From Small to Smart: Reflections on the Concept of Small StatesAuthor(s): Pertti JoenniemiSource: Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 9 (1998), pp. 61-62Published by: Royal Irish AcademyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30001874 .

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From Small to Smart: Reflections on the concept of small states*

Pertti Joenniemi

Senior Research Fellow, COPRI, Copenhagen

As a field of study, international relations has come of age over the past few years. There is suddenly much more intellectual exchange and there are new, challenging themes such as globalisation, regionalism and the role of cities in the international system. Many previously shared meanings--including sovereignty and security- have also been opened up for re-consideration. And the discipline now entertains, in a way it never did before, critical debate on a broad range of issues.

It may be argued, against this background, that the concept of small states does not seem to be an essential part of the new dynamism. It remains largely anchored in a traditional discourse,with 'small' being pitted against 'large', this division then being used as a departure in various endeavours to catch essential patterns in the interaction among states.

Moreover, even within the more traditional literature, there was never a consensus about what actually constituted a 'small' state. Indeed, the term itself remains a controversial one and, though used extensively, has been deployed more in a descriptive manner than as an analytical concept. Wilhelm Cristmas-Mpller has indeed pointed out that few concepts have been subject to so much attack, yet so regularly employed by scholars.' Hans Branner is perhaps less critical but points out that the concept of a small state is a highly flexible one; and in his view, it only makes sense to use the term as a 'situational' or 'relational' notion rather than something that can be easily defined in objective terms.2

The neat binary divide between the small and large state provides the concept with a clarity that at first sight seems to be a source of strength. However, once one begins to explore what smallness actually means, it is impossible not to agree with Branner, who argues that the concept of a small state is relative rather than absolute.

'Wilhelm Christmas-Meller, 'Some thoughts on the scientific applicability of the small state con- cept: a research history and a discussion', in Otmar Hill (ed.), Small states in Europe and dependence (Vienna, 1983), 35-53.

2Hans Branner, Sm&statens udenrikspolitik (Viborg, 1982).

*Paper presented at the Nineteenth Annual Conference of the Irish National Committee for the Study of International Affairs, 21 November 1997.

Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 9 (1998)

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States obviously vary in size, population, political weight and military strength, and small states by definition have less of these various assets than large ones. That said, it is very difficult to explain how any of this translates into policy or outlook, or why small states might or should behave differently either to other small states or to large states. As one sceptic has noted, it is hardly possible to speak of a specific form of 'small state' behaviour.3

The other problem with the concept is that by implication it elevates the importance of large states (and our preoccupation with them) while also reinforcing the realist prejudice that the primary focus of inquiry in international relations should be the state itself. There is enough literature now to suggest that a new intellectual agenda is necessary.

My somewhat iconoclastic argument, therefore, is that the small state concept has not turned out to be as fruitful as it might have been for international relations research. But one cannot just it leave it there: it is also important to ask whether or not recent changes in the world order have any implications for the study of small states. The issue can be posed in terms of two questions. The first, basically, is: do post-Cold War conditions-and the decline of the main 'story' concerning the major powers and power politics more generally-lead one to the conclusion that the term is likely to wither away, in much the same way as the concept of 'neutrality'? And, secondly: does the disappearance of the superpowers (or at least the superpower conflict) actually mean the opposite-that there is now going to be more space within which small states can operate more freely?

It might be too early to pass any definite judgement. Obviously, as Buzan and Segal have noted, the great powers appear to have gone 'lite'; that is, they now have little flavour and not much kick.4 Basically, few now respect (or fear) great powers, while great powers themselves seem to have lost the capacity to organise the world around their agenda. The major powers can of course 'export' strength, as the United States demonstrated only too clearly during the Gulf War. On the other hand, they appear to be all at sea, and quite bewildered by what to do and how to behave effectively in a world where raw military power is far less important than being able to compete economically. Moreover, in an increasingly shapeless world economic system, old notions about capabilities have less and less relevance.

If this is the case, then two things could easily follow: firstly, small states might be able to act in a less constrained fashion and with greater flexibility; secondly, in an international system where the very idea of sovereignty itself is under challenge and large multilateral institutions are assuming greater importance (the EU being the most obvious example) small states could, ironically, become more influential. Certainly, given their historical experience of having to adapt to what other larger powers do or say-in the way for instance that Ireland had to adapt to the United Kingdom until recently-they might find it much easier now to adapt to new and challenging conditions. Having none of the 'hang ups' associated with being a large power, small could indeed become a synonym for smart in the post-Cold War era.5

3Niels Amstrup, 'The perennial problem of small states: a survey on research efforts', Cooperation and Conflict 11(3) 1976, 139-63.

4Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, 'The rise of "lite" powers: a strategy for the postmodern state', World Policy Journal 13(3) (1997), 1-10.

-Bengt Sundelius, 'Sverige bortom smistatsbindningen: litet men smart i ett internationaliserat Europa', SOU 132 (1995), 61-85.

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