full cases plain meaning - ejusdem generis

7/27/2019 Full Cases Plain Meaning - Ejusdem Generis

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PADUA V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 168546

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review assails the Decision[1]

dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution[2]

dated June 14, 2005, of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael Paduas petition for certiorari and denied his

motion for reconsideration. Paduas petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11,

2004[3]

and July 28, 2004[4]

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for probation.

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Branch

168, Pasig City of violating Section 5,[5]

Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,[6]

otherwise known as the Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for selling dangerous drugs.[7]

The Information reads:

The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y

Velchez a.k.a. Allan and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. Mike, with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art.

II, Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows:

On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

accused,Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years

old, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one

another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-

buyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was

found positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.

Contrary to law.[8]

When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.[9]

During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Padua s counsel manifested that his client was willing to

withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders

under Section 70[10]

of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no objection.[11]

Thus, the RTC on the same date

issued an Order[12]

stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and

pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision[13]

dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged:

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of

Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore,

sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as

minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five

Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
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No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine

pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation[15]dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor and a first-

time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 968[16]

(P.D. No. 968), otherwise

known as The Probation Law of 1976 and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the

qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the said laws.

The RTC in an Order[17]

dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to conduct a Post-

Sentence Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor

was also directed to submit his comment on the said petition within five days from receipt of the order.

On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report

to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation.[18]

However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition

for Probation on the ground that under Section 24[19]

of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail

of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus:

Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y

Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of

the Pasig City Parole and Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.

In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor Michael Padua y

Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603,

otherwise known as the Child and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of sentence

and commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find application in this case, the

matter before the Court being an application for probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the

suspension of his sentence.

On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program for

Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165

specifically refer to violations of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of

Section 5 ever mentioned.

More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with

Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is of the

view and so holds that minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of violating Section 5,

Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said section in view of the provision of Section 24 which

is hereunder quoted:

Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers.

Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the

penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation

Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (underlining supplied)
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l

should be, as it is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition

for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19,

2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and

ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[21]

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition

where he raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR

PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONERS RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-

1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN

VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A

COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND

WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND OTHER

PURPOSES.

[22]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its Comment[23]

as its

Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that

I.

THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE LEGAL BASIS IN APPLYING SECTION 24, ARTICLE II OF

R.A. 9165 INSTEAD OF SECTION 70, ARTICLE VIII OF THE SAME LAW.

II.

SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH

THE LAW HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE.[24]

Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorariassailing the trial

courts order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Paduas right under Rep. Act No. 9344,[25]

the Juvenile Justice and

Welfare Act of 2006, violated? and (3) Does Section 32[26]

of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in

Conflict with the Law have application in this case?
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As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari.

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or

any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,

speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[27]

Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction

when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is

exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent

or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at

all in contemplation of law.[28]

A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas petition for probation shows that the RTC neither acted without

jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of statutory construction

in denying Paduas petition for probation.

Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous

drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the

privilege of probation, to wit:

SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any person

convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court,

cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as

amended. (Emphasis supplied.)

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing,

regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary

rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must

be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says .[29]

If a statute is clear,

plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is

known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of

intention.[30]

Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be

no departure.[31]

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No.

9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a

sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections

11[32]

and 15[33]

of the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and

pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the law on

probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their ways.[34]

The Court of

Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug

traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so .[35]
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The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug users. To

illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a

government center, as minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and

convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand

Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.

As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice

and Welfare Act of 2006 was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18- SC otherwise known as the Rule

on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law has application in this case. Section 68[36]

of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No.

02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.

Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38[37]

of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively

applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty

of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the

law under suspended sentence. Section 40[38]

of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of

age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence

for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years . Petitioner has already reached 21 yearsof age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a chil d

[39]for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application

of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14,

2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., petitioner-appellant,vs.MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondent appellee.

Gregorio E. Fajardo for appellant.

Gregorio Baroque for appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of such decisionrelying on what it considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically thefirst two paragraphs thereof: "... (1) A member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws,execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wagespayable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the agreement and to pay the amount sodeducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member to the co-operative.(2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative by a request inwriting and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make the claimant and remit forthwith the amount so deducted to the co-operative."

1
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To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, as quoted in the brief for petitioner-appellant, stated the following:"Then petitioner contends that under the above provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit union to itsmembers enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondent's employees' wages and salaries. As can beclearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 hereinabove quoted which provides that obligation oflaborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees' wagesand salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from the salaries or wages

payable to members of the employees' cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to pay the

same to the credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act 2023 had been enacted, the employer could not be compelled toact as the collecting agent of the employees' credit union for the employees' debt to his credit union but to contendthat the debt of a member of the employees cooperative credit union as having first priority in the matter of deduction,is to write something into the law which does not appear. In other words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 isonlyto compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this overto the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not convert the credit union's credit into a firstpriority credit. If the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first priority inthe matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have soexpressly declared. Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244 show thelegislative intent on preference of credits.

2

Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with the respondent-appellee, which, in its brief, succinctlypointed out "that there is nothing in said provision from which it could be implied that it gives top priority to obligationsof the nature of that payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company, in issuing the documents knownas Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "P", which establish the order of priority of payment out of the salaries of the employees of

respondent-appellee, did not violate the above-quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023. In promulgating Exhibit "3",[and] Exhibit "P" respondent, in effect, implemented the said provision of law.

3

This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it would appearthat no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.

1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity. As thusworded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the lower court to view itotherwise would have been to alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properlyappertains to the legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals:

4"It has been repeated time

and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except toapply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistentlyborn to that effect.

5.

2. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law onwhich he would base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis would haveprevented him from instituting a a suit of this character. In J.R.S. Business Corporation v. Montesa,

6this Court held.

"Man-damus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in theperformance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the useand enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled.

7The opinion continued in this wise:"According to former ChiefJustice Moran," only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legalrights are of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. In support of theabove view, Viuda e Hijos de Crispulo Zamora v. Wrightwas cited. As was there categorically stated: "This court hasheld that it is fundamental that the duties to be enforced by mandamus must be those which are clear and enjoinedby law or by reason of official station, and that petitioner must have a clear, legal right to the thing and that it must bethe legal duty of the defendant to perform the required act.' As expressed by the then Justice Recto in a subsequentopinion: "It is well establish that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to beenforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful." To the same

effect is the formulation of such doctrine by former Justice Barrera: "Stated otherwise, the writ never issues indoubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power alreadypossessed and to perform a duty already imposed."

8So it has been since then.

9The latest reported case, Province.

of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission,10

this court speaking through Justice Concepcion Jr., reiterated such awell-settled doctrine: "It has also been held that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiffshould have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to performthe act required. It never issues in doubtful cases.

11

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.


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Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OFTHE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioners,vs.CHRISTOPHER KORUGA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing theDecision

1dated September 14, 2004 and the Resolution

2dated November 24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in

CA-G.R. SP No. 76578. The assailed Decision set aside the Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the Secretary of theDepartment of Justice (DOJ) and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the Board of Commissioners (BOC) ofthe Bureau of Immigration (BI), and dismissed the deportation case filed against Christopher Koruga (respondent), an

American national, for violation of Section 37(a)(4) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known asthe Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; while the assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

Sometime in August 2001, then BI Commissioner Andrea Domingo received an anonymous letter3requesting the

deportation of respondent as an undesirable alien for having been found guilty of Violation of the Uniform ControlledSubstances Act in the State of Washington, United States of America (USA) for attempted possession of cocaine

sometime in 1983.

On the basis of a Summary of Information,4the Commissioner issued Mission Order No. ADD-01-162

5on September

13, 2001 directing Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Lino G. Caligasan, Chief of the Intelligence Mission and anyavailable BI Special Operations Team Member to conduct verification/ validation of the admission status and activitiesof respondent and effect his immediate arrest if he is found to have violated the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,as amended.

On September 17, 2001, respondent was arrested and charged before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for violationof Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The case was docketed as BSI-D.C. No.

ADD-01-126. The Charge Sheet reads:

On September 17, 2001, at about 10:00 A.M., respondent was arrested by Intelligence operatives at his residence,located at 1001 MARBELLA CONDOMINIUM II, Roxas Boulevard, Malate, Manila, pursuant to Mission Order No.

ADD-01-162;

That respondent was convicted and/or sentenced for Uniform Controlled Substance Act in connection with his beingDrug Trafficker and/or Courier of prohibited drugs in the State of Washington, United States of America, thus, makinghim an undesirable alien and/or a public burden in violation of Sec. 37(4) [sic] of the Philippine Immigration Act of1940, as amended.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6
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On September 28, 2001, after filing a Petition for Bail7and Supplemental Petition for Bail,

8respondent was granted

bail and provisionally released from the custody of the BI.9

Following the submission of respondent's Memorandum10

and the BI Special Prosecutor's Memorandum,11

the BOCrendered a Judgment

12dated February 11, 2002 ordering the deportation of respondent under Section 37(a)(4) of the

Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.

On February 26, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13but it was denied by the BOC in a Resolutiondated March 19, 2002.

Unaware that the BOC already rendered its Resolution dated March 19, 2002, respondent filed on April 2, 2002, aManifestation and Notice of Appeal Ex Abundanti Cautelam

14with the Office of the President, which referred

15the

appeal to the DOJ.

On April 1, 2003, then DOJ Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong rendered a Resolution16

dismissing the appeal. OnApril 15, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration

17which he subsequently withdrew

18on April 23, 2003.

On April 24, 2003, respondent filed a Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition19

with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76578, seeking to set aside the Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the DOJ

Secretary and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC.

On September 14, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision20

setting aside the Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the DOJSecretary and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC and dismissing the deportation case filed againstrespondent. The CA held that there was no valid and legal ground for the deportation of respondent since there wasno violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, because respondent was notconvicted or sentenced for a violation of the law on prohibited drugs since the U.S. Court dismissed the case forviolation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, USA filed against respondent; thatpetitioners further failed to present or attach to their pleadings any document which would support their allegationsthat respondent entered into a plea bargain with the U.S. Prosecutor for deferred sentence nor did they attach to therecord the alleged order or judgment of the U.S. Court which would show the conviction of respondent for violation ofthe prohibited drugs law in the USA; that even if respondent was convicted and sentenced for the alleged offense, hisdeportation under Section 37(a)(4) is improper, since the prohibited drugs law referred to therein refers not to aforeign drugs law but to the Philippine drugs law, then Republic Act No. 6425 or the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972";

that although the BOC is clothed with exclusive authority to decide as to the right of a foreigner to enter the country,still, such executive officers must act within the scope of their authority or their decision is a nullity.

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration21

was denied by the CA in its presently assailed Resolution22

dated November24, 2004.

Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE SUBJECT CASE WHICHFALLS UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT.

II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT IT COULD TAKE COGNIZANCE OVER THE CASE, THE COURT OF APPEALSGRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CHARGES AGAINST THE HEREIN RESPONDENTWERE DROPPED.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIOR CONVICTION IS REQUIRED BEFORERESPONDENT COULD BE DEPORTED.

23

Petitioners contend that the BI has exclusive authority in deportation proceedings and no other tribunal is at liberty toreexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence presented therein; that there was no grave abuse ofdiscretion on the part of petitioners when they sought the deportation of respondent since he was convicted by the
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Supreme Court of the State of Washington for attempted Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act andunderwent probation in lieu of the imposition of sentence; that the dismissal of the charge against respondent wasonly with respect to penalties and liabilities, obtained after fulfilling the conditions for his probation, and was not anacquittal from the criminal case charged against him; that there is a valid basis to declare respondent's undesirabilityand effect his deportation since respondent has admitted guilt of his involvement in a drug-related case.

On the other hand, respondent submits that the proceedings against him reek of persecution; that the CA did not

commit any error of law; that all the arguments raised in the present petition are mere rehashes of arguments raisedbefore and ruled upon by the CA; and that, even assuming that Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of1940 does not apply, there is no reason, whether compelling or slight, to deport respondent.

There are two issues for resolution: (1) whether the exclusive authority of the BOC over deportation proceedings barsjudicial review, and (2) whether there is a valid and legal ground for the deportation of respondent.

The Court resolves the first issue in the negative.

It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien,and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings.

24Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1

25of the

Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, asestablished by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionaryauthority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered toexecute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President,26the Court may look into andresolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act ofthe legislative or executive department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executedwhimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

27

In Domingo v. Scheer,28

the Court set aside the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC over an alien for havingbeen issued with grave abuse of discretion in violation of the alien's constitutional and statutory rights to due process,since the BOC ordered the deportation of the alien without conducting summary deportation proceedings and withoutaffording the alien the right to be heard on his motion for reconsideration and adduce evidence thereon.

In House of Sara Lee v. Rey,29

the Court held that while, as a general rule, the factual findings of administrativeagencies are not subject to review, it is equally established that the Court will not uphold erroneous conclusionswhich are contrary to evidence, because the agency a quo, for that reason, would be guilty of a grave abuse ofdiscretion.

When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a petition forcertiorarior prohibition may be filed inthe CA as provided by law or by the Rules of Court, as amended.

30Clearly, the filing by respondent of a petition

forcertiorariand prohibition before the CA to assail the order of deportation on the ground of grave abuse ofdiscretion is permitted.

This brings us to the second issue.

The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace; suchprivilege is not absolute or permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or deported from thePhilippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto.

31

Respondent was charged with violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended,which provides:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of anyother officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigrationafter a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as chargedagainst the alien.

x x x x
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(4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation ofthe law governing prohibited drugs;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent contends that the use of the definite article "the" immediately preceding the phrase "law on prohibiteddrugs" emphasizes not just any prohibited drugs law but the law applicable in this jurisdiction, at that time, theDangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

32

The Court disagrees.

The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of legislative intent to thecontrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.

33However, a literal interpretation of

a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of thestatute taken as a whole.

34After all, statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the

legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.35

Indeed, courts are not to give

words meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.36

Were the Court to follow the letter of Section 37(a)(4) and make it applicable only to convictions under the Philippineprohibited drugs law, the Court will in effect be paving the way to an absurd situation whereby aliens convicted of

foreign prohibited drugs laws may be allowed to enter the country to the detriment of the public health and safety ofits citizens. It suggests a double standard of treatment where only aliens convicted of Philippine prohibited drugs lawwould be deported, while aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws would be allowed entry in the country. TheCourt must emphatically reject such interpretation of the law. Certainly, such a situation was not envisioned by theframers of the law, for to do so would be contrary to reason and therefore, absurd. Over time, courts have recognizedwith almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law.

Indubitably, Section 37(a)(4) should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very purpose forwhich the law was passed. This Court has, in many cases involving the construction of statutes, always cautionedagainst narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and stressed that it is of the essenceof judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity, and that thereforea literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.

37

Moreover, since Section 37(a)(4) makes no distinction between a foreign prohibited drugs law and the Philippine

prohibited drugs law, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.38

Thus, Section37(a)(4) should apply to those convicted of all prohibited drugs laws, whether local or foreign.lavvphi1.zw+

There is no dispute that respondent was convicted of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the Stateof Washington, USA for attempted possession of cocaine, as shown by the Order Deferring Imposition of Sentence(Probation).

39While he may have pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, and was not imprisoned but applied for and

underwent a one-year probation, still, there is no escaping the fact that he was convicted under a prohibited drugslaw, even though it may simply be called a "misdemeanor drug offense."

40The BOC did not commit grave abuse of

discretion in ordering the deportation of respondent.

The Court quotes with approval the following acute pronouncements of the BOC:

x x x We note that the respondent admitted in his Memorandum dated 8 October 2001 that he pleaded guilty tothe amended information where he allegedly attempted to have in his possession a certain controlledsubstance, and a narcotic drug. Further, he filed a "Petition for Leave to Withdraw Plea of Guilty and Enter Plea ofNot Guilty" to obtain a favorable release from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the filing of the said charge.

Evidently, the U.S. Court issued the Order of Dismissal in exchange for the respondent's plea of guilty to the lesseroffense. Though legally allowed in the U.S. Law, We perceive that this strategy afforded the respondent with aconvenient vehicle to avoid conviction and sentencing. Moreover, the plea of guilty is by itself crystal clearacknowledgment of his involvement in a drug-related offense. Hence, respondent's discharge from convictionand sentencing cannot hide the fact that he has a prior history of drug-related charge.
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This country cannot countenance another alien with a history of a drug-related offense. The crime may havebeen committed two decades ago but it cannot erase the fact that the incident actually happened. This is thevery core of his inadmissibility into the Philippines. Apparently, respondent would like Us to believe that hisinvolvement in this drug case is a petty offense or a mere misdemeanor. However, the Philippine Government viewsall drug-related cases with grave concern; hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as "TheDangerous Drugs Act of 1972" and the creation of various drug-enforcement agencies. While We empathize with theinnocent portrayal of the respondent as a man of irreproachable conduct, not to mention the numerous written

testimonies of good character submitted in his behalf, this incomplete and sanitized representation cannot, however,outweigh our commitment and sworn duty to safeguard public health and public safety. Moreover, while the U.S.Government may not have any law enforcement interest on respondent, Philippine immigration authorities certainlydo in the able and competent exercise of its police powers. Thus, this case of the respondent is no different froma convicted felon abroad, who argues that he cannot be removed from the Philippines on the ground that thecrime was committed abroad. Otherwise, it would open the floodgates to other similarly situated aliensdemanding their admission into the country. Indeed, respondent may not be a menace to the U.S. as a result ofhis being discharged from criminal liability, but that does not ipso facto mean that the immigration authorities shouldunquestionably admit him into the country.

x x x x41

(Emphasis supplied)

It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry in the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into thecountry by the simple passage of time. When an alien, such as respondent, has already physically gained entry in the

country, but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it isfound that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry.42

Every sovereign power has the inherent power toexclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or publicinterest.

43The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign

power.44

It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to beinjurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people.

45

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.SP No. 76578 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the Board ofCommissioners of the Bureau of Immigration ordering the deportation of respondent Christopher Koruga underSection 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

DANILO E. PARAS, pet i t ioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the lastregular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of

the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved toapprove the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election onNovember 13,1995.

[1]At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law.

The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners opposition. OnDecember 6, 1995, theCOMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recallelection, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SPCivil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summaryhearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel toexplain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was withoutCOMELEC approval.

[2]
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In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall electionon January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition forcertiorariwith urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996,the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of publicrespondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor Generals manifestation maintaining anopinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitionerthereafter filed a reply.

[3]

Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwiseknown as the Local Government Code, which states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the dateof the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election , petitioner insiststhat the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election wasset by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof,petitioner citesAssociated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SKelection as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence norecall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

SEC. 74.Limitations on Recall.(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during histerm of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place withinone (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office orone (1) year

immediately preceding a regular local election.

[Emphasis added.]

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to thecontext, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient tothe general intent of the whole enactment.

[4]The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to

recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designatesthe period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of histerm of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SKelection will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal ofpublic officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No.7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular localelection, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall

provision of the Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enactan effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.

[5]An

interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or asotherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

[6]

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with theConstitution.

[7]Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b)

thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enacta local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structureinstituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.

Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus,in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the

intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x[8]

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be readaccording to its spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitatingadditional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately precedingthe regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local
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elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainlyhas a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more inkeeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to anelection where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by theelectorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of theCode considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) monthsaway, the same having been scheduled on May 1997.[9]

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporaryrestraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is herebymade permanent.

SO ORDERED.

PTIC V. COA

G.R. NO. 183517

PEREZ, J.:

The inclusion of allowances in the computation of the retirement/separation benefits of the employees of petitioner

Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) is at issue in this petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Rules 64 and 65 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the nullification and setting aside of the adverse rulings dated July 4, 2003 and

February 15, 2008 issued by respondent Commission on Audit (COA).

The Facts

Created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 252 dated July 21, 1973, petitioner is a government-owned and controlled

corporation tasked with promoting and developing Philippine trade in pursuance of national economic development. Subsequent

to the repeal of said law with the May 9, 1977 issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1071, otherwise known as theRevised Charter

of the Philippine International Trading Corporation , then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 756 on

December 28, 1981, authorizing the reorganization of petitioner pursuant to his legislative powers to amend charters of

government corporations through executive orders in turn issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by

Presidential Decree No. 1772. On February 18, 1983, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 877, authorizing further the

reorganization of petitioner for the purpose of accelerating and expanding the countrys export concerns.[1]

On December 31, 1983, Eligia Romero, an officer of petitioner, opted to retire under Republic Act No. 1616 and received a

total of P286,780.00 as gratuity benefits for services rendered from 1955 to 1983. Immediately re-hired on contractual basis, it

appears that said employee remained in the service of petitioner until her compulsory retirement on April 27, 2000. In receipt of

retirement benefits in the total sum of P1,013,952.00 for the period July 1, 1955 to April 27, 2000, net of the P286,70.00 gratuity

benefits she received in 1983, Ms. Romero filed a July 16, 2001 request, seeking from petitioner payment of retirement

differentials on the strength of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. Said provision states that any officer or employee who
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retires, resigns, or is separated from the service shall be entitled to one month pay for every year of service computed at highest

salary received including allowances, in addition to the other benefits provided by law, regardless of any provision of law or

regulations to the contrary.[2]

Confronted with the question of whether the computation of Ms. Romeros retirement benefits should include the

allowances she had received while under its employ, petitioner sent queries to respondent and the Office of the Government

Corporate Counsel regarding the application of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. On August 20, 2002, then Government

Corporate Counsel Amado D. Valdez issued Opinion No. 197, Series of 2002, espousing a literal interpretation and application of

the aforesaid provision. Invoking the principle that retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the

persons intended to be benefited thereby, said opinion declared that, pursuant to the subject provision, the basis for the

computation of the retirement benefits of petitioners employees should be the highest basic salary received by them, includi ng

allowances not integrated into the basic pay.[3]

On the other hand, on July 4, 2003, COA Assistant Commissioner and General Counsel Raquel R. Habitan issued the

first assailed ruling, the 6th Indorsement dated July 4, 2003, finding the denial of Ms. Romeros claim for retirement differentials

in order. Taking appropriate note of the fact that the Reserve for Retirement Gratuity and Commutation of Leave Credits of

petitioners employees did not include allowances outside of the basic salary, said officer ruled that Executive Order No. 756 was

a special law issued only for the specific purpose of reorganizing petitioner corporation. Although it was subsequently adverted

to in Executive Order No. 877, Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was determined to be intended for employees retired,

separated or resigned in connection with petitioners reorganization and was not meant to be a permanent retirement scheme for

its employees.[4]

Elevated by petitioner on appeal before the respondent,[5]

the foregoing ruling was affirmed in the second assailed

ruling, the Decision No. 2008-023 dated February 15, 2008,[6]which likewise discounted the legal basis for Ms. Romeros claim

for retirement differentials. Finding that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was simply an incentive to encourage employees

to resign or retire at the height of petitioners reorganizatio n, said decision went on to make the following pronouncements, to

wit:

Moreover, RA No. 4968 prohibits the creation of any insurance retirement plan by anygovernment agency and government-owned or controlled corporation other than the GSIS, viz.:

Section 10. Subsection (b) of Section twenty-eight of the same Act, as amended ishereby amended to read as follows:

(b) Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall becreated by the employer. All supplementary retirement or pension plans

heretofore in force in any government office, agency, or instrumentality orcorporation owned or controlled by the government, are hereby declaredinoperative or abolished:Provided, That the rights of those who are already

eligible to retire thereunder shall not be affected.

The Supreme Court explained the rationale of the above provisions in Avelina B. Conte et al. vs. Commissionon Audit, G.R. No. 116422, November 4, 1996, thusly:
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Said Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of anyinsurance or retirement plan other than the GSIS for government officers andemployees, in order to prevent the undue and iniquitous proliferation of suchplans. It is beyond cavil that Res. 56 contravenes the said provision of law and istherefore invalid, void and of no effect. To ignore this and rule otherwise would betantamount to permitting every other government office or agency to put up its ownsupplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such financial assistance.

(Emphasis ours)

To hold that Section 6 of E.O. 756 is a retirement law for PTIC employees other than the GSIS lawwould run counter to the policy of the state to prevent the undue and iniquitous proliferation of retirement

plans that would unduly promote the inequality of treatment in the retirement benefits of governmentemployees.[7]

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner seeks the nullification and setting aside of the assailed rulings on the following grounds, to wit:

A.

RESPONDENT COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK

OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE FIRST ASSAILED RULING, OPINING THAT

SECTION 6 OF EO 756 WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A PERMANENT RETIREMENT SCHEME OF

THE PITC.

B.


OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE SECOND ASSAILED RULING DENYING

PITCS REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ABOVE OPINION OF COA GENERAL

COUNSEL RAQUEL HABITAN, LIKEWISE HOLDING THAT SECTION 6 of EO 756 WAS NOTMEANT TO BE A PERMANENT SCHEME OF THE PITC.

C.


OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED RULINGS WHICH ARE

CONTRARY TO SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THAT RETIREMENT LAWS ARE LIBERALLY

CONSTRUED AND ADMINISTERED IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONS INTENDED TO BE

BENEFITTED AND THAT ALL DOUBTS AS TO THE INTENT OF THE LAW SHOULD BE

RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE RETIREE TO ACHIEVE ITS HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES.

D.


OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RELYING ON SECTION 10 of RA 4968 AS TO THEALLEGED PROHIBITION AGAINST ANY INSURANCE OR RETIREMENT PLAN OR

RETIREMENT PLAN OTHER THAN THE GSIS, SAID LAW HAVING BEEN PASSED PRIOR TO

THE ISSUANCE OF EO 756. OTHERWISE STATED, SECTION 10 OF RA 4968 IS DEEMED

REVISED, AMENDED, SUPERSEDED OR REPEALED BY EO 756 PURSUANT TO THE

REPEALING CLAUSE OF SAID EO 756.[8]

The Courts Ruling
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We find the petition bereft of merit.

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that

every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole

enactment.[9]

Because the law must not be read in truncated parts, its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. The

statute's clauses and phrases must not, consequently, be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part

thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole.[10] Consistent with

the fundamentals of statutory construction, all the words in the statute must be taken into consideration in order to ascertain its

meaning.[11]

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find it well worth emphasizing at the outset that Executive

Order No. 756[12]was m

full cases plain meaning - ejusdem generis

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