functionalism and its critics is a mansion with many rooms, and has meant ... functionalism and its...

FUNCTIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS :An Analysis of the Writings of Gabriel Almond

T alcott Parsons began his first major sociological study with arhetorical question. "Who," he asked, "now reads Spencer?"

His implicit answer was, hardly anyone, and he agreed with CraneBrinton that Spencer was "Dead by suicide or at the hands ofperson or persons unknown. " Today many sociologists are begin-

ning to ask the same question about Parsons himself. Parsons neverachieved Spencer's eminence in the intellectual community and thatcommunity 's rejection of his work has not been as thoroughgoing.However, it is true that, after a period in the 1950 's during whichthe Parsonian brand of functional analysis seemed to be carryingall before it, his decline has been precipitous.

There are some signs that a similar development may be aboutto take place in political science, for here, too, primarily in com-parative politics, the late 1950 ' s and the early 1960 ' s was the eraof a type of systems analysis loosely derived from Parsons. Theseries of volumes sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Poli-tics of the Social Science Research Council and the Little Browncomparative politics series testify to the widespread acceptance ofat least elements of this conceptual framework by political scientists.Of late, however, criticism has been mounting, induced, in part, bymethodological considerations and in part by the changing politicalclimate in the United States and the world.

To comparativists, at least, functional analysis and the nameof Gabriel Almond are almost synonomous. While others havelabored mightily and fruitfully in the same vineyard, the publicationof Almond and Coleman ' s, The Politics of the Developing Areas in1960 was something of a landmark, and Almond and Powell's Com-parative Politics (1966) has served, more recently, as the paradigmof a functional approach.'

Almond actually yields pride of place for the introduction ofsystems analysis into political science to David Easton. For it was,as he notes, the publication of Easton' s, The Political System which

1Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York, 1937), p. 3.2 Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the De-

veloping Areas (Princeton, 1960), and Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell,Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, 1966). Hereafterreferred to respectively as Developing Areas and Comparative Politics.

FUNCTIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS 237

led him to experience "one of those moments of intellectual libera-tion; when a concept comes along that gives one 's thoughts anordered structure."' Almond's earlier work had lacked a systematictheoretical focus, and had been largely descriptive or concerned withthe development of what Merton would call theories of the middlerange.'

After his conversion to a functional approach, however, Almondmoved in a somewhat different direction from that of Easton orParsons. While the latter tended to concentrate on conceptualrigor, Almond remained far more concerned with developing con-structs which were tied as closely as possible to concrete problems.Specification of the meaning of theoretical terms or examining all ofthe implications of theoretical constructs seemed less important tohim than developing some ordering of the material of politics, andhe continued to borrow concepts freely from other intellectual tradi-tions than functionalism. It is for this reason, perhaps, that his in-fluence among students of comparative politics has been far greaterthan that of Easton. Most of those scholars studying the politics ofdeveloping areas have felt that it was far easier to apply Almondthan to work with Parsons ' or Easton 's more elaborate frameworks.

Almond has denied that even his work of the period (roughly1956-1969) can easily be subsumed under the rubric of function-alism, and this is certainly true.' Even at the height of his "func-tional period, " if we may so label it, he remained fairly ecclectic.More recently this ecclecticism has become even more pronounced.

Functionalism is a mansion with many rooms, and has meantsomewhat different things to different theorists. Certainly Almond ' sfunctionalism is, as we shall see, of a far more restricted kind thanthat of Radcliffe-Brown or Parson.' Thus many of the criticismswhich have been directed against them are not applicable to him.

' Gabriel Almond, " Political Development: Analytic and Normative Per-spectives," Comparative Political Studies, I (January, 1969), p. 449.

4 These had included: The American People and Foreign Policy (NewYork, 1950), and The Appeals of Communism ( Princeton, 1954). The termmiddle range theory is from Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and SocialStructure (New York, 1949), pp. 3-16.

5 In a personal communication.°For a discussion of the variety of approaches subsumed under the rubric

of functionalism, and the variety of interpretations of its essential nature, seeFrancesca M. Cancian, "Varieties of Functional Analysis, " International En-

238 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

On the other hand, it is the elaboration of a theoretical frameworkbroadly functional in orientation which has distinguished Almond ' swork in the past sixteen years, and the issues raised by the approachshall serve as the focus for organizing this essay review. Even whereAlmond is elaborating a concept like political culture or developinga theory of political evolution, or talking about the capabilities ofpolitical systems, concepts and theories which are compatible witha number of approaches, the fact that he thinks of a political systemin functional terms gives his approach a particular cast. The same,of course, is true of Talcott Parsons. The latter's emphasis on cul-tural variables is derived from a non-functionalist (Weber) and hisdevelopmental theory (from which Almond 's seems to be derived)probably has more in common with that of Spencer than he wouldcare to admit. Yet the fact that he is a functionalist leads. him to, relyimplicitly on biological analogies of a certain kind which are notintrinsic to an evolutionary theory of social and political develop-ment.

I shall attempt to summarize Almond's ideas as they have de-veloped, bringing out what seem to me some of the underlying, butoften unstated assumptions. At relevant points I shall point outambiguities, contradictions and lacunae. It must be said at the outsetthat Almond's writing, because of his ecclecticism, and lack of con-cern with theoretical completeness, abounds in these. I shall, how-ever, ignore minor details and stick to major issues. After all, thekey question is whether a functional approach, presented in as rea-sonable a form as possible, is likely to be of more value in the studyof politics than alternate conceptual frameworks. If this seems likelyto be the case, theoretical elegance is not essential at this stage, al-though the possibility of improvement is.' Conceptual frameworksare not proven or disproven, they are only more or less useful. A

cyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968) 6, pp. 29-43, and N. J.Demerath III and Richard A. Peterson (eds.), System Change and Conflict(New York, 1967). A short history of functionalism will be found in DonMartindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Boston, 1960),pp. 441-500. A variety of functional approaches in political science are .

described in articles by Robert T. Holt and William Flanigan and EdwinFogelman in Don Martindale (ed.), Functionalism in the Social Sciences( Philadelphia, 1965), pp. 84-110 and pp. 111-126.

7Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco, 1964), pp.77-78, points out that complete conceptual clarity is not the sine qua non ofscientific advance, and that such clarity is attained only after the maturationof new approaches to the study of nature, man and society.


framework which lacks precision but which seems to open possibili-ties for fruitful work is much preferred to one which is quite rigorousbut whose focus is so narrow that it can only deal with relatively un-important matters.

I shall reserve an overall evaluation of the strengths and weak-nesses of Almond 's approach for the concluding section of the essay.At that time I will consider some of the major criticisms which havebeen directed against it and against functionalism in general.

I. SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION

Almond 's first major attempt to develop a functional frameworkfor the study of politics is to be found in his introduction to ThePolitics of the Developing Areas, although some of his ideas hadalready appeared in article form. Pointing out that such traditionalconcepts as the "state" were of little utility in comparing the politicsof western and non-western societies, he suggested substituting suchconcepts as the "political system, " which he defined as :

that system of interactions to be found in all independent societieswhich performs the functions of integration and adaptation (bothinternally and viz-a-viz other societies) by means of the employmentor threat of employment, of more or less legitimate force s

The "political system " is essentially an analytic system and isnot to be identified with any empirical "structure " or "structures,"

although Almond is not entirely clear on this. He does not, at thispoint, define what he means by a "structure," nor does he define asystem. However, he does list those features which characterize apolitical system. There are : (I) comprehensiveness, (2) interde-pendence, and (3) the existence of boundaries.'

By comprehensiveness, Almond means that the political systemincludes all those inputs and outputs which affect in some way theuse or threat of use of legitimate coercion, whether these derive

'Developing Areas, p. 7.elbid., pp. 7-9. In Comparative Politics, Almond defines a structure as:

"particular sets of roles which are related to each other." He prefers it to theterm institution, with which he regards it as practically synonomous, becausehe wishes to emphasize " the actual behavior of individuals. " ComparativePolitics, p. 21.


from formal governmental institutions or caste groups or whetherthey involve petitions, demonstrations or judicial decisions. By inter-dependence Almond means that significant changes in any part ofthe system will produce. chances in other parts : " a change in onesubset of interactions produces change in all other subsets. . . . io

By the existence of a boundary Almond means that there are pointswhere other systems begin and the political system ends. Complaintsabout policy, for example, are not part of the political system, untilthey become demands upon public authorities for some form ofaction or are interpreted as such.

According to Almond, the superiority of functionalism to otherapproaches to politics lies in the fact that it enables us to develop aset of categories for the comparison not only of contemporary in-dustrial societies, but also of industrial societies with "developing"societies and of contemporary societies with historical social orders.Traditionally students of comparative politics have limited theirwork to the comparison of such institutions as interest groups, politi-cal parties, legislatures, courts, etc. These efforts can be reasonablysuccessful, Almond argues, if one is concerned only with the politicsof contemporary European societies which share something of acommon political and social heritage. However, he notes, when oneturns to comparisons between, say, England and Indonesia, tradi-tional analytic categories break down. One can point out, of course,that England or the United States are characterized by many form-ally organized large membership associations, and that in Indonesiasuch associations are poorly organized and inadequately financed,and have highly fluctuating memberships. However, such structuralcomparisons deal only with the comparative anatomy of the threepolities, and within a European frame of reference at that. They tellus little of the "physiology" of the systems in question, let alonetheir dynamics.

On the other hand, Almond contends, if we assume that certainfunctions must be performed in all societies if they are to , survive,and we compare how these functions are actually performed in eachsociety, we can enrich our understanding of all of them by facili-tating meaningful comparative analysis. Further, he suggests, we es-cape both the ethnocentrism that has blinded us to the richness of

loDeveloping Areas, p. 8.


political life in societies whose formal structure differs from ours,and the kind of moralizing which assumes that societies lacking cer-tain Western institutions are somehow at a lower stage of develop-ment. In the end we will develop a better perspective on our ownand other advanced societies, because we will come to realize that,while the same functions must be performed in all societies, theycan be performed ,by a variety of different structures which arerelated to each other in quite different ways than is the case of ourown or other European systems. Finally, in so far as this approachorders our empirical material more systematically, and leads to thediscovery of new data, it should help us develop theories and law-like statements about the political process.

'1

Any conceptual scheme, even if only classificatory, has em-bedded within it some general model the relationships which itscreator hopes to clarify. The model Almond chose was derived fromthe work of David Easton." Easton conceived of the political systemessentially as a mechanism for converting demands from the society(inputs) into policies which involved the "authoritative allocationof values" (outputs) and further supports for the system through afeedback loop. Although the discerning reader can probably detectat least a tension between this model and some of Almond 's defini-

tions, his efforts in The Politics of the Developing Areas were largelydirected to explicating in some detail what kinds of activities thisconversion process entailed. Before demands could become politicallyrelevant they had to be articulated in some way, and since, theoreti-cally, the number of demands was infinite, they had to be aggregatedinto a relatively smaller number of policy alternatives before pro-cessing could take place. If values were to be allocated in an authori-tative manner, the system had to include mechanisms for rule mak-ing, rule application, and rule adjudication. Finally, mechanisms hadto be created for recruiting individuals into political roles, and forcommunicating both demands and policy decisions.

"

The study of how these conversion mechanisms perform their

1llbid., pp. 9-17. In this summary I have made explicit a few points which

are only implicit in Almond 's discussion.12

David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, "

World Politics IX ( April, 1957), pp. 383 if. Easton developed his ideas morefully in: A Framework for Political Analysis (New York, 1965) and A Sys-tems Analysis of Political Life (New York, 1965).

13Developing Areas, pp. 15-19.


functions in various political systems constitutes the meat of com-parative politics for Almond, and the essay attempts to demon-strate the utility of an approach with this focus in organizing politi-cal data, as well as its fruitfulness in the development of law-likestatements of a "probabilistic " kind. For example, Almond arguesthat if various interest groups in a society make "raw" demandsupon governmental institutions, rather than allowing these demandsto be aggregated by political parties, such demands will be moredifficult to process and the result may well be political instability. 14

Almond is convinced that the most important differences be-tween political systems pertain to whether they are " traditional" or"modern. " Traditional societies with traditional political systemsare those characterized by particularistic, ascriptive and functionallydiffuse norms and structures, while modern societies tend to becharacterized by universalistic, achievement, and functionally specificnorms and structures. The classification is one derived from con-temporary sociological analysis and Almond is careful to point outthat the concepts refer to " ideal types." No society is completelymodern or completely traditional. All societies contain a mixture ofmodern and traditional elements. Modern societies are more highlydifferentiated than traditional ones, such that specialized structureshave been created for the performance of particular functions.Nevertheless, even in advanced societies all political structures aremultifunctional, and the analysis of the relation between functionand structure is always a highly complex matter. 76

Nevertheless, it is already clear that Almond 's standard foranalyzing societies is derived from advanced industrial Europeancommunities such as England and the United States. Further, themetaphor is already an organic one. The structures to befound in "advanced" societies are implicit in traditional societies,which modernize, in part, by a process of differentiation. Latentin the conception is an evolutionary theory of social changewhich becomes explicit in his later work; and at least one problemis also discernible here: Almond tells us that his list of functionsis derived from the classic separation of powers doctrines of Euro-pean and American political theorists. " Logically this fact is of

' Ibid., p. 35."Ibid., pp. 24-25."Comparative Politics, pp. 10-12.


little relevance to its adequacy as a means of classifying and study-ing political systems. However, as we shall later see, the source ofits derivation is not without importance, for Almond is not com-pletely free of that ethnocentric bias from which he had hoped toescape.

The Politics of the Developing Areas was a preliminary attemptto apply a structural-functional framework to the analysis of politi-cal systems. In it Almond was not particularly concerned with thenature or direction of social change, at least explicitly, but merelywith fashioning a tool which would permit effective comparisons InComparative Politics he added a number of dimensions to hisanalysis, including a theory of evolution and a set of concepts de-signed to enable political scientists to evaluate political systems.Both of these dimensions will be described later. For the moment,however, we are concerned with his efforts to increase the precisionand depth of his conceptual framework.

Almond begins Comparative Politics with a discussion of someof the criticisms which have been leveled against a functional ap-proach-for example, that it implies an equilibrium or harmony ofparts and that it has a conservative bias. He rightly points out thathis use as a functional approach does not assume that system equili-brium is natural and certainly does not assume harmony amongsystem parts. He admits that his previous writing had lacked an ap-proach to political change, but promises to rectify this in the presentvolume.14

His definition of the political system has changed somewhat.The political system now consists of ". . . all those interactionswhich affect the use or threat of legitimate physical coercion. " It isthe potential use of legitimate force, indeed, which gives the politicalsystem its coherence. 18 He still considers himself a functionalist, how-ever, and promises to :

. . . consider the activities or functions of political systems fromthree points of view. The first of these we have already referred to-the conversion functions of interest articulation, interest aggregationpolitical communication, rule making, rule application, and ruleadjudication. The second consideration is the operation of the politi-

"Ibid., pp. 12-13.18

1bid., pp. 17-18.

244 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE .REVIEWER

cal system as an " individual" in its environment. We refer to thisaspect of the functioning of a political system as its capabilities.Finally, we will need to consider the way in which political systemsmaintain themselves or adapt themselves to pressures for changeover the long run. We speak here of system maintenance and adapta-tion functions-political recruitment and political socialization. 19

After invoking the names of Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, Parsons,Merton and Levy, he actually begins his discussion of functions withthe analysis of system capabilities.

Now all of this is very confusing, and it might be wise to pauseand take stock at this point. Functionalism has meant many thingsto many people. Au Fond, however, and especially in the authorswhom Almond cites, it is a conceptual scheme which involves theanalysis of social institutions in terms of the functions they performin some larger system, and/or the analysis of the functions whichmust be performed in any system if it is to persist. 20 An activity isnot synonomous with a function, and while Almond's analysis ofsystem capabilities derives from a functional analysis, a descriptionof the capabilities of a system or an institution has nothing to dowith functionalism as a system of thought. Given Robert Merton 'sexplicit treatment of this kind of error many years ago, it is sur-prising that a scholar as sophisticated as Almond should repeat it atthis late date.

21

Almond faces other problems. One can define the politicalsystem in functional terms or coercion terms, but, as Meehan pointsout, one cannot easily do both, at least without developing the argu-ment in much greater detail. The monopoly of legitimate force is asystem attribute not a system function, and the admitted effort tocombine Weber and Parsons in one definition leads only to con-fusion.

22

"Ibid., p. 14.20

See the references in footnote 6.21 Robert Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions," in Social Theory and

Social Structure, op. cit., pp. 21-82.22

Eugene J. Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study( Homewood, Illinois, 1967), pp. 175-81. Almond is obviously trying to giveboth Parsons and Weber their due. For a critical appraisal of functionalismfrom a Weberian perspective see Randall Collins, "A Comparative Approachto Political Sociology, " in Reinhard Bendix (ed.), State and Society (Boston,1968), pp. 42-69.


Our confusion is compounded by the fact that Almond hasdropped integration and adaptation as overall functions of the politi-cal system. In one sense the loss is not very great, for he never diddefine the terms. They seem to have been taken over from the workof Parsons, although Parsons tended to see adaptation as a functionof the economic system, and thought that integration was the func-tion of the legal system, among others.

23

The inconsistencies in Almond 's discussion of the political systemare fairly distressing. However they are not really terribly importantin terms of his analysis, for it is quite clear as we examine Compara-tive Politics, that Almond 's functionalism is still derived from anEastonian model. The political system is conceived of as a mechanismfor processing demands from the larger society. Almond 's strategyfor comparing political systems, then, is still in terms of the variablesfirst developed in The Politics of Developing Areas, with some ad-ditions. As already noted, interest articulation, interest aggregation,rule making, rule application and communication are considered"conversion functions. " Political recruitment, as classified alongwith political socialization as fulfilling intra political "system main-tenance " and "adaptation " functions, and the content of demandsand supports which flow into the political system, are specified, asare system outputs. Demands include those for the allocation ofgoods and services; for the regulation of behavior, for participationand communication. Supports include material supports, obedienceto laws and regulations, participatory supports such as voting, andattention paid to communications. Finally, outputs include extrac-tions, regulations, allocations or distribution of goods and services,and symbolic outputs. Clearly, Almond 's scheme for evaluatingsystem capabilities derives from this list.

24

There are a number of issues we might raise. It is not easy tosee, for example, why communication is called a conversion func-tion. Communication would seem, on the face of it, to play aquite different role in any political system than, say, interest ag-gregation. Further, Almond still fails to indicate clearly what hemeans by adaptation and system maintenance and how and whypolitical recruitment and political socialization fulfill these functions

23Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure ( New York, 1969), pp.

398-99.24 Comparative Politics, pp. 25-27 and seq.


for the political system. These, however, are relatively minor diffi-culties which can probably be worked through and I shall not pur-sue them.

Even more explicitly" than in The Politics of the DevelopingAreas, Almond seems convinced, in his later work, that the majordifferences between political systems have to do with where theyfall on a continuum from primitive to modern. The structural fac-tors which seem to be of key importance for determining the natureof demands, conversion processes and outputs are: (1) the degree towhich political roles, structures and subsystems are specialized ordifferentiated, and (2) the relative autonomy or subordination ofthese roles with respect to each other. 25 Modern systems are thosewith a relatively high level of institutional and subsystem differentia-tion, as well as relative subsystem autonomy, and despite Almond 'sefforts to avoid ethnocentrism, it is quite clear that his model ofadvanced states is drawn from the British and American politicalsystems.

Almond's analysis of political culture, defined as " the patternof individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among themembers of a political system," demonstrates this derivation quiteclearly. 26 The basic distinction developed is that 'between "secular-ized" and non-secularized political cultures. The former are char-acterized by "pragmatic, empirical orientations, " and a "movementfrom diffuseness to specificity " of orientations. Individuals who' arepart of a secular political culture deal with others in terms of uni-versalistic criteria as against considerations arising from diffusesocietal relationships such as those of tribe caste or family. 27 Theyare aware that institutions have specific functions and orient them-selves to institutions in these terms. 28

Further, secularized, i.e., modern, political cultures are char-acterized by bargaining and accommodative patterns of politicalaction which are relatively open, in that values are subject to changein the basis of new experience. Modern states in which "rigid"

ideological politics continue to play a substantial role are those inwhich, for some reason, " the bargaining attitudes associated with

251bid., p. 306.

261bid., p. 50.

27 1bid., p. 58.28

1bid.


full secularization" have failed to develop. 29 The image is of theUnited States and England in the 1950 's, and I would supposethat Almond would be forced to say that both of those societies haveregressed somewhat in recent years.

3o

Most of Comparative Politics is taken up with elaborating thebasic elements of Almond ' s conceptual scheme and demonstratingits utility. He applies his categories to a number of historical andcontemporary societies to indicate the fruitfulness of his frameworkfor ordering existing data and discovering new relationships. Therichness of the offering is hard to convey in a short review but onecomes away with the impression from this and other works of thesame genre that whatever the weaknesses of the approach, its utilityfor some purposes has been demonstrated. Comparisons can moreeasily be made between England and Indonesia or 'between Englandand France, which take into account the richness of political life inall of these societies; and the traditional modern distinction seemsto order a good many relationships which had been ignored by poli-tical scientists in the past.

The volume does contain at least one general (although incom-plete) theory: an analysis of the nature of political development.Almond follows Talcott Parsons in approaching social change from abroadly evolutionary view, and it is to this theory and its conse-quences that we shall now turn. 3'

291bid.,

pp.58-59.

'°Almond seems to have accepted and built upon "the end of ideology, "

which became so prominent in the 1950 ' s. For debate on the subject, seeRichard H. Cox, Ideology, Politics and Political Theory ( Belmont, California,1969). See also Joseph La Palombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent andInterpretation, " The American Political Science Review LX (March, 1966),pp. 5-16, and the reply by Lipset in the same issue. The concept of modern-ization is derived essentially from German sociology of the late nineteenthcentury and especially Weber. Rinehard Bendix, Embattled Reason (NewYork, 1970), pp. 250-315 gives a good review of its sources as well as acritique, and Samuel Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization,Development, and Politics, " Comparative Politics 3 (April, 1971), pp. 283-332, provides some interesting insights in a review of the contemporary literatureon development. I will have more to say on the concepts of political cultureand modernization later.

3 "Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," American So-ciological Review 29 (June, 1964), pp. 339-357, and Societies: Evolutionaryand Comparative Perspectives (New York, 1966).


II. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE :

A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

Almond' s 'Comparative Politics offers two theories of politicaldevelopment which, for want of better terms, may be called hisgeneral and special theories. The general theory implicitly drawsupon biological analogies. Societies begin as one celled (primitive)creatures, and gradually differentiate. They develop specialized rolesand structures (cells and organs), such as judiciaries, specializedorgans of communication, etc., for dealing with particular problems.As they do so their capacity to deal with their environment in-creases, although problems of coordination become more pressing,entailing the creation of a more complex 'bureaucratic (nervous?)system.

32Almond suggests on a number of occasions that relative

subsystem autonomy is an important aspect of development, theargument being that such autonomy allows for the more efficientperformance by particular structures of their functions." The im-plication is sometimes that modern pluralistic societies on the Englishor American model are more advanced than one party regimes. 34

Almond, however, is not completely convinced, for in his com-parisons of the Soviet with other modern regimes he speaks of thehigh capabilities of the former, in terms which will be describedlater.

35

Democratic pluralistic regimes are more advanced than oneparty regimes or traditional regimes in still another way. Culturally,a major feature of development is secularization, defined as " theprocess whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical, andempirical in their political action." 3fi "We may illustrate this con-cept," Almond notes:

by comparing a political leader in a modern democracy with apolitical leader in a traditional or primitive African political system.A modem democratic political leader when running for office, forinstance, will gather substantial amounts of information about the

"Comparative Politics, pp. 299-332.33

Ibid., pp. 311-312, for example.341bid. Almond uses the term totalitarian to describe one party regimes

such as the Soviet.35Ibid., p. 278.

"Ibid., p. 24.


constituency which he hopes will elect him and the issues of publicpolicy with which that constituency will be concerned. He has tomake estimates of the distribution and intensity of demands of onekind or another; he needs to use creative imagination in order toidentify a possible combination of demands which may lead to hisreceiving a majority of the votes in his constituency. A village chiefin a tribal society operates largely within a given set of goals whichhave grown up and been hallowed by custom. The secularization ofculture is the process whereby traditional orientations and attitudesgive way to more dynamic decision-making processes involving thegathering of information, the evaluation of information, the layingout of alternative courses of action, the selection of a course fromamong these possible courses, and the means whereby which onetests whether or not a given course of action is producing the con-sequences which were intended.

37

Part of this description of tribal societies seems something of acaricature, for we seem to find as much bargaining and weighing ofalternatives in these societies as in our own. 3S Almond, however, issuggesting something more. Pluralistic societies are more advancedthan others because the ends of these societies are not given. Rather,their values are constantly being revised in the light of new ex-perience. His pragmatism-and it is the very American naturalisticpragmatism of a John Dewey-is clear. Evolution is the replacementof unscientific (traditional or ideological) choices of ends by arational experimental model in which both means and ends areconstantly changing, as our knowledge increases and the adaptiveproblems of the society change.

Evolutionary advance may be defined in any number of waysFor example, one can argue, that the application of the scientificmethod to social affairs, including the sphere of moral action, ismore "advanced" because it is more rational or more humane ormore adaptive. Almond clearly thinks that all three statements aretrue. His implicit theory of evolutionary change (it is never quiteexplicit), as against a description of evolutionary stages has to dowith power. He seems to be saying that those societies becomedominant whose capabilities (power) are greater, either, one sup-

371bid., p. 25.

38 See, for example, Marc J. Swartz and associates (eds.), Political An-throlology (Chicago, 1966) and Marc J. Swartz (ed.), Local Level Politics(Chicago, 1968).


poses, because they become models for other societies or incorporatethem. 39 Rationality, differentiation and openness enhance capabilityand the dominance of certain kinds of political orders over otherkinds. Unfortunately the evidence on this issue is far from clear.Democratic societies have been rather short lived historically, andwe have little real empirical reason to believe that an "experimentaldemocratic" model is more efficient in this sense than others.

Indeed, Almond never comes to grips with the criticisms ofscholars like Nisbet or Bendix. The diffusion of a scientific industrialculture may be the result of a unique breakthrough in Europe.

4o

After all, before the modern period, a good many more highlydifferentiated societies rose to prominence only to collapse. More-over, the fact that the scientific revolution and the power derivedfrom it were associated with liberal pluralism initially says nothingabout the future, and Almond does not offer any good theoreticalreasons for assuming that the pluralist model is more adaptive in thecontemporary world than other political models. Indeed, one canargue, on a number of grounds, that contemporary scientific culturemay well be superseded by something else. In the introduction to hiscollected essays, Almond perceives in the contemporary world :

a reaction against the cognitive overemphasis of the Enlightenmentand associated modernizing processes, and a search for philosophicaland moral meaning and order consistent with science and technologybut not subordinated to it.

41

One need not add, perhaps, that current problems of population,and pollution and the destructiveness of modern weapons raiseserious doubts as to the ultimate adaptiveness of scientific industrialculture. Indeed, there are some very cogent reasons to believe thatthe agricultural productivity so necessary to current levels of exis-tence, and which depends so heavily on fossil sources, will not beable to be sustained very long even at present population levels. 42 In

39Almond never says this, but, so far as I can determine, it is the most

reasonable assumption to be drawn from his analysis.40Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered, " op. cit. Robert Nisbet,

Social Change and History ( New York, 1969).41

Gabriel Almond, Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory(Boston, 1970), p. 27.

42Hugh Nicol, The Limits of Man: An Inquiry into the Scientific Bases

of Human Population ( London, 1970).


short, it is conceivable that the scientific revolution has had very non-adaptive consequences.

Whatever the ultimate merits of Almond 's scheme (althoughI have raised objections to it, these are by no means insurmount-able), it does serve admirably to organize a good deal of materialabout historical societies which had hitherto been dealt with in avery ad hoc fashion. It must be added that Almond, in ComparativePolitics, has transcended his earlier rather simple distinction betweenmodern and traditional societies and has developed a far more com-plex and satisfying scheme, partly derived from Eisenstadt. 43 Hisclassification runs from primitive bands through patrimonial sys-tems and centralized bureaucratic empires, to various types ofmodern systems, including secularized city states, pre-mobilizedmodern systems and mobilized modern systems. 44

Almond 's specific theory of evolution seems to apply primarilyto the modern period and, more specifically, to Europe and the de-veloping countries: It has a peculiar teleological quality to it, forit assumes the mobilized modern state as the inevitable outcome ofdevelopment, and deals with the countries studied in terms of theproblems they faced in trying to achieve this end. In Almond 's ter-minology, European states, since about the sixteenth century, havebeen faced with a series of problems, viz, state building, nation build-ing, participation, and distribution. State building pertains to thecreation of institutions which enable the political system to regulatebehavior and extract a larger volume of resources from the society.Nation building is a process of evolving allegiance to the largercommunity at the expense of parochial attachments to tribes, vil -

lages or regions. Problems of participation and distribution ariseas more and more members of the community demand a voice indetermining the decisions that affect them and what they consider amore equitable division of the values of the society.

45

Almond suggests that the relative peacefulness of British develop-ment in the modern period stems from the fact that these problemsemerged one at a time. A viable state and nation had been cre-ated, for example, before other problems emerged. Other Euro-pean nations faced many of the problems at the same time. As a re-

43S. N. Eisenstatd, The Political Systems of Empires (New York, 1963).44See the table in Comparative Politics, p. 217.451bid., pp. 34-41.


suit the load upon the system was too great, resulting in distorteddevelopment and authoritarian rule. Most of the developing coun-tries today are faced with the need to solve all of these problems at

the same time. 46

The specific developmental model does not seem to derive fromthe more general, except for state building which, of course, hasto do with differentiation. While it is extremely useful in orderingcertain kinds of material, it raises certain questions. The generaltheory deals with society as an organism, differentiating and coordi-nating; the specific theory seems to treat the community as anindividual involved in a problem solving. A good many critics of

functionalism argue that societies are always composed of individualsand groups with divergent interests, and that such groups are alwaysin conflict. The organismic model ignores, or, at least, plays downthis fact. 47 In so far as the special theory treats the nation state as anindividual engaged in problem solving, it has the same effect. Theeffect is compounded by a tendency to set up the modern "stable"

democratic state as the norm, and to examine development in so faras it has led to this goal or deviated from it. Given this emphasis,social justice questions are ignored. The end of the political com-munity, after all, argues 'Christian Bay, is not stable anything, but aricher and more meaningful life for all its members. "

Almond has not been insensitive to some of these criticisms. Hismost recent work takes into account conflict approaches to the studyof politics and both Comparative Politics and other writings haveattempted to deal with broader issues of sound justice. Indeed,Almond regards political scientists as sober trustees of the enlighten-

"Ibid., pp. 322 if.47 See, for example, Collins, op. Cit. and Ralf Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia:

Toward a Reconstruction of Sociological Analysis," in Demerath and Peter-son, op. cit., pp. 465-480.

48See, for example, Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A CriticalEvaluation of Some Behavioral Literature, " in Jack L. Walker, "A Critique ofthe Elitist Theory of Democracy, " in Charles A. McCoy and John Playford(eds.), Apolitical Politicals: A Critique of Behavioralistn (New York, 1967),pp. 12-37 and pp. 199-219 respectively. On the stable democracy theme Al-mond is lumped together with a number of other political scientists who startwith fairly different assumptions under the general label of "behavioralist."

These latter include people like Heinz Eulau, Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby.One should add that critics of "behavioralism " are generally less harsh withAlmond than they are with scholars like Dahl.


ment. Their job is to bring intelligence to , bear on social issues. Whilehe never states his position in full detail, he clearly feels that the endswe choose and the means to choose to attain given ends can both beimproved by a better understanding of reality. The political scientistcannot and should not avoid dealing with the moral dimensions ofpolitics. We may, then, turn to Almond 's attempts to evaluate poli-tical systems. We shall first describe and discuss the implications ofhis concept of the civic culture and democratic stability. From therewe will turn to his analyses of the capabilities of regimes, and finallywe shall discuss his attempt to create an index for scoring regimesaccording to explicit social justice criteria.

III. EVALUATIONS AND VALUES

It is perhaps a commentary on the attitudes prevalent amongAmerican academics during the 1950 's, that Almond' s major con-cern at that point should have been the conditions of democraticstability. The Civic Culture reflected these concerns. Anglo-Americaninstitutions were regarded as reasonably satisfactory; certainly satis-factory enough to serve as a normative model. The aim of thevolume, then, was to understand the bases of their democraticstability from a political culture perspective. The study served otherpurposes, i.e., it enabled Almond to refine his concept of politicalculture. However, it is his conception of democracy, a conceptionwhich falls into the camp of what some of his critics have called"neo-elitist " democratic theory, that has roused the most contro-versy, and we shall emphasize the problems the theory raises in ourdiscussion of the book.

In The Civic Culture the evolutionary model which was to bemade explicit later in Almond ' s work is already foreshadowed.Political culture is described in terms of the orientation of citizenstoward the political system. The scholar should study orientationstoward the system as a general object, toward political roles or struc-tures involved in political inputs or outputs, and toward the selfas a political actor. The character of these orientations varies withthe society 's level of political development, and Almond develops atypology of three basic kinds of political culture: "parochial" politi-cal cultures, "subject" political cultures and "participant" politicalcultures.

Parochial political cultures characterize primitive or traditionalsocieties with limited political role differentiation. Members of such


societies have few if any orientations toward the political system.Subject political cultures are found in more advanced-althoughstill (usually) traditional-societies. Members of the community ex-

hibit "a high frequency of orientations toward a differentiatedpolitical system, but orientations toward specifically input objectsand toward the self as an active participant approach zero. " 4 °

The third major type of political culture, the participant politicalculture, is one in which the members of the society tend to beexplicitly oriented to "the system as a whole and to both the politicaland administrative structures and processes. " 50 Such a culture isobviously more congruent with modern democratic states.

These are ideal type constructs and Almond carefully pointsout that most actual political cultures are a mix of these orientations.One of these mixes, The Civic Culture, is most congruent with exist-ing stable democratic regimes and is the culture which, in somewhatdifferent ways, is characteristic of both England and the UnitedStates.

The civic culture, Almond notes, is not the "rationality-activist" model described in American civics textbooks. That modelimplies that all citizens must participate actively and rationally atall times in the political process. On the contrary, Almond argues,not only do citizens in successful democracies fail to behave in thisway, but they cannot. Indeed any approach to full participation insuch a political order would lead to stasis, instability and perhapseventual collapse of the democratic polity. 61

British and American politics do not conform to the rationalityactivist model because citizens also accept passive subject roles viz a

viz authority, and maintain parochial ties to families and other non-political groupings. Participation in politics does not have greatsalience save at certain critical junctures. It is kept in its place.

Actually, the civic culture and stable democracy depend fortheir continued success on an uneasy balance between the myth of

49 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston, 1965),p. 17.

5°Ibid., p. 18.

51The substance of this argument and the next few paragraphs will be

found on pp. 337-368 of The Civic Culture. Almond, of course, is largelycontinuing the analyses of people like Robert Dahl, Bernard Berelson andV. O. Key. See Bernard Berelson et al, Voting (Chicago, 1954), Robert Dahl,Who Governs ( New Haven, 1961), and V. O. Key, Public Opinion andAmerican Democracy (New York, 1961).


the rational activist citizen, the non-salience of politics, and thewillingness of most citizens to behave as subjects most of the time.The rationalist activist myth is necessary so that citizens will act atenough times on sufficient issues to keep elites in line and so thatelites will expect such action. If special groups of citizens act onlyat certain times and on issues which are salient to them, the politycan respond to their demands, thus re-enforcing their allegiance.

The balance, however, does face certain dangers. If issues ofconsiderable salience to substantial segments of the populationemerge and cannot be dealt with in a reasonable time, seriousproblems can develop. Citizen activity can increase to a point whereelites, caught up in all sorts of cross pressures, will be unable to actat all, and citizens whose demands are not met could develop asense of impotence and alienation, with serious consequences forthe system. Further, in so far as socialization into the civic culturestems less from early childhood experiences (although these are im-portant) than from experience with the political process itself, theimpact of a crisis like this on later generations could be fairly sub-stantial.

Assuming the argument to be correct, its further implicationsare rather disturbing. Mass activism would probably result in eithera longish period of political stasis punctuated by considerable vio-lence, or some sort of dictatorship. In the latter eventuality volun-tary participation might be replaced by directed participation, butthe great mass of the population would, in fact, be merely subjects.Of course, some of the issues which brought about the crisis couldbe resolved and political activity would then fall back to. normallevels.

I 've extended and extrapolated from Almond 's argument some-what for a particular purpose. It seems to me that it offers someinteresting insights into the current malaise of American democracy,especially among upper middle class youth, although among othergroups as well.

Both the Vietnam war and the race issue have generated aseries of conflicts involving upper middle class youth (and theirparents) allied in some cases with blacks, versus various middle class,and working class "ethnics." Despite all the current student rhetoricabout power elites it seems quite clear that upper middle class re-formers have failed to, achieve their aims not because of "elite"

opposition (after all they and their parents constitute a substantial


part of the social establishment, at least, if there is an etsablishment)but because a segment of the political and social elite has joinedwith the working class and lower middle class white majority in op-position. Having been brought up on a "rationality activist" model,upper middle class youth expect the system to respond relativelyrapidly to the essential rightness of their cause, as they perceive it.When the system fails to respond in textbook fashion they becomealienated. Their alienation is heightened when they discover thatsupposedly "liberal" politicians who profess sympathy are unableor unwilling to sponsor the policies upon which they theoreticallyagree. What they often fail to realize is that these political figures aremore fully committed to the political system as it actually functionsthan are activist youth and/or their hands are partially tied by anelectoral constituency which is more conservative than they them-selves are.

In part upper middle class youth and their parents have beenable to achieve more than they might have in terms of numbers,because they have succeeded in mobilizing positions of the blackcommunity, and because their working class and lower middle classopponents tend to behave more like "parochials" and "subjects."Of course, upper middle-class liberals also dominate the prestigepapers and magazines as well as national television and the univer-sities. They have achieved less than they might have because theiropponents have been activated at least sporadically by real orimagined threats W

. what they consider vital interests: Urbanplanning is a case in point. The problems faced by New York Citytoday, while they have many sources, are less a result of the mayor ' sunwillingness to act than they are of the fact that almost all groupsfeel that their interests should be served and are increasingly willingto engage in direct action to secure them. Urban planning has beenfar easier in England in part . (but only in part) because the averagecitizen is still willing to accept elite decisions rather passively.6 2

It seems to me, then, that Almond 's theory is of considerableutility in explaining some of our current difficulties, and that hecould have predicted them with the relevant information. Hisanalysis, therefore, should commend itself to us. It has, however,come under serious attack from those who argue that because it

52The argument is developed somewhat more fully in Stanley Rothman,

European Society and Politics (Indianapolis, 1970), pp. 580-582.


undermines the "rationality activist model" it has conservative im-plications and. thus is unacceptable. 53 It is a little difficult to under-stand what the attackers propose. At least some of their argumentssound quite similar to those the Church offered when deciding tosilence Galileo because his theories were felt to undermine the basisof Christian morality. After all, if the kind of democratic polity des-cribed by Almond is the best we can realistically expect to create,then rejecting it because it does not conform to our wishes, is alittle like suggesting we repeal the law of gravity because it doesnot permit men to walk on water. 54 Whatever the relation betweenfacts and values, no reasonable person will. continue to strive toachieve a state of affairs which cannot be realized, especially ifAlmond's theory is correct, and the attempt seems likely to lead togreater evils than now exist.

Faced with Almond 's analyses, then, a scholar with a seriouscommitment to attaining as democratic a polity as possible, has buttwo options. He may offer an alternative theory which is at leastas good as Almond's in terms of its explanatory power, and whichpermits us to believe that full "rational" political participation canbe achieved by means of structural changes in the society. Alter-nately, he may accept Almond's analysis and yet deny its implication,by showing that so-called disruptive behavior promotes values whichare more important than "democratic stability." He may not,without emulating the Church in one of its most ludicrous mo-ments, reject the analysis for its "moral " or political implications."

Bay and Walker, in the analyses I have been summarizing, at-tempt both tasks. With regard to the first, however, they do littlebut assert that the average man has potentially more competencethan Almond gives him credit for. Unfortunately their argumentremains on the level of assertion, and does not quite hit the mark

53 See Walker, and Bay, op. cit., among many others.54As Marx noted in attacking the German idealists. His point was that

there was little to be gained in attacking the existing system and calling forsocialism, unless one could develop a conceptual scheme and a theory whichdemonstrated that a superior type of social order such as socialism could replaceexisting social arrangements.

J5 See the insightful essay by Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Sci-ence," in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics andSociety, third series (Oxford, 1967), pp. 25-57. Walker cites this article, butit seems to me that he does not really understand its implications.


at that. Almond ' s analysis, after all, was derived from structuralconsiderations rather than personal competence arguments.

The second part of their criticism seems to me to be on firmerground. In The Civic Culture Almond seemingly focused on theachievement of stable democracy to the exclusion of other con-cerns. 66 His critics suggest, as a counter argument, that a certainamount of disorder may serve humane ends. Now, this may verywell be true. However, the issues are rather more complicated. Veryfew political scientists today would seriously suggest that a politicalsystem characterized by violence and disorder is an end to be soughtin itself. The vast majority would recognize that some kind of orderis necessary if any goals are to be attained. A given kind of politicalorder may benefit dominant groups. Continued disorder can onlybenefit the stronger and the more aggressive, if it benefits anyone.

Walker and Bay would certainly seem to accept the above pro-position. Their argument is that a certain amount of instability canbe tolerated if it results in greater social justice. I suspect that Al-mond would not disagree with their position. The differences, if any,would have to do with the relationship between instability, socialjustice and a reasonably democratic order. In short, the issues be-tween the revisionist democratic theorists and their post-revisionistcritics are essentially empirical. I will not, here, attempt to join inthe argument, except to point out that the analyses of the revisionists,including Almond, have to be dealt with directly. They cannotsimply be dismissed. 5 7

Actually, Almond himself has recently attempted to developmeasures which might allow theorists to begin to talk in more mean-ingful terms about just the issues we have been discussing. In Com-parative Politics he discussed in a preliminary manner the problem

56 Two points should be made in Almond's defense. One cannot say every-thing in one book, and The Civic Culture was about the cultural conditionssupportive of democratic regimes. Secondly, nothing in Almond ' s analysisdenies that stable democracy can be associated with the repression of someminority groups.

6 7 These points are made from a somewhat different perspective by PeterY. Medding, "Elitist Democracy: An Unsuccessful Critique of a Misunder-stood Theory," Journal of Politics 31 (August, 1969), pp. 641-654. I shallreturn to some of the points made here in the conclusion of the essay. I shallalso have some critical remarks of another kind to make about Almond' sapproach to the study of political culture at that time.


of evaluating political systems. His aim was to develop measureswhich would enable us to specify the consequences of policies andhence to make more intelligent choices:

The capacity for greater precision . . . enables us to make ourcomparative analysis more relevant to debates over the ethics andbenefits of different types of political systems.5R

When we introduce the capabilities level of analysis, we enhancenot only our capacity for scientific prediction and explanation, butalso our capacity to talk about policies as they may affect politicalchange in desired directions.59

Almond' s first concern at this point was with measures of sys-

tem effectiveness. Such measures, he felt, could give us some notionof the capacity of the system to survive and grow. A measure ofsystem capacities is certainly a necessary preliminary to evaluatingany political system in social justice terms, if we assume that oughtusually implies can. For example, one 's ethical evaluation of asociety which exposed weak or deformed children would certainlydepend very much upon one's estimate of its food resources andlevel of technology.

Almond concentrates on three system capacities: the extractive,regulative, and symbolic. 40 Extractive capacity has to do with therange of system performance in drawing material and human re-sources from the domestic and international environment. 61 Regula-tive capacity has to do with the system's capacity to exere&se controlover individuals and groups. Symbolic capacity is not defined withcomplete clarity, but seems to be a measure of the system' s abilityto secure the support of its members through the "judicious creationand exploitation of the set of powerful and popular symbols." 6 2

Two measures of system capacity discussed by Almond are moreclosely related to issues of social justice, those of " distributive"

and "responsive" capacity. The first has to do with the "activityof the political system as a distributor of benefits among individualsor groups. Capacity here is measured by

5 8 Comparative Politics, p, 192.69 Ibid., p. 194."Ibid., pp. 190-212.sl lbid., p. 195."Ibid., p. 200.


... the quantity and importance of the objects distributed, the areasof human life they touch, the particular sections of the populationreceiving various benefits, and the relationship between individualneeds and governmental distribution to meet those needs."

To determine the responsive capacity of a regime one must knowwhat groups are making demands, how these are processed andwhat kinds of reactions occur to such demands. 64

In a later essay Almond expanded his attempts at evaluationsomewhat further, and added a system of ethical scores primarilyfor purposes of " loosening up the imagination. "61 A justice scorewould

consist of a set of per capita rates of regulatory acts over a periodof time, emanating from a particular political system, weighted forthe salience of the areas regulated and the severity of the regulation,and corrected for opportunities available to the subjects of regula-tion to participate in the determination of the content, scope andintensity of the regulatory rules, and for the procedural protectionsin their enforcement. G °

He added suggestions for a liberty score and offered the possibilityof adaptability and other scores.

It is probably unfair to evaluate these efforts at setting upempirical measures for evaluating polities, given the tentativenesswith which they have been offered. Thus far, however, attemptsto translate them into meaningful research strategies would notseem too likely to meet with success. One can perhaps develop somemeasures of regulatory and extractive capacity, but categories likeresponsiveness raise all sorts of issues as to what constitute decisionsand non-decisions, which seem to raise problems of considerable dif -

ficulty, to put it mildly. 87

The ethical scoring system seems even more dubious. Frankly,I find it hard even to conceive how a justice score might be opera-

63Ibid., p. 198.

"Ibid., p. 203.65"Political Development ...," op. cit., p. 467.86Ibid.G7 See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions:

An Analytic Framework, " American Political Science Review 57 ( December,1963), pp. 632-642, and a critique of their argument by Richard M. Merel-man, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power, " American PoliticalScience Review 62 (June, 1968), pp. 451-460.


tionalized. For example, would one measure opportunities availablefor participation in terms of felt needs or perceptions, or would oneattempt to create some absolute scale? Nevertheless, continued at-tempts in this direction would not be without value, even if theycontributed only slightly to our ability to talk about such issues inmore precise terms.

IV. TOWARD A PLURALISTIC APPROACH TO

THE STUDY OF POLITICS

Even as he began to work in a more detailed manner withproblems of evaluation, Almond 's thinking was undergoing someshifts as regards empirical analyses. In a series of essays he beganto move away self-consciously from as heavy a reliance on a func-tional model as characterized Comparative Politics, and to seek tocombine such a model with other approaches." The criticismsleveled against functionalism in his most recent writing parallel thoseof some of his critics. Functionalism focuses too much upon equi-librium. Its picture of society is too mechanistic or organismic. It istoo deterministic, ignoring such phenomena as political leadership. Itassumes reciprocal relationship among elements of a system whichmay indeed not exist. It is too abstract, because its more generalstatements are not tied closely to research into the ways in whichgroups actually make decisions. It ignores or has ignored suchmatters as the changing international environment by not beingsufficiently aware of the openness of political and social systems, andit ignores the effects of particular policies adopted by elites at criticalperiods.

Almond also admits that functionalism has remained somewhatethnocentric in its outlook, and accepts the criticisms of Hempel

us"Determinancy Choice, Stability-Change: Some Thoughts on a Contempo-

rary Polemic in Political Theory," Government and Opposition 5 (Winter1969-1970), pp. 22-40; Gabriel A. Almond, "State Building in Britain, Franceand Prussia, " (Draft paper prepared for the Summer Workshop in StateBuilding in Western Europe; Stanford, California, mimeographed, n.d., 42pp.) ; "Approaches to Developmental Causation, " (First draft of an introduc-tion to Gabriel Almond and Scott Flanagan (eds.), Developmental Episodes,mimeographed, n.d., 71 pp.). Professor Almond was kind enough to send mecopies of both papers prior to publication. The latter paper will be publishedthis year.


and others that functionalism does not involve casual explanation. 89

Rather, he now argues, its major purpose is hueristic. It is designedto throw light on relationships which scholars might otherwise haveignored or misread.

Almond 's response to his self-criticism is to seek " the historicalcure" and to attempt to use the functional model in combinationwith other models to examine particular developmental episodes ina variety of countries. The attempt is to combine analytic effortswith in depth studies of particular historical events.

His conclusion is that any political analysis must draw uponfour major approaches to the study of politics, which complementeach other: the functional, social mobilization, decision making andleadership models. Any political analysis must also take into accountboth the domestic and international environment. Thus the studyof a given system involves an analysis of system-environmentalproperties, structural functional properties, decision coalition pro-perties and leadership properties.

The analysis of change will involve the examination of coalitionand policy outcomes and linkages between these and the systemwhich is emerging. Part of the job of comparative political history isto write alternative scenarios in an attempt to clarify the impact ofparticular choices. For example, to clarify the development of Eng-lish history in the nineteenth century the analyst might ask whatwould have happened if Whigs and Tories in 1831 had organizeda coalition based on a policy of repression, or the Social Demo-cratic Party in 1918 had moved toward the left rather than towardthe "discredited military-bureaucratic establishment. "

Almond is hopeful that the analyses of a series of case studieswill help scholars integrate these various approaches into a moresophisticated general theory. The nature of this theory is not asyet clear. For example, Almond seems less taken with an evolu-tionary approach, but has not discarded it. He also seems more will-ing to accept the possibility of considerable indeterminancy in poli-tical change involving, for example, "accidents," such as the ap-pearance of a particular charismatic leader. However, it is far fromcertain how this would affect his attempts at conceptualization.

69The classic critique is that of Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Func-

tional Analysis," in Llewellyn Gross (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory( Evanston, 1959).


Conceivably it might lead him to argue that it is impossible to de-velop a general science of politics.

V. FUNCTIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS

The functional approach to the study of society has been aroundfor some time, and the literature on it has grown to fairly enormousproportions. Most of the arguments as to its utility have been fairlywell rehearsed and need not be repeated here. It should be notedthat many of the technical objections raised against the functionalismof Radcliff-Brown, Malinowski or even Parsons are not really ap-plicable to Almond, although some critics behave as if they were.

Hempel, for example, quite correctly pointed out that "explain-ing" the emergence or persistence of an institution by the functionsit performs in the larger society is not an explanation at all, for itassumes that the same function cannot be fulfilled by some otherinstitutions, or indeed has to be fulfilled at all. 70 Hempel and othershave also noted that many functional analyses implicitly assumesome ideal model of a functioning society, and have suggested thatthis is a dubious procedure. One can easily identify a well function-ing car, or, perhaps, a healthy organism, but given the difficulty ofsetting overall goals for a society, what appears to be functionalfrom one perspective might well be disastrous from another.

At least some functionalists have seemed to feel that every in-stitution must have some relevance to the functioning of a givensocial system, and have attempted to explain institutions in wayswhich seemed to justify them. Critics have rightly pointed out thatsuch analyses assume what has to be proven. They also point outthat such analyses often take the overall values and structure of asociety as given. It may be legitimate to demonstrate that Europeanshave too lightly dismissed institutions which played an importantintegrative role in various "primitive" societies as archaic and ir-rational. It is another matter to inhibit reform in one 's own societyby making a similar suggestion.

Other critics have suggested that since all societies consist ofindividuals and groups competing for relatively scarce resources,social arrangements which are functional for dominant sectors,may, in fact, injure other sectors of the population. It is, perhaps,

70See Hempel, op. cit.


because of criticisms such as these that functional theorists beganto experiment with such terms as "eufunction" and "dysfunction,"

in order to permit more critical analyses."Whatever the merits of the above criticisms and the efforts to

meet them, they are not relevant to Almond ' s work. From the be-ginning he has limited his use of functional analyses to certain keyelements. Essentially all Almond has argued is that in all societiesmechanisms must be created for the authoritative allocation ofvalues, and that the job of political scientists is to study the variousways in which this has been and is being done. He has also main-tained that we can do so more effectively by using a systems ap-proach and emphasizing process rather than formal institutions.

Almond has always stated that given political functions can beperformed in a variety of different ways by different institutions.He has never, therefore, attempted to explain the existence of agiven structure by the function it performs. If one wishes to under-stand why the Soviet political system aggregates interests in oneway and the American in another, one must engage in historicalcausal analyses. One may fault Almond his list of functions, or mayargue that functional analysis does not exhaust the kinds of ques-tions of interest to political scientists, but he cannot be accusedeither of using teleological explanations or of being a conservativeon these grounds alone. 72 One can also argue, as does Hempel, thatlisting functional requisites is simply to explicate the obvious. Per-haps so, but in the social sciences at least, the systematic discussionof the obvious may yield at least some advances in our understanding.

Functionalists have also been accused of having adopted a con-servative stance because of their equilibrium assumptions. In hislater writing Almond sometimes apologizes for having done soearlier, but from what he has written there is no evidence that thisis so. His approach does have a static quality in another sense, how-ever, and I shall return to that question later.

"Robert Merton seems to have introduced the term dysfunction. EufuncLion was coined by Marion Levy, Jr. For a recent short statement, see thelatter' s essay in The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, op. cit.,pp . 21-28.

72A. James Gregor raises many of these objections to functionalism in politi-cal science. See his "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis, "The American Political Science Review 62 (June, 1968), pp. 425-439. Howevercorrect he may be in describing Easton ' s work, his analysis is not applicableto Almond.


I should add that one cannot really accuse Almond of havingbecome a new scholastic, a charge which has been leveled againstTalcott Parsons with some justification. 7 3 He does share some ofthe jargon of the functional school . of sociology, but he has triedto stick closely to the data and his category building enterprises havenever really gotten out of hand. The negative side of this virtue isa lack of conceptual precision in some areas. However, I, for one,feel that, on balance, the positive aspects of his strategy outweighits weaknesses.

Finally, I am not impressed by the arguments of those scholars,such as LaPalombara, who maintain that attempts to develop anoverall framework for studying political systems are prematureand inhibit effective work. 14 All of us approach the study of societywith some conceptual scheme or other. The benefits of attempts tomake these explicit seem to me to outweigh the possible losses. It isundoubtedly true that system building of the functional kind hasencouraged at least some scholars, including occasionally Almondhimself, to apply conceptual schemes mechanically rather thancreatively and to ignore the kinds of reality which could not fit intopreconceived boxes. They have also used conceptualization as anexcuse for not doing research. Frankly, I doubt that such studentswould be more creative if the functional model did not exist. Thecapacity of academics to substitute conceptual schemes or rhetoricfor research is boundless.

LaPalombara ' s critique is, however, useful. During the early1960's the movement in the direction of overarching intellectualschemes probably went too far, and rewards in the profession seemedto be directly proportional to the number of neologisms an authorused. Further careful empirical and historical analysis tended tobe downplayed as mere description. Nevertheless, when used withsensitivity and as a tentative guideline, the functional _approach hasbeen fruitful. It certainly has enriched the study of politics in anynumber of ways. We forget now that for many years discussions ofthe Communist Party of the Soviet Union revolved about the ques-tion as to whether it should or should not be called a party, or

73 See Barrington Moore, Jr., "The New Scholasticism and the Study ofPolitics, " in Demerath and Peterson, op. cit., pp. 333-338.

7 4Joseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories and Microapplications in Compara-tive Politics: A Widening Chasm, " in Comparative Politics 1 ( October, 1968),pp. 52-78.


whether Soviet law was really law. How immensely liberating itwas to forget these questions and start asking ourselves what func-tions such institutions performed in Soviet society. In a way func-tional assumptions have become so much a part of the intellectualclimate, that we have forgotten what things were like before. 76

Perhaps some of the disillusion with functional analysis has todo with the kinds of claims which were initially made for it. Manyof those scholars drawn to the approach, including Almond, seemedto percieve of it initially as a full blown theory which was full oflaw like propositions only waiting to be explicated. However, if wemake more modest claims for the approach and see it as Almondnow does, i.e., as a conceptional scheme whose value is primarilyheuristic, it takes on a different perspective. It has not broughtabout a revolution in the study of politics which has all but openedthe way to tremendous advances in our understanding. It has notrelieved us of the difficult and frustrating job of careful researchinto highly complicated relationships. And it is not even a guideto study of all the political questions in which we may be interested.

Almond, then, is merely suggesting we adopt a certain researchstrategy. To be sure, as already indicated, certain assumptions aboutreality are implicit. For example, it is assumed that the reciprocalrelations among parts of the political system are such that significantchanges in some of them will produce changes in others. However,this statement does not have the status of a " law." The actualextent of inter-relatedness must be determined by empirical investi-gation, and should it eventually prove to be the case that the postu-lated relationships are less interesting than others, a new strategy willhave to be developed. Initially Almond 's claims were bolder. Statedmore modestly they seem reasonable. 7G

There are, of course, a good many problems with Almond ' sframework even in his own terms. The political system is conceivedof as an analytic system, one of several subsystems of the largersociety. In postulating inter-connectedness among parts of the sys-tem, Almond does not deny, or at least does not have to deny,that at the boundaries at least, the relations between elements inthe political system and elements in other subsystems may be of

76 0ne of the first books to approach the Soviet Union from this perspec-tive was Frederick 'C. Barghoorn ' s, Politics in the USSR (Boston, 1966).

76The subtitle of his latest book is: Essays in Heuristic Theory.


greater significant than relations among parts of the political systemitself. We should like, then, some clarification as to the relationshipbetween the political system and other subsystems in the society.Almond, however, has little or nothing to say about this problem.For one thing he has not developed a functional model of thewhole society. Thus, while he argues that the political system per-forms certain functions, he never tells us what other functions mustbe performed in a society, and how the performance of such func-tions is to be conceptualized.

Furthermore, Almond never tells us clearly what a boundary is,although he talks freely about boundaries. in reading his analysiswe can develop some vague ideas After all, the political system isinvolved in processing demands, and we have some vague notionsas to which structures are involved in such processing and which arenot. Unfortunately, these vague notions are never clarified, and, asa result, a good deal of fudging occurs, some of it of considerableimportance. The political system floats uneasily in an environmentwhose relation to it remains unclear, and, indeed, at times it seemsto expand until it becomes practically co-equal with the society asa whole. "

One of the major reasons for this, I think, has to do , with Al-

mond's conceputalization of the functions of the political system.The Eastonian model has very serious limitations. For example, iffollowed rigorously, it would prevent really adequate comparisonsbetween the Soviet Union under Stalin, China under Mao, Cubaunder Castro, and countries such as the United States or England.Indeed, it would make comparisons difficult between most modernstates and bureaucratic empires (such as the Ottoman).

In the case of mobilization regimes the effort of the political elitehas not been simply to process demands, but to achieve certaingoals based on ideological preconceptions, and, in fact, to changethe demand structure of society. And, as Eisenstadt points out, oneof the characteristics of bureaucratic empires was the availabilityof resources which the elite could use for ends of its own choosing. 78

Almond attempts to deal with such questions by arguing that de-

"See, for example, his discussion of France in Comparative Politics, op. cit.,pp. 263-66.

"Cf. Stanley Rothman, "One Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis,"

Social Research 34 (Winter, 1967), pp. 675-702 and Eisenstadt, The PoliticalSystems of Empires, op. cit.


mands can come from within the political system itself. 79 The state-ment is, however, incompatible with the model. The political sys-tem cannot be at one and the same time a mechanism for processingsocietal demands and the source of such demands.

It is, of course, quite clear that Almond's as well as Easton'sconception of the functions of a polity are derived from classicalliberalism. The view of Locke and others was essentially that societyconsisted of individuals and groups pursuing their own interests andthat the role of the state was to mediate among these groups, andto perform certain common functions upon which all agreed. Onemay feel that this kind of society is essentially the good society, andthe direction in which all political orders should move. However,such feelings are not a substitute for a conceptual framework whichwill enable us to understand how societies have functioned in thepast and do function now. 80

I am not suggesting that the "conversion" model is entirelywrong or lacks utility. Indeed, in so far as it has encouraged us toexamine the structure of demands. in, say, Soviet society, it hasserved as a useful corrective to the totalitarian model so popular inthe 1950 ' s. I would suggest, however, that it is a partial andethnocentric model, and that Parson's definition of the functionsof the political system is superior, although not without problems.In Parsonian terms the political system would be defined as thatsubsystem of the society through which its members define its goals,and, in the broadest sense, mobilize resources to achieve thesegoals.' Such goals, of course, include the authoritative allocationof values within the society.

Parsons has been. criticized for. failing to specify whose goalshe is talking about, and, in general, for ignoring power assymetriesin society as well as the key role of dominant elites. S2 However, ifhe is at fault in this regard, his definition is not. The existence ofpolitical systems in all known present and historical societies is to

79Comparative Politics, p. 25.

80Joseph LaPalombara has made a similar point in Joseph LaPalombara(ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development ( Princeton, 1963), p. 10.

81Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure (New York, 1969), pp.

317-351.82

See the very insightful discussion and critique by Anthony Giddings,"Power in the Recent Writings of Talcott Parsons," Sociology 2 (September,1968), pp. 257-272. and W. G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory(Cambridge, 1969, 2nd edition), p. 117.


be explained by the fact that men require mechanisms of some kindto define common goals, including mere survival, as well as to mo-

bilize resources for their attainment. The key role played by thepolitical system in any society makes it a focal point of conflict, anda mechanism by which dominant elites can insure their dominanceand engage in various forms of self-aggrandizement. In the studyof any given society the actual relationship between the role ofdemands emanating from other groups within the society and elitepreferences and perceptions is an open question to be settled byresearch.

Almond 's liberal perspectives also weaken his discussion of po-litical culture. It may be that secular, rational, pragmatic cuture isthe high point of evolution, as it manifests (should we say mani-fested?) itself in England and the United States. However onemust deal with some serious questions before such an assertion canbe accepted. American "pragmatism " has always operated withina framework of certain widely shared values themselves derivedfrom the Liberal tradition. The "pragmatism" of the British, while

superficially the same, has other roots. Both traditions seem to bebreaking down, and I suspect that Almond would have been moresensitive to this fact had he not been caught up in certain assump-tions of his own.

His problems with the concept of political culture as an analytictool have, however, deeper roots which are related to his entiremethodology, and the methodology of much of the contemporarybehavioral school. Responding to criticisms that functional theorywas static, that it ignored conflict, and that the relationship betweenmacro-theory and actual empirical analysis was not clearly articu-lated, Almond has modified his approach. An evolutionary theorywas added to the repertoire of functionalism and, more recently,efforts have been made to include coalition and leadership analysis.However, the model still remains static in many ways. Scholars areto search for relevant variables to describe a given society at a givenpoint and then to look for the forces which produce change. As yet,however, one has little sense that Almond has begun to think aboutthe weight of particular variables in producing a given change orhas developed a. method for adequately describing a society at agiven period of time. As a result, superficial resemblances are oftenassumed to represent basic similarities, and concepts like politicalculture become reified. Let me offer an example of what I mean and


then attempt to suggest a strategy. by which efforts may be made todeal with the problem.

In Comparative Politics, Almond contrasts the political style ofthe United States, England and the Philippines, on the one hand,with countries such as France on the other. The latter he argues, ischaracterized by an "absolute, value oriented" style. The formeron the other hand are more pragmatic. He goes on to note:

The pragmatic-bargaining style characterizes aggregation in suchsystems as those of the United States, Great Britain and the Philip-pines. In these countries a wide variety of interests are often com-bined into a limited number of alternative policies. This aggrega-tion is sometimes guided by more general ideological perspectives,but the accommodation of diverse interests is its more notable char-acteristic. . . The presence of this style greatly facilitates systemresponsiveness.

83

My knowledge of the Philippines is not very detailed. I wouldguess that the style of politics described by Almond is based on quitedifferent values than that of the United States or England, and hasmore to do with the clientelist politics so characteristic of LatinAmerican as well as a number of Asian societies. 84 Placed in thetotal context of the society, the style of interest aggregation in thePhilippines, therefore, would seem likely to have a quite differentmeaning than superficially similar styles in the U. S. and GreatBritain. It has, for example, been associated with extremely lowrates of economic growth and quite high levels of corruption. Thelatter phenomenon, at least, is not characteristic of Englishpolitics. 86

Further, while Almond ' s model helps us understand some aspectsof the American malaise today, it seems clear that other forceshave been at work too, associated with changing family patterns,and the decline of Protestant sensibilities of a certain kind. Relat-ing the particular pattern of American political culture dynamicallyto other variables in the 1950 ' s might not have enabled Almond

83Comparative Politics, p. 108.

84 See John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics,"American Political Science Review 64 (June, 1970), pp. 411-425.

86Almond is certainly aware that similar styles do not have the samemeanings in all three countries, but I feel that he is unable adequately toconceptualize the differences (see Ibid., pp. 57-58).

1

FUNCTIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS 27 1

to be completely clear about what would happen in the 1960 ' s.It would perhaps have inspired somewhat greater caution in makingstatements about political cultures which implied that their charac-ter was relatively fixed.

Almond 's efforts to conceptualize societies at given periods oftime do seem to resemble a series of static snapshots. One finds acertain kind of balance at point A. One then searches for exogenousand indigenous forces which have led or might lead to change. Thestrategy is not without merit. It does have limitations.

This kind of approach, however, is not intrinsic to functionalanalysis per se.. On the contrary, a scholar can just as easily beginwith the assumption that all modern societies, at least, represent atany given time an uneasy balance of forces. He would thenactively search out potential tensions and sources of conflict andwould recognize that any full description of the structures whichcharacterize the political system necessarily involve an analysis ofthe balance of forces which led to their emergence, and the waysin which they seem to be changing. S6 The problems involved indealing with political systems in this fashion are very complex, but,then, political systems are very complex. Political scientists might,in this respect, take a leaf from the work of contemporary psycho-analysts. The full description of the balance of forces which con-stitute a personality, involves the recognition that they are in a stateof dynamic tension, and that they are a composite of an individual ' sentire life history. The same neurotic symptoms may represent aquite different combination of elements." Analyses of this typemay often be erroneous, but those making them are less likely to besurprised by change, and are certainly less likely to be taken in bysuperficial resemblances in the responses to relatively short andhighly structured questionnaires.

The efforts which have been made by those of the functionalschool to develop an evolutionary theory of political developmentface a great many difficulties. They are not insuperable, but in sofar as their analyses are decidely teleological they will have to berecast before they can be regarded as more than suggestive. Justas significantly, they will somehow have to be broadened to take

"The point is made quite well in Walter Buckley, Sociology and ModernSystems Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967).

87 Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis (New York, 1945).


into account man 's relation to his total environment, and a theoryof motivation which satisfies our knowledge of man 's biologicalnature as well as his capacity to create culture. 88 If the events ofthe past several years have reminded us of anything it is that anysuch theory must take into account the non-rational elements ofhuman behavior. Almond regards himself as a "sober " trustee of theenlightenment, but he is still a trustee, as are most political scientists.The model is still of rational men seeking to satisfy interests. Theirconceptions of this interest may be determined, in part, by culturalgivens, but within that framework, their means and ends are moreor less rationally chosen. Despite the fact that psychoanalysis is allbut an American institution, there has been little effort to integrateits insights into our work, since Lasswell 's rather abortive efforts. 89

These last remarks have been critical, and it is much easier tocriticize than to innovate, at least if one sets reasonably rigorousempirical standards by which one 's innovations shall be judged. Thecriticisms, however, are offered not to demolish functionalism as anapproach, but to suggest possible ways in which its fruitfulness forthe study of politics may be increased. Again, the functional ap-proach has not involved a revolution in the study of politics andit has not led us much closer to solving the riddle of the sphinx. Ithas enabled us to develop increased sophistication. In short, Almondand those who have worked with him have important achievementsto their credit.

Much of the content of political science has remained and willremain unchanged by the development of functional perspectives.The need for historical analysis remains as important as ever, as dodetailed descriptions of particular institutions. More importantly, andthis may have more to do with the historical sources of func-tionalism, than the framework itself, certain very important ques-tions do not seem amenable to a functional approach.

88Two recent and very stimulating attempts to do just this are those of

Weston LaBarre, The Ghost Dance (New York, 1970), chs. 1 and 2, andPeter A. Corning, "The Biological Bases of Behavior and Some Implicationsfor Political Science, " World Politics 23 (April, 1971), pp. 321-370.

88The reasons for this are complicated and have as much to do with thenature of classical psychoanalysis as with political science. Recently signs havedeveloped of a new attempt to build bridges between psychoanalytic theory,history and other social sciences. See, for example, the very insightful bookby Fred Weinstein and Gerald M. Platt, The Wish to Be Free (Berkeley,1969), La Barre, op. cit., also incorporates a psychoanalytic perspective.


It may be true, for example, that all modern societies are andwill be characterized by structures that fulfill the functions com-monly assigned to bureaucracies, whatever one may call them.Nevertheless, there are still differences between modern societieswhich are important, and these differences are not adequately con-ceptualized by terms like "subsystem autonomy. " The SovietUnion may be a modern political system and a one party regime.It is also a socialist society. There can be but little question thatthe nature of the economic system has important consequences forpolitical institutions, and that the politics of equally modern neo-capitalist and socialist societies will take different forms. The studyof these problems has been relatively neglected in recent years. Theyremain crucial to our understanding of comparative politics, aswell as to our ability to confront some of the problems with whichwe shall be faced in the fairly near future.

One final issue remains to be discussed. In recent years a wide-spread attack has been raised against functionalism in sociology andthe whole behavioral tradition in political science (of which func-tionalism is usually considered part) which goes well beyond someof the criticisms I have already elaborated. 90 A good deal of thecriticism is highly rhetorical and does not readily lend itself to syste-matic analysis. However, in much of it behavioralism and func-tionalism are accused of being conservative because they draw theirimage of man and his behavior from a highly corrupt contemporarysociety. Assuming contemporary behavior is natural, they refuse touse the facts for a leap of utopian speculation which would permitth emergence of new forms of social organization which are freer,more spontaneous and less characterized by " repressive" authority.

90The literature is becoming fairly substantial in sociology and politicalscience. In the latter field the criticism of functionalism is generally part of ageneral criticism of the "behavioral" approach. Some representative worksinclude: Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (NewYork, 1970): Henry Kariel (ed.), Frontiers of Democratic Theory (NewYork, 1970), Marvin Surkin and Alan Wolfe (eds.), An End to PoliticalScience (New York, 1970), Philip Green and Sanford Levinson (eds.), Powerand Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science (New York, 1970),and the McCoy and Playford volume already cited. See also Henry Kariel,"Expanding the Political Present, " The American Political Science Review 63( September, 1969), pp. 768-776, and Sheldon Wolin, "Political Theory as aVocation," The American Political Science Review 63 December, 1969), pp.1062-1082.


Insofar as the (behavioralist) eliminates alternative realitiesby embracing as "real" the very institutions which the social sciencesproperly subject to continuous criticism, it is anti-empirical as wellas elitist. When it fails to acknowledge the problematic-not to saygrotesque character of the present, it is unable to specify how menare kept underdeveloped by the dominant order of commitments;government by a plurality of elites, a functional division of labor. . . the system of fixed social and biological roles within hierarchi-cal organizations. ...91

... the issue is ... between those who would restrict the "reach"of theory by dwelling on facts which are selected by what are as-sumed to be the functional requisites of the existing paradigm andthose who believe that because facts are richer than theories, it isthe tasks of the theoretical imagination to restate new possibilities.

e2

In so far as behavioralists or functionalists have taken as naturalwhat is twentieth century American and European political be-havior, Kariel, Wolin and others certainly have a point, if we ignoretheir hyperbole. Beyond this I am more skeptical. It may be thatdeveloping a theory of human political behavior by drawing on itspast and present manifestations produces a conservative bias. It stillseems to be infinitely preferable to deriving such theory from thefuture unless one owns a good ouija board.

Functionalists, after all, can argue that on the basis of their ownassumptions they could have predicted and can explain why theFrench had to recreate a legal profession after 1789 and why theRussians had to recreate a legal system or a bureaucracy which re -

sembles very closely the bureaucracy of other industrial societies.They could also have predicted the need for organizing industryand education in ways not too different from other communities.And they would predict that the Chinese, despite Mao 's efforts, willcontinue to face the same requirements.

93Finally, they could have

predicted that the failure to recognize the need for some structureof authority in any society and public checks upon it would mostlikely result in its concentration in the hands of a self-perpetuating

91Kariel, op. cit., p. 769."Wolin, op. cit., p. 1082."Stanley Rothman, European Society and Politics, op. cit., chapters 3, 4,

7, 20, 21, 22. On China after the cultural revolution, see John W. Lewis(ed.), The City in Communist China (Stanford, 1971).


elite. 94 Such predictions and explanations, deriving as they do fromfunctional and structural imperatives, seem rather more reasonablethan the simplistic notions of betrayal by which some utopians, atleast, attempt to explain the failure of all past efforts to usher inthe millenium.

If one, then, is to convince reasonable men that transcendenceis more than merely possible, one must develop a conceptual frame-work and theories which stand the test of all empirical theories. Thecreators of such frameworks and theories will have to demonstratethat they enable us to organize data about the present and pastroughly as efficiently as alternate models, and that they are morefruitful with regard to new discoveries. Marx certainly realizedthis. Most of his adult life was dedicated to the attempt to con-struct a model of man and history which would demonstrate, onjust these grounds, the probability of a future society whichwould maximize human freedom. Those who would make use ofthe philosophic "existential" Marx, while ignoring or rejecting themature theory would have received little sympathy from him. Veryfew radical theorists have attempted anything like a comparabletask, and the efforts of those who have tried, such as Marcuse, Bay,Gouldner or Moore seem less than convincing. 95

At least some of the new set of radical critics would refuse toaccept this task. The argument seems to be as follows: All socialscience begins with value assumptions, in Gouldner's terms "back-ground" and "domain " assumptions. We, then, are free to chooseour own and proceed from there. The only requirement is that wemust be aware of the assumptions from which we start. 99

I would assert the contrary. Unless we assume that disagree-ments about political-moral questions stem from constitutional

94Stanley Rothman, "One Party Regimes ..., op. cit.

95Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization ( Boston, 1955), One Dimensional

Man (Boston, 1964), Christian Bay, The Structure of Freedom (New York,1965), and other works cited above; Gouldner, op. cit., and Barrington Moore,Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, 1966). Forcritiques, see Alasdair MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse (New York, 1970), StanleyRothman, "Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution: An EssayReview," The American Political Science Review 64 (March, 1970), pp.61-82. Stanley Rothman, "Objectivity," Commentary 50 (December, 1970),pp. 95-97 represents a critique of Gouldner, and R. S. Peters, The Conceptof Motivation (London, 1958) offers a short but devastating critique ofAbraham Maslow, upon whom Bay builds much of his theorizing.

"Gouldner, op. cit.


differences, they can only derive from differing beliefs about thenatural order of things and their relation to human needs. Mostof us derive these beliefs initially from our culture, or from child-hood experiences. However, confessing that one starts from certainassumptions, does not release one from the obligation constantly tore-examine them in the light of new evidence. To refuse is toabdicate moral responsibility. Children do this, but as adults weshould put away childish things.

As Charles Taylor notes, in an article which should be read care-fully by every political scientist:

. . . "good" doesn't mean "conducive to the fulfillment of human

wants, needs or purposes " ; but its use is unintelligible outside of anyrelationship to wants, needs and purposes. . . For if we abstractfrom this relation, then we cannot tell whether a man is using"good" to make a judgment, or simply to express some feeling; andit is an essential part of the meaning of the term that such a dis-tinction can be made . . .

"good

"is used in evaluating, commending,

persuading and so on by a race of human beings who are such thatthrough their needs, desires, and so on, they are not indifferent tothe outcomes of the world process.

In setting out a given framework, a theorist is also setting out thegamut of possible politics and policies. But a political frameworkcannot fail to contain some, even implicit conception of humanneeds, wants and purposes. The context of this conception will de-termine the value-slope of the gamut... .

In this sense we can say that a given explanatory frameworksecretes a notion of good, and a set of valuations, which cannot bedone away with-though they can be overridden-unless we doaway with the framework. 97

To say that most ethical disagreements about politics stem fromdifferent conceptions of the world, is not to make the task of secur-ing agreement easier. The assumptions underlying various frame-works and theories are difficult to deal with, and prejudice dieshard especially when compounded by self-interest. It is to say thatmorally responsible men must always subject their own and otherframeworks to the kinds of empirical tests I have suggested.

Smith College

97Taylor, op. cit., pp. 54-55, 5

STANLEY ROTHMAN

functionalism and its critics is a mansion with many rooms, and has meant ... functionalism and its...

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