from last time berkeley defines physical objects as collections of ideas god has ideas which...

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From Last time From Last time Berkeley defines physical Berkeley defines physical objects as collections of ideas objects as collections of ideas God has ideas which constitute God has ideas which constitute objects not perceived by finite objects not perceived by finite beings beings A proof of God’s existence based A proof of God’s existence based on the fact that we do not on the fact that we do not control our perceptual ideas. control our perceptual ideas.

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Page 1: From Last time Berkeley defines physical objects as collections of ideas God has ideas which constitute objects not perceived by finite beings A proof

From Last timeFrom Last time

Berkeley defines physical objects as Berkeley defines physical objects as collections of ideascollections of ideas

God has ideas which constitute objects not God has ideas which constitute objects not perceived by finite beingsperceived by finite beings

A proof of God’s existence based on the A proof of God’s existence based on the fact that we do not control our perceptual fact that we do not control our perceptual ideas.ideas.

Page 2: From Last time Berkeley defines physical objects as collections of ideas God has ideas which constitute objects not perceived by finite beings A proof

Is the mind just a collection of Is the mind just a collection of ideas?ideas?

Hylas says that since we can have no idea of a Hylas says that since we can have no idea of a mind, there is no mind, only ideasmind, there is no mind, only ideas

Philonous rejects this saying that we have a Philonous rejects this saying that we have a notion (not an idea) of our self when we think or notion (not an idea) of our self when we think or will. will.

Do we have introspective awareness of our self Do we have introspective awareness of our self as active? Or is “the self” just a bundle or as active? Or is “the self” just a bundle or collection of distinct ideas?collection of distinct ideas?

Page 3: From Last time Berkeley defines physical objects as collections of ideas God has ideas which constitute objects not perceived by finite beings A proof

How is perceptual error How is perceptual error possible?possible?

All ideas are real.All ideas are real.

But some ideas are more faint than othersBut some ideas are more faint than others

These are the ideas of imaginationThese are the ideas of imagination

Some ideas fail to cohere with other ideasSome ideas fail to cohere with other ideas

These ideas are “false perceptions”These ideas are “false perceptions”

Example: The bent stick in water, hallucinated ants Example: The bent stick in water, hallucinated ants on the flooron the floor

Page 4: From Last time Berkeley defines physical objects as collections of ideas God has ideas which constitute objects not perceived by finite beings A proof

The problem of EvilThe problem of Evil

If God is the author of perceptual ideas, then If God is the author of perceptual ideas, then God is the author of murder etc.God is the author of murder etc.Berkeley replies: Evil is found in the will, and Berkeley replies: Evil is found in the will, and God is not the author of evil intentionsGod is not the author of evil intentionsGuilt is the same whether the action is Guilt is the same whether the action is preformed “with or without an instrument”preformed “with or without an instrument”There might be other spirits who cause There might be other spirits who cause perceptual ideas (although this power is derived perceptual ideas (although this power is derived from Godfrom God

Page 5: From Last time Berkeley defines physical objects as collections of ideas God has ideas which constitute objects not perceived by finite beings A proof

Can God Feel Pain?Can God Feel Pain?

Hylas: if God perceives all our perceptual ideas, Hylas: if God perceives all our perceptual ideas, then God must feel painthen God must feel pain

But feeling pain is an imperfectionBut feeling pain is an imperfection

Berkeley agrees that God cannot feel painBerkeley agrees that God cannot feel pain

God can know what pain is, but not feel itGod can know what pain is, but not feel it

Further: God “perceives nothing by sense as we Further: God “perceives nothing by sense as we do” (p.74)do” (p.74)

Page 6: From Last time Berkeley defines physical objects as collections of ideas God has ideas which constitute objects not perceived by finite beings A proof

Two QuestionsTwo Questions

IF God perceives objects in a non-sensible IF God perceives objects in a non-sensible way, then how is the real physical world way, then how is the real physical world the same world we ordinarily perceive?the same world we ordinarily perceive?

It is possible to know what pain is without It is possible to know what pain is without feeling it?feeling it?

Page 7: From Last time Berkeley defines physical objects as collections of ideas God has ideas which constitute objects not perceived by finite beings A proof

If God perceives things in a way alien to If God perceives things in a way alien to us, then the world, the real world as it is us, then the world, the real world as it is sustained by God, is just as unknowable sustained by God, is just as unknowable as Hylas’ “ material substance” as Hylas’ “ material substance”