FROM FALL WEISS TO FALL GELB Evolution of the Heer – French army

A. POLAND – FALL WEISS TOTAL HEER TROOPS 26th August – 1st September 1939 : 7 Panzerdivisionen, 4 Leichten Divisionen, 4 ID (mot), 3 Gebirgsdivisionen and 87 ID = 105 divisions On 1st September 1939, the German Army is still immature, it lacks equipments and is far from being organized around the Blitzkrieg concept. The chain of command is still very classical and the armored units have not the importance they will gain later in 1940. 5 Korps include motorized units but there is no specific group dedicated to large mechanized operations beyond the tactical level. All the Panzerdivisionen and Leichten-Divisionen are dispersed. Only the 10th Army has in some concentrated mechanized troops, the Panzerwaffe of September 1939 is not directed towards a specific Schwehrpunkt of the front. The Panzerwaffe in Poland is mainly used in localized actions and not in big strategic maneuvers with several Korps working together. The Panzerdivisionen and Leichten Divisionen are then particular because of their fire power and mobility but in Poland their role is not the one they will show the world later. They made no fantastic breakthroughs; some Infanterie Division did as well without being motorized like the 10.ID and the 17.ID (XIII.AK, 8.Armee) which pierced the Polish lines without armored support on 1st - 4th September 1939. On 6th September they had reached Lodz at 150 km from their departure line. The Polish line was weak in that area and the point is not to show that is was easily broken but that the speed of the German advance with or without armor was similar. Only in 1940 on the western front was the Panzerwaffe really used to make deep and fast breakthroughs. The size of the Panzerwaffe is too limited in 1939 and its practical use is not yet well defined, the old school favoring the classical warfare is still powerful in the German high command. Once the breakthroughs achieved, the German units led a classical Kesselschlacht war and the mechanized units were often badly used, completely dispersed, often engaged in urban warfare (the 4.PzD was used to enter in Warsaw in 9th September and had 60 damaged/destroyed tanks in this type of combat not in favour of armored units) and they led often front attacks instead of outflanking their enemy. In the Infanterie Divisionen the men were 20-25 years old in the 1. and 2.Wellen (70 divisions) but sometimes 35-45 years old in the 3. and 4.Wellen (35 divisions), especially in the Landwehr. The training and equipments were very good for the 1. and 2. Wellen but largely insufficient for the 3. and 4.Wellen sometimes issued with WW1 equipments. The German infantry is also massively horse drawn / foot infantry and there is usually 1 motor vehicle for 2 to 6 horses according to the units that are considered. In 1939, this infantry led most of the battles and 42 of the infantry divisions remained to face the West front. In 1939, the German army is still very classical but in maturation and it already includes several innovations like the organization of the Panzerdivisionen :

• The Panzerwaffe formed in 1934 includes in 1939 7 Panzerdivisionen and 4 Leichten-Divisionen (light armored divisions) beside 4 ID (mot). It is the most powerful element of the Heer but only 16% of the tanks are armed with a 3.7cm or a 7.5cm gun, 84% of the tanks are Panzer I, Panzer II or command tanks. At the tactical, mobility and flexibility level the German mechanized units were superior to their Polish opponents in 1939 but the inter-arms cooperation (tank/infantry/artillery/air support) was not yet mature even if already tested on the very basic level in Spain with the Panzer I and several crews.

• The close air support provided by the Ju87s and Hs123s. • The omnipresent tactical air reconnaissance played a major role in Poland and later in France :

spotter aircrafts (Hs126s and Fi156s) were accompanying the troops during their advance to communicate the enemy positions and direct the supports. Reconnaissance squadrons were detached to the Korps, Armee and even sometimes divisions.

• The German tactics with good inter-arms cooperation (tank / aircraft couple, close air support provided by the Ju87s and Hs123s, omnipresent tactical air reconnaissance) were not mature in Poland but they are ready for Fall Gelb. The first large trials with air-ground cooperation were to be held in Grafenwöhr training area 21st - 25th August 1939, but cancelled due to the oncoming war. Therefore, in September 1939 the Germans had no new Blitzkrieg tactics to use. Later, in France, Greece and Yugoslavia, Blitzkrieg tactics were used. In Poland the battle turned into something that greatly resembled the Kesselschlachten from World War I even if more motorized. On the other hand, the so-called "Blitzkrieg" proper was revealed later to the Allies.

POLISH ARMY 1939 • 39 infantry divisions, 11 cavalry brigades, 2 motorized cavalry brigades and independent units • 998 AFVs (324 tanks, 574 tankettes and 100 armored cars) • About 3500 field artillery pieces • About 400 planes 1) Infantry 30 infantry divisions + 9 reserve infantry divisions Each with : 3 infantry regiments 1 light artillery regiment 1 heavy artillery battalion (12 pieces) 1 engineer battalion 1 signal company 1 AA battery (4 guns) Each infantry regiment contains : 3x infantry battalions 1x MG battalion

Total : 84 infantry regiments + 6 mountain infantry regiments 2) Cavalry 11 cavalry brigades Each with : 3 to 4 cavalry regiments 1 light artillery squadron (12-16 pieces) 1 AA squad (2 guns) 1 engineer company several service units Each cavalry regiment contains : 4x squadron 1x MG company several service units

Total : about 40 cavalry regiments (27 uhlan, 10 mounted rifles and 3 light horse) 3) Armored units 2 motorized cavalry brigades, each with : 2x 2 motorized cavalry regiments 1x Vickers light tank company 2x reconnaissance TK tankettes company 1x AT battalion Independent units : 2x 7TP tank battalions 2x 7TP tank companies 1x Renault R35 battalion (evacuated to Romania, didn't fight) 3x FT17 tank companies 11 cavalry brigades and 18 infantry divisions had also 1 recon company with WZ armored cars or TK, TKS or TKF tankettes. Total : 50x Renault R35 (37mm SA18 gun) 3x Hotchkiss H35 tank (37mm SA18 gun) 135x 7TP (20 with two MG-armed turrets, 115 with a good 37mm Bofors gun) 102x FT17 (about 70 with a French 37mm SA18 gun)

34x Vickers tanks (47mm Vickers QF gun) 574x TK, TKS or TKF tankettes (24 TKS tankettes were armed with 20mm wz.38 FK-A gun) 100x armored cars (of those were armed with the French 37mm SA18 gun : 6 Peugeot, 30 armored

halftracks Citroën-Kégresse wz.28, 10 armored car wz.29 close to the French Laffly 50AM, 30 armored cars wz.34 based on a Citroën-Kégresse chassis).

That makes a total of 998 AFVs including 371 AFVs armed with 20mm, 37mm or 47mm guns (271 of the tanks, 24 of the tankettes and 76 of the armored cars). 4) Artillery Apart from the divisional artillery there were also 23x heavy artillery groups 3x super heavy artillery groups 20x siege artillery platoons The AT artillery is present as - platoons in the cavalry brigades - companies in the infantry regiments Total : Field Artillery : 24x 65mm wz.06 French mountain guns 1230x Schneider 75mm wz.97 guns (also used in AT role) – Buffetaut indicates 1374 guns 466x 75mm Mle1902 Russian guns 900x 100mm Skoda howitzers 242x Schneider 105mm guns (118 wz.13 and 124 wz.29) – Buffetaut indicates 254 guns 38x De Bange 120mm guns (32 wz.78/09/31 and 6 wz.78/10/31) with trail from Russian 6" howitzer) –

Buffetaut indicates 43 guns 340x Schneider 155mm wz.17 French howitzers – Buffetaut indicates 340 guns too 27x very heavy 220 mm mortars AT artillery : 1200x 37mm Bofors guns AA artillery : 306x 40mm Bofors guns 72x 75mm Bofors guns 84x Schneider 75mm wz.1897/25 French AA guns 12x Schneider 75mm wz.1918/24 French AA guns on De Dion-Bouton cars (self-propelled AA guns) 2x Schneider 75mm wz.1917 French AA guns POLISH LOSSES : 200,000 losses (66,300 KIA, 133,700 WIA and MIA) (an about 200,000 civilian killed by bombings) 787,000 prisoners 188 aircrafts + many escaped to Rumania ENGAGED BY GERMANY • About 63 divisions • 2771 tanks (16% of the tank armed with a 3.7cm or a 7.5cm gun) • About 5000 field artillery pieces • About 3000 planes GERMAN LOSSES : 40,390 losses (13,110 KIA, 27,280 MIA and WIA) + Soviets (2953 KIA) 285 aircrafts definitely destroyed (+ 279 damaged ones) 236 tanks definitely destroyed (8.5% of the engaged tanks)

B. THE PHONEY WAR Between 1920 and 1927, France made military agreements with Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia but in 1938 the situation had considerably evolved :

• Belgium is completely neutral • Czechoslovakia is seen as too weak to counter any German or even Italian attack. It is in trouble

because of the German minorities in the Sudetes and France doesn't really count anymore with it. • Romania is between Hungary and Bulgaria and is not really in a situation to be an ally but French

armaments are being delivered to Romania (Renault R35 tanks, 105mm field guns, Brandt mortars etc.)

• Poland appears then as the last possible ally. The French intelligence services noted weaknesses about the Polish Army in their reports :

o insufficient instruction of the NCOs o tactical doctrines not adapted to modern warfare o insufficient ammunition and equipment o war industry too weak

But they also noted good points like the instruction of the officers and the ardent patriotism. Poland is seen as a good ally but it is unsure if Poland will fight with the French troops at this time.

During this time, French politicians are also trying very slowly to cooperate with the Soviets in the simple aim to isolate Germany but the latter choose to support Hitler. Nonetheless in 1938, the French Army on its side doesn't see a possible alliance with the Soviets at all. At the beginning of WW2 it is intended to send an allied expeditionary force in Finland ... but the intervention takes finally place later in Norway in 1940 with British, French and Polish soldiers. In February 1938, the British Army has only 6 active divisions and 11 reserve divisions. Great Britain doesn't want to be involved in the coming war and before October 1938 is not implicated in the rearmament programs beside France. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax indicated (as noted by Georges Bonnet) that a ground involvement in continental Europe by the British Army is purely hypothetical and could at the moment only reach 2 incomplete divisions. Therefore by end 1938 the single allied ground troops that could help France against Germany are those from the Polish army and 2 British divisions. At that time the involvement of Poland is nevertheless also seen very hypothetical because of the foreign policy of colonel Beck. The perception from the French high command about the French troops in 1938 is also not very good, many armaments and divisions are lacking, the war industry is insufficient etc. but the clash with Germany is not expected before 1941 (in the worst case for end 1940). France was not prepared at all to enter in a war in 1939 and many types of equipment will lack in 1940. In 1938-1939, France feels roughly alone to face Germany on the continent and is very cautious. This will be illustrated by the decisions taken in 1939. During the Phoney war the French and German armies didn't remain completely inactive. France and Great-Britain declared war to Germany after the invasion of Poland but at first this is mainly a political gesture. The French attack on the Sarre area in 1939 is very limited and is much more a probe than a full scale offensive. Such an offensive could in no case be launched at that time. Even engaging all the peacetime units in north-east France would not have been sufficient and there would remain no troops to cover the mobilization of the reserve divisions. The Saar attack was launched on 7th September 1939, 4 days only after France declared war to Germany. The Sarre area is the single area where the probe could be launched. The neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium made this 180 km border (from the Rhine to Luxembourg) the single area were French and Germans were in direct contact. The combats by themselves were not really intense; they looked often more like traps, ambushes, a bit like guerrilla warfare against the cautiously advancing French troops. The Germans let only active rearguards units and a huge number of AT and AP mines everywhere. The French troops are for the first time confronted to huge quantities of AP and AT mines. These weapons (especially the AP mines) are rather new and the soldiers don't really know how to deal with so many mines. All the reports insist on the numerous mines hidden everywhere even AP mines in the trees. There were nonetheless losses (the French 21e DI alone for example had 329 losses) on both sides and the French captured also German troops. In front of the French troops in the sector of the Moselle the reinforcement of the German front is a reality :

• 28th August 1939 : 6 divisions • 6th September 1939, after France declared war and just before the French move : 12 divisions • 12th September 1939 : 14-16 divisions • 20th September 1939 : 18-20 divisions

So yes the Germans moved additional troops to this part of the border against the French troops but of course it was far from sufficient to help the Polish troops. This first French attack was before all political but it had to be said that general Weygand is guilty of having told the Polish HQ that a major offensive was currently launched. The French politicians are also guilty for having a foreign policy completely incompatible with the insufficient means they allowed to the French Army (whose modernization and reorganization had roughly just begun). Later operations were intended (e.g. an attack was planned on Sarrelouis on 22nd September 1939) but had no justification at all since Poland was already defeated. The Polish collapse was faster than initially believed. The French HQ thought that Poland would resist at least 6 months. France needed 15 days to fully mobilize but launched the operations in the Sarre 4 days only after the declaration of war. If France was to have launched a full scale offensive 15 days after it declared war this would have been around 18th September 1939 at the earliest. This was 4 days after the Polish government had opened negotiations on the terms of its flight to Rumania and the same day that it and its military High Command fled their own country and ordered all their forces to head for neutral borders. The rapid collapse of Poland left France in a very exposed position. France remained in 1939 roughly alone to face Germany, which had nearly twice its metropolitan population (including Germans from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland etc.). Germany had also at that time a pact with the Soviets (which led to strikes and some sabotages organized by communists in France to target the French military industry). The Belgian and Dutch neighbours were at that time neutral; they did not allow the French troops to deploy on their territory before an invasion and had rather tiny armies. The British could eventually put only 4-5 divisions into Europe in September 1939 and would take 2 years to field a continental-scale army. The French were very cautious in September 1939, but one can see why. The evolution of the German army from 1939 to 1940 shows that the French HQ had really reasons to be cautious. Not ready in 1939 and also unable to really match the innovations in terms of organization of the German army in 1940. The modernization of the French army (in all the fields like the bombers for example) should have enabled to be at level with the new German army in 1941 but the Germans attacked earlier. What the Polish asked for before all was air support and allied bombings. Everyone studying the state of the French Air Force in 1938-1939 knows that at that time nothing could be done for that. Even around Sedan on 14th May 1940 only about 30 French bombers could be engaged ! On 3rd September 10 British light bombers dropped propaganda tracts over Germany and on 4th September there is the first British bombing mission with several planes over the naval base at Heligoland (5 Blenheim bombers were lost). The first combat involving fighters takes place on 8th September 1939 between French Curtiss H75s and German Me109s with 2 German aircrafts reported shot down. The same day a Mureaux 115 (observation aircraft) is lost over Karlsruhe. During September 1939, 24 German aircrafts, 27 British aircrafts and 30 French aircrafts were shot down. In total, between September 1939 and April 1940, 176 German aircrafts were lost for 82 British and 57 French ones (= 139 allied aircrafts). Concerning the ground operations during the Phoney War, except the Sarre limited actions, they consisted in ambushes and deep patrols behind enemy lines. The German "Stosstruppen" and the French "Corps Francs" launched many deep reconnaissance patrols, prepared ambushes, took prisoners etc. behind the enemy lines. There were also artillery battles etc. The so-called Phoney War was not a completely quiet period of time and had its number of killed and wounded men. Concerning the French Navy in 1939 there were several small actions :

• German freighter "Chemnitz" : captured by the submarine "Poncelet" on 28th September 1939 • German submarine U-49 : heavily damaged by torpedo boat "Siroco" on 20th November 1939 • German merchantmen "Halle" (scuttled) and "Santa Fe" (captured) : found by a joint Franco-British

group including "Dupleix" cruiser, counter-torpedo boat "Le Terrible" and counter-torpedo boat "Le Fantasque" on 25th November 1939

• German freighter "Trifels" : captured by French auxiliary cruiser "Koutoubia" in November 1939. Fall Weiss allowed testing some Blitzkrieg principles at the tactical level and the German HQ wanted to upscale this concept. The Germans did more than replace losses between the Polish and French campaigns. They created 50 new divisions and improved their army in terms of equipments, chain of command and doctrine. The 8 months of the Phoney war gave them the time to adapt and develop the German army. In September 1939 on the western front, France + BEF + Belgium + Netherlands together could align 125 divisions, but the Dutch and Belgians were still neutral ! The Heer with its 105 divisions had nonetheless to increase its size and power.

• At the eve of Fall Gelb there are 155 German divisions available (136 engaged), including 2 Waffen-SS motorized divisions instead of 105 divisions (63 engaged) in September 1939. The 4 Leichten-Divisionen have been converted into Panzerdivisionen (created in 1936, these Leichten-Divisionen were based on the model of the French DLM. After Fall Weiss, the 1., 2., 3. and 4. Leichten-Divisionen became the 6., 7., 3. and 4. Panzerdivisionen) and the 5. PzD has been created. The German army in May 1940 had therefore 10 Panzerdivisionen, 6 motorized infantry divisions and 1 newly created cavalry division.

• The armored units were better armed in 1940 than in 1939 : more tanks were armed with 3.7cm and 7.5cm guns (16% - 452 tanks - in Poland and 36% - 955 tanks - in France). The tanks used in 1940 were also far better armored : more Panzer IV Ausf. A/B in Poland and more Panzer IV Ausf.C/D in France, early and lightly armored Panzer III in Poland and Panzer III E/F in France, at the time of the 1940 western campaign also most of the Panzer II had been uparmored.

• The 3. and 4. Wellen Infanterie Divisionen from the Polish campaign were largely improved, younger men were enlisted and the equipment was modernized. In 1940, 15 of these divisions were frontline units.

• The chain of command is also modified and modernized. During Fall Weiss, the German army lacked some specific HQ especially for armored units. The chain of command was still very traditional. For Fall Gelb a new, more flexible chain of command was developed and could already be used during operation Weserübung.

C. FALL GELB (10th May – 25th June) TOTAL HEER TROOPS 10th May – 25th June 1940 : 10 PzD, 4 ID (mot), 1 Kav.Div., 3 Gebirgsdivisionen, 126 ID and 7 Landesschützen Divisionen + Waffen SS motorized divisions : SS Totenkopf (mot), SS Verfügung (mot) + 11th motorized brigade

155 divisions A complete new HQ and ad-hoc structure is created with Gruppe Kleist for the initial phase, on the basis of the XXII.Armee Korps (mot.) HQ. Gruppe Kleist includes 3 motorized corps directed toward the Schwehrpunkt of the Ardennes. They contain 3 motorized infantry divisions and 5 of the 10 Panzerdivisionen. Unlike in Poland, the mechanized elements are well concentrated and have a real strategic role. They are well supported by the VIII.Fliegerkorps concentrating all the 300 Ju87 dive bombers and 42 Hs123 assault biplanes. The 5.PzD and 7.PzD of the XV.Armee Korps (mot.) are only several kilometers north of Gruppe Kleist. Therefore 7 Panzerdivisonen are concentrated against the weak area of the Ardennes. In the area of the Meuse River, more than 1,500 aircrafts are concentrated to support the German assaults. It is the very first time in History that such armored and air support forces are concentrated on such a small area. In 4 days and 170 km, Gruppe Kleist crossed the Ardennes and established a bridgehead beyond the Meuse River. The Channel is reached on 20th May 1940, trapping many allied units. Fall Gelb is also the first operation seeing the extensive use of the ad-hoc formations called Kampfgruppen : inter-arms cooperation at the tactical level to quickly give an answer to an evolving situation. These formations give a superior adaptability to the German army. The French army will be able to organize such units in June when leaving the obsession of trying all the time to reorganize a continuous front and rather organizing inter-arms strongpoints. Another decisive element during Fall Gelb is the so-called "Auftragstaktik" giving a big autonomy and individual initiative to the subaltern officers. The operations were also often led by high ranking officers going directly on the frontline to have a real idea of what was happening on the field. This way of thinking the command tasks was at first introduced by general von Seeckt (commander of the Heeresleitung from 1919 to 1926). The chain of command is therefore less centralized and more flexible whereas in Poland, if the roots of the change were already there, the command structures were very traditional. Add to that the important communication means (many radio sets), a well organized logistics and you have a powerful army. During the initial phase of Fall Gelb, the Germans used also extensively airborne troops (paratroopers and glider troops) and commandos (in German uniforms, in allied uniforms or in civilian clothes – Brandenburger commandos, assault engineers or elite infantry of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment etc.). Such a concentration of commandos and airborne troops having a real strategic role is probably also a first time in History. For all these reasons, the 1940 western campaign can be seen as the best example of the so-called Blitzkrieg. It still worked later against Greece and Yugoslavia but it couldn't work anymore in Russia which

was too big. In Poland it was much more a classical Kesselschlacht and the too weak Leichten-Divisionen had been after that transformed in Panzerdivisionen. For Fall Gelb, a large faked attack was undertaken in Belgium and in the Netherlands with airborne troops (paratroopers and glider troops), commandos and special assault engineers, which were used to secure important points, to capture bridges or to rapidly neutralize fortifications like the Belgian fort of Eben Emael. The best French and British units were sent in Belgium and in the Netherlands. The main German forces, (concentrating 7 armored divisions out of 10 and 3 motorized infantry divisions) attacked in an unexpected area, the Ardennes. They pushed on almost without concern for their flanks, leaving the cleaning up to the infantry. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe attacked as support for the Panzers and the infantry. The Polish army fought very bravely with less means than the French army and no ally but too often I have heard that the Germans suffered more losses in Poland than in France, or that the French army didn't fought and ran to surrender which is totally wrong. The German equipments, organization and tactics were also superior in May 1940 than in September 1939 which seems to be easily forgotten. The Polish army suffered roughly 200,000 losses in 36 days (5555 per day) and the French army about 300,000 losses in 45 days (6667 per day), both have fought bravely and Poland was attacked during the same time by the Soviets (France at the end of June by the Italians). The idea that France did not fight is just false, it was defeated in shame because quickly for the country as it was seen in 1939, yes, but the soldiers were courageous and died too for their homeland. In 1940, in 45 days, the French army lost about 100,000 KIA on the battlefield. In the same time the Germans lost 45,000 KIA. Despite lacks in the high command, the French soldiers did resist to the enemy each time they were well commanded on the front. ENGAGED BY GERMANY • 136 divisions (10 Panzerdivisionen, 6 motorized infantry divisions : 2.ID (mot), 13.ID (mot), 20.ID (mot),

29.ID (mot), SS Totenkopf (mot), SS Verfügung (mot), 1 cavalry division partly motorized, 120 of the infantry divisions and the 11th motorized brigade)

• About 3900 aircrafts (including 1215 fighters, 1100 bombers, 350 attack planes, 600 observation planes, 450 transport and about 200 various long reconnaissance aircrafts)

• About 7500 field artillery pieces • 2636 tanks, 167 SP guns and 917 armored cars = 3720 AFVs GERMAN AND ITALIAN LOSSES (whole western campaign until the end of the battle of France) : 156,492 losses (27,074 KIA, 111,034 WIA, 18,384 MIA). This first figure established on 25th June 1940 has been corrected later to 45,218 German KIA (with the MIAs) + 111,034 WIA. 6100 Italian losses in the French Alps in a few days (642 KIAs, 2691 WIAs, 2151 frozen men and 616 POWs) 1236 planes definitely destroyed (+ 323 damaged) + Italian losses against the French air force 839 tanks definitely destroyed (32% of the 2636 tanks engaged) ENGAGED BY FRANCE • At the beginning of the 1940 western campaign, there are 83 French divisions in the north-east area (3

DLMs, 3 DCRs, 5 DLCs, 72 infantry divisions and 4 cavalry brigades). The 6 DCR/DLM armored divisions were never the equivalent in power and combined arms than a Panzerdivision. They had only about 160 tanks against about 250-320 for each Panzerdivisionen. There are also 10 British divisions (BEF), 22 Belgian divisions (but their real men strength corresponds only to 12 divisions) and 8 Dutch divisions. The allied had therefore a strength of 123 divisions (113 with the real strength of the Belgian divisions) to face a total of 136 German divisions. There are the equivalent of 13 French divisions on the Maginot line and 6 French divisions initially left to face the Italians. The German operations launched on 10th May 1940 enable to encircle 13 French infantry divisions, 3 French armoured divisions (DLM), 13 Belgian and 9 British divisions in the north on 23rd May. On 27th May the British evacuation plan is ready and the War Office tells Lord Gort that "his single duty is now to evacuate to Great Britain as much troops as possible". On 28th May morning the Belgian army surrenders. To defend the 500 km of the so-called "Weygand Line", from the North Sea to the Rhine, there remains only 63 divisions (59 French, 2 Polish depending from the French army and 2 British divisions) to stop 136 German ones, including 10 Panzerdivisionen, 6 motorized infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division. With such means only a frontline on the Somme and Aisne Rivers can be defended. Mathematically the campaign is lost, but the French troops will offer a fierce resistance during June 1940, inflicting heavy losses to the Germans and later during a few days in the Alps to the Italians who declared war to an already beaten opponent.

• About 1,400 frontline aircrafts available (650 fighters, 240 bombers and 490 reconnaissance and observation)

• About 10,000 field artillery pieces

• 2822 tanks but only 2352 "modern" ones and 609 armored cars (in fact 330 armored cars and 279 light reconnaissance tanks) = 3431 (2961) AFVs. Except 960 tanks in big mechanized units, all the French tanks were dispersed on the whole front in various battalions and several independent companies. On the German side all the tanks were in the 10 Panzerdivisionen.

FRENCH LOSSES : 302,000 losses (90,000 - 100,000 KIA and 212,000 - 202,000 WIA) 1,450,000 POWs … including 1,100,000 who surrendered between the 18th and 25th June due to the order of armistice of the French government of Pétain, the others 350,000 were captured during the previous battles. 892 aircrafts About 2500 AFVs including enemy fire, abandoned vehicles due to mechanical breakdowns or lack of fuel (vehicles often scuttled) Concerning the Maginot line in the north-east, 45 'ouvrages' (defense works) out of 53 and 130 'casemates' were still fighting on 25th June. Many surrendered only during the first week of July 1940. Allied losses according to Karl-Heinz Frieser (Oberst Bundeswehr, MFGA) in his book "Blitzkrieg Legende" and Gérard Saint-Martin in "L'arme blindée française" : • Belgian losses (19 days) : 7,500 KIA, 15,850 WIA • Luxembourg : no resistance except French troops meeting German ones • Dutch losses (6 days) : 2,890 KIA, 6,889 WIA • British losses : 3,457 KIA, 13,602 WIA, 3,267 MIA (and about 28,000 POWs, 64,000 various vehicles lost including mostly all the 592 tanks, 20,000 motorcycles and 2,500 guns) • French losses in 45 days : 100,000 KIA and about 202,000 WIA (other common sources indicate 120,000 "fallen for France" but this figure includes beside the KIA the POWs who died in German hospitals or camps as well as some civilians KIA – roughly about 90,000-100,000 French troops died during Fall Gelb). The Swiss historian Eddy Bauer says also that the Germans lost much more men in the second part of the western campaign, in France the resistance was harder when time advanced. 156,492 German losses (KIA, MIA, WIA) in 45 days, that's 3477 losses per day but in fact the French resistance was all days harder : 2499 German losses per day between the 10th May and the 3rd June but 4762 German losses per day between the 5th and the 24th June. You can compare that to the 4506 German losses per day during operation Barbarossa from 22nd June to 10th December 1941. Once again the western campaign was much more deadly than the common myth admits it. As a comparison, in 1941 the Soviet army had roughly 158 divisions, 17,500 AFVs, 12,000 aircrafts. This army confronted to the Germans retreated from 1,000 km (compare that to the size of France) in 7 weeks from 22nd June to 9th August 1941. The Soviets lost 3,500,000 men (KIA, MIA, WIA and POWs), 11,000 AFVs and 9,500 aircrafts. During the first 5 months on the eastern front, the Germans lost some 71,000 KIA, 138,000 WIA, 1,300 tanks and 660 aircrafts. Statistically, in only 6 weeks the French army and its allies inflicted heavier losses to the German army, although many still think the French didn't fight. Here are several examples of German losses against French troops : During the battles of Hannut / Gembloux in Belgium 12-15th May 1940, the Germans suffered very heavy losses among their tanks. In Hannut some 164 German tanks were knocked out and in Gembloux the French artillery alone destroyed about 50 German tanks, including 32 in the Pz.Rgt.35. On 15th May, the 4.PzD had only 137 operational available tanks left (including only 4 Panzer IV) from its 331 tanks. So there were 194 tanks damaged, under recovery/repair or destroyed after the battles of Hannut and Gembloux (only 41 % operational tanks). On 16th May : • The 4.PzD had about 55% operational tanks = 182 available tanks. Therefore 45 extra operational tanks

than on 15th May. But 149 tanks remained unavailable, this number is including destroyed tanks and tanks in the repair workshops.

• The 3.PzD had 75% operational tanks. Therefore about 85 tanks are still destroyed or in the repair workshops one day after the battles.

On 16th May 1940, one day after the battles, 234 tanks (35% of the tanks) were not operational anymore, including an unknown number of definitively destroyed tanks. General Hoepner estimated that he was unable to continue efficiently the combats the next day. The Germans repaired probably some more of their tanks during the later days or weeks while the French could not recover the 105 tanks they had left in Hannut.

The area of the Mont Dieu woods was held by the French troops facing German assault from 14th to 25th May. During this time there were important battles in Stonne, Les Grandes Armoises, Tannay and Le Chesne. During these battles the French lost about 3,000 men including about 1,000 KIA. The German losses were even higher, serious studies estimate them 3 times higher. From 17th to 31st May, the German 24.ID had 1,490 losses (347 KIA, 1,086 WIA and 57 MIA). From 17th to 25th May the 1st battalion of the German 79.IR sustained 191 losses (41 KIA, 144 WIA and 6 MIA) near the Mont Damion. Most of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment losses of the 1940 Western campaign were around Stonne with 570 losses (KIA, WIA, MIA). On 25th June the "Grossdeutschland" regiment had lost 1108 men. In front of Abbeville (during 3 counter-attacks between 27th May and 5th June) the Germans sustained about 2000-2500 KIAs + WIAs and 400 POWs but also most of the vehicles, AT guns, AA guns, HMGs and mortars of the 57.ID were destroyed or captured. A whole battalion (III/IR.217) was wiped out in one attack of the 4e DCR in Huppy. Several German companies were reduced to only about 20-30 men. But the French troops lost a lot of tanks during this battle. On 5th June, the German XIV.Panzerkorps (9.PzD, 10.PzD, 13.ID (mot), 9.ID and "Grossdeutschland" regiment) assaults the French positions south of Amiens on the Somme River. The 14-20 km front (including the plateau of Dury) is hold by the 16e DI supported by 2 companies (26 Renault R35 tanks) of the 12e BCC. More than 400 German tanks and about 64,000 men are launched against about 18,000 French troops and 26 tanks. The French troops are organized in strongpoints in the towns and woods on a depth of about 10 km sometimes. These hedgehogs include infantry, HMGs, 25mm and 47mm AT guns, 75mm field guns used in AT role, AT mines etc. for a 360° defense. The advancing German tanks are rapidly cut from their supporting infantry and confronted on the rears to French 75mm, 105mm and 155mm artillery batteries engaging them in direct fire. On 8th and 9th June the 16e DI rears are reinforced by the 24e DI. After 5 days the German operation is stopped in that area, it failed and the Germans sustained heavy losses. The XIV.Panzerkorps is then moved and engaged behind the XVI.Panzerkorps in Péronne. The German troops lost 196 destroyed or damaged tanks, including many definitively destroyed ones especially against French artillery batteries firing directly on the enemy tanks. The 2 French divisions have lost 60-70% of their strength but they stopped a Panzerkorps. Unlike in Gembloux the French troops had no strong artillery support since the artillery was mainly engaged in direct fire missions. After this battle the number of operational tanks of the XIV.Panzerkorps dropped transiently to 45%. During the 9th and 10th June, several German divisions were roughly handled by the French troops, especially on the Aisne River. • the French 36e DI captured 714 German POWs • the 14e DI captured about 800 Germans POWs and many assaults were defeated • the 2e DI captured about 500 German POWs • at the same time, the German 36.ID and 299.ID Divisions lost some 2,500 men while fighting the French

6e DI. • the German 58.ID lost 1,600 men, while attacking the French 1e DIC. During operation Tiger against the Maginot line in the Sarre area on 14th June. The German troops lost 1,200 KIA and 4,000 WIA during this single day. During operation Kleiner Bär against the Maginot line in Alsace on 15th June 1940, the Germans lost 766 KIA, 2,567 WIA and 117 MIA. The French fought very well as companies, battalions and often as divisions but generally horribly as armies when facing the best German mechanized corps because they were too fast ... organization,, doctrine (conception and use of tanks), communication issues etc. The French Army didn't loose because of a lack of equipment (though a high lack of radios, modern fighters, bombers, especially AA weapons and AA ammunitions) and its armament was as good as the German one (sometimes better), the reasons are both the doctrine at the military level and several political decisions as well as the German innovations. The French tanks were trained to support the infantry but most of the infantry (except the infantry of the mechanized and motorized units) was not well trained to cooperate with the tanks. It would also be wrong to depict the French officers as being not respected ; it was not the case in most of the units where these officers were the single reason for the unit not to collapse under the German pressure. If indeed some generals were totally obsolete, mostly all the lieutenants, captains, colonels and many generals had the will to fight and were well formed. Many of the officers, especially of ranks higher than captain were WW1 veterans and experienced heavy shelling and bloody fight before.

The German army is far from being better than the French army in many cases. The idea of a total superiority (kind of racial superiority) of the men themselves is a myth still propagated today. The bulk of the French army (the reserve units) was generally not prepared psychologically for the war, but the German soldier of May 1940 had in general not a better morale or training than the French one. Most Germans were afraid of this war and the Phoney War also had effects on the German morale. Except for the mechanized units planned for the main effort, which were heavily trained and told that their mission was of high importance, the morale and preparation of the German soldiers were not better than for the French soldiers. From 1935 on, the Wehrmacht is always more politicized and the influence of the paramilitary youth organizations is growing. The whole German society is slowly militarized and influenced by the Nazi propaganda. Unlike these best motorized German troops, the French soldiers didn't fought fanatically for their country or their "Führer", but simply for their comrades, platoon or company commander The initial successes boosted quickly the German morale, hiding the lack of quality of many second line units (which could be compared to French B-divisions). When talking about the German army of 1940, too many people still imagine an army only composed of powerful mechanized/motorized units with first class armaments. The French army had 400,000 motorized vehicles (more or less equivalent to the German army, the small US army at the same time for example had 12,000 vehicles). In fact if there are "two" French armies (active and reserve kind of units), there are also "two" German armies : the mechanized one (Panzerdivisionen and motorized units), strongly supported by the Luftwaffe, created and designed to be a strategic and independent arm in 1940 ... and the majority of the German army : foot infantry, with horse drawn units, closer to the army of 1918 like the French basic infantry units. The German had also reserve units, not only first wave units, concerning the tanks, the Panzer I and Panzer II couldn't really hurt the French tanks and there were still MG08/15, not MG34s everywhere etc. Everyone seems to believe the Germans had the better basic soldier training and tougher soldiers than others. The basic training for a soldier was more or less the same as in all other countries. What can you teach a recruit ? How he handles his weapon, how he follows orders, how he uses his equipment, train his fitness etc. The myth that the Waffen-SS had a different basic training than the Heer comes also up frequently. The only differences are that the treatment in the Waffen-SS was more inhumane and "hard" than in the Heer. They tried harder to break the will of the recruits with more senseless punishments and drills. In 1940 the size of the Waffen-SS is also rather limited. Many German veterans also say they never fired more than 10 life rounds during training. Some of them also say they never fired a single one before the first engagements of 1940. The real difference in quality and combat effectiveness were factors like combined arms actions, officers' corps, experience etc. The British tanks except the Matilda II were all too lightly armored and the crew inexperienced. All the British light tanks could be easily penetrated even by the German 2.0cm guns which were not efficient against the French tanks. Some of these British tanks were fast but they did not use this potential advantage to hit and run. As described by German testimonies in Abbeville for example : while fired on, the British tanks generally just stopped to fire or to regroup, allowing the German AT gunners to concentrate easily on sitting ducks. The French tanks at least, even the lighter ones, had the luck to have a 40mm thick armor. The counter-attack in Arras involved 60 Matilda I and 16 Matilda II but also 60 French tanks (45 Hotchkiss H35 of the 13e BCC and 15 Hotchkiss H39 + Somua S35 of the 3e DLM). It is rather a tactical failure with an advance of only 3 km and heavy losses for the British before retreating : 62% of the tanks (47 tanks), about 50% in the infantry and 75% of the reconnaissance vehicles (16 armored cars). The French troops covering the right flank were soon confronted to direct 10.5cm artillery and Flak fire as well as Pak and tanks. They were even fired at by British AT guns. They destroyed at least 3 Panzer IV and 6 Pz38(t) from the Pz.Rgt.25 when covering the retreat of the British troops. The French lost about 20 tanks and the Germans about 20 tanks during the battle of Arras. The 3rd RTR (48 tanks of the 1st AD) was completely lost in Calais without achieving anything. The first attack on Abbeville was led by the 1st AD, which lost 120 tanks out of 165 (73% losses), the attack failed in only 2 hours. Most of the remaining British tanks were simply abandoned or lost due to mechanical breakdowns and could not be recovered and repaired in front of the advancing German troops. The 1940 British army shared the same weaknesses as the bulk of the contemporary French one like the inability to wage mobile battles, slow-thinking command, poor communications and intelligence. The British did no better job in May/June 1940 than the French army. They were beaten the same way and led their battles more or less according to the same tactics of infantry support. On the other hand, the ability to conduct static defense was good, as in the French army. The BEF generally looks better because that is the kind of battles that it ended up fighting, and because they had not to face the main shock of the German attack, but when you look at the details you find that British units were behaving in much the same way as equivalent French ones. Of course, the British equivalent of B reserve divisions hadn't left Britain and remained unengaged.

In 1914, Germany had faced France, Russia and a larger BEF than was available in 1939. In 1918, Germany had no second front but there were over 60 Commonwealth divisions in France and US divisions were also arriving. In 1940, the British were saying "thank God for the French army" (which was smaller than it had been in 1914) and both they and the French forced themselves to believe the views of WWI. There isn't really a morale issue in the French army in 1940, not more than in the British army when Churchill was asking "will they ever fight ?" of the British troops by May 1941 after they had been kicked out of Cyrenaica and Crete by inferior numbers of Germans. This doesn't mean that there was a morale problem with the British army at the time. There was a doctrine problem, and a command problem. The same goes for the French army, a big majority of good soldiers but a doctrine/command issue. Elements of the French army panicked and didn't fight to the last - which is quite true considering the B divisions in the Ardennes but it would be wrong to generalize that to the whole French army. Generalizing the state of morale before April/May 1940 for example ignores the huge boost once the war became a readily understandable one, e.g. defense of national territory against foreign aggression. So this shows that the problems with morale were associated with the Phoney War and the regime's inability to deal with it, it wasn't an inherent feature of the French army or nation. As to the failure to put things in perspective, it bears repeating that the British essentially constructed a narrative that went "our fine troops went to Belgium, had to withdraw due to our inept allies collapsing all around us, but fortunately the Navy brought out the Miracle of Dunkirk". But that is not the whole truth : at the tactical level, there were many cases of British troops "withdrawing" but ending up farther than intended and without most of their equipment, as well as the same kind of shortcomings experienced by the French (essentially slow reaction time). The BEF was sometimes more successful than the bulk of French army, because most of the fighting (except the first attack of Abbeville and the battle of Arras) in which it was involved consisted of static defense against frontal attacks. The French did also well in such situations, except at Sedan, but the BEF never faced a Sedan-like situation. On the Meuse River, 7 French infantry divisions (5e DIM, 18e DI, 22e DI, 61e DI, 102e DIF, 55e DI and 71e DI) largely incomplete and lacking armament and equipments (sometimes no AA guns like for the 55e DI and 71e DI which had also respectively only 12 and 8 AT guns instead of 62) have to defend an overstretched front, from Houx to Sedan. Each French division has to defend a 15-30 km front, whereas an infantry division should theoretically defend a 5-7 km front only. They will have to face 7 Panzerdivisionen (1762 tanks), 3 motorized infantry division and the elite "Grossdeutschland" regiment on 13th May. These 10 German divisions are followed by 26 infantry divisions and 1 mountain infantry division. The German assault is supported by 1500 aircrafts concentrated on a small area during hours. These two concentrations (tanks and aircrafts) are a first time in History. The French troops can only rely on very insufficient and largely unachieved fortifications. The Maginot Line by itself is indeed stopping at the border with the Luxembourg. This doesn't mean that the BEF was better, just that it was in a more favorable position. Some French armies have as good a 1940 record as the BEF. Dunkirk and the evacuation of the BEF would probably not have been possible without the successes of the French troops especially the cavalry corps in Belgium and in Cambrai which delayed the Germans enough and without the stiff French resistance around Lille, which blocked 7 German divisions. From 28th May to 1st June, about 40,000 French troops led by general Molinié (also commander of the 25e DIM) held about 800 German tanks and 110,000 soldiers from the 4.PzD, 5.PzD, 7.PzD, 7.ID, 217.ID, 253.ID and 267.ID. The French troops are composed of various more or less complete units. These French troops fought encircled until all their ammunition was used and led several counter-attacks, the commander of 253.ID, general Kühne, was even captured. The Germans let the defenders parade in the streets after the battle granted them the honors of war to salute their fierce resistance. Even Churchill in his memories recognized the role of the troops in Lille. The ground defense of the Dunkirk pocket itself was mostly in French hands (100,000 French and 20,000 British troops on 30th May; only French troops after the 1st June). The priority of the British HQ is to evacuate as fast and as much as possible. The French HQ priority is to fight as long as possible to gain time for the troops, which will face all the regrouped German troops on the Aisne and Somme Rivers after Dunkirk. This resistance played a role in the evacuation but generally people think that French troops did nothing there. The British historian Julian Jackson for example recognized partly the role of the French troops. If on the ground the defense was mostly French, in the skies over Dunkirk the allied aircrafts were mostly from the RAF but several French fighters took part to the battle. Nevertheless most of the French air force was engaged more south. For the evacuation itself, the Royal Navy was not alone since French ships participated also to the evacuation. Nevertheless in many Anglo-American documents the French troops are simply ignored. In Dunkirk the BEF abandoned 76,000 tons of ammunition ; 600,000 tons of supplies and fuel ; 1,200 field guns ; 1,250 anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns ; 6,400 anti-tank rifles ; 11,000 machineguns and 75,000 vehicles. On 10th May 1940, there are comparable numbers of allied and German tanks with about 2900-3000 tanks. This apparent equality in the number of tanks is purely mathematical but in the facts it is completely false. All the about 3000 German tanks are concentrated in the 10 Panzerdivisionen and these Panzerdivisionen were also concentrated. On the French side only about 960 French tanks are concentrated in armored divisions

(DCR/DLM). A French general said that the French tanks were used in 1000 groups of 3 instead of 3 groups of 1000 and he was rather right. The French and British used tank tactics that were very different from Germany's ones. Most of the French tanks were in battalions spread out among the infantry. The armored divisions were used as a delaying or shock element, working for the infantry units, never as a decisive and independent arm. The French tanks were trained to support the infantry, but the French infantry, except the infantry of the armored units, was generally not trained to operate with the tanks. The big allied armored units didn't show as good combined arms efficiency as the German ones. Each DCR/DLM has less tanks than a Panzerdivision : there are roughly 10x300 German tanks against 6x160 French tanks and many dispersed battalions. That was the reality on the battlefield. The British 1st AD concentrated the cruiser tanks but did not really change the balance and was quickly neutralized. All the Belgian tanks were dispersed in small numbers in their infantry divisions, the higher number of Belgian tanks could be found in the 1e division de chasseurs ardennais with about 50 AFVs. The Germans had always more tanks in specific battles than the allies because they concentrated their tanks and had better tactical regulation. All the French tanks have a power/weight ratio of 7-10 hp/ton ; the German tanks have a power/weight ratio of 15-20 hp/ton, they have a better mobility. French tanks were generally more adapted to heavy and brutal charges against slow or immobile targets but were not really conceived for a war in which speed and mobility rules. And this speed and mobility was created by the revolutionary Panzerdivisionen. Only the Somua S35 cavalry tank could really compete with the German tanks in terms of speed, mobility and autonomy. All the French tanks have a better armor then the German tanks (13-30mm for the German tanks and 40-60mm for the French tanks). The 23 British Matillda II tanks are also far better armored than the German ones. French tanks are able to sustain many German hits. The Germans tanks have often a better AT capacity, except the French 47mm SA35 gun and 75mm SA35 gun. The 47mm SA35 L/32 gun is able to destroy all the German tanks up to 800-1000m but generally the French rate of fire is slower because of the 1-man turret where the commander is also spotter, loader and gunner.The 2636 German tanks include 965 ones (37%) armed with a 3.7cm or 7.5cm gun. Not counting here the additional 117 Panzerjäger I and 24 StuG A. Which leads to 2777 AFVs and 1106 ones (40%) armed with a 3.7cm, 4.7cm or 7.5cm gun. From the 3101 French tanks (if the AMR33/35s are counted as tanks), there are only about 480 French tanks armed with a 47mm SA35 (including the B1bis tanks with their 75mm hull gun) and about 350 which have a 37mm SA38 gun. From the 279 AMR33/35s, 259 are only armed with a single 7.5mm or 13.2mm MG and 20 AMR35 have a 25mm SA35 gun, which is also better than the German 3.7cm gun. That makes 850 tanks (27%) with an excellent to good anti-tank capacity. The huge majority of the French tanks are light tanks armed with the 37mm SA18 gun which can be used at 300-400m against the Panzer I and Panzer II but to knock out a Panzer III Ausf.E/F (the previous models are less armored and easier to destroy) or a Panzer IV Ausf.C/D, they have to get as close as < 25-100m, whereas the enemy can destroy them at about 300m (3.7cm KwK) to 500m (7.5cm KwK). On 10th May, there are also 23 British + 236 Belgian tanks with a rather good AT capacity for a total of 1039-1089 allied tanks with a good AT capacity. The 150 British cruisers arrive later. The German "superiority" was mainly due to : • better tactical regulation, much more concentrated armor (usually 4 vs 1, sometimes 8-10 vs 1 odds) • generally higher speed and mobility of the German tanks • tracer and smoke shells available in the German tanks (not in the French ones) • more radio sets allowing to better organize and control the maneuvers • mostly always presence of observation planes (Hs126 and Fi156) to provide information about the allied

position and direct artillery and aerial support • mostly omnipresent close air support • German tanks were spreading into the allied rears … difficult then to preserve a HQ or a fuel supply dump

… leading to tanks being abandoned and scuttled due to lack of fuel • better and faster logistics in the armored units (and far less hindered by aerial attacks or artillery fire) • 1-man turret in most of the French tanks and several very recently constituted units lacking training • usually German tanks avoided combat with the heavy allied tanks like the B1bis which constituted a big

threat, they were rather engaged by 8.8cm FlaK and 10.5cm LeFH. The Germans took an enormous risk in May 1940. They got through it with a few tactical innovations, several technical innovations, recklessness and a lot of luck. Germany's victory occurred as a result of a combination of factors, including air superiority, strategic and tactical innovation (including concentration of the tanks, concentration of the bomber/attack aircrafts), and the failure of the allies to anticipate or respond effectively and fast enough to German tactics.

The French air force The French air force was largely inferior to the German one, in numbers and quality, especially the bomber fleet which was really small in comparison. Operational frontline aircrafts on 10th May 1940 on the western front : France : 879 UK : 384 deployed in France (total of 416 : 100 fighters (Hurricane + Gladiator) and 316 attack/bomber aircrafts (Fairey Battle + Blenheim) Belgium : 118 Netherlands : 72 Germany : 2589 (versus 1453 allied ones) The French air force had some 1,900 aircrafts, of which only about 1,400 frontline aircrafts available (650 fighters, 240 bombers and 490 reconnaissance and observation aircrafts). It was conceived as a defensive arm, in cooperation with / attached to the ground troops. It was therefore much dispersed and it explains the importance of the reconnaissance fleet working for the ground troops. At the time of the German attack the French air force was just modernizing and reorganizing. The French air force at the moment of the Phoney War and of Fall Gelb was under strengthened and under complete mutation. The Air Force HQ would have been really ready for war end 1940 or in 1941. The French fighters were Morane-Saulnier MS.406, Curtiss H75, Bloch MB.151, Bloch MB.152, Dewoitine D.520 and Potez 631 twin-engine fighters. Only 400 fighters were operational on 10th May 1940. All the MS.406 fighters were already planned to be replaced by Bloch MB.152, Dewoitine D.520 or Arsenal VG.33 fighters but in May 1940 they constituted still the backbone of the French fighter fleet. There were only 36 Dewoitine D.520 fighters in May 1940 and no Arsenal VG.33 fighter had been produced. The Bf-109E reached 556 km/h and the Spitfire MkI 580 km/h (it depends also which conditions are considered). Anyway, the Morane-Saulnier MS.406, Bloch MB.151/152 and Curtiss H75 were all 50 to 90 km/h slower than the Bf-109E. All of them had worse climbing speed and top altitude compared to the Bf-109E. The D.520 had 240 hp less than the Bf-109E (1150 hp vs 910 hp) and the German fighter was still 30-40 km/h faster in level flight but that was not the case at all altitudes. The difference was obvious at lower altitudes but roughly inexistent at 5000-6000m. The D.520 climbed not as good as the German fighter from 0-4000m but as good as the Bf-109E between 4000 and 6000m. In manoeuvrability and agility the D.520 was often better and the diving speed was better and reached more than 665 km/h (more than 700 km/h according to pilots). An isolated Bf-109E pursued by a D.520 and which tried to escape by diving was generally lost. Nonetheless the low number of D.520s in service in 1940 and the advancing German troops on the ground (you have to control airfields to operate your fighters) made that this good fighter could not change the overall balance of forces. Only 120 of the bomber/assault aircrafts were modern ones (10 Amiot 354, 55 Lioré et Olivier 451, 45 Bréguet 691 or 693, 10 Potez 633) with 85 being operational. The others were older ones : 75 Bloch 200 or 210, 10 Farman 221 or 222 and 35 Amiot 143 with about 100 considered operational. From the 490 reconnaissance aircrafts only 370 are really operational and rather modern ones : Bloch 174, Potez 637 and Potez 63/11. Older Mureaux 115 and 117 were also still in use. Great Britain sent 416 aircrafts in France and kept about 800 aircrafts in Great Britain but all the allied planes available (1340 French + 416 British + about 190 for Belgium and the Netherlands = 1946) was still inferior to the about 3,500 German aircrafts effectively used during the 1940 western campaign. Nevertheless the RAF was also active from Great Britain, especially during the battle of Dunkirk. At the beginning of the German attack a large part of the Dutch and Belgian air forces are destroyed on the ground as well as 232 French aircrafts. The German air force was conceived as an offensive arm with very numerous fighters and a powerful tactical bombardment/attack fleet to support the ground troops like aerial artillery. They had 1,264 fighters (1016 single-seat fighters like the Me109 and Me110) and 1,120 bombers (He111, Do17, Ju88). The VIII.Fliegerkorps concentrated 300 Ju87 "Stuka" dive bombers and 42 Hs123 "assault" biplanes for close air support. There were also about 700 observation and reconnaissance planes (Fi156, Hs126, Do17, He111 and Ju88) and about 450 transport planes for a total of about 3900 aircrafts. The Germans had a powerful fighter's fleet, which combined with a very powerful mobile AA artillery covering the advancing troops was decisive to gain the air superiority. More of the 892 destroyed French aircrafts were shot down by the AA guns than by the German fighters. On 13th May 1940, the Luftwaffe was able for the first time of history to concentrate about 1500-1700 aircrafts over the small area of Sedan where only weak French divisions were defending an overstretched front. Nevertheless, from 10th to 18th May 1940, 179 German aircrafts had been shot down over the Meuse River area.

The Panzewaffe was actually trained to cooperate closely with the Luftwaffe, especially the VIII.Fliegerkorps, which concentrates all the dive bombers and assault aircrafts, specialized in close air support, and providing a new kind of mobile artillery to support the advance of the Panzerdivisionen. The Germans were able to concentrate all their tanks in the Panzerdivisionen but also all their dive bombers in one Fliegerkorps. The Germans had also the advantage of having omnipresent observation aircrafts to support them. According to Karl Heinz Frieser, the Luftwaffe lost 1236 planes (about 525 bombers, 125 dive bombers, 275 transports, 235 Bf-109 fighters and 75 Bf-110 fighters) + 323 heavily damaged ones during the western campaign. Jean-Gisclon studied the French fighter units. He indicates that the Germans lost between 10th May and 25th June a total of 1471 destroyed and 675 damaged aircrafts, these numbers are higher than the German ones. The usual numbers given by the historians of the Luftwaffe are between 1389 and 1470 lost planes. We will retain the number of about 1300-1400 German aircrafts lost in May-June 1940. The German human losses in the Luftwaffe are 1,355 KIAs, 1,226 WIAs and 715 POWs. Often it is said that the French fighters destroyed 800-1000 aircrafts but modern studies indicate that this number is rather 300-500. Beside propaganda, the fighter groups claim in fact a maximum of 996 victories, of those 733 are "confirmed" in air combat and 263 only probable. Among these 733 victories, many French pilots (even sometimes French + British pilots) share the same victory and are each credited with one victory. The bomber / reconnaissance aircrafts defensive fire and the anti-aircraft fire from the ground are on their side estimated to be responsible for the loss of 100-200 more aircrafts. That would make 400-700 German aircrafts destroyed by the French Air Force and AA defenses. The claimed victories for May-June 1940 are :

• United Kingdom : 821 (for the fighters : 201 for the Air Component, 131 for the Advanced Air Striking Force and 489 for the Fighter Command)

• France : 853 (733 for the fighters + 120 for the AA defenses) (Buffotot and Ogier, 1975) • Netherlands : 525 (fighters + AA defenses) • Belgium : about 100

Total : 2299 These numbers of course are impossible because the Germans lost about 1300-1400 planes. If we take into consideration the latest serious studies the Dutch would have destroyed 225 aircrafts, including about 170-200 transport aircrafts lost in the Netherlands during the airborne operations and often destroyed on the ground by the artillery. The Belgian Air Force seems to have destroyed only 6 German aircrafts. If we take into consideration the German losses due to accidents (250-300) there are about 800-850 aircrafts that were destroyed by the British and French. To these losses for May-June 1940 you can also add the losses on the western front during the Phoney war. These German aircrafts shot down were later missing above London. Another wrong idea is that during Fall Gelb there were mostly fighter versus fighter combats and that during the battle of Britain the fighters attacked preferentially the German bombers. In fact the real statistics show that the percentage of bombers lost is higher over France than over Great Britain. The main French fighters were Morane-Saulnier MS.406, Bloch MB.151/152, Curtiss H75, Dewoitine D.520 and twin-engine Potez 631. Except the few Dewoitine D.520 the other aircrafts were inferior to the last version of the Bf-109 but the French fighters scored nevertheless rather well. The Curtiss H75 equipped 4-5 fighter groups (from a total of 24 single-seat fighter groups) in May 1940 and got the most air victories with 237 claimed victories (and the loss of 71 Curtiss H75 fighters). The French Air Force lost 892 aircrafts and the human losses are : 541 KIAs, 364 WIAs and 105 MIAs (40% of the officers and 20% of the NCOs and men). For the fighter units alone Jean Gisclon gives the numbers of 204 KIAs, 188 WIAs and 31 POWs. "At the end of 1939, the Royal Aircraft Establishment arranged for a loan of a Curtiss Hawk from France (the 88th production Hawk 75A-2) for comparative trials against a Spitfire I (K9944). In many respects, the Hawk turned out to be superior to the Spitfire. The RAE found that the Hawk did indeed have exceptional handling characteristics and beautifully harmonized controls. In a diving attack at 400 mph, the Hawk was far superior to the Spitfire I owing to its lighter ailerons. In a dogfight at 250 mph, the Hawk was again superior, because its elevator control was not over-sensitive and all-round view was better. However, the Spitfire could break off combat at will because of its much higher speed. When the Spitfire dived on the Hawk, the Curtiss could avoid its opponent by banking and turning rapidly. The Spitfire could not follow the Hawk around and would overshoot the target. The Hawk 75A displayed appreciably superior take-off and climb characteristics. The swing on takeoff was smaller and more easily corrected than on the Spitfire, and during the climb the Hawk's controls were more effective. However, the Hawk tended to be rather slow in picking up speed in a dive." On 5th June 1940 was a very good day for the French air force with 55 German aircrafts reported destroyed for the cost of 10 pilots KIA, 9 WIA and 5 MIA. As a comparison, on 15th September 1940, during the battle of

Britain, the RAF claimed 56 German aircrafts and lost 25 fighters. In fact in both cases these numbers are too high and for example on 5th June the Luftwaffe lost only 35 aircrafts. The French ace Edmond Marin-la-Meslée collected 20 victories (16 confirmed + 4 probable) in May/June 1940 with a Curtiss H75A. He was pilot in the GC I/5 which obtained 111 air victories (84 confirmed and 27 probable). The German ace Werner Mölder had been shot down over France and made prisoner like 714 other aircraft crew members during the battle (on 17th June France had still about 400-500 Luftwaffe air crews kept prisoner). On 15th June 1940, second-lieutenant Pierre Le Gloan (GC III/6) shot down 5 Italian aircrafts (4 Fiat CR.42 and 1 BR.20) in 40 minutes with his Dewoitine D-520 over Saint-Raphaël. Le Gloan was in formation with captain Assolant when they saw 12 Fiat CR.42. Le Gloan destroyed 2 CR.42 and Assoulant returned to base with his guns jammed. Alone, Le Gloan continued his patrol. Over Hyères Le Gloan attacked 3 CR.42 and destroyed one plane, he broke the combat when 8 other Italian aircrafts arrived. The airbase at Luc called him back because it was attacked by Italian planes. Le Gloan destroyed his fourth CR.42 and one BR.20 from the 172nd strategic reconnaissance Squadriglia. It was one of the very first pilots of WW2 to destroy 5 planes in one sortie. The French Farman 222.2, 223.3 and 223.4 heavy bombers (a total of about 42 only available in May/June 1940) were really long range bombers and carried 4200 kg bombs (2x 500 kg and 16x 200 kg). Ugly and slow, this was typical of France’s pre-modernization air force of the mid 30's. This "advanced" version of the Farman 221/222 (222.2) had retractable gear, but showed little improvement over its predecessor. It did have long range and carried a large bomb load. First they dropped leaflets over Germany and Czechoslovakia but they were also the first allied planes to bomb Berlin (Siemens factory) and other cities (Rostock - Heinkel factories -, Hamburg, Münich and Köln). They also bombed rail-roads in Aix-La-Chappelle, Maastricht, Flessingue and Middelburg in order to delay the Germans. After Italy declared war against France these bombers dropped leaflets over Roma and bombed fuel refinery in Porto Maghera and Livourne. Only one was lost during the Battle of France - and that was a flying accident. Vichy and the Luftwaffe used them as transports through 1944. The Lioré & Olivier 451 was by most accounts, an excellent aircraft, though a bit short on defensive armament. Used badly for ground attack in small numbers without escort. This plane bombed Germany and Italy but France had so few bombers and very few attack planes that it didn't change the strategic outcome. Later used by Vichy in North Africa and Syria. Also used by the Germans. A total of about 155 Amiot 351 and Amiot 354 have been available during May/June 1940, they carried about 2200 kg bombs (2x500 kg and 6x 200 kg). It was a very modern medium bomber (477 km/h) but the last version, the Amiot 354, arrived too late. Four of them were later used as transports by the Luftwaffe, including two with 1./KG200 (the special service Geschwader). Others were later used for the French air mail service. The engines were taken by Germany and used on the Me323 . The Amiot 143M carried about 1200 kg bombs, 12 of these obsolete aircrafts were called to desperate daylight raids over the Sedan ! The Bloch MB.200 and MB.210 carried up to about 1600 kg bombs (2x 500kg or 8x 200kg or 32x 50kg). There were also 24 in Rumania and 124 in the Czech Air Force. The Potez 630 series in the French Air Force in 1939/1940 : Potez 631 = heavy fighter and attack - equivalent to the Me110 Potez 633 = light bomber, this model has a bomb bay Potez 631 armament : 2x 20mm HS404 4x 7.5mm MAC34 (4x 50 kg bombs for attack missions) 1-2x 7.5mm MAC34 for rear defense Potez 633 armament : 1x 7.5mm MAC34 2x 100 kg bombs 4x 100 kg bombs or 8x 50 kg bombs (in the bomb bay) 1-2x 7.5mm MAC34 for rear defense

The Potez 630 series is modern in 1938. The Czech AVIA company bought the licence to build a fighter version (Potez 636) but the German invasion ended the project. China bought 4 PO.631 and 5 PO.633 but they were seized by the French Army in Indochina (French colony composed of Annam, Cochinchina, Tonkin, Cambodia, Laos and a part of the Chinese territory that is called Kouang-Tcheou-Wan) before delivery. 3 of them have been used against the Japanese (in Lang Son) and Thai armies attacking Vichy forces in 1940 and 1941. Yugoslavia received 2 PO.630, no further deliveries because of the war and all the production was directed to the French Army. Switzerland used 1 PO.630 and 1 PO.632 (= PO.633 with Hispano engines), no further deliveries because of the war and all the production was directed to the French Army. Used until 1944 and equipped with a 2x 20mm Oerlikon FF/K guns extra pod. Greece ordered 24 PO.633 but only 10 could be delivered and saw action against Italian and Albanian forces. Rumania received 21 PO.633B2 used in the 74th and 75th bombing squadrons. They were used for bombing and long range recon missions. Used during Barbarossa, Odessa and Stalingrad for example and at least until 1943. The Luftwaffe used French booty PO.630s for training and reconnaissance missions. The Bréguet Br.693/695 assault aircrafts were very good (top speed of 480-495 km/h) and sturdy, with excellent maintenance features (engine change in 80 minutes). The armament consisted in : 1x 20mm HS404 5x 7.5mm MAC (2 in the nose and 3 fixed and pointing aft and downwards used for strafing only) 1x 7.5mm MAC for rear defense 8x 50 kg bombs The starboard side cannon and machineguns in the nose have a 0 to -15° elevation towards the ground for better aiming and strafing of ground target even if the aircraft is in level flying. It was first used in attacks with a 45° dive from 2,500 - 3,000 meters, with fighter cover. But the Morane-Saulnier 406 could generally not follow the assault aircrafts. The Loire Nieuport LN.401/411 dive bombers (speed of 380 km/h) of the fleet air arm were also used against ground targets in the Netherlands (to support the French landings) but also desperately to try to stop the Panzerdivisionen in France. Even Morane-Saulnier 406 fighters were ordered to attack the Panzers with their 20mm gun. 1x 20mm HS404 2x 7.5mm MAC 1x 225 kg type K bomb or 1x 150 kg type I2 bomb or 9x 15 kg bombs or 10x 10 kg bombs The French artillery According to many testimonies and battle reports (Gembloux, Abbeville and others), the French artillery was very efficient in 1940 and it seems to have been often superior to the German artillery : fast responding, high rate of fire and very accurate. The French gunners and forward observers new their job and defeated many German attacks. On the German side, the logistics and sometimes the mobility were probably better organized but they often went in combat with insufficient ammunition supplies. The German artillery has also the advantage of the air superiority, enabling the use of Fi156 and Hs126 spotter planes. Nevertheless, the French troops were skilled in camouflage tactics and the Germans were often too self-confident and caught on their positions by French counter-battery fire. Of course the quick advance of the German troops explains sometimes the lack of the German artillery if the attack was not well prepared. In the French infantry division there are more field guns / howitzers than in a German infantry divisions but the Germans have far more infantry guns and mortars. In Gembloux, the French artillery proved to be very efficient and very precise, stopping many German assaults, firing on each German concentration, destroying many tanks and silencing the German artillery by counter-battery fires. Perfectly camouflaged, the batteries remained often undiscovered despite the German spotting planes. The German artillery and the Luftwaffe were unable to neutralize the French artillery. The power of the French infantry / artillery couple as opposed to the German tanks / aviation couple is well illustrated by the Gembloux battle were many assaults were defeated thanks to artillery concentrations. German divisions' HQs were also quickly detected by French radio detection means and they were immediately under French artillery fire. The German reports about the battle of Abbeville also indicate that the French artillery was very powerful, accurate, fast responding and had a high rate of fire. Strong artillery will also show to be the king of the battle during the second part of WW2. The Maginot line The choice of building the Maginot Line had several goals :

• Avoid a surprise attack like in Belgium, Netherlands ... and give alert • Cover the mobilization (at least 2-3 weeks) • Economize the French forces (France had only 39 millions citizens against 70 millions for Germany

and much less 20-25 year old men in the Army than Germany had) • Protect Alsace/Lorraine and its industry • Be the departure line for a counter-attack • Force the Germans to attack by the flanks (Belgium or Switzerland)

Only after having solved the case of Dunkirk, Hitler decided to attack the Maginot Line. The German crossed the Rhine and destroyed several small bunkers but the big defense works, even attacked by heavy support (420mm Skoda heavy mortars, 1000kg bombs etc) resisted to all assaults and inflicted heavy losses to the enemy. About 22,000 encircled men in Alsace/Lorraine mobilized 240,000 Germans and in the Alps 60,000 frontline alpine troops encountered 312,500 Italians. Oddly enough, the Maginot line was a success ; it accomplished exactly what it was intended to do. It wasn't designed to fully protect France from an attack from the east, though the Maginot line mentality fostered the idea that it would. It was designed to compensate for France's inferiority in troops, versus Germany, by reducing the area that the field army had to cover, and by freeing up personnel for that field army's manoeuvre divisions. It did exactly that. It wasn't the Maginot line's fault that the French High Command wasn't able to use the field army effectively. The Germans launch operation Tiger against the Maginot line in the Sarre area on 14th June, on a 30 km front between Saint-Avold and Sarralbe in Moselle. The Germans engage 6 infantry divisions and 3 divisions in reserve, a total of 9 divisions. The German troops involved are from the 1.Armee (von Witzleben) with the XXX.Korps (258.ID and 93.ID), the XII.Korps (268.ID and 75.ID) and the XXIV. Korps (60.ID and 252.ID). That makes 155,000 men which are supported by 1,020 field guns, heavy mortars, howitzers and rail road guns (Four 280mm rail road guns, 27 batteries of 210mm, 35 batteries of 100mm, 84 batteries of 150mm, 108 batteries of 105mm etc.), batteries of 8.8cm FlaK and of course the Luftwaffe with 300 German bombers. It is the strongest artillery concentration of the campaign in France. The 79.ID, 198.ID and 168.ID are in reserve. On the French side the fortifications are of course stronger than in the area of Sedan but are nonetheless weak and not always finished. There are fore posts, dismountable MG turrets, about 50 infantry casemates and 100 smaller bunkers for a total of about 300 defensive emplacements but there are no big artillery defense works. The defense is also largely completed by flooded areas. The French troops consists in 3 mixed fortress infantry regiments (69e RMIF, 82e RMIF, 174e RMIF), 1 fortress infantry regiment more on the right (133e RIF) and 2 colonial MG regiments (41e RMIC and 51e RMIC) for about 18,000 men. The RMIF differs from a RIF since in the 3rd battalion the weapons and rifle company is replaced by a support company and a rifle company. The French artillery adds about 100 field guns. They will fight in 1 versus 8-9 odds. During the 14th June, the 41e RMIC (colonel Tristani) is shelled constantly by the German artillery; it is attacked 3 times by Ju87 dive bombers and pulls back 4 infantry assaults. The French troops have 600 KIA and 1,800 WIA but the German attack is a complete failure and the German troops loose 1,200 KIA and 4,000 WIA during this single day. In fact on 14th June the French troops are ordered to retreat to avoid being encircled by other advancing German troops, and that despite their success during the day. On 15th June there is only a small crest of rearguard units defending the French positions. The Germans decided to cancel completely the attack on this area which was too bloody but they captured one French soldier with the orders of the retreat and knew that the line will be only weakly defended on 15th June. The renewed assaults on 15th June are therefore successful. On 15th June 1940, the Germans launch operation Kleiner Bär against the Maginot line in Alsace, on the Rhine. The Germans engage 8 divisions : 6. Gebirgsdivision, 213.ID, 218.ID, 221.ID, 239.ID, 554.ID, 556.ID and 557.ID. The first five divisions are rather good ones but the 3 last ones are rather second line troops. These troops are supported by more than 5 artillery regiments and strong air support (including 150 Stukas). During operation Kleiner Bär, the Germans grouped heavy AA guns (8.8cm FlaK) to fire directly at the bunkers at less than 200m and to destroy them while 3.7cm FlaK and 3.7cm PaK had to blind/destroy the weapons crenels and observation means of the same bunker. In front of each French bunker there were about 4 to 6 AA/AT guns. Less than 10,000 French troops to face more than 100,000 German troops and there are only 18 field guns (75mm Mle1897 and a few 155mm) to support them. The French 104e DIF (42e RIF, 28e RIF and 242e RI – 8 battalions) is alone to face the German assault on the Rhine between Rhinau and Neuf-Brisach on a 30 km front. There are also 5 companies in the fortifications (CEO = compagnie d'équipage d'ouvrage) and the 5e DBCPy (5th Chasseurs Pyrénéens half-brigade) with the 9th and 10th battalions. The 18e BCC with its 63 Renault FT17 tanks is in the area but these tanks played no significant role. Instead of being grouped in a counter-attack the tanks are dispersed in villages surrounded by barbed wire networks to support the local

defenses. The French fortifications on the Rhine are only small bunkers and due to the ground water they have no underground levels at all, these were surface fortifications with simplified armament. Due to the small size, there for example no 47mm AT guns and except a few 37mm AT guns, only 13.2mm HMGs as AT weapons. Roughly without artillery support the 104e DIF could not efficiently stop the German crossings and the fortifications on the banks were not numerous enough, defending an extended front but the German troops suffered 766 KIA, 2,567 WIA and 117 MIA. The German assaults on 15th June are at first repulsed or reduced to very small bridgeheads. Several counter-attacks are led by French "groupes francs", which for example manage to take again the town of Vogelgrun. Nonetheless, on the north, in what was initially a diversion attack, the 557.ID manages to establish a bridgehead near Rhinau on the hinge between the 104e DIF and the 103e DIF deployed more north. On 16th June the Germans renewed their assaults and French troops encircled in their bunkers in the first lines continue to fight or withdraw in the woods where they continue to resist. On evening the German assault engineers have finally managed to break through the French line (the canal and the villages next to it just behind the Rhine itself) in the area of Marckolseim. They have neutralized the 2 bunkers there with flamethrowers and satchel charges but the village itself is organized in strong point and cannot be defeated. Further assaults are postponed on 17th June. Nonetheless, on 17th June the 104e DIF is ordered to retreat to the Vosges heights and valleys where they will fight until 25th June. A 9th German division crosses the Rhine only on 18th June to take Strasbourg. The cities of Colmar, Mulhouse and Strasbourg in the Alsatian plain are occupied by the 7.Armee on 19th June. Armistice came in application on 25th June 1940. At that date, from the Maginot Line in the north-east some 45 defense works out of 53 and 130 casemates/blockhouses were still fighting and many defense works surrendered only on 7th July. Looking at these facts the Maginot Line did play a good part of its role. It avoided an immediate surprise attack like in Poland, Belgium, Norway etc. It covered the mobilization period and no enemy incursion occurred during this period, it efficiently protected the industries in Alsace/Lorraine and forced Hitler to attack the neutral Belgium where elite troops were send to stop them. Everyone now knows that they did not manage to stop them and that they were in fact only attracted in Belgium. Defeat was not a fatality and the Maginot line was not the reason of that defeat but became often the scapegoat. Reasons of the quick fall of France ? 1) Demography and economics : France had only 39 millions citizens against 70 millions for Germany (not counting the Austrians etc.) and much less 20-25 year old men in the Army than Germany had. In France there were 11.5 millions employees with 5.5 millions in the industry (47.8%). In Germany there were 21.5 millions employees with 14 millions in the industrial field (65.1%). France was less industrial and had more farmers. France produced 7-8 millions tons of steel per year against 14 millions tons for Germany, which gives already an advantage for the military industry. 2) Politics : The French government was clearly weak. From 1931 to 1939 Gamelin modeled a new army and made several errors :

• instead of unifying the command he diluted it in several intermediate command, what complicated the chain of command

• on the eve of war he created two TO : North East and the Alps • he planned operation Dyle/Breda but against the opinion of general Georges in charge of it on the

field • he did not understand the role of aviation in a modern war and was opposed to the creation of big

armored formations unlike other generals and colonels • in 1939 his collaborators and the army had no trust and no respect for him • entrenched in the Vincennes castle he communicated only by phone and was reluctant to use

modern radio sets. 3) Strategy / Military :

• The French army was not able to lead a modern movement war, it relied on the older doctrine of the continuous front the outbreak of the war (it changed already in June).

• Bad coordination between the infantry/tanks/artillery/aviation in comparison to the Germans who trained in that way.

• The French infantry / artillery couple was opposed to the German tanks / aviation couple and purely on the battlefield it did very well when led by good commanders, for example during the battle of Gembloux in Belgium.

• Roughly no reserves • The continuation of the war from the colonies alone against Germany is a myth, there were only

several days of ammunition, fuel etc. supply … no industrial power in the colonies. • The French infantry / artillery couple was opposed to the German tanks / aviation couple and purely

on the battlefield it did very well when led by good commanders, for example during the battle of Gembloux in Belgium.

• No large-scaled counter-attack could be launched, the Germans kept the initiative. • Lack in radio sets, most of the communication means were telephones, flags or men on motorcycles

... very slow when you have to make a quick decision against a quick advancing foe. • A very important point is the lack in AA artillery compared to the German one (not enough pieces but

also not enough AA ammunition). The Stukas dive bombers and Hs123 assault planes had it easy while most of the French aircrafts were not destroyed by German fighters but by the very dense Flak the German had.

• The bulk of the French army (the reserve units) was generally not prepared psychologically for the war, but the German soldier of May 1940 had in general not a better morale or training than the French one. In Germany in the 30's there was a strong militarization of the society and of the youth with many paramilitary and armed political movements. Nonetheless, most Germans were afraid of this war and the Phoney War also had effects on the German morale. Except for the mechanized units planned for the main effort, which were heavily trained and told that their mission was of high importance, the morale and preparation of the German soldiers were not better than for the French soldiers. Unlike these best German troops, the French soldiers didn't fought fanatically for their country or their "Führer", but simply for their comrades, platoon or company commander The initial successes boosted quickly the German morale, hiding the lack of quality of many second line units (which could be compared to French B-divisions).

• The communists often claimed that there were numerous in the resistance but they forgot to mention that it is because they were already well organized since the dissolution of their political movement in September 1939. Because of the German-Soviet agreement they were in favor of the Germans and were responsible for many strikes (which slowed down the military production) and several sabotages. The Farman factory had been damaged by a bomb in June and it is well known that many tanks/armament coming out from the Satory factory were sabotaged and that some tanks had mechanical breakdowns due to that. That does not explain at all the total defeat but it puts into light the general atmosphere in the country. Already during the 30's they led a subversive pacifist/internationalist campaign in the country and tried to hinder the French armament program. Nonetheless, regarding the whole campaign, the communists had only a minimal impact.

• The British sent only 10 divisions in France, unlike 60 divisions during WWI • Belgium and the Netherlands remained always neutral until it was too late. Therefore the French

troops could not enter in Belgium to deploy before they had to go there to meet the German troops. The Belgian army should have prepared and fortified several positions (trenches, anti-tank ditches for example around Gembloux) for the future deployment of the French troops but when they arrived nothing or very little had been done. It didn't prevent the French troops to fight fiercely in Belgium.

• Unlike for the German army, on the allied side there was no HQ unit commanding all the troops. Each country remained independent and the BEF in France kept certain autonomy. Several times the British troops made movements or took decisions on their own, without even informing the neighboring French units. Sometimes they were withdrawing too far, endangering French troops.

• The French generals were generally 8-10 years older than the German ones, especially due to big purges in the German army in 1919 and under Hitler. The people of same age in France were only colonel or commanding a division like De Gaulle and had therefore not a significant impact on the whole operations.

• General Gamelin is commanding general Georges (ground troops), general Vuillemin (air force) and admiral Darlan (navy) but each arm keeps a certain autonomy whereas on the German side the inter-arms cooperation is very efficient.

4) Psychology :

• France declared war to Germany with a civil population often said to be deeply pacifist after the WWI slaughter (France had about 6 millions losses that meant 10% of the active male population of the country - 1,400,000 KIA - and only in the late 50's the French population could reach again the

number of before WW1). Nonetheless, The French were more bellicist and the Germans more pacifist than usually thought.

• Communists' strikes and sabotages in the armament industries (because of the pact between Germany and Russia) may have played a minimal role.

• The political power was weak. • No real will to fight in the high spheres of decision ? That is rather right, nonetheless, there are also

numerous accounts of despair in the German high command after the French declared war. The Germans were not sure at all to beat France. Their previous opponent at Verdun was still in the minds.

German tanks deployed / lost (definitively destroyed) : 1) POLAND Total participating :

• Pz.Kpfw. I : 973 • Pz.Kpfw. II : 1127 • Pz.Kpfw. III : 87 • Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 112 • Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 55 • Pz.Kpfw. IV : 198 • Pz.Bef. : 219

Total : 2771 tanks (452 with a 3.7cm or 7.5cm gun = 16%) Total losses :

• Pz.Kpfw. I : 89 • Pz.Kpfw. II : 83 • Pz.Kpfw. III : 26 • Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 7 • Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 7 • Pz.Kpfw. IV : 19 • Pz.Bef. : 5

Total : 236 tanks (8.5%) 2) FRANCE AND LOWER COUNTRIES Total participating :

• Pz.Kpfw. I : 643 (total available : 1077) • Pz.Kpfw. II : 880 (total available : 1092) • Pz.Kpfw. III : 349 (total available : 381) • Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 118 + 10 in the AA Totenkopf (total available : 143) • Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 207 (total available : 238) • Pz.Kpfw. IV : 281 (total available : 290) • Pz.Bef. : 148 (total available : 244)

Total : 2636 tanks (965 with a 3.7cm or 7.5cm gun = 36%) Total losses :

• Pz.Kpfw. I : 182 • Pz.Kpfw. II : 240 • Pz.Kpfw. III : 135 • Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 62 • Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 54 • Pz.Kpfw. IV : 97 • Pz.Bef. : 69

Total : 839 tanks (32%)

David Lehmann