french relations with sub-saharan africa under president

South African Instit

ute of Inte

rnat

iona

l Affa

irs

African perspectives. Global insights.

South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme

O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 1 0 7

French Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa Under President Sarkozy

J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2

R i c h a r d M o n c r i e f f

A b o u t S A I I A

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record

as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent,

non-government think-tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into

public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs

with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research

excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA’s occasional papers

present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in

Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good

governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace;

and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the

environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about

SAIIA’s work.

A b o u t t h e S o u t h A f r I c A n f o r e I g n p o l I c y A n d A f r I c A n d r I v e r S p r o g r A m m e

Since the fall of Apartheid in 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy has prioritised the

development of Africa. To achieve its ‘African Agenda’ objectives, South Africa needs to

intensify its strategic relations with key African countries. SAIIA’s South African Foreign Policy

and African Drivers (SAFPAD) Programme has a two-pronged focus. First, it unpacks South

Africa’s post-1994 Africa policy in two areas: South Africa as a norm setter in the region and

South Africa’s potential to foster regional co-operation with key African states and other

external partners, in support of the continent’s stabilisation and development. Second, it

focuses on key African driver countries’ foreign policy objectives that have the ability to

influence, positively or negatively, the pace of regional co-operation and integration.

SAFPAD assumes a holistic examination of the internal and external pressures that inform

each driver country’s foreign policy decisions by exploring contemporary domestic factors;

the scope of their bilateral relations; their role in the regional economic communities; and

lastly their relations with South Africa.

Programme head: Dr Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya [email protected]

© SAIIA January 2012

All rights are reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised in any form by any

means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information or

storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Opinions expressed are

the responsibility of the individual authors and not of SAIIA.

Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.

A b S t r A c t

Since the early 1990s France has framed its approach to Africa as a debate between

reform and adherence to the old ways. President Nicolas Sarkozy came to power in

2007 promising change. In many ways he represents a new relationship with Africa and

he is free of the baggage of his predecessors. However, in his rise through the Gaullist

movement Sarkozy developed ties with some of Francophone Africa’s long-standing and

authoritarian leaders. The result has been oscillation and ambivalence in French policy

towards Africa. Military relations are a case in point. France has initiated extensive and

important reform, including renegotiating all military and defence agreements and moving

towards a reduction in French troop presence. However, the French military continue to

intervene in a variety of settings and will remain present in at least two large bases on

the continent. Equally, Africa continues to be of strategic importance to France, especially

for oil and uranium. However, change in France’s relations with Africa is occurring, and is

more dependent on developments in individual Francophone African countries than on

the reform debate in Paris. Côte d’Ivoire is an important example. Despite the decisive

role played by the French military in April 2011, the relationship has for some years been

driven by Côte d’Ivoire’s fluctuating crises, rather than by French policy decisions, and by

perceptions of France’s role, often coloured with conspiracy theory. This prevalence of

conspiracy theory in African perceptions of France is driven in part by a continued lack of

transparency on the French side. It is also a product of an ambivalence by the Francophone

African elite towards renewal, which mirrors that of the French.

A b o u t t h e A u t h o r

Dr Richard Moncrieff is an expert on the politics of West and Central Africa and has lived

and worked in Paris, Abidjan and Dakar. From 2008 to 2010 he was the West Africa

Director of the International Crisis Group, where he researched and wrote reports on

Guinea (Conakry), Cameroon and Nigeria. In 2011 he was the Bradlow Research Fellow at

SAIIA and a visiting lecturer in International Relations at Witwatersrand University. He would

like to thank SAIIA and the Bradlow Foundation for their support in the writing of this paper,

and the four reviewers who made numerous insightful comments on earlier drafts.

4

S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 10 7

S O U T H A F R I C A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y & A F R I C A N D R I V E R S P R O G R A M M E

A b b r e v I A t I o n S A n d A c r o n y m S

AfD Agencefrançaisededéveloppement(FrenchDevelopmentAgency)

APSA AfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitecture

AQIM al-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb

CFA CommunautéFinancièred’Afrique(CFAfranc)

ECOWAS EconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates

ESDP EuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy

OECD OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

RECAMP Renforcementdescapacitésafricainesdemaintiendelapaix

(Africanpeacekeepingcapacityreinforcementprogramme)

UNSCR UNSecurityCouncilResolution

F R E N C H R E L AT I O N S w I T H S U B - S A H A R A N A F R I C A U N D E R P R E S I D E N T S A R kO z Y

5


f I g u r e 1 : f r A n c o p h o n e A f r I c A A n d t h e c f A f r A n c Z o n e

Source:InvestirenZoneFranc,http://www.izf.net/upload/Documentation/Cartes/zone.pdf

Note:MapshowingtheFrancZonecountries,dividedintotheWestandCentralAfrican

currencyblocks.TheyareequivalenttothetworegionalgovernmentsofFrenchcolonial

sub-SaharanAfrica.TheWestAfricanFrancZone,nowgroupedintheUEMOA(l’Union

EconomiqueetMonétaireOuestAfricaine)regionalblock,istheformerWestAfrican

colony,theAOF(Afriqueoccidentalefrançaise).TheCentralAfricanFrancZone,now

groupedintheCEMACregionalblock,istheoldEquatorialAfricancolony,theAEF

(Afriqueéquatorialefrançaise).

ThethreeGuineasareexceptionstothematchbetweenthecurrentFrancZoneand

thecolonialstructures.GuineaConakryisnotpartoftheFrancZone,havingwithdrawn

fromcollectivefinancialarrangementsonindependencein1958.EquatorialGuinea,a

formerSpanishcolony,joinedtheCentralAfricanFrancZonein1985.Guinea-Bissau,a

formerPortuguesecolony,joinedtheWestAfricanFrancZonein1997.

mali

côte d’Ivoire

Senegal

guinea-bissaubenin

togo

equatorial guinea

burkina faso

niger

chad

cameroon

gabon

congo

central African republic

West African franc Zone

central African franc Zone

6



I n t r o d u c t I o n

SincePresidentNicolasSarkozy’selectioninMay2007,France’softencontroversial

relationswithsub-SaharanAfricahaveundergonesignificantchanges.Somehave

resultedfrompolicydecisionsmadeinParis,whereasothersarepartofamoregeneral

evolutioninAfricaandofAfrica’sstrategicandcommercialpositioninworldaffairs.In

thefouryearsupto2011,therehavebeenanumberofcrisesonthecontinentthathave

ledtoFrenchmilitaryinterventions,includinginCôted’Ivoire,ChadandintheWest

AfricanSahel.ThecriseshavepresentedaseriouschallengetoFrenchpolicymakers,who

aretaskedostensiblywithimplementingaprogrammeofreform,butwhohavetodeal

repeatedlywiththelegacyofFrance’slonginvolvementinAfrica.

IntendedmainlyforanAnglophoneaudiencewithlimitedknowledgeofFrancophone

Africanaffairs,thepaperfirstexaminesthehistoricalbackgroundofFrance’srelations

withsub-SaharanAfrica,anddiscussesPresidentSarkozy’spositiononkeyissuesbefore

andafterhis electoral victory.These includecommercial andaid relationshipswith

bothformercoloniesandwithother,economicallymoreimportantAfricancountries;

thefateofFrance’smilitarypresenceonthecontinent;France’sreactiontocrisesinits

traditionalsphereofinfluence;andaseriesofongoingjudicialissuesinvolvingFrance

andAfrica.AlthougheventsinNorthAfricaaretouchedon,thepapercoverssub-Saharan

Africa (with ‘Africa’ or ‘Francophone Africa’ referring to sub-Saharan Africa, unless

otherwisespecified).ThepaperfocusesoncountriesinAfricawhererelationsaremost

dense,namelytheformercoloniesinWestandCentralAfrica,exceptwhereimportant

relationships (especially commercial) are emerging elsewhere.Restrictionson space

preventcoverageofrelationswiththeIndianOceanislandstates.

ThepaperthenreviewsSarkozy’sreformprogramme,withitsmanyhesitationsand

ambivalences.ItexaminesthereformofFrenchmilitarypresenceonthecontinentand

France’sroleintheCôted’Ivoirecrisis.AlthoughParisianpoliticsandbureaucracyare

notignored,emphasisisgiventotheperceptionsandactionsofFrancophoneAfricans

inthisrelationship,atbotheliteandpopularlevels.Tothisend,thepaper’sfinalsections

considerpopularperceptionsoftheFrenchrole,suchasinelectionsinGabon,riotsin

CameroonandinInternetdebatesoneventsinCôted’Ivoire.France’sAfricapolicyistoo

disparateandcomplexforasinglesetofrecommendations.However,thepapersuggests

thatthelong-termsuccessofFrenchobjectiveswilldependonfurtheranddeeperefforts

attransparency.

b A c k g r o u n d – f r A n c e I n A f r I c A

The France–Africa special relationship

To thoseunfamiliarwith theFrance–Africa ‘special relationship’,which lasted from

independencein1960totheendoftheColdWar,ithasalwaysseemedacuriousbeast.

Farfromthe ‘billiardball’conceptofinternationalrelationspopularisedinAmerican

universitiesduringthecoldwar,1herewasasetofinterconnections,personal,institutional

oreven‘sovereign’(defence,currency),betweenindependentnations,whichdefiedmost


7


standardinterpretations.Thestrongtiesandcontinueddependencyontheformercolony

alsobeliedtheclaimstoindependentstatehoodadvancedbyAfricanleaderstoboosttheir

legitimacyintheearlydays.

TheoriginofthiscuriousrelationshipliesintheformerFrenchpresident,Charlesde

Gaulle’sdeterminationthatFrancewouldnotloseitsinfluenceinsub-SaharanAfrica,ata

timewhenithadlostorwaslosingwarsofindependenceinAlgeriaandIndochina.Sub-

SaharanAfricawastherebycalledupontohelpmaintainFrance’srankinworldaffairsin

thepost-colonialera,andconfirmitsautonomyrelativetotheUS.‘Decoloniseinorder

tobetterremain’becametheorderoftheday,andthedensityofrelationscontinuedin

anupwardtrendthatlastedfromtheFirstWorldWaruntilthe1980s,regardlessofthe

formalaspectsofdecolonisation.MoreFrenchpeoplelivedandworkedinFrancophone

Africain1970thanatindependence10yearsearlier.

Thesetiescoveredthreeareas:commerce,developmentco-operationandfinance;

diplomacy; and the military.2 Commercial and development ties and military ties,

consideredlaterinthepaper,werebothconsideredpartofabiggerpictureofinfluence.

FrancewascommerciallydominantinFrancophoneAfrica,andstrategicmineralswere

ofparticularimportance.Itenjoyedaformalmonopolyoveroilanduraniuminsome

countries,writtenintoagreementsthatweresignedonindependencein1960.France’s

militarypresencewasusedmainlytopropupalliedgovernmentsthreatenedbyinternal

dissent,andwasacceptedbyFrance’salliesaspartofanti-SovietColdWarstrategic

arrangements.

PersonaltiesbetweenFrenchandAfricanpoliticianswereofimmenseimportance

incementingthesystem.AlthoughdeGaullehimselfdelegatedrelationstohisAfrica

advisor,JacquesFoccart–andnevervisitedsub-SaharanAfricaafterindependence–

compliantleadersneverthelessfoundfavourabletreatmentinParis,andconsolidatedlinks

forgedinthe1950swithpoliticiansofallpartiesinFrance.Whereastheattractionsof

Frenchcultureandlanguagecountedforsome,forothersensuringFrenchsupportagainst

internalopponentswasmoreimportant.SomeofFrancophoneAfrica’sleaders,especially

thosewhosurvivedseveraldecades,developedconsiderable influenceinParis(such

asoverdiplomaticnominationsandoveraidflows),andinmanyrespectsinvertedthe

relationsonewouldexpectfromtheneocolonialmodelofFrenchpower.3PresidentFélix

Houphouët-BoignyofCôted’Ivoire,forexample,wasinstrumentalinFrenchdiplomatic

andmilitarysupportfortheBiafranrebelsintheNigeriancivilwar.

Tounderstandsubsequentevolutions,itisimportanttonotethatfromthebeginning

France–Africarelationsweremarkedbyexceptionalismandsecrecy.Thedensityofties

andagreements,andtheirinfringementonnormallysovereignmatters,especiallymilitary,

leddeGaulletocreateadhocstructuresinParis,ratherthanallowthemtobemanaged

thoughnormaldiplomaticchannels.GiventhatAfricawasofvitalstrategicimportance

fordeGaulle’svisionofFranceintheColdWar,manyaspectswerekeptoutofpublicor

parliamentaryview,andentrustedtodeGaulle’snetworksofactingandformerarmyand

intelligenceofficers.4

TheFrance–Africaexceptioncontinuedlongafteritsfounder’sdeathin1970.However,

itbecamemorefragmentedandlesscontrollable–asetofself-interestednetworks(often

calledpejoratively‘la Françafrique’)ratherthancoherentgovernmentpolicy.Whenthe

FrenchSocialistPartygainedpowerin1981,manyexpectedsweepingchanges.Theywere

disappointed,asPresidentFrancoisMitterrand,whoselinkstosomeofthecontinent’s

8



long-standingleaderswentbacktothe1940s,continuedinmuchthesameveinashis

predecessors.5ManyAfricanleadersfoundtheycouldwieldconsiderablepowereven

overtheirFrenchcounterparts,notleastowingtotheirsheerlongevityinofficeandtheir

financialgenerositytowardsFrenchpoliticians.Meanwhile,theyouthfulpopulationof

FrancophoneAfrica,sufferingfromthedestructuringofAfrica’seconomiesinthe1980s,

becameincreasinglyalienatedfromtheirownpoliticalsystems,andtherebyfromthe

French‘model’outofwhichtheirowncountrieshad,inpart,grown.

Crisis, change, and ‘reform’

TheFrenchmodel,as itwasexported toAfrica,wasoneof stableauthoritarianism,

influencedbyGaullistviewsonthedangersofparliamentarydemocracy.Itwastherefore

stronglychallengedbythewaveofdemocracymovementsinAfricainthe1990s.Some

countriesmaderealdemocraticadvances,butelsewhereauthoritarianleaderswereableto

hangon.Thisphenomenonof‘authoritarianrestoration’wasnotuniquetoFrancophone

Africa,but itwasstrikingthat the formercolonialpower,France,offeredonly tepid

supporttodemocratisationmovements,andwassometimesdownrighthostile.Thiswas

despitethedeclarationbyPresidentMitterrandattheLaBauleFrance–Africasummitin

June1990thatFrancewouldsupportcountriesthatmadegreaterdemocraticprogress.

Whetherbecauseofasincerebeliefinstabilitybeforedemocracy,orthroughself-interest,

theFrenchdidnotfollowthispolicythroughclearly.ManyFrancophoneAfricanleaders

successfullyexertedastabilityblackmail(‘ifIgoitwillbechaos’)toretainFrenchsupport

astheyusedandabusedincumbencytohangontopower.6

France’sfailuretofullysupportdemocratisationinthe1990shasprofoundlymarked

itsimageonthecontinent.AsFrance’srelationswithAfricahavefragmented,insome

casesbecomingviolentlycontentious(suchasinCôted’Ivoire),theearly1990scannow

beregardedasalostopportunityforagenuinerenewalofrelations,andforsomeformof

truthtellingorreconciliation.

Thespecialrelationshipcameunderseverestrainin1994.Justweeksafterthedeath

ofHouphouët-Boigny,FrancophoneAfrica’scommoncurrency,theCFA(Communauté

Financièred’Afrique)franc,wasdevaluedforthefirsttime.Inthecontextofslidingprices

fortheregion’smainexports,itwasaclearsignthatFrancecouldnolongerprotectits

formercoloniesfromthepressuresoftheworldeconomy.Onlyfourmonthslater,the

Rwandangenocideoccurred.TheFrenchhadprovideddiplomaticandmilitarysupport

toPresidentJuvénalHabyarimana’sgenocidalregime,leadingtoasagaofrecriminations

overFrance’srolethatisstillfarfromsettled.7Afurthermajorfactorintheunravelling

oftheFrance–Africarelationshipinthe1990swasthelengthyjudicialinvestigationinto

thefinancesoftheFrenchoilgiant,ELF,whichuncoveredahugearrayofpersonaland

politicalcorruption.

Sincethistime,France’sapproachtothecontinenthasoscillatedbetweenadesire

tochangeandadesire tomaintainthefragmentsofasystemthatmanyindividuals,

companiesandpoliticalparties–inAfricaaswellasinFrance–stillfindcomfortable.8

Unsurprisingly,thereformpositionisadheredtobymost,atleastinpublic.Itcanbe

characterisedasfollows.


9


• Thedesire to limitFrance’smilitaryengagementsonthecontinentandtoreduce

interferenceintheinternalaffairsofAfricancountries.

• ThedesiretolimitthecostofFrance’sengagementwithAfrica.Thiswasinitially

themostimportantfactorbehindreform,anddatesfromthelate1980sand1990s

whenincreasingaidflowstoindebtedFrancophoneAfricancountriesconflictedwith

budgetaryrestrictions flowingfromFrance’scommitments toEuropeanmonetary

convergence.AsignificantlobbyintheFrenchfinanceministry,associatedwiththe

thenprimeminister,EdouardBalladur,pushedhardtoreduceFrenchsupporttoits

formercolonies.

• The desire to make France’s Africa policy more transparent, and subject to the

normalchecksandbalancesbuilt intoFrenchpublicadministration.Thisshould

entailadministrativereformdoingawaywiththespecialstatusofAfricainFrance’s

diplomaticmachinery.AlthoughthereformdebateisgenerallyconcernedwithParisian

issuesandpolitics,itisalsobelievedthatmakingFrenchpolicymoretransparentwill

encouragedemocracyinareasofstrongFrenchinfluence.Unliketheconservatives

oftheFrenchAfricapolicycommunity,whooftenclaimthatAfricaisnotsuitedto

democracy(JacquesChiracopenlyexpressedthisviewinFebruary1990),reformers

tendtoseedemocratisationinAfricaasagoodthing.

• ThedesiretoforgecloserworkingrelationshipswiththewholeofAfrica.Thiswould

notonlybepotentiallyprofitableforFrancegiventhatthemoredynamiceconomies

ofAfricalieoutsideFrance’straditionalsphereofinfluence,butitwouldalsohelp

todilutesomeofthemoreobscureandcontroversialaspectsoftheFrance–Africa

relationship.ForgingnewworkingrelationshipswithotherAfricancountriesandwith

Africa’sregionalbodieshasbecomeparticularlyimportantintheareaofpeacekeeping

andsecurity.

• Thedesiretoco-operatewithothernon-Africanpowers, includingotherbilateral

powers(theUKandtheUS),theEUandtheUN.Again,thisisviewedasawayof

dilutingtheproblematicrelationswithFrancophonecountries,possiblyopeningup

theFrance–Africarelationshiptomorescrutiny,andsharingsomeoftherisksand

costsofFrenchengagement.Ithasalsobeenseenasawayofcounteractingtheidea

thatFrancecompeteswithotherWesternpowersforcontrolofAfrica,anideawhich

cantakequiteparanoidformsforsomeFrench.9

When the SocialistPartywon the legislative elections inMay1997, thenewprime

minister,Lionel Jospin,whoadhered to the reformagenda,used the atmosphereof

publicdisgustwithFrance’sAfricapolicyfollowingthecrisesoftheearly1990s,toput

inplacesomeoftheselong-advocatedreforms.Theco-operationministrywasabsorbed

intotheforeignministryinJanuary1998.Atthesametime,France’said-givingbodies

wererevampedbyrestructuringtheFrenchDevelopmentAgency(theAgencefrançaisede

développement,AfD)toboostitsroleinFrenchaidpolicyandmakeitamoretechnical

andlesspoliticallyorientedbody.ThesemeasurespartiallyendedFrancophoneAfrica’s

specialstatusinFrenchdiplomaticmachinery.However,theydidnotaffectthespecial

roleoftheFrenchpresidentialoffice(oftencalledtheElyséeafterthepresidentialpalace)

inAfricanpolicy,partlybecauseJospin’sgovernmentdidnotholdalltheleversofpower

inthecontextof‘cohabitation’withPresidentChirac.

10



TheIvoriancrisis,whichbrokeoutwiththesuccessfulcoupofDecember1999,was

afurtherwatershedinFrance’srelationswiththecontinent.ThecrisisdividedFrench

politiciansandofficialsfromthebeginning.ManyintheGaullistmovement,whichwas

closetoPresidentHenriKonanBédié,whowasoverthrowninthecoup,supporteda

Frenchmilitaryinterventiontoreturnhimtopower.However,thiswasvetoedbyJospin’s

government,partlyowingtoanawarenessofBédié’sunpopularityinCôted’Ivoireand

partlyowingtopartypoliticalfactors.Theselatterfactorsbecameevenmoreimportant

whenLaurentGbagbo,whowasveryclosetoimportantfiguresintheFrenchSocialist

Party,wonelectionsinOctober2000,amidstwidespreadviolenceandwithhismainrivals

(BédiéandAlassaneOuattara)excludedfromstanding.Gbagbowasabletoresistcalls

fortheelectiontobererun(includingfromthethenUNsecretary-general,KofiAnnan),

largelyowingtoFrenchdiplomaticsupportemanatingfromtheSocialistParty.

Thebattlebetweenthe‘reformers’andthe‘oldguard’ragedoninParis,acrossthe

variousgovernmentchangesofthe1994–2007period.Adistinctionshouldbemade,

however,betweenthereformagendainFrance’sAfricapolicy,withallitsinfightingand

hesitations,andthebroaderissueofchangeinFrance–Africarelations.Despitethereform

debatedraggingon,significantandmoreorganicchangehasbeenoccurring.Thischange

isrelatedtochangesinAfrica’spositioninworldaffairsandtheincreasingimportanceof

newpowerssuchasChina,IndiaandMiddleEasterncountries.Itisalsorelatedtothe

willingnessonthepartofFrancophoneAfricanstoforgeanewkindofrelationshipwith

theirformercolonialpower.

S A r k o Z y A n d A f r I c A – p r o m I S e S o f r e f o r m , r e A l I t I e S o f p o W e r

Sarkozy’s Africa background

Sarkozy’svictoryintheMay2007presidentialelectionsinFrancewasmetwithmixed

reactionsinFrancophoneAfrica.Onthepositiveside,manyhopedforthemuch-awaited

renewalofFrance’sAfricapolicy.Hewas,atleastostensibly,thefirstFrenchpresident

sincede-colonisation in1960tohavenoclose linkstotheFrançafriquenetworksof

backroomintereststhathadsodominatedpreviousties.Sarkozy’srelativelyyoungageand

immigrantbackgroundappealedtowatchfulAfricans.10Furthermore,hegaveprominent

officialpositions toFrenchof immigrantorigin,andappearedwilling tocorrect the

marginalplacethatimmigrantcommunitiesplayineliteFrenchlife.

On thenegative side,however,manyAfricansperceived Sarkozy as a symbolof

France’sever-hardeningimmigrationlaws.As interiorministerunderChirac,hehad

indeedbeenpartof avitriolicdiscourseon immigrants inFrance.Hehadoverseen

an increased securitisation of immigration policy, with police tracking down illegal

immigrantsanddeportingthembacktoAfricaonspeciallyconvenedflights(commonly

knownas‘charters’),oronregularairlines.11SomeAfricansfearedthat,despitetalkof

renewalandopening,SarkozyrepresentedaparochialandxenophobicFrance,whichfears

anddistrustsimmigrants.12



11

TheperceptionthatSarkozywasnotlinkedtothenetworksofla Françafriqueonhis

arrivalinpowerrequiresfurtherexamination.Ontheonehand,itistruethathedidnot

havetheimportantpersonallinkstoFrancophoneAfricanleadersthathispredecessors

had,andthatAfricadidnotfeatureprominentlyinhisearlierpoliticalcareer.Inaddition,

the importanceof theFrançafriquenetworks inFrenchpolitical lifehad inanycase

declined.

Ontheotherhand,suchhasbeenthedensityoflinksbetweenAfricanleadersandthe

FrenchGaullistmovement,thatitishighlyimprobablethatanyonecouldrisethrough

itsrankswithoutsomesupportfromthoseconnectedtoAfrica.InSarkozy’scase,itcame

throughCharlesPasqua,who,asministeroftheinteriorandelectedheadoftheHauts-

de-SeinedepartmentnearParis,forgedsignificanttieswithOmarBongoofGabonand

DenisSassou-NguessooftheRepublicofCongo(morecommonlyandhenceforthCongo-

Brazzaville),andwithvariousFrenchbusinessinterestsinCentralAfrica.13AsPasqua

fadedfromtheFrenchpoliticalsceneSarkozymaintainedlinkswithAfricathroughthe

lawyerandfixer,RobertBourgi.BourgiisaprotégéofFoccartwho,sinceFoccart’sdeathin

1997,hasactedasaninformalchannelofcommunicationandinfluencebetweenFrench

politiciansandAfricanpresidents,andisclosetomostofthekeyFrancophoneAfrican

headsofstate.14BourgiisalsoclosetoClaudeGuéant,whountilrecentlywas,asSarkozy’s

generalsecretary,chargedwithrelationswithmanyAfricanheadsofstate.

Speeches, policies, judicial cases

Thisdualheritageandconsequentambivalenceisreflectedinaseriesofspeechesthat

SarkozygaveonAfricaduringhiscampaignandinhisfirstyearinoffice.InBeninon18

May2006,hegavesuccourtosupportersofreformbystatingthat‘wemustdefinitively

turnthepagefromthisindulgence,thesesecretsandthisambiguity’inFrance’srelations

withAfrica.HearguedthatFrance’sroleonthecontinentwasalreadyevolvingfarbeyond

theclichésofsupportforageingdictators.ReferringtothetendencyforFrancophone

oppositionmovementstolaytheblamefortheircountry’sillsatFrance’sdoor,Sarkozy

statedthat‘Francehasneithertheintentionsnortheinfluencethatpeoplethink’.15

SarkozygavehisfirstspeechonAfricaaspresidentinDakaron26July2007.Ifhe

hadgainedanycreditamongFrancophoneAfricansinBenin,itwasquicklyundonehere.

OstensiblyintendedasacontributiontothedebateonAfricanrenaissance,thespeech

restatedthestereotypesofatimelessandunchangingcontinentthathadbeenusedto

justifycolonial rule. Itwasrepletewithexoticisminspiredby18th-and19th-century

philosophers.Rousseau’sideaofthenoblesavagewasaclearinspiration,seeninrepeated

referencestoAfrica’s‘soul’,andtalkofthe‘sacredtiesthatAfricanmenhaveforgedfor

millenniawiththeskyandthelandofAfrica’andthe‘powerfulAfricanmythsflowing

fromthedepthsoftime’.Africa,accordingtothespeech’smostnotoriousline,‘hasnot

sufficientlyenteredhistory’.16

Thespeechprovoked(perhapsdeliberately,Sarkozynotbeingapoliticianwhovalues

hisrelationswithintellectuals)anoutcryfromFrenchandAfricanintelligentsia,who

sawinitconfirmationofFrance’sinabilitytofaceuptoitsowncolonialpastandaccused

PresidentSarkozyofusingAfricatocourtthevoteoftheFrenchfarright.17Thereaction

ofAfricanpresidentswasmoremixed.PresidentAbdoulaye WadeofSenegalsuggested

thatSarkozyhadbeenmisledbyhisspeechwriter;PresidentThaboMbekiofSouthAfrica

12



welcomedthecontributiontotheAfricanrenaissancedebate;whilePresidentGbagboof

Côted’Ivoiredismisseditasofnopoliticalimportance.18

TheDakarspeechremainsanimportantmarkerinSarkozy’spositiononAfricanissues.

ItispartofastrandofthinkingonAfricathatisprevalentontheFrenchright.Often

usedasajustificationforallianceswithnon-democraticleaders,itemphasisesAfrica’s

unchanging traditions,whichonly the initiated canunderstand.As Sarkozy saidof

BourgiwhenconferringamedalofhonouronhiminSeptember2007,‘youhavegreat

knowledgeofthe“soul”ofAfrica’.19Equally,thespeechmustbesetinthecontextof

thedebateinFrance,launchedbySarkozy’sgovernment,overFrenchnationalidentity.

Thisdebate,whichhasbeenboycottedbymanyintellectualsandpeopleontheleft,is

stronglycolouredwithaxenophobicviewofFranceasproperlybelongingtowhitepeople

ofEuropeanorigin.NotonlydoesthishaveprofoundimportanceforFrenchpeople

ofAfricandescent,butitalsoresonatesstronglyinAfricathroughdebatesontherole

andresponsibilityofFranceasanimperialpower.Thislinkstoafurtherdebateover

whetherimperialhistorycanbeseen,andshouldbetaught,aspartofFrenchhistory,oras

somehowoutsideit,againwithevidentimplicationsforthepositionofethnicminorities

inFrance.20TheDakarspeechhasclearimplicationsforthisdebatebypositioningan

exoticAfricanotheroutsideFrenchhistory.

FurtherspeechesonAfrica,especiallyinCapeTowninFebruary2008(considered

laterasregardsdefencepolicy)attemptedtorecoversomeofthecreditlostinDakar.

Despitethis,theoverallimpressionremainedoneofoscillationbetweenadiscourseof

renewalandsupportfortheoldways.Thisimpressionwasconfirmedbypolicydecisions.

Thejockeyingforpositionbetweenthereformersandtheoldguardwasevidentfrom

theverybeginningofSarkozy’sterminoffice.On27May2007,Liberianpresident,Ellen

JohnsonSirleaf,wasthefirsttovisittheElyséePalace,attheinstigationofSarkozy’s

reformistAfricaadvisor,BrunoJoubert.However,shewasfollowedtheverynextdayby

PresidentBongo,thepersonificationoftheoldstyleFrançafrique.Sarkozysubsequently

visitedBongoinGaboninJuly2007andinFebruary2008.Later, theFrance–Africa

summit inNice inJune2010wasanotheropportunitytopresentareformedFrench

positionandmarkacertaindistancewithFrancophoneAfricanleaders,thistimethrough

anemphasisoncontinent-widebusinesslinksandaplaceofhonourforthenPresident

HosniMubarakofEgyptandPresidentJacobZumaofSouthAfrica,France’sbiggest

tradingpartneronthecontinentandconsideredasymbolofFrance’snewrelationswith

thecontinent.21

Theincidentthatmanysawasaturningpointawayfromthereformagendawas

the dismissal of the co-operation minister, Jean-Marie Bockel, a former member of

theFrenchSocialistPartyco-opted,liketheforeignminister,BernardKouchner,into

Sarkozy’sgovernment.InJanuary2008BockelhadattackedAfrica’scorruptheadsofstate

andpubliclyurgedthatFranceshouldstopgivingaidanddebtrelieftocountriesthat

benefitfromhighoilproductionwhiletheirpopulationsliveinmisery.Gabon’sPresident

Bongo,feelingtargetedbysuchremarksandfuriousatrevelationsintheFrenchmedia

concerninghispropertyassetsinFrance,quicklyactivatedhisremarkablenetworkof

influencewithintheFrenchGaullistmovement.Bockelwasremovedfromhisposton

17March,andreplacedbythefarmoreconservativeAlainJoyandet.22

Thecontinuedambivalenceonthebynowwell-wornreformagendainFrance’sAfrica

policymaybeinterpretedondifferentlevels.23Ononelevelthereareclearlyamultitude


13


ofpersonalrivalriesinParisandFrancophoneAfricainwhichtheactorsarepro-oranti-

reform,orsupportiveofvariousversionsofreform.Theirfortunesfluctuatewiththoseof

theirpoliticalsponsors.Inadditionthereareanumberofinstitutionalrivalries,especially

amongthedefenceministry(anditsintelligencenetwork),theforeignministryandthe

presidentialoffice.Moresubtlerivalriespersistbetweenthosetraditionallyattachedto

FrancophoneAfricaandthemoretechnocraticandreformistofficials,forexampleatthe

AfD.ManyprivateFrenchindividualsprofitfromrelationswithauthoritarianAfrican

governmentsasadvisors,oftenlayingclaimtosupportfromFrenchauthoritiesthatthey

donotofficiallyhave.Thepoliticallyconnectedwriterandconsultant,PatrickBalkany,is

aprominentexample.24Powerrelationsvaryaccordingtothedifferentissuesconcerned,

andaccordingtothecomingandgoingofministersandsenioradvisors.InParis,the

debateandrivalrybetweenthereformersandtheoldguardhascontinuedunderSarkozy.

TheformerhavetakensuccourfromSarkozy’sstatedpositions,andcorrectlyconsiderthat

longer-termtrendsfavourtheirposition.However,thoseinthelattercamp,suchasRobert

Bourgi,havewieldedconsiderableinfluence.

Onanother level, accountneeds tobe takenof the sheer complexityofFrance’s

relationswiththeAfricancontinent,whichSarkozyinheritedratherthancreated.In2007

asignificantnumberofmajorjudicialcasesconcerningAfricawereongoingorunder

appealinParis.TheseincludedtheinvestigationintothemurderofaFrenchinvestigating

magistrate,BernardBorrel,inDjiboutiin1995,whichhasimplicatedseniormembersof

theDjiboutianregime(DjiboutihousesthebiggestFrenchmilitarybaseonthecontinent);

theongoingcasesinvolvingRwanda(discussedbelow);thearmssalesaffairinvolving

Angolaknownas‘Angolagate’,whichhaslargelybeenresolvedsinceSarkozycameto

power;thejudicialaffairopenedbytheNGOcoalition,Sherpa,inJune2007concerning

ill-gottengainsheldinFrancebythepresidentsofGabon,EquatorialGuinea,Congo-

BrazzavilleandAngola;25theinvestigationintothedeathofFranco-Canadianjournalist,

Guy-AndréKieffer, inCôted’Ivoire inApril2004,whichappearsto implicatesenior

membersoftheformerIvorianregime;andacaseinvolvingaFrenchsoldieraccused

ofhavingkilledtheIvorian,FirminMahé,inCôted’IvoireinMay2005andseemingly

havingbenefitedfromtheprotectionofhissuperiors.

This representative rather thanexhaustive listdemonstrates theconsequencesof

decadesofcloseFrenchpresenceonthecontinent.Itisalsoindicativeofthegrowing

involvementoftheFrenchjudiciary,andtheirpoliticalindependence,andindicatesthat

Frenchpoliticiansmaystillrunsomerisksrelatingtopartypoliticalfinancingcoming

from Africa. African leaders do not always understand this independence, and see

politicalmanipulationbehindjudicialdecisions.Alltheseaffairshaveimportantpolitical

implicationswithcountrieswithstrategicorcommercial importanceforFrance,and

presentFrenchpolicymakerswiththedilemmaofhowtocontinuetowieldinfluence

whileunravellingFrance’spost-colonialentanglements.

RelationswithRwandaareparticularlycomplexinthisrespect.Ongoingjudicialcases

includetheextraditionofsuspectedgenocideculpritsfromFrance,andtheindictment

ofnineseniorRwandanofficials,accusedbyaFrenchjudgeofshootingdowntheplane

ofPresidentHabyarimanain1994,therebykillingFrenchnationalswhowerepartofthe

crew.TheselatterindictmentsledRwandatobreakdiplomaticrelationswithFrancein

2006.In2007Sarkozywasdeterminedtonormaliserelations,arguingtohisofficialsthat

therewasnoreasonthatheshouldbecaughtupinthecontroversiesofhispredecessors.

14



Thisnormalisationprocesshasbeencarried through relatively successfully, and the

judicialdossiershavebeendefused,althoughnotresolved,bysomecomplexdiplomatic

manoeuvring.ThisculminatedinthevisitofPresidentSarkozytoRwandainFebruary

2010,whenheadmittedtoFrench‘errors’duringthegenocide,andareciprocalvisitof

Rwandanpresident,PaulKagame,toParisinSeptember2011.Initiallythisnormalisation

agendawasdriveninpartbythethenforeignminister,BernardKouchner,whowasclose

totheRwandanregime.However,itdoesnotseemtohavebeendisruptedsignificantlyby

hisreplacementasforeignministerbyAlainJuppé,despitethelatter’swell-knownhostile

relationswiththeRwandans,havingbeenaccusedbythemofcomplicityinthegenocide

whenforeignministerin1994.26

OnafurtherlevelisaclearincoherenceinFrenchgovernmentpolicy,andSarkozy’s

unwillingnesstoimposeacoherentsetofpolicylines,ofteninhissearchforaquick

favourablemediaheadline.AnexampleofthelatterishisroleintheArchedeZoéaffair

in2007inChad,whichinvolvedthearrestofsixFrenchmembersofacharityonchild

traffickingcharges.SarkozyalternatedbetweenprofessingrespectfortheChadianjustice

system’sabilitytoconductthetrials,andhisdesiretogaindomesticpoliticalplauditsby

obtainingtheirrelease.27Furthermore,thecoherenceofFrenchpolicyonthecontinent

initiallyfellvictimtotheco-optingofformermembersofthesocialistoppositioninto

hisgovernment.Comingfromoutsidetherulingparty,theirpositionandauthoritywas

alwaysindoubt.ThiswasmostfamouslythecaseofBernardKouchner,foreignminister

untilDecember2010.Oneofhiscloseallies,Jean-ChristopheRufin,hadlefthispost

asambassadortoSenegalinJune2010complainingthattheforeignministrywasbeing

marginalisedinFrance’sAfricapolicy.28

AlainJuppé’sreturntotheforeignministry inFebruary2011hastosomedegree

changedthepictureinParis,andhascertainlyreinforcedtheroleofhisministry.One

oftheconditionshesetdownwhentakingthejobwasthatSarkozy’sgeneralsecretary,

ClaudeGuéant,bemovedoutoftheElyséeandthereforeceasetohavearoleinAfrican

issues (Guéant subsequently became interior minister). This has allowed Juppé to

marginaliseRobertBourgi,whoreliedonhisrelationswithGuéanttoexertinfluence.

Bourgiwas, for example, excluded from theFrenchdelegation to the investitureof

AlassaneOuattarainCôted’Ivoire.Bourgireactedtothisbymakinghighlypublicised

claimsthathetransferredmoneyfromAfricanpresidentstoChiracandtotheforeign

andfutureprimeminister,DominiquedeVillepin.Bourgi’sactionshavebeeninterpreted

variouslyasanattempttoputpressureonSarkozy,oraspreparationforsellingmemoirs.

What isclear,however, is thatBourgi,oneofthefewremainingactorsunashamedly

attachedtooldFrançafriqueways,isburninghisbridgesandwillcertainlynolonger

beabletoplaythesortofbackchannelroleheplayedbefore.29Inaddition,thereare

othersmallbutperceptiblesignsofchangeemanatingfromtheforeignministry,suchas

thelukewarmreactiontothere-electionofPresidentPaulBiyainCamerooninOctober

2011.30

Africa’s perception of change in France–Africa relations

Asdiscussed,muchofla Françafriquesystem,especiallyinitslateryears,wasdrivenby

theinterestsoftheoldguardofFrancophoneAfricanpresidents.Itisclearthatsomeof

them–inparticularOmarBongoofGabon–hadleverageoverthenewFrenchpresident


15


in2007,andwereabletoextractconcessionssuchasdebtrelief.31Bongo’ssheerlongevity

inpower,likethatofCameroon’sBiyaandCongo-Brazzaville’sSassou-Nguesso,gavehim

aclearadvantageinnavigatingthecomplexitiesofFranco–Africanrelations.Bongo’sson

appearstohaveinheritedsomeofthisleverageonsucceedinghimafterhisdeathin2009.

However,suchconservativeforcesarenotabletoholdbackthetide,stilllessturnback

theclock,andanyanalysisofFrance’sroleshouldnotbelimitedtothelackofdemocratic

credentialsofits‘dinosaur’allies.Atbest,theoldguardcanhopetouserelationswiththe

Frenchtobolstertheirdomesticposition,evenastheyseekoutnewalliesandcommercial

partners.

InanyeventitisclearthatthecoreareaofinfluenceoftheFrançafriquenetworks

hasshrunktoCentralAfricanstatessuchasGabon,Cameroon,CentralAfricanRepublic

andCongo-Brazzaville.Eventhereitismorefragilethanthehighlyprotocolairerelations

withFrancemaysuggest.Therecentupsurge inFrenchrelationswithCôted’Ivoire

appearstobuckthetrendofrelativeFrenchdisengagement.Nevertheless,acrossallof

FrancophoneAfrica,presidentsandpopulationscontinuetoremodeltheirrelationswith

theirformercoloniserinwaysmoresuitedtothetimes.Recentrelationswithemerging

powersfromAsia,theGulfandLatinAmericaareaveryvisibleaspectofthisrelativeshift

ofFrancophoneAfrica’sinternationalrelationsawayfromFrance.However,theyareonly

apartoflonger-termculturaltrendsthataredilutingFrenchinfluence,suchastherapid

spreadofPentecostalChristianchurches,manywithlinkstotheUS,attheexpenseofthe

Catholicchurch,whichismoreassociatedwithFrenchpower.

In some cases this reassessment of relations has been relatively serene, even as

FrancophonecountrieshavesoughtalliesandfinancinginAsiaandtheMiddleEast.

IncountriessuchasSenegalandBenintherelativeserenityofthisrenegotiationowes

muchtosuccessfuldemocratisationexperiences(bothcountrieshavehadpeacefulregime

changessincetheearly1990s),whichhashelpedtodefuserelationswithFrance, in

contrasttocountriessuchasCôted’Ivoire.Inothercountriesthetensionbetweenapro-

Frenchleaderandamorehostilepopulation,suchasCameroon,mayhintatfuturetrouble

fortheFrench.InFrancophoneAfrica,aselsewhereonthecontinent,Francenowhasto

playafarmorecompetitivegameinsupportofitsinterests.Themoststrikingexample

ofthisduringSarkozy’stimeinofficewasinlate2007whentheFrenchinfrastructure

company,Bolloré,whichSarkozystronglysupports,unexpectedlylostthecontractto

renovateandruntheportinDakar.ThecontractinsteadwenttoDubaiPortsWorld.

Toreturnbrieflytothedistinctionbetweenreformandchange,theFrenchdebate

betweenla FrançafriqueandreformlooksincreasinglytiredfromanAfricanperspective.

Althoughitisclearthatmuchischanging,theconstantgapbetweenrhetoricofreform

andrealityofpolicyisfrustratingtomostFrancophoneAfricans.However,relationswith

Franceremainimportantforallcountriesoftheregion,notleastgiventheirhighlevels

ofdependencyonoutsidesupportforaidandinvestment.Sodespitethechangingterms

oftherelationship,FrancophoneAfricanleadersoftenstillremainattached,forpragmatic

asmuchasemotivereasons,torelationswiththeirformercolonisers.Therefore,although

thelonger-termhistoricaltrendistowardslessdenseandlessemotiverelations,they

frequently remain ambivalent in their relations with France, unwilling to distance

themselvesfullyfromtheiroverbearingformercoloniser.32

16



f r e n c h c o m m e r c I A l I n t e r e S t S A n d A I d p r e S e n c e

Commercial interests

Despite declining relative influence on the continent, France retains considerable

commercial interests, and President Sarkozy considers their promotion one of his

priorities.SincecolonialtimestheseFrenchinterestshavebeendividedamongthree

distinctelements–rent-seeking,strategicandexpansive.33Intermsofrent-seeking,French

companiesofallsizeshavebenefitedfromthesupportandprotectionaffordedbyFrance’s

closerelationswithFrancophoneAfricanstatesformanyyears.Plantationagriculture,

infrastructure,publicutilitiesandtimberhaveallbeen important. Immediatelyafter

independence,muchofthiswasformalisedintheshapeoftradeagreementsandother

protectionmeasures.AsinternationalagreementsanddeepeningEuropeanintegration

erodedthesemechanisms,Frenchcompaniesincreasinglylookedtoinformaldiplomatic

support.

However, even today, formal mechanisms such as the Franc Zone continue to

benefitFrenchcompanies,orallowinformalinfluencetooperatemoreeffectively.The

exchangestabilityithasprovidedhasgivenFrenchcompaniesandinvestorsasignificant

advantageovertheirpotentialrivalsbyreducingtransactioncostsandrisksassociated

withcurrencyfluctuations.34ThisisseeninthedominanceofFrenchbanksintheFranc

Zone, controlling70%of the zone’s banking activity.35 In reality,French companies

enjoydifferentkindsofadvantages,varyingaccordingtothesectororcountry.Formal

politicalsupport,languageandculture,asimilarcommerciallaw,astrongdevelopment

aidpresenceinFrancophoneAfrica36andtheadvantagesofalongpresenceintheregion

allcount.Owingmainlytoweaklevelsofcompetition,manyFrenchcompanieshavebeen

abletomakeveryhighprofits.

Regardingthestrategicelement,oilanduraniumcontinuetobeofgreatimportanceto

theFrench.TheFrenchnuclearpowergiant,Areva,obtainedaround40%ofitsuranium

supplyfromNigerevenbeforetherecentopeningofthemassivenewmineinImouraren.37

Despitelosingthemonopolyitpreviouslyenjoyedoverthecountry’suraniumsectorin

2007,thecompanymanagedtohangontoamajorshareofthemarket,amidsttense

negotiationswiththenPresidentMamadouTandja.TheFrenchwerealsoabletoensure

thatthesearrangementswereunaffectedbythecoupthatoverthrewhimtwoyearslater.

Thecompanyisalsoprospectinginothercountries,suchastheCentralAfricanRepublic.

AfricaremainsstrategicallyvitaltoFrance’soilsupply.However,thereisalong-term

shift fromFrancophonecountries, suchasGabonandCongo-Brazzaville, toNigeria

(whereFrenchpresenceisgrowing)andAngola(whichisFrance’sfifth-largestoilsupplier

andwhereTotalisthethird-largestoilcompany).Overall,Total,bysomedistanceFrance’s

biggestoilcompany,reliesonAfricafor35%ofitsproduction.38Historically,thisstrong

involvementintheAfricanoilbusinesshasbeenanimportantfactorbehindmanyofthe

underhandedpoliticalinterventionsandopaquebusinessdealingsofla Françafrique, from

supportforBiafranseparatiststocorruptinvolvementwiththeAngolanregime.

Finally, expansiveFrenchcommercial interests includeanarrayofmajorFrench

companies looking to capturemarket share acrossAfrica.Typically suchcompanies

havegrownoutofaprotectedbaseinFrancophoneAfrica,butnowhaveasignificant


17


presenceontherestofthecontinent.Theeconomiccrisisofthelate1980s,whichaffected

FrancophoneAfricastrongly,hasinpartledthemtolookformarketselsewhereinAfrica,

although,paradoxically,theyalsobenefitedfromtheprivatisationsthatresultedfromthe

crisis.ExamplesofsuchcompaniesincludegiantssuchasAirFranceandmobilephone

company,Orange.

Infrastructurecompany,Bolloré,isexpandingitsAfricaoperationsrapidly.In2011

itwonthecontractforrefurbishingandrunningtheportinConakry,oustingarival

company.Bollorésubsidiary,EuroRSCG,acommunicationscompany,advisedGuinean

president,AlphaCondé,duringhisrecentelectoralvictory(aroleitalsoplayed,less

successfully,forLaurentGbagboinCôted’Ivoire).Thecompanyoustedfromthecontract

istakingthemattertocourt.39Bolloré’spositionintheWestAfricanportsector,which

includesLagosinNigeriaandTemainGhana,andvirtuallyallFrancophoneAfricanports,

issostrongastobevergingonmonopolistic.Bouygues,anotherFrenchgiant,isalso

expanding,fromastrongbaseinthepublicutilities.Itsigneda15-yeardealtorunCôte

d’Ivoire’swaterandelectricitynetworksinOctober2005,andtheBouyguesfamilyis

developingastakeinthecountry’soffshoregasfields.40

BouyguesisattheforefrontofastrongcommercialrelationshipwithSouthAfrica,

byfarFrance’sbiggesttradingpartnersouthoftheSahara.IthasastakeintheGautrain

project,inroads,stadiumsand(withFrenchcompany,Alstom,whichitpartowns)in

powergeneration.TheFrenchnuclearindustry,whichhasahistoricstakeinSouthAfrica’s

nuclearindustry,continuestocourtthecountry;Areva’sdirector,AnneLauvergeon,was

onPresidentMbeki’sInternationalInvestmentCouncil.However,thishasnotproduced

anysignificantnewdeals,owingtoSouthAfrica’sdecisiontoconcentrateoncoal-fired

powerproduction.

PresidentSarkozy,whomakesnoefforttohidehispro-businessapproachingeneral,

presentshimselfasclosetotheexpansiveaspectsofFrenchpresenceinAfrica.Heis

certainlyclosetosomeofthemajorplayers,andhaspersonaltiestotheownersofboth

BolloréandBouygues.OnhisvisitstoAngolaandSouthAfricainparticular,Sarkozyhas

beenaccompaniedbylargebusinessdelegations.TofullygrasptheFrenchcommercial

positioninAfrica,itisimportanttoconsideritsrelativestrengthinFrancophoneAfrica,

whereitenjoystheadvantagesdiscussed,andotherAfricancountrieswheretheyhave

tocompeteinadifferentcontext.Tables1and2(onpage18)provideabreakdownof

France’s10-largesttradingpartnersinAfricain2010forexportsandimportsofgoods

respectively.

The tablesclearly show the importanceofnon-Francophonecountries, although

itisstrikingthatsomelargeeconomies,suchasKenya,donotfeatureinthetop10.

BiggerFrancophonecountriesstillhaveanimportanttraderelationship,particularlyas

aproportionoftheirowntrade,althoughAfricaasawholeremainsalowpercentageof

France’soveralltrade.ThereisanimbalanceinFrance’sfavourasregardsnon-orlowoil-

producingstates(Cameroon,Senegal,Côted’Ivoire).Finally,theyshowthedominanceof

oilintermsofimportstoFrance.Spacedoesnotpermitadetailedhistoricalcomparison,

buttwopointscanbemade.Firstly,overallthevolumesofFrenchtradewithAfricahave

beengrowingatasteady,butnotspectacular,rateoverthepast10years.Secondly,it

isimportanttonotethattheshifttoAnglophoneAfricaisnotnew,andisastructural

responsetotheweaknessesofFrancophoneAfrica’seconomyandshiftingpatternsofoil

supply,ratherthantheproductofspecificeventsorpolicyshifts.

18



Table 1: French exports to its ten-largest trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa

($ million), 2010

$ million

Sub-Saharan Africa total 15,000

South Africa 2,300

Nigeria 2,100

Côte d’Ivoire 1,000

Senegal 946

Angola 841

Cameroon 790

Gabon 750

Mauritius 420

Madagascar 309

Democratic Republic of Congo 226

world total 511,651a

aSub-SaharanAfricaisapproximately3%oftotalFrenchexports.

Source:UNCTADstat,http://www.unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportfolders.aspx

Table 2: French imports from its ten-largest trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa

($ million), 2010

$ million

Sub-Saharan Africa total 12,500a

Nigeria 3,494

Angola 2,265

South Africa 1,100

Côte d’Ivoire 718

Gabon 654

Equatorial Guinea 635

Congo-Brazzaville 601

Ghana 424

Madagascar 394

Mauritius 360

aFranceabsorbsapproximately3.5%ofAfrica’stotalexportsof344,000$million

Source:UNCTADstat,http://www.unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportfolders.aspx


19


Frenchcompaniesarecompetingincreasinglywithnewpowers forcontractsand

marketshares.However,theyremaininastrongpositionacrossthecontinentandare

dominant inmanyFrancophoneAfricancountries.ThepreciseFrench strategies in

reactiontothegrowingpresenceofothercommercialpowerswouldbeasubjectofuseful

furtherresearch.Inmanyrespectsnewcommercialpowers,suchasChina,competein

differentsectorstotheFrench.Butinsomeareasthereisdirectcompetition,suchasin

infrastructureandoil.HeretheFrenchtrytodeploywhatpoliticalinfluencetheycan,

accordingtodifferentnationalcontexts,tocountertheevidentChineseadvantagesin

termsofcostandscale.

TheleadersofFrancophoneAfricancountriesaretryingtoencouragetieswithother

countries,buttheyalsoremaindependentonFrenchinvestment,aidandbroadersupport,

simplyowingtoalackofdomesticcapacity.Itisstriking,forexample,thatsoonafter

awardingthecontractfortheDakarporttoDubaiPortsWorld,PresidentWadesenthis

sontoParistomendrelationsdirectlywithSarkozy.Thiscontinueddependenceisoften

seeninAfricaasmonopolisticorexploitative.Inpart,thatperceptionderivesfromthe

historicandcurrentrealities,andfromacorrectperceptionthat,likeelsewhere,political

influenceisavitalpartofcapturingmarketshareinAfrica.Itisalsoafunctionofthe

lowlevelofAfricancapitalformationandthecommodityexportorientationofAfrican

economies.AlthoughPresidentSarkozyisunlikelytobeoverlyconcernedbysuchissues

ofperception,thelonger-termquestionthisraisesisatwhatpointFrenchcommercial

presencecanbeseenas‘normal’ratherthanasrelatedtotheFrançafriqueheritage.Thisis

aparticularlyacuteproblemforFrenchpolicyinthecontextofincreasedcompetitionfor

Africa’sresourcesandmarkets.AlthoughSarkozyisostensiblyworkingtoreformFrench

actionsonthecontinent,manyFrenchofficials,politiciansandprivateindividualsalso

wishtomaintainprivilegedrelationswithauthoritarianleaderspreciselybecausetheyare

regardedasofvitalcommercialimportance.

French development aid

Frenchdevelopment aidhas longbeen concentrated in sub-SaharanAfrica.Despite

someshifts,theregionstillabsorbs45%ofFrenchofficialaid,accordingtothelatest

OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)figures.Thetwo

sectors inwhichaidhasbeenmostconcentrated inrecentyearshasbeeneducation

(atraditionalareaofFrenchaid,whichaccountsfor20%ofcurrentFrenchspending)

anddebtrelief.ThelatterbecameanimportantpartofFrenchaidinthelate1980s,but

hassinceeasedoffasthefinancesofFrancophoneAfricaneconomieshaverecovered,

anddebtreliefhasbeengranted.Frenchaidhasbeenoneofthesupportmechanisms

ofFrenchcommercialpresenceonthecontinent,whetherformallythroughaidtiedto

commercialcontracts,orinformallysincethe‘untying’ofFrenchaid.Sarkozyhasmade

itclearthatheintendstouseaidtothatend,bothinFrancophoneAfricaandbeyond.

Following the reforms of 1998, the institutions of French aid remain relatively

complex.Theforeignministrycontrolsaportionofaidspend,especiallyintheculture

andeducation.ButthetechnicalFrenchaidagency,theAfD,hascontinuedtoassertits

position.Itisinvolvedinfinancinginfrastructureprojectsandhasundergonearelative

shift towardsnon-Francophonecountries.TheAfDnowraisesandspendsits largest

amountsinsub-SaharanAfricainSouthAfrica,whereitworksonsocialservicedelivery

20



andthepromotionofsmallandmediumenterprises.However,theexactrelationship

betweenFrenchdevelopmentaidandtheAfDishighly intricate. Inmoredeveloped

economiestheAfDactslikeadevelopmentbank,givingloansratherthangrantsand

actingasaleverforfinancefromotherinstitutions.Insuchcountries,onlyapartof

AfDspendingcountsasofficialdevelopmentaid.TheAfDislegallyabank,ownedby

theFrenchstate,andinSouthAfrica,forexample,itmakesaprofit.Intermsofaidand

personnel,itisstillfairlyconcentratedinFrancophoneAfrica.

r e f o r m o f f r e n c h m I l I t A r y p r e S e n c e

Background – the French military in Africa and Chirac’s reforms

SincethecreationoftheSenegaleseTirailleurs(riflemen)in1857,themilitaryhasalways

beenanimportantpartofFrance’srelationswithAfrica.Sharedexperiencesofcombatin

thetwoworldwarsandintheFrenchempirehadalastingeffectonrelations.41Insome

countries,Frenchmilitarypresencewasmorebrutalandcontroversial,asinCameroon

whereitstayedonafterindependencetocrushanationalistmovement.42However,in

allcasestieswerecreatedwiththeemergingAfricanleadership,civilianandmilitary.

Significantly,theFrenchmilitarycametoseeAfricaasanareainwhichFrenchpower

couldbeprojected,withcostsandriskscontained.

TherationaleofFrenchmilitarypresenceinAfricathereforederivedfromtheoverall

philosophyofFrenchpresencedescribedearlier–toprotectloyalalliesandsecureFrench

diplomaticandeconomic interests.Themeansto thisendconsistedofanetworkof

Frenchbasesandmissions,complementedbyaverylargecontingentofadvisorsand

trainers,anintelligencepresence,andoccasionalrelianceonmercenaries.

Agreementsweresignedwithmostformercolonies.InSenegal,Côted’Ivoire,Gabon,

theCentralAfricanRepublicandDjiboutimilitarybaseswereestablishedormaintained

fromthecolonialperiod.Someagreementsallowed–althoughdidnotoblige–France

tointervenetosecuretheregimeincaseofinternalorexternalthreats.Inothercases

militaryco-operationagreementsweresignedtoprovidetrainingandequipment.43This

presenceallowedtheFrenchmilitarytointerveneontheAfricancontinent,inavarietyof

circumstances,around30timesafter1960.Mostcommonly,althoughnotalways,these

interventionswereinsupportofathreatenedally.

AttheendoftheColdWar,tenthousandFrenchtroopswerepresentonthecontinent

infivebases,aswellasamissioninChadthathadbecomeapermanentbaseinallbut

name.Frenchmilitaryadvisorsstillnumberedoverninehundred.44Anadditionalrapid

reactionforcehasalsobeenavailabletoFrenchpolicymakers,andwasusedinRwanda

in1993.Thispresencehaddeclinedsteadilyfromaroundthirtythousandtroopsjust

afterindependence,butstillrepresentedsignificantinvestment.ManyFrenchofficersand

officialswereproudthatFrancophoneAfricahad,overall,sufferedfromlessinstability

thanotherpartsofthecontinent.However,theendoftheColdWar,thespreadofcivil

conflictandcomplexemergenciesinAfrica,andtheFrenchroleinRwandaallundermined

therationale,andlegitimacy,ofFrenchpresence.


21


In1995Chiraccametopower,stronglyattachedtotheFrenchmilitaryaswellas

toFrance’straditionalroleinAfrica,butalsoawareoftheneedforreform.Heandhis

advisorsaimedtoadaptandredefineFrenchmilitarypresence,addressingitsweakening

legitimacywhilestill retaining influenceacquired throughthepresentstructures. In

Frencheyes,theAfricansecuritycontexthadbecomeoneof‘diffusethreat’(including,

after2001,terrorism)andcomplexstabilitychallenges.45

Toaddressthelegitimacydeficit,ChiracemphasisedthatFrancewouldnolonger

playthe‘gendarmeofAfrica’,andwouldceasetointerfereintheinternalaffairsofAfrican

countries.Asdiscussed,thispolicywasstronglyinfluencedafter1997byJospin’sSocialist

Partygovernment.Wheninterventionsdidoccur,greateremphasiswasplacedonacting

underaUNmandate.This‘UNcover’hadbeenafeatureofFrenchinterventioninRwanda

(OperationTurquoisein1994)andwasusedtointerveneinCôted’Ivoirefrom2002.

To address Africa’s evolving security challenges, Chirac started the evolution of

FrenchmilitarypresencetowardstrainingAfricanforces,subsequentlylinkedtosupport

fortheemergingAfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitecture(APSA).Thisresultedinthe

creationof17regionaltrainingcentresandthelaunch,in1997,oftheRenforcementdes

capacitésafricainesdemaintiendelapaix(AfricanPeacekeepingCapacityReinforcement

Programme,RECAMP)trainingprogramme,consistingofbiannualtrainingexercisesand

logisticalsupportforAfrican-ledmissions.46Finally,emphasiswasgiventospreadingthe

financialcostandpoliticalriskofinterventioninAfricathroughdeepeningco-operation

withtheEU.

Lastly it is important to note what Chirac did not do – reduce French bases or

troopnumbers.TheonlyexceptionwastheclosureofthebaseintheCentralAfrican

Republic,althougheventhereFrenchtroopsstayedonaspartofa(temporary)mission.

Hemaintainedthisincreasinglyanomalousstructureowingtoresistancetochangefrom

seniorofficersandtoamajorprogrammeofprofessionalreformoftheFrenchmilitary,

whichwasconsideredapreconditionforreformofitsAfricanpresence.47

Sarkozy’s ambivalent and unfinished reforms

Thisreviewofthechangingdoctrinesfrom1994to2007demonstratesthatforallhis

protestationsofarenewal,theSarkozyperiodhasbeencharacterisedbyatleastasmuch

continuityaschange.Thisincludespromisesoflessunilateralintervention;multilateral

cover,bothpoliticalandfinancial;andanemphasisontrainingAfricansoldiers,and

supportingAfrican interventions insteadofputtingFrenchtroopsontheground. In

addition,Frenchofficialorsemi-officialanalysisoftheAfricansecuritycontextremains

constant, centredoncrises, ‘ungoverned space’ anddiffusenon-state threats.48This

approachissimilartotheanalysisofothermajorexternalpowers,suchastheUKandthe

US,andhasevidentlinkstothepost9/11agenda.49

Sarkozy’s speech inCapeTown inFebruary2008 laidout thebroad linesofhis

approach. France would avoid direct interventions; help Africa to build its own

capabilities(‘TheAfricanUnionwishestobuildastand-byforceby2010–12?Wellthen,

thatisFrance’sobjectivetoo’);andinvolvetheEUintheseefforts.Itisimportanttonote

thatthisswitchtotrainingAfricanpeacekeepersiscommonacrosstheUKandtheUS.50

Finally,andthisiswherehisapproachhasdifferedsignificantlyfromhispredecessors,

22



SarkozypromisedtorenegotiatealldefenceagreementswithAfricancountries,toreview

allFrenchmilitarybases,andtodosoonanentirelytransparentbasis.

TherenegotiationscommencedfollowingtheCapeTownspeech.InJuly2008the

FrenchbaseinAbidjanformallyclosed,leavingjusttheUN-mandatedLicorneforce.

However,followingtheconfirmationofAlassaneOuattarainpowerinApril2011,the

expectedwithdrawalofFrenchtroops fromAbidjanhasbeendelayed,with thenew

presidentaskingthemtostayontohelpwithtrainingthenewIvorianarmy,stabilising

hisregimeandprotectinghimphysically.51

AfternegotiationswiththeSenegaleseandGaboneseauthorities,thedecisionwas

madetoclosethebaseinDakar,andkeepthebaseinLibreville.Themainfactorbehind

closingtheDakarbasewasthedesireoftheSenegaleseregimetorecoverlandincentral

Dakar.TheregimeofferedtheFrenchtheopportunitytomovetheirbasetoanewinland

locationnearThiès,butthiswasnotconsideredpractical.TheFrenchwillretainaround

halfthelandand450housesandapartmentstheycurrentlyoccupy,andleavebehind300

soldiers.Thebasewillnotincludeanyformedunits,butwillmainlybeatofficerlevel,

andwillhaveatrainingroleandlogisticalcapacity.Thesoldierswillpotentiallyprovidea

platformforinterventionsagainstnewthreats,suchasterrorism(seeBox 1).52

IntermsoftherenegotiationsforthenewagreementsannouncedinCapeTown,all

ofwhichwillbeassistanceagreementsandnotdefenceagreements,thosewithTogoand

theCentralAfricanRepublichavebeenfinalisedandarepublishedintheofficialFrench

governmentgazette.Atthetimeofwriting,newtreatieswithGabon,Senegal,Djibouti,

Cameroon,Côted’IvoireandtheComorosarestillbeingnegotiated.53

Box 1: French troop presence in Africa at start of 2010

MissionsCôte d’Ivoire: 930 troopsChad: 945 troopsCentral African Republic: 230 troops

BasesDjibouti: 2 900 troopsSenegal: 1 150 troopsGabon: 900 troops

In addition to this, France has around two hundred troops embedded in European or UN missions, and 2 600 troops and gendarmes on the island of Réunion (part of French soveriegn territory).

Source: French Senate, February 2010

PendingthewithdrawalfromDakarandwithquestionmarksremainingoverthepresence

inAbidjan,therewerestillaroundseventhousandFrenchtroopsonAfricansoilin2010,

onlyaslightreductionfrom1990levels.However,theplannedconfigurationwillprobably

reducethisbyjustunderhalf.Itisalsoimportanttoemphasisetheseverereductionin


23


thenumberofmilitaryco-operationofficersembeddedwithAfricanforces,whichhas

declinedfromoverninehundredinthelate1980s,toaroundonehundredandfiftytoday.

Theemphasisisnowontrainingandlogisticalsupportforallfourregionalcomponents

ofAPSA:Dakar(1 150troops)intheWesttocovertheEconomicCommunityofWest

AfricanStates(ECOWAS);Libreville(900troops)inthecentretocovertheEconomic

CommunityofCentralAfricanStates;Djibouti (2 900 troops) tocoverEastAfrica’s

regionalorganisations;andthebaseinReunion(2 600troopsandgendarmes)tocover

theSouthAfricanDevelopmentCommunity.Evenshoulddirectinterventionsbephased

out,thisisthincoverageforthesizeofthetasksandthegeographicalspread;whichhelps

toexplaincontinuedemphasisonaEuropeanrole.

There are several points to consider in attempting tounderstand the reforms to

Frenchmilitarypresenceinsub-SaharanAfrica.Thefirstisthatoncethechangeshave

beenbeddeddown,theywillrepresentareducedpresenceandareducedcost.Thecost

pressures,inthecontextofexpensivere-equipmentprogrammes,rejoiningthecommand

structureofNATO,andcontinuedfocusonAsiaandtheMiddleEast,includinganew

FrenchmilitarybaseinAbuDhabi,areundoubtedlyafactor.54Equally,Sarkozy’sstrong

emphasis on relations with the Mediterranean have been important, as seen in the

decisiontoholdthe2010France–AfricasummitinEgyptandlater–whenitwasshifted

toFranceowingtodisagreementsovertheInternationalCriminalCourt’sarrestwarrant

forPresidentOmaral-BashirofSudan–tomakeHosniMubarakaguestofhonour.There

issignificantuneaseamongtheFrenchmilitaryatthisreduction,andabeliefthatFrance

shouldretainastrong,albeitreformed,presenceinsub-SaharanAfrica,55notleastforthe

emergencyevacuationofFrenchandothernationals.

Thesecondpointconcernsanemphasisonmultilateralism,whichisnowaconstant

refrainaccompanyingallFrenchaction.InparticularaUNmandatehasbeenseenasvital

legitimacycoverforinterventionsinCôted’IvoireandChad.56However,thisemphasison

theUNsuffersfromtwomajorproblems.Firstly,itisnotperceivedasprovidinglegitimacy

whenFranceisseenasdominatingtheSecurityCounciltosuititsownagenda.Asthe

FrenchSenatereportof2006stated,‘itisdifficultforaformercolonialpowersuchas

Francetoengageontheground,evenintheframeworkofthe“newdoctrine”[ieunder

UNmandate],whichwillnotnecessarilybeseenasnew’.57Secondly,therefusalofFrench

troopstoactunderUNcommand,evenwhenunderaUNmandate(forexampleinCôte

d’Ivoire), is often seenon theAfrican continent as compromisingmultilateralism.58

Conversely,althoughthispointislessfrequentlyheard,theFrenchroleasleadnationin

multilateralinterventionsisusefultoprovidecoherence,fundingandpoliticalmomentum

toensuretheysucceedintheirmandatedtasks.59

AfurtherimportantaspectofFrance’smultilateralisationislinkswiththeAUandits

fiveregionalbodies.ThenewconfigurationoftheFrenchmilitaryinAfricaisintended

torespondtotheemergingAPSA.TheFrench,alongwithotherWesternpowers,have

devotedconsiderablehumanandfinancialresources,includingthroughtheEuropean

AfricanPeaceFacilitywhichisfundedingreatpartbytheFrench,tosupportingthe

variouselementsofAPSA.ThisisnowconsideredavitalpartofFrance’sAfricapolicy.

AlthoughFrance’s actual bilateral financial contribution to theAU ismuch smaller

thanthatoftheUK,forexample,andissmallcomparedwithFrance’soverallmilitary

engagementonthecontinent,ithasallocatedalotofresourcestoregion-basedtraining

activities.Inaddition,thepositionoftheAUandregionalbodiesisconsideredavital

24



partofmultilateral cover forFrenchactions,and isan increasingsiteofdiplomatic

co-ordination.OnCôted’Ivoire,theECOWASandNigerianposition–intheforefront

of attempts to forceGbagbo to recognisehiselectoraldefeatof2010–wasofgreat

importancetotheFrench,whonowrecognisethegrowingandlargelypositiveroleof

ECOWASinconflictmediationintheregion.60

TocontributetothemanagementofAfrica’scomplexcrises,Franceiswellawarethat

itmustsharethepoliticalandfinancialcostswithitsEuropeanallies.Thishasbeenseen

inthedecisiontakenin2007totransformRECAMPintoanEUprogramme,underthe

authorityoftheEUCouncilofMinisters.Itnowhasnon-FrenchEuropeanofficersat

seniorlevels.However,onthegroundthereisstillreluctancetomergeallFrenchtraining

efforts fully intomultilateralprogrammes,not leastowing toaperception thatsuch

programmesarecumbersomeandunproductive.61RECAMPandtheregionaltraining

centresarestillstaffedmainlybyFrenchpersonnel,focusedonFrancophonecountries

andpredominantlyintheFrenchlanguage.

This comes at a time when Europe’s embryonic security actors are increasingly

interestedinAfrica’sstability–aswitnessedbothbyEuropeanfundingofAPSA,andby

EuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP)missionsinAfrica:fourmilitary(DRC

twice,Chad/CentralAfricanRepublic,andSomalia)andtwotrainingorsupportmissions

(DRC,Guinea-Bissau)since2003,outofatotalof10ESDPmissionsworldwide.62France

hasbeeninstrumentalinmanyoftheseinitiatives,andhasatraditionofusingtheEU

toburden-shareinAfrica.However,itisnotinexclusivecontroloftheESDPagendain

Africa,norisFrenchsupportforaEuropeanroleabsolute,especiallygivenSarkozy’s

supportforFrance’sroleinNATO.Forthemoment,theEUandNATOhaveadefacto

divisionoflabour,bothintermsofthekindsofinterventionstheycarryoutandwhere

thesearecarriedout(theEUfocusingespeciallyonsub-SaharanAfrica).Inshortthereis

genuine,although‘messy’,multilateralismoccurring.63

Interventions in Chad and Libya

ThecomplexstoryofFrance’sinvolvementinChadunderSarkozystartswiththedesireof

theformerforeignminister,BernardKouchner,toplayaroleintheresolutionofSudan’s

Darfurcrisis.Whenhis ideaof ‘humanitariancorridors’provedunworkable,French

attentionturnedtothepossibilityofusingpresenceandinfluenceinChadtocontribute

tomuch-neededregionalstability,encompassingDarfur,ChadandtheCentralAfrican

Republic.64

Inlate2007thedecisionwasmadetopushforanEUforce,toactasabridgingmission

forafutureUNforceandasastabilisingpresencetoallowhumanitarianworktocontinue

intheeastofthecountry.ThepresenceofaFrenchmilitarymissionalreadyinplace

wasseenasawayoffacilitatingwhatwastobetheEU’smostcomplexlogisticalmission

inAfrica.Europeanpartnersprovedsceptical– theFrenchmemberof theEuropean

Parliament,Marie-ArletteCarlotti,spokeformanywhenshesaid‘Francemustnotseek

tocontrolthismissionforitsownends…Iwillbeparticularlyvigilanttomakesurethat

theinterestsofAfricaandEuropeprevailoverFrance’spre-carre [France’sareaofinfluence

onthecontinent]’.65InthefaceofthisEuropeanreluctance,theFrenchmadeupover

halfthetroopsofthemission,includingthegroundcommander(theoverallcommander,

basedinEurope,wasIrishgeneral,PatNash).


25


InFebruary2008,astheEuropeanmissionwaspreparingfordeployment,Sudanese-

backedrebelsenteredthecapital.Followingaprolongedbattle,whichreachedthegates

ofthepresident’scompound,therebelswerebeatenback.France’spreciseroleinthese

eventsisnotentirelyclear.AlthoughtheFrenchtroopsinNdjamenaundoubtedlyspent

mostofthetimeinvolvedinacomplexevacuationofFrenchandothernationals,itisalso

highlylikelythattheysuppliedassistancetoChadianpresident,IdrissDéby,inparticular

intelligenceonrebelmovements.ItalsoappearsthattheFrenchsuppliedDébywith

crucialarmamentsjustbeforethefighting.66Itiscertainthattheirroleinsecuringthe

airportforevacuationpurposesnotonlyprotectedDéby’shelicopters,butalsoallowedfor

furtherarmstocomeinfromLibya.

France’s presentation of its role has been ambivalent. On the one hand, it has

emphasised itsneutrality,withSarkozy stating inCapeTown threeweeks later that

‘Francedidnotallowitselftobecomeembroiledintheconflict’.Ontheotherhand,it

hasemphasisedthatDébywasthelegitimatepresidentofthecountryand,implicitly,that

therewasnothingwronginofferinghimsupportunderthetermsofthe1974defence

agreement.Thisisanimportantdistinctionanddemonstratesthatthereisremaining

uncertaintyinFrenchpolicycirclesconcerningwhatkindsofinterventionsaredesirable

andlegitimate,intheframeworkofa‘reformed’policy.Intheend,theviolenceofFebruary

2008didnotpreventthedeploymentoftheEuropeanforce,whichoperatedintheeast

ofthecountryforayearalongside,butwithadifferentmandatefrom,theFrenchtroops,

untilitwasreplacedbyaUNforce.

TheFrenchforce,whichmanyobservershadexpectedtoleavewiththewithdrawal

of the European force, has stayed on. This is in part because many in the French

militarywishtoremaininChad,asapresence intheheartof theAfricanSaheland

fortrainingopportunities,especiallyforfighterjets.However,recentindicationsarethat

theFrenchpresenceinChadwillevolvetowardsasmallertraining-orientedmission.67

As it ischaracteristicof thesenegotiations, itshouldalsobenotedthatmuchof the

hesitationoverFrance’swithdrawalhasbeenowingtoPresidentDéby’sownuncertainty

overwhetherFrenchpresenceserveshisinterestornot,andhisattempttoextractthe

maximumpoliticalandfinancialgainfromanyrenegotiation.68

ChadclearlyrepresentsacaseofcomplexmultilateralisationofanexistingFrench

policy.TheinvolvementofaEuropeanforce,andaUNmandate(authorisingtheEUforce

throughtheUNSecurityCouncilResolutionorUNSCR1778ofSeptember2007),proved

insufficienttoallayfearsandsuspicionsofaFrenchagenda,andinparticularofFrench

supporttoanauthoritarianleaderthreatenedbyinternalinstability.

France’sroleinChadshouldnot,however,betakenasrepresentative.Althoughthe

factorspushingtheFrenchtoseekaEuropeanroleandaUNmandatearenowclearly

astructuralfeatureofFrenchpolicy,itislikelythatdirectFrenchmilitaryinvolvement

willdeclineinthecomingyearsowingtogrowingreluctanceonbothFrenchandAfrican

sides.Whereinterventionsdooccur,theyarelikelytobetargetedatspecificthreats(see

Box2onpage26)ratherthanprovidingallieswithblanketregimeguarantees,although

African leadersmaywell try touse the formeras leverage togain the latter.African

populations,forwhomtheFrenchmilitarypresenceonthecontinentisavividsymbol

ofincompletedecolonisationandpartialsovereignty,regardthesedevelopmentsaslong

overdue.FrancophoneAfricanleadersaremoreambivalent;somewelcomethechanges,

whereasotherscontinuetolooktoFrancetosecuretheirregime.

26



RecenteventsinCôted’IvoireandLibyaseemtostronglycallintoquestiontheFrench

doctrineofnon-interferenceintheinternalaffairsofAfricanstates.The2011intervention

inLibyainsupportofanti-Gaddafirebelsis,onthefaceofit,acurious‘neocon’turnon

thepartoftheFrenchpresident,usingmilitarytechnologytosupportsupposeddemocratic

forces.Themilitarysupportgiventorebelforces,evenastheAUwastryingtosetin

placeanegotiatedsettlement,wasresentedacrossAfrica,andhasopeneduptheFrench

andotherWesternpowerstoaccusationsofdoublestandards.Despitemanymisgivings

aboutMuammerGaddafiasaleader,thelackofrespectshownforthesovereigntyofan

Africanstatewillnothavebeenoverlooked.NorwillthestretchingofaUNmandatefrom

protectingcivilianstotakingsidesinaconflict.RelationswiththeAUmayhavesuffered,

althoughinstitutionalco-operationisthickenoughtocontinueintheinterestsofboth

parties,especiallyastheAUCommissiontookarelativelystronganti-Gaddafiposition.

Box 2: France in the Sahel

The west African Sahel has hosted a group of terrorists since around 2000.69 The group, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is an offshoot from the Algerian civil war of the 1990s. It sought sanctuary in the Sahel, principally in northern Mali, following defeat by the Algerian military. Analysts tend to agree that the group numbers in the Sahel region are between one hundred and three hundred people, divided into three or four separate cells (it also has a presence in Northern Algeria). The majority, especially the leadership, are Algerian, but the group also includes other nationalities, including Mauritanian, Nigerian and Malian. The group has inserted itself into the smuggling economy of the region. Indeed the line between its ideological and criminal aspects is decidedly blurred.70

The group announced its presence spectacularly in 2002 by kidnapping 32 European tourists (none of whom was French) in Mali. They were eventually freed, most likely following ransom payments. For the next six years the group appeared to be contained. Despite evident French concerns, not least as Algerian militancy has a significant impact on France, the Americans appeared willing to take the international lead in training and equipping local forces – principally Mauritanian, Nigerian and Malian – to confront the threat.

However, as the group turned increasingly to kidnapping western targets, generally accomplished through intermediaries, France was dragged into direct confrontation.71 In December 2007, a group of French tourists were killed in Mauritania, although the exact role of AQIM in this is not clear. Following the execution of British hostage, Edwin Dyer, in June 2009 when Britain refused to pay a ransom, in November the French aid worker, Pierre Camate, was kidnapped in Mali. He was released in February 2010 when Mali released four terrorists, thereby drawing the anger of neighbouring Mauritania and Algeria who were seeking their extradition. The French government has denied that they pressured the Malian government to release the four (who served out very short sentences before their release).

In April 2010, another French aid worker, Michel Germaneau, was kidnapped in Niger, and, as is typically the case, transported across the region to Mauritania. After an attempt to free him by French special forces and the Mauritanian army on Malian territory in July, in which several supposed members of the kidnap cell were killed, Germaneau died.


27


At first the French authorities condemned his execution by the group, but it is now considered possible that he died of natural causes. His body has not been recovered.

Possibly in revenge for the July 2010 raid, AQIM kidnapped five French nationals, a Madagascan and a Togolese, all working for the French uranium giant, Areva, or its contractors, in Niger in September.72 The Madagascan, the Togolese and one French hostage were released in February 2011; the others remain in captivity. Emboldened by this, a group, presumed to be AQIM or working for them, then kidnapped two Frenchmen in a restaurant in central Niamey in January 2011. The Nigerian military and the French – who by this point had established a considerable military presence in the area, including surveillance planes based in Niamey – gave chase. Both hostages and three Nigerian gendarmes died in a shootout in Mali two days later.73 A number of uncertainties remain concerning whether any kidnappers survived, and how one of the hostages and the Nigerian gendarmes were killed. The suspicion of death by friendly fire remains strong.74

AQIM is now explicitly targeting the French, and is demanding that they withdraw from Afghanistan and repeal the recent law banning the public wearing of the full veil in France. These demands may well be an ideological cover for pecuniary motivations, and the group’s capacity to inflict serious damage on French interests may be limited (the kidnappings can in some ways be seen as easy targets). However, they do alter the strategic context for the French. The time when the French could stand aside from these issues in light of their position on the 2003 Iraq war appears to have ended.

As French military and intelligence services increase their presence in the region, they will be obliged to build closer relations with local forces, including in Burkina Faso where they have already relied on the regional negotiating power of some of Blaise Compaoré’s close aides. It is interesting to note that the new French ambassador to Ouagadougou is an army general, a very unusual situation in French diplomacy. The risk that this poses of being manipulated for local agendas should not be underestimated, especially in a context where a growing terrorist and criminal threat is creating considerable tensions between the states of the region; and the fall out from the end of the Gaddafi regime in Libya is being felt across the region in terms of increased fflow of fighters and weapons. The journalist, Philippe Leymarie, offers some shrewd advice:75

Beware of mission creep, a French specialty. It starts with a humanitarian mission, with information sharing or soft cooperation, aimed at rescuing [French] nationals. And then it morphs, days or weeks later, into a fully ffledged intervention, with its obscure side and a whole load of geopolitical consequences, not all very positive.

f r A n c e ’ S I n v o lv e m e n t I n t h e c ô t e d ’ I v o I r e c r I S I S

France and the Côte d’Ivoire crisis

Sincethe1930sCôted’IvoirewasthemosteconomicallysuccessfulofFrance’sAfrican

coloniesandattheheartofla Françafrique–aphrasecoined,withpositiveconnotations

28



atthetime,bypro-Frenchpresident,Houphouët-Boigny.Côted’Ivoirewasalsoavitalpart

ofFrancophoneAfrica,drawinginmigrantlabourfromallovertheregion.Thecountry

hadaremarkabledensityoftieswiththeformercolonialpower,includingthousandsof

ex-patriotFrenchworkers,adominant,indeedmonopolisticFrencheconomicpresence,

highlyplacedFrenchofficialsandadvisors,andamilitarybase.76

Giventhesedenselinks,itwasperhapsinevitablethatFrancewasdraggedintothe

IvoriancrisissparkedoffbythecoupofDecember1999,andthesubsequent(andlinked)

coupattemptof2002,whichresultedinanon-offcivilwar.Spacepreventsthorough

discussionofthecrisis,butitisimportanttonotethatFrenchpolicymakersweredeeply

involvedfromthebeginning.UndertheJospin–Chiraccohabitationtheydecidedagainst

interveningwithmilitaryforcein1999,despitesupportforsuchactionfrommanyin

Paris.77

FollowingtheoutbreakofhostilitiesinSeptember2002–afewmonthsafterChirac

was returned to power, this time without having to ‘cohabit’ with a Socialist Party

government– theFrenchapproachwas tostabilise thesituation,andsupportpeace

negotiationsbetweentherebelsandLaurentGbagbo’sgovernment.Thiswasbasedon

severalpremises.Firstly,thattheIvoriancrisiswasaninternalmatter,andthattheFranco–

Ivoriandefencetreatyconcerningexternalaggressionthereforedidnotapply.Secondly,

that therebelshada legitimatecaseandshouldbetreatedasequals innegotiations.

Finally,thatanegotiatedsolutionwaspossible,providedsufficientbuy-inwasachieved

bothfromIvorianpartiesandfromtheinternationalcommunity.

Thisapproachledtothesigningof theLinas-MarcoussisAgreement inFrancein

March2003andthecreationofaseriesofnationaluniongovernments.However,the

agreementwasdeeplycontroversialfortheIvorianregime.AlthoughFrancepresented

itaspartofanewwayofdoingbusiness,preferabletotheAmericans’bellicoseattitude

towardsIraq,itwasseenbyGbagbo’ssideasgivingsuccourtoanillegitimaterebellion,

andasarefusaltorecognisethesupportBurkinaFasohadgiventothatrebellion.That

ChiracwasamajorhistoricalfigureintheGaullistbranchesofla Françafrique,towhich

Gbagbo’scampwasviscerallyopposed,furtherfuelledIvoriansuspicions.SodidBurkina

Faso’swell-knownpositionasakeyallyoftheFrench.

EventstookadramaticturnfortheworseinNovember2004.Followinganattackona

FrenchbasebyIvorianplanes,theFrenchdestroyedthesmallIvorianairforce,parkedon

therunwayatAbidjanairport.Anti-Frenchriotingfollowed,orchestratedbytheIvorian

regime,andtheFrenchusedlethalforceagainstprotestersontwooccasions.Themajority

of the twenty thousand-strong French community left the country. These incidents

fundamentallyalteredFrance’srelationswithitsformercolonies.Itdemonstratedthat

France’sdensepresencemadeitvulnerabletoanyregimewillingtomanipulatedomestic

hostilityandresentment,andthatitsinvolvementinAfricancrisescouldquicklybecome

ano-winsituation.OtherAfrican leaders, includingsoon-to-beAUmediator,Thabo

Mbeki,wereshockedbythesightofFrenchtroopsfiringoncrowds.78

In the subsequent two and a half years, France gradually disengaged itself from

the Ivorian mediation (notably in favour of South Africa), while also attempting to

multilateraliseitthroughaninternationalcontactgroupsetupinOctober2005.Official

andunofficialemissariesonbothsidesattemptedtopatchuprelations,andpreserve

France’scommercialinterests.But,withGbagbostillunwillingtomovetoelectionseven

afterhisfirstpresidentialtermexpiredinOctober2005,politicalrelationsremainedhostile.


29


Sarkozy and Côte d’Ivoire, 2007–11

ThearrivalofSarkozyasFrenchpresidentinMay2007appearedtoheraldatentative

improvement, despitehis long-standing friendshipwithopposition leader,Alassane

Ouattara.ThiswashelpedbytheOuagadougouPeaceAgreementofMarch2007,andthe

consequentcalmingoftensionsinthecountry.Itwasalsofacilitatedbytheincreasingly

prevalentanalysisinFrenchofficialcirclesthatGbagbowastheretostay,andlikelytowin

anyfutureelections,andthatrelationsthereforehadtoberepaired.

ConvincedthatChirachadbeenbehindthe2002coup,PresidentGbagbo’ssupporters

cautiouslywelcomedapresidentwhoappearedtohavelittleFrançafriquebaggage,and

whohadbrokenacrimoniouslywithChirac,theirbête noire.Gbagbohimselfwelcomed

Sarkozy’sintentiontoresetmilitaryrelations,describingthedecisionashistoric.79Ties

weremaintainedthroughRobertBourgi(who,rathersurprisinglygiventheirdivergent

politicalcareersandallegiances,isclosetoGbagbo,astheytaughttogetheratAbidjan

Universityinthe1960s);theformerco-operationminister,MichelRoussin,nowworking

for Bolloré; and through Claude Guéant. Sarkozy was particularly concerned about

protectingFrance’scommercialinterests,andwasrelativelysuccessfulindoingso.This

wasdemonstratedwhenBolloréwonthecontracttomanageAbidjan’snewport,which

openedinApril2008.TheBolloréaffiliate,EuroRSCG,alsoactedasconsultanttoGbagbo

inhiselectoralcampaignin2010.

Inaddition,FrenchcompaniesranCôted’Ivoire’swaterandelectricitythroughout

Gbagbo’stimeinpower,andOrangehadwelloverhalfitsmobilephonesubscribers.

However, theFrenchstoppedshortof fullyrenewingdiplomaticrelationsso longas

electionsweredelayed.Forexample,GbagbodidnotattendtheFrance–Africasummitin

NiceinJune2010.80Hisrefusaltoacceptelectoraldefeaton28November2010,andthe

subsequentcrisisasrebelsadvancedonthecapitalinFebruary2011,evidentlyledtoa

sharpdeteriorationinrelationswithFrance.Forthreemonths,Gbagbo’sregimeusedan

anti-imperialistdiscoursetotrytodriveawedgeintheAfricanposition,makingithardfor

theFrenchtoclaimfullAUsupport.AlthoughmostofWestAfrica,particularlyNigeria,

stoodfirm,SouthAfrica,partofthepanelestablishedbytheAUtolookattheissuein

January2011,initiallytookthelinethattheelectionshadbeen‘inconclusive’,whichmost

observerssawasapro-Gbagboposition.However,seeminglyowingtoPresidentZuma’s

discussionswithothermembersofthatpanelatthebeginningofMarch(althoughthe

changehasneverbeenexplainedfullybytheSouthAfricangovernment),theposition

changed,isolatingAngolaandUganda,andtoalesserdegreeGhana,asGbagbo’slast

supportersonthecontinent.

TheinitialFrenchapproachwastopushforbroaddiplomaticisolationoftheGbagbo

regime,rebuffanypossibilityofFrenchmilitaryintervention,andtoputinplacesanctions

toisolateGbagbowithinhisowncampandpersuadethosearoundhimofthehopelessness

ofhiscause.FollowingaEuropeanvisabanonGbagboand58ofhissupporters,on14

February85peopleand11companiesweresubjecttoaEurope-wideassetfreeze,affecting

inparticularthecocoaexportsector.ThisEuropeansanctionsregimewasunusuallyfirm

andbroad.

On23December2010theWestAfricanCentralBankof theFrancZonestopped

emittingmoneytotheGbagbogovernment.Onemonthlaterthepro-Gbagbogovernor,

PhilippeDacoury-Tabley,resigned.French-ownedcommercialbankswerecaughtbetween

30



pressurefromGbagbotostayopenandthecollapseoftheirday-to-dayworkasthecrisis

unfoldedandliquiditydriedup.Thetwomostimportantbanks–theSGBCI,ownedby

SociétéGénérale,andBICICI,ownedbyBNPParibas–eventuallypulledoutinFebruary

2011,justasGbagbowasattemptingtoacquiretheirassets,theseniormanagersfleeing

thecountrywiththeirfamilies.81NotallFrench-orchestratedeconomicpressurewas

successful,withLe MondereportinginFebruaryofconsiderableresistanceamongthe

FrenchbusinesscommunitytoFrenchgovernmentmovestoisolateGbagbo.82However,

itdoesappearthattheoverallpressurewasafactor,asGbagbo’sgovernmentfoundit

hardertopaycivilservantsandtroops.IthasalsonowbecomeclearthatGbagbolostalot

ofmoneyinrushedpurchasesofarmsthatheneverreceived,partlyduetointernational

(includingFrench)pressureonpotentialsuppliers.83

TowardstheendofMarch2011,thesituationdeterioratedsignificantlyontheground

as the forces loyal toAlassaneOuattarapushed through toAbidjan.84French troop

numbersinthecountrywereboostedfrom900toaneventual1 700withreinforcements

fromGabonandChad.Atthispoint,Francewasclearlypreparingfortheeventuality

ofarmedintervention.Atthemultilaterallevel,itobtainedcoverthroughtheUNSCR

1975of31March2011,whichconfirmedearlier authorisation ‘touse allnecessary

meanstocarryoutitsmandatetoprotectciviliansunderimminentthreatofphysical

violence,withinitscapabilitiesanditsareasofdeployment,includingtopreventtheuse

ofheavyweaponsagainstthecivilianpopulation’.However,asinLibya,whetherthis

actuallycoveredwhatFrancesubsequentlydidisamatterofsomedebate.MaiteNkoana-

Mashabane, theforeignministerofSouthAfrica,whichservedontheUNSecurityCouncil

atthetime,saidlaterthatshedidn’t‘rememberhavinggivenanyoneauthorisationforan

aerialbombardmentofIvoryCoast’.85

On1April2011itseemedthattheforcesloyaltoOuattarawereabouttodepose

GbagbowithnosignificanthelpfromFrenchforces.However,Gbagboheldout,and

undercoverofatruce,hisforcespushedoutintoAbidjan.Atthispoint,on9–10April,

followingarequestfrombothOuattaraandtheUNsecretary-general,BanKi-moon,the

FrenchstartedheavybombardmentofGbagbo’spositions.On11AprilFrenchforces

helpedtosurroundGbagbo’sresidencywhilehewascaptured.Althoughtherewasa

carefulpresentationtoshowGbagbobeingcapturedbypro-Ouattaraforces,itisnow

knownthatFrenchforcesplayedacrucialrolerighttotheend.86

Aswellasdamaging the legitimacyof the incomingpresident, theseeventshave

inevitablysparkedapolemicaldebateontherightsandwrongsofFrenchintervention.

Thisdebatecarriesahugestakeforacountrystillrecoveringfromcivilwar,andthere

isarealriskofopposing‘narratives’againhardeningintoopposingsides.87Theposition

differentpeoplehavetaken,inCôted’Ivoire,therestofAfricaandinFrance,isgenerally

dependentonpriorattitudestoGbagbo,andonviews,oftenill-informed,ofwhowon

theelections.Doubtlessly,thedebatewillrageon(seeBox3onpage31).Frenchofficials

sawtheinterventionasameansofbringingeventstoaswiftendandofpreventingthe

sortofprolongedandbloodyfightthatotherAfricancapitals(Brazzaville,Freetown,

Monrovia)hadsufferedfrominrecentyears.Theyalsofeltthathavingtroopsalreadyon

thegroundputtheminapositionofmoralobligationtointervenetocutshortagrowing

catastrophe.88

In the first six months of Ouattara’s rule, the French have maintained a strong

presence,organisingOuattara’spersonalsecurity,beginningsecuritysectorreform,and


31


preparingabigaidanddebtreliefpackage(Côted’Ivoirehassignificantunpaiddebtsto

theAfD,whichwillprobablybeconvertedintodevelopmentprojectsinwhatiscalleda

C2Dcontract,orContratdedésendettementetdéveloppement).Theclosetiesbetween

thetwopresidents,andtheroleofOuattara’sFrenchwife,whohasimportantbusiness

interestsinthecountry,haveclearlyoiledthewheels.

Box 3: Côte d’Ivoire and the war of the web

while democratisation in Côte d’Ivoire has a poor record, it has done much to open up public debate. A new generation have used music, public forums (the famous ‘agoras’ and ‘parliaments’ of Abidjan) and the Internet to make themselves heard on the political scene. Although violence has been prevalent in these debates among the country’s youth and students, the crisis itself has also allowed new forms of national self-understanding to emerge. whether lambasted for its neocolonial role, or seen as an ambivalent route for social ascent through emigration, France is never far from such debates.89

The 2010–11 crisis was played out in forums and discussion sites on the Internet. Although there are evident pitfalls in studying this phenomenon,90 its importance for the Ivorian crisis makes it hard to ignore. This importance derives from Abidjan’s relatively dense Internet connectivity; from weakness or evident partiality of print and broadcast media; and from a persistent mistrust of official or established information channels, including foreign news sources. The rights and wrongs of the confflict have also been debated vigorously by a large diaspora community and throughout much of Francophone Africa.

The outgoing president, Gbagbo, made a significant investment in Internet campaigning, both because incumbency gave him the resources to do so and because his entourage were more adept at using new technologies than his rivals.91 Following his electoral defeat, the official or semi-official – the difference of course is deliberately blurred – pro-Gbagbo websites propagated his main messages. These included a legalistic and ‘sovereignty’ interpretation of the events designed to persuade any wavering civil servants or security forces that the incumbent was there to stay. As the crisis dragged on, the websites embarked on a sustained campaign against the international community, which was held to be plotting Gbagbo’s downfall (which in effect it was, but only following his electoral defeat) if not murder (which it was not).92 The most elaborate version of this latter approach was the detailed ‘leak’ from the French intelligence services concerning a plot to assassinate Gbagbo published in the regime-owned paper, Notre Voie, in December 2010. Although an evident fabrication, this document was taken up, often completely uncritically, by other websites in Francophone Africa, and widely commented on in the blogosphere, with opinions fairly evenly divided on its credibility.93

Such ideas have been shared on less-official sites, or in the comments attached to popular websites. Much of the debate is both nuanced and heartfelt. In many cases, sovereignty and associated pan-African ideas are combined with an analysis that is not naively uncritical of Gbagbo’s role.94 For some, the very intensity of the debate concerning France’s role is a problem, and a sign that Francophone Africa is having difficulty moving on from relations with the former colonial power.

32



However, much is highly polemical, centred on insulting the leading Ivorian players, with little regard for facts or credibility of sources, perhaps because the distance of the Internet encourages people to make their polemics more vociferous. The role of the diaspora is also of great importance, and often very polemical, possibly because of greater Internet connectivity outside Africa. Also striking is the level of polemics among non-Ivorian Francophone Africans. For them, the Ivorian crisis is a reflection of their domestic problems and, in particular, of the perceived role of France in their countries’ politics. The case of Cameroon, where a pro-French authoritarian regime has been in place since independence, is particularly striking. Cameroonians have been a source of considerable pro-Gbagbo and anti-French writing.95

The standard opposition in Côte d’Ivoire’s war of the web is for Gbagbo supporters to accuse their opponents of being in the pocket of the west, and of France in particular, who are seeking control of Africa’s resources. The murder of Thomas Sankara, the independent-minded president of Burkina Faso in 1987, and the Rwandan genocide of 1994 crop up frequently as references to France’s villainous role on the continent. The other side then replies that support for Gbagbo is perpetuating dictatorship.96 However, this apparent binary opposition should not lead one to overlook the underlying debate on Ivorian and Francophone African history that, although polemical, is part of the evolution of the political self-understanding of the countries concerned. Views on the role of France, in all their diversity, are part of that evolution.

v I c t I m o f c o n S p I r A c y t h I n k I n g , o r S t I l l A f r A I d o f

t r A n S p A r e n c y ?

Conspiracytheoryisanestablishedpartofdiscourseoninternationalevents, inpart

drivenbyInternetcomment.Viewsof9/11andofthedeathofOsamabinLadenare

prominentexamples.ItisalsoanimportantpartofrecentevolutionsinFrance’srelations

withAfrica.ConspiracytheoriesfindfertilegroundinFrance–Africarelationsprecisely

becausetheserelationshavebeendominatedbysecrecy,andbecauseFrancehasinmany

casesdonejustwhattheconspiracytheoriestakeupandexaggerate–destabilisingor

proppingupregimestofurtheritsinterests.Inrecentyearstherehavebeenanincreasing

numberofcredibleexposésofFrance’shistoricroleonthecontinent,oftenwithafairly

wideaudienceinFranceaswellasinAfrica.97

ThecaseofCôted’Ivoirehighlights theproblem thatFrance faces in lightof its

historically dominant position in Francophone Africa. When Gbagbo’s camp point

toaFrenchhandbehindthecountry’sproblems,manyathomeandabroadarehighly

susceptibletosuchclaims(seeBox3onpage31).ItisnocoincidencethatGbagbo’s

strategywasdevelopedinacountrythathadbeensodominatedbyFrenchinterests

underPresidentHouphouët-Boigny(1960–1993)andthatsufferedasharpeconomic

declineinthe1990s.Aselsewhere,theassociationbetweenaregimenolongerableto

deliverservicesandemployment,andtheFrenchpowerbehindthethrone,hadbeen

currentsincethe1980s,reinforcedbyFrenchreluctancetolendunambiguoussupportto

democratisationonthecontinent.


33


Box 4: France–Gabon: A very special relationship

The dense relations between France and Gabon are usually interpreted as a result of French interest in Gabon’s oil wealth. Although this factor is crucial, recent studies have shown that the ‘special relationship’ pre-dates the opening up of Gabon’s first oil field, the Gamba, in 1963. It appears that French colonial presence, based mainly on forestry concerns, met little resistance from the populations of the area.101 This accommodation with French presence was reflected in the request made in 1959 by the emerging leader, Léon M’ba, that Gabon become a department of France rather than acceding to independence. Independence did come the following year, owing mainly to French desire to avoid such an anomaly. But it was a curious independence, with the French retaining control over diplomacy and defence, whether through agreements or on an informal, but equally effective, basis. Notably, the French retained monopoly rights over the extraction of mineral (especially uranium) and oil resources.

The French ‘stability guarantee’ was activated in 1964, when a coup attempt threatened Mba’s regime. He was saved by French troops. Mba’s weak internal position, in part owing

Howthisplaysout,andwhattheconsequencesareorwillbe,variesfromcountryto

country,eachhavingitsowndistinctexperienceofdemocratisationsincetheearly1990s.

IncountriessuchasGabon,Congo-BrazzavilleandCameroon,whosedemocratisation

processesarefrozeninasortofnationalinertia,politicalpowerisfrequentlyseenas

derivedfromexternalorotherwisesuspiciousandnon-transparentsources,andFrench

powerisseenasavitalpartofthatequation.FormanyFrenchofficialsthe‘stability’of

GabonandCameroon–ietheabsenceofrecentcivilwar–isanachievement,apositive

sideofFrenchpresence.ButformanyGaboneseandCamerooniansitisperceivedas

double-edged,astheverystabilitytheywelcomeisoftenalsoheldresponsiblefornational

inertiaandaninabilitytotackleregimecorruption.98

ThedeathofPresidentBongoofGaboninJune2009,andtheelectionofhisson

twomonthslater,isarevealingexampleofhowthisperceptionofFrance’sroleinAfrica

is evolving (although the very different contexts of Francophone African countries

makebroaderconclusionsdifficult).TheFrench,whosepowerinpost-colonialGabon

hasindeedbeenextraordinary,weregenerallyassumedtobebackingBongo’sson,Ali.

PresidentSarkozydeniedanysuchsupport,claimingon16June2009thatFrancehad‘no

favouredcandidate’.However,hehadalreadymetAliBongoinParisinNovember2008,

acalculatedmovebyAlitoboosthisauraoflegitimacyontheinternationalstage,and

anunusualmeetingfortheFrenchpresident,giventhatatthetimeAliBongowasnota

headofstate.

Onthedaybeforetheelections,Sarkozy’sunofficialemissary,RobertBourgi,stated

hissupportforAliBongo,callinghima‘verylistenedtofriendofPresidentSarkozy’.99

Giventhiscontext,itishardlysurprisingthat,asPlacideOndopointsoutinhisanalysis

ofthepoliticalsignificanceofrumoursinGaboneselife, ‘Franceholdsakeyplacein

theconspiracyrumoursoftheKongosseurs[barroomgriotsorstorytellers]…Inmany

politicaldebatesFrenchpowerhasbecomethefactorthatneedstoberesolvedifanyreal

changeofregimeispossible’(presentauthor’stranslation).100

34



Frenchofficialsfrequentlycomplainthattheirroleonthecontinentissystematically

exaggerated.107Thishassomebasisinfact;manyoppositionleadersandotheractivistsin

FrancophoneAfricadoseeFrance’shandbehindalltheircountries’ills,andareconvinced

thatFranceisplunderingalltheirresources.TheoutrageousmanipulationsoftheGbagbo

to his ambivalence over the very notion of national independence, was recognised by the French. In 1967, with Mba’s health declining, they chose his young chief of staff, Albert (later Omar) Bongo, as successor.102

At first, Bongo was highly dependent on French support. He repaid this not only through the oil sector, but also through supporting French official or semi-official actions in Africa. Examples included support of rebels in Biafra in 1968 and support of a coup attempt in Benin in 1977. However, in the early 1970s more oil discoveries and rising prices strengthened Bongo’s position. Furthermore, the arrival of Valéry Giscard D’Estaing in power in France in 1974, and the subsequent fragmentation of the Gaullist networks in Africa, gave Bongo a decisive advantage over his French interlocutors. Over time, he became a very powerful figure in French politics, financing political parties and forging ties with politicians of all sides (with the exception of the far left). Meanwhile at home, Bongo co-opted all political forces through patronage and looted the country’s resources via his family. He acquired significant influence in other Francophone African countries (he was married to the daughter of President Sassou-Nguesso of neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville), and was known to occasionally financially bail out other presidents of the region. Bongo managed to control the opening up of Gabon’s political space in the early 1990s, although the French once again had to intervene to prop up their ally, when he was threatened by widespread rioting in May 1990.103

French interests in the oil sector in Gabon date back to the loss of the Algerian oil fields in 1962, when the French looked increasingly to the Gulf of Guinea. As more oil was discovered in Gabonese waters, the French parastatal oil company, ELF, became heavily involved in the country, and ELF Gabon became vital not only to French energy supplies, but also to Bongo’s control over the country in the 1970s. with its ranks swollen by refugees from Foccart’s Gaullist networks, ELF Gabon developed elaborate security and intelligence functions of its own. while the company enjoyed an extremely advantageous fiscal position in Gabon, Gabonese officials, members of the Bongo family and ELF employees siphoned off huge amounts of money to Swiss banks.104 French nationals remained firmly entrenched at all levels of the Gabonese state, especially in security.105

Much of this system unravelled in the 1990s, in particular through the judicial investigations of ELF’s finances in Paris, which resulted in its merger with Total in 2000. The enquiry implicated a number of senior French officials. Although the relationship remains critical to both sides, Gabon’s oil sector and Total’s presence in Africa have both since diversified. Following Omar Bongo’s death in June 2009, the controversies around the election of his son, Ali, demonstrated, however, that one of the lasting legacies of this very special post-colonial relationship, beyond the ripples it has caused in Paris, is in the politics of Gabon itself, where the political class, haunted by its own dependency and corruption, is still unable to articulate a vision of national independence.106


35


campinCôted’Ivoireareastarkexample.Inpartthisisaproductoftherumoursand

conspiracytheoriestypicalofauthoritarianrule,wherepopularperceptionsoftensee

powerasapuppettheatrewiththestringsbeingpulledabroad.108

However,France’snegativereputationalsoderivesfromacontinuedunwillingness

tobefullytransparentaboutitsroleonthecontinent.Thiscanbeseen,forexample,

inChad,whereduringtheattackonPresidentDébyin2008,themainmembersofthe

unarmedoppositionwereroundedup,andthe leadingchallengertoDéby,Mahamat

Saleh,waskilled.Saleh’sdeathhasneverbeeninvestigatedproperly,althougheventhe

timidcommissionofenquiryconcluded, inSeptemberof thesameyear, thathewas

killedbygovernmenttroops.Before,duringandafterthebattleofNdjamena,France

suppliedlogisticalandintelligencesupporttoDéby,includingplacingFrenchofficers

inDéby’spresidentialoffice.DespitepressurefromsomeFrenchparliamentarians,no

clearexplanationofwhattheFrenchgovernmentknowsconcerningthedisappearanceof

Chad’soppositionleaderhasbeenforthcoming,andlittleapparentpressurehasbeenput

ontheDébyregime.109DespiteFrancehavingfewclearinterestsinChad,andaminimal

economicpresence,itisinevitablethatsuchincidentsfuelageneralfeelingthatFranceis

continuingtopropupAfricandictatorsforitsownbenefit.

c o n c l u S I o n

ThepaperbeganbylookingattheremarkablecontinuityinFrance’srelationswithAfrica

inthefirstthreedecadesofindependence.Itthenlookedatthechangesofthe1990–2007

period,andFrance’sattemptsto ‘reform’itsapproachtothecontinentinresponseto

thosechanges.WheretheSarkozyperiodfitsintothisnarrative,andwhetherhechanged

France’srelationswithAfricaortheychangeddespitehisactionsandapproach,receives

amixedscorecard.Althoughsomerealchangeshavebeenputinplace,thereremainsa

persistentgapbetweenprofessedintentionsandactions,especiallyintermsofmilitary

interventions,and tieswithauthoritarian leaders.Thisgap ispartlyowing tostated

intentionsthatdonottakefullaccountoftheintricaciesofpower,norofthetiesthat

continuetobindFrancetoitstraditionalallies.Itisalsoowingtoaninsufficientwillto

pushthroughreformagainstresistanceinParisand,insomecases,inAfricancapitals.It

shouldalsobeunderstoodasaresultofeventsthatovertakeFrenchpolicy,andshiftthe

dynamicsinParisandinAfricaawayfromthereformprogramme.

AnyjudgementonchangeinFrenchpolicyisalsodependentonone’spointofview.

Seen fromAfrica, thepresenceofFrenchmilitarybases isperhaps themostglaring

anomalyinFrance’srole.Sarkozy’sreformsinthisarea,althoughrenderedambivalent

byeventsinChadandCôted’Ivoire,couldyetbehismostimportantlegacy.Seenfrom

Paris,theanomalousstructuresdealingwithFrancophoneAfricahaveprovendurable.

DespiteFrenchprotestationsthatthepresident’sAfricaunitisnowsubordinatetohischief

diplomaticadvisorandtherefore‘normal’,110itisclearthattheroleofthepresident’soffice

inAfricanaffairsremainsexceptional.TheroleofClaudeGuéantinrelationswithAfrican

leaderswas,untilonlyveryrecently,classicFrançafrique.

ThepaperalsotouchedonwhatFrancemeanstoAfricaandwhatAfricameansto

France.Onthelatter,duringtheColdWarFrancelookedtoAfricatoboostitssenseof

rankinworldaffairs.AsFrenchinterestsshifttopartsofAfricawheretheycannotexpect

36



thissortofsymbolicreturn,andtootherpartsoftheworld,thishasinevitablychanged.

FormanyFrenchpoliticiansandofficials,FrancophoneAfricaisasmuchaseriesof

complexreefstobenavigatedasanareaofsolidinfluence.Frenchpublicperceptionof

Africa,andthereforeofFrance’spotentialroleonthecontinent,isstrikinglynegative,an

‘Afro-pessimism’ratheroutofsynchwithsomeoftheeconomicgrowthandotherpositive

developmentsinAfricainthelastdecade.111IntermsofAfricanperceptions,despitethe

passingyearsFrancestillplaysanimportantroleinhowFrancophoneAfricancountries

perceivetheirowncommunities.Theformercolonialpowerremainsimportantinthe

debatesanddivergentinterestsofdifferentpoliticalandsocialgroupsinFrancophone

Africancountries,inwaysthatarehighlydependentontheirownpoliticaljourneyssince

theearly1990s.

e n d n o t e S

1 Thisistheunderstandingofinternationalrelationsderivedfromthe‘realist’school,whichsees

countriesasindivisiblesovereignunitscollidingontheinternationalscene.

2 TheliteraturecoveringFrance’srelationswithAfricaafterindependenceisfartoovoluminous

to cover in thepaper.For an indicative sample see various special issuesof theFrench

Africanist journal, Politique Africaine (for example Devaluation June 1994; Mitterrand et

l’Afrique,June1995;France-Afrique: sortir du pacte post-colonial,March2007;seethewebsite

http:www.politique-africaine.com);Jean-FrançoisMédard,concentratingonthenotionof

FrenchculturalstatusinAfrica:‘LesavatarsdumessianismefrançaisenAfrique’,L’Afrique

politique,1999;andinEnglish:ChaferT,‘Franco–Africanrelations:Nolongersoexceptional?’,

African Affairs,101,2002,pp.343–63.

3 OnthisparticularaspectseeMédardJ-F,‘ThepatrimonialisationofFranco–Africanrelations:

Politicalexchanges,economicexchangesandsocialexchanges’,inECPR joint sessions,Lieden,

1993.

4 ThisexceptionalismandlegalanomalyiswellanalysedinObiangJ-F, France–Gabon: Pratiques

clientélaires et logiques d’Etat dans les relations franco–africaines. Paris: Karthala, 2008,

pp.77–117.

5 SeeBayartJ-F,Mitterrand et l’Afrique.Paris:Fayard,1983.

6 ForexamplesoftheblockeddemocracyofFrancophoneAfricasee,forTogo,ToulaborC&J

Heilbrunn,‘UnesipetitedémocratisationpourleTogo’,Politique africaine,58,June1995;and

forCameroon,ICG(InternationalCrisisGroup),Cameroon: Fragile State?Brussels:ICG,May

2010,chapter3.ForaspecificanalysisoftheroleofFrenchaidseeBanegasR&PQuantin,

‘Orientationsetlimitesdel’aidefrançaiseaudéveloppementdémocratique’,Revue Canadienne

d’études du développement,1996.

7 UnsurprisinglytheroleoftheFrenchinRwandahasbecomethesubjectofahighlypolemical

debate.ManyFrenchofficialsresentaccusations,putforwardnotablybythecurrentRwandan

regime,thattheywerecomplicitinthegenocide,andpointtotheirsupportfortheArusha

politicalprocess.However,mostbalancedaccountsshowtheextenttowhichtheysupported

theHabyarimanaregimeandturnedablindeyetoitsmaterialandpsychologicalpreparations

forgenocide.SeeinparticularKroslakD,The Role of France in the Rwanda Genocide.London:

Hurst,2007.


37


8 SummariesofthesecontrastingpositionscanbefoundinBourmandD,‘Lapolitiqueafricainede

JacquesChirac:lesancienscontrelesmodernes’,Modern and Contemporary France,NS4,4:431-

42;andinGouninY,La France en Afrique: le combat des anciens contre les modernes.Paris:

DeBoeck,2009.

9 SeeHuliarasAC,‘TheAnglo-Saxonconspiracy:FrenchperceptionsoftheGreatLakescrisis’,

Journal of Modern African Studies,36,4,1998.

10 SeeBayartJ-F,‘Quelle politique africaine pour la France?’,blogentryonMediapart,25October

2010,http://blogs.mediapart.fr;andforaselectionoflargelypositivereactionsfromAfrican

headsofstateinMay2007,seeRFI(Radio France Internationale),‘Sarkozy et l’Afrique: “tourner

la page”’,7May2007,http://www.rfi.fr.

11 OnimmigrationissuesseeBayartJ-F,2010,ibid.;andthewebsitesofthetwomainimmigration

charitiesinFrance,http://www.cimade.organdhttp://www.gisti.org. Thepresentauthorwas

unfortunateenoughtowitnessaforcedevacuationonaregularflightfromParistoDakarin

September2010andcanattestdirectlytothehighlevelofviolenceusedandtheshocked

reactionofAfricancitizens.

12 For anexcellent analysisof Sarkozy’s links to this strandofFrenchpolitics seeDelyR,

‘LatentationpopulistedeNicolasSarkozy’,Philosophie Magazine,Paris,December2010–

January2011.

13 The ‘Pasquanetworks’arewelldissectedinObiangJ-F,op. cit.,pp.180–186.Pasquawas

condemnedtoayearimprisonmentandaEUR 100,000finebyaFrenchcourtin2009inthe

‘Angolagate’armstraffickingaffair.HewonanappealinApril2011.

14 ImportantlinksbetweenBourgiandSarkozydatebackatleastto2005,whenBourgi,whohad

previouslybeenclosetoDominiquedeVillepin,declaredhissupportforSarkozyintheraceto

bepresidentialcandidatefortheGaullistmovement.SeeGlaserA&SSmith,Sarko en Afrique.

Paris:Plon,2008,prologueandchapter1.

15 The citations from Sarkozy’s Benin speech are taken from RFI, ‘Bénin Sarkozy révèle sa

politiqueafricaine’,19May2006,http://www.rfi.fr,accessed25November2011.

16 Thetextofthespeechisavaliableathttp://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/discours/2007/

discours-a-l-universite-de-dakar.8264.html.Translationsbythepresentauthor.

17 SeeGassamaMet al.,L’Afrique répond à Sarkozy.Paris:PhillipeRey,2008;andChrétienJ-Pet

al.,L’Afrique de Sarkozy: Un déni d’histoire.Paris:Broché,2008.Theauthorofthespeech,Henri

Guaino,repliedtohiscriticsinLe Monde,‘L’homme africain et l’histoire’, 27July2008.

18 SeeGlaserA&SSmith,2008,op. cit.

19 Anotherexampleiswhenthenew(andconservative)co-operationminister,AlainJoyandet,

saidin2008,‘tospeaktoAfricanheadsofstate,youhavetounderstandtheircustoms’.Sarkozy

iscitedinGlaserA&SSmith,2008,op. cit.,prologue;andJoyandetinFoutoyet S, Nicolas

Sarkozy ou la Françafrique décomplexée.Paris:Poche,2008,p.121.

20 ForanexcellentreviewofthisdebateseeCoquery-VidrovitchC,Enjeux politiques de l’histoire

coloniale.Paris:Agone,2009.

21 SeeLe Monde,‘Au sommet de Nice, M. Sarkozy prône des relations “décomplexées” avec l’Afrique’,

2June2010.

22 FortheintriguesofPresidentSarkozy’sAfricapolicyinhisfirst18monthsinpower,see

GlaserA&SSmith,2008,op. cit.FortheroleofOmarBongointhesackingofBockel,seethe

evidenceRobertBourgihimselfpresentedtoFrenchtelevisionon7September2009,available

ontheFrenchnewswebsite,http://www.rue89.com,‘France – Afrique : Virer un ministre ? C’est

simple comme un coup de fil de Bongo’.

38



23 SeeGnanguenonA,‘Quelle politique africaine de la France sous Nicolas Sarkozy ?’,Dynamiques

Internationales,4,May2011,foradiscussionofthisambivalence.

24 ThisiswelldocumentedbyHugeuxV,Les Sourciers Blancs: enquête sur les faux amis de l’Afrique.

Paris:Fayard,2007.

25 Onill-gottengainsseethefinalreportoftheFrenchNGO,CCFD-TerreSolidaire,ofwhich

theinterimreportin2007ledtotheopeningoftheinquiry:Biens mal acquis: à qui profite

le crime?byAntoineDulinandJeanMerckaert,Paris,2009.Theaffairwasclosedwithno

outcomeinNovember2007,buttheissueislikelytorumbleon,seeLe Monde,‘L’arrêtsurles

biensmalacquisouvredesperspectivespourlesONGanticorruption’,9November2010;and

Le Monde,‘LesbiensmalacquisafricainsgênentlaFrance’,9June2011.Regardingthewealth

ofPresidentBongoofGabon,seetheUSSenatereport,Private Banking and Money Laundering.

Washington,DC:USSentate,1999.ForcorruptlinksbetweenFrenchofficials,politicians,

ELFandtheAngolanelite,seeGlobalWitness,All the President’s Men.London:GlobalWitness,

2002.

26 LittleofsubstancehasbeenwrittenontheveryinterestingrecentrelationsbetweenFrance

andRwanda,andthepaper’saccountreliesonthepressandseveralinterviewswithofficials

andexpertcommentatorsinParisin2011.Foraninterestingviewofthecomplexinternal

factorsdrivingRwanda’srelationswithoutsidepowers,includingbutnotlimitedtoFrance,

see Reyntjens F, ‘Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world:

Governanceinpost-genocideRwanda’,African Affairs,110,438,2011,pp.1–34.

27 ThemembersoftheArchedeZoéONGwerefoundguiltyinaChadiancourtandweresent

backtoFrancetoservetheirsentences,inlinewithFranco–Chadianjudicialagreements.They

weregrantedapardonbyPresidentDébyinMarch2008,shortlyaftertheFrenchhadhelped

tosavehisregime.SeeChaslesJ-M,‘LapolitiqueafricainedeNicolasSarkozyauprismedes

relationsfranco-tchadiennes’,Dynamiques internationales,4,2011.

28 SeeJean-ChristopheRufin’sinterview, ‘LeQuaid’Orsaynepèseplusriendanslesaffaires

africaines’,Le Monde,7July2010.ThepolemicbetweenFrance’sforeignministryandthe

president’sofficecontinuedin2011,inthecontextoftheresignationoftheforeignminister,

MichèleAlliot-Marie, inFebruary2011, followingscandals surroundingher links to the

overthrownregimeofBenAliinTunisia.Seealsotheanonymousletterbyformerandserving

diplomatscriticisingSarkozy’sapproachinLe Monde,22February2011.

29 See, for example, La Lettre du Continent, ‘Pourquoi Bourgi a brûlé sa case à fétiches’,

22September2011.

30 SeeBBCMonitoring,‘FrancebacktracksonendorsingCameroonelections’,fromLe Figaro

website,24October2011.

31 SeetheassessmentofGlaserA&SSmith,2008,op. cit.,chapter8,andsection6.

32 Forthehistoricalaspects,seetheanalysisofthe‘ambivalent’oreven‘schizophrenic’attitudes

oftheSenegaleseelitetoFrenchruleinJohnsonGW,‘LesélitesauSénégalpendantlapériode

d’Indépendance’, inMichelM&C-RAgeron (eds), l’Afrique noire française au temps de

l’Indépendance,1stedition&2ndedition.Paris:CNRS,1992&2010.

33 Theconfusionbetweenthesedifferentelementsisoftenattherootofanalyticdisagreements,

frequentlyconcernedwithwhetherAfricais‘important’toFrance’seconomyornot.Theclassic

argumentthatFrance’spresenceinAfricaisnotimportanttothemoredynamicelementsofthe

FrencheconomyismadeinMarseilleJ,Empire coloniale et capitalisme français. Histoire d’une

divorce.Paris:AlbinMichel,1984.Foracounterargumentconcentratingonthe‘strategic’

aspects,seeObiangJ-F,op. cit.,pp.92–96.


39


34 TheCFAFrancoriginated inacolonialcurrency,andhadaconstantexchangeratewith

the French Franc from 1948 until 1994. It is divided into two separately administered

currencies,inWestandCentralFrancophoneAfrica,whichbothhavecentralbanks(inDakar

andYaoundérespectively).TheirexchangeratewiththeEuroisguaranteedbytheFrench

government,inreturnforwhicheachcountrydepositsaportionoftheirforeigncurrency

reserveswiththeFrenchtreasury.

35 SeeHugonP,‘LapolitiqueéconomiquedelaFranceenAfrique:lafindesrentescoloniales ?’,

Politique africaine,105,2007.

36 OnFrenchaidasasupporttoFrancophoneAfricaseeMoncrieffR,French Development aid

and the reforms of 1998–2002.PhDthesis,SouthamptonUniversity,UK,2004,chapters1and

2,http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/46178/1.hasCoversheetVersion/Richard_Moncrieff_Thesis.pdf.

37 GlaserA&SSmith,2008,op. cit.,p.115.

38 FiguresarefromAfrica Confidential,11September2009.

39 ForBolloré’spositiononthis,seeinterviewwithBollorédirector,DominiqueLafont,inJeune

Afrique, 3April2011.

40 See Le Monde, ‘Gbagbo: retour sur l’investissement’, 16 February 2011; and for details

of Bolloré’s presence see La Lettre du Continent, ‘La stratégie en 3D de Vincent Bolloré’,

24February2011.

41 SeeEchenbergM,Les Tirailleurs sénégalais en Afrique occidentale française (1857–1960).Paris:

Karthala,2009.

42 SeeDomergueM,DelthombeT&JTatsitsa,Kamerun ! Une guerre cachée aux origines de la

Françafrique. Paris:Broché,2010.

43 SeeChipmanJ,French Power in Black Africa.Oxford:Blackwell,1989,chapter5.Inthe1970s

thiskindofagreementwassignedwithanumberofformerBelgiancolonies,asFrancemoved

tospreaditsinfluenceinCentralAfrica.

44 ChipmanJ,ibid.,p.147.

45 ThenewFrenchdoctrineforitsmilitarypresenceinAfricawasdefinedincabinetinMarch

1998.Thefocuson ‘crisis’canbefound,forexample, inthe2006FrenchSenateReport,

writtenlargelybyaparliamentarianofChirac’scamp,AndreDulait:Rapport sur la Gestion des

Crises en Afrique subsaharienne.Paris:FrenchSenate,July2006.

46 Theregionaltrainingcentresarelistedonpp.12–13oftheFrenchSenatereport,ibid.Details

ofRECAMPcanbefoundonp.14.Eachofthetrainingcentresdealswithadifferentaspectof

militaryaffairs,suchasdeminingandairpilottraining.ThetraineesaremostlyFrancophone,

althoughanumberofAnglophoneshaveparticipatedenthusiasticallyintrainingexercises.

Littleco-ordinationexistsbetweenthistrainingnetworkandECOWASplansforasubregional

interventionforce.

47 Itshouldbenoted,however,thatthenumberofmilitaryadvisorscontinuedtodecline,partly

owingtotheabsorptionoftheco-operationministry(whichwasresponsibleforthem)into

theforeignministryin1998.Foranillustrationofresistancefromthemilitaryinthisperiod,

seethecommentsofChiefoftheGeneralStaff,GeneralBentegeat,intheFrenchSenatereport,

op. cit.,pp.56–57.

48 ForanassessmentofthenewroleoftheFrenchmilitaryseeLe Monde, ‘Pourquoil’armée

françaisereste-t-ellesurplace?’,1June2010.AlsoseetheFrenchGovernmentwhitepaperon

DefenceandSecurity,June2008,http://www.defense.gouv.fr.

49 SeeBellamyW,‘MakingBetterSenseofU.S.SecurityEngagementinAfrica’,inCentrefor

40



StrategicandInternationalStudies, U.S. Africa Policy beyond the Bush Years.Washington,DC:

CSIS, 2009.

50 See,forexample,VandeValleN,‘U.S.policytowardsAfrica:TheBushlegacyandtheObama

administration’,African Affairs, 109,434,January2010.

51 Personalinterviews,seniorFrenchofficer,Dakar,May2011,andotherinformedofficials,Paris,

AugustandOctober2011.

52 SenegalesePresidentWadealsowanted touse thewithdrawal topolishhisanti-colonial

credentials.NeitherOmarBongoofGabon,norhissonwhotookoverpowerafterhediedin

2009,hasshownanysuchconcerns.SeeLe Monde,‘LaFrancevafermersabasemilitaireau

Sénégal’,23February2010.Otherdetailsarefromapersonalinterview,seniorFrenchofficer,

Dakar,May2011.

53 Thefinalisedagreementscanbefoundathttp://www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr,althoughthe

actualfulltextoftheagreementsisnotavailableonthatwebsiteatthetimeofwriting(August

2011).ThepresentauthorhasalsobeeninformedbypersonalinterviewswithseniorFrench

officers,PretoriaandDakar,AprilandMay2011.

54 See,forexample,LindleyJ,French Britain and France: a Dialogue of Decline? Anglo-French

defense cooperation and implications for the European and Euro-Atlantic security and defense

Relationships. London:ChathamHouse,2010.

55 Personalinterviews,Frenchofficersandofficials,Paris,PretoriaandDakar2010and2011.

56 GandoisH,‘LapolitiqueafricainedelaFranceauConseildesécuritéde2007à2010:un

viragemultilatéralconfirmé?’,Dynamiques Internationales,May,2009.

57 FrenchSenatereport,op. cit.,p.11.

58 AsreportedbySouthAfricaninterlocutorsintheFrenchSenatereport,ibid.,p.18.

59 Theauthorisgratefultoareviewerofthepaperforpointingthisout.

60 OntheAUseeChaferT, ‘TheAU:anewarenaforAnglo-FrenchcooperationinAfrica?’,

Journal of Modern African Studies,49,1,2010.

61 Personalinterviews,seniorFrenchofficers,PretoriaandDakar,AprilandMay2011.

62 SeeVinesA,‘RhetoricfromBrusselsandRealityontheGround:theEUandSecurityinAfrica’,

International Affairs,86,5,2010,pp.1091–1108;andCummingsG&TChafer, ‘Beyond

Fashoda:AngloFrenchsecurityCooperationinAfricasinceStMalo’, International Affairs,86,

5,September2010,pp.1129–1148

63 ToborrowthetermofGibertM,‘TheNewEuropeanSecurityArchitecture:Anexampleof

MessyMultilateralism?’,inChaferT&GCumming(eds),From Rivalry to Partnership? New

Approaches to the Challenges of Africa.Aldershot:Ashgate,2011.

64 Fordevelopmentsinthisearlyperiod,seeGlaserA&SSmith,2008,op. cit.,chapter2.

65 CitedinChaslesJ-M,op. cit.forbriefassessmentsoftheEuropeanmissioninChad;seeVines

A,op. cit.;andSeibertBH,EUFOR Tchad/RCA – A cautionary Note.EuropeanSecurityReview.

Paris:EUInstituteforSecurityStudies,March2008.

66 SeeLa lettre du Continent,‘100missilesMilanpourIdrissDéby’,20December2007.

67 Fortheevolutiontowardsatrainingmission,seeforeignminister,AlainJuppé,citedinLe

Monde,18January2011;andRFI,‘AuTchad,lafindel’opérationEperviersemblesepréciser’,

6July2011,http://www.rfi.fr.Chadhas longplayedaveryparticularrole for theFrench

military,forwhommythsofthebraveChadianwarriorhaveresonatedsinceitwasthefirst

countrytodeclareitsallegiancetodeGaulle’sFreeFrenchin1941.ItissaidthatPresident

Déby,whofoughtalongsidetheFrenchagainsttheLibyansinthe1980s,oncegavebloodto

saveaFrenchsoldier.Foradetailedreview,seeDeLespinoisJ,‘Lesinterventionsfrançaises


41


auTchad1968–1990’,inPascallonP,La politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique.Paris:

Harmattan,2004.

68 Personalinterview,Frenchofficial,Paris,October2011.

69 TheSahel,derivedfromArabicfor‘frontier’,isthearidstripbetweentheSaharaandtropical

WestAfrica.

70 Reliableinformationconcerningthegroupisextremelyhardtoobtain;firstlybecausethe

terrainandresearchtargetarehardlypropitioustoacademicresearchandsecondlybecause

muchanalysis iseitherfromasomewhatremoteangle,suchasitsrelationstotheglobal

al-Qaedanetwork(see,forexample,CelsoA,‘AlQaedaintheMaghreb:the“newestfronton

theWaronTerror”’,Mediterranean Quarterly,19,1,2008)orwrittenbyexpertsonitsAlgerian

origin.Theroleonthegroundofmilitaryintelligenceservicesfurthermuddiestheanalytic

waters.ThespecialissueofThe Journal of Contemporary African StudiesinJanuary2007,edited

byAnnMcdougall,isausefulcollection.Morerecentpiecesincludetheinformativepodcast

byYvanGuichaouaonhttp://www.opendemocracy.net,17April2011;LeymarieP,‘AuSahelun

nouveaufrontahautrisqué’,Le Monde Diplomatique,September2010;andtheveryUSpolicy-

orientedLeSageA,The Evolving Threat of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.Washington,DC:

InstituteforNationalStrategicStudies,July2011.Thepresentauthor’sunderstandingisalso

informedbyseveraldozenpersonalinterviewsinMaliandNigerinDecember2006.

71 Forashortanalysis,seeinterviewwithFrenchspecialist,MathieuGuidere,byRFI,10January

2011,http://www.rfi.fr.

72 EventsinNiger,withacoupd’étatcomingshortlyafteramajorrenegotiationofAreva’smining

contracts,furthercomplicateFrance’spositionintheregion.

73 SeetheaccountinLe Monde,‘Chronologiedel’enlèvementdesotagesfrançaisauNigerpar

AQIM’,17April2011.

74 Foralistoftheissues,seeSurvie,Billets d’Afrique,Fevrier2011,http://www.survie.fr.

75 LeymarieP,op. cit.,presentauthor’stranslation.

76 AmongthevoluminousliteratureontheIvorian‘miracle’andthehistoricalroleoftheFrench,

seeFauréY-A&J-FMédard(eds),Etat et Bourgeoisie en Côte d’Ivoire.Paris:Karthala,1982.

77 TheIvoriancrisis,andFrenchinvolvement,havebeenwellcoveredelsewhere,inparticularin

severaleditionsoftheFrenchscholarlyjournal,Politique Africaine.Seeinparticular,D’ErsuL,

‘LaCriseIvoirienne:uneintriguefranco-française’,Politique Africaine,105,2007.Thissection

alsodrawsonobservationsandnumerousinterviewsofthepresentauthorinParisin2003and

inAbidjanin2005.

78 See,forexample,BovconM,‘France’sconflictresolutionstrategyinCôted’Ivoireanditsethical

implications’,African Studies Quarterly,1,11,2009.

79 SeeGbagbo’sinterviewwithRFIon14April2008,http://www.rfi.fr.

80 OnFrenchbusinessinterestsseeLa Lettre du Continent,‘ChezGbagbo,auparadisdubusiness

français’,8May2008.

81 See Le Monde, ‘Cote d’Ivoire: Gbagbo réquisitionne deux filiales de banques françaises’,

17February2011.

82 Le Monde,‘Gbagbo:retoursurinvestissement’,16February2011.

83 See‘CommentlesoldatGbagboaperdusaguerre’,La Lettre du Continent,7April2011.

84 ThereisanunresolveddebateoverwhethertheFrenchprovidedtrainingorlogisticalsupport

totherebelsatthispoint.TheFrenchnewspaper,Le Canard Enchainé,initseditionof6April,

claimsthattheFrenchgavetrainingsupport,andthenewschain,France24,claimsthatthe

pro-OuattaraforcesweretrainedbyFrenchandNigeriantrainers,addingthattheequipment

42



theyhadwasstrikinglynew.SeeFrance24, ‘Commentlesforcespro-Ouattaraontpréparé

l’offensivecontreGbagbo’,6April2011.

85 CitedinLibération,6April2011.

86 SeeinparticularLe Monde,‘LesModalitésdel’interventiondestroupesfrançaisesàAbidjan’,

12April2011.

87 See,forexample,SchumannA,‘IvoryCoast:Theagoniesofreconciliation’,The Guardian,

London,8May2011.

88 SeeFrenchsourcescitedinLe Monde,‘LesModalitésdel’interventiondestroupesfrançaisesà

Abidjan’,12April2011.

89 For the musical aspects, see Schumann A, Danse philosophique! The Social and Political

Dynamics of Zouglou Music in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 1990–2008.PhD,SchoolofOrientaland

AfricanStudies,London,2010,especiallychapters7and8.SeealsoBanégasR,‘Côted’Ivoire:

Patriotism,ethnonationalismandotherAfricanmodesofself-writing’,African Affairs,105,

421,2006.

90 Thereliabilityandrepresentivityofsourcesisdifficulttodetermine,ashighlightedrecentlyin

theaffairofAmericanTomMacMaster,whofakedawidelyreadgaySyrianblog.

91 See,forexample,Le Monde, ‘lesPartisansdeGbagboorganisentlaripostesurleWeb’,29

December2010.

92 A representative selection can be found on http://revuedepressecigbagbo.over-blog.com/

categorie-11891206.html.Seealsohttp://claudus.ivoire-blog.com.Itshouldalsobenoted

thatmuchmainstreammediaanalysedtheFrenchinterventionofApril2011asneocolonial

interference,inparticularintheUS,wheretheviewthatFranceisthevillaininAfricafeeds

intoanti-FrenchsentimentstemminginpartfromtheIraqwarof2003.SeeLe Monde,‘Cote

d’Ivoire:Lapresseinternationalejugeneo-coloniale l’actiondelaFrance’,12April2011.Some

prominentAmericans,suchasRepublicansenator,JamesInhofe,haveofferedGbagbosupport,

partlyowingtoperceivedreligiousaffiliations,andalsoowingtolinksthroughtheoilsector.

SeeNew York Times, ‘AstrongmanfoundsupportinprominentU.S.conservatives’,11April

2011.

93 Theoriginalarticleisinthearchivesectionofhttp://www.notrevoie.com,accessed28July

2011.Foranexampleofhowthearticlewastakenupandwidelycommentedonwithlittle

criticalevaluationofitssource,see‘Côted’Ivoire:undocumentsecretdesmilitairesfrançais

révélantleplanpourtuerGbagbo’,29December2010,http://www.Camer.be, accessed28July

2011;andinparticulartheextensiveandinterestingcommentchain.

94 AgoodexampleofsuchanapproachisthearticlebySenegal’sMoustaphaCheSall, ‘Cote

d’Ivoire:trêvededémagogie;trêved’hypocrisie’,Africa Presse,22February2011.

95 See,forexample,thearticlebyBeyalaC,‘Horriblejournée:L’AfriquevientdeperdrelaCôte

d’Ivoire’,24May2011,http://revuedepressecigbagbo.over-blog.com/categorie-11891206.html.

ForarepresentativeexampleoftheinterpretationoftheIvoriancrisisthroughCameroonian

history,seeAnonymous,‘LaFranceoulastratégieduchaosenCôted’Ivoire’,CameroonVoice.

com,28January2011.SeealsothemusicandstatementsofCameroonianreggaeman,JoeLa

Conscience,forwhomGbagboisanAfricannationalisthero.

96 Arepresentativeexchangeisthefollowing,fromthecommentchaintoanarticleonThe Post

website:AKAHle30/03/2011à15:53:Le seul qui le 14 juillet 2010 ne se soit pas prosterné

devant sarkozy en France, c’est Laurent Gbagbo...Il a choisi la totale indépendance...C’est mal passé

en Françafrique... ;FantaDiallole30/03/2011à17:37:Laurent Gbagbo indépendant face à la

France ? Arrêtons là les fables, c’est bien lui qui a signé tous les contrats liant la Côte d’Ivoire à des


43


entreprises françaises. Gbagbo n’est pas le ‘combattant’ contre l’impérialisme des occidentaux qu’il

veut faire croire, sa fortune personnelle amassée sur le dos du peuple ivoirien et mise à l’abri en est

la meilleure preuve,http://www.lepost.fr,accessed26July2011.(Translation:AKAH:The only

person to not go and prostrate themselves before Sarkozy in France on the 14 July 2010 is Laurent

Gbagbo … he chose total independence … that goes down badly in Francafrique.FantaDiallo:

Laurent Gbagbo independent from France? Let’s stop the dreaming, he is the one who signed all the

contracts tying Ivory Coast to French businesses. Gbagbo isn’t the ‘fighter’ against imperialism he

wants to make us believe, his personal fortune gained at the expense of the Ivorian people and put

safely abroad is the best proof).

97 ThepolemicalworkofFrancoisXavierVerschaveinthe1990sdidmuchtobringtheseissues

to theFrenchpublic.Morerecentlysee theFrance2 televisiondocumentary,BenquetP,

Francafrique, 50 années sous le sceau du secret, France2,2010;andtherecenttomeontherole

oftheFrenchinCameroon,DomergueM,DelthombeT&JTatsitsa,op. cit.

98 FortheperceptionsoftheFrenchroleinCameroon,especiallyaroundthe2008generalstrike,

seeICG,Cameroon: the Dangers of a Fracturing Regime.Brussels:ICG,June2010,pp.20–21.

Theconclusionshereareinpartdrawnfromdozensofpersonalinterviewstheauthorcarried

outinCameroonwhileresearcherforInternationalCrisisGroupin2009and2010.Forthe

caseofGabon,seeBernaultF&JTonda,‘LeGabon:unedistopietropicale’,Politique Africaine,

115,2009.

99 CitedinLe Monde,30August2009.

100 OndoP,‘LeKonossapolitiqueoulapassiondelarumeuràLibreville’,Politique Africaine,115,

2009.

101 SeeObiang J-F,op. cit., chapter1;andM’BokoloE, ‘Forcessocialeset idéologiesdans la

décolonisationdel’AEF’,Journal of African History,22,3,1981.

102 ForevidencethatBongowasquiteliterallychosenbytheFrench,seethestatementsofsome

actorsinvolvedatthetimeinBenquetP,op. cit.Bongopresentsamorerebelliousandanti-

Frenchvisionofhisearlyyearsinhisratherunconvincingbookofinterviews:OmarBongo,

Blanc comme Negre.Paris:BernardGrasset,2001.

103 Onthisperiod,seeGardinierD,‘Gabon:Limitedreformandregimesurvival’,inClarkJ&D

Gardinier(eds),Political Reform in Francophone Africa.Colorado:Westview,1997.

104 SeeObiangJ-F,op. cit.,pp.152–168.

105 OnthemanyFrenchnationals,usuallyconnectedtoELFandexplicitlyorimplicitlysupported

bytheFrenchstate,seeObiangJ-F,op. cit.,chapter3;andSmithS&AGlaser,Comment la

France a perdu l’Afrique.Paris:Hachette,2004,chapter5.Aparticularlynotablecasewasthat

ofMauriceRobert,theformerheadofELF’sintelligenceservice,whobecameambassador

toGabonin1979,atBongo’sinsistence,andinthefaceofmuchunhappinessintheFrench

diplomaticservice.

106 SeetheanalysisoftheelectoraldynamicsinLeviMartialMidepani,‘Pratiquesélectoraleset

reproductionoligarchiqueauGabon’,Politique Africaine,115,October2009.

107 Atypicalstatementisthefollowing:‘We[theFrench]findourselvesinasituationwhereour

politicalmilitaryoreconomicengagementinsupportofAfricaisseenbymanynotasasincere

desiretohelp,butasneo-colonialinterference;butasituationwhere,atthesametime,any

indifference,orwithdrawalorlackofengagementisseenasanabandonmentorasingratitude’.

SpeechbyNicholasSarkozyinCapeTown,February2008(presentauthor’stranslation).

108 SeeBernaultF&JTonda,op. cit., whoexplainthisaspectwiththenotionof‘l’ailleursdu

pouvoir’(the‘distanceofpower’,or‘powerfromafar’).

44



109 SeeOrtizF,‘Tchad:IbniOumarMahamatSaleh,symboledesdisparusdurégimeDéby,Le

leaderpolitiqueincarnelacaused’uneoppositionbrimée’,4February2010,http://www.Afrik.

com.

110 ThispointhasbeenmadetothepresentauthorseveraltimesbyFrenchofficials,includingat

theElysée.

111 SeeareportonpollingofFrenchopinioninJeune Afrique,6June2010.

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