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TRANSCRIPT
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Formal Methods for
Cybersecurity
Hélène Kirchner
16/01/2020 1
French Institute For Computer Science
and Applied Mathematics
Tunis
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CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY OF THE EU
“For new connected technologies to take off, including e-payments, cloud computing or machine-to-machine communication, citizens will need trust and confidence. Unfortunately, […] almost a third of Europeans are not confident in their ability to use the internet for banking or purchases”
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CONNECTEDOBJECTS
• 20165.5BILLION
• 202020.8BILLION
2013,2017
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• What do we want to trust ?
• Creditcard,passport• Phone,Computer• Car,Plane• Medicaldevices(pacemaker)• Infrastructures:water,electricity,publictransports,• Internet,IoT• Electronicvoting
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What are Formal Methods useful for?
DualuseofFormalMethods(logicalsystem:syntax,deduction,models,semantics)- tobuildreliablesoftware:givetrustandcertifysoftware- toanalyseandunderstandexistingsoftwareorprocesses:provideexplainability
andconformitytoexpectations• Chasingbugsinsoftware:bugsaresourceofvulnerabilities• Modelingenvironment(conforming,adversarial,uncertain,unknown)and
expected(mis-)behaviour• Riskanalysis:accidentalorintentionalthreats,faultsorattacks• Recoverymechanisms• Certification• (Safety/Security/Privacy)bydesign
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Cyber systems requirements
withimpactonuser’strustandempowerment:• Safety• Security• Privacy• Transparency• Accountability• Certification• Ethics
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Safety
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• Formalmodelingandverificationmethodshavebeensuccessfulinimprovingthesafetyandsecurityofsoftwareinareassuchasaeronautics…
• …itisessentialtoimproveonthefoundationsandinterconnectionoftoolsandformalismsforinteractiveandautomatedprogramverificationsuchasCoq,Why3,F*,TLA+,aswellasvariousstaticanalyzers,suchasAstrée.Theautomationandtheexpressivityofthesetoolsmustbeimprovedsothattheycanscaletotheverificationoflargersoftwaresystems,andcertifybothqualitativeandquantitativeproperties.
PS2018-2022Inria
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Scientific strategic plan
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void mpi_swap(mpi *X, mpi *Y) { mpi T; memcpy((void *)(& T),(void const *)X,sizeof(mpi)); memcpy((void *)X,(void const *)Y,sizeof(mpi)); memcpy((void *)Y,(void const *)(& T),sizeof(mpi)); return; }
Value Plug-In
Frama-C Kernel
Path-Crawler Plug-In
WP Plug-In
Coq, Alt-Ergo,
Colibri, Why
Impact & Slicing Plug-In
Frama-C Open Source Distribution
Aoraï Plug-In
E-ACSL Plug-In
Invariant generation and RTE checks
Sequence properties
Functional verifications
Runtime monitoring …
/*@ requires \valid(X); requires \valid_read(Y); ensures (\result ≡ 0 ∧ *Y ≡ \old(*X) ∧ *X ≡ \old(*Y));
• CODEANALYSES
SecureFlow
Plug-In
Information flows
Test case generation
Slidecredit:F.KirchnerTunis
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Security
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Cybersecurity relies on
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• Cryptography:confidentiality,integrity,anonymity,authenticity
• SecurityPolicy:setofrulesthatspecifyhowsensitiveandcriticalresourcesareprotected
• Prevention:toearlydetectvulnerabilities• Cyber-resilience:capacitytotolerateattacks(hardwareand
software),todetectmalware
• Securitybydesign
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Towards provable security
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• cryptographicprimitives-mathematicalproofs,usetheoremprovingandprogramverificationtoachievecomputercheckedproofs.
• automatedverificationtoolstoanalyzetheprotocolspecificationsandfindvulnerabilitiesintheprotocollogic
• producingverifiedimplementations.
CryptoVerifEasyCryptCertiCrypt
https://mitls.org/
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Comprehension,Detection,Resistance(CIDRE)Needstoidentify- thetargetsofthismalware(aparticularend-user,acompany,
anymachineunderaspecificoperatingsystem,etc.)- theactionsitintendstoperformtoattackthetargets(sensitive
informationleakage,encryptionandransom,etc.),- thewayitsucceedstobypassthesecuritymechanisms
protectingthetargets,thewayitprotectsitselfagainstmalwaredetectionengines(obfuscation).
• Methods:reversemaliciouscode,staticanalysis,morphologicalanalysisbasedoncontrolflowgraphcomparison,…
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Malwareanalysis
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Privacy
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Privacy
• Abilityforindividualstocontroltheirpersonaldataanddecidewhattorevealtowhomandunderwhatcondition.
• Privacyleaksin:Socialnetworks,Geolocationinformation,Webtracking,Smartworld
• EuropeanGeneralDataProtectionRegulation(GDPR)definespersonaldata,SensitivePersonalInformation,userempowermentandresponsibilityofallstakeholders.
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Trade-offbetweenprivacyandutility
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Privatics
ANRBIOPRIVApplicationof«PrivacybyDesign»tobiometricaccesscontrol• Aformalframeworkbasedonepistemiclogictoexpressdataminimizationrequirementsaspropertiesdefiningforeachstakeholdertheinformationthatsheis(orisnot)allowedtoknowü alanguagetodefineprivacyarchitecturesü alogicforreasoningaboutarchitectures.ü axiomatizationtoprovethatagivenarchitecturemeetstheexpectedprivacyandintegrityrequirements.
• appliedinparticulartocomparedifferentarchitecturesforbiometricaccesscontrolandtoprovidearationaleforthechoiceofspecificoptions.
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Formal methods and Privacy
• Dataanonymization:detectprivateinformationthatcanbeinferredaboutindividualsusingtheanonymizeddatawithprior(orbackground)knowledge
• Differentialprivacy:protectanindividual’sdatawhilepublishingaggregateinformation.Capabilityforuserstoobfuscatetheirpersonaldata,addingnoisebythemselves(COMETE)
• Empoweringuserswithpersonalclouds:individualizedmanagementandcontroloverone’spersonaldata.Ensuresecurityandextensibility(PETRUS)
• Privacypreservingprotocolsandcommunicationtechnologies:Homomorphicandfunctionalencryptiontooperateonencrypteddata
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Transparency
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Transparency
TransAlgo:PlateformescientifiquepourledéveloppementdelatransparencedesalgorithmesetdesdonnéesInria,IMT,CNRS,CEA
https://www.transalgo.org/
• Unalgorithmeesttransparentsil’onpeutfacilementvérifiersa«responsabilité»,parexemple,s’ilouvresoncode,s’ilexpliciteàlafoislaprovenancedesdonnéesqu’ilautilisées,etcellesqu’ilproduit,s’ilexpliquesesrésultats,ouencores’ilpubliedestracesdesescalculs.Notonsquenousconsidéreronsaussilessituationsoùlecoden’estpasouvertcariln’yaaucuneobligationdedivulgationdecelui-ci.
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16/01/2020 - 21 Slidecredit:A.JolyTunis
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• identifyweaknessesofdeeplearningstrategies• analysewhatkindsofattacksarepossibleandproposemechanisms
forprotectingconvolutionalneuralnetworksagainstadversarialattacks.
• monitortheinternalactivationsthatflowbetweenthelayersofadeepnetwork
• maketheoverallprocessmorerobust
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FormalmethodsandDeep Neural Network
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HyAIAI Inria Project Lab : design of novel, interpretable approaches for Artificial Intelligence
HyAIAIapproach:• proposeaprincipledtwo-waycommunicationstrategybetweenahumanuserandsomeblack-boxMLmodel
• usesymbolicmodelsasa“translationlayer”betweenthehumanandthelearningmodel(calledthesystem)
https://project.inria.fr/hyaiai/
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Fourchallenges:1. Systemmustunderstandhumanrequirements:fairness,privacy2. Humanmustunderstandsystemresponses:multi-instancelocalexplanations3. Humanmustunderstandtheinnerworkingofthesystem(“debugging”):morerobust
toadversarialattacks4. Causality,yetanotherdimensionofexplainability:helptounderstandthemodel
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Accountability
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Accountability (Respect des règles)
• Principlewhichrequiresthatorganizationsputinplaceappropriatetechnicalandorganizationalmeasuresandareabletodemonstratetheircompliancewiththeregulation.
• Exampleandchallengesofblockchain
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• Ablockchainimplementsasecureelectronicledger:Ø dataregisteredintheledgercannotberemovedormodifiedØ integrityofpasthistoryreliesoncryptographichashfunctions:thehashofthelasttrustedblockcertifiestheintegrityofthewholeledgersinceitsinception.
Ø theroleofcertifyingtheblockchainisdecentralizedØ blockchainisreplicatedbetweenparticipants:allmusthavethesameviewoftheblockchaintoavoidattacks
Yet,theirrealsecurityandleveloftrustneedtobeproperlyassertedwithanalysisbothfromthecryptographyanddistributedsystemscommunities.
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Blockchain
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• Developblockchainlanguagesandvirtualmachinesthatcomedirectlyequippedwithformalanalysisandverificationtools.
• Generatealltheseautomatically,correct-by-constructionfromaformalspecification.
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GrigoreRosu'sFormalSystemsLaboratory(FSL)atUIUCandRuntimeVerification(RV)haveusedtheKframeworktobuildandtestamathematicalmodeloftheEthereumVirtualMachine,andtoformallyverifytheaccuracyofsmartcontracts.KFrameworkEnablesVerificationofSmartContractshttps://runtimeverification.com/blog/
BlockchainChallenges
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TezosisablockchainlaunchedinJune2018,writteninOCamlandsupportingsmartcontracts.Mi-Cho-Coq,aCoqframeworkforverifyingthefunctionalcorrectnessofsmartcontractswritteninsmartcontractlanguageMichelson
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• Low-levelnetworkattacks:athreatassessmentmodelneedstobeestablishedandadaptedtoeachblockchaintechnology.
• Blockchain-specificnetworkpoliciesmustbedefined,deployedandverifiedautomatically
• Softwarefailures:asanysoftwaresystem,duetobugs,attacks,undefinedbehavior,andsoon.
• Blockchainsasbuildingbricksforhigherlevelprotocols:providingaledger,onwhichhigherlevelprogramsandprotocolscanbeimplemented.
• Privacylackingbydefault:ensureprivacyusingzero-knowledgeproofsandotheradvancedcryptography
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FormalMethodsandBlockchain
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Certification
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• Certificationreferstoevaluationofthelevelofconfidenceinthestrengthofaproduct,system,solution,serviceororganisation
• ItreliesonØ NormsandstandardsØ GraduationofcybersecuritylevelsØ Audits
SpecialcaseofCyber-PhysicalSystems(CPS)involvedinSCADAapplications,inmedicaldevices,inrobotics,partofInternetofThings(IoT)
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Certification
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• Characteristics:ü autonomyanddynamicity,self-reconfigurableü partofcriticalsystemsü resourceslimited
• Challengesofbuildingasafe,efficientandsecureCPS:ü semanticformalisms,programmingparadigms,modelingandverificationtechniquesforhybridsystems.mixingdiscrete-timeandcontinuous-timedynamics.
ü certificationoftheunderlyingsoftwareinfrastructuresandoperatingsystemsü resource-constraineddevices:tocertifypropertiesofquantitativenature(useofresourcessuchastimeandenergy).
ü lightweightcryptography:efficient,certifiedcryptographicprimitivesforresource-constraineddevices
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FormalmethodsandCyber-PhysicalSystemsScientific strategic plan
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RIOT
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RIOT:ThefriendlyOperatingSystemfortheInternetofThings.RIOTpowerstheInternetofThingslikeLinuxpowerstheInternet.RIOTisafree,opensourceoperatingsystemRIOTsupportsmostlow-powerIoTdevicesandmicrocontrollerarchitectures(32-bit,16-bit,8-bit).RIOTaimstoimplementallrelevantopenstandardssupportinganInternetofThingsthatisconnected,secure,durable&privacy-friendly.
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Ethics
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Ethicalreasoning:reasoningtakingintoaccountethicalconsiderations(principalsthatgovernaperson’sbehaviourortheconductingofanactivity)
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Ethics
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Thetrolleyproblem:shouldyoupullthelevertodiverttherunawaytrolleyontothesidetrack?https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=67107784
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Formal methods and Ethics
Identifyandformaliseanumberofvaluesandconceptsforanethicalreasoning:• Formaliseethicaldilemna(howtocharacteriseadilemna?)• Designareasoningframework:
§ Asystemofvalues:judgementmayneedapartialorderonvalues§ Takeintoaccountseveralpointsofview,identifysourcesofsubjectivity
§ Takeintoaccountuncertaintyinrealworld• Validatethroughexperimentationwithhumanparticipants
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Hierarchyofvalues:• Safety• Security• Privacy• Transparency• Accountability• Certification
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Wrap-up:EthicsforCyberSystems
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