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Case List for Criminal ProcedureJudge MendeTABLE OF CONTENTS1. People vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 167304]---------Page 22. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy [G.R. No. 167304] -------------Page 103. Yusuke Fukuzume vs. CA [G.R. No. 167304] ---------Page 174. People vs. Regalario [G.R. No. 167304] ----------------Page 245. Zaldiva vs. Reyes [G.R. No. 167304] --------------------Page 366. Reodica vs. CA [G.R. No. 167304] -----------------------Page 407. Panaguiton vs. DOJ [G.R. No. 167304] -----------------Page 518. Crespo vs Mogul [G.R. No. 167304] ---------------------Page 599. Dimatula vs. Villon [G.R. No. 167304] -------------------Page 6310. El Cano vs. Hill [G.R. No. 167304] -----------------------Page 83

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,vs.SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE,Respondents.D E C I S I O NPERALTA,J.:Before this Court is a petition1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution2of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991, entitledPeople of the Philippines v. Victoria Amantefor lack of jurisdiction.The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:Victoria Amante was a member of theSangguniang Panlungsodof Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount ofP71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she received by reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances ofP71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in aforesaid amount.CONTRARY TO LAW.The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION4dated November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers were still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.The OSP filed its Opposition5dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established during the trial of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local officials/heads.The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic.SO ORDERED.Hence, the present petition.Petitioner raises this lone issue:WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the former's appreciation of this Court's decision inInding v. Sandiganbayan.7According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.Respondent Amante, in her Comment8dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law was phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent proceeded to cite a decision9of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.1avvphi1In its Reply10dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses in relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case ofEsteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.11wherein this Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.The petition is meritorious.The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan inSerana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,12thus:x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.13P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.14P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x xSpecifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of theSangguniang Panlungsodunder Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.This Court rules in the affirmative.The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.15The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity,at the time of the commission of the offense:The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following ratiocination:x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of specifically including the public officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only because they are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when they are committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration, jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized that the general qualification that the public official must belong to grade '27' is a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court.In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade '26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge must involve a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant case, even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general qualification that accused must be a public official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public office with salary grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.1avvphi1Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the Sandiganbayan is the case ofInding v. Sandiganbayan16where this Court ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts contained in the said case. In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.17Thus, in the case ofLacson v. Executive Secretary,18where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.Also, in the caseAlarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that "accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private complainants attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning ofoffenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:InSanchez v. Demetriou[227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office" by referring to the principle laid down inMontilla v. Hilario[90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized inPeople v. Montejo[108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out inMontilla v. Hilariois that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x." InPeople v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show thatx x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x20Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated,public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,21unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.22The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.23WHEREFORE,the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is herebyGRANTEDand the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED andSET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case beREMANDEDto the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellees,vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO,defendants,MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH)bonding company and defendant-appellant.F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees.Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio.Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano for defendant-appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.DIZON,J.:On July 19, 1948 barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also the followingaffirmative relief: "to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counterbond. On the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id.p. 97). Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it filed its brief raising therein no other question but the ones covered by the following assignment of errors:I. That the Honorable Courta quoerred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957, by holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and compliance with the other mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.II. That the Honorable Courta quoerred in ordering the issuance of execution against the herein bonding company-appellant.III. That the Honorable Courta quoerred in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution filed by the herein bonding company-appellant as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of execution.Not one of the assignment of errors it is obvious raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.On January 8, 1963 five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as follows:It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit for collection of money in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But about a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's motion is an important one which merits serious consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July 19, 1948. This case therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse decision.There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be worthy of consideration in connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaia de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956; Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-14591, September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092, September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of appellants submitting their case for decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the "exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue" (See. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we have no choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify, this case to the Supreme Court.1wph1.tACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, let the record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court.It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case which shall forthwith be set forth We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred bylachesfrom invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almostfifteen years beforethe Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdictionfor the first time.It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additionalaffirmative relief that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition lack of jurisdiction of the courta quonot being one of them.Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppelin pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel bylaches.Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conductnot because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse as well as inPindagan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962;Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092;Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, andMejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the courta quoas well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quotein toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as follows:In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a suit for collection of a sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued against defendants' properties. The attachment, however, was subsequently discharged under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing by defendants of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved, under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the bond. But the motion was, upon the surety's opposition, denied on the ground that there was "no showing that a demand had been made, by the plaintiffs to the bonding company for payment of the amount due under the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p. 60).Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction of the judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of writ of execution against the surety, with notice of hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957, the surety received copy of said motion and notice of hearing.It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel asked that he be given time within which to answer the motion, and so an order was issued in open court, as follows:1wph1.tAs prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr., counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, isgiven until Wednesday, November6, 1957,to file his answerto the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs,after which this incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution.SO ORDERED.Given in open court, this 2nd day of November, 1957, at Cebu City, Philippines.(Sgd.) JOSE M. MENDOZAJudge(Record on Appeal, pp.64-65, emphasis ours)Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection within the period given him, the court, on December 7, 1957, issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety; and on December 12, 1957, the corresponding writ of execution was issued.On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the same was "issued without the requirements of Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court having been complied with," more specifically, that the same was issued without the required "summary hearing". This motion was denied by order of February 10, 1958.On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-stated order of denial; which motion was likewise denied by order of March 26, 1958.From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 and March 26, 1958 denying the surety's motion to quash the writ of execution and motion for reconsideration, respectively the surety has interposed the appeal on hand.The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing required by Section 17 of Rule 59, which reads;"Sec. 17.When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any bond given pursuant to the provisions of this role to secure the payment of the judgment shall become finally charged on such bond, and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon demand the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice andsummary hearing in the same action." (Emphasis ours)Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties" (Ibid., pp. 793-794); and as to the extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the discretion of the court, depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of the incident up for consideration.In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the courta quogave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the motion "for the simple reason that all its defenses can be set up during the hearing of the motion even if the same are not reduced to writing" (Appellant's brief, p. 4). There is obviously no merit in this pretense because, as stated above, the record will show that when the motion was called, what the surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given time to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in the order given in open court upon request of the surety's counsel that after the four-day period within which to file an answer, "the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution"; and counsel apparently agreed, as the order was issued upon his instance and he interposed no objection thereto.It is also urged that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59,supra, there is no need for a separate action, there must, however, be a separate judgment against the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). Not so, in our opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section 12 of Rule 59, "to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he may recover in the action," and stands "in place of the property so released". Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the execution is "returned unsatisfied" (Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefor, writ of execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 143647 November 11, 2005YUSUKE FUKUZUME,*Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,**Respondent.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before us is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888, which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 146 dated October 21, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-083, finding herein accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years and to pay private complainant the sum ofP424,000.00; and the CA Resolution dated June 16, 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.2The facts of the case are as follows:Private complainant Javier Ng Yu (Yu) is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires.3Sometime in July 1991, Yu, accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate,4who was the vice-president of Manila Electric Company, went to the house of herein accused-appellant Yusuke Fukuzume (Fukuzume) in Paraaque.5Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation (Furukawa) and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires.6Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).7Believing Fukuzumes representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume.8The initial agreed purchase price wasP200,000.00.9Yu gave Fukuzume sums of money on various dates which eventually totaledP290,000.00, broken down as follows:P50,000.00, given on July 12, 1991;P20,000.00, given on July 22, 1991;P50,000.00, given on October 14, 1991; and,P170,000.00, given on October 18, 1991.10Fukuzume admitted that he received the same from Yu and that he still owes him the amount ofP290,000.00.11To support his claim that the aluminum scrap wires being sold are indeed owned by Furukawa, that these scrap wires are with NAPOCOR, and that Furukawas authorized representatives are allowed to withdraw and dispose of said scrap wires, Fukuzume gave Yu two certifications dated December 17, 1991 and December 27, 1991 purportedly issued by NAPOCOR and signed by its legal counsel by the name of R. Y. Rodriguez.12At the time that Fukuzume gave Yu the second certification, he asked money from the latter telling him that it shall be given as gifts to some of the people in NAPOCOR. Yu gave Fukuzume money and, in exchange, the latter issued two checks, one forP100,000.00 and the other forP34,000.00.13However, when Yu deposited the checks, they were dishonored on the ground that the account from which the checks should have been drawn is already closed.14Subsequently, Yu called up Fukuzume to inform him that the checks bounced.15Fukuzume instead told him not to worry because in one or two weeks he will give Yu the necessary authorization to enable him to retrieve the aluminum scrap wires from NAPOCOR.16On January 17, 1992, Fukuzume gave Yu a letter of even date, signed by the Director of the Overseas Operation and Power Transmission Project Divisions of Furukawa, authorizing Fukuzume to dispose of excess aluminum conductor materials which are stored in their depots in Tanay and Bulacan.17Thereafter, Fukuzume agreed to accompany Yu when the latter is going to take the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound.18When Yu arrived at the NAPOCOR compound on the scheduled date, Fukuzume was nowhere to be found.19Hence, Yu proceeded to show the documents of authorization to NAPOCOR personnel. However, the people from NAPOCOR did not honor the authorization letter issued by Furukawa dated January 17, 1992.20NAPOCOR also refused to acknowledge the certifications dated December 17, 1991 and December 27, 1991 claiming that these are spurious as the person who signed these documents is no longer connected with NAPOCOR as of December 1991.21Unable to get the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to Fukuzume and asked from the latter the refund of the money he paid him.22Fukuzume promised to return Yus money.23When Fukuzume failed to comply with his undertaking, Yu sent him a demand letter asking for the refund ofP424,000.00 plus loss of profits.24Subsequently, Yu filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).25In an Information, dated November 4, 1994, filed with the RTC of Makati, Fukuzume was charged with estafa committed as follows:That sometime in the month of July, 1991 up to September 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y Ng, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make false representation and fraudulent manifestation that he is the duly authorized representative of Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd., in the Philippines, and was authorized to sell excess aluminum conductor materials not being used by Napocor and Furukawa, the accused knowing full well that those representations were false and were only made to induce and convince said Javier Yu y Ng to buy said materials, who believing said representations to be true, gave and delivered the total amount ofP424,000.00 but the accused once in possession of the money, far from complying with his obligation to deliver said aluminum conductor materials to herein complainant, with intent of gain, unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, applied and used for his own personal use and benefit the said amount and despite repeated demands failed and refused and still fails and refuses to account for, to the damage and prejudice of Javier Yu y Ng in the aforementioned amount ofP424,000.00.CONTRARY TO LAW.26Upon being arraigned on February 28, 1995, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty.27Trial ensued.In its Decision dated October 21, 1996, the trial court found Fukuzume guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and hereby orders him to suffer the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years. With respect to his civil liability, accused is hereby ordered to pay complainant the amount ofP424,000.00 plus legal interest from the date of demand until fully paid.SO ORDERED.28Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, Fukuzume filed an appeal with the CA.On March 13, 2000, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court but modifying the penalty imposed, thus: although the trial court correctly imposed the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years, it failed to determine the minimum penalty for the offense committed (prision correccionalin its maximum period toprision mayorin its minimum period but imposed in the maximum period), hence, the penalty is modified to six (6) years and one (1) day ofprision mayorin its minimum period, as the minimum, to not more than twenty (20) years ofreclusion temporalin its maximum period, as maximum.29Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, except for the aforementioned modification in the prison term of appellant, is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.30Hence, herein petition filed by Fukuzume based on the following grounds:THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI HAS JURISDICTION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLEGED FALSE PRETENSE WAS EXECUTED PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE FRAUD.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE ORIGINAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN NOVATED AND CONVERTED INTO A MERE DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP, THEREBY EXTINGUISHING THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY THEREOF, IF ANY.31We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged. The CA ruled:The trial court of Makati has jurisdiction. Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (Rule 110, Sec. 15, Rules of Court). Although the false representation and verbal contract of sale of the aluminum scrap wires took place at appellants residence in Paraaque, appellant and private complainant nevertheless admitted that the initial payment ofP50,000.00 for said transaction was made at the Hotel Intercontinental in Makati City (Record, pp. 15, 68). Hence, an element of the crime that the offended party was induced to part with his money because of the false pretense occurred within the jurisdiction of the lower court giving it jurisdiction over the instant case.The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI on April 19, 199432and the affidavit of Fukuzume which was subscribed on July 20, 1994.33With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged therein that on July 12, 1991, he gave Fukuzume the amount ofP50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzumes contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that on July 12, 1991 he gave the amount ofP50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latters house. It is not disputed that Fukuzumes house is located in Paraaque. Yu testified thus:Q Mr. Witness, you testified the last time that you know the accused in this case, Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume?A Yes, sir.Q Now, would you enlighten us under what circumstance you came to know the accused?A I know the accused Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume through Mr. Hubati.Q And why or how did Mr. Hubati come to know the accused, if you know?A Mr. Hubati came to my place dealing with the aluminum scrap wires.ATTY. N. SERINGYour Honor, may I move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive to the question.COURTPlease wait until the answer is completed.Q Now, you met this Mr. Hubati. How?A He came to me offering me aluminum scrap wires.FISCAL E. HIRANGQ When was that, Mr. Witness?A That was in 1991, sir.COURTWhen?FISCAL E. HIRANGYour Honor please, may the witness be allowed to consult his memorandum.A July 12, 1991, sir.Q And what transpired during that time you met Mr. Hubati?A We went to the house of Mr. Fukuzume and game (sic) him some amount of money.Q Now, would you tell the Court the reason why you parted to the accused in this case the amount of money?A In payment of the aluminum scrap wires and we have documents to that effect.Q Now, please tell us what really was that transaction that took place at the house of Mr. Fukuzume on that particular date?A Our agreement with Mr. Hubati and with Mr. Fukuzume is that, I am going to give money in payment of the aluminum scrap wires coming from Furukawa Eletric Company.Q How much is the amount of money which you agreed to give to the accused?A Our first agreement was forP200,000.Q Where is that aluminum scrap located?A The electric aluminum scrap wires was or were under the care of the National Power Corporation but according to Mr. Fukuzume it belongs to Furukawa Electric Company.Q In short, Mr. Witness, on July 12, 1991, you only gave to the accused the amount ofP50,000?ATTY. N. SERINGObjection, Your Honor.FISCAL E. HIRANGThe complainant testified he gaveP50,000. I am asking how much the complainant gave to the accused on that particular date.A On July 12, I gave himP50,000 on that date.Q NotP200,000?A No, sir.34Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits takenex parteare inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.35More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere inMakati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.36CitingUy vs. Court of Appeals,37we held in the fairly recent case ofMacasaet vs. People38that:It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.39(Emphasis supplied)Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing it to take jurisdiction and to try the case and to render judgment.40In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows:1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.41The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yus sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts ofP50,000.00 on July 12, 1991,P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991,P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 andP170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount ofP50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latters house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Fukuzume himself alleged in his affidavit dated July 20, 1994 that in an unspecified date, he receivedP50,000.00 from Yu at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we cannot rely on this affidavit for the reason that it forms part of the records of the preliminary investigation and, therefore, may not be considered evidence. It is settled that the record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the case in the RTC.42InPeople vs. Crispin,43this Court held that the fact that the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC. Such record must be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take judicial notice of the same.44Since neither prosecution nor defense presented in evidence Fukuzumes affidavit, the same may not be considered part of the records, much less evidence.From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafashould be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or consideredmotu propioby the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.45Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.46While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case ofTijam vs. Sibonghanoy,47wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.Thus, having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try the case against Fukuzume, we find it unnecessary to consider the other issues raised in the present petition.WHEREFORE, the instant petition isGRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888areSET ASIDEon ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146. Criminal Case No. 95-083 isDISMISSEDwithout prejudice.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 101451 March 23, 1993PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ALEX REGALARIO y VILLAGRACIA, CARLOS PABILLAR y VILLON, JOSE QUINIQUITO y MAGNATA, ROLANDO DE CHAVEZ y MONTALBO, AUGURIO VILLAGRACIA, JR. y ISABELO and ALBERTO DESEMBRANA,accused-appellants.The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Rosario C. Salamillas for accused-appellants.REGALADO,J.:This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 58, declaring accused-appellants guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. 565 thereof which was initiated by an information alleging That on or about the 18th day of September, 1986, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with a deadly weapon, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Menardo Garcia, thereby inflicting upon the latter (a) stab wound which caused his death.1During their arraignment on October 28, 1986, appellants, with the exception of appellant Desembrana, entered a plea of not guilty.2However, before the prosecution rested its case, appellants Regalario and Pabillar changed their plea to guilty.3Appellant Desembrana was apprehended only on October 7, 1987 by elements of the Lucena City police for another offense,4and when separately arraigned for the case at bar on November 3, 1987, he pleaded not guilty.After trial, appellants were found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ALEX REGALARIO y VILLAGRACIA, CARLOS PABILLAR y VILLON, JOSE QUINIQUITO y MAGNATA, ROLANDO DE CHAVEZ y MONTALBO, AUGURIO VILLAGRACIA, JR. y ISABELO, and ALBERTO DESEMBRANA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and, considering the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength which is not off set (sic) by any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences said accused persons to each suffer the penalty ofReclusion Perpetua,to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Menardo Garcia the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as indemnity, and to pay jointly and severally said heirs the amount of Twenty Three Thousand Three Hundred Eighty-one (P23,381.00) pesos, as funeral expenses and expenses incident to the prosecution of the accused, and to pay the costs.5The judgment of conviction was promulgated in open court on January 17, 19916and a copy thereof was received by appellants' former counsel, Atty. Revenito P. Caruruan, on January 18, 1991.7On January 31, 1991, within the 15-day reglementary period, appellants filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on February 22, 1991.8On March 4, 1991, appellants filed their notice of appeal which was denied due course by the courta quofor having been filed out of time.9Nonetheless, in an order dated August 2, 1991, said court directed that the records of this case and the transcripts of the proceedings had therein be forwarded to this Court.10The trial court thoroughly summarized its findings on the material facts of the case as follows:From the evidence, the Court finds that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of September 18, 1986, Menardo Garcia, herein victim, Glenda Osabal and Romano Padillo, all students of Quezon National High School, were walking in the grounds of the Quezon National High School in Lucena City after dismissal from classes on their way home. Outside the gate, as they neared the Division Office of the school, at the corner of Don Feliciano and General Lucban Streets, the six accused, namely: Alex Regalario, Carlos Pabillar, Rolando de Chavez, Jose Quiniquito, Augurio Villagracia, Jr., and Alberto Desembrana, joined them. Menardo Garcia and Romano Padillo were then walking side by side while Glenda Osabal was walking ahead of them. Accused Carlos Pabillar talked to Menardo Garcia and asked the latter where the "balisong" was. When Menardo Garcia answered that the "balisong" was no longer in his possession, Carlos Pabillar boxed him and told his companions, the five other accused, "tirahin na iyan" (roughly, attack him). At this point, Menardo Garcia ran towards Don Feliciano Street, chased by the six accused. About 50 meters away from the corner of Don Feliciano and General Lucban Streets, in front of the former residence of Ex-Mayor Mario L. Tagarao, the six accused overtook Menardo Garcia and, acting in unison, they ganged up on him and boxed him. With their number Menardo Garcia could just try to evade the blows. Then accused Rolando de Chavez was heard to have stated, "Tarantado si Menardo, niloloko ako". At this point accused Alex Regalario stabbed Menardo Garcia once with a fan knife locally known as "beinte nueve" and hit him at the left side of his back. Despite being stabbed, the six accused, still acting in unison, continued boxing Menardo Garcia until they saw he was down and could no longer stand up. The six accused then hurriedly left the scene together. Romano Padillo, who was walking side by side with Menardo Garcia when the latter was initially confronted and boxed by accused Carlos Pabillar, followed the six accused chase (sic) Menardo Garcia along Don Feliciano Street and witnessed the attack on Menardo Garcia from 10 meters away. The scene was then well lighted by a mercury lamp on the post. When the six accused left the scene, Romano Padillo also left, fearing for his safety, and proceeded to the house of Menardo Garcia and reported the incident to his grandmother, Guida Rendon Panganiban. He accompanied the grandmother to the Quezon Memorial Hospital where they saw Menardo Garcia unconscious. Glenda Osabal, Menardo Garcia's sweetheart and one of his companions that fateful night, who was then walking ahead of the victim and Romano Padillo, heard people shouting and there was a commotion. When she looked behind, she saw the six accused chasing Menardo Garcia along Don Feliciano Street and she ran towards the direction they were running but could not catch up with them. The six accused caught up with Menardo Garcia in front of the gate of the house of former Mayor Mario L. Tagarao and she met the six accused already leaving hurriedly (sic) the scene and, under the light of the electric post and nearby houses illuminating the area and at a distance of about 5 meters, she recognized them. She then proceeded to where Menardo Garcia fell. She asked him what happened but he did not answer but only pointed to his bleeding side. He was trying to stand up but he fell back. When he lost consciousness, a teacher, one Mrs. Dimayuga, arrived and after verifying he was a student of the Quezon National High School, they carried him to a jeep and brought him to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. At the emergency room, Menardo Garcia regained consciousness and called Glenda Osabal and told her he loved her and when she asked for the identity of his assailants he mentioned one by the name of "YULAC" and as he said this he was already gasping for breath and then he passed away. "YULAC" is accused Carlos Pabillar, who was one of the two accused to enter a plea of guilty. The other accused who pleaded guilty was Alex Regalario, the one who stabbed the victim.Per Autopsy Report (Exhibit "A") submitted by Dr. Carmelita Amat Laureano of the Quezon Memorial Hospital, who performed the autopsy on Menardo Garcia, external findings show "stabbed (sic) wound, left, back, level of 8th rib directed upwards measuring 1.7 x 17 cms." and internal findings show:Massive blood clots in the thoracic cavity. Stabbed (sic) wound at the left back penetrated the inferior lobe, and the inferior border of the superior lobe or the left lung and the base of the heart.Penetration of the heart measures 3.5 x 5.5 cm.Cause of death was established to be shock due to massive internal hemorrhage due to stabbed (sic) wound at the left back penetrating the left lung and the heart. (Exhibits "A" and "B")P/Sgt. Eduardo Somera (now P/Lt.), then Chief of the Investigation Section of the Lucena City INP, investigated the stabbing incident that led to the death of Menardo Garcia. He summoned eyewitnesses Glenda Osabal and Romano Padillo in the morning of September 19, 1986 and took their statements. Said witnesses gave the names of two of the suspects, Alex Regalario and Carlos Pabillar. As accused Alex Regalario and Carlos Pabillar could not be found in their residences, the mother of Alex Regalario and the sister of Carlos Pabillar were questioned and information was given that said two accused could be found in Labo, Camarines Norte. That very same afternoon, P/Sgt. Somera and 5 to 6 other policemen proceeded to Labo, Camarines Norte where the two accused were arrested. When brought to the Lucena City police headquarters the following morning, they admitted having committed the crime and named their companions in the commission of the crime as Jose Quiniquito, Alberto Desembrana, Rolando de Chavez and Augurio Villagracia, Jr. That very same morning, elements of the Lucena City INP arrested accused Jose Quiniquito at his given address at Short Cut, General Malvar Street, Lucena City. On September 27, 1986, accompanied by the father of Augurio Villagracia, Jr., elements of the Lucena City INP led by P/Capt. Rolando Albacea and P/Sgt. Somera, arrested accused Augurio Villagracia, Jr. and Rolando de Chavez at Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte. When arrested, the two accused readily admitted their participation in the crime.Sometime (o)n October 7, 1987, accused Alberto Desembrana was arrested by police authorities, together with other persons, for some other offense in Barangay Mayao, Lucena City. Verification of police records showed that Alberto Desembrana is the same person accused in this case and this Court was accordingly informed of his arrest.11The defense version in effect confirms the foregoing factual findings but presents a variation on the details of the actual encounter, in this manner:On September 18, 1986, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Menardo Garcia, the private offended party, was allegedly walking on his way home after his dismissal from his class at Quezon National High School, Lucena City with his girlfriend, Glenda Osabal, and Romano Padillo, the victim's best friend and neighbor; when they were allegedly at the place near the Office of the Division of the City School, the accused-appellants, namely: Alex Regalario, Carlos Pabillar, Augurio Villagracia, Jr., and Alberto Desembrana, allegedly joined them; Rolando de Chavez, one of the accused, allegedly would like to get the "balisong" which he lent to the said victim in June 1986; Rolando de Chavez allegedly told Alex Regalario of his intention to get the said "balisong" from Menardo Garcia, before the fatal incident took place; (a)t that time, Alex Regalario was with Carlos Pabillar; (c)oincidentally, the said three accused, allegedly met the other three accused: Augurio Villagracia, Jr., Jose Quiniquito and Alberto Desembrana who at the time were also at the gate of the Quezon National High School, to meet the girl friend of Alberto Desembrana; Alex Regalario upon seeing Menardo Garcia, asked for the "balisong" of Rolando de Chavez, but Menardo Garcia answered back and uttered "ba't ikaw ay pakialam, hindi naman sa iyo." (why are you interested, it is not yours?); Carlos Pabillar, irked by the remark of Menardo Garcia, boxed him (Menardo Garcia) on the chest; (t)hen Menardo Garcia stepped back; Alex Regalario and Menardo Garcia grappled with each other; (w)hen they were separated Menardo Garcia ha(d) a stab wound on the left side above the waist of his body; (t)hen Menardo Garcia ran toward the direction of the house of the former Ex-Mayor (sic) Tagarao. (TSN June 7, 1989, pages2-4, 5, 6, 7 and 8)12Appellants Regalario and Pabillar, who, as earlier stated, had changed their pleas from not guilty to guilty, invoked the circumstance that they were minors when the stabbing incident took place. Both of them presented evidence in order to avail of the mitigating circumstance of minority.The court below, however, ruled that the evidence adduced by said appellants failed to establish their claim that they were minors when the crime was committed. Likewise, said court gave no credence to the testimonies and evidence presented by the defense and, as heretofore stated, rendered a verdict of guilty.In their brief, appellants contend in substance that the lower court erred:1. In rejecting the notice of appeal filed by the accused on the ground "that it was filed beyond the reglementary period;"2. In accepting the plea of guilty of appellants Regalario and Pabillar when they were re-arraigned but were not apprised clearly and fully of the nature of the offense charged against them;3. In not considering the testimonies of Rolando de Chavez, Augurio Villagracia, Jr., Jose Quiniquito and Alberto Desembrana;4. In relying on the testimonies of the two witnesses for the prosecution, instead of weighing the evidence adduced during the trial in favor of appellants that there was no conspiracy and the act of boxing and stabbing were independently committed by appellants Regalario and Pabillar;5. In not considering the age of minority of appellants Regalario and Pabillar at the time of the commission of the crime; and6. In not considering the financial standing of appellant's parents in the imposition of the award of indemnity, as well as the funeral and other expenses incidental to the prosecution of the case.Appellants inceptively claim that the computation of the period of fifteen days wherein to file the notice of appeal "should be counted from February 23, 1991, not from date of the decision of said case."13The flaw in this argument is immediately apparent. Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court very clearly provides:Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his attorney.As earlier observed, the records of this case show that the judgment of conviction was promulgated in open court on January 17, 1991. Fourteen days thereafter, or on January 31, 1991, appellants filed a motion for reconsideration and a copy of the order denying the same was received by appellants' counsel on February 22, 1991. When appellants filed their notice of appeal on March 4, 1991, ten days had elapsed since the receipt of the notice of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.As hereinbefore noted, the appeal must be perfected within fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment, but said period is interrupted from the time a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed and starts to run again from receipt of the notice denying said motion. Accordingly, from receipt of such denial order, appellant has only the remaining period within which to perfect his appeal. In the case at bar, fourteen days had elapsed before the filing of appellants' motion for reconsideration, hence they had only one day from February 22, 1991 to file a notice of appeal. Consequently, the trial court was correct in rejecting appellants' notice of appeal since it was filed beyond the reglementary period.Ordinarily, therefore, the appeal herein could have been dismissed outright for being time-barred. The records, however, do not show that either the public or private prosecutor moved for the dismissal of said appeal or objected to the aforesaid order of the trial court directing the elevation of the records of the case to this Court, obviously for appellate review. It was only after appellants had filed their brief that appellee, in its brief, raised the issue of the belated appeal and, inferentially, the lack of appellate jurisdiction of this Court in this case. However, the principle of estoppel by laches to bar attacks on jurisdiction has been adopted and repeatedly applied by this Court, notably inTijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al.,14and in several cases which followed thereafter, including criminal cases.15Thus, inPeople vs. Tamani,16although the appeal of the accused was demonstrably filed out of time, to obviate a miscarriage of justice this Court nevertheless reviewed the case and rendered judgment on the merits thereof, in view of the fact that the filing of the appeal out of time was due to the inadvertence of the defense counsel and the further consideration that the briefs of the parties had already been filed. Considering that the same features also obtain in the present case, and in view of the gravity of the offense and the penalty involved, we feel that we should also follow the same judicial path and, in the oft-invoked broader interests of substantial justice, grant to appellants in this case the benefit of judicial review.The trial court did not err in accepting the plea of guilty of appellants Regalario and Pabillar when they were re-arraigned. As reflected in its order dated February 23, 1988,17both appellants were assisted by their counsel and it was only after a series of questions to both of them that said court, after being convinced that the plea of guilty was made intelligently and voluntarily, accepted the change of plea, but nevertheless required the prosecution to present its evidence. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, appellants never questioned the correctness of that order and of the declarations therein,18until they filed their brief.Also, during the trial of the case, counsel for both appellants never raised the issue of improvident plea of guilt, as appellants Regalario and Pabillar even presented witnesses to prove their minority during the commission of the crime. If appellants were indeed convinced that their plea of guilty was made without their being duly apprised of the consequences thereof, then they should not have waited for the termination of the case in the lower court and thereafter raise the issue only after the promulgation of the adverse judgment of the trial court. Worse, appellants can not raise for the first time in the appellate court such issue which was not raised in the courta quoas it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.19Appellants also assail the judgment of the trial court for not considering the testimonies offered by the defense. It will be noted that in coming up with the verdict of guilty, the lower court relied on the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, Glenda Osabal and Romano Padillo, who positively identified the six appellants during the police investigation and during the trial. Said court also ruled that from the facts of the case, it had been established that there was conspiracy among appellants as their individual actions indubitably showed a common design and concerted action. We have carefully reviewed and evaluated the evidence in this case and we agree with the aforequoted findings of the lower court and its conclusion that the culpability of appellants and the existence of a conspiracy among them was sufficiently established by the prosecution.Prosecution witness Romano Padillo, testifying in a clear, forthright and consistent manner, refuted the defense version of the fatal encounter by narrating what actually transpired that fateful evening of September 18, 1986, which testimony we feel should be reproduced here:Q When you said that on the evening of September 18, 1986, you were walking in company with Menardo Garcia and Glenda Osabal, these 6 persons you enumerated joined you, what happened when they joined you?A I saw Carlos Pabillar talked (sic) to Menardo Garcia, sir.Q Did you hear what they talked about?A Yes, sir.Q What did they talk about?A Carlos Pabillar asked M