from um- and mitwelt to das man: a comment on the ... · pdf filehusserl and heidegger (term...

Husserl and Heidegger (Term Paper) KPCKE TINTUR, Maria Isabel
From Um- and Mitwelt to Das Man: A comment on the Functions of Das
Man within Heideggers Being-In-The-World
Term Paper
Husserl and Heidegger: Proseminar
Prof. Ch. Parsons (Spring 2003)
KPCKE TINTUR, Maria Isabel (LL.M., Harvard Law School)
Student ID # 405 7132 9
May 2003
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IInnddeexx
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................3
II. ...the last nail in the coffin... ...................................................................................................4
II.1. Daseins Discovery of Things,... ............................................................................................6
II.2. ... Disclosure of Others,..........................................................................................................7
II.3. ... and Disclosure of Itself ....................................................................................................10
III. Das Man ...................................................................................................................................11
IV. Das Man and Intelligibility .....................................................................................................15
IV.1. Positive Aspect ...................................................................................................................15
IV.2. Negative Aspect? ................................................................................................................17
V. Das Man and Normativity........................................................................................................18
V.1. Negative Aspect ...................................................................................................................20
V.2. Positive Aspect?...................................................................................................................23
VI. Concluding Remarks...............................................................................................................25
Bibliographical References.............................................................................................................27Bibliographical References
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I Introduction
HEIDEGGER devotes Chapter IV of Division I to the analysis of the second structural moment
of being-in-the-world (BIW); this has to lead him to uncover the entity, which respectively is in the
mode of BIW (...) in Daseins average everydayness1. His answer to the question of the who of
everyday Dasein is articulated along three sections ( 25-27). The first of these sections ( 25)
contains an introductory discussion concerning the possibility, and the framing, of the mentioned
question; I shall only briefly refer to it infra II.3. The second section ( 26) is an inquiry into the
existential structures that underlie Daseins encounter with other Daseins; notably the structure of
Mitsein. The third section ( 27) introduces the notion of Das Man as both the ordinary
manifestation of Daseins BIW with Others, and as the answer to the who-question.
The relation between the second and the third sections poses a puzzle. Different prominent
readers of HEIDEGGER offer different conceptualizations of this relation. For some, Das Man is the
corollary of the modes of being analyzed under 262; others envisage the discussion of Das Man as
a further implication of a particular aspect of Mitsein3. What these authors generally agree to is that
HEIDEGGER himself was not clear. They also tend to converge in acknowledging the key-role of
Chapter IV within Being and Time (BT), if not within HEIDEGGERs entire thought.
Against this background, the aim of this paper is two-fold. I primarily intend to shed some light
on the nature and possible functions of the notion of Das Man in HEIDEGGERs account of BIW. In
doing so, constant references to Mitsein (and related existential structures) will need to be made.
Consequently, I also hope to contribute to a further clarification of the relation between HEIDEGGERs
analysis of Mitsein and his analysis of Das Man.
Section II of this paper will provide an overview of Daseins behavior towards other entities in
its BIW. By discussing in this order Daseins relation to things, to Others, and to itself, I will try
to lay plain some of the basic pillars of HEIDEGGERs new ontology of the subject (OLAFSON
1 P. 53; emphasis added (all references that only indicate the page-number correspond to HEIDEGGER 1926). 2 As we shall see, this is the case e.g. of Prof. DREYFUS; the reason, synthetically stated, is that he interprets social intelligibility in terms of Das Man (infra III.1).
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1987:12), which represents the last nail in the coffin of the Cartesian tradition (DREYFUS
1991:144). It will appear that there is a continuum between the three stages of analysis things,
Others, Dasein itself and, in a sense, Das Man is already contained in this continuum4. To what
extent this is so will become clearer when Das Man is specifically addressed (Sections III-VI).
In Section III, I shall introduce the notion of Das Man and suggest a way of comparing the
approaches to Das Man by the various authors I will be considering. The fundamental distinction is
the one between Das Man as a source of intelligibility, and Das Man as a source of (a weak sense of)
normativity; these are the two categories around which I propose to organize the conceptions of Das
Man. Sections IV and V are, respectively, an elaboration of each of these categories. By way of
conclusion, Section VI will tentatively sketch out a way of reading together these two categories.
II ...the last nail in the coffin...
The Cartesian Self is an abstract, worldless subjectum; a self whose essence consists in
treating everything, including its own natural and historical experience in the world, as an object of
knowledge5. But this worldless Self has nevertheless, we might say a kind of being, namely the
only kind of being that DESCARTES believed to be available: it is a substance. Thus, the spiritual
thing (HEIDEGGER) is both cogitans and a res (DESCARTES 1824). In other words, it is both
abstracted from the external world (immaterial), and a substance within that world.
As OLAFSON notes (OLAFSON 1987:7), HEIDEGGERs main objection to this account was not
the paradoxical relation between immaterial and material substances (mind / body and, per
extension, the rest of the external world). It was rather the conditions of an inference from the
inner sphere to the existence of the outer sphere. The Cartesian subject doubts the existence of
the external world. Accordingly, his knowledge of it is not more than a belief which, by its nature,
3 I would include in this category those authors who conceive of intelligibility independently of Das Man, the latter having only a (usually negative) normative function. Examples are Profs. OLAFSON and INWOOD. 4 HEIDEGGER does not explicitly make this claim but, in a slightly different context, he insinuates that the germ of the analysis in Chapter IV is contained in his previous account of the worldhood (Chapter III); p. 113. 5 OLAFSON 1987:6; the author speaks of a purely epistemic form of selfhood.
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can be true or false (ibid.:13). The very presupposition of the doubt and thus of the inquiry itself
is the possibility of conceiving the mind independently from the world (ibid.:9). If it was not
independent, it could not doubt the worlds existence. So the world, if there is such, must be external
to our mental states; if the world does not exist (if the belief was false), its nonexistence does not
undermine the existence of the doubting Self; if the world does exist (if the belief was true), the
doubting Self will turn out to be side by side (nebeneinander) with the material substances in the
world6.
HEIDEGGER can be said to challenge the presupposition of the doubt; not (necessarily) the way
it is solved. The presupposition is a certain conception of the Self, upon which the subsequent proof-
searching-enterprise is built7. For the purposes of our present inquiry, we may distinguish three
features of the Cartesian Self that HEIDEGGERs construction specifically refutes.
First, the Selfs detached character its extramundane locus standi (OLAFSON 1987:13).
Second, what could be called the Selfs epistemological priority over the external world and the
Other Selves that is, the Self always-already knows itself before it can project that knowledge on
other substances. Third, the Selfs self-containedness or self-sufficiency the Self qua Self does not
receive any attribute from a source external to it, and therefore subsists even in the case there is no
other substance bes

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