Company Public – NXP, the NXP logo, and NXP secure connections for a smarter world are trademarks of NXP

B.V. All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2019 NXP B.V.

Segment Line Manager, Powertrain & ElectrificationPL Drivers & Energy Systems

Vincent M. McNeil, Ph.D.

Functional Safety High Voltage Traction Inverter Reference Platform

October 2019 | Session #AMF-AUT-T3659

COMPANY PUBLIC 1

Session Goal

• Technical Presentation

• Go through the ISO 26262 Process with Example of Power Inverter

• Understand NXP Reference Design Safety Concept

COMPANY PUBLIC 2COMPANY PUBLIC 2

• Following the ISO26262-2018

− Part 3: Concept Phase Inverter

− Part 4: Technical Safety Requirements

− Part 5: HW Safety Architecture

− Part 6: SW Safety Architecture

Agenda

COMPANY PUBLIC 3

NXP Offer to the State-of-the-Art xEV Architecture

48 V or > 60 V

(e.g. 400 V)

* only in (P)HEVs, BEVs, omitted in 48 V MHEV systems

** bidirectional in 48 V systems

*** as in exisiting ICE-based vehicles

AC

MM

~

=

ACDC

Charger*

=

=

DCDC**

=

~=

~

Motor control Motor(s)

M

LV

lead-acid

or Li-Ion

Battery

BMS

BMS

DC

12 V

HV

Li-Ion

Battery

48 V and HV

Modules

12 V-bus

Modules***

Hybrid Control

Unit (HCU)

Wed 12th 5pm: GD3100 Next Advanced Isolated

of High Voltage Gate driver

Thru 13th 9am: Cost optimized HV BMS MC3377x

Thru 13th 1:30pm: Next Gen Processor solutions

for advanced HEV and Safety Domain

Wed 12th 4pm: High Voltage Safe reference

design Introduction

Thru 13th 2:30pm: Functional safety concept of

High voltage traction Inverter

Thru 13th 3:30pm: Mathworks Model based Design

with NXP Greenbox II

Wed 12th 10:45am: S32K Complete portfolio

update

COMPANY PUBLIC 4

eMotor Inverter Reference Design

• Traction eMotor power inverters convert DC

from HV battery to multi-phase AC

• Output power & efficiency critical at operation >300V

• Output power requirements ranging up to 200+ kW

• Functional safety requirement at ASIL-C/ ASIL-D

Yesterday we studied how an Inverter work…

Today we are going to study how to make sure it fails safely

COMPANY PUBLIC 5

What Can Go Wrong in a Traction Inverter?

Unintended self

acceleration while in

stop

Unintended reverse

speed wheel while in

stop or parking

Unintended loss of

torque while driving

(overtaking)

Unintended over

torque while driving

Tra

cti

on

ha

za

rds

Bra

kin

g h

aza

rds

Unintended self braking

while driving at high

speed

Unintended

regeneration inside the

HV Battery that could

result in fire hazard

Unintended self

braking while driving

at low speed

COMPANY PUBLIC 6

ISO26262-2018 Standard

“Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning

behavior of E/E systems”

NXP Safety Assure Process

COMPANY PUBLIC 7

ISO26262-2018 Standard

NXP Safety Assure Process

“Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning

behavior of E/E systems”

COMPANY PUBLIC 8

ISO 26262-2018 Standard

NXP Safety Assure Process

NXP Safety Enable

NXP Safety enablement

NXP value

proposition

Assumptions

for analysis

Hazard and risk

assessments

Safety Goals

System Safety

Concept

FMEA, FTA,

FMEDA

Test Safety

mechanism

Test Safety

mechanism

Validate safety

assumptions

“Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning behavior

of E/E systems”

COMPANY PUBLIC 9

Part 3: Item Definition

COMPANY PUBLIC 10

Part 3: Concept Phase

• Item definition

• HARA

• FSC

COMPANY PUBLIC 11

Example of Assumptions and Safety Goals

Safety goal ASIL

SG1: Avoid unintended acceleration while in stop D

SG2: Avoid unintended acceleration , torque lock or over

acceleration torque while drivingB

SG3: Avoid reverse torque D

SG4: Avoid sudden loss of acceleration torque B

SG5: Avoid self-braking torque while driving at high speed D

SG6: Avoid self-braking torque while driving at low speed B

Unintended self

acceleration while in

stop

Unintended reverse

speed wheel while in

stop or parking

Unintended loss of

torque while driving

(overtaking)

Unintended over

torque while driving

Tra

cti

on

ha

za

rds

Bra

kin

g h

aza

rds

Unintended self braking

while driving at high

speed

Unintended

regeneration inside the

HV Battery that could

result in fire hazard

Unintended self

braking while driving at

low speed

Assumption:• Single permanent magnet motor PMSM

• No clutch

-> Cannot open motor phases at high speed!

(Back EMF, High braking power, SG5 violation)

* Exercise was done as a example (with Severity, Exposure,

Controllability Matrix)

** One possible example, customer can have different safety goals

COMPANY PUBLIC 12

Functional Safety Requirements

FSR1: “We need to guarantee the

received command is correct and the

communication alive.”

FSR2: “We need to guarantee the

sensors measurements are correct.”

FSR3: “We monitor the torque to detect a

fault of torque processing.”

FSR5: : “When a fault of communication,

sensors or control is detected we need to go

to the appropriate safe state”.

FSR4: : “We need to guarantee the

information we send to VCU, and report

fault”.

COMPANY PUBLIC 13

Functional Block Analysis

Example for function Command • For each of this block:

− Defined FR and FSR

− Decompose functional safety requirements

− Available inside application notes:

“Functional Safety concept of HV Traction

Inverter”.

COMPANY PUBLIC 14

Part 4: System Design

COMPANY PUBLIC 15

Part 4: System Design

• Technical Safety

Requirements

• System Architectural

Design

• Technical Safety Concept

COMPANY PUBLIC 16

Technical Safety Concept

System Functional details decomposition

COMPANY PUBLIC 17

Safe State (1/2)

• Preferred safe state = 0 Torque control or Degraded Torque control

In 0 Torque control we keep PWM the IGBT, but the control request an Iq = 0 which will lead to no torque and will not violate any safety goal.

This safe state has the advantage to be easily restarted, and avoid sudden loss of torque (ramp down). It requires to have a fully functional control and sensors measurement. This strategy will be applied for communication failure with VCU for example.

• Three phase Open at low Speed

M

This safe state open all the Phases of the Inverter. This safe state is only acceptable at low speed (see next slide). It is a preferred safe state when vehicle is stopped or at low speed.

When the speed is unknown or when higher than the maximum back EMF allowed, the preferred safe state will be 3 phases short.

COMPANY PUBLIC 18

PMSM + No Clutch + 3PO = Braking Hazard at High Speed

M

BEMFVBAT

Braking current • Back EMF > Battery voltage

• Regeneration current

• Braking torque

Depending on your motor in can generate:

~100Nm braking ~ 100kW Braking Power

Violation of safety Goal !

SG5: Avoid self-braking torque

while driving at high speed

COMPANY PUBLIC 19

Safe state (2/2)

3 Phases ShortThis safe state LS Short is the preferred safe state when the speed

is high or unknown (loss of control). The control of the high side or

low side needs to be fully functional to close one or the other.

MM

We must adapt the reaction if the Fault is in High side (BATT to Phase Short ) or low side!

Requirements:

• We need to detect the side and type of failure

• We need to have at least the high side or the low side to work

COMPANY PUBLIC 20

High Level Failure Modes

High Level System Fault Condition Safe State

Failure of communication 0 Torque control

Failure of control or sensor at low speed 3 Phase Open

Failure of control or sensor at high speed Active short

(HS or LS based on the

fault)

Loss of control capability (MCU/SW) or speed information

missing

Active short LS

COMPANY PUBLIC 21

Fault Reaction of Sensor (Easy!)

COMPANY PUBLIC 22

Technical Safety Concept

System Functional details decomposition

COMPANY PUBLIC 23

Technical Safety Concept Example

• Inside the safety concept

for each functional block

you will find:

− Technical requirement

− Technical safety requirement

− Reaction and safe state for

safety manager

TSR_ CUS _004: [CURRMEAS_OOR_ERR]

TSR_ CUS _005: [CURRMEAS_PLAUS_ERR]

COMPANY PUBLIC 24

Technical Safety Concept ExampleTechnical requirement

Technical safety requirement

Reaction and safe state for safety manager

COMPANY PUBLIC 25

Principle for SPF and Failure Matrix

Function

Detection=

Safety

mechanism

Reaction

Safety goal violationFunction Safety

Mechanism

Reaction

Function x SM x Safe State y

… … …

Failure matrix

COMPANY PUBLIC 26

Principle for Latent Fault

Function

Detection=

Safety

mechanism

Reaction

Latent fault

We check for all the latent fault once at Init.

COMPANY PUBLIC 27

Fault Reaction of Motor Interface

(a Little Harder!)

COMPANY PUBLIC 28

Technical Safety Requirements

System Functional details decomposition

COMPANY PUBLIC 29

Motor Interface Implementation1/2The GD3100 will detect the fault of the IGBT, and Motor phase using DESAT, Short circuit, VGE monitoring, temperature, and some additional voltage that could be the DC bus or the Phase voltage

1

Critical fault (like short circuit) will need a quick reaction from the GD3100, without any MCU feedback.The GD3100 will turn off the gate quickly (but not abruptly) with some configurable waveshapping to maintain the IGBT in an Off position.

2

VGE comparator verify the measure value of the gate (through AMC pins) and the commands. It guarantee the communication path, gate drive and gate drive logic

3

The bidirectional communication has several safety mechanism to detect the integrity of the message (CRC...) and the loss of communication (watchdog...)

4

PWM and PWMALT is a safety mechanism to guarantee the command does not allow shoot-through and respect dead time

5

The GD3100 reports a fault by pulling the INTB pins and by sending a 5% duty cycle on AOUT pins. The INTB pins of all the HS and LS are connected through an OR gate, the AOUT are individually connected to the eTPU for analysis

7

COMPANY PUBLIC 30

Motor Interface Implementation (2/2)

• Each gate driver reports fault by

Daisy Chain (HS or LS)

• GD3100 flag are analyzed and

changed to system Fault

[MOT_SHORTCUT_HVN_ERR]

• System Fault are sent to safety

manager for reaction

VCCOVVCCREG

UVVSUPOV

OTSD_IC

OTSD OTW CLAMP DESAT SC OC

BIST_FAIL

VDD_UVOV

DTFLT SPIERRCONFCRC_ERR

VGE_FLT

COMERR

VREFUV VEEWDOF_

FLT

8

COMPANY PUBLIC 31

Motor Interface Highlight

• Remember Safe State slide:

• Highlights:

− Quick protection to protect against short circuit

− Fault reporting to identify HS or LS and fault criticality (SPI, INTB, AOUT)

− Analyze fault and react on system

− We must have independence of HS and LS or we can have a fault without

3PS possibility!

COMPANY PUBLIC 32

Fault Reaction of Processing and

Safety Manager (a little harder!)

COMPANY PUBLIC 33

Motor Control Algorithm

Motor control developed in QM

COMPANY PUBLIC 34

Motor Control Algorithm

Motor control developed in QM

Safety mechanism to verify it

inside the lockstep

COMPANY PUBLIC 35

Safety Manager

COMPANY PUBLIC 36

Safety Manager

COMPANY PUBLIC 37

Safety Manager

COMPANY PUBLIC 38

Technical Safety Requirements

COMPANY PUBLIC 39

Part 5: HW Design

COMPANY PUBLIC 40

Part 5: HW Design

• HW Safety Requirements

• HW Architecture Design

• HW Metrics (FMEDA with

IC system failure mode)

COMPANY PUBLIC 41

HW Architecture Highlight

• High level overview:

− 1) Decomposition QM and ASIL-D:

▪ Functional traction motor control

QM(D)

▪ Safety Manager ASIL-D

− 2) Three phase short at high speed

for Back EMF and SPF:

▪ Independent HS and LS driver

▪ ASIL D gate driver

− 3) Safety logic to do three phase

short during MCU failure

COMPANY PUBLIC 42

Vepco Hardware

Leadership ASIL-D

Certified MCUs

Smart, flexible

Fail-safe SBCs

FS65

Traction Motor

Inverter Systems

Advanced Si IGBT

Power module

Integrated Isolated

HV IGBT gate driver

COMPANY PUBLIC 43

Part 6: SW Design

COMPANY PUBLIC 44

Part 6: SW Design

• SW Safety Requirements

• SW Architecture Design

• SW Verification

NXP

COMPANY PUBLIC 45

Software Architecture WIP Function Safety

Mechanism

Reaction

Function x SM x Safe State y

… … …

COMPANY PUBLIC 46

NXP Safety Enablement

COMPANY PUBLIC 47

Safety Enablement

• Followed the ISO 26262 Standard for NXP Components

• Proposed TSC, HWSC, SWSC for Inverter to be re-used by customer

• We make available the Safety Application Notes, and safety Lib.

COMPANY PUBLIC 48

Control Flow from Torque to Wheel

COMPANY PUBLIC 49

VCU Interface

COMPANY PUBLIC 50

CAN Messaging

• Two CAN path:− FS65 Path

− TJA1051 NXP transceiver

• FS65 functions are:− Power for all sensor, driver,

MCU, Comm

− Key Safety Mechanism for MCU:

▪ Check MCU, Clock, Power Supply

− Bring the system into safe state

− Latch on / latch off system

COMPANY PUBLIC 51

FS65: Integrate MCU Safety Monitoring Capabilities

Independent Fail Safe State

Machine

✓Physical & Electrical

independance to fit for ASILD

✓Power Management

Monitoring Unit (UV / OV)

✓Analog & Digital Built In Self

Test to minimize Latent Faults

✓Own Reference & Supply to

Reduce Common Cause

Failure

Fail Safe Pin (FS0b) :

✓Redundant System Fail Safe

enabler

✓Second Fail Safe pin to assert

safety path with configurable

delay after failure

Advanced Watchdog

✓Challenger

✓Replace external MCU

Monitoring

MCU Monitoring

✓FCCU : Fault Collection

Control Unit

✓Monitor Dual Core Lock Step

Modes MCUs

RSTb – Fail Silent Mode

✓Configurable RSTb activation

giving more system availability

HW Redundancy

✓Vcore external Monitoring

Safety SBC

FS65

Safety MCU

COMPANY PUBLIC 52

MCU and SW Architecture

COMPANY PUBLIC 53

MPC5775E: Traction Inverter MCU

Cores

Z7 Functional core (QM)

Z7 Safety Core (lockstep)

Interconnect Isolation

Cross bar with end to end ECC

MPU for isolation

Memory

4M Flash

512K RAM

Peripherals

FlexCAN (4) + CRC

SPI for gate driver and FS65

ETPU for (next slide):

- CA-PWM + ADC Trigger

- SW Resolver and diag

eQADC

SD ADC (for resolver)

Security

Crypto Security Engine

For OTA Update

Safety

FCCU, ECC, SWT, Lockstep

CMU PMU…

And Latent fault check (BIST,

ECC Fault Injection)

COMPANY PUBLIC 54

SW Architecture

• Performance core:

− Mostly use for Motor Control

− Re-use NXP Enablement(SDK, App notes,…)

− Enable customer or offer professional partner (Vepco) to develop their own Motor control

• Safety core:

− Implement Safety Concept of NXP product (MCU+ AAA product)

− Help customer to achieve ISO 26262

COMPANY PUBLIC 55

FOC Control for Traction Inverter

COMPANY PUBLIC 56

SW EnablementMotor control Application

• Develop your own using service layer

• Buy professional code (Vepco)

• Use NXP Matlab Model Base Toolbox

Service

• Reusable and modifiable basic source code

NXP SDK• NXP Software development kit• FreeRTOS or bare-metal with OS

interface layer• Production-ready drivers with MISRA

C 2012 compliance

https://www.nxp.com/support/developer-resources/run-time-software/s32-sdk/s32-sdk-for-power-architecture-devices:S32SDK-POWER-ARCHITECTURE

eTPU code• Advance Motor control already optimized

• Customer can customize/optimize it

COMPANY PUBLIC 57

Where to Find the Software?

Visit our web at www.nxp.com/evinverterplatform for more information.

https://www.nxp.com/support/developer-resources/evaluation-and-development-boards/ultra-reliable-dev-

platforms/mpc57xx-mcus-platforms/ev-power-inverter-reference-platform:RDPWRINVERTER

COMPANY PUBLIC 58

PWM to IGBT/SiC Drive

COMPANY PUBLIC 59

GD3100 Architecture & Product Features

Features:

Applications:• HEV Motor Inverters

• HV UPS Inverters

Advanced gate driver for high voltage power IGBTs with integrated high voltage isolator.

ASILC/D compliant

Logic Block 1

SCLK

CSB

MOSI

MISO

SPI

PWM

FSSTATE

INTB

Config, DT Control,Cross Conduction,Flt Management,

Safing

VSUP

TSENSEA

AMC

GH

VEE

(2 pins)

DESAT

GND1

(2 pins)

GND2

(2 pins)RX TX

INT

DATA_IN

DATA_OUT

PWMALT SerialComm

GL

RX TX

Logic Block 2

CLAMP

ISENSE

TEMP IGBT

AMUXIN

TX RX

NC13

PWM

TX RX

TEMP IC

AOUTDuty Cycle Encoder

VCC

VREF

(5 V, 1 %,

20 mA)GND2

VCCREG

AMUX & 10-bit ADC

VCC

SerialComm

Fault Management,

Conf. Registers,

fault registers,Gate control

logic,ASIL test control

FSENB

VDD

Gate Drive

Control

Active Vce Clamp, Desat

Charge and Discharge

Control

Active Miller Clamp

IGBT Current Sense

Safing Logic

Deadtime Control

IGBT Temp Sense

Power

Management 1VCCLV,

Bandgap,

References,

Oscillators

UV/OVLO, etc.

Power

Management 2VCCHV,

Bandgap,

References,

Oscillators

UV/OVLO, etc.

NC2

FSISO

INTB/VGEMON

• High gate current capability 10A peak source/sink current

• ISO 26262 ASIL C/D compliant

• Integrated galvanic isolation in compact 10 x 18 mm SOIC

• Separate outputs (GL/GH) to IGBT gate

• Active Miller Clamp (AMC) reduces need for turn off assist circuitry

• Fast short circuit protection via direct feedback through i-sense IGBTs with soft shutdown.

• Programmable Desaturation Detect level, Two Level Turn off

• Minimum programmable deadtime of 500ns

• Integrated temperature sense for system warning and ultimately soft shutdown for system protection

• Compatible with 200V to 1700V IGBTs, power range

>125kW

• Compatible with 3.3V and 5V IOs

32-PinSOIC-WB

COMPANY PUBLIC 60

Motor Interface Implementation 1/2

COMPANY PUBLIC 61

Motor Interface Implementation (2/2)

• Each gate driver reports fault by

Daisy Chain (HS or LS)

• GD3100 flag are analyzed and

changed to system Fault

[MOT_SHORTCUT_HVN_ERR]

• System Fault are sent to safety

manager for reaction

VCCOVVCCREG

UVVSUPOV

OTSD_IC

OTSD OTW CLAMP DESAT SC OC

BIST_FAIL

VDD_UVOV

DTFLT SPIERRCONFCRC_ERR

VGE_FLT

COMERR

VREFUV VEEWDOF_

FLT

8

COMPANY PUBLIC 62

IGBT/SiC to Motor Phase

COMPANY PUBLIC 63

Fuji 750V/800A 6-in-1 Power Inverter ModuleFeatures

• 750V/800A 6-in-1 3-phase power inverter module

• Reverse-conducting IGBT with integrated temperature sensor

• Integrated ‘i-Sense’ current sensor for fast over-current detection

• 162mm × 117mm × 24mm compact direct-cooling water-jacketaluminum housing with new thin fin structure

• Flange structure at cooling water IN/OUT for 30% lower thermalresistance vs conventional fin type heat sink.

• 175℃ guaranteed operating temperature range

Application Example

• 70～120kW motor output power

− Fsw = 6kHz

− Coolant temp = 65℃

− Coolant flow rate = 10L/min

− Vdc = 450V

− Ipeak = 460Arms @ 1s

− Icont = 430Arms

Top view

Bottom view

COMPANY PUBLIC 64

High Level Inverter Specification

• Automotive Optimized EE – Simple Mechanical

• What if you need 150KW peak?

− Change IGBT and Motor

− Keep same architecture

• Open design, Adapt it to your Spec !

COMPANY PUBLIC 65

Sensor Feedback to Close the Loop

COMPANY PUBLIC 66

Current and Voltage Sensing

Current Sensing HV Battery Sensing

COMPANY PUBLIC 67

MPC5775E: SW Resolver

eTPU + SD_ADC= SW resolver

eTPU Engine

A executes

functions:• Resolver_EXC

• Resolver_ATO

• PWMM

eTPU Engine

B executes

functions:• Resolver_DIAG

• Resolver_EXT

RAPOL

• AS

SCM

SDM

COMPANY PUBLIC 68

eTPU B

eTPU-Based RDC – Block Diagram

eTPU A

SDADC

Resolver

Cos

Sin

Output

Excitation

Amplifier

DIAGnostics

Angle

Tracking

Observer

Angular Position

Angular Speed

EXC

SIN

COS

Diagnostic Measures

Diagnostic Flags

EXCitation

Generator

Sh

are

d D

ata

Me

mo

ry (

SD

M)

ADC1

ADC0eDMA

eDMA

MPC5775E

Angle

EXTrapo-

lation

Angular Position

Angular Speed

trigger

Sh

are

d C

od

e M

em

ory

(S

CM

)

Input

resistor

network

External HW

On-chip HW

On-chip SW

TE Core

Fault

reporting

Command

integrity

check

Sensor

plausibility

check;

includes

RDC

checker

Torque

monitoring

NTE Core

Command

processing

Torque

control

Motor

state

measur

ement

Status

reporting

Sa

fety

Ma

na

ge

r

COMPANY PUBLIC 69

And We are Closing the Loop…

COMPANY PUBLIC 70

What About Functional Safety…

• Safety is the longest part ofthe development

• Enable with:− Part 3,

− System Part 4 and

− Safety lib Part 6

NXP Safety enablement

NXP value

proposition

Assumptions

for analysis

Hazard and risk

assessments

Safety Goals

System Safety

Concept

FMEA, FTA,

FMEDA

Test Safety

mechanism

Test Safety

mechanism

Validate safety

assumptions

Functional safety concept:

• “What if… fails…”

• See more in tomorrow’s session

COMPANY PUBLIC 71

NXP High Voltage Traction Offer

COMPANY PUBLIC 72

NXP/Vepco Enablement Kit Design DocumentationVisit www.nxp.com/evinverterplatform for more information on acquiring the kit with the following documentation:

− Inverter specification

− Schematic and layout recommendation

− Safety concept Application notes

− NXP SDK and motor control enablement

− Dyno Test and efficiency results

− NXP components and safety

documentation

COMPANY PUBLIC 73

NXP High Voltage Traction Offer

• Everything you need for:

− Spin a Motor

− Evaluating on a dyno

− Design your own PCB and build your own A sample

− Understand NXP recommend Safety architecture

Evaluation Package

A Sample

Pre-Production Package

B Sample

Safety customization (IC,

Software, System…)

• Everything you need for:

− Customize a motor/Gearbox to

your own Specs (Different Form

factor, Power Voltage)

− Customize Inverter

− Customize Professional Motor

Control software

− Quick time to market

• Everything you need for:

− Adapt NXP Safety concept to

your own Assumptions of Use

− Support for Safety Analysis

− Customize software Lib

Visit www.nxp.com/evinverterplatform

COMPANY PUBLIC 74

NXP’s Power Inverter Platform

NXP Reference Design Differentiators:

• System safety concept based on NXP’s Safety IC & ISO 26262 methodology

• Optimized BOM solution to comply with ASIL-D requirements• Automotive Quality Proof-of-concept available for Dyno testing

• Scalable offer with professional design partners (e.g. Vepco) can reduce customer’s engineering efforts significantly

• Open hardware, enablement software and safety concept to support prototype development

NXP Components• GD3100 (6x) - Isolated IGBT gate driver with <2us over-current protection

• MPC5775E - Advanced motor control ASIL-D MCU with software resolver

• FS65 - Robust ASIL-D SBC with fail-silent and Grade 0 capabilities

• TJA1042 - Redundant CAN bus interface with low power standby

PCB assembly Vepco ref Design Matching 150kW PM Motor

NXP Early Success Story

High Volume production for HEV

Successfully re-use 75% of analysis for SiC design

Successfully re-use 90% for IGBT, save R&D time

…A lot more to come

Availability:

• Website and Distribution → Now

COMPANY PUBLIC 75

NXP Offer to the State-of-the-Art xEV Architecture

48 V or

> 60 V (e.g. 400 V)

* only in (P)HEVs, BEVs, omitted in 48 V MHEV systems

** bidirectional in 48 V systems

*** as in exisiting ICE-based vehicles

AC

MM

~

=

ACDC

Charger*

=

=

DCDC**

=

~

=

~

Motor control Motor(s)

M

LV

lead-acid

or Li-Ion

Battery

BMS

BMS

DC

12 V

HV

Li-Ion

Battery

48 V and HV

Modules

12 V-bus

Modules***

Hybrid Control

Unit (HCU)

Wed 12th 5pm: GD3100 Next Advanced Isolated of

High Voltage Gate driver

Thru 13th 9am: Cost optimized HV BMS MC3377x

Thru 13th 1:30pm: Next Gen Processor solutions for

advanced HEV and Safety Domain

Wed 12th 4pm: High Voltage Safe reference design

Introduction

Thru 13th 2:30pm: Functional safety concept of High

voltage traction Inverter

Thru 13th 3:30pm: Mathworks Model based Design

with NXP Greenbox II

Wed 12th 10:45am: S32K Complete portfolio update

NXP and the NXP logo are trademarks of NXP B.V. All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2019 NXP B.V.