that will depend on their situation. In general the two major categories of users are those on operations and those undertaking training. For simplicity those on operations include Land Command units undertaking collective training and those in training include those within a barracks environment and undertaking individual training.

Access to the domain in an operations setting will be through the Battlefield Management System (BMS) – the output from Project Land 75 Phase 3.4 and Battle Command Support System (BCSS) (and successor programs). The BMS project does not currently include the requirement to access a knowledge domain as envisaged in this paper. Access in a training environment would come through the Defence Restricted Network (DRN). Reference A outlined the potential for users to employ a PDA to store and use knowledge that they have identified as being important (or given guidance that it is important). The feasibility and desirability of this is outside of the scope of this paper but will require a decision.

An issue that requires decision is whether user access to the knowledge domain is required through the internet13. Providing internet access through a secure access point provides advantages for Army in developing a culture of learning. The enhanced access provided by the internet will allow greater opportunities for members of Army to engage with, and collaborate within, the knowledge domain. It is assessed that 85 per cent of homes will have personal computers and internet access by 201014 and makes for a compelling argument in providing internet access to the knowledge 11 It is noteworthy that ADFWC is very interested in Army’s work on the knowledge domain. It is apparent that Army has taken an intellectual lead on an aspect of professional development that has applicability to both the other services and the joint environment. 12 Note however that lessons from an external lessons centre would still only constitute an observation until analysed and validated. 13 See LWDC, op. cit., pp11-12. 14 Figures derived from CRN Australia http://www.crn.com.au/story.aspx?CIID=22729&eid=4&edate=20050429 and Australian Bureau of Statistics http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/7599F94FFDBADCCBCA256D97002C8636?O

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domain. However, it is noted that this access comes with an overhead in managing right of entry to restricted areas and while maintaining security will be achievable, it will come with a cost. Deciding if this is a cost effective option is an important decision for Army.

In deciding about access issues for users, Army must seek to leverage the most of its investment in HNA. The ability for users to extract knowledge from the network should be as equally important as accessing information which supports tactical decision making.

Flows of Knowledge. It is envisaged that most of the knowledge flows will be from users ‘pulling’ information to fulfil their individual needs. The section on presentation (page 18) will highlight that the ability to pull information is relatively straightforward in an electronic environment.

There will also be a requirement to develop a ‘push’ capability within the knowledge domain. This will enhance the responsiveness of the Army’s knowledge by helping to ensure that users are kept up-to-date on changes. High priority areas for this would be with issues surrounding safety. Users can be informed of changes to the knowledge domain that will have an impact on them. There are a number of mechanisms by which this can be achieved in a general way, however, the aim should be to push updates to specific users who need to know. This becomes an increasingly complex task when seeking to target small groups of specialist users, but it will add substantially to the knowledge domain’s agility if it is achievable.

The success of the knowledge domain rests on the ability of knowledge to flow between the various stores and users, and for information to be meaningfully exchanged. This presents a major hurdle, however, the increasing robustness and sophistication of ICT, and the increasing maturity of the Defence Information Environment (DIE) means developing a knowledge domain is not an overwhelming task. For Army the immediate challenge is to ensure that current work on knowledge (most particularly the ongoing production of doctrine) is configured so that it is ready to transition to the knowledge domain with little modification. This might include such measures as producing knowledge elements in Extensive Markup Language (XML) and the inclusion of metadata15.

Tools. Reference A highlighted the significant advantages to be gained from incorporating a range of tools to assist with understanding, accessibility, application and learning. Army has a modest capability to develop many of these tools and this capability is mostly resident within the Training Technology Centre (TTC).

The development of tools will not be an inexpensive undertaking. It is arguable that the cost of development of tools will reduce in relative terms over time as libraries of artefacts are progressively developed, enabling software becomes more efficient and development organisations more adept at building tools as they master the mechanisms and gain in experience. In addition, contractor capability and capacity to produce such tools will continue to expand in a global market.

15 Metadata is defined as data about data. Metadata describes how and when and by whom a particular set of data was collected, and how the data is formatted. Metadata is essential for understanding information stored in data warehouses and has become increasingly important in XML-based Web applications. Source: www.webopedia.com

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Regardless of these developments it is apparent that demand for tools will be far greater than Army’s capacity or resources. Consequently, the tasking of Army’s capability to provide these tools needs careful management and prioritisation. In particular, LWDC needs work closely with TTC to ensure the resource is most appropriately and effectively applied.

Organising the Doctrine Component One of the most important issues for resolution in describing the architecture of the knowledge domain is how the doctrine component will be structured (this includes both enduring doctrine and TTP). The structure for organising this knowledge is described as taxonomy16. The current taxonomy is the doctrine hierarchy which is illustrated in annex A. The move to an electronic based knowledge domain offers the opportunity to review and adopt a new approach to organising doctrine.

A key feature of a knowledge domain and electronic system is the use of knowledge elements. These elements are discrete and stand alone. Most importantly they are linked to other elements through metadata.

In assessing the different options for a knowledge domain, it is important to note that the underlying organisational schema will only be partially visible to the user. The section on Presentation describes what the user will see. The schema sits behind the user interface and describes a management and coordination framework.

The options with associated advantages and disadvantages in organising doctrinal knowledge are:

• Current Hierarchy – The current hierarchy provides a useable framework, albeit the content within the framework would be ‘thinner’ that is currently the case as duplication would be removed. It would require some adjustment to the Application level elements to reflect a new approach. The current hierarchy is attached as annex A.

o Advantages – a proven and readily understood framework. It allows easy allocation of responsibility based on existing sponsorship lines. It allows rapid transition of knowledge elements from the current

16 A taxonomy may refer to either a hierarchical classification of things, or the principles underlying the classification. Almost anything, animate objects, inanimate objects, places, and events, may be classified according to some taxonomic scheme. Source: www.wikipedia.org

Recommendation It is recommended that Army:

• adopt the knowledge domain architecture illustrated in Figure 5 as its high level view of the knowledge domain and in particular:

o separate TTP from doctrine; o include SOP as part of the knowledge domain; and o develop a robust lessons capability.

• limit the production of hard copy doctrine to enduring doctrine; • provide the knowledge domain with the ability both pull and push knowledge; • have LWDC work closely with TTC to coordinate multimedia output; • determine how the knowledge domain will work with BMS/BCSS; and • decide if access through the internet is required.

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framework into knowledge elements. It has compatibility with joint and allied hierarchies.

o Disadvantages – it might be construed that this is ‘business as usual’ approach. There will be a cost in identifying and removing duplication of knowledge within the hierarchy.

• Encyclopaedia – knowledge could be organised in the same way that an encyclopaedia is configured. This would be similar to that employed by the on-line sites such as Wikipedia and Webopedia17.

o Advantages – this is a simple way of organising knowledge as it based around themes and alphabetically arranged. It makes the boundary between the user interface and the development and management functions easy to manage.

o Disadvantages – it is difficult to manage the complexity of Army’s doctrine using this method and it does not readily provide simple boundaries for responsibility and accountability. In addition, it would require significant work to disaggregate the current hierarchy.

• Battle Operating System Based – it is possible to divide the contents of doctrine along Battle Operating System (BOS) lines.

o Advantages – simplicity in management, responsibility and accountability, particularly for TTP. Supports access to knowledge based around BOS.

o Disadvantages – The durability of BOS construct could be an issue. The construct does not support the philosophical and application levels well as there is overlap of some knowledge elements having significance in different BOS.

• Continental Staff System – the categorisation of knowledge along the continental staff system (the 0 to 9 system) is closely aligned to the current doctrine hierarchy and is therefore not seen as a discrete alternative.

Each of the taxonomies described will provide the ‘back end’ support to manage and control the doctrine component. Changing from the current system is likely to be expensive and difficult, although once changed there are unlikely to be additional costs. In deciding which taxonomy to adopt, the tenet of simplicity is perhaps the overriding issue. Consequently, the use of a modified version of the existing doctrine hierarchy would appear to be the most effective framework. A suggested framework is outlined in Annex B.

In recommending this framework, it is not a case of simply placing the current system on line. As noted previously, duplication that exists within the hierarchy will be removed. For instance, a general discussion of the Principles of War can be found in a number of publications – this would now form a single knowledge element that would reside within one place in the hierarchy. However, it would be available in a wide range of situations as described in succeeding paragraphs.

17 See www.wikipedia.org and www.webopedia.com

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Presentation For the user, the knowledge domain will provide a single point of entry to access the knowledge they require – a portal. The technology and sophistication of portals has improved considerably in the last ten years. In line with this, user familiarity and expertise in working with portals is substantial, perhaps best evidenced by the success of Google18 with its search capability within the world wide web. There are a wide range of portals in use, both publicly and within organisational intranets. Consequently, the portal approach is likely to be the most successful and powerful approach.

It is too early in the process to specify the specific presentation format for the knowledge domain. However it is possible to outline the look and general requirements. A number of existing knowledge portals provide useful examples of what is currently available and provide a basis for understanding the possibilities. Well known examples include Microsoft Encarta and the web based Wikipedia19. The importance of the Wikipedia example is that it is based on a collaborative approach using open source software20 and allows individuals to contribute to the content once validated by a panel of experts. The key features of this approach are:

• single point of entry;

• linkages of material within knowledge elements which allow users to explore ideas (through hyperlinks);

• use of multimedia material throughout;

• ability to move to related areas of knowledge through links provided in frames and tool bars;

• user customisation where appropriate;

• supports collaboration;

• presentation that aids learning through layout, highlighting of key ideas etc…; and

• use of powerful search engines.

An example of the portal introduction is shown in Figure 6 and an internal page is shown in Figure 7.

18 See www.google.com.au 19 See www.encarta.com and www.wikipedia.com . Interestingly WIKI stands for What I Know Is and this is the same approach that underpins the knowledge domain. 20 Generically, open source refers to a program in which the source code is available to the general public for use and/or modification from its original design free of charge, i.e., open. Source: www.webpedia.com

Recommendation It is recommended that Army modify the existing doctrine hierarchy to provide the architectural framework for the doctrine component of the knowledge domain (see Annex B).

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Figure 6: An Example Portal Introduction Page21

Figure 7: An Example Knowledge Domain Page22

21 Source: Microsoft Encarta

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Lessons Making doctrine a living body of knowledge will require the more rapid incorporation of the observations and lessons from training and operations. As noted previously, the lessons capability is a key factor in substantially enhancing the responsiveness of Army’s doctrine and TTP. Providing the lessons capability on line will provide immediacy to the capturing of observations, more rapid development of lessons from these observations and immediate dissemination of lessons once validated. While Army has an extant, albeit developing and arguably under-resourced, lessons capability it can not provide the range of functions proposed within the knowledge domain.

The application of a lessons capability is illustrated in Figure 8. It should be noted that this approach is equally applicable to the development of lessons from training whether it be from Land Command exercises or TE. However, it should be noted that the ability to do this will not come without some cost. In order to provide this needed level of responsiveness the CAL will require a modest increase in personnel and resources in order to manage the process and conduct the analysis. The benefits to be realised from this investment are substantial and will enhance the effectiveness of training in both Land Command and Training Command. Ultimately this benefit will be translated to success on operations.

22 Source:www.wikipedia.com

Recommendation It is recommended that Army adopt a web based user interface with a comprehensive search capability format for the knowledge domain.

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Figure 8: The Application of the Lessons Capability with in the Knowledge

Domain The ability to access information immediately is a major strength of a web based knowledge portal (a part of the knowledge domain). The power of this type of technology is used every day, particularly by younger people who have adapted to a networked environment. As the case study (page 24) shows, the desire for up-to-date and responsive knowledge exists and can be filled by unofficial means if the official mechanisms fail users’ expectations.

The flow of material within the lessons element of the knowledge domain and its management of the capability is illustrated in Figure 9. It should be noted that as an observation moves through the process it is still accessible on the knowledge domain unless it is assessed as being incorrect. An important consideration in developing the lessons component of the knowledge domain is the security implications of lessons from current operations. This issue is discussed in greater detail in the Technical Considerations section.

The responsibility for the analysis of observations should continue to reside with the CAL. In undertaking its analysis the CAL will be assisted by a range of organisations with the capability to provide support. These organisations, such as DSTO and Force Development Group (FDG), might be supplemented by contractor support. As noted earlier, the CAL will still require additional personnel to be able to analyse observations in a timely manner. The validation function in this model will reside with the organisation responsible for the management of the knowledge. For instance, lessons relating to TTP will be validated by the relevant sponsor of the TTP or KD. This model also notes the role of a Knowledge Domain Steering Group. This

Observation entered into KD from operations

Observation is accessible to those on the same operation, noting it is not validated and used with discretion

Once validated a lesson is available for inclusion in training and in endorsed doctrine, TTP and SOP where applicable

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governance organisation is discussed in the Management section (page 25). In some cases validation may be referred to this body.

Obs

erva

tions

Ana

lysi

sOperations Training Other Armies Experimentation

Individuals Units Formations Formal Collection

Centre for Army Lessons

DSTO

FDG

AEF

Other

Valid

atio

n

LWDC or Training Establishments

Knowledge Domain Steering Group

Dis

trib

ute

Knowledge Domain Training

Figure 9: The Lessons Capability Model

Case Study – US Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the Internet The well resourced and respected CALL provides a range of services on lessons. In an article entitled Annals of War Battle Lessons, Dan Baum compared the responsiveness and use of the CALL with that provided by two unofficial lessons websites –companycommand.com and platoonleader.org. He found that junior officers on operations in Iraq invariably preferred the information provided through the unofficial sites because these were far more responsive and provided knowledge in a form they could use. Concern was raised about the information provided as there is no moderation or analysis of observations. Baum noted that the US Army is now attempting to absorb these websites. For the Australian Army the implication is that it will need to meet the demand for this type of service or the vacuum will be filled by unofficial sources. Source: Baum, D. Annals of War – Battle Lessons, The New Yorker, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?050117fa_fact 1 January 2005.

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MANAGEMENT

Knowledge Domain Leveraging the full benefit of the knowledge domain will require a new approach to traditional management and governance structures. The principles that should underpin Army’s management for the knowledge domain are to:

• maximise responsiveness,

• be mindful of duty of care, and

• delegate management to the lowest appropriate level.

The establishment of the knowledge domain will require a new governance model. This model will be similar to that which currently exists for doctrine. The peak governance body would be the Knowledge Domain Steering Group and it would fulfil a similar but expanded function to that of the Army Doctrine Steering Group (ADSG). Its representation would need to be enlarged to encompass its wider role.

The management of the knowledge domain will need to be vested into a single organisation. It is suggested the best organisation to undertake this role is LWDC. This is because it is the current repository for much of Army’s knowledge (through its responsibility for doctrine) and is best place to develop the expertise to management the domain. It would also minimise disruption and transition issues from the current to the new system.

As discussed previously, LWDC will need to work closely with TTC to support the development of multimedia and interactive content within the domain (particularly within the doctrine and TTP components). This would also include the simulation function resident within LWDC which will also provide an important content within these components.

Doctrine The management of doctrine should continue to use the extant management framework. The reduced size of the endorsed doctrine pool will minimise the associated workload of LWDC, however, there is likely to be an increase in workload with the broader oversight of the knowledge domain.

To assist with the production and management of doctrine and other knowledge areas it is suggested that a development and management application be used. Currently the ADFWC uses a Joint Doctrine Development Environment to project manage its

Recommendation It is recommended that Army: • adopt the lessons model for the knowledge domain as illustrated in Figure 9; • make lessons available in real time as outlined above; and • the CAL be resourced to undertake the key analysis role.

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doctrine development. A similar and expanded application would assist in maintaining quality in a decentralised environment23.

A development and management application would also allow greater linkages with Land Command formations and units, and other stakeholders (such as the other Groups and Services) in the development and amendment of knowledge. The ability to draw on the expertise and experience resident in Land Command will substantially enhance both the quality and responsiveness of knowledge products.

Tactics Techniques and Procedures The management of TTP logically best sits with the organisation most familiar with it or which has the greatest stake in its relevance. This allows requests for changes to be more quickly evaluated and modified. This is not only from lessons but also due to changes in technology and the introduction of new equipment. Consequently, the management of TTP would best reside with the appropriate TE or sponsor. By retaining the existing doctrine hierarchy the transfer of responsibility for the management of TTP can be transferred to the appropriate school or centre. The transfer of this responsibility is unlikely to be onerous and should include a commensurate allocation of resources.

Standard Operating Procedures Management of unit and formation SOP would be through existing mechanisms. The advantages of placing SOP on the knowledge domain (from a management perspective) are:

• visibility of SOP across the chain of command;

• ability to automatically update SOP due to top down changes (particularly in the area of reports and returns and higher headquarter guidance); and

• the ability to ‘cut and paste’ SOP as required to suit changes in regrouping.

23 This is not to suggest that the JDDE is a preferred application for this requirement, rather it demonstrates the general technology is available and being used by the ADF.

Recommendation It is recommended that Army: • establish a Knowledge Domain Steering Group or similar governance mechanism; • retain LWDC as the responsible entity for the knowledge domain and in particular

doctrine management; • develop a management application to support project management and a

collaborative development environment for the knowledge domain; • make TTP the responsibility of the appropriate TE or sponsor; and • manage SOP through existing mechanisms.

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TRANSITIONING TO THE FUTURE

Approach In transitioning to the proposed knowledge domain Army should seek to minimise risk associated with the project. These risks include:

• technical risk;

• cultural risk; and

• implementation risk.

Technical Risk. Minimisation of technical risk is outlined as follows. A focus of risk mitigation will focus on close liaison with the Chief Information Officer Group (CIOG) as the Chief Information Officer (CIO) has responsibility for the key enabling infrastructure of the knowledge domain. The other essential risk minimisation strategy is the use of proven technology and Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) products. As discussed previously in the paper the technical risk is not high, as much of the base technology is already well proven in the commercial environment.

Cultural Risk. Mitigating cultural risk is a more complex task and not within the scope of this paper. Nonetheless it will require investigation by Army and development of a mitigation strategy. Elements of this will need to target the transition plan and in particular how the change is to be communicated to Army and other users.

Implementation Risk. The implementation of the project will carry risk. In deciding how to implement the knowledge domain project, Army has two broad options:

• development of the knowledge domain to a point where it is essentially complete and then implement it across Army; or

• develop the knowledge domain to a ‘critical mass’ prior to implementation and then continue development while it is in operation.

It suggested that the incremental approach will carry the least risk and enable Army to leverage the most benefit from the maturing knowledge domain. In taking this approach Army will need to decide what the critical mass is and when to put the knowledge domain ‘on line’. This also allows a ‘learn as you go’ activity so users can provide immediate feedback in order to make incremental adjustments to the concept. There will be a cost associated with this as a number of doctrine and TPP publications will be maintained in hard copy.

The use of either approach will require the development and testing of a trial version of the knowledge domain. This proof of concept ensures that all elements deliver the required outcomes.

The development of a comprehensive program plan is essential to successful implementation. Deciding on the sequence to bring elements into the domain will require considered judgement. It suggested that the most useful element to develop and implement first would be the lessons element. It represents a relatively ‘quick win’ for Army for a capability that is required and will add substantial value. Importantly it will assist with the culture change of getting personnel access via electronic means to useful and up-to-date knowledge.

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Technical Considerations The technology underpinnings of the knowledge domain, whilst enabled by ICT, are not the solution in itself. The correct exploitation of technology, fused with relevant strategies and structures, competent people and appropriate processes is required. The technological architecture of the solution must be congruent with the information needs of the user, business needs of Army and the enterprise requirements of Defence. First and foremost is the requirement to articulate a process and detailed requirements. Wherever possible the solution to these requirements should be sourced from a COTS product.

A knowledge domain solution for 2012 will consist of technology that is designed for today, and whilst the medium and modality of delivery will alter over time, the technology should not be leading edge. The benefits of using the designs of today are twofold: firstly, it is low-risk, as an application built to reliable, pervasive and open-ended technological standards (ie. Java, XML) will remain interoperable in the future. Secondly, a solution, planned today, and built tomorrow, will provide a feasible solution to operate in the future space of 2012.

Data. Effective utilisation of a knowledge domain application is dependant on reliable provision of data entry, data presentation, security, physical storage, and management services. Effective management of the knowledge domain data will be reliant upon a content management and document management system that both controls and distributes knowledge. Ownership of doctrine and TTP data could present an issue, when publications are represented in a 'knowledge element’ format. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for data ownership, sponsorship, stewards and custodians will be required to ensure effective management of the application. The guidelines provided within the management section of this paper will minimise this risk.

In moving towards the introduction of the knowledge domain, the development of data as part of the ongoing update of doctrine will need to start conforming to the planned for standards and protocols. This will reduce costs and hasten the implementation of the domain.

The multimedia component of the knowledge domain data requires a detailed level of design analysis. Multimedia elements like audio and, especially video are expensive for both the viewer and the deliverer of the information, as video makes significant demands upon the storage capacity and bandwidth of the infrastructure. Network link speed, congestion, host usage, and other variables can influence the replay of multimedia. Production of video is expensive, whether simply compressing a video

Recommendation It is recommended that Army: • develop a comprehensive transition plan designed to minimise risk; • prepare a plan to minimise cultural risk; • undertake a ‘proof of concept’ trial; • adopt an implementation approach based on building the knowledge domain to a

‘critical mass’ and then making it available on line; and • develop the lessons capability element as the first priority.

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image, or professional digital editing of source material. The close coordination between TTC and LWDC will ensure that these issues are addressed in the development stage. This will also require close liaison with the CIOG.

The Knowledge Domain Application. A knowledge domain application that is accessible for all Army personnel has to compete with an existing base of user applications that support military and corporate activities. These existing applications create significant demand for bandwidth, the availability of which is particularly constrained in deployed environments. This is becoming increasingly problematic for administrative, logistic and management applications which are required in deployed environments, but are designed for the greater bandwidth availability of the fixed network.

The requirements for the knowledge domain application (i.e. the software component of the knowledge domain architecture) will need detailed consideration. On one hand, a knowledge domain application that runs from within the Standard Operating Environment (SOE) will be less demanding on bandwidth and network resources. However, this SOE based application will need constant revision in line with potential network protocol and operating system changes, and consequently involve constant testing and migration schedules. On the other hand, and a knowledge domain application designed to run from a centralised server model will consume far greater bandwidth than a SOE based application. Regardless of the form of the knowledge domain application, planning considerations need to account for several iterations of Internet Protocol and Microsoft network operating systems. Integration with Existing Information and Communication Technology Services. Defence provides users with the ability to conduct business over the internet, run basic computing services (such as printing, file management, e-mail and formal messaging), run remote and local access control and ensure ongoing anti-virus protection. A knowledge domain application design will need to account for the manner in which it will integrate with, and potentially make use of, these existing applications. Hardware. The knowledge domain application will run primarily on the fixed network. Server designs and desktop capabilities of the fixed network are unlikely to present a design limitation, as the Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) will exhibit improved responsiveness to technology change through hardware refresh programs integrated with SOE rollouts. By 2012, Defence expects to have a fixed network storage capability and infrastructure that will provide mass data warehousing and continuous business continuity. However, it would be expected that a knowledge domain project would require funding for the purchase of server/storage infrastructure to support the requirements of the users and the application. Furthermore, the knowledge domain project would need to ensure sufficient funding was allocated for on-going support and maintenance of this additional ICT infrastructure.

Support to a deployed network is more problematic, in that operational demands for infrastructure, bandwidth, ICT service support, security and maintenance will override the content delivery component of the knowledge domain application. However, Defence’s network centric warfare approach is likely to support the greater provision of these services. There is undoubtedly a cost associated with making the knowledge domain available in a deployed network, however, by doing so it will contribute to operational effectiveness.

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An additional hardware issue is that of the use of individual PDA. As noted earlier this will provide substantial benefits for the user and may assist in reducing bandwidth requirements (as less information will have to be pulled by users). This aspect will require separate discussion and consideration. Networks. In 2012, the DRN will continue to support routine and administrative data traffic for Defence, providing multiple service layers, such as voice and data, to integrate a range of user devices while also supporting commercial encryption, and an intrusion detection/prevention system. The Defence Secret Network (DSN) will continue to support command and control, management and intelligence data traffic for Defence. It will be considered a mandatory system for all headquarters elements and thus coverage will grow. It is assumed that the knowledge domain application will operate primarily within the DRN.

An important consideration in regard to networks is the expected enhancement of the Defence Remote Access System (DRAS) to take advantage of public Wi-Fi ‘hotspots’24. The use of wireless local area network (LAN) capabilities, alongside the expansion of the DRAS infrastructure, has the potential to overcome some of the bandwidth concerns that are faced by incremental growth of the fixed network. Advancements in wireless technology (such as the amalgamation of Bluetooth and Ultra Wide Band technology that is capable of wireless transfer at 220mb/sec25) is likely to resolve some of the concerns surrounding bandwidth distribution. Furthermore, there is likely to be a massive growth in the availability of public wireless network infrastructure that Defence will be able to utilise for non-operational tasks (as it currently does with DRAS).

These developments are likely to reduce the key concern that currently exists on developing an electronic based knowledge domain. However, Army will have to work closely with CIOG in developing a solution that optimises operations within the constraints and future requirements of the network.

Security. Security requirements such as anti-virus, firewalls, encryption and access control will shape the delivery of a knowledge domain application. It would be reasonable to expect the knowledge domain application to be designed with its own internal security measures, such as public key / private key encryption, passport validation and access rights. However, it will be the broad DRN network (both fixed and deployed) that will provide the bulk of ICT security for the knowledge domain application. It would be reasonable to assume that by 2012, Defence will have an operational computer network defence capability that can protect, detect and react against any and all security threats external to Defence. However, the requirement for the knowledge domain application to interface with the internet, coalition partners and external agencies offer potential vulnerabilities. These issues are not insurmountable

24 Wi-Fi is short for wireless fidelity and is meant to be used generically when referring of any type of 802.11 network, whether 802.11b, 802.11a, dual-band, etc. The term is promulgated by the Wi-Fi Alliance. While a hotspot is a specific geographic location in which an access point provides public wireless broadband network services to mobile visitors through a wireless local area network. Hotspots are often located in heavily populated places such as airports, train stations, libraries, conventions centres and hotels. Hotspots typically have a short range of access. Bluetooth is a short-range radio technology aimed at simplifying communications among internet devices and between devices and the internet. It also aims to simplify data synchronisation between internet devices and other computers. Source: ww.webopedia.com 25 See http://www.intel.com/technology/comms/uwb/faq.htm for more information on this emerging technology.

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but will need to be addressed in conjunction with CIOG in the initial development of requirements.

A key aspect of security for consideration is that of classified doctrine (which mostly resides in Special Operations Command and around the performance specifications of certain units, platforms and equipments) and operationally derived observations and lessons. While a future multi-level security application may solve this issue, until it is developed, a separate solution will be required. Resolution will require close liaison with key stakeholders.

Cost

Recommendation It is recommended that Army: • recognise that delivery of the knowledge domain will occur primarily within the

DRN, but there will be access through the BMS and perhaps the internet; • seek to use a COTS solution for the software component of the knowledge domain,

which uses existing technology based on accepted standards (ie. low risk); • agree to data management standards as quickly as possible. Once agreed the

development of current doctrine should conform to this standard immediately; • determine if there exists a requirement for individual PDA to support the knowledge

domain concept; • note the security implications of classified doctrine and lessons derived from current

operations; • develop a doctrinal information needs analysis for data management in order to

inform a content management plan; and • once the content management plan (that includes user requirements, capability

statements, process diagrams and a roadmap for transition to a future state) is developed, work with CIOG to determine the technical requirements of the knowledge domain, including:

o application placement; o hardware requirements; o network, accessibility issues and associated bandwidth requirements; and o security requirements.

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CONCLUSION

‘The courage of a soldier is heightened by his knowledge of his profession.’26

Vegetius, De Re Militari, 378 AD

Meeting the challenges of future operations will test Army’s people as they will be required to succeed in increasingly complex environments. This will demand people who are not only well equipped but most importantly, capable and innovative. Developing this type of person will require Army to enhance its training and development practices, and also to provide new tools to support them in training and on operations. The establishment of a knowledge domain will provide Army’s people with the knowledge that they need to meet the challenges of the future.

The knowledge domain articulated in this paper will provide Army’s people with up-to-date and relevant knowledge to support them. It represents a fundamental change in the way that Army has traditionally presented its knowledge. In doing so it will maximise the power of the electronic medium and provide the immediacy and responsiveness that is currently lacking. Importantly the approach and underlying technology are well proven and this presents a low risk, but high payoff solution for Army.

The impediments to developing and implementing a knowledge domain will be a lack of will and resources. The resources are very modest in comparison to those being invested in Army’s hardware and it is the intangibles that will make the hardware work. In order to make the knowledge domain a reality, decisions need to be made and the recommendations of this paper actioned.

26. As quoted in Royle, T., A dictionary of military quotations, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989. p174.

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Annexes: A. Doctrine Hierarchy

B. Suggested future management hierarchy

Selected Reading Baum, D. Annals of War – Battle Lessons, The New Yorker, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?050117fa_fact 1 January 2005.

Brownlee, L. & Schoomaker, P.J. Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities, Parameters, Summer, 2004.

Department of Defence, Report of the Strategic Workforce Planning Review, Canberra, 2003.

Evans, Dr M., Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine, 1972 – Present, Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Paper No.301, Duntroon, 1999.

Johnston, P. Doctrine is not enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behaviour of Armies, Parameters, Autumn, 2000.

Holley, I.B. Concepts, Doctrines, Principles: Are You Sure You Understand These Terms? Air University Review, July-August, 1984.

Watts, B.D. & Hale, J.O. Doctrine: Mere Words, or a Key to War-Fighting Competence Air University Review, September-October, 1984.

Wong, L. Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, July 2004.

World Wide Web resources: www.companycommand.com

www.platoonleader.org

Annex A