friedlander broszat exchange

8/8/2019 Friedlander Broszat Exchange

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A Controversy about the Historicization of National SocialismAuthor(s): Martin Broszat and Saul FriedlnderSource: New German Critique, No. 44, Special Issue on the Historikerstreit (Spring - Summer,1988), pp. 85-126Published by: New German CritiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/488148

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A ControversyabouttheHistoricizationofNationalSocialism

Martin Broszat/Saul Friedlinder

ISeptember 28, 1987Dear Mr. Friedlander,On the occasion of the 40th anniversaryof the end of Nazi rule inMay 1985, I published an essay entitled "A Plea for a HistoricizationofNational Socialism" ("Plidoyer ffir eine Historisierung des National-sozialismus") in the magazine Merkur.As far as I know, you havevoiced reservations about the concept and fundamental idea of thishistoricizationpostulate a number of times in variouslectures and arti-cles, more than any other of my colleagues in the field of contempora-ry history in Germany and abroad. Moreover, your apprehensionswere also affectedby the backwash of the Historikerstreitthat erupted in1986 in the Federal Republic, though this particulardebate has beencharacterizedin partby a quite different set of motives, emphases and

opposing camps. In my view, this dispute has certainly also led tosome positive results. Yet the Historikerstreitwas not particularlysuitedas a means toward furthering an objective discussion of the notionswhich I - for completely nonpolemical reasons - had put forward inmy "Plea" a yearearlier.Rather,a partof my argumentswere extolledand applauded by the wrong camp, while in contrast,certainreserva-tions and doubts surfacedwhere the basic ideas expressed therein (inmy "Plea")had met open-minded interest and agreement before.Due to such "distortions"of the objective discussion of the topic asa result of the Historikerstreit,I declined (as you are aware) - after givingthe matter considerable thought - to accept an invitation by theFischer Verlag to contribute to a paperback collection of essays that85


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86 Historicizationof National Socialism

might have affordedme an opportunity in the fall of 1987 to respond,albeit briefly,to your critical "Reflectionson the Historicizationof Na-tional Socialism" ("Uberlegungen zur Historisierung des National-sozialismus") contained in that volume. I'decided against such a re-sponse and againsta republication of my "Plea"in this paperbackcol-lection for one principalreason: because I did not wish to contribute ahelping hand to yet another ratherone-sided compilation of essaysonthe Historikerstreit,which had alreadygenerateda spateof publications.You regrettedthatdecision, but havefortunatelyagreedwith my sug-gestion that we discuss the problem "among ourselves" - outside ofsuch a context and within the more sedateforum of the Vierteljahresheftefiir Zeitgeschichte- in the form of a dialogue consisting of three ex-changes of letters. We trust the readers of thisjournal will takeit uponthemselves to read the two initialpoints of departurefor this dialogue- my "Plea"in Merkurand your "Reflections"in the Fischerpaper-back volume' - since, in the course of the following exchange of let-ters, I am sure that it will be possible to recapitulatethe argumentsde-veloped by us thereonly in partand not in theirfull entirety.Moreover,we willbe embarkinghere upon an experimentwhose outcome is quiteuncertain. Our agreement in regard to the dialogue remains, for thetime being, only a token of our mutual good intentions to engage in adiscoursewhich will not be simply polemical, but rather,so we hope, afruitful and enlightening undertaking.Yetwhether - and how well -we have succeeded in this taskwill not emerge until we are finished,and the readersof the journal will have to be the final arbitersof that.In opening our dialogue, I would like to dwell on three questions:1. The concept of the historicization of National Socialism which Imake use of is ambiguous and can easilybe misunderstood - in this Iagree with you completely. In your critique, you proceed basicallyfrom the premise of the pervertibilityof this concept, the ease withwhich it can be abused and misused, and not from what I indicatedquite expressly as its objective and motivation. In my "Plea" I did notfurnish any basis or "handle" for your fear that the concept of thehistoricizationof National Socialism had provided a dangerous catch-word for a false normalization of historicalconsciousness in the Feder-al Republic, and thata step had thus been taken down the path leadingtoward a moral leveling of perspectives on the Nazi period.

1. Dan Diner, ed., Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte?Zu Historisierung undHistorikerstreit(Frankfurtam Main: Fischer, 1987).


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BroszatandFriedldnder 87

Due to the fact that misunderstanding and distrust can nonethelessapparentlyremain extremely powerful factors,I would like, at the out-set of our discussion, to underscore quite clearlythe following point.My concept of historicization was - and remains - bound up withtwo postulates which are mutually conditioning and thus indispensa-ble: First,it is based on a recognition of the necessity that, in the finalanalysis, the Nazi period cannot be excluded from historical under-standing - no matter how much the mass crimes and catastropheswhich the regime perpetratedchallenge one again and again to take astance of resolute political and moral condemnation. Secondly, myconcept of historicizationis founded on a principle of critical,enlight-ening historical understanding (Verstehen);this understanding, shapedin essential terms precisely by the experience of National Socialismand the nature of man as revealed by the Nazis, should be clearlydis-tinguished from the concept of Verstehenin the frame of Germanhistoricism of the 19th century, with its Romantic-idealistic basis andthe one-sided pattern of identification bound up with this notion.From my perspective, the concept of historical "insight" (Einsicht)appearsmore pertinent and to the point than that of "understanding"in regardto the ambivalence of post-National Socialisthistoricization.Insight in a double sense: seen, on the one hand, as a distancing expla-nationand an objectificationto be achievedanalytically;and, on the oth-er,viewed as a comprehending, subjectiveappropriationand empath-etic reliving (Nachvollzug)of past achievements, sensations, concernsand mistakes. Historicalinsight in this dual sense is quite generally-and not only in respectto the Nazi period in Germanhistory- chargedwith the taskof preventing historical consciousness from degeneratingonce more into a deification and idealization of brute factsof power, asexemplified by the Prussian-Germanhistorical thought of a Heinrichvon Treitschke.A historicization which remains awareof this doubleobjective in gaining and transmittinghistoricalinsight is in no dangerwhatsoever of relativizing the atrocities of National Socialism. Corre-spondingly, I attempted to make clearin my 1985 "Plea" that in tryingto deal with National Socialism, what remains crucial is precisely theabilityto endure the acute tension between the two components of 'in-sight' - (a)the desire to understand and (b) criticaldistancing - andnot to takerefuge either in a Pauschaldistanzierung,a general and whole-sale distancing, (which is morally likewise an all-too-simple option) oran amoral Verstehenpredicated on "mere understanding."


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For reasons which remain a mystery to me, all this was not able todispel your fears and suspicions that a departure on the train ofhistoricization supposedly constituted the beginning of a journeywhose final destination was a relativism of values: a relativismwhereeverythingcan be "understood" and "excused." To allaysuch appre-hensions, I would like to cite a wise and historically knowledgeablejournalist on the staffof the SiiddeutscheZeitung,Hermann Rudolph. InOctober 1986, Rudolph commented on the Historikerstreitin his paperin the following way:The historicization of National Socialism, in hisview, is not only unavoidable, but rather is absolutely necessaryif onewishes to comprehend the ambivalent connections between civiliza-tion and aggressivityin the effective history (Wirkungsgeschichte)of theThird Reich. In dealing with such interconnections, "a sense of judg-ment that has only been sharpened in moral terms gets nowhere, ormerely lacerates itself." As Rudolph sees it, the danger that the singu-larityof National Socialismmight be compromised by such a differen-tiation is "about the least likely eventuality."National Socialism, Ru-dolph contends, itself provided a sufficient guarantee against such aneventualityby the unprecedented magnitude of its crimes and devasta-tion - in historical terms, these remain unforgettable.22. My polemic stance against a more declamatory, morally impotentgeneral and wholesale distancing from the Nazi period provoked par-ticular concerns and criticalobjections on your part.I would like in thefollowing to present a clarification regarding this - a clarificationdrawn from the very evolution which "masteringof the past" (Vergan-genheitsbewdltigung)has undergone in the Federal Republic.

Initially, right after 1945, the number-one item on the agenda wasthe creation of an anti-National Socialistpolitical and social order anda return, on the level of the discussion about constitutional norms, tothe humanitarian values of a constitutional state. This renewal ofnorms and the associated necessity for a sharp verbal renunciation ofthe Nazi period were all the more unavoidable since (and although) atthat time, during the Adenauer era, people were not particularlywill-ing or indeed able, to a sufficientdegree, to assume a morallyconvinc-ing position of uncompromising condemnation in respect to the con-crete individual cases of manifold entanglements in the former regimeof injustice - and to engage in a detailed confrontation with this past.

2. Cf. SiiddeutscheZeitung4-5 October 1986.


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Broszatand Friedldnder 89

In other words, the officialgeneral and wholesale distancing from theNazi past, despite its importance for the reestablishment of norms,compensated for (and yet simultaneously served to mask) the insuffi-cient investigationand subsequent punishment of concrete individualinvolvement with respect to guilt and responsibility. Such investiga-tions and punishment frequently did not occur, or were too limited inscope. The Nazi past was rejected in general terms, in declamatoryfashion, also due to the factthat it wasvery awkwardto weigh and pon-der that past more precisely and in detail. Correspondingly,historicalinquiry about the recent past in the 1950s and 1960s was dominatedby a demonological interpretation of National Socialism, concernedmore with bringing about a distancing exorcism of the demons thanarrivingat a historical explanation.In the immediate postwar period, there were many weighty politicaland psychologicalreasonsfor this approachof declamatorygeneraldis-tancing.Yetthese reasons lost much of their importanceas time passedand the democraticorder of government in the FederalRepublic tookon stability.Nowadays,when we have a situation where the field of his-tory and historical studies is no longer represented by a generationwhose members were contemporaries of National Socialism and be-came adults before 1945, but rather is represented, already in largemeasure, by the grandchildrenof that generation, there is no longer asufficient reason for the imposition of a general quarantine.Moreover,there is no longer any great need for the chargingand prosecution ofperpetrators,since at the present time there areveryfew left who mightproperlybe accused of directresponsibility.In addition, the formerdis-tinctionsof being differentiallyinvolved in and affectedby National So-cialismhave, in the meantime, largelyblurred and faded within the so-ciety of the FederalRepublic. In contrast,the desire to understandthispast has become all the more powerful,especiallyamong younger peo-ple - a pastwithwhich they arerepeatedlyconfrontedas a special lega-cy and burden, a kind of "mortgage,"yet a past which for them canonly be experienced intellectuallyand in historicalterms.

By no means - and let me repeat this once again - does this meanthat the moral evaluationand condemnation of the crimes and failuresof the Nazi period are passing from the scene. It does mean thoughthat such evaluation and condemnation must be mediated by consci-entious historical inquiry, and that they must be able to stand the testof a rational comprehension of this period. If one proceeds from these


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needs and from the necessarilytransformedperceptionsof the youngergeneration of Germans, then, for quite some time, the crucial matterhas indeed not been whether historicization should be seen as a desid-eratum. Rather, what remains crucial today is only the necessity ofmakingpeople conscious and awareof the unavoidabilityof this histori-cization - a process which has been in progressnow for some time.3. Of course, such a German-centristperspectivealone is not enough.I attempted in my "Plea" to make clear, if nothing else, thatthe historyof the Nazi period cannot be determined by German historiansalone.Rather,one of the special features of this period is that, in the wakeofthe incalculable persecution of millions of individuals of non-Germannationality,any exclusiveGermanclaim to historicalinterpretationin re-gardto thisperiod hasbeen forfeited.EveryGermanhistorianis well ad-vised to keep thisfullyin mind, with all the consequencessuch an aware-ness entails. To the extent that the historyof NationalSocialism has be-come a centralchapterin the historicalexperience of those persecutedby the Nazis from all countries and nations, it holds to a particularde-gree that this period is by no means a dead past in historicalterms forthese persons and the generationof the bereaved. It is both absurdandpresumptuous for Germansto demand that memory be submerged inthe slough of such dead historicity.Among the special features of thescholarly-scientificinvestigationof thispastis the knowledgethatthispe-riod still remains bound up with many and diverse monuments ofmournful and accusatorymemory, imbued with the painfulsentimentsof many individuals,in particularofJews, who remainadamantin theirinsistence on a mythicalform of this remembrance.

Germanhistoriansand students of history- and let me add thisveryexpressly to my "Plea"- have the obligation to understandthat vic-tims of Nazi persecutionand theirbereavedrelativescan even regarditas a forfeitureof the rightto their form of memory if historicalresearchon contemporary history, operating only in scientific terms, makesclaims in its academicarroganceto a monopoly when it comes to ques-tions and concepts pertainingto the Nazi period. Respect for the vic-tims of Nazi crimes demands that this mythicalmemory be grantedaplace. Moreover,there is no prerogativehere of one side or the other.Whether the juxtaposition of scientific insight and mythical memoryrepresentsa fruitfultension also depends, to be sure, on whether theformer is able to provide productive images and insights, or whether itis based only on a coarsening - with the passage of time - of the data


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Broszat and Friedldnder 91

of history:on a process involving the forgetting of details still familiarto contemporaries and of the imponderable elements of genuine his-torical events. Among the problems faced by a younger generation ofGerman historiansmore focused on rationalunderstanding is certain-ly also the fact that they must deal with just such a contraryform ofmemory among those who were persecuted and harmed by the Naziregime, and among their descendants - a form of memory whichfunctions to coarsen historical recollection.In your collection of essays entitledKitschundTod,you dealt with va-

rious literaryforms into which such mythical remembrance has beentransposed. Perhapsyou paid too little attention there to a fact whichappears to me of greatsignificance in this regard:namely that, in theirnonscientific way, many such literary,mythical images of the Nazi ex-perience furnish us with insights. Such insights are, in the best sense ofthe term, "intelligent,"and are thus quite compatible with the growingneed for a better scientific understanding of this past.

IIDear Mr. Broszat,The present context is certainlya most adequate frameworkfor athoughtfulclarificationof the themes outlined in your "Plea"(aswell asin some previousarticles),and of some of the criticalremarksexpressedin my "Reflections."'I am gratefulto you for suggestingthis possibilityand to the editors of the Vierteljahresheftefor acceptingthe idea.In the opening statementto our discussion, you may have given theimpression that my criticism of your text was much sharper and lesstentativethan it was. But,we seem to agreeon what explains partof thecriticism,namely that the concept of historicization,as you formulatedit in the "Plea," was "ambiguous and easily misconstrued" and ledthereby to some incomprehension and some misuse too, particularlywithin the context of the Historikerstreit.Some difficulties, however,seemed inherent in the concept itself. In any case, your statement putin focus some of the main issues and brought up at least one crucial

1. Originally published in English as "Some Reflections on the Historicization ofNational Socialism," TelAvivJahrbuchfiir DeutscheGeschichte16 (1987).


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new theme, possibly the most important of all.1. The historicalorigins of the general and wholesale distancing fromthe Nazi era,within the postwarWest Germancontext, are clear to me.But our discussion is not about the general scene; it is about historiog-raphy. My impression was that, since the early 1960s at least - let ustake K. D. Bracher's Die Auflisung der WeimarerRepublikas a symbolicstartingpoint - West German historiographyand the historiographyof the Nazi era in general adopted, all in all, a reasonably detached,non-moralistic approach. As far as precise and detailed inquiry goes,this historiographywas certainlyas strictlyscientific as that of anyotherperiod. You know the impact of your own work,as well as that of HansMommsen, for instance. Thousands of studies have dealt with all pos-sible subjects, from all possible angles. Nowhere do I see "moralism"or, as a matter of fact, some kind of "overall blockade" which wouldhave hampered the normal development of scientific inquiry. Alltags-geschichtemay have been criticized for conceptual reasons, but this didnot stop it from becoming a flourishing field.You were possibly right in pointing to the "monumental" presenta-tion of the Widerstandand, in general, in stressing the existence ofmuch more confusion and normalcy in many areas of life during theNazi era, in emphasizing similaritiesmore than clear-cut differencesinattitudes of various groups (your examples in the literaryfield, for in-stance), etc. In short, you ask for a greater perception of complexityand ambiguity, but again, although this process of differentiation isstill going on, and will by definition go on as long as historicalinquiryitself, one cannot say that historians have been unaware of thecomplexities of the overallpicturefor the last 25 or 30 years.It so hap-pens that, more than 20 years ago, I myself published a biography ofKurt Gerstein with the subtitle "Die Zwiespiltigkeitdes Guten" (Paris,1967; Gtitersloh, 1969), where the ambiguity of individual positionsand roles, even within the SS,even within the annihilation machinery,was at the very core of my argument.In short, all this being well known, one may wonder what blockadethe "Plea"was tryingto lift,whatyet unopened door it wished to open.And, as your articles, those of 1983 and that of 1985, were somehowpleas for a massive change in historiographicalattitudes toward theNazi era, one could wonder what the boundary was which you wishedto cross. Sometimes, you express your aim in general formulas, butthese general formulas leave uncertainty about what you have in mind.


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For instance, you conclude your 1983 article "Literatur und NS-Vergangenheit"with the following lines:Ourreflectionon thisperiodfromthevantageof alengthyspanof50 yearsshouldfinallyalso help us to disengageourselvesto agreaterextent from the false notion of the dominantnegativecentralityof NationalSocialismin German20th-centuryhistory.2

You will understand that for those who are awareof the ongoing de-batesabout the Sonderwneg,who know that the place of the Nazi erawithinGermanhistoryis the objectof the most diverse and unhampered opin-ions, such a call, with the wordfinally,sounds puzzling. In short, howshould one understand the "Plea"in relation to the historiographicalwork of the last decades?Why a "Plea?"Where is the "blockade?"The discrepancy between the general state of the historiographyofthe Nazi epoch and the tone of urgencyof your "Plea" can give the im-pression that you aim, in fact, at a very significantchange of focus inconsidering the overallpicture, along some of the lines which I tried todefine in my "Reflections:"relativizationof the political sphere; can-cellation of distancing; historical evaluation of the Nazi epoch as if itwere as removed from us as 16th-centuryFrance ...2. Within the theoretical frameworkwhich you outline, you write thathistorical Verstehencannot "come to a halt with the Nazi period." Yousuggest, as a possible approach, a criticalunderstanding,thatis, if I fol-low you correctly, a balanced "historical insight" based on the con-stant interactionof Verstehenand of "criticalevaluation."The questionis: What does it mean concretely?

The immediate problem is that of the limits. There is no reason toargue againstyour endeavor on any theoreticalground, but in practiceyou may indeed encounter the difficultyto which I pointed in my "Re-flections." We both quote approvingly Hermann Rudolph's "FalscheFronten?"and, indeed, it was one of the more original contributionsto the Historikerstreit.But what is Rudolph's concrete point, the one rel-evant here? Historicization as you pursue it is necessary, he says, butone cannot praise it, as Jiirgen Habermas did and, at the same timeheavily attack Andreas Hillgruber's position in ZweierleiUntergang:

2. Hermann Graml and Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ed., Nach Hitler.Der schwierigeUmgangmit unsererGeschichte.BeitrdgevonMartinBroszat(Munich:R. Oldenbourg, 1986)130.


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"One cannot actively accelerate this process of differentiation," writesRudolph, "and simultaneously continue to look back in disgust." There,really, lies your dilemma: Where are the limits of the Verstehen?Wheredoes the critical distancing intervene? There is no difficulty as far as theovertly criminal domains are concerned, but what about the Wehr-macht units holding the Eastern front in 1944/45? I do not want to de-velop all the contradictions into which this, by now notorious, exam-ple could lead, in the light of your theoretical premises, but it would beextremely helpful if you agreed to comment on it, as it is almost a lit-mus test of the applicability of the widened historical insight you possi-bly have in mind.3. I wonder, however, if one of the main reasons for your "Plea" and,therefore, part of the answer to my previous questions is not to befound in the third and last section of your statement. It is the percep-tion of the NS-era held by "the victims" of the Nazi regime which couldwell be the main locusof the moralistic approach. Here is the problemthat historiography - and you say "German historiography" - has toface. You express respect for what you consider as the specific memoryof the victims, but you call it a "mythical" memory and you conclude:

Among the problems faced by a younger generation of Germanhistorians more focused on rational understanding is certainlyalso the fact that they must deal withjust such a contraryform ofmemory among those who were persecuted and harmed by theNazi regime, and among their descendants - a form of memorywhich acts to coarsen historicalrecollection.I assume, first of all, that we do not speak here of popularGeschichtsbilder,but of the work of historians. In the "Plea" you men-tioned that, after the war, the history of the Nazi era was essentiallywritten by historians who had been forced to leave Germany for politi-cal or racial reasons, or had placed themselves at a strong critical dis-tance from Nazism. This certainly influenced the image they had ofthis era. What you imply here is that the victims or their descendantscontinue, even after four decades, to hold to this kind of nonscientific,black-and-white "mythical" memory, creating in fact the problem youallude to.This issue will, I think, be very central to our debate. It has not been

openly dealt with up to now and it is important for all that it be broughtto the surface and clarified. Let me therefore try to understand your


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point as well as possible and askyou, at the outset, who, more precise-ly, would be the historians belonging to the category of carriers of a"mythical" memory.I assume that the Jewish victims (and their descendants) are the es-sential category you have in mind. It would be useful to know, how-ever, if non-JewishFrench historians for instance,belonging, let us say,to families involved in the Resistance, or just French historians, con-sidered among many others, would be included in your category.And,if you limit the categoryto theJews, who is included? Those who weredirect victims of Nazism and their descendants only, or all the Jews?You once expressed your admirationfor such pioneers of the analysisof Nazism, all of them Jewish emigres, such as Ernst Fraenkel,FranzNeumann and Hannah Arendt. Are they, retrospectively,included inyour analysis?And what aboutJewish historianswho, lateron, openedvistas which correspond to your own interpretationof the history ofthe Third Reich?A second preliminaryaspect of the issue seems to me no less impor-tant than the preceding one. You oppose the rationaldiscourse of Ger-man historiographyto the mythical memory of the victims. You men-tion younger German historians as the natural bearers of this rationaldiscourse. Some of these younger historiansare, it so happens, amongthe most sensitive to the moral issues raisedby the historyof the ThirdReich. But why refer to the younger historians? The recent debateshave all been conducted among a great majorityof historiansbelong-ing, on the German side, to the "generationof Hitler Youth," at least,sometimes belonging to families considered as involved at the time,etc. Do not misunderstand me: I feel strong empathy with those bear-ing such difficult burdens, but wouldn't you agree that this Germancontext createsas many problems in the approach to the Nazi era as itdoes, differently,for the victims? This point, which you seem to havedisregarded, was a decisive argument in the "Reflections."Allow meto quote a few words from my text:

Thispast[theNSera]is stillmuch toopresentforpresent-dayhis-torians, be they German or Jewish in particular,be theycontemporariesof the Nazi era or membersof the second andperhapsthirdgenerations,to enableaneasyawarenessof presup-positionsand of a prioripositions.

But, if we see things from your perspective, why, in your opinion,


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would historiansbelonging to the group of the perpetratorsbe able todistance themselves from their past, whereas those belonging to thegroup of the victims, would not?These are really preliminaryissues. As for the historicalplace of the"Final Solution" (asa paradigmaticillustrationof the criminal dimen-sions of the Nazi era)within an overallrepresentationof that erawhichshould not be "dominantly negative" (iibermdchtignegativ),we should, itseems to me, come back to it in our next exchange.

IIIOctober 26, 1987Dear Mr. Friedlainder,Your objections provide abundant material for our continued ex-change of ideas. Naturally, they also point up all the difficulties en-tailed in a German-Jewishdiscussion on the presentationand remem-brance of the Nazi period. Some time ago, you expressed the appre-hension that a heightened move back to one's own historical experi-ence and concerns among both Germans andJews could serve to wid-en even further the gap in a contrastive and opposed presentation ofthis period. This danger certainly exists, and I would like later on tospeak a bit about a few aspects in this regardwhich also disturb me.Yetperhaps one should view the situationwith a certain sense of confi-dence. In view of the liveliness of the controversies - but also of the

new kind of reflection being generated, as I see it, by the Historikerstreit- I wonder whether there might not indeed be new possibilitiesemerging here as well for German-Jewishdialogue, a dialogue whichhas to date been neglected.One must ask: Did this dialogue - which Gershom Scholem even25 years ago called a mere myth' - indeed ever take place as a publicevent? When it comes to this "dialogue," is not the same thingbasically true with respect to the German side which I have criticizedregarding the official German "mastering of the past:" Namely, thatdespite all its merits in setting the fundamentally correct political and

1. Gershom Scholem, "Wider den Mythos vom deutsch-jiidischen Gesprach,"JudaicaII (Frankfurtam Main: SuhrkampVerlag, 1970) 7ff.


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moral tone, it has remained floundering for some time now in declam-atory statements, devoid of any strength or imagination for historicalreflection that might also be morally innovative? In German-Jewishdiscussions on recent history which have taken place in increasingnumbers in Israel, the Federal Republic and elsewhere for two dec-ades, isn't it true that an open expression of a good many of the partic-ularlysensitive,most opposed sentiments, feelings and memories havebeen avoided - either consciously or unconsciously - because other-wise it would have been impossible even to initiate contacts for such adiscussion in the first place? Consequently, is it really so terribly sur-prising if now, afterthe need on both sides (forwhateverreasons) hasgrown stronger to give expression to such elements of memory, thatthis is quite naturally taking place associated with every possible kindof awkwardness,mutual offense and counterreactiondue to woundedfeelings - because it is new and untried, and there is little fund of ex-perience on which to draw?Yet I do not wish to see this simply as areason for being discouraged. Please accept this thought, tentative as itis, also as my first response to the especially insistent and pressingquestions you pose in the final section of your contribution. In the fol-lowing, I do not intend to take up your important objections one byone. Rather,I wish once again to try to put forwardmy position in re-spect to several larger complexes.It is a fundamental misunderstanding of the concept of historiciza-tion, as I have sketched it, to assume that it involves a revision-brought about consciously or by negligence - of the clearjudgmenton and condemnation of the dictatorial, criminal, inhumane aspectsand measures of the Nazi regime, aspectsand measures which have bynow been researched and documented in detail and at length. Thatjudgment has been firmly established within the historical sciences inWest Germanyfor some time, and with almost 100%unanimity. Thislikewise holds true in fundamental terms when it comes to ErnstNolte. Rather, the making conscious of the process of historicization- a process which in factual terms has been going on now for sometime - or the plea for greaterhistoricizationof the Nazi period, aimsmore at a meaningful continuation,at anewstagein dealing with the Nazipast (in the discipline of history as well as in public discussion), onthebasisof this evaluationof the essential political-moralcharacterof Nazirule. This is an evaluationwhich is now indeed quite firmlyestablished.Such a call for greater historicization proceeds from the assumption


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that despite the colossal expansion of detailed historical research onthe Nazi period which you allude to, the total image of the period asreflectedin public consciousness and in comprehensive historiograph-ic treatments has remained strangely shadowy and insubstantial,pre-cisely because of the "obligatory"and preeminent underscoringof thephilosophical-political basic features. It is more often a black-and-white constructviewed in retrospectratherthan a geneticallyunfoldingmultidimensional history; it is a landscape inhabited less by plastic,psychologicallyconvincingfiguresthan by typesand stereotypesdrawnfrom the conceptual vocabularyof political science. It is framed moreby moral-didactic commentary than by historicalreport. It is formu-lated in the more-or-less emotional or abstract-academiclanguage ofhistorianswhose embarrassment,disconcertedness vis-i-vis the historyof National Socialismalso manifests itself in the fact that they refuse togrant that history the true and genuine means of communication em-ployed by historicalpresentation - namely, narrativelanguage.What is basicallymeant by historicizationis an attempt to breakupand dissolve such stereotypes, embarrassment constraints and over-generalizations.It does not imply any softening of the political-moraljudgment on the unjust characterof the Nazi regime, even if it mustwork out the pluralityof historicallines of action andhistoricalsubjects,not all of which can be categorizedin terms of the political systemandideology of Nazism. In this sense, I spoke in 1983, within the frame-work of whatwas more some sort of ancillaryobservationon literatureduring the Nazi period, about the falseconception, which ought "final-ly" to be overcome, "of a dominant and all-powerful negative,centralposition of National Socialism"in all areas of life during the Nazi peri-od. Unfortunately,whatyou then did was to takethis quote and place itin another context, thus giving it a misleading meaning.Apparently,however, in the matterjust alluded to we also have dif-fering conceptions. In your "Reflections,"you contend that becauseNazism was fundamentally criminal, even those institutional and so-cial spheres which were little contaminated by the Nazi ideology (in-dustry,bureaucracy,the military,churches, etc.) should be viewed pri-marily from the perspective of whether - and how - they served tomaintain Nazi rule. "Even nonparticipation and passivity"were "assuch elements serving to stabilize the system."2From the perspective

2. Christian Meier, 40 Jahre nach Auschwitz. Deutsche Geschichtserinnerungheute(Munich: Deutscher Kunstverlag,1987) 42ff.


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of the victims of National Socialist persecution - and, in particular,Jewish experience - in view of the large number of "bystanders,"who did not aid the regime in its measures of persecution, this stand-point is certainlyunderstandable. Formulatedin absolute terms, how-ever, it would serve to block important avenues of access to historicalknowledge, and would also hardly satisfy the demands of historicaljustice.I sense something similarwhen it comes to your strong reservationsand doubts regardingalmost all the newer perspectivesof historicalin-quiry into the Nazi period, such as the study of Alltagsgeschichte(every-day history) or the social-historical approach, especially insofar asthese approaches exceed the bounds of the political sphere and politi-cal period of 1933-1945. You view this - and quite narrow-mindedlyin my opinion - merely, or primarily,as an attemptto deflect interestfrom the political-ideologicalcore of events. In my opinion, in arguingthis way you fail to give proper consideration to the fact that only bythe inclusion of such other perspectives do many aspects of the ques-tion as to how Nazi rule was able to develop become comprehensible.Only by including such perspectivescan numerous "shearingforces,"as it were, lying outside of ideology and politics be rendered visible forthe first time. This in no way alters the judgment about the crimes ofthe Nazis; yet it helps make more comprehensible why such large seg-ments of a civilized nation succumbed mistakenly - and to such amassive degree - to National Socialism and Hider. Historicization inthis sense also means, above all else, an attempt to remove some partof that barrierwhich would make this period in history appear to be acompletely strange and alien phenomenon.ChristianMeierwas correctin his recent reference to this point. Fora long time, not only the Germans in the GDR but in the FederalRe-public as well, which claims to be the successor state of the GermanReich,were unwilling to accept this successor status,but ratherhad ac-customed themselves to presenting Germanhistoryprior to 1945 withdistancing, like the history of a foreign people. We wrote about thishistory only in the third person, and not in the firstperson plural;wewere no longer able to feel that this historywas somehow dealing withourselves, and was "our thing."3Historicization, which wishes to con-tributeto lifting this barrier,is not an attempt to place the Nazi period

3. SaulFriedlknder,"Uberlegungen zur Historisierungdes Nationalsozialismus,"Dan Diner, ed., Ist der NationalsozialismusGeschichte?42.


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in some compartment reserved for dead history. Rather, its intentionis to createthe prerequisitefor rendering it at all possible for this utter-ly depraved chapterin Germanhistoryto become capable of being in-tegrated once again as a portion of one's own national history.What I comprehend least of all is your criticismregardingthe inten-tion and manner of "everydayhistory"of the Nazi period, as we havebeen endeavoringto develop the approachin the InstitutfiirZeitgeschichtein Munich since the mid-1970s within the frameworkof the long-term"BavariaProject."What we have focused on here is the previouslymuch-neglected task of renderinghistoricalmemories comprehensibleand infusing them with life, an endeavor which quite specificallydoesnot seek to exclude the politicaland moral elements, but tries rathertoprovide them with a new foundation by means of concretization.One such example of concretization involved rendering the motivesof erring small-time Nazi supportersmore transparentvia the detailedpresentation of a specific local milieu during the emergency, thus di-vesting the concept "Nazi" of its characteras a mere catchword.It wasalso achieved, when, through the plastic portrayalof individuals andcases of brave resistance on a small scale, the exaggeratedconcept ofthe basic resistance was once again imbued with fidelity to historicalreality, thus opening up for the reader a new approach to the topic,both via the path of Verstehenand that of moral empathy (Nachvollzug).Or it was accomplished in still another manner:for example, when theJews, the "objects" of this persecution, often degraded to mere ab-stractions in the description of Nazi persecution, took on palpableform in their concrete local and social milieu, and it became possible- through the presentation of concrete exemplary instances - tomake visible the so heavily poisoned relationship between Germansand Jews under the conditions prevailing during Nazi rule.Documentation and studies focusing on local and everydayhistory,like those of the "BavariaProject,"were able to unearth a profusion ofpreviously unknown facts for the first time, specifically in regard towhat remains the centralquestion in moral terms - namely, what de-gree of involvement in the murderous persecution ofJews by the Naziregime the majorityof our people can be accused of, and what mannerof guilt they incurred, also by failing to provide assistanceand sympa-thy. It is not enough that the treatment of the Nazi period express theretrospectivelycorrect moral view of its more-or-less smug and self-satisfied authors. As little as history can ill afford to get along "without


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Broszatand Friedlinder 101

distinguishingbetween good and evil" - as Dolf Sternbergerrecentlypointed out in a thoughtful reflectivecommentary on the Historikerstreit- it likewisecannotdo without "asympatheticand involved interest."4In conclusion, I would like to take up once again the problem ofGerman andJewish historical memory and - at your special sugges-tion - the role of Auschwitzwithin this historicalmemory. I believe Imade clear that what I mean by "mythical memory" is precisely aform of remembrance located outside the framework of (GermanandJewish) historical science. However, such remembrance is by nomeans simply the negative opposite pole to scholarship and scientificmethod; it is not simply erroneous or coarsened historical memory.Preciselywhen confronted with the inexpressible events of the Holo-caust, many Jews have indeed come to regard as indispensable aritualized, almost historical-theological remembrance, interwovenwith other elements of Jewish fundamental world-historical experi-ence, alongside the mere dry historical reconstruction of facts - be-cause the incommensurability of Auschwitz cannot be dealt with inany other way.

For this reason, there probably is no need to provide an answer tothose additional and very artificialquestions regarding my classifica-tion, as imputed by you, of varioushistorians,Jewish and German.Wecertainlyboth agree that such great emigre German-JewishscholarsasHannah Arendt, Franz Neumann and Ernst Fraenkel achieved pio-neering insights into the nature of National Socialism, viewed in partprecisely from the vantage of a longer-range historical perspective -insights whose importance was not recognized and utilized by Ger-man researchon recent historysufficientlyuntil at best fifteen to twen-ty years later.What remains for us a difficult problem - one that may lie at thevery center of our differing conceptions, though it need not necessarilybe a line of demarcationseparatingthe perspectivesofJewish and Ger-man historians - is that the magnitude and singularityof the horrify-ing events of the destruction of theJews call not only for a mythical in-terpretation;rather, they also necessitate a retrospective constructionof diabolical causation in historicalpresentation which is comparablein scale. Consequently, this need has repeatedly come into conflict

4. Dolf Stemberger,"Unzusammenhangende Notizen ilber Geschichte"Merkur9(1987): 748.


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with the political-scientificdiscovery of the "banalityof evil" by Han-nah Arendt or with other historicaltreatmentswhich demonstratethatthe full magnitude of this crime was made up of a multitude of oftenvery small contributingelements, and of frequently negligible portionsof guilt.A point is reached in confronting the singular event of Auschwitzwhere scientific comprehensibility and explicability are doubtless faroutstripped by the sheer epochal significance of the event. For thatreason, Auschwitz has in retrospect rightfullybeen felt againand againindeed to be the central event of the Nazi period - and this not onlybyJews. Consequently, Auschwitz also plays a central role in the WestGermanhistorical treatment of the Nazi period - in school books, forexample - as can be readily shown. And in the face of the especiallyintensiveJewish memory of the Holocaust, it may well be that such in-tensity causes other deeds and outrages perpetrated by the ThirdReich to pale and fade away more and more in the memory of theworld. Yet this potential of Holocaust memory also tends retrospec-tively toward the creation of a new hierarchyand ordering of the fac-tors shaping history, i.e., an attempt to unfurl the entire historyof theThird Reich in reverse fashion backwardsstartingfrom Auschwitz, in-stead of unfolding its development in a forwarddirection, in keepingwith historicalmethodology.When viewed retrospectively,one historical fact must be juxtaposedto the centralityof Auschwitz:namely, that the liquidation of theJewswas only feasible during the perod of time in which it actually wascarried out specifically because that liquidation was not in the lime-light of events, but rather could largely be concealed and kept quiet.Such concealment was possible because this destructioninvolved a mi-noritywhich even many yearsbefore had been systematicallyremovedfrom the field of vision of the surroundingnon-Jewishworld as a resultof social ghettoization. The ease with which the centralityof the "FinalSolution" was carriedout became a possibility because the fate of theJews constituted a little-noticed matter of secondary importance forthe majority of Germans during the war; and because for the alliedenemies of Germany, it was likewise only one among a multitude ofproblems they had to deal with during the war, and by no means themost important one.It is evident that the role of Auschwitz in the originalhistoricalcon-text of action is one that is significantly different from its subsequent


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importance in terms of later historicalperspective.The German histo-rian too will certainly accept that Auschwitz - due to its singularsig-nificance - functions in retrospectionas the central event of the Naziperiod. Yet qua scientist and scholar, he cannot readily accept thatAuschwitz also be made, after the fact, into the cardinal point, thehinge on which the entire factual complex of historical events of theNazi period turns. He cannot simply accept without further ado thatthis entire complex of historybe moved into the shadow of Auschwitz- yes, that Auschwitz even be made into the decisive measuring-rodfor the historical perception of this period. Such a perspective wouldnot only serve,afterthe fact, to force totallyunder its usurped domina-tion those non-National Socialist German traditions which extendedon into the Nazi period and, due to their being "appropriated"by theregime, to a certain extent themselves fell prey to National Socialism.Above all else it would fail to do justice to the immense number ofnon-German and non-Jewishvictims, who also have their own - anddifferent - monuments of memory.

IVDear Mr. Broszat,Each exchange, indeed, opens many new vistas in our discussion.Let me, at the outset, try again to clarifythe reasons for the possiblemisinterpretationof your "Plea"as a demand for some kind of revis-ion of the traditionalhistorical representation of the Nazi epoch.In our first exchange of letters, we agreed that the ambiguity of thehistoricizationconcept led, by itself, to many misunderstandings, andI added some remarks about the possibly problematic aspects of theconcept as such, even when correctlyunderstood. But there is more toit. It seems to me that the aspect of the "Plea"which raisedmost ques-tions was the way in which the sequence of your argumentsended in ageneralization about the moral evaluation of the Nazi epoch.The sequence could be read as follows: after the war, a black-and-white picture of the Nazi era was imposed by an essentially emigre-dominated historiography,creatingsome kind of moralistic "counter-myth," as Ernst Nolte would put it. This stereotypical,simplisticrepre-sentation seemed to endure, notwithstanding the passage of time.


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Now, after several decades, a change became imperative and you out-lined the methodological aspects of that change, aspects which I myselfanalyzed in my "Reflections." It is at this point that what seemed to bethe logical outcome of your argumentation - and these were the con-cluding lines of your text - found its expression:

The general and wholesale distancing from the Nazi past is alsoanother form of suppression and tabooing ... To eliminate thisblockade in favor of an attempt to achieve a deepening of moralsensibility toward history in general, specificallybased on the ex-perience of National Socialism - that is the meaning of this pleafor its historicization.'This conclusion was meant, I am sure, to overcome the moral paral-

ysis, the declamatory and ritual aspect which you impute to much thatwas written about Nazism over the last three decades. But wideningthe moral perception of the Nazi epoch to the whole of history as such,that is, making it boundless and, therefore, hard to define and to ap-ply, except for general formulas about good and evil, could easily beunderstood as a thrust toward some kind of overall relativization of themoral problems specificallyraisedby Nazism: This may have created thefeeling that your idea of historicization as expressed in the "Plea" wasquite far-reaching.You criticized what you considered to be my rejection of new histor-ical approaches. Obviously, I am not opposed to social history of theNazi era or to Alltagsgeschichteas such. In my "Reflections," I stated sev-eral times that, for the historian, the widening and nuancing of the pic-ture was of the essence. But the "historicization," as you presented itand as was already discussed here, could mean not so much a widen-ing of the picture, as a shiftoffocus. From thatperspective, the insistenceon Alltag or on long-range social trends could indeed strongly relativ-ize what I still consider as the decisive historiographical approach tothat period, an approach which considers these twelve years as a defi-nable historical unit dominated, first of all, by the "primacy of poli-tics." If we agree that this is the core, every additional differentiation isnot only important, but necessary. My methodological "traditional-ism" should be understood only in the context of my initial reading ofthe sense of the "Plea." As far as Alltagsgeschichteis concerned, however,

1. Graml and Henke ed., Nach Hitler 172-173.


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I am of two minds. Some of the criticismsexpressed at the colloquiumwhich you yourself organized around the BavariaProject and whichcarried the pertinent title Alltagsgeschichte:neue Perspektivenoder Trivialis-ierung?do not seem unconvincing to me. But, as an example will showfurther on, many insights can obviously be drawn from the Alltag.It would be helpful to clarifyone more methodological point: yourinsistence on the narrativeapproachas the only possible historical ap-proach for the Gesamtdarstellungyou have in mind. In the "Plea,"youcriticized the fact that up to now when the historian turns to the Naziera, "the abilityto feel one's way emphatically into the web of histori-cal interconnections comes to a halt, as does the pleasure in historicalnarration."In your second letter,you insist on the narrativeapproachand have hard things to say about conceptual history of the Nazi era.This was not your position when you wrote your TheHitlerState,and Iassume that it is the constant awarenessof the nuances of each specificsituation, as brought to the fore in the BavariaProject,which led youto change your theoretical approach.One could argue about conceptual history versus traditionalnarra-tive until doomsday and come to no result. I am curious to see, howev-er - and this is said without any irony - where, once we get the kindof total presentation you call for, the "pleasure in historical narration"will find its expression. It is not the "narrow"viewpoint of the victims Itry to express, but something else. What created the distancing, whateliminated the normal historical empathy is not only the criminal di-mension of the regime, but also the abhorrentvision of nationalistex-altation, of frenetic self-glorificationwhich so rapidly penetrated prac-tically all domains of public life and so much of private life, too.Other regimes have demonstrated their capacityfor criminality,butat their beginnings at least, in their officialproclamations at least, theyaimed at universal ideals, at changing the condition of man. We knowwhat became of all this. Nonetheless, there can be a kind of ideologi-cally free "pleasure in historicalnarration"when we think of "the tendays that shook the world," possibly even when we recall the firstyearsof the Soviet experience, notwithstandingone's personal commitmentto liberalism. The universalist dream is there in all its power. Nothingof that exists in Nazism. For other reasons, millions of people still feelhistorical understanding and empathy when they think of the RedArmy crossing the borders of the Reich. For Andreas Hillgruber, thiscould be the viewpoint of the victims of Nazism only, and his


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"pleasure in historical narration" was awakened by the desperate re-sistance of the Wehrmacht.But for you, where could that domain be?Don't you think that, seen from the angle of narrativehistoryand the"pleasurein historicalnarration,"my argumentabout the possible re-appearance of some kind of historicism is not entirely unfounded?Let me now respond, very scantily, to what, in fact, would requiremuch longer considerations:your thoughts about the place of"Ausch-witz" within the Gesamtdarstellungof the Nazi epoch. Firstof all, when Ispeak of "Auschwitz" in this context, I refer to Nazi annihilationpolicies toward various categories of victims. As I mentioned at theend of my first letter, I consider Auschwitz as a paradigmaticexpres-sion of Nazi criminality.In that sense, the implicit meaning of the lastline of your second letter does not correspond to my thinking.You state - and we obviously agree - that for any historian of theNazi epoch, Auschwitz is the salient "event," because of its specificityand incommensurability. It seems to me that JiurgenHabermas re-cently expressed this specificityand incommensurabilityin particular-ly strong terms:

Somethingtookplacehere(inAuschwitz,S.F.)whichupuntilthattime no one had even thought might be possible. A deep stratumof solidarity between all that bears a human countenance wastouched here. The integrityof this deep stratumhad, up until thattime, remained unchallenged, and this despite all the naturalbestialitiesof world history.... Auschwitz has altered the condi-tions for the continuityof historical life connections - not only inGermany.2You write that this incommensurability of Auschwitz calls for amythicalcreativememory to help in reachingany kind of understand-

ing. Historiography, indeed, does not suffice. This being said, I agreewith you that the historian, as historian,cannot consider the Nazi erafrom its catastrophic end only. According to the accepted historicalmethod, we have to start at the beginning and follow the manifoldpaths as they present themselves, including numerous developmentswithin German society which had little to do with Auschwitz, and thisthroughout the history of the era. But the historian knows the end

2. Jilrgen Habermas, Eine Art Schadensabwicklung(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,1987) 163.


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BroszatandFriedliinder 107

and he shares this knowledge with his reader. This knowledge shouldnot hamper the exploration of all the possible avenues and interpreta-tions, but it compels the historian to choose the central elementsaround which his unfolding narrativeis implicitly built. In short, wecome back to the problem of the dominant focus. Nobody would ar-gue that a whole chapter on social security cannot be included in aGesamtdarstellung,but even if you show the normalcy of everydaylife,even if you stress the split consciousness, the main thrust of your nar-rativeprogresses toward an end that you know very well.All this leads to the two arguments outlined toward the end of yoursecond letter and which seem to me to be central to your entire dem-onstration.Their validitywould allow, up to a point, the integrationofAuschwitz within the general frameworkof the historicization of theNazi epoch, as outlined in the "Plea."First,you indicate that the very singularityand incommensurabilityof Auschwitz not only leads to a necessary search for some kind ofmythical interpretation,but that, on the level of historiography,it alsoleads (only for some historians, obviously) to a reconstruction of thechain of events, as if these had been initiated by equally singular, al-most demonic, causes. This creates, for scientific historiography, thekind of problem which you alreadymentioned in your first letter. Inyour opinion, the answeris to be found in Hannah Arendt's theory of"the banality of evil."Secondly, you write that the centralityof Auschwitz, as we perceive ittoday, was not perceived during the events, as theJews had been pro-gressivelyisolated from the surrounding populations, the annihilation

was kept totally secret, and even the allies did not consider it a centralissue.Both the "banalityof evil" and the non-perception of the events byGerman society are clearlyessential for the historicization of NationalSocialism. Let me try to relate to both points, albeit in inverse order,and, necessarily, in the most schematic terms.Let us startwith what people knew or did not know. As far as Ger-many is concerned, the most recent studies of this problem - the oneby Ian Kershawin his revised English edition of The'HitlerMyth':ImageandRealityin theThirdReich3and an excellent study in Alltagsgeschichte,3. Ian Kershaw,The'HitlerMyth':ImageandRealityin theThirdReich(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1987); see particularly Chapter 9: "Hitler's Popular Image and the'Jewish Question'" 229ff.


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H. and S. Obenaus's Schreiben,wie es wirklichwar!.. .4 - indicate thatthe general population was much more aware of what was happeningto the Jews than we thought up to now. But why not quote your owntexts, for instance your 1983 article, "Zur Struktur der NS-Massenbewegung," where you write, concerning what the populationknew of the extermination policies against the Jews:

The Nazi leadership was thus itself plagued by the strongestdoubts as to whether the full knowledge of the crimes it had initi-ated would find popular support. Yet these persecutionswere notso completely and totally evident and visible. And especially theanti-human basic conception from which they were derived - inparticular,the fanatical hatredof theJews - was repeatedlygivenexpression by the leadership in public on almost every occasion.Thus, there was certainlya social basis of response for this.5More telling even is the remark you make at the end of the same ar-ticle concerning the possible reasons for the passivity of the German

population, even as the end approached: "One factor involved hereapparently was also the consciousness that one had a shared complici-ty in the excesses and crimes of the regime."6In short, although the destruction of the Jews may have been a mi-nor point in the perceptions and policies of the allies during the war, itseems, more and more, that it loomed as a hidden but perceived factin many German minds during the war itself.If my point is correct, it has considerable importance in relation tothe core thesis of your "Plea." Indeed, normal life with the knowledgeof ongoing massive crimes committed by one's own nation and one'sown society is not so normal after all....In your opinion, Hannah Arendt's "banality of evil" offers thehistoriographical answer to the kind of unacceptable constructs whichyou mentioned. Immense evil can result from a multitude of tiny, al-most unperceived and more or less banal individual initiatives. There

4. H. and S. Obenaus, "Schreiben,wie es wirklich war!" Aufzeichnungen KarlDuerkefaeldensaus denJahren 1933-1945 (Hannover, 1985) 107ff.5. Martin Broszat, "Zur Struktur der NS-Massenbewegung," VierteljahresheftefiirZeitgeschichte31 (1983): 74.6. Broszat, "Zur Struktur" 76 (I am grateful to Professor Otto Dov Kulka for draw-ing my attention to this article by Martin Broszat.)


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Broszat and Friedliinder 109

need not be an overridingevil design to achieve a totallyevil result. Buteven Hannah Arendt used other concepts when dealing with Nazismand the "Final Solution." You may recall that she spoke of "radicalevil," too, and that, in a famous letter to KarlJaspers, she consideredthe actions of the Nazis as not to be comprehended in normal cate-gories of guilt and punishment.7I do not know, by the way,who the historians arewho seek demoniccauses to explain Auschwitz. I know of some Germansand others whoput emphasis on ideology and on centrallydirected policies: This haslittle to do with demonology, and I cannot understandwhy you imputethis strangeposition to historiansbelonging to the group of the victims.Nobody denies the "banalityof evil" at many levels within this annihi-lation process, but it possibly is not the only explanation at all levels.In my opinion, partof the leadership and part of the followers, too,had the feeling of accomplishingsomething truly,historically,metahist-orically,exceptional. We both know Himmler's Posen speech of Octo-ber 1943 in its details.This is not the banalityof evil, this is not, as far astheJewish question is concerned, a pep talkto tired SS dignitaries;it isthe expression of a Rausch,the feeling of an almost superhuman enter-prise. That is why I would tend to consider some important aspects ofthe Nazi movement in terms of "politicalreligion," in the sense usedby EricVoegelin, Norman Cohn, KarlDietrichBracher,James Rhodes,Uriel Tal and many others. If we speak of a political religion, we comecloser again to the traditional framework, but from an angle whichleaves ample space for new investigations.That is what I meant in the"Reflections"when I referredto the stillnebulous relation between ide-ology and politics as far as, for instance, the "Final Solution"was con-cerned.And ifwe takethisangle,then, indeed, we aresomewhat at a dis-tance from theAlltagin Schabbach,but not veryfar from the Ordensburgenor from the insistenceof some of the commanders of the Einsatzgruppento stayon duty, not veryfar eitherfrom thatRauschwhich penetratedsofar and so deep and which wasnotjust the resultof a functionallyuseful"Hider-Myth."All this, too, somehow has to be interpretedwithin thecontinuity of German history. Here, no doubt, we agree.Finally,allowme some remarksaboutthe German-Jewishdialogue,its difficultiesand its possibilities.When GershomScholem,in the

7. Letterof 17 August 1946, HannahArendt- KarlJaspers,Briefwechsel,ed. LotteK6hler and Hans Saner (Munich: Piper, 1985) 88-93.


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text you mention, spoke of this dialogue as a myth, he referred firstofall to the pre-Nazi period, in which, possibly, the Jews in Germanycarried on a "dialogue" with themselves. After what happened be-tween 1933 and 1945, the idea of such a dialogue appearedto Scholemas a desecrationof the memory of the dead. He may have changed hismind later on, and his stay in Berlin, shortly before his death, mayhave been an expression of this change of mind.The fundamental difficultyof such a dialogue remains nonetheless,and is compounded by the layers of ritualized behavior and gross in-terests which cover it. You mentioned this difficultyin general terms,but you also referredto it in relationto the "pressing questions" whichI askedyou in the last part of my firstletter. These were not "pressingquestions:" itwas an attemptto understandwhatyou meant by oppos-ing the rationally oriented German historiography to the moremythically oriented memory of the victims. In your answer, you givecentral importance to the mythical memory and, as for the difficultiesof historiographyin the face of unacceptable constructs, you presentthem with less emphasis, but present them nonetheless, as I havejusttried to show.In case the change of emphasis in your second letter was more theexpression of a desire not to push too strongly a theme consideredoverly sensitive for our discussions, perhaps you would wish toreconsider. Some measure of openness belongs to our "experiment"and this openness, as you yourself noted, is the only possible basis fora true German-Jewishdialogue.

V December 4, 1987Dear Mr. Friedlander,I havegiven a greatdeal of thought to the question of the element ofconstraintor openness in our exchange of ideas in the wakeof your fi-nal remarkin your last letter.The difficultyinherent in our dialogue -and this we both agree on - is probably also manifested in this re-spect. Youyourself express it with a certaindegree of reservewhen youstate that "some measure of openness" is necessary. In the concluding


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section of your first letter, as in your "Reflections," you had alreadywarned about the danger of overestimating the possibilities of objec-tive scholarly-scientifictreatment of the Nazi period, since this periodwas still "much too present" and it was by no means an easy task forpresent day historiansto rid themselves of their prejudices or even tomake themselves conscious to these prejudices. Of course, I wonderwhether your skepticism necessarilyhas to burden our discourse withsuch a high degree of suspicion, which I repeatedly can sense behindyour comments and remarks.Thus, I find it very meaningful that in connection with the above-mentioned admonition you also conjecture that certain positions ofthe Historikerstreitin the Federal Republic may perhaps be indeedbound up with the fact that the German historians involved in that de-bate "belong to the generation of Hider Youth." In the context of ourcorrespondence and what occasioned it, this remark should probablyalso categorize my plea for historicizationas being a need of the gener-ation of Hitler Youth.A few paragraphsbefore that,you challenge mein your first letter to apply the concept of "critical understanding"which I make use of to the example put forwardby AndreasHillgruberof the "German Wehrmacht units which held the Eastern front in

1944/45" (and thus also helped to maintain the concentration camps).You contend that that would constitute "almost a litmus test," and it isyour belief I should not be spared that test. In your second letter, youbroached the matter of Hillgruber's identification with the Easternfront and inquired as to whether my "delight in historical narration"might perhapswish to seize upon this topic aswell, or some other one.

Do you really believe, Mr. Friedlander, that such questions aremerely pensive and reflective,rather than "pressing"and constraining,thatthey serveto promote the openness of our dialogue - and do notengender embarrassing constraint? Haven't you yourself staked outsuch definite positions in your suspicious distrust of possible tenden-cies toward trivialization and minimization in dealing with the Naziperiod in the work of German historians, in particularthose of thegeneration of Hitler Youth - as expressed in articlesyou have pub-lished and lectures you have given (specifically,for some time now, inthe form of a critique of my "Plea")- that you are no longer able tobreak free from and abandon these positions, even here in this ex-change of letters? Wasn't, for example, the dispute you had several


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yearsago with Syberberg'sand others' treatmentsof the Nazi period infilms or imaginativeliterature'- in itself a quite fascinatingconfronta-tion - shaped and determined to an excessive degree by such a pessi-mistic suspicious distrust? In so doing, haven'tyou also erecteda fencearound yourself, one which only permits you "some measure of open-ness?"First I would like to say something about the topic of the generationof Hider Youth, to which I belong (born 1926);these remarks are notonly intended in reference to my own case, but are broaderin implica-tion. Initially,allow me a very personal comment: If I myself had notbeen a member of the generation of Hitler Youth, if I had not livedthrough its very specific experiences, then I probably would not havefelt such a need after1945 to confront the Nazi past so criticallyand, aswe sensed back then, to do this at the same time with "solemn sobrie-ty." As a member of that generation,one had the good fortune of notyet being drawn(orbeing drawnonly marginally)into political respon-sibilityfor actions. Yet one was old enough to be affectedemotionallyand intellectuallyto a high degree by the suggestivity- so confoundingto feeling and to one's sense of morality- which the Nazi regime wascapableof, especiallyin the sphere of youth education, and this despitethe counter-influencestemming from parents, teachers and acquaint-ances who were criticalof the regime. An importantportion of the po-tential for youthful dreamshad been occupied, takenover by the worldof Nazism; it was no longer possible to dream other, better dreams.Only lateron, in the period of retreatinto the realm of privatevaluesduring the final years of the war and the immediate postwar period,did we begin to make up avidly, greedily for what we had missed -with a growing feeling, and sense of anger, that we had been cheatedout of important yearsof our youth. Affected,yet hardlyburdened, thegeneration of Hitler Youth was both freer than those who were older,and more motivated than those who were younger, to devote itself to-tally to the learning process of these years. From the personal know-ledge of many of my contemporaries - and this is, I believe, confirm-ed by the biographies of many others - I know that the majorityofthis generationof Hitler Youthafter 1945 adopted with enthusiasm thevalues once denounced by the Nazis, and made them their own. An

1. Saul Friedlainder, Refletsdu Nazisme (Paris: Seuil, 1982). The English translationis Reflectionsof Nazism: An Essay on Kitschand Death, trans. Thomas Weyr (New York:Harper & Row, 1984).


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especially large number of committed democrats emerged from thisgeneration, and thatgeneration is indeed overrepresentedin the ranksof those who are prominent in politics and culture in the Federal Re-public today, as is shown by a report on contemporaries published onthe occasion of the 40th anniversaryof the end of the World War 11.2I must tryto maintainfurtheropenness, if only because, with the ne-cessarilylimited frameworkof our exchange of letters, this is, for themoment, the last opportunity I will have to come back to a few pointsin your argumentation which I do not wish to let pass without com-ment, lest the documentation of our exchange of ideas become defec-tive by dint of omission.First of all, I would like to deal with three clarificationsregardingspecific points. I then intend to return to several more complex issuesthat will lead back to the thematic substance of our discussion.- In my firstletter, I statedonly that the conceptof historicizationassuch was ambiguous and can easilybe misused - not my presentationas contained in the "Plea."You thus went too far and were mistakenincontending in your first letter that we were both in agreement that Ihad expressed myself in a misleading way in this "Plea."- Your version of the supposed motivation of my "Plea," as putforwardin the third paragraphof your second letter, has no basis inwhat I have written.You yourself call your version a possible reading("could be read as.. ."). I would have preferred you to have made ref-erence to what I had actuallywritten. I am also surprisedthatyou thengo on to embellish the motivation imputed by you to underlie my"Plea"with an imputed concept drawn from Ernst Nolte. This is remi-niscent of your already characterizedattempt, also contained in your"Reflections," to place my "Plea" in close proximity to AndreasHillgruber's identification with the Easternfront.- At the end of the second letter,you give rise to the impression, asyou did in your firstletter, that I had made a distinction between a ra-tional German memory of the Nazi period vs. an irrationalJewishmemory of that time. In so doing, you completely reverseand miscon-strue the train of thought which guided me and which I was trying toexpress. I alreadymade clear reference in my firstletter to two points,and did so with the expressed purpose of wishing to supplement my

2. Werner Filmer and Heribert Schwan, eds., MenschderKriegist aus! Zeitzeugenerinnernsich(Diisseldorf/Vienna:Econ, 1985).


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plea in this respect and to expand its initially German-centeredper-spective, as determined by the motivatingoccasion. My firstpoint wasthat"anyexclusive Germanclaim to historicalinterpretationin respectto this period had been forfeited"as a resultof the outragesof the Naziregime; secondly, I pointed out that alongside the scientific-academicreconstructionof the Nazi period (by German and non-German histo-rians),therewas also a legitimateclaimbythevictimsforotherformsof historicalmemory(forexample,mythical),and thattherewas"noprerogativeof one side or the other."You canappreciatethatitwasimportantforme to pointoutwhatIalludedto above.Now though,I wouldlike to get backto severalofthe broadercomplexestouched on in our exchangeof ideas. Firstofall,let me returnonce more to thequestionof approachesin researchand the focus in historical inquiry dealing with the Nazi period.You concede that "everydayhistory"or looking at the Nazi periodin terms of a longer-rangesocial-historicalperspectiveis a positive de-velopment - as long as there is some guaranteethat the most impor-tant aspect of the period, i.e., the Nazi world view ("Weltanschauung")and the criminal dimension of the political system, remains within thecenter and focus of the approach. In contrast, I hold that the wish toprescribewhat should or should not be done scientifically- and thustojuxtapose and contrast Broszatqua author of the studyDerStaatHit-lers to Broszat qua author within the "BavariaProject" - leads usastray,forcing us into a constrictivenarrowingof the possibility to askscientific questions.In researchsuch as the "BavariaProject,"for example, what is cru-

cial initiallyis to gain new experiences and impressions of the histori-cal realityof the Nazi period as based on a specific new approach, inorder to then be able to contrast these in fruitful and productive fash-ion with experiences garnered using other researchapproaches. Natu-rally,you arequite correctin statingthat the focus of the "BavariaProj-ect" differs from the focus, for example, of my earlier studies overmany yearsof Germanand National Socialistpolicy towardPoland, orwork on the Nazi concentrationcamps. But a concentratedpursuitof aspecific research perspective would be quite impossible if one con-stantly had to worry and fret nervously about whether the focus -whichwouldnaturallyhaveto payconsiderableattentionto thepoliti-cal system and world view of National Socialism in the writing of anycomprehensivetreatmentof the Nazi period - is also properlychosen


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within the frameworkof such a specialized study.I also wish to contradictyour view, expressed with such great elo-quence, that a study of the Ordensburgenis a greatercontribution to es-sentialknowledge on the period than a study of the everydayhistoryofSchabbach. Ifyou take a good look at the findings of all six volumes ofthe series Bayernin derNS-Zeit,you will easily note thatwhat has beendocumented there is by no means simply an unpolitical "normalcy"ofeverydaylife under Nazism. Rather,one can see that the criminal di-mension also extends to a considerabledegree farout into the Bavarianprovince, and that it can even be illustratedin a veryvivid and impres-sive manner instantiatedin the local fates of individuals in this prov-ince. Take, for instance, the case documented in the sixth volume ofthis series: that of the Wiirzburg lawyerand wine dealer Obermayer,who was persecuted with especially rapacious vindictiveness by theGestapoas aJew and homosexual - for double ideological reasons, asit were; a man who nonetheless proved capable of resistingthis perse-cution over many years, and with astounding bravery,until he finallymet his death in Mauthausen. Yet, on the other hand, I see the func-tion of a research endeavor such as the "BavariaProject" precisely inits ability to render the side-by-side existence - to an extent withoutany linking connections - of (a)a relatively unpolitical "normal life"and (b) the dictatorial impositions and persecutions of the regime, afruitfulobject for historicalinquiry and furtherthought. In this regard,what can and should ultimately emerge is what you have justifiablystressed using the example of the "half-knowledge"of the Germanpeople regardingthe crimes perpetratedagainsttheJews: namely, thatunder such conditions, everydaylife in the Nazi period was probablynot as normal afterall as it might appear to have been on the surface.Yet it is not only these political-moral key questions which are ofconcern here. Historicizationof the Nazi period also encompasses thepossibilityof looking at the events of this time from the point of view offunctionalityaswell: for example, within the frameworkof a social-his-torical theory of modernization. This certainlyentails a shift in focus.But it is unlikely any historianwho still has his wits about him will, as aresult, forget the political aspects, and especially the criminal natureofthe regime, or exclude these in an overall treatment of the period.A quite differentaspect of historicizationis the problem I raised -which you apparentlymisunderstood- of the expressivepowersof his-toriography when confronted with the so "corrupt" historical segment of


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the Nazi period. I had originallywritten about the lost "delight"in his-toricalnarrationin another context priorto my "Plea"3- this is an ar-ticle you were probably not familiarwith, and in that other context theword itself had an ironic meaning. Actually,it is not a question of "de-light;"rather,what is important is the restorationof a plastichistoricallanguageeven in dealing with the indeed often quite sinister or medio-cre figuresof the Nazi period - in order to raise these figures up fromtheir shadowyexistence as mere phantoms and make them once morethe subjects of emphatic (and this can also mean angry)retrospectivere-experiencing, and thus likewise subjects of a new moral encounter.Perhapsit is only the plasticityof languagewhich can finallydeterminewhether a figure or a pattern of action of the Nazi period can indeedbe conceived of only in typological or symbolic terms, and can nolonger be made a living concrete realitywithin historical language.I consider it extremely hard - and, in the final analysis, unfair - tojustify thatyou arewilling to regardthe erring Trotsky,if need be, as aworthy object for the language-basedillustrativedemonstration of his-tory, but that, by the same token, you would completely withhold theconsideration of language from the erringpetit bourgeois (Kleinbiirger)of the Nazi era - a petit bourgeois who voted for Hitler and followedhim, but who otherwise profited very little from this and understoodeven less; and who nonetheless unintentionallymade a significantcon-tribution to the efficiency of the regime - indeed, a prototype who"made history" during the Nazi period. There will continue to bespheres within the Nazi period which elude the graspof plastichistori-cal language. But to deny this language to the Nazi period as a wholeappearsto me similar to a denial of the historiographicalmethod basedon criticism of sources - because what is at the heart of the project ofinfusing history with life through the medium of language is an at-tempt to recover authenticity.In closing, I would like once again to address myself to the topic ofAuschwitz and severalof the problems arisingfrom this for historyas ascience and for historical memory. In your second letter, you statedthat what you meant by "Auschwitz"was, quite generally, the "Nazi

3. Cf.MartinBroszat,"DerDespotvonMiinchen.GauleiterAdolfWagner- eineZentralfigurderbayerischenGeschichte,"SiiddeutscheZeitung30-31March1985,week-end supplement.In this article,I attemptedquite consciouslyto portrayin a fairlyplasticmanner,and trueto reality,thefigureof this onceso powerfulGauleiter,a manwhoin the standardworkson Bavarianhistoryis presentedonlyinveryphantom-likefashionby historiansspecializingin Bavaria.


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annihilation policies toward various categories of victims." You saythat you regard Auschwitz as a "paradigmatic expression of Nazicriminality"as such. In my view, such a far-reachingextension of theconcept is problematic, also precisely because it is no longer possiblethen to readily give reasons for and defend the singularityof Ausch-witz. If Auschwitz is employed only as a synonym for the "FinalSolu-tion," the problem I have alluded to remains: namely, that in connec-tion with the "centralityof Auschwitz," which should be underscoredfor good reasons in any historical, retrospective view, one must alsobear in mind just how many other, non-Jewish victims of Nazismthere were.I would like quite expressly to second your position when you em-phasize that the "banalityof evil" cannot by any means serve as a soleand exclusive explanation for the mass murder of the Jews. That wasnot what I meant, and I think what you say on this point is impressive;for example, as seen from the perspective of a negative "political reli-gion," which I likewise regard as a possible way of trying to compre-hend the fanatical hatred of the Jews based on the Nazi world view.However, let me also point out that the older generation of Germanhistorians(Meinecke,Ritter,Rothfelsand others),a generation that ini-tially played a dominant role in German historiography after 1945,very often resorted to writing about a "demonic" or "diabolical" Hit-ler and the like as a consequence of their inabilityto offer historical ex-planations. In contrastwith this, there has long been a need for morerational explanation, and such metaphors tend in this connection toimpede further questioning rather than furnish answers. When I my-self stated that I considered it important, for example, to make clearthat even the existence of such a murderous, racist ideology as that ofthe Nazis nonetheless did not necessarilyhave to lead automaticallytogenocide as a consequence - and that the historian therefore waschargedwith the taskof investigatingvery carefullywhat the operativerealconditions were, in the context of what structuresof influence andpower, etc. it became possible to translate such an ideology into prac-tice - I saw this likewise as a contribution to historicization:namely,in the sense that the normal historical methods of inquiryand researchshould also be applied to the study of National Socialism. It should,however, be borne in mind that this is a plea for normalization of themethod, not of the evaluation.Let me come now to the final point that I regardas important in our


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discussion. My conception of historicization- and this certainlymustbe quite evident - is antitheticallyopposed to any presentationof theNazi period in the form of frozen "statuary,"and meant primarilyfordidactic purposes. As I see it, the danger of suppressing this periodconsists not only in the customary practiceof forgetting,but rather,inthis instance - almost in paradoxical fashion - likewise in the factthat one is too overly "concerned," for didactic reasons, about thischapter in history. As a result, what happens is that an arsenal of les-sons and frozen "statuary"are pieced together from the original, au-thentic continuum of this era; these increasinglytake on an indepen-dent existence. Particularlyin the second and third generation, theythen intrude to place themselves in front of the originalhistory- andare finally, in naive fashion, understood and misunderstood as beingthe actual history of the time.Thatdangeris allthegreaterwhen historiansthemselvesbelievethatthey no longer need to make any special effortto present an authenticpictureof this time - since thatperiod has, in any case, been so totallycorrupted by the Nazis; and when historiansare accommodatingly in-clined to hand over and relinquish this period of history,without anyregrets,to be utilized for purposes other than that of historical under-standing.I am firmly convinced that it is preciselythe credibilityof the didac-tic transmission of the Nazi period which would sufferimmense dam-age over the longer term if it is not left sufficientlyopen to repeatedfeedback from the process of differentiatedhistoricalknowledge aboutthis segment of history.I can well imagine that, seen in this perspective, the centralityofAuschwitz - which lies so very much in the foreground of conscious-ness and which presses so compellingly for a paradigmaticview - canalso pose a problem for theJewish historicalmemory of the Nazi peri-od and the transmission of this authentic memory to the followinggeneration. The gigantic dictatorial and criminal dimension of theNazi period also harbors within it the danger that the authenticityofthis segment of history may end up being buried beneath monumen-tal memorial sites for the Resistance - and indeed perhaps also be-neath memorials for the Holocaust. In contrastwith this, I would like,in closing this final letter, to quote a sentence of the greatIsraeli histo-rian Uriel Tal, which he formulated in such impressive manner someyears ago in Jerusalem at a German- Jewish discussion on the proper


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form which the historicalpresentationand treatmentof the Holocaustshould take. As I best recall, his exact words were: "We have not onlyor primarilyto tell what had been done

friedlander broszat exchange

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