‘Withourpoliticians refusing toconfront theclimatecrisis, someare lookingwithhope to the increasingly influential role being played by military planners andcorporatetitans.Ifyouwanttounderstandwhywecan’tleaveittothePentagontoshapeourresponsetoclimatechange,thenyouneedtoreadthisbook.’

NaomiKlein,authorofThisChangesEverythingandTheShockDoctrine

‘Willclimatechangeprovethedownfallofcapitalism?Orcanthecorporateworldharness even the threat of ecological meltdown to its advantage? Do the securityrisksitwillunleashundermineconventionalgeopolitics,orenhancetheirholdonusall?Asthisrivetinganalysismakesclear,climatechangewillhavewinnersaswellaslosers.Thisisfartooimportanttobelefttothescientists.’

FredPearce,environmentconsultant,NewScientist

‘The compelling arguments in this volume show very clearly that linking climatechangetosecurityisnotthesimplematterpoliticalelitesnowsofrequentlyassume.Asthesechaptersshowindetailitmayperpetuatepreciselythedangersthatweneedtoconfront.Unless,thatis,muchmoreattentionispaidtowhopreciselyisdecidingwhatkindoffutureweneedtosecureforwhichpartsofhumanityinaveryunequalworld.Thisbookisa“mustread”foranyoneconcernedtosecureecologicalfuturesformorethanjusttherichandpowerfulfewintheglobalsystem.’

SimonDalby,CIGIChairinthePoliticalEconomyofClimateChange,BalsillieSchoolofInternationalAffairs

‘We’reatacrucialmoment.Wecandealwiththeclimatecrisiseitherasamomentto build new global unity, or to further divide the planet between wealthyprofiteering elites and everyone else. This book will help you understand thepossibilities,andhopefullymoveyoutojointhefightforjustice.’

BillMcKibben,Environmentaljournalistandco-founderof350.org

‘A tremendousbook that showshow the few intend toprofit fromclimate changeandhowthemanycanstopithappening.’

JohnVidal,Guardian

‘Respondingtoclimatechangeisincreasinglyseenasasecurityissuenotamatterofhumanrightsandjustice.Aslongaselitecommunitiesareprotected–theproperjob

of the military-then security professionals are doing what they should, with thecontrolparadigmtheonlywayforward.TheSecureandtheDispossessedchallengesthat head-on, bringing together a seriesof excellent contributions to take apart thedangersandshort-sightednessofsecuritisingclimatechange.Thisisabadlyneededbookandahugelyimportantcontributiontooneofthemostsignificantissuesofourage.’

PaulRogers,ProfessorofPeaceStudiesatUniversityofBradford

‘Amongthebooksthatattempttomodelthecomingcentury,thisonestandsoutforits sense of plausibility and danger. It examines several current trends in ourresponsestoclimatechange,whichifcombinedwouldresultinakindofoligarchicpolicestatededicatedtoextendingcapitalisthegemony.Thiswillnotwork,andyetpowerfulforcesareadvocatingforitratherthanimaginingandworkingforamorejust, resilient, and democratic way forward. All the processes analysed here arealready happening now, making this book a crucial contribution to our cognitivemappingandourabilitytoformabetterplan.’

KimStanleyRobinson,Award-winningsciencefictionwriter

‘Buxton andHayesmake clear that climate justice activistsmust be careful aboutmakingallianceswithstrangebedfellowssuchasthemilitaryinthefightforclimatejustice.Whilethemilitarydoesrecogniseclimatechangeasathreat,theirsolutionsoften create new dangers for themost vulnerable, by curtailing civil liberties anddemocratic space. It is the task of climate justice activists to seize the crisis as anopportunity for building amore justworld – a job that ismademore difficult bypartnershipswithrepressiveinstitutions.’

PayalParekh,GlobalCampaignsDirector,350.org

‘A brilliantly conceived and edited volume thatwarns us of the dire political andecologicalconsequencesofacceptingasecurity rationale for thecontrolofclimatechangepolicythatentruststhehumanfuturetothemainculpritsofourera:corporateneoliberalismandgeopoliticalmilitarism.’

RichardFalk,AmericanProfessorEmeritusofInternationalLawatPrincetonUniversity

‘Thisbookprovidesadeepandwide-ranginganalysisofthesecuritizationofclimatechangeanditsmilitaryandcorporatesponsorsandbeneficiaries. It ismustreadingforactivists,scholars,researchersandpolicymakersworkingtobuildadifferentkindofpresentandfuture,wherepeace,equalityandjusticeareatthecenterofresponsesto climate change – not men with guns or corporate balance sheets. The authors

mount an important challenge to environmentalists willing to play the nationalsecuritycardinordertogetmoreattentiontoclimatechangeatthehighestlevelsofgovernment.Therisksofsuchframingsfaroutweighthebenefits.’

BetsyHartmann,ProfessorEmeritaofDevelopmentStudiesandSeniorPolicyAnalystofthePopulationandDevelopmentProgram,HampshireCollege,Amherst,

MA

‘Wealready see the climate crisis unfoldingworldwide.Howwe reactwill be thechallengeofourage.Willwerespondwiththepoliticsoffearandbusinessasusual–andinsodoingcondemnmillions?Orwillwewrestpowerfromthecorporationsandthemilitaryinordertodeveloptheradicaljustsolutionsweneed?Thisbookisanindispensableguidetothedystopianforceswemustconfrontandthealternativejustsolutionswewillneedtoadvance.’

PabloSolón,FormerAmbassadortothePlurinationalGovernmentofBoliviaandleadclimatenegotiatortotheUN

‘Thisbookshowsthatpreventingworseningclimatechangeinthefaceofbusiness-as-usualismoreurgentthanever.Moreimportantly, itshowsthatthestrugglesforenvironmental justice and civil liberties, for refugee rights and #blacklivesmatter,willonlybewonifweunitetogetheragainstasystemthatpreservestheprivilegesofthefewagainsttherightsofthemany.’

AsadRehman,HeadofInternationalClimate,FriendsoftheEarth

‘While millions of people, in Transition groups, community energy groups, andmany others, are looking at the climate crisis and seeing opportunity amidst thecrisis, so, sadly, are other less altruistic forces. Familiarising ourselves with themadness that sees retreating ice as potential oil fields, and a warmingworld as abusinessopportunity,isvital.TheSecureandtheDispossessedshinesabrightlightintocornerswe’dratheravoid,andindoingso,doesusahugeservice.’

RobHopkins,TransitionNetworkandauthorofThePowerofJustDoingStuff

‘The war business is constantly on the hunt for new opportunities to profit fromdeath. This illuminating book unveils how military and corporate planners arecapitalisingontheclimatecrisistointroducenewdeadlytechnologiestopoliceourborders,represspeacefulprotestorsandunderminehumanrights.But italsoshowshow–justasinthemovementtobanlandmines–ordinarypeopleeverywherearestandinguptorejectviolenceandtoproposereallastingpeacefulandjustsolutionstotheclimatecrisis.’

JodyWilliams,NobelPeacePrizewinner,awardedforherworktobanlandmines

“Thisisagreatcontributiontothemuch-neededconnectionbetweenwarandclimatechaos.”MedeaBenjamin,awardwinningpeaceactivist,founderofCodePinkandauthorof

DroneWarfare:KillingbyRemoteControl

‘Thelinkbetweensecurityandclimatechangehaslongbeenregardedbytheglobalsecuritystatusquoasapretextforhardeningsecuritymeasuresonlocal,nationalandinternational scales. Buxton and Hayes have crafted an important book that bothacknowledges the climate crisis and takes a critical approach towardmanaging itshuman consequences. Climate change – like many of the new insecurities in thenews today – first and foremost reveals the social and political inequalities of ourtime.TheSecureandtheDispossesseddocumentsandanalysesthemultiplefacetsofthe new – but perhaps actually very old – configuration of power, economicresources, social standing and political access that have shaped the most recentclimate-changeevents.It is thefirstworkofitskindthatundertakessuchacriticalmapping, culminating in a set of recommendations, both wise and sharp, foraddressing climate-based crises in the age of the security-industrial-media-entertainmentcomplex.’

J.PeterBurgess,ProfessorofPhilosophy,VrijeUniversiteitBrussel

‘TheSecureandtheDispossessedwarnsof the looming“perfectstorm”ofclimatechaos,globalinequality,andmassdispossessionofvulnerablepeople–butaboveallexposesagrowingcorporatemilitaryandsecuritycomplexdeterminedtoprotecttheworstof thestatusquo.Thankfully theauthorsalsoofferusaverydifferentfuturerooted in justice, community rights to land, water and energy, and a sustainablepeace.Apowerfulcollection.’

MaudeBarlow,NationalChairoftheCouncilofCanadiansandauthorofBlueFuture

‘Ata timewhentoomanyin theclimatemovementarequick tocelebratemilitaryand corporate forces acknowledging the reality of climate change,TheSecureandthe Dispossessed asks the critical questions about the fundamental differencebetweenclimatesecurityandclimatejustice.Thisisanimportantreminderthatweneedtochangenotjustourenergysystem,butourpowerstructuresaswell.’

TimDeChristopher,Fossilfuelabolitionactivist,founderoftheClimateDisobedienceCenter

‘This excellent andpowerfulbookexplores the riseof “climate security”– a state

andcorporateled reframingofclimatechange fromapredominantlyenvironmentaland social justice paradigm into one defined primarily by military security. Weshouldallbedeeplyconcernedby the riseof“climatesecurity”and this importantcollection of essays from scholars and activists explains in graphic detail why.Buxton and Hayes have curated a deeply disturbing and compelling analysis inwhichenvironmentalcrisis,unbridledneoliberalismandmilitarismareconvergingtoigniteglobalconflictsandnormaliseexceptionalsecurityregimes.’

PennyGreen,ProfessorofLawandGlobalisationatQueenMaryUniversityofLondonandDirectoroftheInternationalStateCrimeInitiative

‘In responding to climate change, not all actors are equal: whilemost of us (andespecially the poor) will suffer egregiously, many corporations and militaryorganizationswill seek to benefit from the devastation. There’s no better guide tothesedifferentiated responses thanTheSecureand theDispossessed. Each chapterprovidesvaluableinsightsintothesocialandeconomicdimensionsoftheunfoldingclimatecatastrophe.’

MichaelKlare,authorofTheRaceforWhat’sLeft

‘This is themissing link theclimate justicemovementhasneeded,mainlywithoutknowing it: the corporatisation andmilitarisation of our changing weather. Givenhowmuch the Pentagon and firms like Shell are investing in their own secretiveresearch,andgiventhefree-to-pollutepassthattheworld’smilitariesgetduringUNclimate summits, it is vital for us all to learn what Buxton andHayes eloquentlyexplaininthisexcellentbook.’

PatrickBond,ProfessorofPoliticalEconomy,UniversityoftheWitwatersrand,JohannesburgandauthorofPoliticsofClimateJustice

THESECUREANDTHEDISPOSSESSED

Ideasintomovement

The Transnational Institute (TNI) is an international research andadvocacy institute committed to building a just, democratic andsustainableworld.Formorethan40years,TNIhasservedasauniquenexusbetweensocialmovements,engagedscholarsandpolicymakers.

www.tni.org

Alsoavailable:

TheNewLatinAmericanLeft:UtopiaRebornEditedbyPatrickBarrett,DanielChavezandCésarRodríguez-Garavito

Agrofuels:BigProfits,RuinedLivesandEcologicalDestructionFrançoisHoutart

TheBasesofEmpire:TheGlobalStruggleagainstU.S.MilitaryPostsEditedbyCatherineLutz

THESECUREAND

THEDISPOSSESSED

HowtheMilitaryandCorporationsareShapingaClimate-ChangedWorld

EditedbyNickBuxtonandBenHayes

ForewordbySusanGeorge

Firstpublished2016byPlutoPress345ArchwayRoad,LondonN65AA

www.plutobooks.com

Copyright©NickBuxtonandBenHayes2016

TherightoftheindividualcontributorstobeidentifiedastheauthorsofthisworkhasbeenassertedbytheminaccordancewiththeCopyright,DesignsandPatentsAct1988.

BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataAcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary

ISBN9780745336916HardbackISBN9780745336961PaperbackISBN9781783717200PDFeBookISBN9781783717224KindleeBookISBN9781783717217EPUBeBook

ThisbookwasgenerouslysupportedbyOccupy.comwhichcontributedtoitsproductionandispromotingitsanalysis.Occupy.comisamulti-mediachannelprovidingindependent,internationalnewsfortheglobal99%:www.occupy.com.

OCCUPY.COM

Thisbook isprintedonpaper suitable for recyclingandmade fromfullymanagedand sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes areexpectedtoconformtotheenvironmentalstandardsofthecountryoforigin.

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SimultaneouslyprintedintheEuropeanUnionandUnitedStatesofAmerica

CONTENTS

ListoffiguresandboxesAcknowledgementsForewordbySusanGeorge

Introduction:Securityforwhominatimeofclimatecrisis?NickBuxtonandBenHayes

PARTI:THESECURITYAGENDA

1 The catastrophic convergence: Militarism, neoliberalism andclimatechange

ChristianParenti

2 Colonising the future: Climate change and international securitystrategies

BenHayes

3 ClimateChangeInc.:HowTNCsaremanagingriskandpreparingtoprofitinaworldofrunawayclimatechange

OscarReyes

PARTII:SECURITYFORWHOM?

4 A permanent state of emergency: Civil contingencies, risk

managementandhumanrights NafeezAhmed,BenHayesandNickBuxton

5 From refugeeprotection tomilitarised exclusion:What future for‘climaterefugees’?

BenHayes,SteveWrightandAprilHumble

6 Thefixisin:(Geo)engineeringourwayoutoftheclimatecrisis? KathyJoWetterandSilviaRibeiro,ETCGroup

7 Greenwashingdeath:Climatechangeandthearmstrade MarkAkkerman

PARTIII:ACQUISITIONTHROUGHDISPOSSESSION

8 Sowinginsecurity:Foodandagricultureinatimeofclimatecrisis NickBuxton,ZoeW.BrentandAnnieShattuck

9 Indeepwater:Confrontingtheclimateandwatercrises MaryAnnManahan10 Powertothepeople:Rethinking‘energysecurity’ ThePlatformCollective

Conclusion:Findingsecurityinaclimate-changedworldNickBuxtonandBenHayes

NotesonContributorsIndex

OnlinechaptersWehadsomuchgoodanalysisforthisbook,wewereunabletofititall

into the final version. However we are glad to say that additionalmaterial, not included in the book, is available free of charge on theaccompanyingwebsite:www.climatesecurityagenda.org.

Twominutestomidnight:WhytheintergovernmentalprocesshasfailedNickBuxton

‘We thought it was oil, but it was blood’: Resistance to themilitary-corporatewedlockinNigeriaandbeyondNnimmoBassey

Seeingred:stateresponsestoenvironmentalprotestsChrisJones

Conversion to a low-carboneconomy from ‘below’and ‘inside’:NewalliancesandtransformativetradeunionismHilaryWainwrightandJacklynCock

Climate, commons and hope: The Transition Movement in globalperspectiveJustinKenrickandTomHenfrey

LISTOFFIGURESANDBOXES

Figure4.1 NRRRiskmatrix–‘Otherrisks’–excludingterrorismandothermaliciousattacksFigure5.1 Mapindicating54bordersecurityfences

Figure8.1 Foodpriceincreaseprojectionsduetoclimatechangeoverthenexttwentyyears

Figure8.2 Greenhouse-gasemissionsandagricultureFigure9.1 IncreasingglobalwaterstressBox6.1 GeoengineeringinvolvingSRMtechnologies

Box6.2 Geoengineering technologies involving CO2 removal andcapture/storage

Box6.3 Geoengineering technologies involving weathermodification

Box7.1 ConservationInternationalandLockheedMartin

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We’d like first to thank theTransnational Institute (TNI)– a fabulousresearch institute with four decades of history embedded in socialmovement struggles – for its support in helping us put this booktogether.Inparticular,wearedeeplyappreciativeofTNI’sFellowsandstaffthathaveinspiredourthinkinganditsdirectorFionaDovewhohasgivenusbothtremendoussupport.We are deeply indebted to the hundreds of individualswho showed

their confidence in our book by crowdfunding its production andpromotion.Theirwillingnesstobelieveintheimportanceoftheprojectwasevenmorevaluablethanthecriticalresourcesitraised.Thefulllistofcontributorsisbelow.WewanttogiveaspecialthankstoLawrenceTaubmanandOccupy.comfortheirparticularlygeneroussupport.A very kind group of academics, scholars and activists generously

gavetheirtimetopeerreviewchapters.Theseareinalphabeticalorder:Fidelis Allen, Juliette Beck, Steffen Boehm, Saturnino ‘Jun’ Borras,Ben Brangwyn, Elizabeth Bravo, Rose Cairns, Katy Fox, JenniferFranco, Harriet Friedmann, Emily Gilbert, Patrick Kane, SatokoKishimoto, Edgardo Lander, Daniel Moss, Daanish Mustafa, AlexRandall, Janet Redman, Rachel Smolker, Pascoe Sabido,Vish Satgar,SaraSexton,DimitrisStevis,LarrySwatuck,KathleenTierneyandTimWise.WewouldparticularlyliketothankSimonDalby,awonderfullong-

term scholar on environmental security issues who has given usinvaluableadvicefromstarttofinishofthisproject.WearealsogratefultoDavidCastleatPlutoBooksfortakingonand

publishing this book at very short notice, for all the work done by

Melanie Patrick and Emily Orford to produce and market it, JeanneBrady forher copyedit andDaveandSueStanford for the typesettingandproofreading.Nick would like to give a special thanks to two key activists that

startedhimonthejourneyofexplorationthatledtothisbook.ThefirstisPabloSolon,afriendandformerBolivianclimatenegotiator,whosecourage in standingup for a truly just solution to the climate crisis atUNclimateconferencesandconveningof thehistoricWorldPeoples’Summit on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth inCochabamba,Boliviain2010showedthatnothinglessthanadifferentpoliticsandeconomicscanhelpusaddresstheclimatecrisis.The second is Tim DeChristopher, an inspiring American activist

whoseamazingdisruptionofanoilauctionin2008inspiredthousandsofactiviststotakedirectaction.AninterviewwithTimalsopromptedNick to look beyond the issue of stopping climate change to who isshaping its impacts. As he said: ‘We need to start working now onputting in place power structures that share our values as we enterdifficulttimes.’NickalsothanksSaraRogers,MattFlutyandEricDoudforproviding

beautiful hideaways towrite and edit,RobertaMcNair for her editingand moral support and Sally Hensel for helping with the nightmareendnotes.Benwouldliketothanktheverymanypeoplewhohaveinspiredand

encouragedhim to thinkcriticallyaboutcivil libertiesandstatepowerover the years. In particular his mum, Judy, and the many peopleinvolved in Statewatch, especially Tony Bunyan, Trevor Hemmings,AnnSingleton,PaddyHillyard,StevePeak,HeinerBuschandNadineFinch.HealsowishestoexpressahugethankstoNick,forwithouthispatience, commitment and encouragement of all involved, this projectwouldneverhavebeencompletedWhile it’s traditional to acknowledge long suffering partners in a

book,it’snotuntilyoutakeonachallengelikethisthatyourealisehowmuch of a nightmare it is for those who manage alone when you’re

working instead of doing other things. Sowe aremore than eternallygrateful for their support, and hugely appreciative of the years ofconversations with Juliette and Gina that have helped shape ourthinking.Wehopethatthefutureofourfouryoungchildrenwillreflectthe dreams and actions of the movements now fighting for a betterfuture,andnot thedystopianvisionsof the ‘securocrats’who inspiredthisbook.Finally,wewouldliketodedicate thebookto thememoryofPraful

Bidwai, who died suddenly inAmsterdam in June 2015, a wonderfulTNIFellowwhoseworkonclimatechangeandsecurity issueswasaninspirationtoeveryonewhoknewhim.

Fulllistofcrowdfunders

Caroline Clark, Maxim Narbrough, Travis Driessen, Julian Jacobs,AnuradhaVittachi,DanBoorman,HelenWolfson,DanMontuschi,SaraRogers, Beatriz Martinez, Greg Wright, Dixon Caspar, N. Capellini,Julian Filochowski, Payal Parekh, Mauricio Vargas, Dave Patterson,Kathryn Johnson, John Adams, Kara Moore O’Leary, TheresaWolfwood, Matthew Hodson, Ralph Suikat, William Carroll, FredFaust, Dan Caines, Tom and Katy Buxton, Chris Venables, NicolaRogers, David Heath, Katharine Collenette, Adam Boulter, JasonGehrig,TomKruse,MaximilianLeroux, JuliaRuxton, JoannaBernie,MaiaBaconguis,NinaIszatt,LarryLohmann,BenLowe,LiavanWijk,Martin Roberts, Rita Huybens, Gonzalo Berron,Michael Klare, SallyHill,JohnFarrar,MikeGould,MonishaBhaumik,AlanDube,SabrinaAguiari, Brid Brennan, Sarah Garden, Aaron Nitzkin, Peter Wright,Nuria Del Viso, Ben Dangl, Esther Lexchin, Yonit Percival, JolyonWhite,KrisAbrams,DavidAlexander,KristianSmith,AmiraArmenta,Nicolien Scholtens, Kevin Odell, Bernard Meijfroidt, Michel Fleur,NeleMarien,BarbaraCrowther,MaryLight, JamesandKariStewart,AngelaBurton,PeterCarter,CatherineDilley,FergusMcInnes,András

Novoszáth,IgnacevanderMeijden,SarahBarfoot,JamesSmith,UlrichKarthaus,SteveMcGiffen,LouisReynolds,LindsaySimmonds,SteffenBoehm,DanielChavez,Bill Powers andMelissaDraper, Peter Stone,Donna McGuire, Franz Bonsema, Rafael Alejandro Salvador, AaronNitzkin, Barry Gills, Marlene Barrett, Jonathan Brough, MartinaWeitsch, Kirsten Moller, Deb Mason, Joachim Rollhaeuser, CindyBlaney, Aidan Patrick White, Liz Scurfield, Grietje Baars, SalehMamon, Linda McPhee, Jean Jackman, Kathrin Barta, Claire BlackSlotton, Luis Sierra, Susan Bizeau, Elisabeth Robbins, Julian Eaton,Nina Iszatt, CorinneVoilquin, FrancisBuxton, Linda Farthing,DavidHallowes, Jeff Rudin, Alexander Leipold, Rejo Zenger and themanyanonymousdonorsorthosewhodidn’tleaveafullname.

AllURLscitedinthisvolumewereaccessedinAugust2015.

NickBuxtonandBenHayesAugust2015

FOREWORD

SusanGeorge

As I read the chapters of this book commissioned by editors NickBuxtonandBenHayes,Ihadanaggingfeelingofdéjàvu,evendéjàsu[known]. Not because the contributions were unoriginal – to thecontrary,theywerefullofnew,oftenscaryinformationandwrittenbypeople I seldom encounter in the vicinity of ‘my’ subjects. But theywereall,eachinitsownway,facingthereaderwithasortofexistentialcontradiction and hard, borderline impossible, choices that go to theroots of who we are, individually and collectively; who we want toremainortobecomeas–ifthetermisstillvalid–thehumanfamily.Weknowthatnosinglefactor isever thesinglecauseofacomplex

phenomenon,butasthemilitarysay,climatechangeis,attheveryleast,a ‘threat multiplier’ and seems now also to be a human disastermultiplierinbothfrequencyandintensity.Thetensionthatliesbetweenthe threatsand thehumandisasters isat thenexusof thehardchoicesandthecontradictions.An example: How can one possibly condone what is happening to

migrants, topoorpeople, tounnumberedinnocentsas their livelihoodsaredestroyedbyfloodorerosionaugmentedbywarandtheirplaceinthe world becomes unliveable? But how can one not simultaneouslyagreewiththefamousremarkbyformerFrenchPrimeMinisterMichelRocard,justifyingthereinforcementofhisimmigrationpolicyin1989:‘Francecannotwelcomethewholeworld’smisery.’Twenty-fiveyearslater,Kos,Kalymnos,Samos,ChiosandLesbos–

the Greek islands closest to the Turkish border – in June 2015 were

trying to cope with about 3,500 new arrivals landing their sputteringZodiacsontheGreekbeachesevery48hours.TheEuropeanUnionwithits rule of first European touchdown point apparently considers thatausterity-stricken Greece by itself should manage to care for thesepeoplewhohave lost everything.Climate change and failed crops arerecognised as one of the causes of the huge inflows of desperateSyrians, Eritreans and Somalis who are also fleeing war and inter-religiousandethnicstrife.ThepopulationsoftheseGreekislandsrangefrom10,000-33,000people,exceptforLesbos(86,000).Butasfirststopin theEU, it falls to them tomanage sharing resourceswith an extra10,000destitutepeopleeachweek.Isit just?CouldI?Couldyou?It’soutofsightandofmindformostEuropeans.1How can one not feel pity for the people in some neighbouring

European country whose houses have been flooded and theirautomobileswashed away? They generally emerge alive; help arrivesmorequickly.Seeing theirplighton television,doesn’tonealsofeelasort of guilty relief? ‘It’s awful, but this time itwasn’t forme ormychildren and grandchildren. Maybe our turn won’t come after all.’ IcannotsayI’veneverhadthatreflex.Canyou?It’shumantowanttobeprotectedfromtheelementsand, ifneedbe,fromotherpeople.Anditworksbothways.AyoungSyrianrefugeeonKostoldareporter,‘Myparentsbroughtmeuptobeagoodman.Ihadeverythingtobeagoodpersonbut thiswarmakesusdo thingsyoucan’t even imagine.’Andwho can protect you from yourself and from others and from theelementsifnotthegovernment?Thegovernmenthasn’tsavedusfromincreasinginequality, financialcrisisandjoblessness,but theyseemtoknowwhatthey’redoinginprotectingusfromnature’sbacklash.Andiffor that they’re making full use of the military, then we assume themilitarymustbenecessary.Theravagesandunexpectedperilsofclimatechangeprovideadress

rehearsalforactingouttheHobbesianscenarioandweknowhowthatplay ends. In the stateofNature towhich climate change threatens toreduceus– first locally, thenperhapsuniversally–and thewarofall

againstall,theLeviathandemandsasovereignwhomaybedespoticbutshieldsusfromthewarinwhich,otherwise,everyoneisaloser.So whence came the sense of déjà vu, déjà su I referred to at the

beginning?Ittookmeawhiletorealiseitcamefromawell-documentedbut fake narrative I had written in 1999 as my contribution to theMillennium.Iaskthereadertoforgivemethisbriefforayintomyownwork.The titleof thisbookwasTheLuganoReport,which I called a‘factual fiction’, because all the facts were seriously sourced but thecontext, the scenariowasmyown.Tenexperts inasmanydisciplinesarerecruitedbyafactotumandcommissionedbymysteriousbutclearlyextremelypowerfuldecisionmakers toprovideareportonamatterofparamountimportancetotheCommissioners:‘Preservingcapitalisminthe21stcentury’.IntheircomfortablevillainLugano,theexpertsfirstestablishthebaselineofpotentialfactorsthatwillthreatencapitalisminthe twenty-first century: these naturally include climate change. TheyestablishthebasicequationI=CxTxP,whichstandsforImpact(onthe earth) equals Consumption x Technology x Population. Sincecapitalismisasubsystemoperatingwithin,andnotoutsideoforbeyondafinitebiospherewhosecapacitycannotbeincreased;protectionofthistotal natural system– and thus of its economic capitalist subsystem–depends upon 1) the number of people in the world, 2) the quantity,quality and nature of their consumption, and 3) the technologyemployed toproduceanddistributewhat theyconsumeand todisposeofthewastetheyengender.These experts have been selected because they are trustworthy

neoliberals and can be counted on to be sympathetic to theCommissioners’aims.Insolvingtheirequation,theyquicklyeliminatethe notion that consumption can somehow bemade fairer, transferredfrom North to South, or from Haves to Have-nots to any significantdegree.Theynotethatchoicesdictatedbymoralityandmoregenerallyethical behaviour in all circumstances have never, and will neverbecomemassphenomena.Meanwhile, numbers of new,more affluentconsumers are rising (for example, China) and under such

circumstances, the two products for which demand immediatelyincreases are energy and meat. This has proven true regardless ofculture:richerpeopleinvariablyplacemoredemandsontheir–andtheworld’s–environment.Asfor technology,althoughitmaybeconstantlyimproved, thiswill

notguaranteeasmallerimpactontheplanetsinceincreasedefficiencyiscontinuallycancelledoutby thesheernumbersof, say,automobilesorairplanes.Withtheseandotherarguments,theexpertsestablishthatthe solution to the equation depends crucially on the ‘P’ factor, orPopulation, which is overwhelmingly located in the poorer countrieswherepeople’sconsumptionmaybelesshigh-techbutwhereanythingseemingly‘free’,suchastreesorsoilwillfallvictimtodeforestationorerosion. Furthermore, these people usually have several children forreasonswhichmaybeperfectlyvalid in their individualcircumstancesbutarenotcollectivelyjustifiable.I’m drastically summarising here much longer and entirely logical

arguments. The upshot is that Malthus is not dead, population willoutrun resource capacity, a smoothly functioning capitalist systemcannotcoexistwith8billionpeopleintheworldandsincetheseexpertsexplicitlydecline tobelongto thecasteof‘coopted thinkers…whoselivelihoodschieflydependonmaintainingtheillusionsthatthe(ruling)classholdsaboutitself’,theygostraighttothesolutions.2Whateveryoumay have guessed, these solutions do not include Hitlerian methods,which the experts gathered in Lugano deem primitive andunsophisticatedbutnonethelesscostlyandresource-intensive.Drasticpopulationreductioncan,however,beachieved,mostlybyallowing,orencouraging, nature to take its course, in the personae of the FourHorsemen of the Apocalypse: Conquest (orWar), Pestilence, FamineandDeath.And this is why, patient reader, I had the eerie feeling that today’s

neoliberal politicians, corporate brass and military strategists hadliterallytakenaleaffrommybook,asrecountedinthisone.Imeantmybookasabiting,dystopian satireandhad to recognise that something

much more sinister, such as a serious, realistic scenario is underconstruction and is literally documented here in The Secure and theDispossessed. And asMarx observed, today’s co-opted thinkers, bothmilitary and civilian, are still telling the ruling class exactly what itwants to hear. It wants to hear that the planet can no longer toleratehundredsofmillions–perhapsbillions–ofunnecessary, superfluous,useless,unwelcomeanddisposablepeoplewhocannotbepermitted toburdentheearth.Thereforeitismorallypermissibletomaintainorder,discipline andmanageable human societies bywhatevermeans revealthemselvesasnecessary.Climate change is the backdrop and the proximate cause of this

offensive,aswellasitsjustification.Itwillrequirerationalisationwithnew rhetoric and soothing language, but the neoliberals have beennurturingexpertsinsuchmattersininnumerablethinktanks.Fortunately,theon-the-groundrealityofclimatechange’simpactcan

becountedupontoproduce,spontaneouslyorwithalittlehelpfromitsfriends,anynumberofmostlyinternecineconflicts,manyofwhichwillproduce significant fatalities. The producers of higher-tech walls,barriers,fencesandrelatedimpedimentstofreemovementwillflourishaswillotherbranchesofcapitalistendeavoursuchascommunicationsequipment, surveillance gear, or crowd-control equipment. Capitalismwillcontinuetoprosper–atleastuntilNewYorkissubmerged–andbythen, the present politicians will be out of office.Withmany foreigndestinations newly off-limits, internal tourismwill grow.The FortressStatewillhaveitscharmsformany.Peoplewill,foratime,feelsafe.Naturally,citizensofNortherncountrieswillhavetosufferpartofthe

impact, but only in rare cases will it be fatal and even then,unattributabletoforcesotherthannaturalones.Andlestweforget,therichcountries, too,have their shareof theuselessanddisposable.Themilitarywill find a new lease on life aftermyriad failures in itsmoreclassicconflictsoftheMiddleEast.Where the Southern, poorer countries are concerned, studies also

show that in many cases, no outside agency will be necessary for

assistingmillionsoftheunnecessaryandunwelcometoannihilateeachother.Afterseveredroughts,forexample,newconflictsemerge,oroldonesrisefromtheirashesandoncemoreclaimmanylives.What I am trying to say is that the ice-cold logicof the rulingclass

isn’tgoingtochangecourse.Theworld-as-we-know-itwillhenceforthbeplungedintoasituationinwhichclimatechangeisatthecentrebutengulfsusalsointhecertaintythatcapitalismwillnotgiveup,andnotjust the fossil-fuel corporations. Contrary to ordinary people, themastersoftheuniversewillnotbeorderedto‘adapt’ortobecomemore‘resilient’. We, not they, are the adjustable variable. It may not beexactlyaprèsnousledéluge,butneithertheUSnorChinanoranyotherrich,greenhousegas-emittingcountryisgoingtocanceltheirsubsidiestothemajorpollutersorstopmakingpolicyintheirfavour,atleastnotspontaneouslyorvoluntarily.Iwon’tgosofarastosaythatunlesswecangetridofcapitalismwe

can’twinonkeepingglobalwarmingunder2°C.Iwillsaythatwemustrecognisethatrelocalisationandlocalaction,howeveressential,cannotreplacethestate.Onlythestatecanforcecapitalismtocomplywiththelaws of survival and only the people can force the state to force thecompaniestoobey.Thismeans that thepeoplemustbondandconsciously,purposefully

merge their individual struggles under the banner of compassion. Thehopeful pages in this book show us people reactingwith spontaneousaltruism to relieve distress and intervening with ordinary kindness,wheretheauthoritiescanthinkonlyofsendinginthetroops.Climate change has got to be on the hymn sheet or manifesto or

charterofeverycitizeneffortfromnowonanditdoesn’tmatterifit’sthe local football club or the movement to separate banks and closedowntaxhavensorpromotehuman(gay,women’s,minority)rightsorsavethewhalesoranythingelseyoucaretoname.Findtheangleandincludeitinyourstruggle.IgnoretheconstantdietoffearwhichPowerfeedsustomakeusquiescentandfrozen.Telltheshamefullittlevoicewithintoshutupwhenitmurmursinthefaceoftragedy,‘ThankGodit

wasn’tmethistime’,or‘Wecan’taffordtosharewiththeseoutsiders’.Joinwithothers,placetheaccentonwhatunitesyou,notwhatseparatesyou.Timeisshort.Audensaiditbest:‘Wemustloveoneanotherordie.’3

Notes

1. Kourounis,A.andJacobi,T.(11June2015).‘Kos,l’autreportedel’Europe’,Politis.PolitisisasmallishleftFrenchweekly.

2. Marx,K.andEngels,F.(1970).TheGermanIdeology,Vol.1,MaterialistTheory,DominantClassesandIdeas.NewYork:InternationalPublishersCo.

3.

From‘September1,1939’(thedayGermanyinvadedPolandandstartedtheSecondWorldWar).Later,Audendisavowedtheline,saidthepoemwas‘trash’andeveryonewasgoingtodieanyway.YetsomehowIfeelhewouldnotobjecttoitsusehereintheradicallynewcontextthisbookreveals.Retrievedfromhttp://www.poets.org/poetsorg/poem/september-1-1939.

INTRODUCTION:SECURITYFORWHOMINATIME

OFCLIMATECRISIS?

NickBuxtonandBenHayes

Our challenge has changed. It is no longer about just reducing emissions.Wehave to work out how to hold on to our humanity as we head to increasinglydifficulttimes.

TimDeChristopher,environmentalactivistarrestedandimprisonedfordisruptinganauctionofoilandgasleasesinUtahin2008

The year 2008 will go down in history as the year that the LehmanBrothers filed for bankruptcy, bringing theworldwithin a breath of aglobal banking meltdown and prompting the world’s most seriouseconomiccrisissincethe1930s.Itwasalsotheyearinwhichtwooftheworld’smostpowerfulforcesstartedplanningforadystopianfutureinatime of climate crisis.On one side of theAtlantic, inTheHague andLondon, the oil giant Shell’s internal ‘scenarios team’ were asked tolookintotheircrystalballtoseehowtheirbusinessmodelwouldfareina climate-changed world. On the other side of the Atlantic, inWashington,DC,apowerfulgroupofpoliticalelites including formerUSassistantdefencesecretaries, theex-chiefof theCIAandaleadingDemocratpolicyadvisorgatheredtoassessthelikelyimpactsofclimatechangeforUSnationalsecurityinterests.Neither group would be considered prime candidates for

environmentalleadership.Thepositionsadoptedbytheoilindustryandthe US military have hitherto been associated with the diversionary

tacticsofthedeniersandgas-guzzlingwarmongers.Yetheretheyweretaking climate change very seriously and in Shell’s case tacitlyacknowledgingthecostoftheworld’sfossil-fueladdiction.Shell’s team, led by Jeremy Bentham, forecast two scenarios:

‘Scramble’ and ‘Blueprint’.1 Scramble envisages a future where thegrowingdemandforenergy,fuelledbyIndiaandChina’srapidgrowth,leadstoincreasingcompetition,rivalryandtensionsbetweenstates,andensuing conflicts and social and environmental crises. Blueprintimagines that public concern about the environment and the rise ofrenewable energy leads to significant reduction of carbon emissions,leadingby2050toa‘worldofelectronsratherthanmolecules’.Inotherwords,aworldfuelled largelybyrenewablesources, rather thanfossilfuels.Unusually,Shell,whichhaspublishedglobalforecastsformorethan

fortyyearswithout everpublicly stating its energypolicypreferences,declaredthistimethatitwasinfavourofBlueprint.Thiswasheraldedatthetimeasasignthatoilcompaniescouldbepartofthesolutiontoclimatechangeratherthantheprincipalcause.However, a closer look at the Blueprint’s small print showed that

Shelldidnotenvisage that this scenariowould involvecurtailing theirownfossilfuelproduction.Instead,theirscenarioreliesheavilyontwopolicysleights-of-hand:firstacap-and-tradeschemethatin2013hadallbutcollapsed in ignominy,havingboth failed to reduceemissionsandrewarded the world’s worst polluters. Second, it depends on a hugeincreaseinCarbonCaptureandStoragetechnologiesthathaveyettobeproventoworkandareunlikelytodosoanytimesoon.Inotherwords,Shell believed that a renewableworldwould come intobeingwithoutrequiring any fundamental change in Shell’s operations; instead, theproblemofcarbondioxidewouldbemagicallyresolvedwiththehelpofafewtechnofixesandtheuseofcarboncredits togetothers toreducetheiremissions.Giventhat theInternationalEnergyAgencystatesthattwo-thirdsofexistingfossilfuelreserveswillneedtostayinthegroundto have a chance to keep global temperature rises below the

internationally agreed goal of 2°C, Shell’s so-called Blueprint was infactaplanforcontinuingbusiness-as-usual–evenifitleadstoaworldconsidereddangerousbymanyclimatescientists.AsiftoproveShell’sunderlyingcynicism,withintwoyears–andin

the wake of the collapsed UN climate talks in Copenhagen – Shelladmitted that ithadeffectively joined the‘Scramble’ for theresourcesthat could be accessed thanks to the melting ice in the Arctic. Anypretence that the company cared about anything other than profitwaslaidbareforalltosee.2Themilitarystrategists,meanwhile,published their scenarios for the

futureinabook,ClimateCataclysm:TheForeignPolicyandNationalSecurityImplicationsofClimateChange.Theresearchbuiltonastudyreleasedayearbeforethatwarnedthathumankindhadnowenteredthe‘Age of Consequences’ that would ‘increasingly be defined by theintersection of climate change and the security of nations.’3 In thatreport (see further Chapter 2), the researchers sketched out threescenarios of possible climate impacts: an ‘expected’ one based ontemperatureriseof1.3°C(2.3°F)by2040,a‘severe’one(2.6°C/4.7°F)anda‘catastrophic’one’(5.6°C/10.1°F)by2100.Theauthorsissuedstarkwarningsaboutentirepopulationsfleeingor

perishing, particularly across Africa, South and Central Asia, CentralAmerica,theCaribbean,SouthAmericaandSouthEastAsia.Thereportforecastcivilunrest,conflicts,millionsofmigrantsonthemove,andthegrowing use ofmartial law to control unrest. ‘As first thousands andthenmillions and then hundreds of millions of starving people beginflooding toward Europe,’ warns the book, ‘the EU will try to retreatbehindhighwallsandnavalblockades,acontainmentstrategythatwillbe seen asmorally indefensible andwill provoke tremendous internalunrest and impoverishment, but also will be seen as a matter ofsurvival.’ It concluded laconically, ‘Altruism and generosity wouldlikelybeblunted.’(Disturbinglythepathwearecurrentlyonintermsofemissionsgrowthliesclosertothe‘severe’than‘expected’scenarios.)Their report does not provide concrete recommendations for US

military responses, but the authors were clear that this posed anunprecedentedsecuritythreat,intheirwords,to‘oursociety,ourwayoflife,andourliberty’.Theyexplainedthat‘Innationalsecurityplanning,it generally can take about 30 years to design aweapons system andbring it to the battlefield, so it is important to anticipate future threatenvironments. It is no less important to anticipate and prepare for thechallengeswemayfaceinthefutureasaresultofclimatechange.’Thisreportisnowbutoneofmanywecouldhavechosentointroduce

this book.And themessages in each of them are being repeated evermorewidely in themedia and in the corridors of power: that climatechangeisa‘threatmultiplier’thatwillmakecurrentglobalconflictsandsocial tensions far worse, leading to a far more insecure world. Theimmediate call is formoreurgent action to tackle climate change,buttheobvioussubtextisthatthemilitarybettergetreadyandbegiventheresourcestodealwithamessierandmoreconflict-riddenworld.InthewordsofaUSDepartmentofDefensereport,‘Wehaveenteredaneraofpersistentconflict…asecurityenvironmentmuchmoreambiguousandunpredictablethanthatfacedduringtheColdWar.’4Webelievethatwhentheworld’sforemostmilitarypowerandoneof

the world’s most powerful corporations start predicting the future inways thatdovetail, it isworthwhile listening towhat theysay.For theway they forecast the future also influences how these powerfulinstitutionsarenowshapingpoliciestodealwithclimateimpacts,whichhashugeandstilllargelyundiscussedconsequencesfortherestofus.Thegenesisofthisbookemergedfromourownexperiences,working

in social movements fighting for justice on issues related to climatechange and civil liberties respectively. We are linked to theTransnationalInstitute(TNI),aprogressiveinternationalinstitutebasedin Amsterdam that has, for four decades, provided research andlogisticalsupportforstrugglesforsocialandenvironmentaljustice.Forthepastdecade,TNIhasworkedtoconfrontthecorporateintereststhathave sought to stall effective action on climate change by blockingprogressordivertingenergiesintofalse,ineffectiveandunjustsolutions

suchascarbontrading.After thecollapseof theCopenhagen talks in2009,when itbecame

obviousthattherewaslittlepoliticalwilltotaketheboldstepsneededtotackleclimatechange,wewerestruckbythepotentialimplicationsofparallelattemptstorecastclimatechangeasasecurityissue.Clearlythisnew‘security’agendawillhaveagrowingimpact–notjustforpeopleinvolved in environmentalorpeace andcivil libertymovements–butalso for everyone concerned with maintaining or creating a livablefuture. In December 2011, coinciding with the UN climate talks inDurban, South Africa, we convened a workshop bringing togetherclimate scientists, security scholars, social and political scientists andactivists.Outofthatseminar,aseriesofworkingpapersweredevelopedandtheproposalforabookemerged.Inautumn2013,weorganisedacrowdfunding campaign5 that successfully raised €10,000 to fund theproductionof thisbook.Wehavealsoproducedonlinechaptersandaliving website to accompany this book(www.climatesecurityagenda.org).Thisbookposes thesamefundamentalquestionthatweaskedat the

seminarinDurban:WhataretheimplicationsofinstitutionssuchasthePentagonorcorporationssuchasShellre-framingclimatechangefromanenvironmentalandsocialjusticeissuetoasecurityone?Thisbegs several relatedquestionsof a ‘what if’nature.First,what

does a climate-changed world look like, and what are the social,politicalandeconomicimplicationsof‘businessasusual’?Second,whoarethewinnersandlosersofthenew‘climatesecurity’strategies–or,putanotherway,whatisbeingsecured,forwhom,fromwhom,andatwhatcost?A small collection like this cannot, of course, hope to provide

comprehensiveanswerstoquestionsthatmanyscholarsandresearchershave long been asking. What we hope it can do is provide food forthought about how these new security strategies relate to existingconcerns about the environment, social justice, adaptation andresilience, and the implications of failing to prevent runaway climate

change.Wealsohopetheaccompanyingwebsitecanbeaplacewherethisdiscussioncancontinueandbeenriched.It is important to stress that this is not a book about how to stop

climatechange.Climatechangeisalreadyhappening,havinganimpactparticularlyonthevulnerable,andit isgoingtoworsen.Thisdoesnotmean we have given up hope that concerted action can still avert aworseningcatastrophe;infactwebelievetheopposite.Weareactivelyengagedandfullyinsupportofallmovementsandcommunitiestakingdirect action against fossil fuel interests and working to createalternative low-carbon futures. Our actions can still affect how badclimatechangewillbe.However,wethinkitiscrucialtocastacriticaleyeontheclimatechangeandinternationalsecuritydiscourse,becausewe believe that progressives need to engage in these debates andarticulatethenecessaryalternatives.Leavingtheplanningofaclimate-changedfutureinthehandsofcorporateandmilitaryeliteshasfartoodangerousimplicationsforallofus,assubsequentchapterswilltestify.Inturningthespotlightonclimate-changeimpacts,thebookexposes

more clearly the agents that are both causing the climate crisis andseekingtobenefitfromitsconsequences–betheystates,corporations,or private security companies. It is no coincidence thatmanyof thesesame entities are engaged in the subversion or repression of preciselythe kinds of activism and ideas that are necessary to avert any futureclimatechaos.Exposing theveilof legitimacy that ‘security’cangivetheseeffortsisoneofthekeymotivationsforourwork.One issuewehaveconstantlyhad tograpplewith,aseditors, is that

the subject matter in this book can at times be dispiriting. At a timewhen concerted action to combat climate change is neededmore thanever, it may appear counter-intuitive to produce a book that couldcompound the sense of relative powerlessness that many believeunderpinscontemporaryapathy.We certainly do not wish to add to the sense of doom, nor give

dystopian and catastrophic narratives a legitimacy or sense ofinevitabilitytheydonotdeserve.Butwedonotwishtoself-censorthe

dangers, either. For if we don’t engage critically with these state-corporate narratives in order to understand how this fear is beingexploitedtoperpetuateinjustice,wearenotgoingtobeinapositiontochallenge,confront,orreshapethefutureaswewantittobe.We therefore asked two thingsof the contributors to this collection.

First, to make these trends and power-plays visible by carefullyanalysingthepoliticalandeconomicforcesthatmakeamilitarisedandcorporatised future possible.Second, to inspire resistanceby exposingthe cracks in the system, giving voice to progressive alternatives andexperiences and recounting the stories of hope and self-determinationthat are so often overlooked by media commentators. Interestingly,manyofthealternativestoasecuritynarrative,outlinedineachchapter,providenotonlyamorejustresponsetoclimatechangeimpactsbutarealsosolutionsthatcanhelptopreventfurtherclimatechange.

Heatingupandnoendinsight

Ifwearetolookathowwerespondtoclimateimpacts,weneedfirsttolook at what the best consensus of science says are the likelyconsequences of our current trajectory of carbon emissions. We alsoneedtounderstandwhytheinternationalcommunityhassofarfailedtoact to curtail emissions and the way this has bolstered a security-ledresponse.The evidence of rising emissions shows that we are currently on a

treacherous one-way slope. Moreover, there is little sign that we areeven heading in the right direction. Greenhouse gas emissions grewnearly twiceas fast from2000 to2010as in theprevious thirtyyears,and in 2013, they grew at their fastest rate since 1984.6 As carbondioxide stays in the atmosphere for hundreds of years, every increaselocks in an increase in globalwarming,whichmeans that even ifwestopped carbon emissions tomorrow, we would still continue to seeincreasesinglobalwarmingfordecadestocome.UKclimatescientists

Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows say that the only way to keeptemperatureswithin thegloballyagreed targetof2°Cofwarmingwillbe for industrialised countries to peak their emissions soon after 2015andthenenforcea10percentcutinemissionsyearafteryear,startingin2020.7Theyadmitthiskindofcutisunprecedentedinhumanhistory;it is a target that even the most praised ‘green’ economies such asGermanyhavefailedtoachieve.Thismeansthatwhateverwedo–andmustdo–toendthefossil-fuel

economy,wearestillgoingtobelivinginaclimate-changedworld,sowemustsimultaneouslyprepareforitsconsequences.The rapid degradation of our planetary home is not just an issue of

carbon emissions. A team of 28 scientists in 2009 identified nineseparate biophysical systems crucial to humanity’s flourishing, andmarkedoutboundarieswithinwhichwemustremaininordertoprevent‘irreversibleandinsomecasesabruptenvironmentalchange’.8Wehavealreadycrossedtheboundariesforclimatechange,biodiversityloss,andinterference with the nitrogen cycle; we are fast approaching theboundaries for freshwater use, land-use changes, ocean acidification,and interferencewith theglobalphosphoruscycle. In fact,humansarehavingsuchasignificantimpactontheplanetthatsomegeologistsarenowsayingwehavemoved intoanewepoch– the ‘Anthropocene’–marked by the fact that humans are now shaping the entire planet’secosystem, oceans and atmosphere, leaving nothing untouched. Weagree that it would be better called the ‘Capitalocene’, given that theresponsibility for continued destruction lies with contemporaryalignmentsofpowerandcapital,ratherthanhumanityasawhole.9TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)reportisthe

most widely acknowledged reflection of consensus among scientists,even though its statements and predictions are frequently on theconservativeside,giventhedifficultyinreachingconsensusamong195countries. Nevertheless, their report released in March 2014 starklychronicledsomeofthechangesscientistsacrosstheworldarereporting–andthelikelyimpactsasthesetrendscontinue.Theseincludeextreme

weather, rising sea levels that will flood many coastal cities, foodinsecurity and ‘the breakdown of food systems’, declining watersupplies,increasesin‘ill-healthinmanyregions,’andongoingcollapseofbiodiversity.10The report notes that climate impactswill be not be evenly spread,

hittingthoseintheGlobalSouthandvulnerablepopulationsthehardest.This points to theprofound injustice at theheart of the climate crisis:that thosewho played the least role in causing the crisis will feel itsimpact hardest. People living at the edge of subsistence have fewresources to deal with additional stresses caused by climate change.Frank Rijsberman, head of the international Consultative Group forInternationalAgriculturalResearch (CGIAR)15crop-researchcentres,explainshowitwillimpactfoodproduction:

Theannualproductiongainswehavecometoexpect…willbetakenawaybyclimatechange.Wearenotsoworriedaboutthetotalamountof food produced so much as the vulnerability of the one billionpeoplewhoarewithout foodalreadyandwhowillbehithardestbyclimatechange.Theyhavenocapacitytoadapt.11

The financial capacity to respond to climate change impacts is alsostarkly different betweenNorth and South. TheUS government spent$68 billion on the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, but all the richestcountries together have barely raised $30 billion a year to help thepoorestcountriescopewithclimatechangeimpacts,despiteapledgetoraise $100 billion in 2009.12 Former Filipino climate negotiator YebSanodespairswhenhethinksofhowmuchmoneyandresourcesitwilltaketopreparehiscountryforclimateimpacts:

The fact iswe are not ready.We have a coastline of 37,000miles.Howcanwepossiblydefendthatfromsealevelrise?Sixtypercentofour people live in low-lying areas which may flood. It will beprobablybe4Cwarmer–thatwillseriouslyimpactonourfisheries,ourcities,ourcoralreefs,ourfoodsupplies,oureconomy.Everything

weknowwillbecompromised.13

Planning for the future is not made any easier by the fact thatunderstandingourclimateisstill,inthewordsofenvironmentalpolicyprofessorJosephDiMento,‘afilmwithmanyblurryimagesandemptyframes’.14 We know it will lead to increased extreme weather,heatwaves, floodingand risingseas,butpredictingwhereandwhen isan elusive science. The most disturbing scientific predictions nowsuggest that as climate change accelerates, it could prompt self-reinforcingfeedbackloopsthatwouldcreateatippingpointandleadtoasuddensurgeinemissions.Thereisparticularconcernatthespeedofmelting permafrost in the Arctic and Northern Siberia, which couldcauseamajorandsuddenreleaseofmethane,oneofthemostpowerfulgreenhousegases.In spite of impressive innovation and take-up of renewable energy

production,ourcurrent trajectory, ifnotaltered,couldsee temperatureincreases of up to 4 degrees Celsius, which, according to theWorldBank,wouldmeanthatby2080,thecoolestmonthsoftheyearwouldbe substantiallywarmer than thewarmestmonthsnow,andwewouldexperience ‘a completely new class of heat waves, with magnitudesneverexperiencedbefore in the20thcentury’.15AsAustralianscholarCliveHamiltonargues,thesekindofscenariosforceustoconsidertheabilityofhumanitytoadapt,evenwithallthefinancialresourcesintheworld.16

Hotairandnoaction

Thebigquestioniswhy–giventhealarmbellssoundedbytheworld’ssciencecommunityandtheacceptanceofthefactsbymostpoliticians–therehasbeensolittleactioncommensuratewiththethreat.Inanonlinechapter that accompanies this book, Nick Buxton and Pablo Solonexplore the reasons in more depth.17 To summarise their arguments,

risingcorporatepower, theconstantdrive for capital expansion, andamistaken focus on emissions rather than extraction and production offossilfuelshaveblockedaneffectivedismantlingofadeeplyembeddedfossilfueleconomy.Internationalgovernance,weakenedbyyearsofUSunilateralism, has spectacularly failed to rise to the challenge.AnnualUNclimateconferenceshavebecomeanabysmalcharade.Behind thegrand speeches and posturing, it is clear that the whole point of theannualspectacleiscosmetic;thedecisiontoavoidanycommitmentthatcouldpossiblyputacountryanditsnationalandcorporateinterestataneconomicdisadvantagehasalreadybeentaken.Theresultofthesesystemicfailureshasbeenacatastrophicpolitical

stasis, that allows the current fossil fuel complex to run amok. Thedangerous impacts of inaction play out in the context of growingcorporatepoweranddiminishingpopularaccountabilitywhilethesameforces that caused the crisis are also looking to shape its impact,increasinglybehindthebarrelofagun.Itmeansforconcernedcitizensthat the struggles tocombatclimatechangeand toaddress its impactsarenolongerseparateissuesbutneedtobeaddressedtogether.

Thenewsecurityagenda

The first part of this book examines the way in which states andcorporationsareseekingto leverageclimatechangeto theirownends.Chapter 1 is abridged from Christian Parenti’s book, The Tropic ofChaos,18andexploresthese‘newgeographiesofviolence’andthelinksbetween climate, conflict and insecurity.AUS journalist and scholar,Parenti argues that climate changehas been anoverlooked factor in awhole range of conflicts, particularly in the world’s central latitudes,whichareaffectedmostbychangesinweatherpatterns.To his evidence gathered inAfghanistan,Kenya and India, one can

alsoaddrecentresearchthatsuggeststhatthecivilwarinSyriawasalsofuelled,atleastinpart,byanextremedroughtthataffectedthecountry

from 2006 to 2009, most likely due to climate change. Rising foodprices linkedtoclimatechangearealsoseenasasignificantsourceofthemassfrustrationsthatboiledoverintotheso-called‘ArabSpring’.Parenti’s chapter demonstrates how the environmental crisis is

collidingwith the twin legaciesofColdWarmilitarismandunbridledfree market economics to inflame existing conflicts and create newpatternsofviolence–andhowcountriesoftheGlobalNorthandothersin theSoutharerespondingwithgreaterrepression,surveillanceandaprogramofpermanentcounter-insurgency.Much of the violence that Parenti describes also has roots in the

conflictsembeddedwithintheglobalfossilfueleconomy:violencehasconsistently followed extraction of oil, ranging from repression ofresidentsinextractionzonestothegiantgeopoliticalconflictsthathavedevastatedanddistortedpoliticsintheMiddleEast.In apowerfulonline chapter that accompanies thisbook,19 Nigerian

environmentalcampaignerNnimmoBasseyexploreshowmilitarisationhas accompanied oil extraction in Nigeria, causing devastation to theenvironment and local communities. The chapter provides an insightintothedynamicsofresourcewarsinthetwenty-firstcenturyandshowshow militarisation in distressed regions is becoming the givengeopolitical backdrop for our times.20 At the same time, Bassey alsodrawsattentiontothecreativeandpowerfulresistancethathasemergedandagainsttheoddshaswonsignificantvictories.In Chapter 2, security researcher Ben Hayes examines the security

strategiesseekingtoaddresstheimpactsofclimatechange.Heunpicksthe‘threatmultiplier’doctrineadoptedbyNATO,thePentagon,theEUandtheUNandothersthatframeclimatechangeasasecurityissueinorder to cement their role in managing its impacts. Long-term threatassessment issomething thatmilitaryandsecurityagenciesclaimtheyaremandatedtodointhepublicinterest,however,thereisaninherentdangertolibertyanddemocracyinlettingtheseagenciesplayaleadingrole in this area, because they are structurally and ideologicallypredisposedtoalimitedsetofhardsecurityresponses.Thesearebased

on a ‘paradigm that seeks tomaintain control rather than address theunderlyingproblems’.21Thisideologyandpracticealsoservestheinterestsofthosewhohave

powerandresources;byitsverynature,itmilitatesagainstactionsthatwould seek to redistribute power and wealth and thereby address theinequities that are at the heart of the climate crisis. This can be seenmostobviouslyinthedetailofmilitarysecuritystrategiesthatfocusonhow to protect assets, resources and supply chains against the socialinstabilitycausedbyclimatechange.Whatunitesallthesestrategiesistheir externalisation of threat. As scholar Robyn Eckersley notes,‘environmentalthreatsaresomethingthatforeignersdotoAmericansortoAmerican territory’,and theyareneversomethingcausedbyUSorWestern domestic policies.22 By its very nature, then, themilitary/security approach disregards the systemic causes of climatechange and therefore the changes that need to be made in US andWestern institutions, structures and policies. As usual, the enemyiselsewhere.The chapter also explores the relationship between the politics of

security and the politics of scarcity, which have together spawned awhole set of sub-narratives – food security, water security, energysecurity, and so on. These narratives largely persist with the military‘control’paradigm,ignoringissuesofjusticeandequity,andseekingtoensurethatthosewithresources,nomatterhow,why,andatwhatcost,continuetokeepthem.Whilemanypeoplestillview‘security’inbenignterms–beingable

towalksafelyatnightorhaving thesecurityofa jobor income– thetermhasbeenco-optedradicallysince9/11andisincreasinglydeployedto justifycoercivemeasuresagainst people.As later chapters explore,wearestartingtosee,forexample, thenotionof‘foodsecurity’beingused to justify landgrabbing, or ‘energy security’ used as a reason totake pre-emptive action against environmental campaigners.Cornerhouse research group suggest a useful distinction between‘Upper-Case’ Security which secures property and privilege, and

‘lower-case’ security,which is the right to have themeans to surviveand to defend territory and livelihoods. Not only has Upper-CaseSecurity been used to ‘subdue recalcitrant or colonised peoples, toprovidephysical andpolitical infrastructure, to assure the flowof rawmaterials, [and] to break apart old social relationships in order tolubricateincreasinglyglobalchannelsofcommerce,’ithasalsobecomea‘scarce,globalcommodity…ofwhichtherecanneverbeenough’.23Given the application of ‘security’measures usually ends up creatingfurther insecurity, security rapidlybecomesapanopticvisioncoveringeverythingandeverywhere.Thismuch isnowpatentlyclear thanks toEdwardSnowden.Chapter 3 by climate scholar and activistOscar Reyes takes up the

corporatesideofthenewsecurityagendathroughthelensofmanaging‘risk’ and promoting corporate ‘resilience’, in other words, continuedprofit making. Reyes explains how the narrative of security has beenusurped by corporate elites to defend the status quo and consolidatetheir power.Climate change brings both risks to corporations such asfloodingofwarehousesordisruptionof traderoutes– tobeaddressedthroughcorporateresilience–andopportunities–expressedintermsofnew markets, new supply routes and changes in patterns ofconsumption.Resilienceacceptsworseningclimatechangeasfactand,rather than seeking to take the radical actions to prevent it, seeks toadapttoit.Usedwithequalvigourinthemilitary-industrialcomplex,itembraces ‘disequilibrium as a point of organisation’, in whichpopulations are helped to ‘survive’ while corporations and capitalismaresupportedto‘thrive’.24Corporationsarealsohedgingtheirbetsonclimatechange,promoting

a number of ‘sustainable’ activities to attempt to appease consumerconcernsandprotectingthemselvesfromspecificthreatssuchasrisingsea levels.Yet in financial terms, these samecorporations continue toinvest indeeplyunsustainableactivitiesand inpolitical termsexercisetheir influence to prevent radical dirigiste climate interventions,promoting their technocratic expertise as the solution to any problem

thatemerges.Walmart is a typical example of this corporate greenwashing. The

retailgiantreceivedplauditsforsettingagoalofbeing‘suppliedby100percent renewable energy’, before an investigation byGristmagazinefoundthatatitscurrentpaceofconvertingtorenewablesthecompanywould take about 300 years to achieve this.25 Similarly, divestmentcampaigners forced Exxon Mobil to analyse its climate-change riskexposure, given that burning all of its reserves would undermineinternationallyagreedclimategoalsandthereforeriskedtheirbecoming‘stranded assets’. Exxon Mobil’s report concluded that governmentactionforcingExxon tokeepanyof itsoil reserves in thegroundwas‘highlyunlikely’,andargued that itcould thereforecontinue tosearchformoreoilandgaswithoutrestraint.Reyesconcludes:

That type of response represents a complacent – indeed, arrogant –disregard for the planet. But it is based on a confident bet thattransnationalcorporationswillcontinue tohavesignificant influenceonpublicpolicy-making,boththroughtheirlobbying,andasaresultof theanti-regulatoryneoliberalismsharedbypoliticiansofboth thecentre-leftandcentre-rightinmostindustrialisedcountries.

Meanwhile,othercompaniesarelininguptoprofitfromtheimpactsofclimatechange.OnesuchcompanyisArcadis,aDutchengineeringfirmthat offers flood-protection services.The companyhas embarkedon abuying spree, snapping up ETEP, a Brazilian water-engineering andconsulting firm, winning contracts in New York to bring water-treatmentfacilitiesonlineafterHurricaneSandy,andworkingwithNewOrleansandSanFranciscotoraiseleveesandplanforrisingsealevels.Arcadis’s revenue rose 26 per cent in 2012 to €2.5 billion ($3.25billion).Servicessuchasfloodprotectionwillbecritical,buttheriseofthesenewclimate-changeprofiteersdoesreflectaneconomicmodelinwhich corporations and elites are best placed to prosper from climatechange while the vast majority of the planet will have no suchprotection. As explored later in the book, some of the solutions that

corporationsprovidetoaddressclimatechangeendupintensifyingthedispossession of peasants and marginalized communities. WhenMichael Richardson, head of business development at LandCommodities,who advises rich investors and sovereignwealth funds,says that ‘there is an overemphasis of its [globalwarming’s] negativeimpacts’ and celebrates its potential to increase the value of land andcreate newmarkets, you can be sure that he is not thinking about theimpactsofclimatechangeonpeasantfarmers.The corporate capacity to shape our climate-changed world reflects

the growing power that corporate elites have accumulated in the pasttwodecades.AreportbyTNIin2014showedthattheworld’swealthisconcentratedtoanevengreaterextentthanispopularlyunderstood:notinthehandsofthe1percentbutthe0.001percent,thatis,the111,000people who control $16.3 trillion. This is equivalent to a fifth of theworld’s GDP. Moreover, 37 of the world’s largest economies arecorporations, not nations.But the concentration of power goes deeperstill: in a study of 43,000 corporations, mathematicians at the ZurichPolytechnic Institute found just 147 companies control 40 per cent oftheeconomicvalueoftheentiresample.Mostofthesearebanks,hedgefunds, or other financial services corporations. Even an advisor toDeutsche Bank, George Sugihara, admitted that ‘It’s disconcerting toseehowconnectedthingsreallyare.’26Theunprecedentedconcentrationof economicandmilitarypower is

notonlyanindicationoftheforcesthatwillseektodominateaclimate-changedworld,itisalsoanindicationofsystemicvulnerabilitiesinourglobalised world. Geographer Mazen Labban explains: ‘Thevulnerabilityofthenetworkderivesnotonlyfromitsvastness…ofthe(physical) concentration of the infrastructure, but also from itsconnectivity: disruption of supply in one placemight create shocks atthe regional, or even global scale.’27 On the flip side, though, thesevulnerabilities are also opening new spaces for social innovation andchallengestocorporatepower.

Adaptationandsecurityforwhom?

Thesecondpartofthisbookexaminesfourspecificfeaturesofthestate-corporateclimate-changeagendaastheyrelatetoadaptationtoclimatechange.Climateadaptationisunderstoodaseffortsmadetoreducethevulnerability of human, natural and social systems to the impacts ofclimatechange.Cities, institutions,governmentsclearlyneed to investin adaptation efforts to protect people from negative climate impacts.However, as environment and security scholar Geoff Dabelko andothershaveargued,bothmitigationandadaptationeffortshandledbadlyare likely to aggravate social unrest and conflict.28 While climaticevents may be the catalyst for future conflicts, ham-fisted eliteadaptationsarelikelytomakethemevenworse.AnEU-fundedstudyofconflicts in the Mediterranean, Sahel and Middle East showed, forexample,thattheprincipalcausesofconflictinthesecountrieswasnothydro-climatic conditions, but ratherdemocraticdeficits, distorted andunjust economic development and poor adaptation efforts to climatechangethatendupworseningthesituation.29Amilitarisedresponseis–as we have already seen all too clearly – only likely to make thissituationworse.Many people watched in horror as 58,000 troops were deployed to

NewOrleansinthewakeofHurricaneKatrina,togetherwithprivatisedsecurity forces such as the notorious Blackwater commandos. Whilemany civilians were rescued, others found themselves shot at andarrested.Sevenpolicewereeventually indictedforkilling twoAfricanAmericans and wounding four others. Many more killings by themilitary, security guards and vigilantes still await justice. RebeccaSolnit,whohasanalysedmanydisasters,includingNewOrleans,notesthat militarisation normally occurs because of what she calls ‘elitepanic’–thefearofsocialdisorderandfearofthepoor,minoritiesandimmigrants. This fear prompts police and military to prioritiseprotectingpropertyoverhumanlives.TheUSmilitarycontinuestosee

potentialdisorderwhereothersseeinjustice,suggestingNewOrleansisnot an unusual one-off case: a US Army Strategic Studies Institutereport in 2008 said that in thewake of civil unrest caused by climatechange,the‘DoDwouldbe,bynecessity,anessentialenablinghubforthecontinuityofpoliticalauthority inamulti-stateornationwidecivilconflictordisturbance.’30InChapter4,writerandjournalistNafeezAhmed(writingwithNick

Buxton and Ben Hayes) looks at how governments are preparing for‘natural’disasterswith‘civilcontingencies’and‘disasterpreparedness’.Across the world, states have added new statutes to their books thatprovideforthesuspensionofdemocraticinstitutionsandtherestrictionofcivillibertiesintimesofcrisis.Inmanycases,thislegislationbuildsupon and even extends powers previously adopted inwartime.At thesame time, the standard for invoking those powers has slipped fromstateofemergencytoanytimeof‘crisis’.Whileitisbothlegitimateanddesirable for governments to plan for the worst, it is clear that asignificant part of this planning is concerned with the ‘threat’ thatcitizens are seen to pose to governments. Ahmed shows how these‘emergency’ powers build upon the exceptional and now permanentmeasuresintroducedunderthe‘waronterror’.Inapost-Occupy,post-Arab Spring world, security agencies have become increasinglypreoccupied with managing and anticipating social unrest, whichinevitably rests on targeting ‘radical’ social activism.One example isthePentagonMinervainitiative,whichisfundingresearcherstodevelopadvanced data-mining tools that can automatically categorise activistgroups and rank them on a threat-scale and determine their allegedpropensity for violence or terrorism by automatically tracking andanalysing their social media posts. Within these models, the threatcomes not from climate change or the iniquities of the neoliberalsystem,butnowfromthosewhooppose it.There isofcoursenothingnewinstatescasting‘radicals’asathreat,butthethreatisnowgreenaswellasred.31Thesetendencieshaveputenvironmentalactivistsinparticularonthe

front line of state repression, as one of the online chapters thataccompany this book explores.32 GlobalWitness reports in 2014 and2015indicatedthat therehasbeenadramaticriseinkillingsofpeopleprotectingtheenvironmentanddefendinglandrights,ascompetitionfornatural resources intensifies.33 Around three-quarters of these deathstookplaceinCentralandSouthAmerica,oftenduringtherepressionofresistance to hydropower projects, mining, agribusiness and logging.Meanwhile in the US and UK, climate-change activists have beendefined along with terrorist suspects and armed militias as ‘domesticextremists’,or‘eco-terrorists’,withenormousresourcesnowdevotedtoidentifying,trackingandspyingonthem.Meanwhile, thosewho flee their countries due to climate disruption

confront even biggermilitary obstacles and dangers, asmany nationsfollowtheleadofEuropeandtheUSinbuildingever-strongerfencestokeeprefugeesatbay.JournalistToddMillercallstheborderlandsoftheUS ‘constitution-free zones’ and says the borderlands are providing auseful ‘on-the-ground laboratoryfor thedevelopmentofasurveillancestate … one of the police and the policed’.34 The disturbingmilitarisation of borders, using ever more dangerous technologies towardoffthoseforcedtomigratefromclimateinstability,isexploredbysecurityscholarSteveWright,bordersecurityexpertAprilHumbleandco-editorBenHayesinChapter5.Theyarguethatwhatisneededislessa new legal category of ‘environmental refugee’ than sustainedresistancetothe‘borderindustrialcomplex’.In Chapter 6, Kathy Jo Wetter and Sylvia Ribeiro of ETC group

examine the corporate and military interests that promote geo-engineering of the climate to reduce temperatures and prevent theirdamaging impacts. The fact that these proposals are gatheringmomentum is a reflection of both the support of Big Oil and theinfluenceof those inpowerwhobelieve thatbizarreexperimentswithsunshades in space is a more sensible course of action thanconfrontationofthefossil-fuelindustry.Wetter andRibeiro explain how geo-engineering advocates – or, as

theyprefertocallthem,‘geopirates’–arebackedintheUSandEuropeby some of the same conservative institutes and politicians that aresceptical about climate change. Perhaps that explains why geo-engineering’s impact is perversely the same or worse than climatechange,legitimisingfurtherhumanmeddlingwiththeclimate,creatingprofits for a small few and leaving those most affected out of thediscussions.Despite its dangers, geo-engineering is gaining evermoretraction and government support. The Central Intelligence Agencyfunded a 21-month $630,000 scientific study in 2013 to analyse theprospectsforandpotentialimpactsofgeo-engineering.35The final chapter in this part of the book, by Dutch peace activist

MarkAkkerman, looksat someof thebroader responsesof theglobalmilitary-industrialcomplextoclimatechange.Inthewakeof9/11,whatismoreaccuratelydescribedasthemilitary-securityindustrialcomplexhasbecomeextraordinarilypowerful.In2013,globalmilitaryspendingreached about $1.7 trillion dollars, 130 times that of plannedhumanitarianspendinganddwarfinganyinvestmentinclimatechange.US military spending is roughly equal to the next nine top globalspenderscombined,withevermorecorporationsseekingtograbasliceof the pie.36 A Washington Post investigation in 2010 revealed theexistence of 1,931 private companies benefiting from a $75 milliongovernment intelligence budget that had more than doubled since9/11.37 Corporations reaping handsome rewards from this burgeoningfear-basedindustryclearlyhaveavestedinterestinfuellingamediaandpolitical debate that forecast an insecure dangerous future in order topromotetheir‘security’solutions.Europe is involved in a similar security-industrial arms race. TNI’s

reportNeoconopticon revealed, for example, that arms manufacturersarebenefitingfrom€1.4billionofEUlargessetodevelopresearchintohow to integrate land, air, maritime, space and cyber-surveillancesystems.As the report noted,we are not just ‘sleepwalking into… asurveillancesociety’,butalso‘turningablindeyetothestartofanewkindofarmsrace,oneinwhichalltheweaponsarepointinginwards’.38

Despitetheinterestsatstake,themilitaryembraceofclimatechangeas a new raison d’être has been warmly welcomed by some in theenvironmentalistcommunity.ClimatescientistJohnSchellnhuber,39forexample, expresses his relief that ‘the military do not deal withideology.They cannot afford to:They are responsible for the lives ofpeopleandbillionsofpoundsofinvestmentinequipment.’CertainlyintheUS,themilitaryisseenasoneofthefewpossiblevoicesthatcouldgetahearingbyRepublicanclimatesceptics.NickMabey,formerlyofWorld Wildlife Fund, has urged military officials to become louder‘communicatingthesecurityimplicationsandcostsofuncontrolledandextreme climate change to political leaders and the public’, saying itwould protect their interests, open up new markets, and drivetechnological innovation.40 Others point to the potential role for themilitary in dealing with climate disasters, with the US OperationDamayanintheaftermathoftheTyphoonHaiyaninthePhilippinesin2012,asonerecentexample.Weseetheunfoldingloveaffairbetweensomeenvironmentalistsand

the military as deeply problematic. Akkerman’s closer look at themilitary’s ‘green pivot’ shows that it ismainly driven by energy, notenvironmental concerns – and the need to identify a new ‘threat’ thatwill fillarmycoffers incase the threatof terrorismnolongersuffices.The military have also welcomed new allies from the environmentalmovement and efforts to paint themselves ‘green’, as it helps detractattention from thedeeplyunpopularwars inAfghanistanand Iraqandthemuch less publicised, but constant, public opposition to their vastglobalinfrastructureofmilitarybases.

Acquisitionthroughdispossession

Thethirdpartofthebookcastsacriticaleyeonthenewstate-corporatediscoursesonfood,waterandenergysecurity.ThecommonthemeisaMalthusianvisionofscarcitythatpredictsshortagesinthefuturedueto

population growth combined with climate constraints. The dominantproposed solution to these ‘InSecurities’ is always the same: expandproduction, encourage more private investment and participation anduse new technologies to overcome obstacles. Issues of distribution,injusticeandenvironmentalexploitationorthevaluesofself-relianceorlocal control, where considered at all, are dismissed as unfeasible orirrelevant.Yet the scarcity most describe is not an absolute scarcity – there

continues to be enough food and water for everyone – but is mainlycreatedbyhow these resources are shared. Inourglobal food system,30–50percentoffoodproducedgloballyiswasted;moreoverwhileanestimated1billionpeopletodaysufferfromhunger,500millionpeopleinboththeGlobalNorthandSouthareobese.Despitethischronicmal-distributionofresources,thebulkofresearchandinvestmentcontinuestogointoproductionandtechnologicaldevelopment.Theresultisthatreal-lifeexperiencesofpresentinjusticesinourenergy,foodandwatersystems are ignored, not learnt from. As research group Cornerhousepoint out, this also means we are doomed to repeat and deepen theproblemswithourcurrentsystemsoffood,waterandenergy:

Asthefuturewillgrowoutofthepresent,abetterwayofdealingwith‘future [resource] crisis’ is not imagining a futureMalthusianworldthatbearsnorelationshiptowhatexistsnoworeverhasexisted,andthenimagininghowtostaveoffthathypotheticalMalthusiandestiny,but rather dealing with current scarcities now on the realisticassumptionthatwhatcausesscarcitytodayisgoingtogooncausingscarcityinthefuture.41

The advocacy and implementation of plans for food security, watersecurityandenergysecurity in thenameofclimatechangehasalsoinmany cases perversely accelerated climate change. In Chapter 8, ZoeBrentandAnnieShattuckofthethinktankFoodFirst,togetherwithco-editor Nick Buxton, note that theWorld Bank’s and others’ calls for‘sustainable intensification’ of agriculture in future decades will

consolidate an industrial agricultural model that is decidedlyunsustainable in its dependence on cheap fossil fuels and globaltransportation.Moreover,peasantsarehavingtheirlandgrabbedinthenameof‘foodsecurity’atanunprecedentedrate.InChapter9,researcherandactivistMaryAnnManahanofFocuson

theGlobalSouthrevealshowwaterscarcityhasbecomeamajordriverin corporations and banks securing water rights in order to lock-inguaranteedprofitsas theprecious resourcebecomesscarce.This leadsto situationswhere companies like Pepsi have glossy brochures aboutreducingtheirwaterfootprint,yethavequietlysecuredrightstowaterinwater-stressed regions of India. ‘Water security’ is also invoked inCalifornia to back ‘climate-friendly’ water infrastructure that willmainlybenefitagribusinessandfrackingfirms.Meanwhileintheworldofenergy,dwindlingresourceshavefuelleda

calamitous‘raceforwhat’s left’,42ascompaniesenter regions like theArctic, Amazonian rainforests, protected national parks and oftenindigenous territories to extract the very last drop of oil and gas. InChapter 10, UK oil campaigner Emma Hughes and the Platformresearch collective show how, despite the obvious role our energysystem has played in causing climate change, most government andcorporateenergyplannershaveusedenergysecuritytojustifyongoingfossil-fuelexploitation,tolegitimisemilitaryinterventionindefenceofsupply, to repress environmental activists and to prioritise energy forcorporationsratherthanpeople.

Fromsecuritytojustice

Thefinalchapterinthebookaskswhatourresponsetoclimate-changeimpactsshouldbeoncewerejectthenotionofsecurity.Aftercriticallyexaminingtwopopularconceptsof‘adaptation’and‘resilience’,thelastchapteroutlinessomeofthedrivingprinciplesandpracticesthatcouldembody a people’s just response to climate change. Many of the

alternatives are described in each of the preceding chapters and havearisenoutofresistancetocorporateandsecurity-ledstrategiesaswellasthroughattemptsbycommunitiestotakebackcontrolofkeyresourcesin a way that embodies principles of justice, democracy andsustainability.Twoaccompanyingonlinechaptersexplorethesethemesfurther–oneby labour scholarsHilaryWainwright and JacklynCockpointstotheimportanceandpotentialoftradeunionstoaddressclimatechangeand its impacts, theotherby JustinKenrickandTomHenfreywho have been deeply involved in the Transition Town movementdrawsoutthelessonsforcommons-basedmovementsworldwide.43Thebookendsonanoteofhope,drawingontheinspirationfromthewaypeople throughout history in times of disaster have more oftenrespondedwithcreativityandindefenceofjusticethanwithrepressionandviolence.For a long time, environmental advocates have ducked the issue of

howweshouldrespondtotheimpactofclimatechangebecauseitwasseenasatacitadmissionofdefeat,anadmissionthatwehadfailed.Butas climate impacts become increasingly obvious, that is ever more aself-defeating strategy.When it becomes clear that this void has beenfilled mainly by the military and corporations seeking to cash in oncatastrophe,itisevenmoreshort-sighted.We hope this book, which analyses those forces, and points to the

dangers of viewing all our basic necessities such as food and waterthrough the lens of ‘security’ will build support for alternativeapproaches. These alternatives already exist as many of this book’sauthorsmakes clear. Indeed, climate disruptionmaywell provide theopportunitiestoputthemonthetableasneverbefore.Thekeywillbeto connect them from the bottom up and build the inclusive local,regional and globalmovements that can tackle systemic injustice.Weneedtoensurethatasdifficulttimesemerge,oursocietiesrespondwithjusticeandcompassion,ratherthanfearandrepression.

Notes

1. ShellEnergyScenariosto2050.(2008).TheHague,Netherlands:ShellInternationalBV.

2.

In2013,Shellprovidedtwomorescenarios,thistimedividedinto‘Mountains’and‘Oceans’.WhileScrambleandBlueprinthadfocusedoninter-staterivalriesandenergysources,MountainsandOceanshonedinonpowerdynamicsandclasstensionswithinstatesandtheinterconnectionofwaterwithenergyandfood.Likeitspredecessor,thescenarioassumesanongoing‘raceforwhat’sleft’,butinterestinglyperceivesthemainfault-linestobealong‘class’orsocial-stratalines.Mountainsimaginesaworldwhere‘statusquopowerislockedinandheldtightlybythecurrentlyinfluential’,leadingtomorestabilitybutalsoinequalityandsocialunrest.Oceans,ontheotherhand,iswhere‘powerisdevolved,competinginterestsareaccommodatedandcompromiseisking’;itpaintsamoremessyworldwithastrangemixoframpantmarketforces,revitalisedcivilsocietyandinactiononclimatechange.Again,neitherscenariocanimagineaworldwherecorporatepowerisconstrainedandfossil-fueluseradicallyreduced.

3.

Campbell,K.M.,ed.(2009).ClimateCataclysm:Theforeignpolicyandnationalsecurityimplicationsofclimatechange.Washington,DC:BrookingInstitutePress;Campbell,K.M.,Gulledge,J.,McNeil,J.,Podesta,J.,Ogden,P.,Fuerth,L.,Mix,D.(n.d.).TheAgeofConsequences:Theforeignpolicyandnationalsecurityimplicationsofglobalclimatechange,pp.1–124.Retrievedfromhttp://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf.

4.

DepartmentofDefense.(2008).2008ArmyModernizationStrategy.Retrievedfromhttp://downloads.army.mil/docs/08modplan/Army_Mod_Strat_2008.pdf.

5.Thecrowdfundingappealcanbeseenhere:https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/cashing-in-on-catastrophe.

IPCC.(2014).Climatechange2014:Mitigationofclimatechange.SummaryforPolicymakers,p.6.Retrievedfromhttp://ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/

6.ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers.pdf;WorldMeteorologicalOrganization.(9September2014).RecordGreenhouseGasLevelsImpactAtmosphereandOceans.Retrievedfromhttps://www.wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/press_releases/pr_1002_en.html.

7.

Anderson,K.(2012).RealClothesfortheEmperor:Facingthechallengesofclimatechange,pp.1–86.Retrievedfromhttp://kevinanderson.info/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Cabot-Seminar-anderson-ppt.pdf.

8.

FordescriptionsofthePlanetaryBoundariesProject,includingtheirlatestreportreleasedin2015,visithttp://www.stockholmresilience.org/21/research/research-programmes/planetary-boundaries.html.

9.

Moore,J.W.(2010).Ecology,capital,andthenatureofourtimes:Accumulationandcrisisinthecapitalistworld-ecology.UmeåUniversity,108–47.Retrievedfromhttp://www.jasonwmoore.com/uploads/Moore__Ecology_Capital_and_the_Origins_of_Our_Times__JWSR__2011_.pdf.

10.

IPCC.(2014).Summaryforpolicymakers.ClimateChange2014:Impacts,Adaptation,andVulnerability,9(1),1–34.Retrievedfromhttp://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf.

11.

Vidal,J.(13April2013).Millionsfacestarvationasworldwarms,sayscientists.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/apr/13/climate-change-millions-starvation-scientists.

12.

USDepartmentofCommerce.(2013).Serviceassessment:Hurricane/post-tropicalcycloneSandy,October22–29,2012,pp.1–66.Retrievedfromhttp://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/Sandy13.pdf;WorldResourcesInstitute.(December2013).

Adaptationfinancetracking.Retrievedfromhttp://www.wri.org/resources/presentations/adaptation-finance-tracking.

13.

Vidal,J.(1April2014).YebSano:Unlikelyclimatejusticestar.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/01/yeb-sano-typhoon-haiyan-un-climate-talks.

14. DiMento,J.F.(2014).ClimateChange:Whatitmeansforus,ourchildren,andourgrandchildren.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.

15.

WorldBank.(2014).TurnDowntheHeat:Confrontingthenewclimatenormal,pp.1–320.Retrievedfromhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/11/20/000406484_20141120090713/Rendered/PDF/927040v20WP00O0ull0Report000English.pdf.

16. Hamilton,C.(2010).RequiemforaSpecies:Whyweresistthetruthaboutclimatechange.London:Earthscan.

17. Seewww.climatesecurityagenda.com.

18. Parenti,C.(2012).TropicofChaos:Climatechangeandthenewgeographyofviolence.NewYork:NationBooks.

19. Seewww.climatesecurityagenda.org.

20. Welzer,H.,andCamiller,P.(2012).ClimateWars:Whypeoplewillbekilledinthetwenty-firstcentury.Cambridge:PolityPress.

21.Rogers,P.(2009).ClimateChangeandSecurity.TheHague:AdvisoryCouncilonInternationalAffair.Retrievedfromhttp://rcpjournal.org/content/9/2/108.full.pdf.

22.Eckersley,R.(2009)Environmentalsecurity,climatechange,andglobalizingterrorism,inD.GreenfelandP.James,eds.RethinkingInsecurity,WarandViolence:Beyondsavageglobalization?London:Routledge,p.87.

23.Hildyard,N.,Lohmann,L.,Sexton,S.,andTheCornerHouse.(2012).Energysecurityforwhat?Forwhom?Retrievedfromdoi:10.1080/19934270.2012.675191.

24.

Theterm‘resilience’hasbeenuncriticallyembracedbymanycivil-societyorganisations,butasJeremyWalkerandMelissaCooperwarn,ithasstrongneoliberalandDarwinianrootsand‘risksbecomingthemeasureofone’sfitnesstosurviveintheturbulentorderofthings’.Itcertainlytellsusnothingabouttheexerciseofpowerandtheneedfortransformation.SeeWalker,J.andCooper,M.(2011).Genealogiesofresiliencefromsystemsecologytothepoliticaleconomyofcrisisadaptation.SecurityDialogue,42(2),143–60.

25.

Mitchell,S.(18November2011).ThinkWalmartuses100%cleanenergy?Try2%.Retrievedfromhttp://grist.org/business-technology/2011-11-17-walmarts-progress-on-renewables-has-been-very-slow/.

26.

Coghlan,A.andMacKenzie,D.(24October2011).Revealed–thecapitalistnetworkthatrunstheworld.Retrievedfromhttp://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21228354.500-revealed--the-capitalist-network-that-runs-the-world.html#.VUNCf_DE-Dk.

27. Labban,M.(2009).Thestrugglefortheheartland:HybridgeopoliticsintheTranscaspian.Geopolitics,14(1),1–25.doi:10.1080/14650040802578641.

28.Dabelko,G.D.,Herzer,L.,Null,S.andSticklor,R.,eds.(2013).Backdraft:Conflictpotentialofclimatechangeadaptationandmitigation(2ndedn,Vol.14).Washington,DC:WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars.

29.

Zographos,C.,Goulden,M.C.andKallis,G.(November2014).Sourcesofhumaninsecurityinthefaceofhydro-climaticchange.Retrievedfromhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378013001933.

30.

Freier,N.(2008).Knownunknowns:Unconventional‘strategicshocks’indefensestrategydevelopment[Abstract].StrategicStudiesInstitute,pp.1–52.Retrievedfromhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB890.pdf.

31. Potter,W.(2011).GreenistheNewRed:Aninsider’saccountofasocialmovementundersiege.SanFrancisco,CA:CityLightsBooks.

32. Seewww.climatesecurityagenda.org.

33.

GlobalWitness.(2015).Howmanymore?2014’sdeadlyenvironment:Thekillingandintimidationofenvironmentalandlandactivists,withaspotlightonHonduras.GlobalWitnessLimited.Retrievedfromhttps://www.globalwitness.org/documents/17882/how_many_more_pages.pdf.

34.

Miller,T.(17August2013).Warontheborder.NewYorkTimes.Retrievedfromhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/opinion/sunday/war-on-the-border.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1.

35.Dunlea,E.(n.d.).Geoengineeringclimate:Technicalevaluationanddiscussionofimpacts.Retrievedfromhttp://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49540.

36.

Kutsch,T.(13April2014).Globalmilitaryspendingfallsoverall,butrisesoutsidetheWest.Retrievedfromhttp://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/4/13/global-military-spending.html.

37.

Priest,D.andArkin,W.M.(19July2012).Ahiddenworld,growingbeyondcontrol.Retrievedfromhttp://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/.

38.

Hayes,B.(2009).NeoConOpticon:TheEUsecurity-industrialcomplex,p.5.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/neoconopticon_0.pdf.

39.

Carrington,D.(30June2013).Climatechangeposesgravethreattosecurity,saysUSenvoy.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jun/30/climate-change-security-threat-envoy.

Mabeyalsosuggestedthatmilitaryactiononclimatechangecouldhelpthwartmoreradicalgroupsandtheirpotentialgrowing‘resentmentagainstthecurr

40. entinternationalorder’.Mabey,N.(23April2008).Deliveringclimatesecurity:Internationalsecurityresponsestoaclimatechangedworld.Retrievedfromhttps://www.rusi.org/publications/whitehall/ref:I480E2C638B3BC/#.VUPDRfDE-Dk.

41.

TheCornerHouse.(2006).Colonizingthefuture:‘Scarcity’aspoliticalstrategy.DifferentTakes,43,1–4.Retrievedfromhttp://popdev.hampshire.edu/sites/default/files/uploads/u4763/DT%2043%20-%20Corner%20House.pdf.

42. Klare,M.T.(2012).TheRaceforWhat’sLeft:Theglobalscramblefortheworld’slastresources.NewYork:MetropolitanBooks.

43. Seewww.climatesecurityagenda.org.

PARTI

THESECURITYAGENDA

1

THECATASTROPHICCONVERGENCE:

MILITARISM,NEOLIBERALISMANDCLIMATE

CHANGE

ChristianParenti

Waterflowsorblood.

SloganofthebannedPakistanipoliticalpartyJamaat-u-Dawa

Introduction

Climatechangearrives inaworldprimedforcrisis.1And thepoliticalresponses to climate change increasingly take the form of ethnic,religious, or classviolence in the formofbanditry, rebellion,warfare,state repression and generalmilitarisation. This is because the currentandimpendingdislocationsofclimatechangeintersectwiththealreadyexisting crises of poverty and inequality left by thirty years ofneoliberalism, and the violence and tattered social fabric left byColdWar-eramilitaryconflicts.Icallthiscollisionofpolitical,economicandenvironmentaldisastersthe‘catastrophicconvergence’.Bycatastrophicconvergence, I do not merely mean that several disasters happen

simultaneously, one problem atop another. Rather, I am arguing thatproblems compound and amplify each other, one expressing itselfthroughanother.Societies, like people, deal with new challenges in ways that are

conditionedby the traumasof theirpast.Thusdamaged societies, likedamagedpeople,oftenrespondtonewcrisesinwaysthatareirrational,short-sightedandself-destructive.Inthecaseofclimatechange,thepasttraumas that set the stage for bad adaptation – a destructive socialresponse–areColdWar-eramilitarismandtheeconomicpathologiesofneoliberal capitalism.Over the last fortyyears,both these forceshavedistortedthestate’srelationshiptosociety–removingandunderminingthe state’s collectivist, regulatory and redistributive functions – whileoverdeveloping its repressive and military capacities. And this, Icontend, seriously challenges society’s ability to avoid violentdislocationsasclimatechangekicksin.

Climatecrisis

The scientific consensus about climate takes institutional form in theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC).TheIPCCdoesnotconduct independent research but is instead a government- and UN-supported international clearinghouse. It collects and summarises allpublished scientific literature on climatology and related issues inbiology, hydrology and glaciology to facilitate governments’ responsetoclimateissuesbasedonfullyvettedresearch.The IPCC has been attacked by climate denialists as alarmist and

wrong, due to several minor errors in its 2007 Fourth AssessmentReport. But correcting theseminor errors did not change the report’soverallconclusions.Infact,becausetheIPCCoperatesonthebasisofconsensus, its conclusions are quite conservative and its reports lagyearsbehindthelatestscientificdevelopments.TheIPCCrepresentsthelowest-common-denominator, fully accepted conclusions of the

scientificmainstream.TheIPCChasconcludedthatourcivilisation’sdependenceonburning

fossil fuels has boosted atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxidefrom around 280 parts per million (ppm) before the IndustrialRevolution to400ppmtoday.Analysesofancient icecoresshow400ppmtobethehighestthatatmosphericCO2hasbeenfor10,000years.AtmosphericCO2 functions like the glass in a greenhouse, allowing

the sun’sheat inbutpreventingmuchof it fromradiatingbackout tospace.We need atmosphericCO2 –without it, the earthwould be anice-cold lifeless rock.However,over the last150years,wehavebeenloadingtheskywithfartoomuchCO2,andtheplanetisheatingup.AstheCenterforClimateandEnergySolutionsexplains,‘TheEarth’s

average surface temperature has increased by 1.4°F (0.8°C) since theearlyyearsofthe20thcentury.The10warmestyearsonrecord(since1850)havealloccurredsince1998,andallbutonehavehappenedsince2000.’2Less than1degreeCelsiuswarmeroverahundredyears?Thatmay

not sound like much, but scientists believe it is enough to begindisrupting the climate system’s equilibrium. The negative feedbackloopsthatkeeptheearth’sclimatestableareincreasinglygivingwaytodestabilising positive feedback loops, in which departures from thenormbuildonthemselvesinsteadofdiminishingovertime.Asaresult,climate change is happening faster than initially predicted and itsimpacts are already upon us in the form of more extreme weatherevents, desertification, ocean acidification, melting glaciers andincrementally rising sea levels. The scientists who construct thecomputermodels that analyse climate data agree that even ifwe stopdumpinggreenhousegasesintotheatmosphere,CO2levelsarealreadyso high that we are locked into a significant increase in globaltemperatures.Disruptiveclimatechangeisacertaintyevenifwemaketheeconomicshiftawayfromfossilfuels.Incipient climate change is already starting to express itself in the

realmofpolitics.Extremeweathereventsandoff-kilterweatherpatternsarecausingmorehumanitariancrises.TheUNestimatesthat70percentofhumanitariandisasters areclimate related,up from50percent twodecades ago. Already climate change adversely affects 300 millionpeople ayear, killing300,000of them.By2030– as floods, drought,forestfiresandnewdiseasesgrowworse–asmanyas500,000peopleayearcouldbekilledbyclimatechange,andtheeconomiccostofthesedisruptionscouldreach$600billionannually.3This dangerous mix of extreme weather and water scarcity could

inflame and escalate already existing social conflicts. ColumbiaUniversity Earth Institute’s Center for International Earth ScienceInformation Network (CIESIN) and the International Crisis Groupcombineddatabasesoncivilwarsandwateravailability,andfoundthat‘When rainfall is significantly below normal, the risk of a low-levelconflict escalating to a full-scale civil war approximately doubles thefollowing year.’4 The project cites the example of Nepal, where theMaoist insurgency was most severe after droughts and almostnonexistent in areas thathadnormal rainfall. In somecases,when therainswerelateorlight,orcameallatonce,oratthewrongtime,‘semi-retired’armedgroupsoftenre-emergedtostartfightingagain.BetweentheTropicofCapricornandtheTropicofCancerlieswhatI

havecalledthe‘TropicofChaos’,abeltofeconomicallyandpoliticallybatteredpost-colonialstatesgirdingtheplanet’sequatorial latitudes.Inthisbandaroundthetropics,climatechangeisbeginningtohithardest.The societies in this belt are heavily dependent on agriculture andfishing,thusveryvulnerabletoshiftsinweatherpatterns.Accordingtoa Swedish government study, ‘There are 46 countries – home to 2.7billionpeople–inwhichtheeffectsofclimatechangeinteractingwitheconomic,socialandpoliticalproblemswillcreateahighriskofviolentconflict.’5 Their list covers that same terrain. These latitudes are nowbeingmostaffectedbytheonsetofanthropocentricclimatechange.Inmybook,TropicofChaos,Idescribednumerousconflictsthatare

beingexacerbatedbyclimatechange,beginningwith theescalationof

violenceamongEastAfricanpastoralists,mostspecificallytheTurkana.Moving farther eastward, Afghanistan is facing the worst droughtconditions in a hundred years. On to India, where amap of Naxaliteguerrilla activity correlates almost perfectly with the most drought-affected districts. More recently, other climate conflicts have becomewellknown:Syria’scivilwarin2011,forexample,wasprecipitatedinpartbyahorrificdroughtfrom2006to2009.Risingsealevelsprovideanothermajorchallengeforourcapacityto

adapt.In2007,theIPCCprojectedsealevelscouldrisebyanaverageof7–23 inches this century. These numbers were soon amended andscientists nowbelieve that sea levels could rise by an average of fivefeetoverthenextninetyyears.Suchsea-levelriseswillleadtomassivedislocations.One2014studyfromColumbia’sCIESINprojectsthat700million‘climaterefugees’willbeonthemoveby2050,althoughmostof thesewill not cross borders andwillmovewithin their country ofbirth(seeChapter5).6Perhaps the modern era’s first ‘climate refugees’ were the 500,000

BangladeshislefthomelesswhenhalfofBholaIslandfloodedin2005.InBangladesh,22millionpeoplecouldbeforcedfromtheirhomesby2050becauseofclimatechange.Indiaisalreadybuildingamilitarisedborder fence along its 2,500-mile frontier with Bangladesh.7 And thestudentactivistsof India’sHinduRightarepushingvigorously for themassdeportationof(Muslim)Bangladeshiimmigrants.Meanwhile, 22Pacific islandnations, home to7millionpeople, are

planning for relocation as rising seas threaten them with nationalannihilation. What will happen when China’s cities begin to flood?When the eastern seaboard of theUS starts to flood, howwill peopleandinstitutionsrespond?

MilitarylegacyoftheColdWar

ThevulnerabilityoftheGlobalSouthtoclimatechangecannotbefully

understoodwithoutnotingthatthisregionwasalsothefrontlineoftheColdWar’shotproxybattlesand the laboratoryforneoliberal,violenteconomicrestructuring.Themainpre-existingcrisisofthecatastrophicconvergenceisthelegacyofColdWarmilitarism.IntheGlobalSouth,the Cold War was hot. Revolution and counter-insurgency were itsmethods.Conventionalwarfareinwhichthemilitaryandinfrastructuresare targeted is, despite all its horrors, often associatedwith increasedsocialsolidarity,aswitnessedinBritainduringtheSecondWorldWar,where Nazi bombardment was met with evacuation, rationing,conscription and an unprecedented levelling of class differences.Asymmetrical socio-military conflicts, such as thosewaged across theGlobalSouthattheheightoftheColdWarwerequitedifferent,erodinganddestroyingthesocialfabric.Forthemostpart,therebellionintheGlobalSouthwasahome-grown

affair,andthereactionfromtheUSwas–intheeyesofUSplanners–defensive. As a doctrine, counterinsurgency is the theory of internalwarfare; it is the strategy of suppressing rebellions and revolution.Counter-insurgencymimicsrevolution:Itsobjectisciviliansocietyasawhole,andthesocialfabricofeverydaylife.Whereastraditionalaerialbombing(whichisnotoriouslyineffective)targetsbridges,factoriesandcommand centres, counter-insurgency targets –pace Foucault – the‘capillary’ levelofsocial relations. It rupturesand tears (but rarelyre-makes) the intimate social relations among people, the ability tocooperate,thelivedtextureofsolidarity–inotherwords,thebondsthataresociety’ssinews.Conventional warfare seeks to control territory and destroy the

opposingmilitary,butcounter-insurgencyseekstocontrolsociety.Inaninsurgency, the military force – the state or the occupying power –already has (at least nominal) control of the battle space, but it lackscontrol of the population. Guerrillas, irregular forces, even smallunpopular terrorist groups all rely on the populace, or parts of it, forrecruits, food, shelter, medical care, intelligence and, if nothing else,simple cover. Mao Zedong summed it up: ‘The guerrilla must move

amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.’ Thus, the counter-insurgent’staskistoisolateanddestroytheguerrillasbygainingcontrolof the population through violence as well as psychological andideological control. Society is the target, and as such, society isdamaged.Irregular,proxyconflicts–insurgencyandcounter-insurgencyinthe

Third World – defined the American and Soviet methods during theColdWar.Thosemethodsprimedmanyareasof theworldforseriousinstability.TheUNdocumentedaround150armedconflictsintheThirdWorldbetween1945and1990.Inthese‘smallwars’,20millionpeopledied, 60 million were injured, and 15 million were deracinated asrefugeesby1991.DerekSummerfield,apsychiatristandacademicwhospecialises in the mental-health effects of modern war, described thesituationasfollows:

Fivepercent of all casualties in theFirstWorldWarwere civilians;thefigurefortheSecondWorldWarwas50percent,andthatfortheVietnamWarwasover80percent.Incurrentarmedconflictsover90percentofallcasualtiesarecivilians,usuallyfrompoorruralfamilies.This is the result of deliberate and systematic violence deployed toterrorizewholepopulations…Population,notterritory,isthetarget,andthroughterrortheaimistopenetrateintohomes,families,andtheentire fabric of grassroots social relations, producing demoralizationandparalysis.To thisend terror is sownnot just randomly,butalsothroughtargetedassaultsonhealthworkers,teachersandco-operativeleaders, thosewhoseworksymbolizessharedvaluesandaspirations.Torture, mutilation, and summary execution in front of familymembershavebecomeroutine.8

Nowhere saw amore devastating counter insurgency thanGuatemala.Beginning in 1981, the military government of General Rios Montcombinedagenocidalscorched-earthcampaignagainstcivilianswithaclassic‘secureandhold’developmentstrategy.Thestrategywascalled‘frijoles y fusiles’ (kidney beans and guns). After destroying Indian

villages andmassacringmany of their inhabitants, themilitarywouldgatherthesurvivingciviliansandconcentratethemin‘modelvillages’.Malesurvivorswereforcedtoparticipateincivilpatrols,lightlyarmedvigilanteforces thatweretheeyesandearsof themilitary–andoftentheir human shield. An estimated 100,000 civilians were murderedduring the Guatemalan civil war, the vast majority of them bygovernmentforces.Ihadanopportunitytoseethiswarfirst-hand,in1988,whenIhiked

across the Ixill Triangle in the highlands war zone. The trails werelittered with government and guerrilla propaganda – small handbillsexhortingthepeopletojoinonesideortheother.Theareawasstillatwarbuttheguerrillaswereinretreat.Everywherewesawthemethodsof counterinsurgency: trails cleared of trees on all sides, air patrols,civilianmilitiacheckpoints,burntvillages,andnewlyconstructedonesunder strict government control. Later, in 1991, I travelled with andreportedontheResistenciaNacional,partoftheFMLN,inthehillsofCabañas,ElSalvador;similarphysicalandsocialscarswereevident.Today,theGuatemalanhighlandsandthesmalltownsofElSalvador

are still violent, but instead of guerrilla operations and counter-insurgency,crimeistheplague.Theglobalaveragehomiciderateislessthan eight per 100,000.But the 2012UNOffice onDrugs andCrimereportonCentralAmericacitestheratesthatmurderincreasedbetween2000and2011:from51to92per100,000inHonduras;from60to69per 100,000 in El Salvador; and from 26 to 39 per 100,000 inGuatemala,withaspiketo46per100,000in2008and2009.9All threeof thosecountrieswere sitesof intensecounter-insurgency

from the late1970s toearly1990s, and the legacyof that is a societyweakened, social fabric frayed: gun culture; large populations ofunemployedmentrainedandhabituatedtoviolence,discipline,secrecy,packloyalty,brutality,andtheartsofsmuggling,extortion,robberyandassassination.Thepoliticalclass isalsosteeped inviolence,andmuchof it sees society as warfare: enemies must be destroyed, socialproblems eliminated by force. Walls and armed guards define the

landscape.Thepolicearesteepedintraditionsoftorture,disappearanceanddrugrunning.10Relativedeprivationdefinesthepsychologicalterrain:thesesocieties

are more unequal than ever, but the revolutionaries and progressivesocialmovements,inraisingclass-consciousness,havemadethemassesaware of the inherent unfairness of the situation.11 The spectacle ofmodern media, in advertising riches and fame, make them aware ofwhat they lack – all of which now feed criminogenic relativedepravation.

Post-ColdWar

Famously,theUSdefeatinVietnamturnedtheUSmilitaryawayfromthe study of counter-insurgency, though the methods of irregularwarfare were still part of the instruction for US proxy forces in ElSalvador,thePhilippines,Colombiaandelsewhere.Counter-insurgencydoctrinebegantomakeareturnafterUSArmyRangersgotintotroubleinMogadishu,Somalia,in1993,duringabotchedraidonthecompoundof Somali warlordMohamed Farrah Aidid. A BlackHawk helicopterwas shot down in the city and a seat-of-the pants rescue missioneventuallyshotitswayinandthenbackoutofthecity,butnotwithoutconsiderablelossof life–particularlyfor theSomalimilitiamen,800–1,300ofwhomwerekilled–andaspectacularhumiliationfor theUSArmy.12After that, thePentagonbegan to thinkmoreseriouslyabouthowto

fight irregulars incitiesand failedstates.Soon theRANDcorporationputoutastudycalledTheUrbanizationofInsurgency,andaDecember1997,NationalDefensePanelreview

… castigated the Army as unprepared for protracted combat in thenearimpassable,maze-likestreetsofthepoverty-strickencitiesoftheThirdWorld.Asaresult,thefourarmedservices,coordinatedbythe

JointStaffUrbanWorkingGroup,launchedcrashprogramstomasterstreet-fightingunderrealisticthird-worldconditions.13

GregGrandin’sEmpire’sWorkshop:LatinAmerica, theUnitedStates,and the rise of the new imperialism made clear the links betweencounter-insurgency in Iraq and its antecedents in Central America.GrandinquotesanAmericancounter-insurgencyexpert,whodescribedthe ferocity of US-funded and trained forces in Central America as‘goingprimitive’.AsGrandinexplains:

WiththeUnitedStatesfailingtodefeattherebels[inIraq]onitsown,thePentagoncametodebatethe‘Salvadorianoption’,thatistheuseof local paramilitary forces otherwise known as death squads, to dothekindofdirtyworkthatitwaseitherunwillingorunabletodo.Itturned to men like James Steele, who in the 1980s led the SpecialForcesmission inElSalvador andworkedwithOliverNorth to runweaponsandsuppliestotheNicaraguanContras….14

The Shiite death squads of Iraq’sMaliki governmentwere the result.Theywere also a disturbing harbinger of aworldwracked by climateinsecurity,aswewillexplorelater.In themeantime, letusnowturn to theothergreatcrisis: the riseof

neoliberalism.

Thepoliticaleconomyofneoliberalism

From the 1930s until the 1980s, many developing economies in theGlobal South followed a model of state-directed import-substitutionindustrialisation,orISI.Thisformofcapitalistdevelopmentinvolvedanuneasy compact between business and labour, brokered by aninterventioniststate.TheriseofCommunismintheUSSR,thespreadofradical left movements, and the collapse of markets for traditional

exportsduringtheGreatDepression,allencouragedanembraceofthemodel. In exchange for discipline on the shop floor, the state createdsocialsecurityprogrammesandallowedrisingwagesforthearistocracyoflabour.Investmentandfinancewereregulated,andbankswereoftenstateowned.ExamplesofthismixarefoundfromBraziltoMexicotoMorocco to South Africa to India. Overall – and contrary to theassertionsof today’seconomicorthodoxy– labourproductivity, livingstandardsandtheeconomyasawholeincreasedunderISI.15Bythemid-1960s,however,signsoftroubleemerged.Therestartedto

be toomuchstuff andnot enoughdemand.16By1970, 99per cent ofAmericanhomeshadrefrigerators,electricironsandradios.Morethan90 per cent hadwashingmachines, vacuum cleaners and toasters. Asoneeconomistputit:

Saturation in one market led to saturation in others as producerslooked abroad when the possibilities for domestic expansion wereexhausted.Theresultsweresimultaneousexportdrivesbycompaniesin all advanced countries,with similar, technologically sophisticatedproducts going into one another’smarkets… Increasing exports…fromdevelopingcountriessuchasTaiwan,Korea,MexicoandBrazilfurther increased the congestion of mass markets in the advancedeconomies.17

By the early 1970s, capitalism was suffocating from industrialsuccess.18 In 1973, the other shoe dropped: Arab defeat in the YomKippurWar led toanoilboycottbymanykeyexporters.Thepriceofoil quadrupled in less than a year.That hit countries likeBrazil hard.Thoughitisnowamajoroilproducer,itwasthenimporting80percentofitspetroleum.Beforepricescouldsubside,theShahofIranfelltoarevolution and there was a second oil shock in 1979. Prices nearlydoubledagain.Thesepetrodollarsfloodedtheworldfinancialmarketsandwerelent

outtoanyonewhowouldborrowatverylow,butvariableinterestrates.

InLatinAmerica,thistranslatedintomountingdebt.Overcapacityandacollapse in therateof returnon investmentpromptedPaulVolker, thechairmanoftheUSFederalReserve,tobeginadramaticriseininterestratesfrom7.9percent in1979, to16.4percent in1981.Thishadtheeffect of cutting borrowing throughout the economy; with that,investment and consumer spending also ratcheted down abruptly.Unemployment in theUS reached10.8per centbyDecember1982.19At the same time, both Reagan and Thatcher launched offensivesagainst thepoweroforganised labour,cutsocialspendingandslashedtaxesonthewealthy.In LatinAmerica, the newmonetary policy alsomeant that interest

paymentsonexistingdebtsoared.ThusbegantheLatinAmericandebtcrisis.From1978 to the endof1982, totalLatinAmericandebtmorethandoubled,from$159billionto$327billion.Debtservicing–thatis,paying the interest – grew even faster: The average Latin Americancountrywasusingmore than30percentof itsexportearnings just toserviceitsdebts–Brazilpaidnearly60percent.20

…Austerity

The solution to the debt crisis came in the form of IMF- andWorldBank-enforced austerity. Though the pattern played out differently ineach affected country, I will focus on the paradigmatic examples ofBrazilandMexico.In1983,Brazilhadthelargestforeigndebtofthedevelopingworld–

$83.8billion.Justtoserviceitsdebts,ithadtoborrowmoreandmoreinadownwardspiral.Inearly1983,BrazilwenttotheIMFfor$6billion,which was then the single largest loan in the Fund’s history. But inreturn, Brazil agreed to a brutal austerity program: To cut inflation,growthwasstrangled,publicspendingwascut, thecurrencydevalued,imports restricted, public assets privatised, exports boosted.21 In Sao

Paulo,workersweresoonrioting.22Unfortunately, Brazil’s export drive took place amidst falling

commodityprices.Twofactorscontributedtothis.TheBrettonWoodsinstitutionswere simultaneously pressuring otherThirdWorld debtorstoexportmore;meanwhile,deeprecessionsandhighinterestratesintherichercountrieshelddownconsumption.Increasedsupplyplusreduceddemandmeantplummetingprices.Sugar,copper,aluminiumandotherrawmaterialsallhitdeeplows.The IMF’s structural adjustment programme resulted in higher

unemployment, risingpoverty andgrowingurbanisation– as the ruralpoorwenttocitiesinsearchofwork.From1980to1990,Rio’soverallpopulationgrowthratewas8percent,butthefavela(slum)populationsurged by 41 per cent.As economist andLatinAmerica expertMarkWeisbrotexplained,‘From1960to1980,incomeperperson–themostbasicmeasure that economists have of economic progress – in Brazilgrewbyabout123percent.From1980to2000,itgrewbylessthan4per cent.’ Weisbrot estimates that had Brazil not embracedneoliberalism,‘thecountrywouldhaveEuropeanlivingstandardstoday.Insteadofabout50millionpoorpeopleastherearetoday,therewouldbe very few. And almost everyone would today enjoy vastly higherlivingstandards,educationallevels,andbetterhealthcare.’23InMexico, thedebtcrisisplayedasimilarrole,butwasexacerbated

by trade policies. Mexico’s crisis broke on 12 August 1982, whenMexicoannouncedthatitcouldnotpayitsbillsandtookthefirststepstowardsdefault,declaringa90-daymoratoriumonrepayment.Thepesowasdevalued30percentandbeforetheyear’sendwoulddropanother53percent.24Thecrisiswaspromptedayearearlierthough,whentheeffect of Volker’s monetarist squeeze went international: oil pricesbegan to slide and Mexico faced badly diminished revenues and theworld’s largest foreign debt: $70 billion. Mexican economists hadprojected the countrywould have oil revenues of $20 billion in 1981and$27billion in1982,but in1981oilbrought inamere$14billionand the next yearwas also below target.25 The cost of debt servicing

now consumedmost ofMexico’s projected petroleum sales, and thusmost of its foreign earnings. By the summer of 1982, Mexico owedalmost$81billiontoforeignbanks,andthatsumwasrising.Toavoiddefault, the peso was devalued and the government imposed limitedcapital controls. It was the second devaluation of the year. Richindividualsandprivatefirmsbegantopanicandshifttheirwealthoutofthecountry,promptingadefaultandthefearthatitwouldclearlyspreadtotheUSbankingsystemandworldwide.

Bailout’82

AdealbetweentheUSFederalReserve,theIMFandmostoftheeighthundred banks to which Mexico owed money led that country to begranted$12billionincredit,inexchangeforaprogrammeofeconomicliberalisationandimposedausterity.OutwentKeynes;incameHayek.Thegovernment sold106 state-ownedcompanies andagencies.Theseincludedsugarmills,shipyards,textileplantsandpowerplants,aswellastheparastatalprocessingplantsandtheexport-marketingfirms.26Privatisation brought new owners, who broke unions, fired workers

and drove down wages. By decade’s end, Mexico’s 1,155 statebusinesseshadshrunktoonly400.Thegovernmentearnedlessthan$2billionfromtheseprivatisations,whichwent toservicedebts.27At thesame time, food subsidieswere slashed; those for eggs,milk, cookingoil,sugar,beansandricewereeliminatedcompletely.Theretailpriceofgasolineandnaturalgasdoubled.28By1986, thepurchasingpoweroftheaverageMexicanwasabouthalfofwhatithadbeenin1982.29Mexico’s trialbydebtbegan the longmarch to theNorthAmerican

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that came into effect on 1 January1994.At thesame time, in thesouthernMexicanstateofChiapas, theZapatista National Liberation Army – a group of mostly indigenouspeasants – rose up against the government, calling NAFTA a death

sentenceforIndians.30What did ‘free trade’ really do for Mexico? An almost quizzical

article published in the New York Times in 2009 answered this asfollows:

In some cases, NAFTA produced results that were exactly theoppositeofwhatwaspromised.Forinstance,domesticindustriesweredismantledasmultinationalsimportedpartsfromtheirownsuppliers.Localfarmerswerepricedoutofthemarketbyfoodimportedtariff-free.ManyMexicanfarmerssimplyabandonedtheirlandandheadednorth.31

ThepiecewentontonotethatalthoughthevalueofMexico’sexportshadquintupledin15years,almosthalfamillionpeopleeachyearweremigrating in search ofwork, a disproportionate number of them fromthecountryside.Withonlyone-quarterofMexico’stotalpopulation,thecountrysideaccountsfor44percentofallMexicanimmigrantsmovingtotheUnitedStates.32UnderNAFTA,thegovernmentdismantledmostoftheagenciesthat

offeredassistanceandadministeredsubsidiestosmallfarmers:‘Lendingbybothgovernmentandprivate-sectorruralcreditprogramsdeclined75percentafter1994,whenNAFTAtookeffect,whileruralbankruptciesincreasedsix-fold.’33 The reformedArticle 27 now allows the sale ofejido(common)lands,whichhasincreasedlandlessness.34Accordingtoa2010reportbyOxfam,Mexicohasspent$80billiononfoodimportsand now has a deficit in food trade of $435 million.35 Mexicanagricultural production has turned away from food for people andinternalmarketstowardanimalfeedforexport.36Marketsforcorn,thestaple food, protected by government policy untilNAFTA, have beencompletely opened.37 Peasant organisations have demanded arenegotiationofthetreaty.38Since1994,Mexico’seconomicgrowthhasslowed.Itnowaverages

onlyabout3percent.From1921to1967,annualgrowthaveraged5.2

percent,andformuchofthatperioditwasover6percent.39AccordingtoWorld Bank figures, ‘in 2004, 28 per cent of rural dwellers wereextremelypoorand57percentmoderatelypoor.’40Bythe late1980sandearly1990s, theneoliberalmodel imposedon

BrazilandMexicowasenforcedallover theplanet.Sometimes itwasassociated with a high rate of growth, as in India, sometimes withstagnation, as in Latin America, but it always created increasedinequality.The suffering and social polarisation produced by neoliberalism has

fostered corruption and exacerbated relative deprivation. This is thestage, pre-set, onto which now enters the issue of climate change toconvergewiththeeconomiccrisesandthelegacyofpoliticalrepression.Incombination, allof these factorshelpdrivemigration to theUnitedStates and to northernMexico, where the chaotic drug war now eatsawayatsociety.

Militarisedadaptation

The anticipation of increased conflict in a world remade by climatechangehasledthemilitariesoftheGlobalNorthtowardanembraceofmilitarisedadaptation.Militaryplanning isconceivedofasaresponse toevents,but italso

shapesevents.Planningtoodiligentlyforwarcanprecludepeace.TheUS’soverdevelopedmilitarycapacity–itsmilitary-industrialcomplex–hascreatedpowerful interests thataredependentonwarand thereforepromoteit.Today,theoldmilitary-industrialcomplex–companiessuchas General Electric, Lockheed and Raytheon, with their fabulouslyexpensiveweaponssystems–arejoinedbyaswarmofsmallersecurityfirmsofferinghybridservices.Blackwater,DynCorpandGlobalcometomind,butprivateprisoncompaniessuchasCorrectionsCorporationofAmerica,ManagementandTrainingCorporationandtheGeoGrouparealsoinvolved.Thisnewsecurity-industrialcomplexoffersanarray

of services for home and abroad: surveillance, intelligence, bordersecurity, detention, facility and base construction, anti-terrorismconsulting,militaryandpolicelogistics,analysis,planning,trainingand,ofcourse,personalsecurity.Their operations are found wherever the US projects power: in

Afghanistan, running supply convoys, serving food and providingtranslators;inColombia,sprayingcocafieldsandtrainingthemilitary;in the Philippines, training the police; in Mexico, guardingbusinesspeople; and all along the US-Mexico border, processingimmigrantdetainees.Thisneweconomyofrepressionhelpspromulgatea xenophobic and bellicose ideology. For example, private prisoncompanies lobbied hard for passageofSB1070,Arizona’s tough anti-immigrationlaw,in2010.41As a politics of climate change begins to develop, this matrix of

parasitic interests has begun to shape adaptation to the militarisedmanagement of civilization’s violent disintegration. Returning to thebrutallegacyoftheColdWar,theyalsohaverevivedUScommitmenttostrategiesofcounterinsurgency.

Theapocalypseonpaper

One of the first government investigations on the security impacts ofclimatechangetomakenewswasa2004Pentagon-commissionedstudytitledAnabruptclimatechangescenarioanditsimplicationsforUnitedStates national security.42 It was authored by Peter Schwartz, a CIAconsultantandformerheadofplanningatRoyalDutchShell,andDougRandalloftheCalifornia-basedGlobalBusinessNetwork.SchwartzandRandallforecastanewDarkAges:

Nationswiththeresourcestodosomaybuildvirtualfortressesaroundtheir countries, preserving resources for themselves … As famine,disease,andweather-relateddisastersstrikeduetotheabruptclimate

change, many countries’ needs will exceed their carrying capacity.This will create a sense of desperation, which is likely to lead tooffensive aggression in order to reclaim balance… Europe will bestruggling internally, large numbers of refugees washing up on itsshoresandAsiainseriouscrisisoverfoodandwater.Disruptionandconflictwill be endemic featuresof life.Onceagain,warfarewoulddefinehumanlife.43

A2007reportbythePentagon-connectedthinktankCNACorporationenvisioned permanent counter-insurgency on a global scale.Here is asalientexcerpt:

Climatechangeactsasathreatmultiplierforinstabilityinsomeofthemostvolatileregionsoftheworld.ManygovernmentsinAsia,Africaand theMiddleEast are already on edge in terms of their ability toprovide basic needs: food, water, shelter and stability. Projectedclimatechangewillexacerbatetheproblemsintheseregionsandaddto the problems of effective governance. Unlike most conventionalsecuritythreats that involveasingleentityactinginspecificwaysatdifferentpoints in time, climatechangehas thepotential to result inmultiplechronicconditions,occurringgloballywithin thesame timeframe. Economic and environmental conditions in these alreadyfragile areaswill further erodeas foodproductiondeclines,diseasesincrease, clean water becomes increasingly scarce and populationsmigrate in search of resources.Weakened and failing governments,with an already thin margin for survival, foster the conditions forinternal conflict, extremism and movement toward increasedauthoritarianismandradical ideologies.TheUSmaybedrawnmorefrequently into these situations to help to provide relief, rescue andlogistics,ortostabilizeconditionsbeforeconflictsarise.44

Other developed states have conducted similar studies, most of themclassified. The European Council’s report in 2008 noted, in familiarlanguage, that ‘climate change threatens to overburden states and

regionswhicharealreadyfragileandconflictprone.’Andthisleadsto‘politicalandsecurityrisksthatdirectlyaffectEuropeaninterests’.45 Italsonotedthelikelihoodofconflictoverresourcesduetoreductionofarablelandandwatershortages;economicdamagetocoastalcitiesandcritical infrastructure, particularly Third World megacities;environmentally induced migration; religious and politicalradicalisation,andtensionoverenergysupply.46Westernmilitaryplanners,andgrowingnumbersofpolitical leaders,

are speaking out about the dangers in the convergence of politicaldisorder and climate change. Instead of worrying about conventionalwars over food and water, they see an emerging geography ofclimatologically driven civil war, migration, pogroms and socialbreakdown.Inresponse,theyenvisionaprojectofopen-endedcounter-insurgencyonaglobalscale.47

Mitigationandadaptation

The watchwords of the climate discussion are mitigation andadaptation. We must mitigate the causes of climate change, whileadapting to its effects. Mitigation means drastically cutting ourproduction of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases – such asmethane and chlorofluorocarbons – that prevent the sun’s heat fromradiating back out to space. Mitigation means moving towards cleanenergysourcessuchaswind,solarpower,geothermalandtidalkinetics.Itmeansclosingcoal-firedpowerplants,weaningoureconomyoffoilandbuildingasmartelectricalgrid.Adaptation,ontheotherhand,meanspreparingtolivewiththeeffects

of climatological changes, some of which are already underway, andsome of which are inevitable, that is, ‘in the pipeline’. Adaptation isbothatechnicalandapoliticalchallenge.Technicaladaptationmeanstransformingourrelationshiptonatureas

naturetransforms:learningtolivewiththedamagewehavewroughtby

building seawalls aroundvulnerable coastal cities,giving landback tomangrovesandevergladessotheymayacttobreaktidalsurgesduringgiantstorms,openingwildlifemigrationcorridorssospeciescanmovenorth as the climate warms and developing sustainable forms ofagriculture that can function on an industrial scale, even as weatherpatternsgyratewildly.Political adaptation, on the other hand, means transforming

humanity’s relationship to itself, transforming social relations amongpeople. Successful political adaptation to climate change will meandeveloping new ways of containing, avoiding and de-escalating theviolence that climate change fuels. That will require economicredistributionanddevelopment.Itwillalsorequireanewdiplomacyofpeacebuilding.Butthemilitary-ledstrategyfordealingwithclimatechangesuggests

another typeofpoliticaladaptation isalreadyunderway,whichmightbe called the ‘politics of the armed lifeboat’: responding to climatechange by arming, excluding, forgetting, repressing, policing andkilling. One can imagine a green authoritarianism emerging in richcountries,while the climate crisis pushes theThirdWorld into chaos.Already, as climate change fuels violence in the form of crime,repression,civilunrest,warandevenstatecollapseintheGlobalSouth,theNorthisrespondingwithanewauthoritarianism.ThePentagonanditsEuropeanalliesareactivelyplanningamilitarisedadaptation,whichemphasises the long-term,open-endedcontainmentof failedor failingstates–counterinsurgencyforever.This sort of ‘climate fascism’ – a politics based on exclusion,

segregationandrepression–ishorrificandboundtofail.Thestrugglingstates of the Global South cannot collapse without eventually takingdown wealthy economies with them. If climate change is allowed todestroywholeeconomiesandnations,noamountofwalls,guns,barbedwire, armed aerial drones and permanently deployedmercenaries cansaveelitesfromaplanetincollapse.

Conclusion

The catastrophic convergence offers a way to think about climatechange that can help reveal its more obscured political impacts. Thecatastrophicconvergencealsohasimplicationsforhowweshouldadaptandmitigate. If climate change acts through and by exacerbating pre-existing crises, then it is imperative that climate adaptation andmitigation act upon those same crises. Proper adaptation requiresaddressing the pre-existing crises – militarism and neoliberalism –throughplanningandsociallynecessaryinvestment.Societiessufferingfromcontinuedneoliberalausteritymeasures,and

anewroundofcounter-insurgencynowdeliveredundertheframeworkof thewaronterror,cannotbeexpectedtoaddress theimplicationsofclimatechange.Realmitigationlikewiserequiresmovingawayfromanunbridled free market economic orthodoxy that is only hindering ourattemptstocopewithclimatechange.

Notes

1.FromTropicofChaos:ClimatechangeandthenewgeographyofviolencebyChristianParenti,copyright©2011.ReprintedbypermissionofNationBooks,amemberofThePerseusBooksGroup.

2. Scienceandimpacts.(n.d.).Retrievedfromhttp://www.c2es.org/science-impacts.

3.

Vidal,J.(29May2009).Globalwarmingcauses300,000deathsayear,saysKofiAnnanthinktank.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/may/29/1.

4.QuotedinSusanGeorge,Globalisationandwar.InternationalCongressofIPPNW,NewDelhi,10March2008.Retrievedfromhttps://www.tni.org/en/archives/act/18042.

5.Smith,D.andVivekananda,J.(2007).Aclimateofconflict.InternationalAlert.Retrievedfromhttp://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/A_climate_of_conflict.pdf.

6.

Warner,K.,DeSherbinin,A.,Adamo,S.andChai-Onn,T.(May2009).InSearchofShelter:Mappingtheeffectsofclimatechangeonhumanmigrationanddisplacement(report).CenterforInternationalEarthScienceInformationNetwork.Retrievedhttp://ciesin.columbia.edu/documents/clim-migr-report-june09_media.pdf.

7.

Stefanova,K.(19April2009).RisingsealevelsinPacificcreatewaveofmigrants.WashingtonTimes.Retrievedfromhttp://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/19/rising-sea-levels-in-pacific-create-wave-of-migran/.

8. Summerfield,D.(1991).ThepsychosocialeffectsofconflictintheThirdWorld.DevelopmentinPractice,3,159–73.

9.

TransnationalOrganizedCrimeinCentralAmericaandtheCaribbean(report).UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(September2012).Retrievedhttp://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf.

10.

Hereisarandomsamplingofnewsstoriesonthepost-warviolence:Gunmenslaughter14footballplayers,Independent(UK),1November2010,retrievedfromhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/gunmen-slaughter-14-football-players-in-honduras-2121861.html;DaniloValladares,CentralAmerica:Youthgangs–Reservearmyfororganizedcrime,InterPressService(English),21September2010;Miroff,N.,andBooth,W.(27July2010).SeealsoWolf,S.(2009).Subvertingdemocracy:Eliteruleandthelimitstopoliticalparticipationinpost-warElSalvador.JournalofLatinAmericanStudies,41(3),429,doi:10.1017/S0022216X09990149.

11.Rogers,T.(September2000).ThespiralofviolenceinCentralAmerica.ZMagazine.Retrievedfromhttp://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Central_America/Spiral_Violence_CA.html.

12. Bowden,M.(1999).BlackHawkdown:Astoryofmodernwar.Berkeley,CA:AtlanticMonthlyPress.

13.

Davis,M.(19April2004).ThePentagonasglobalslumlord.TomGram.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/1386/tomgram%3A_mike_davis_on_the_pentagon%27s_urban_war_planning.

14. Grandin,G.(2006).Empire’sWorkshop:LatinAmerica,theUnitedStates,andtheriseofthenewimperialism.NewYork:MetropolitanBooks.

15. Colistete,R.P.(2010),RevisitingImport-SubstitutingIndustrialisationinPost-WarBrazil,MPRAPaper24665,UniversityLibraryofMunich,Germany.

16. Schor,J.(1992).TheOverworkedAmerica:Theunexpecteddeclineofleisure.NewYork:BasicBooks,p.111.

17.CharlesSable,quotedinHarrison,B.andBluestone,B.(1990).TheGreatUTurn:CorporaterestructuringandthepolarizingofAmerica.Boulder,CO:BasicBooks,p.10.

18.Onexcesscapacityorover-accumulationseeArmstrong,P.,GlynA.,andHarrisonJ.,(1991)CapitalismSince1945.Oxford:BasilBlackwell,esp.Chapter11.

19. Morris,J.(6December1982).Marketsrecoverfromlosses,butoutlookisgrim.AmericanBanker.

20.

FederalDepositInsuranceCorporation.(5June2000).Historyoftheeighties:Anexaminationofthebankingcrisesofthe1980sandearly1990s.Retrievedfromhttps://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/vol1.html.

21. Brooke,J.(18April1983).Growthofsoutherngiantsstifledbyausterityplans.MiamiHerald.

22. Oppenheimer,A.(18April1984).Recession,debtbatterAmericas.MiamiHerald.

23.

Weisbrot,M.(27August2010).WhowillallowBraziltoreachitseconomicpotential?FolhadeSaoPaulo.Retrievedfromhttp://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds&-columns/who-will-allow-brazil-to-reach-econ-potential.

24.Riding,A.(19February1982).Mexicodevaluespeso30%.NewYorkTimes;Riding,A.(14August1982).Worryspreadsafterpesocurbs.NewYorkTimes.

25. Ross,O.(6August1982).DroppingoilpricesleaveMexicoineconomiclimbo.TorontoGlobeandMail.

26.

Mexicoplans106closings.NewYorkTimes.(17November1982);onOceanGardenProducts,seeYoung,E.(2001).Stateinterventionandabuseofthecommons:FisheriesdevelopmentinBajaCaliforniaSur,Mexico.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers,91(2),283–306.doi:10.1111/0004-5608.00244.

27. Ellison,K.(22October1989).Mexicoshedsitsassets.SanJoseMercuryNews.

28. Riding,A.(3December1982).BankerscheerMexico’sausterityplan.NewYorkTimes.

29. Crewdson,J.,andSchodolski,V.J.(23November1986).PriceofreformcripplesMexico.ChicagoTribune.

30. Chomsky,N.(1999).ProfitOverPeople.NewYork:SevenStoriesPress.

31. Malkin,E.(23March2009).Nafta’spromise,unfulfilled.NewYorkTimes.

32. Ibid.

33. Wise,T.(December2003)FieldsofFreeTrade:Mexico’sSmallFarmersinaGlobalEconomy.Dollars&Sense.

34.

Dyer-Leal,G.andYúnez-Naude,A.(2003).NAFTAandconservationofmaizediversityinMexico(report).CommissionforEnvironmentalCooperationofNorthAmerica,2003.Retrievedfromhttp://www.cec.org/Storage/49/4150_Dyer-Yunez-ExSum_en.pdf.

35.

PerezU.M.(2January2010).EnmateriaalimentariaparaMéxico,elTLCANestáreprobado:Oxfam.LaJornada.Retrievedfromhttp://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/01/02/index.php?section=politica&article=008n2pol.

36. Chomsky,N.(1999).

37. Dyer-Leal,G.andYúnez-Naude,A.(2003).

38.

Pavón,O.(20December2007).AfrontarconmuchocorazónaperturatotaldelTLC,aconsejaAlbertoCárdenas.LaCrónicadeHoy.Retrievedfromhttp://www.cronica.com.mx/nota.php?id_nota=338675.

39. Gilly,A.(2005)TheMexicanRevolution.NewYork:NewPress,p.337.

40.

Mexico–Incomegenerationandsocialprotectionforthepoor.Volume4.AstudyofruralpovertyinMexico(p.170,Rep.No.32867MX)(2005–08).Retrievedhttps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/8286;TheCIAWorldFactBook(2012)listspovertyratesas52.3percentusingfood-baseddefinitionofpoverty.Asset-basedpovertyamountedtomorethan47percent.Retrievedfromhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-2012/.

41.

Sullivan,L.(28October2010).PrisoneconomicshelpdriveArizonaimmigrationlaw(Radioseriesepisode).InAllThingsConsidered.NPR.Retrievedfromhttp://www.npr.org/2010/10/28/130833741/prison-economics-help-drive-ariz-immigration-law.

42.

ThisreportwaspreparedforPentagonOfficeofNetAssessment.Itiswidelyavailableontheweb,forexample:Schwartz,P.andRandall,D.(October2003).AnabruptclimatechangescenarioanditsimplicationsforUnitedStatesnationalsecurity(ReportNo.ADA469325).Retrievedfromhttp://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA469325.

43. Schwartz,P.andRandall,D.(October2003),p.2.

44.

Nationalsecurityandthethreatofclimatechange.(April2007),p.44,report.Retrievedfromhttp://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change%20-%20Print.pdf.

45.

ClimateChangeandInternationalSecurity:PaperfromtheHighRepresentativeandtheEuropeanCommissiontotheEuropeanCouncil.(2008),pp.1–2,report.Retrievedfromhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/99387.pdf.

46. Ibid.,pp.3–4.

47.

Statistically,battle-relateddeathsworldwidehavedeclinedsincetheSecondWorldWarandespeciallysincetheendoftheColdWar–whichinthefrontlinestatesoftheGlobalSouthwasoftenquitehot.Butotheramorphoustypesofviolencelinkedtosocialbreakdownarespreading.TakethecaseofElSalvador:twelveyearsofcivilwarendedin1993,butdeathsbyhomicideinthepost-wareraatonepointsurpassedthedeathrateduringthewar.Andtheyremainalmostashightoday.OrconsiderCaracas:inthe1970s,Venezuelasufferedaseriesofsmallguerrillainsurgencies;infact,theyoungparatrooperHugoChavezfoughtMaoistguerillasaroundLakeMaricaibo.Today,Venezuelaisatpeace,butthehillsidebarriosofCaracasarehyper-violentwithcrime;Caracasisfarmoreviolentthanduringtheeraofcivilwar.TheCaracasmurderrateisabout130per100,000.

2

COLONISINGTHEFUTURE:CLIMATECHANGEAND

INTERNATIONALSECURITYSTRATEGIES

BenHayes

ImaginingtheunthinkableThe two most likely reactions to a sudden drop in carrying capacity due toclimatechangearedefensiveandoffensive.The United States and Australia are likely to build defensive fortresses

aroundtheircountriesbecausetheyhavetheresourcesandreservestoachieveself-sufficiency. With diverse growing climates, wealth, technology, andabundant resources, theUnitedStatescould likelysurviveshortenedgrowingcyclesandharshweatherconditionswithoutcatastrophic losses.BorderswillbestrengthenedaroundthecountrytoholdbackunwantedstarvingimmigrantsfromtheCaribbeanislands(anespeciallysevereproblem),Mexico,andSouthAmerica. Energy supply will be shored up through expensive (economically,politically, and morally) alternatives such as nuclear, renewables, hydrogen,andMiddleEasterncontracts.Peskyskirmishesoverfishingrights,agriculturalsupport,anddisasterreliefwillbecommonplace.TensionbetweentheU.S.andMexicowill riseas theU.S. renegeson the 1944 treaty thatguaranteeswaterflowfromtheColoradoRiver.Reliefworkerswillbecommissionedtorespondtoflooding along the southern part of the east coast andmuch drier conditionsinland. Yet, even in this continuous state of emergency the U.S. will bepositionedwellcompared toothers.The intractableproblemfacing thenation

willbecalmingthemountingmilitarytensionaroundtheworld.As famine, disease, andweather-related disasters strike due to the abrupt

climatechange,manycountries’needswillexceedtheircarryingcapacity.Thiswillcreateasenseofdesperation,whichislikelytoleadtooffensiveaggressioninordertoreclaimbalance…InthateventtheUnitedStateswillneedtotakeurgentactiontopreventand

mitigatesomeofthemostsignificantimpacts.Diplomaticactionwillbeneededtominimize the likelihoodofconflict in themost impactedareas,especially intheCaribbeanandAsia.However,largepopulationmovementsinthisscenarioareinevitable.Learninghowtomanagethosepopulations,bordertensionsthatarise and the resulting refugees will be critical. New forms of securityagreementsdealingspecificallywithenergy,foodandwaterwillalsobeneeded.Inshort,whiletheU.S.itselfwillberelativelybetteroffandwithmoreadaptivecapacity, itwillfinditself inaworldwhereEuropewillbestrugglinginternally,largenumbersof refugeeswashingupon itsshoresandAsia inseriouscrisisoverfoodandwater.Disruptionandconflictwillbeendemicfeaturesoflife.

P.Schwartz,andD.Randall(2003).AnAbruptClimateChangeScenarioandIts

ImplicationsforUnitedStatesNationalSecurity1

Fromenvironmentalsecuritytosecureenvironments

The idea of ‘environmental security’ emerged in the 1980s. It wasconsolidated in the 1990s as the United Nations (UN) and othersincorporated theadverse impactsofenvironmentaldegradation into its‘human security’ agenda.2More recently, over the past decade or so,climate change has been cast as an international and national securityissueinitsownright.Whilethisdiscoursesharessomebasictheoreticalassumptionswiththeconceptsofenvironmentalandhumansecurity,itdiffersmarkedlyinitsprognosisandremedy.From the crude projections in the early Pentagon climate-security

scenarios(above)–inwhichsomerichcountriescanadaptwhilethoseon the periphery of the global economy buckle under the weight ofclimatechange,resourcewarsandfailedstates,imperillingtheWestern

wayof lifewiththeiruncivilisedandrefugee-producingways–anewpolitical discourse that takes conflict for granted and places self-preservationandriskmanagementaheadofmeasurestoaddresstherootcausesofenvironmentalinsecurityhasemerged.Becauseaspectsoftheclimate-securityagendaappeartodovetailwith

the environmental justice movement’s demands for mitigation,adaptation and transition,many social justice activists havewelcomedthe military and security establishment’s new-found concern for theenvironment – either as a victory for common sense, a fillip forcampaigns to limit emissions (including by themilitary, famously the‘world’sbiggestpolluter’),and/orasnecessaryplanningforaclimate-changed world. This is particularly the case in the US, whereprogressives have tried (and largely failed) to use the re-framing ofclimate change as a security issue to by-pass the deniers in theRepublicanPartyandgaintractiononotherclimate-changeissues.Climateconsiderationsarenowfirmlyembeddedinamuchwiderset

of security imperatives that have taken hold of public policy in theGlobal North. As noted in the introduction to this book, some of thesecurity threats now typically associated with climate change havespawnedtheirownsub-narratives–includingthoseexploredinchapters8–10on‘energysecurity’,‘foodsecurity’,‘watersecurity’–whilethelanguageofrights(therighttofood,towater,etc.)andsovereignty(forexample, food sovereignty, energy sovereignty and other struggles fordemocraticcontrolovercriticalresources)isbeingusurpedbythelogicof‘security’,andmorerecently,‘resilience’.Thislanguagebringsitsownseductivelogic:whodoesn’twanttobe

more secure or resilient in the face of heightened insecurity ordevastating climate change,which, left unchecked, is by anymeasureindeedthebiggestsecuritythreatourspeciesfaces?Butthislogicalsocomprisesaparticularwayofmitigatingthreatsandmanagingriskthatinevitablyprioritises the resilienceof the system– that is, business asusual; themarket supported by the state – ahead of other human andenvironmental security concerns. In thismodel, poverty, injustice and

the protests and resistance this causes are seen not as fundamentalsocial-policy failures, but as a source of potential social unrest to bepredicted,managedandcountered.While there are perfectly sound and welcome reasons for states to

think critically about how to ensure the continued supply of publicgoods and the protection of critical infrastructure from a securityperspective, there are good reasons to be wary of national securityestablishmentsappearingtobeargiftsforclimate-changecampaigners.Thischapterattemptstounpicktheclimate-securityagenda.First,by

exploring the framing of climate change as a security issue: who isdoing it andwhy?What do climate change and inter/national securitystrategiessay?Second,bylookingcriticallyatthekindofsecuritythatis envisaged through the transformation of security apparatuses since9/11.Third,by lookingat theways inwhich thenewclimate-securitynarratives are related to wider processes of securitisation underneoliberalism;thisisreallyaquestionofhowthenewsecurity-scarcitynexus benefits elites. The issue ofwhat kind of strategy is needed tochallengesecuritisationandmilitarisationinthenameofclimatechangeisdeferredtotheconclusiontothiscollection.

The‘AgeofConsequences’

Thediscourseonclimatechangeasasecuritythreathasemergedfromvariousquarters:social,politicalandenvironmentalscientistslookingatthe implications of climate change; national and international securityagenciestaskedwithidentifyingandmitigatingfuturethreats;agrowinginterest in issues related to climate changeon thepart of themilitary;journalists reporting (andsensationalising) these issues,andagrowingnumberofthinktanksandNGOs.Theideaofclimatechangeasa‘threatmultiplier’appearedbrieflyin

a 2004 report by a UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges andChange,3 but it wasn’t until 2007 – just as emphasis on the ‘war on

terror’wasreceding–thatinfluentialsecurityactorsinEuropeandtheUS began to outline foreign policy options for addressing climatechangeasasecuritythreat.Fromhere,theideawassteadilywrittenintothe national and international security strategies of nation states andintergovernmentalorganisations.Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security

ImplicationsofGlobalClimateChange,producedbytwoinfluentialUSthinktanks in2007, is typicalof theseclimate-securitybriefings.4Thereport begins by citing potential conflict over newly accessibleresources in the Arctic, floods in Bangladesh, and the genocide inDarfurasexamplesofclimatechange-fuelledconflict.AnexpertpanelisthenaskedtoconsiderthenationalsecurityimplicationsfortheUSofthreeclimate-changescenarios.The first scenario, entitled ‘expected climate change’ envisages an

averageglobaltemperatureincreaseof1.3°Cby2040andisdescribedas‘theleastweoughttopreparefor’.Itbringstheprospectof

…heightenedinternalandcross-bordertensionscausedbylarge-scalemigrations; conflict sparked by resource scarcity, particularly in theweak and failing states of Africa; increased disease proliferation,which will have economic consequences; and some geopoliticalreordering as nations adjust to shifts in resources and prevalence ofdisease.

The second scenario, ‘severe climate change’, brings a 2.6°Ctemperatureriseby2040,whichsees

…nationsaroundtheworld…overwhelmedbythescaleofchangeand pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease … Armedconflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and itstributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible. The socialconsequencesrangefromincreasedreligiousfervortooutrightchaos.

The third, ‘catastrophic scenario’ is a5.6°C temperature riseby2100.

Unsurprisingas itmaybe toseasonedobserversofUSforeignpolicy,theworld is now characterised by ‘strong and surprising intersectionsbetween the two great security threats of the day – global climatechangeand international terrorismwagedby Islamistextremists’.Thisscenario‘wouldposealmostinconceivablechallengesashumansocietystruggledtoadapt’.Forwhatit’sworth,thelastreportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelon

ClimateChange(IPCC)suggeststhatintermsofexpectedtemperaturerises,wearestillclosertothefirstscenario(a1.3°Crise,5althoughlessconservativeandmorerecentassessments,particularlythoseconcernedwith the potential effect of feedback loops, suggest that we aremorelikely to be on track for the second ‘severe’ scenario.But in climate-security thinking, thescientificprognosis is far less important than thegeopoliticalone,andthedefiningfeatureofthe‘AgeofConsequences’anditsilkisthattheworld’sunderdevelopedareasaremostvulnerable–andhencemostthreatening–becauseclimatechangecanbeexpectedtoexacerbateexistinginternationalcrisesandproblems.Allofthisiscouchedinneo-Malthusianscares–toomanypeople,not

enough to go around – about disaster-induced migration: ‘the mostworrisomeproblemsassociatedwithrisingtemperaturesandsealevelsarefromlarge-scalemigrationsofpeople.’Thereportfinisheswiththestarkwarning that ‘“national security”may bewoefully inadequate toconveythewaysinwhichstateauthoritiesmightbreakdowninaworst-case climate change scenario.’For all intents andpurposes, this is the‘failedstate’narrative,whichservesprimarilytolegitimiseWesternandnowothermilitary interventions in sovereign states, transplanted ontotheentireGlobalSouth.

Thethreatmultiplies

It was summer 2007 when the Council of the European Union (EU)invitedtheHighRepresentativeforEUCommonForeignandSecurity

PolicyandtheEuropeanCommissionerforExternalRelationstojointlyassessthepotentialsecurityimplicationsofclimatechangefromanEUperspective. Their joint paper, Climate Change and InternationalSecurity, published in March 2008, picks up the themes of Age ofConsequences: conflict over resources, economic damage and risk tocoastal cities and critical infrastructure, loss of territory and borderdisputes,environmentallyinducedmigration,situationsoffragilityandradicalisation,tensionoverenergysupply,andpressureoninternationalgovernance.6 Although the paper stops well short of Age ofConsequences’ hyperbolic predictions about nuclear war andcivilisationalcollapse,itconfirmstheviewthatclimatechangeis‘bestviewedasathreatmultiplier’,whichcarries‘politicalandsecurityrisksthatdirectlyaffectEuropeaninterests’.Thepaperwasthinondetailinterms of how best to protect ‘European interests’ beyond thestrengtheningofexistingEUdevelopment,securityandclimate-changepolicies.Ithassincebeenintegratedintothewider‘EuropeanSecurityStrategy.’7WhilethePentagontookanearlyinterestinclimatechange,itwasn’t

until Barack Obama’s administration took office that the nationalsecurity establishment could attach significant importance to climate-related issues. In his December 2009 Nobel Prize acceptance speech,Obama called on the world to ‘come together’ to confront climatechange.‘Thereislittlescientificdisputethatifwedonothing,wewillfacemoredrought,morefamine,moremassdisplacement–allofwhichwill fuelmoreconflict fordecades’,hesaid. ‘For this reason, it isnotmerely scientists and environmental activists who call for swift andforcefulaction–it’smilitaryleadersinmyowncountryandotherswhounderstand our common security hangs in the balance.’8 Twomonthsearlier,ObamahadissuedExecutiveOrder13514,mandatingallfederalagenciestoestablishgreenhousegasemissionreductionplansandmeetenergy,waterandwastetargets.The Department of Defense’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

(QDR) then identified ‘energy security and climate change’ as one of

four issues requiring imperative reform.9On theonehand,USenergysecuritywould serve as a ‘forcemultiplier’, increasing ‘the range andendurance of forces in the field’ and reducing ‘the number of combatforces diverted to protect energy supply lines’;10 on the other hand,climate change would act as ‘an accelerant of instability or conflict,placingaburdentorespondoncivilianinstitutionsandmilitariesaroundtheworld’.11Fouryearslater,theQDRstatesthatclimatechange‘willaggravatestressorsabroadsuchaspoverty,environmentaldegradation,political instability, and social tensions – conditions that can enableterrorist activity and other forms of violence’.12 Later in 2014, aDepartment of Defense ‘Report on Climate Change Readiness’categorised climate conflict as anear-term strategic challenge for thefirsttime.13TheUSNavy’sMilitaryAdvisoryBoardalsoconcludedthatclimate

changewasa‘threatmultiplier’in2007.14By2013,AdmiralSamuelJ.Locklear III, head ofUS Pacific Command (PACOM), had identifiedclimate change as the biggest security threat facing the Asia-Pacificregion.‘Wehaveinterjectedintoourmultilateraldialogue–evenwithChina and India – the imperative to kind of get military capabilitiesaligned [for]when the effects of climate change start to impact thesemassive populations,’ he explained.15 Other senior PACOM officialshave been more candid about their motivations: ‘climate change is agreat soft power engagement tool – just like medical is, just likelogistics is.That’swhyweareembracing this sowholeheartedly rightnow.’16 In its latest report, the Navy’s Advisory Board has upgradedclimatechangefroma‘threatmultiplier’toa‘catalystforconflict’,17toreflectaslightlymorenuancedapproachtoclimatesecurity.The US intelligence community has also embraced climate change.

GlobalTrends2025:ATransformedWorld,publishedby theDirectorofNationalIntelligence(DNI)andNationalIntelligenceCouncil(NIC)in 2008, included a chapter entitled ‘Scarcity in theMidst of Plenty’,whichpredictedthat‘globalinattentiontoclimatechangeleadstomajor

unexpected impacts, thrusting the world into a new level ofvulnerability.’18Ofcourseitwouldbethebankingcrisisandnotclimatechange thatwould reveal the fragility of this ‘world of plenty’ a fewmonthslater.Subsequent DNI and NIC reports have included The Impact of

ClimateChangeto2030(2009),19GlobalWaterSecurity(2012),20andNaturalResourcesin2020,2030,and2040:ImplicationsfortheUnitedStates(2013).21TheCIAhasalsocommissionedseveralreportsintothesecurityimplicationsofclimatechange,22andin2014,theUSNationalIntelligence Strategy addressed the issue for the first time.23 ‘Manycountries important to the United States are vulnerable to naturalresourceshocksthatdegradeeconomicdevelopment,frustrateattemptsto democratize, raise the risk of regime-threatening instability, andaggravate regional tensions’, said former Director of NationalIntelligence, James Clapper, in subsequent testimony to a SenateCommitteeonIntelligence.24TheUS’s allies have adopted their national security strategies along

similarlines.IntheUK,the2006reviewofthe‘EconomicsofClimateChange’, led by Lord Stern, famously put the cost of adaptation toclimatechangeat1percentofGDP(ascomparedtopotentiallossesof5andeven20percentforfailingtoadapt).25The‘SternReview’alsoraised the spectre of 200million climate refugees for theUK to helpdeal with. In 2008, the UK’s first ever National Security Strategydescribedclimatechangeas‘potentiallythegreatestchallengetoglobalstability and security, and therefore to national security’. The premisethatclimatechangeisa threatmultiplier thatwillexacerbateallmajorexistinginsecuritieshasalsobeenincorporatedintothenationalsecuritystrategies of France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and other EUmember statesaswell asAustralia.TheGermanAdvisoryCouncilonGlobal Change’s 2007 report was noteworthy for stressing that whileclimate change carried the threat of destabilisation and violence, it‘could also unite the international community, provided that it

recognizes climate change as a threat to humankind and soon sets thecoursefortheavoidanceofdangerousanthropogenicclimatechangebyadoptingadynamicandgloballycoordinatedclimatepolicy’.26Most of the major Western foreign-policy think tanks, with the

exception of the climate sceptical organisations in the US, haveembraced this agenda as well, spawning dedicated climate-securityprogrammesandorganisations.27In2009,forexample,theInstituteforEnvironmental Security established the Global Military AdvisoryCouncil on Climate Change (GMACCC) in order to engageinternationalpolicymakers,environmentaldecisionmakersandmilitarystrategists globally on climate change and security, and to fosterincreasedinterestintherolethemilitarycanplayinhumanity’sefforttosurmountabruptclimatechange.‘When I meet with my colleagues at the GMACC – generals and

admirals from around the world, all with career-long experience inmilitaryplanningandoperations–Iamstruckbythesimilarityofourconcerns’, saidA.N.M.Muniruzzaman, theCouncil’schairman.28 ‘Allcountries of theworld are experiencing changes that are destabilizingcommunitiesand increasing securityconcerns.Diseasesare spreading,wells are drying up, storms are smashing cities and destroying crops,and rain is either a distant memory or an acute danger.’ The firstGMACCC public statement called on all governments to ensure thatsecurity implications of climate change are integrated into theirrespective military strategies, and on the military to reduce its owncarbon‘bootprint’.Despite the hype, the climate-security discourse has been less well

receivedattheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(UNSC),thoughnotforthewantoftryingonthepartofitsadvocates.In2007,attherequestoftheUK,adiscussionon‘Climate,energyandsecurity’tookplaceintheSecurity Council. In 2009, the Brookings Institution, ChathamHouseandtheInstituteforEnvironmentalSecurityorganisedaspecialsessionon‘Climatechangeandthemilitary’at theCOP15proceedingsof theUN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen

(UNFCCC). In 2011, the UN Security Council (UNSC) recorded itsconcernthat‘possibleadverseeffectsofclimatechangemay,inthelongrun, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace andsecurity.’29Butin2013,ChinaandRussiarejectedaconcertedattempttohaveclimatechangerecognisedasaninternationalsecuritythreatbytheUNSC.Togetherwith India andmany other developing countries,they fundamentally object to climate change becoming aUNSC issuebecause theCouncil does not operate under the principle ofCommonButDifferentiatedResponsibilitywhichunderpinstheUNFCCC(thisisthe principle that recognises that thosewho have contributedmore togreenhousegas emissions (that is, developed and industrialised states)have a greater role to play in terms of mitigation efforts). Whileacknowledging that ‘climate change is one of the greatest challengesfacing humankind’, the BRICS dialogue has spurned the climate-securityagendaforthesamereasons.30Moreover,whentheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangelast

reported,the2014reportsofWorkingGroupIIon‘Impacts,adaptation,and vulnerability’ (AR5) focused not on national security or defenceconcerns about international conflict, but local and regional threats tofoodproduction,humansecurity,healthandlivelihoods.31TheGMACCput its own spin of the report, however, ‘translating’ the IPCC’s ‘keyfindings’asrecognisingthatclimatechange:

i) ‘posesanincreasingthreattopeaceandsecurityintheworld’,ii) ‘actsasa“threatmultiplier”’,

iii) threatens to overwhelm the ‘global or regional capacity tomanage[the]responsespeacefully’,

iv) challenges states’ ability to share resourcesandprovidehumansecurity,andv) ‘directlyaffects…militaryforces’.32

However, although the IPCC did acknowledge a threat to peace and

security,themilitarywasnotevenmentionedintheAR5reports.

Athreattowhom?

With varying emphasis on the national, military, or human securityimplicationsofclimatechange,theG7/G8,G20,OECD,OSCE,NATO,theWorldBankandtheDavosForumhavealsoembracedkeyelementsoftheclimate-securityagenda.Butwhydoesallofthismatter?Beforeattemptingtoanswer thatquestion, it is important topointout that theargumentsputforwardbythesecurityandmilitarystrategistsareneitherhomogeneous nor universally accepted. As noted earlier, there arevarious perspectives on environmental security and the potential forclimatechangetofuelviolentconflictandinstability.Whattheyshareisabeliefthatclimatechangewillhave–orisalreadyhaving–animpactonpeaceandsecurity,andthattheseissuesmustbeaddressedbypolicymakers. And it is not just the ‘securocrats’ who are making thesearguments: critical security scholars such asMichael Klare, ChristianParenti (see Chapter 1) and Nafeez Ahmed (see Chapter 4) stronglyendorsearealistinterpretationof‘threatmultiplier’theory.Wheretheiranalysesstronglydivergefromthoseofthe‘securocrats’,however,isonthefundamentalcausesofcontemporaryinsecurityandwhatshouldbedoneintermsofadaptationandmitigation.Thatrisingtemperatures,sealevels,foodpricesandalltherestposea

genuine threat to basic human security (as defined by the UN as‘freedomfromfear,freedomfromwant’)maynotbeindispute,butthecorebeliefthatclimatechangewillleadinevitablytochaosandconflictis contested.Leadingenvironmental security scholarSimonDalbyhasconsistently pointed out thatmany of the security forecasts, that positscarcity as a cause of conflict, are not supported by social-scientificevidence. Similarly, the fact that environmental change may lead toformsofconflictdoesnotnecessarilyimplytheyarethreatstonationalor global security.33 While some evidence of a correlation between

temperature variation and civil conflict in specific regions has beenproduced, the issue remainshotlydisputed.34But there is certainlynoevidencebasetosupporttheMalthusianhypothesesinthelikesofAgeof Consequences which sees climate change leading to massinternationalmigrationandwarinthenextcoupleofdecades.On the contrary, a majority of scholars argue that governance and

policyfailureare,andwillremain,farmoreimportantdriversofconflictthan climate change. Similarly, in respect to international migration,whichisthefocusofChapter5,itissuggestedthatnotonlyhavefearsabout environmental migration been massively overblown andsensationalised, it is in practice very difficult to discern a ‘climaterefugee’or‘climate-inducedmigrant’fromanyotherkind,becausethereasons people move around are much more complex and based onmultiplefactors.Andwhatresearchhasbeenproducedtodatesuggeststhat most migration that can be plausibly related to climate changeoccurs,atleastsofar,mostlywithinstates.35Critics of climate-security narratives have also pointed out that the

discourseisinhockwitharangeofquestionablemilitary,authoritarianand developmental agendas, and consistentlymisrepresents the causesof contemporary violence.36 Others have linked it to a more ‘radicalinterventionistagenda–firstandforemostcarriedoutbytheWestintheGlobalSouth’.37Butwhereascritical scholarsandactivistshavesownthe seeds of resistance to the framing of climate change as a nationalsecurity and defence issue, ‘most Northern governments, militaries,think tanks and NGOs continue to believe that climate change willworsenexistingsocialstressesandeitherdirectlyorindirectlyadvocateforappropriatesecurity-centredresponsestothoseproblems’.38These perspectives are inexorably related to the failure of the

international community to agree upon a significant curbing of CO2emissions.Aslongas thishiatuscontinues, itmustbeassumedthat intheseparanoidtimes,theveryinsecuritycreatedbythefailuretotackleclimatechangewillcontinuetodrivetheinstitutionalframingofclimate

change as a security issue. Put another way: absent radical action tocombat climate change, the realist take on climate insecurity couldbecomesomethingofaself-fulfillingprophecy.

Whatkindofsecurity?

In addressing these insecurities, what kind of ‘security’ should weexpect? The concepts and practices associated with inter/nationalsecurity have changed markedly since the end of the Cold War andespeciallysincetheterroristattacksintheUnitedStateson9/11,soitisin this context that newclimate-security strategies should be criticallyappraised.Thisperiodhasbeencharacterisedby thegrowing reachofinternal and external securitymandates, the blurring of the traditionalboundaries between security and defence, and an obsessionwith newsecuritytechnologies.Intermsofexternalsecurity,policymakersintheGlobalNorthhave

cometobelieve that theyareembroiled insomekindof ‘longwar’ tocontain the threat of terrorism, failing states and now climate change.ThiskindofthinkinggrewoutofNATO’sinterventionintheBalkansand theneo-conservativeProject foraNewAmericanCentury; it tookholdastheneo-consthenkickedofftheverywarstheyhaddreamedof,draggingtheirNATOalliesandclientstateswiththem.Mostnowsharethe conviction that the US-led alliance has a mandate to intervene,militarilyifnecessary,anywhereontheglobe,inthenameofcombatingthosethreatsto‘internationalsecurity’.Intermsofinternalsecurity,itisthetwindevelopmentofframeworks

formass surveillance – revealed so strikingly byEdwardSnowden in2013 – and an ever greater emphasis on public order and civil unrestthat have characterised the post-9/11 period. In terms of informationtechnology,securityagencies,empoweredbybattlefielddevelopments,ubiquitous surveillance and ‘bigdata’ analytics, are now firmly in thebusiness of trying to predict and act against threats before they

materialise, be they terrorist attacks, food price riots or popularuprisings.Thesefeaturesarebynomeanslimitedtotheirspiritualhomelandin

the US; the constant refining of internal and external security toencompass more and more ‘threats’ have gripped democratic andauthoritarian regimesalike.Anewmantraof ‘crisismanagement’ and‘inter-operability’throughoutthe‘crisiscycle’isintegratingpreviouslydisparate state functions such as public order and ‘social unrest’ (thepolice), ‘situational awareness’ (intelligence gathering),resilience/preparedness (civil planning) and emergency response(including first responders, counter-terrorism; chemical, biological,radiological and nuclear defence; critical infrastructure protection,military planning, and so on) under new ‘command-and-control’structures(seefurtherChapter4).The emergence of Islamic State out of the ruins of the disastrous

invasion of Iraq and the flawed intervention in the Syria crisis hasdiscreditedboth‘neo-con’foreignpolicyand‘liberalinterventionalism’– while severely undermining the UN’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’doctrine.39Butthishasnotreducedtheappetiteforinterventionperse.Bush and Blair’s promises of spreading democracy and human rightshave simply been replaced by a narrative of containment and riskmanagement. The goal has essentially been reduced to what securityscholarPaulRogershaslongcalled‘liddism’(thatis,keepingthelidonthings),astrategythatis‘bothpervasiveandaccumulative,involvinganintense effort to develop new tactics and technologies that can avertproblems and suppress them should they arise’.40 In practice, this hasincluded,interalia,theviolentrepressionofpoliticalIslam,supportfordictators, fuelling civil wars, engaging in covert operations andconducting the kinds of ‘Dirty Wars’ exposed by journalist JeremyScahill.41Intermsofkeepingthelidonthefalloutfromclimatechange,asone

militarymanput it, ‘it’s likegettingembroiled inawar that lasts100years.That’s the scariest thing forus.There isnoexit strategy that is

availableformanyoftheproblems.’42It’salsoascarythingfortherestofus.AsRollingStonewasmovedtoponder:

… the U.S. military is the only force on Earth with the ability topolice,process,house, feedandmoverefugeesonamassscale.Butyoucanseehowthispicturecouldturndarkfast–oneofthebiggestlong-termthreatsclimatechangeposescouldbetocivillibertiesandfreedom. ‘It’snotaquestionofwhat themilitarycando forclimatechange,’saysoneformerPentagonofficial.‘It’swhatclimatechangewilldotothemilitaryanditsmission.’It’sascarynotion,butthat’swhereweareheaded.43

Therearegoodreasonstofearthegrowinginvolvementofthemilitaryindisasterrelief.AfterHurricaneKatrinaoverwhelmedNewOrleansin2005,theworldwitnessedhowquicklyademocraticsuperpowercouldtoturntomilitaryforceinthefaceofdomesticdisaster,asimpoverishedblack communities were treated like aggressors by their owngovernment.44 Following the earthquake inHaiti in 2010 –which theUN described as the worst it had ever faced – police opened fire onpeople taking provisions from supermarkets and other stocks of foodandwater.InthePhilippinesin2013,afterthedevastationofTyphoonHaiyan (aka Yolanda), one of the strongest tropical cyclones everrecorded,theauthoritiesimposeddefactomartiallaw.Onemust be careful to stress that state responses to disaster do not

alwaysbringouttheworstintheauthoritiesandemergencyservices.Onthe contrary, much disaster response clearly brings out the best inhumanity. As writers like Rebecca Solnit have explained, whilegovernmentresponsesmayattimesbecharacterisedby‘elitepanic’,

[m]ost people behave beautifully in disasters … The majority inKatrinatookcareofeachother,went togreat lengths torescueeachother – including the ‘cajun navy’ of white guys with boats whoentered the flooded city the day after the levees broke – and weregenerallyhumaneandresourceful.Aminoritythatincludedthemost

powerful believed they were preventing barbarism while theyembodiedit.45

Nevertheless, for journalist Richard Seymour, the tale of disasterresponsehasbecome

… depressingly familiar. The agonisingly slow delivery of aid.Desperate survivors scratching out messages pleading for help,seemingly getting none. Soon, the panic about social breakdownprovidesa justificationformilitarisingthedisasterzones.Andat thecentreofitall,amorallyloadednarrativeabout‘looters’.46

These narratives, he argues, ‘tap into animating myths about humancivilisationbeingonlyafewhotmealsawayfromtotalbreakdown.Bymobilisingthatcommonsense,ofteninaracialisedway,theyexertrealeffectsinorganisingviolentinterventionsintodisasterzones.’As Simon Dalby has explained, ‘consideration of ways of adapting

without inducing conflict is now part of the environmental-securityagenda.’47 But disaster response is only half the story of a growing‘ensemble of techniques for taking control of crisis situations’,whichservesprimarily tomaintain‘existingauthoritystructuresandpropertyarrangements’ and render people ‘passive, dependent and thusgovernable’.48Theglobalmaniaforallthings‘HomelandSecurity’thathasgrippedtheworldsince9/11correspondswithincreasinglyfrequentand repressive clampdowns on freedom of expression and associationacrosstheworld.WhileostensiblydemocraticgovernmentsintheWestnowpubliclylamentthe‘closingofpoliticalspace’forcivilsociety,andwonder how to create an ‘enabling environment’ in the rest of theworld,49 many are as embroiled in the systematic undermining ofactivismandrepressionofpoliticalprotestastheauthoritarianregimestheybemoan.

Publicorder

InTakeBack the Streets, the InternationalNetwork of Civil LibertiesOrganisations concludes that ‘Governments all around the world toooften treat protest as at best an inconvenience to be controlled ordiscouraged,andatworstathreattobeextinguished.’50ThepolicinginFerguson,Missouri andBaltimore,Maryland,which exposed thehighlevels of deaths of black men at the hands of the police and led towidespread ‘Black Lives Matter’ protests throughout 2015, is rightlyseenasa fundamental issueof racial injustice,but it isalso intimatelyconnected to the ‘militarization of America’s police forces’ and ‘theblurring distinctions between the police and military institutions andbetweenwarandlawenforcement’.51Thisisblamedinnosmallpartontheobsessionwithsecurityand‘federalprogramsthatcreateincentivesforstateand localpolice touseunnecessarilyaggressiveweaponsandtactics designed for the battlefield’.52 Although research is sorelylacking, the same process can be observed in security-obsessed statestheworldover.53Thepolicyandpracticeofmilitarisationhasprofoundimplicationsfor

‘crisis management’, particularly the development of so-called ‘lesslethalweapons’.Justifiedonthegroundsthatthesedevicesprovidethepolicewithan‘alternative’tolethalforce,theyhavemerelyaddednewtools of political and social control to the state’s still-lethal armoury.Crowd-controltechnologiesanddirected/acousticenergyweaponsmayprovidetheauthoritieswithalesslethalwayof‘takingbackthestreets’thantheslaughterwitnessedinthesquaresofTiananmen,AndijanandRabaa, but the goal is every bit the same.USpolice forces have thusbeenusingmilitary-grade‘sonicweapons’(long-rangeacousticdevices)todispersecrowdssincetheprotestsinFergusonagainstpoliceviolencein2014–15.54These technologiesarealready toutedby thecompaniesthat developed them for everything from crisismanagement to bordercontrol.

TwoyearsafterUSintelligenceoperativeEdwardSnowdenlaidbarethemasssurveillancecapabilitiesoftheUSanditsclosestalliesinmid-2013, therehasbeenno significant intelligenceor surveillance reformanywhereoutsideoftheUSitself(whichhasonlymovedtolimitspyingon US citizens by US agencies – the rest of the world remains fairgame).55Snowdenunveiledhow intelligenceagenciesnowoperateontheprinciplesofcollecting‘allof thesignals,allof the time’, ‘byanymeans necessary’ – or what former National Security Agency (NSA)Director James Clapper acknowledged as the capacity to search the‘haystackofglobaltelecommunications’,includingretrospectively.Yetacross theworld,anentirepoliticalgeneration,witha fewhonourableexceptions,haseffectivelyacquiescedtoeverythingSnowdenrevealed,as national security trumpedhuman rights concerns for theumpteenthtimesince9/11.ThatincludesthesurveillanceofNGOsandactivists–including people campaigning for action to prevent climate change –who,accordingtotheSnowdendocuments,wereroutinelytargeted.Paralleling developments in government, corporate security is now

characterised by corporate espionage, thanks to a revolving doorbetween state-security agencies and the private sector. In SecretManoeuvres in theDark, EvelineLubbers has begun to document theway in which corporations are undermining legitimate actions andinvestigationsbyactivistsusing tactics suchas spyingand infiltration,pursuing injunctions, damages claims andmanifestly unfounded courtcases, disinformation, ‘stakeholder dialogue’ and bogus ‘corporatesocialresponsibility’.56Shearguesthatcorporateintelligencegathering– like that doneby the state – has shifted frombeing reactive to pro-active, and shows how companies like Nestlé, Shell andMcDonald’susecovertmethodstoevadescrutinyandaccountability.Terrorism laws have also been used against environmental change

activists,and‘eco-terrorism’hasenteredthethreatlexicon(todescribeactivists,notenvironmentaldestruction).In‘Seeingred:stateresponsestoenvironmentalprotests’,publishedonlinetoaccompanythisbook,57Chris Jones shows how internal security structures developed in the

name of counter-terrorism have increasingly been deployed againstthose opposed to destructive attempts to extract new and moretraditionalfossilfuels.Indeed,thetwothingsmostlikelytogetyouanintelligence record in democratic countries is being deemed an‘Islamist’orparticipatinginenvironmentaldirectaction.These are worldwide trends. According to Global Witness, 116

environmental activists were murdered in 2014 – almost double thenumber of journalists reported killed in the same period.58 Forty percentofthesevictimswereindigenouspeoples,‘withmostpeopledyingamiddisputesoverhydropower,miningandagri-business’,andnearlythree-quarters of the deaths were in Central and South America. InIndia, often laudedas thebiggestdemocracyonearth,PrimeMinisterModi froze Greenpeace’s bank accounts in 2015 on the grounds thattheir‘anti-development’agendaiscontrarytothepublicgood,andtheorganisation has threatened to quit the country.Add to this repressivepicturethegustowithwhichtheOccupymovementwasremovedfromstreetsandsquaresacrosstheworldandwhatemergessince9/11isanincreasingly fine-tunedsystemof repressionandcontrol thatviewsallcitizens as suspects to bemonitored, and all activists as threats to becountered.AsHeidiBoghosianhasexplained,itisinevitablethatsuchsystems come to be used ‘to suppress the most essential tools ofdemocracy: the press, political activists, civil rights advocates andconscientious insiderswhoblow thewhistle on corporatemalfeasanceandgovernmentabuse’.59It is this backdrop to preparations for more frequent disasters that

should concern us. But in climate change and national securitystrategies, the widespread restriction of civil rights is something thathappens in the future, when climate change gets out of hand andcivilisationstartstocrumble.Ofcourse,theyareverymuchpartofthestatus quo; the very same organisations warning about the securityimplications of climate change are also spying on perfectly legitimateanddemocratic activity tomake sure that it doesn’t get in thewayofbusiness as usual. Philosophers have long identified this as a

fundamental problem with ‘security’: at its core is the essentiallyrepressivegoalofmakingthingsstaythesame–nomatterhowunjusttheymaybe.

Securitythrough‘resilience’

Discussionsaboutpreparationsforaclimate-changedworldseldompasswithoutdemandsforsocietytobecomemore‘resilient’–particularlyinnationalsecuritycontexts.Theconceptof‘resilience’wasmarshalledinthe wake of terrorist attacks in the US, and subsequent attacks inEurope,butsinceclimatechangeappearedonthethreathorizon,ithastaken on epic proportions. Now the concept of ‘resilience’ iseverywhere:PresidentObama’snewlyinauguratedCouncilonClimatePreparedness and Resilience (co-chaired by the Assistant to thePresident for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism); the UK’sNational Resilience Capabilities Programme (a sub-project of theNational Security Council); the UN Plan of action on disaster riskreductionforresilience;andtheEUSecuresocietiesprogramme,whichis ‘protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens’ by‘enhancing the resilienceofour society againstnatural andman-madedisasters’.60Thebasicpremiseofresilienceistobetterpreparefor,respondto,and

recover fromdisasters,which in the contextof climate change soundslike a very sensible idea. But like being ‘more secure’, the newresiliencedoesnotoccurinavacuum.Rather,itisasif‘thedemandofsecurityandforsecurityissomehownolongerenough…Itisasthoughthe state is fast becoming exhausted by its own logic of security andwants a newer concept, something better and bolder’, writes MarkNeocleousintheJournalofRadicalPhilosophy.Neocleousexplainsthat:

The state now assumes that one of its key tasks is to imagine the

worst-case scenario, the coming catastrophe, the crisis-to-come, theloomingattack, theemergency thatcouldhappen,mighthappenandprobablywillhappen,allinordertobebetterprepared…Inthistaskresilienceplaysheavilyon its origins in systems thinking, explicitlylinking security with urban planning, civil contingency measures,public health, financial institutions, corporate risk and theenvironmentinawaythathadpreviouslybeenincrediblyhardforthestatetodo.61

Thisobsessionwithimaginingeverythingthatcouldgowronghasalsocometopermeatestateplanningateverylevel:April2015wasCriticalInfrastructure Security and Resilience Month at the Department ofHomelandSecurity; it is part of the policing of so-called ‘megavents’such as theOlympics (theLondon2012OrganizingCommittee had a‘Security and Resilience’ section); the term is even applied to state-building itself (which the OECD has styled as ‘from fragility toresilience’).Ateveryturn,ofcourse,thesecuritisationofinfrastructureor public policy provides a boon for the security and resiliencespecialists,consultantsandsystemsdevelopers.More profoundly, writes Neocleous, the concept of resilience now

stretches from the security state through business and the financialsystem to the management of personal problems. ConsultantsPricewaterhouseCooperspublishaResilienceJournal to help ‘reliancebuilders’ stay ‘attuned to both opportunities and threats’ and preparetheir ‘enterprises to be more resilient to change’. Since the 2008financialcrisis,theoverwhelmingemphasisinthebankingfraternityhasbeen to resist significant policy reform in favour of ‘Building amoreResilientFinancialSystem’,so that thefinancialsystemis ‘capableofabsorbingshocksfromtheeconomy’.62Andthisisthenubofresilience:the focus is stealthily transferred from the production of crises bycapital toward the management of crises by capitalism – fromsustainabledevelopmenttosustainablecapitalism,asitwere.Parallelingdevelopmentsinthewiderpoliticaleconomyof‘business

asusual’ispersonalresilience.Withitsoriginsintheendlesssupplyof‘self-help’books, resiliencepromises tohelpyouovercomeemotionalorphysicaltrauma,orjusttobeabetter,stronger,moreresilientperson.As Neocleous explains, resilience thus ‘connects the emotionalmanagementofpersonalproblemswiththewidersecurityagenda’.Thisisembodied,forexample,intheUKgovernment’sdecisiontosendex-servicepersonnel intoschools to teachkids ‘gritandresilience’,63andtheRANDCorporationsellingservicesfor‘individualsandcommunityorganizationswishing to learnmoreabout resilienceand to implementstrategies to help communities prepare, withstand, and recover fromdisasters’.64RAND has identified no less than eight ‘levers of community

resilience’: ‘wellness’ (pre- and post-incident population health),‘access’(tohealthandsocialservices),‘education’(aboutpreparednessand risk), ‘engagement’ (participatory decision making), ‘self-sufficiency’ (responsibility for preparedness), ‘partnership’ (betweengovernment and NGOs), ‘quality’ (improve community resiliencethrough constant evaluation), and ‘efficiency’ (leveraging resources).Whatisstrikingisnotjusthowthe‘soldiersofreason’nowprofferanoff-the-shelfsolutionforvulnerablecommunities tomitigate the threatposed by climate change,65 but how conceptually similar it is to theTransitionTownmovement’s definition,whichviews ‘resilience’ as adesiredstatecentredupon‘strengthen[ing]ourcommunitiesfromwithininordertoreduceourvulnerabilityandincreaseourabilitytorespond,surviveandprosper’.66Tobeclear, there isnothing intrinsicallywrongwith thepremiseof

being more resilient: of course, we should wish that in the face oflegitimate fears about the potentially devastating impacts of climatechange. There is equally nothing new about the appropriation ofalternative/autonomouscultural andpolitical action for corporategain.Thequestionthatwemustkeepasking,however,iswhoorwhatgetstobe resilient, andwhoorwhatgets leftbehind? Is thegoal tokeep thelightsonortokeeptheprofitsflowing?

Theconceptof‘adaptation’canbenolessproblematic,withtheonusfor change placed on vulnerable communities instead of powerfulinterestswhomightinsteadbeaskedtoadapttheirpracticessotheynolonger harm people. The dangers are self-evident: thosewho lack theresourcestoadaptandbecomemoreresilientareforgotten,whilecallsfor more radical social and political change are marginalised. AsNeocleousexplains,‘Resiliencewantsacquiescence,notresistance.Notapassiveacquiescence,forsure, infactquite theopposite.But itdoesdemandthatweuseouractionstoaccommodateourselvestocapitalandthestate,andthesecurefutureofboth,ratherthantoresistthem.’67

Policingtheimagination:Dystopiaandscarcity

If ‘security’ boils down tomaking things stay (largely) the same, and‘resilience’ is aboutmarshalling activism (or at least volunteerism) inthe service of this endeavour, the dystopian narratives about climatechangeandinsecuritythatunderpinthemtakeonanaddedsignificancebyfeedingintoawidercultureofpoliticalapathy.Reflecting on the capacity of well-educated individuals to

simultaneously grasp the threat and impact of climate change whiledoing nothingwhatsoever about it,British novelist Zadie Smith jokesthat‘It’shardtokeepapocalypseconsistentlyinmind,especiallyifyouwant to get out of bed in the morning.’68 The quip belies a moreprofound observation; it is as if our current spirit of resilience isencapsulated in the supremely irritating ‘Keep calm and carry on’meme.Orperhaps it is that theworld isalreadysuffering‘catastrophefatigue’?Regardless, dystopia is now an important cultural and political

phenomenoninitsownright.The‘hopeless’fightagainstgreed,excessand corporate plunder has itself become a hackneyed backdrop topopular culture, spurred on by those branches of right-and left-wingthought that adopt essentially Malthusian approaches to the current

crisis–approachesframedbysomefuturedayofreckoning,beitwithGod,MotherEarth,orsomepluckyHollywoodhero.The ‘doomers’ have been widely criticised in recent times. The

authors of Catastrophism: The apocalyptic politics of collapse andrebirth do not just critique the way in which these discourses areembroiled in theproductionof apathy,buthow theydovetailwith theagendas of the powerful, and the political choices their rhetoricpromotes, from localism to green capitalism to gun-toting‘survivalism’.69 ‘Catastrophists’, they argue, believe that ‘an ever-intensified rhetoricofdisasterwill awaken themasses from their longslumber’: the left hoping for the collapse of capitalism and a radicalrebirth,therightlookingfordivineinterventionandretribution–neitherstrategy having much to commend it. Leigh Phillips has taken thiscritique a step further by linking green-left dystopia to a retreat fromEnlightenment values and calls for ‘de-growth’, which he suggests ispaving the way for an era of permanent ‘eco-austerity’, sounding thedeathknellforsocialistsandprogressivesalike.70Buttheclimate-securitydiscoursesuggeststhatdystopiaisalsoatop-

downstrategyrelatedtotheconsolidationofpowerandthereproductionof inequality. Two things are particularly important here. First, by‘shiftingtheresponsibilityforthecrisistothemassesofpoorpeopleintheworld’, ‘Malthusianenvironmentalism’eases thepressureon thosecorporations, nation-states and militaries who bare significantresponsibility for current insecurity.71 Second, as Jackie Orr hasintimated in ‘making civilian soldiers’, by suggesting conflict andcatastrophe is predictable or even inevitable, ‘civil society can bepsychologically conditioned for the production of violence.’72 In thiscontext, preparing for violent confrontation and civilisational collapseappears the very worst of foundations for thinking about just andproportionate responses to current insecurities, let alone trying toorganiseradicalpolitics.Rather,itoffersanexcellentplatformforstatestoexploitauthoritarianpopulisminthenameofscarcity.Herewe can be confident that the appropriation and exploitation of

land, water, mineral and hydrocarbon resources will lead to localconflictandsocialunrestbecauseitalreadydoesso.Thisisnotonlyastruggle that frequently pitches states and corporations against localcommunities, but one in which those states and corporations oftentriumphwith support fromsecurity forces.AsNnimmoBasseymakesclearinanonlineessaypreparedforthiscollection,themilitaryandthefossil-fuel industry inNigeriahaveworked inasymbiotic relationshipfor decades.Themilitary has grown fat on the back of its promise tokeep oil flowing, while the oil industry has happily turned to themilitaryforactionwheneversupplywasthreatened.Thisis,ofcourse,amicrocosmof amuchwider ‘energy-security’ policy that hasblightedtheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.Rather than seek to avoid the ‘race for what’s left’ of our natural

resources, the security establishments of powerful countries andregional blocs continue to support the extraction and consumptionpatternsresponsibleforclimatechangeandinsecuritywithasmuchzealas ever. The melting ice-caps in the Arctic region – an almost ever-present topic in climate-securitydebates– are a case inpoint. ‘Asweconsiderhowtomakethemostoftheemergingeconomicopportunitiesin the region, we recognize that we must exercise responsiblestewardship…promotinghealthy,sustainable,andresilientecosystemsoverthelongterm’,wroteBarackObamain2013,beforesettingoutanational ‘Arctic strategy’ predicatedon theUS’s commercial, securityanddefenceinterests.73Thefollowingyearthiswouldbecomeafully-fledgedArcticmilitarystrategy.AndastheMiddleEastlurchesfromonecrisistothenext,European

andUSinter/nationalsecurityinterestsremainembroiledwiththoseofSaudiArabiaandtheGulfstates.Isthisacrediblewayofmitigatingthethreats of climate change and resourcewars (neverminddealingwithright-wing Islamic fundamentalism)? Of course it isn’t. As researchcollectiveCornerHouseexplains:

…futurecrisesarelikelytoberootedinthesamedynamicsinwhich

they are rooted today: political conflict, exploitative distributiveinstitutions,sexism,racism,humanrightsabusesandenvironmentallydestructive practices. If societywants to prepare for future resourcecrises(andtheresurelywillbefuturescarcityofonekindoranother),itwouldbemoreprudent to look to thepresent rather than to sometheoretical model of the future. As the future will grow out of thepresent,abetterwayofdealingwith‘futurecrisis’isnotimaginingafutureMalthusianworldthatbearsnorelationshiptowhatexistsnowor ever has existed, and then imagining how to stave off thathypothetical Malthusian destiny, but rather dealing with currentscarcities now on the realistic assumption that what causes scarcitytodayisgoingtogooncausingscarcityinthefuture.74

In climate change and security strategies, although some of thestructural problems underpinning current crises are acknowledged, thefutureisusedto‘thrustthemintothebackground,castingthemaspettydistractionsofpurely academic interest’, in comparison to the comingshitstorm.Inthisway,arguesCornerHouse,threatstotheenvironmentand society are ‘beingused to colonize the future and therebycapturethepresent’.‘Resilience’,thenewhandmaidenofsecurity,canbeseenasanotherfundamentalmechanismforwhat theydescribeas‘policingtheimagination’,withthe‘constantre-imaginingofthemyriadwaysinwhich [threats]mightbe realized’ amounting to ‘nothing less than theattemptedcolonizationofthepoliticalimaginationbythestate’.75

Insecurityasopportunity

Tosuggestthatitisnotalldoom-and-gloomistoriskbeingwrittenoffas delusional, or a techno-utopian, but many climate-changecampaigners do see transition as an opportunity to build a moreequitableandsocially justworld(back toZadieSmith’s ‘whyelsegetoutofbed’conundrum).AsSimonDalbyhasexplained,recentresearch

emphasises that ‘environmental difficulties frequently facilitate co-operation rather than conflict, as dealing with stratospheric ozonedepletionmadeespeciallyclear.’Hemakesthepointthat‘collaborationhas frequently provenmuchmore effective than conflict inmanagingscarceresources’,providing‘considerablecauseforoptimismin termsofsecurityplanning’.76The climate crisis could also be a boon for advocates ofKeynesian

economic and social policy – or what their detractors call ‘biggovernment’.AsChristianParentihasexplained:

Duringnaturaldisasters, society regularly turns to thestate forhelp,whichmeans such immediate crises are amuch-needed reminder ofjusthowimportantafunctionalbiggovernmentturnsouttobetooursurvival…Afterall,thereisonlyoneinstitutionthatactuallyhasthecapacity to deal with multibillion-dollar natural disasters on anincreasingly routine basis. Private security firms won’t help yourflooded or tornado-struck town. Private insurance companies aresystematically withdrawing coverage from vulnerable coastal areas.Voluntary community groups, churches, anarchist affinity groups –eachmayprovehelpfulinlimitedways,butforbetterorworse,onlygovernmenthasthecapitalandcapacitytodealwiththecatastrophicimplicationsofclimatechange.77

‘Catastrophism’, however, sounds a warning of the more likelyimplicationsofanexpansionofthestate:

The Keynesian stimulus hoped for by proponents of a Green NewDealismorelikelytobeafurtherexpansionofborderfences,navalpatrols,militarycontractors,privatisedsecurityservices,surveillancesystems, and climate monitoring drones. Indeed, since 2008, thesecurity industry has grown at 5% annually despite a worldwiderecession and its projected global revenue was estimated to besomewhereintheregionof$20billionin2013.78

Littlemoreneedstobesaidaboutthepredatoryandpervasivelogicof‘disaster capitalism’ at this point, except perhaps to warn, as othershave,thatfailuretopreventclimatechangecouldpersuadethesecurityestablishmenttosupportfuturegeo-engineeringprojects.That corporate profiteers and private individuals will continue to

feather their own nests on the back of disaster is a given. What isperhapsmore interesting in termsof climatechangeand inter/nationalsecuritystrategyisthewayinwhichdisastercapitalismbringswithitaparticularwayofviewing theworld.AsNaomiKleinobserved inherbookTheShockDoctrine:

AtfirstIthoughttheGreenZonephenomenonwasuniquetothewarinIraq.Now,afteryearsspentinotherdisasterzones,IrealizethattheGreenZoneemergeseverywherethatthedisastercapitalismcomplexdescends,withthesamestarkpartitionsbetweentheincludedandtheexcluded,theprotectedandthedamned.79

Dividing the world into red zones and green zones and the like issomethingeliteshavealwaysdone.Butubiquitoussurveillanceandriskmanagement have taken this enterprise to new heights. Greentechnology and the military’s new-found concern for climate changewill take it further still.TheUSDepartment ofDefensenowboasts aprogrammethat

…visualizesmultipledimensionsofclimatevulnerabilityandrisksina singlemap.Data about conflicts, aid, governance and climate areoverlaidtogiveadynamicviewofthecontinent’sriskfactors,aswellas development projects such asWorldBank initiatives to buffer oradapt toclimatechange.Userscanselectand layeranycombinationof data to see how climate change intersects with risks over time.Local conflicts, for example, canbe related to climate-induced foodinsecurity.80

Surelynothingencapsulatesourcurrentmalaisebetter thanthe images

depicted in the Department of Defense’s screenshots (seehttp://tinyurl.com/securitymap). We have satellites and drones andalgorithmstohelpusmeasureandconnecteachandeverydimensionofthe disasters to come, but we can’t muster the political will to try toprevent them. We are mapping vulnerability – not to help thevulnerable, but to seek out opportunity for the disaster-industrialcomplex.Meetthenewdystopia,sameastheoldone,insulatingtherichfromthethreatofthepoor.

Notes

1.Schwartz,P.andRandall,D.(2003).AnAbruptClimateChangeScenarioanditsImplicationsforUnitedStatesNationalSecurity.Washington,DC:USDepartmentofDefense.

2.

Asstatedinparagraph143ofthe2005WorldSummitOutcome(A/RES/60/1),entitled‘HumanSecurity’,theHeadsofStateandGovernmentstressed‘therightofallpeopletoliveinfreedomanddignity,freefrompovertyanddespair’,andrecognisedthat‘allindividuals,inparticularvulnerablepeople,areentitledtofreedomfromfearandfreedomfromwant,withanequalopportunitytoenjoyalltheirrightsandfullydeveloptheirhumanpotential.’

3. High-levelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChange.(2004).AMoreSecureWorld:Oursharedresponsibility:Report,p.15.

4.Campbell,K.M.etal.(2007).TheAgeofConsequences:Theforeignpolicyandnationalsecurityimplicationsofglobalclimatechange.CenterforStrategic&InternationalStudies.

5.

Kirtman,B.,Power,S.B.,Adedoyin,A.J.,Boer,G.J.,Bojariu,R.,Camilloni,I.,andWang,H.(2013).Near-termclimatechange:Projectionsandpredictability.ClimateChange2013:ThePhysicalScienceBasis.doi:10.1017/cbo9781107415324.023

6.

ClimateChangeandInternationalSecurity.(2008).Retrievedfromhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/

pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf.

7.

‘AsecureEuropeinabetterworld–theEuropeanSecurityStrategy’wasapprovedbytheEuropeanCouncilheldinBrusselson12December2003.AReportontheimplementationoftheEuropeanSecurityStrategy–providingsecurityinachangingworld,incorporatingthereportonClimateChangeandInternationalSecurity,wasapprovedbytheEuropeanCouncilheldinBrusselson11and12December2008.

8.

RemarksbyPresidentObamaattheacceptanceoftheNobelPeacePrize.(10December2009).Retrievedfromhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize.

9.USDepartmentofDefense.(2010).QuadrennialDefenseReviewReport.p.73.Retrievedfromhttp://www.defense.gov/QDR/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf.

10. Ibid.,p.87.

11. Ibid.,p.85.

12. Ibid.,p.8.

13.

USDepartmentofDefense.(2014).2014ClimateChange:Adaptationroadmap.Retrievedfromhttp://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1312288/dod-report-on-climate-change-readiness-october.pdf;McDonnell,T.(13October2014).Pentagon:Wecouldsoonbefightingclimatewars.Retrievedfromhttp://www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2014/10/pentagon-climate-change-shift-wars.

14.CenterforNavalAnalyses.(2007).NationalSecurityandtheThreatofClimateChange,report.Retrievedfromhttp://www.cna.org/reports/climate.

Bender,B.(9March2013).AdmiralSamuelLocklear,commanderofPacificforces,warnsthatclimatechangeistopthreat.Retrievedfromhttp://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/03/09/

15. admiral-samuel-locklear-commander-pacific-forces-warns-that-climate-change-top-threat/BHdPVCLrWEMxRe9IXJZcHL/story.html.

16.

Olson,W.(10August2014).PACOMnotwaitingonpoliticstoplanforclimatechangechallenges.Retrievedfromhttp://www.stripes.com/news/pacom-not-waiting-on-politics-to-plan-for-climate-change-challenges-1.297433.

17.CenterforNavalAnalyses.(2007).NationalSecurityandtheAcceleratingRisksofClimateChange,report.Retrievedfromhttps://www.cna.org/reports/accelerating-risks.

18.

OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence.(2008).Globaltrends2025:Atransformedworld.NationalIntelligenceCouncil,2008(3),77.Retrievedfromhttp://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf.

19.

NationalIntelligenceCouncil.(n.d.).Commissionedresearchandconferencereports.Retrievedfromhttp://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-nic-publications/the-impact-of-climate-change-to-2030-commissioned-research-and-conference-reports.

20.

DefenseIntelligenceAgency,NationalGeospatial-IntelligenceAgency,CentralIntelligenceAgency,BureauofIntelligenceandResearchoftheUSStateDepartment,andUnitedStatesDepartmentofEnergy.(2012).GlobalWaterSecurity.Retrievedfromhttp://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/ICA_Global%20Water%20Security.pdf.

21.

NationalIntelligenceCouncil.(2013).Naturalresourcesin2020,2030and2040:ImplicationsfortheUnitedStates.NationalIntelligenceCouncilReport,2013(5).Retrievedfromhttp://www.dni.gov/files/documents/NICR%202013-05%20US%20Nat%20Resources%202020,%202030%202040.pdf.

22.

USGovernmentIntelligence.(n.d.).Climateandsecurityresources:U.S.government,intelligence.Retrievedfromhttp://climateandsecurity.org/resources/u-s-government/intelligence/.

23.OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,andUSIntelligenceCommunity.(2014).TheNationalintelligenceStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica2014,p.5.

24.Klare,M.(2013,21April).Tomgram:MichaelKlare,thecomingglobalexplosion.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175690/.

25.

SternReview:Theeconomiceffectsofclimatechange[Abstract].(2006).Population&DevelopmentReviewPopulationandDevelopmentReview,p.vi.Retrievedfromhttp://mudancasclimaticas.cptec.inpe.br/~rmclima/pdfs/destaques/sternreview_report_complete.pdf.

26.GermanAdvisoryCouncilonGlobalChange.(2007).Worldintransition:Climatechangeasasecurityrisk.Retrievedfromhttp://www.wbgu.de/en/flagship-reports/fr-2007-security/.

27.Forexample,intheUS:CenterforClimateandSecurity(http://climateandsecurity.org),WilsonCenter‘NewSecurityBeat’http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/.

28.

Muniruzzaman,A.(17October2013).Globalwarmingandglobalsecurity.Retrievedfromhttp://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/muniruzzaman-khanon-climate-change-as-a-military-problem.

SecurityCouncil.(20July2011).Securitycouncil,instatement,says‘context

29. ualinformation’onpossiblesecurityimplicationsofclimatechangeimportantwhenclimateimpactsdriveconflict.Retrievedfromhttp://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10332.doc.htm.

30.

BRICSMinistryofExternalRelations.(15July2014).SixthBRICSsummit:Fortalezadeclaration.Retrievedfromhttp://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/press-releases/214-sixth-brics-summit-fortaleza-declaration.

31.IPCC.(30March2014).Summaryforpolicymakers(approved)andfinaldraft(accepted).Retrievedfromhttp://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/report/final-drafts/.

32.

GlobalMilitaryAdvisory,CouncilonClimateChange,UniversityofCambridge’sInstituteforSustainabilityLeadershipandEuropeanClimateFoundation.(June2014).Climatechange:Implicationsfordefence.Retrievedfromhttp://www.academia.edu/7454647/Climate_Change_Implications_for_Defence_June_2014.

33.

Dalby,S.(June2013).Climatechange:Newdimensionsofenvironmentalsecurity.Retrievedfromhttps://www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:A51CC1B1090750/#.VXIdgFLE-Dm.SeealsoSelby,J.andHoffman,C.(30October2014).Rethinkingclimatechange,conflictandsecurity.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fgeo20/19/4.

34.

Randall,A.(17February2014).There’slittleevidencethatclimatemigrationwillleadtoglobalconflict.Retrievedfromhttp://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2014/02/despite-the-guardians-front-page,-theres-little-evidence-climate-change-will-lead-to-global-conflict/.

35.

Dalby,S.(June2013).Climatechange:Newdimensionsofenvironmentalsecurity,p.36.Retrievedfromhttps://www.rusi.org/publications

/journal/ref:A51CC1B1090750/#.VXIdgFLE-Dm

36.Selby,J.andHoffmann,C.(30October2014).Rethinkingclimatechange,conflictandsecurity.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tandf.net/books/details/9781138915398/#description.

37.

Söderbaum,F.andSörensen,J.(2012).Introduction:Theendofthedevelopment-securitynexus?Retrievedfromhttp://www.gu.se/english/research/publication?publicationId=170904.

38. Selby,J.andHoffman,C.(30October2014).

39.OfficeoftheSpecialAdviseronthePreventionofGenocide.(n.d.).Theresponsibilitytoprotect.Retrievedfromhttp://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml.

40.

Rogers,P.(1April2010).Beyond‘liddism’:Towardsrealglobalsecurity.Retrievedfromhttps://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/beyond-%E2%80%9Cliddism%E2%80%9D-towards-real-global-secrity.

41.

Scahill,J.(9May2013).DirtyWars:Theworldisabattlefield(Wellcome).London:Serpent’sTail.Retrievedhttp://www.amazon.co.uk/Dirty-Wars-world-battlefield-Wellcome/dp/1846688507.

42.

Holthaus,E.(n.d.).‘Climatechangewar’isnotametaphor.Retrievedfromhttp://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/04/david_titley_climate_change_war_an_interview_with_the_retired_rear_admiral.html.

43.

Goodell,J.(12February2015).ThePentagonandclimatechange:Howdeniersputnationalsecurityatrisk.Retrievedfromhttp://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-pentagon-climate-change-how-climate-deniers

-put-national-security-at-risk-20150212#ixzz3TMD1JwUS.

44.Riefer,T.(2007).Blownaway:U.S.militarismandHurricaneKatrina,inH.Potter(ed.),RacingtheStorm:RacialimplicationsandlessonslearnedfromHurricaneKatrina.Lanham,MD:LexingtonBooks.

45.

Solnit,R.(25August2009).Fouryearson,Katrinaremainscursedbyrumour,cliche,liesandracism.RetrievedJune5,2015,fromhttp://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/aug/26/katrina-racis-mus-media;Riefer,T.(2007).

46.

Seymour,R.(15November2013).Therealstoryof‘looting’afteradisasterliketyphoonHaiyan.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/15/looting-typhoon-haiyan-philippines-new-orleans-haiti.

47. Dalby,S.(June2013),p.45.

48. Seymour,R.(15November2013).

49.Hayes,B.(25April2013).Howinternationalrulesoncounteringthefinancingofterrorismimpactcivilsociety.Retrievedfromhttp://socs.civicus.org/?p=3823.

50.

InternationalNetworkofCivilLibertiesOrganization(INCLO).(2013).TakeBacktheStreets:Repressionandcriminalizationofprotestaroundtheworld,p.61.Retrievedfromhttps://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/global_protest_suppression_report_inclo.pdf.

51.

Greenwald,G.(14August2014).TheMilitarizationofU.S.police:FinallydraggedintothelightbythehorrorsofFerguson.Retrievedfromhttps://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/14/militarization-u-s-police-dragged-light-horrors-ferguson/.

52.AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion.(2014).Warcomeshome:TheexcessivemilitarizationofAmericanpolicing.Retrievedfromhttps://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-web-rel1.pdf.

53. Hörnqvist,M.(2004).Thebirthofpublicorderpolicy.Race&Class,46(1),30–52.doi:10.1177/0306396804045513.

54.

Cantú,A.(2014,5December).Video:NYPDusesmilitary-gradesonicweapononEricGarnerprotesters.Retrievedfromhttp://www.alternet.org/news-amp-politics/video-nypd-uses-military-grade-sonic-weapon-eric-garner-protesters.

55.

Hayes,B.(2014).Stateofsurveillance:TheNSAfilesandtheglobalfightback.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/state_of_surveillance_chapter.pdf.

56.

Lubbers,E.(2012).SecretManoeuvresintheDark:Corporateandpolicespyingonactivists.London:PlutoPress;Lilley,S.,McNally,D.,Yuen,E.andDavis,J.(2012).Catastrophism:Theapocalypticpoliticsofcollapseandrebirth.Oakland,CA:PMPress.

57. Seewww.climatesecurityagenda.com.

58.

GlobalWitness.(20April2015).Howmanymore?Retrievedfromhttps://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/environmental-activists/how-many-more/.

‘NotonlyisiteasyfortheU.S.anditscontractorstofocusonactivists,itisimperativethattheydoso.Theymusttargetsocialadvocatesinordertojustifymaintainingtheirbudgetsandtheirlivelihoods.Therearesimplynotenough“terrorists”inexistenceforthegovernmenttowarrantthecurrentlevelofintelligencespending.Asaresult,enormousfederalresourcesaredevotedtoidentifyingandtrackingactivistswhoareportrayedas“extremists.”Individualswhohavehelpedbringaboutchangesincorporatepolicies,suchasanimalrightsorenvironmentaladvocates,arelabelleddomesticterroristthreatsbytheFBI.Themoreindividualsthesecurityindustrycanidentifyasposinganationalsecuritythreat–oftenbasedontenuous,inaccurateormisleadinginformatio

59. n–themoreitbecomespossibletosecuresizablegovernmentcontracts’Karlin,M.(21August2013).Fromspyingon‘terroristsabroad’tosuppressingdomesticdissent:Whenwebecomethehunted.Retrievedfromhttp://truth-out.org/news/item/18292-from-spying-on-terrorists-abroad-to-using-massive-surveillance-to-suppress-domestic-dissent-when-we-become-the-hunted.

60.

EuropeanCommission.(n.d.).Securesocieties–ProtectingfreedomandsecurityofEuropeanditscitizens.Retrievedfromhttp://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/secure-societies-%E2%80%93-protecting-freedom-and-security-europe-and-its-citizens.

61.Neocleous,M.(March2013).Resistingresilience.Retrievedfromhttp://www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/resisting-resilience.

62.

BankofEngland.(2009).Buildingamoreresilientfinancialsystem.Retrievedfromhttp://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/2009/fsr25sec3.pdf.

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64.RandCorporation.(n.d.).Resilienceinaction.Retrievedfromhttp://www.rand.org/multi/resilience-in-action.html.

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69. Lilley,S.,McNally,D.,Yuen,E.andDavis,J.(2012).

70. Phillips,L.(2015).AusterityEcology&theCollapse-pornAddicts:ALeftdefenceofeconomicgrowth,progressandstuff.ZeroBooks.

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Orr,J.(2005).Makingciviliansoldiers:Themilitarisationofinnerspace,inHartmann,B.,Subramaniam,B.andZerner,C.,eds,MakingThreats:Biofearsandenvironmentalanxieties.Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield,pp.47–70.

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79. Klein,N.(2008).TheShockDoctrine:Theriseofdisastercapitalism.London:Penguin,p.414.

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Coren,M.(18April2012).U.S.DefenseDepartmentmapsfutureclimateturmoilinAfrica.Retrievedfromhttp://www.fastcoexist.com/1679682/us-defense-department-maps-future-climate-turmoil-in-africa.

3

CLIMATECHANGEINC.:HOWTNCsARE

MANAGINGRISKANDPREPARINGTOPROFITINA

WORLDOFRUNAWAYCLIMATECHANGE

OscarReyes1

I’mnot disputing that increasingCO2emissions in theatmosphere is going tohave an impact … [but] we believe those consequences are manageable …Changes to weather patterns that move crop production areas around – we’lladapttothat.It’sanengineeringproblem,andithasengineeringsolutions.

(RexTillerson,CEOofExxonMobil)2

Introduction

Transnational corporations (TNCs) account for themajority of globaltradeandinvestmentintoday’seconomy,whichisoftentakenasasignthatweshouldlooktothemasleadersinaddressingboththecausesandimpactsofclimatechange.Large corporations themselves are generally fond of extolling their

climate-change credentials. For example,Walmart, theworld’s largestretailer, and EDF, the world’s largest electricity producer, both claim

their climate policies make them a ‘leader in sustainability’.3Meanwhile, some nongovernmental organizations like theEnvironmentalDefenseFund,theWorldWildlifeFundandTheNatureConservancy have long sought partnerships with (and funding from)some of the world’s largest TNCs. ‘We work closely with businessleaders and hold them accountable to ambitious goals while alsocelebrating their environmental gains,’ explains Tom Murray, vicepresidentof theEnvironmentalDefenseFund’sCorporatePartnershipsProgram.4Thischapteroffersadifferentview.ItshowshowTNCs’investment

strategies seek to escape accountability for their role in causing theclimate crisis, consistently fail to address the systemic risks thatbusiness-as-usualposes,anddoverylittletosupportajusttransitiontoalow-carboneconomy.Ratherthanembracingcorporateleadership,thekeytoaddressingclimatechangeanditsgrowingimpactsonour livesandsocietywilllieindiminishingthepowerofthetransnationals.

Adirtybusiness

Where TNCs stand on climate change largely depends on theinvestmentstheyaresittingon.Oilandgascorporationshaveconcludedthat they would benefit far more from building up huge reserves –exploitingnewsites andunconventional fuels– than theywould fromspearheading a renewable energy transition. As Naomi Klein puts it,‘Wrecking theplanet is their businessmodel.’5 Similarly, the bankingsectorcurrentlyhastoomuchinvestedinfossil-fuelstockstopaymuchmorethanlipservicetocleaneralternatives.Eventheinsurancesector,which often takes the lead in calling for action on climate change, ispositioning itself togain from inaction:extremesofweathercanserveasamarketingopportunitytosellmoreproducts,therisksofwhichareoutsourcedtoothercompaniesor,ultimately,underwrittenbystates.Transnational corporations are not just gearing up to profit from

climatechange,buttheyweredisproportionatelyresponsibleforcausingtheprobleminthefirstplace.Justninetycorporationsproducedalmosttwo-thirds of the CO2 and methane emissions produced during theindustrialera.6Many of the same transnational corporations, and a small clutch of

newerones,maintaintheirleadingroleincausingclimatechange–asiswell-documentedbyresearchersattheCarbonTrackerInitiative(CTI).Their analysis shows that financialmarkets are carrying an enormous‘carbon bubble’ with ‘more fossil fuels listed on the world’s capitalmarkets than we can afford to burn if we are to prevent dangerousclimate change’.7 The 200 largest polluters listed on public stockmarkets in 2013 own 762 Gigatonnes of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) inuntappedreservesofoil,gasandcoal.Bywayofcomparison,aglobalcarbonbudgetforlimitingclimatechangeto2°C(whichmaystillleadtoclimatedisaster)wouldbearound565–886GtCO2to2050.8

Whilethesefiguresusefullyshedlightonthescaleoftheproblemtheworld’s largest fossil fuelcompaniespose, theCTIanalysisofhow toaddressthisproblemismorelimited.Theiraimistopersuadeinvestorsthat the carbon content of investments should be counted and tohighlighttheriskofholdingontostrandedassetsifstatesputrestrictionsonextraction in linewith their international commitments.Sincemostof the value on oil and gas companies’ balance sheets relates toupstream investments that will pay off in over a decade’s time, aconsideration of the long-term risks could dent their share value andencouragearethinkonlonger-termstrategies.Atthesametime,theaimis to compel institutional investors to push for greater action, toencourage ratings agencies to factor in climate risk and to pressureregulatorstodemandmandatorycarbonreporting.Thismayprovideacompellingargumentforactivistsandconcerned

citizens, but it is unlikely to convince fossil-fuel companies andfinancialsectorinvestorstochangetack.Theyarebettingon(andoftenencouraging)states to takeactionsonclimatechangethatareweak,at

best,whileprojectingthelucrativepossibilitiesfromremaininginvestedinfossil fuels.To illustrate thispoint, let’s lookmorecloselyata fewparticularsectors:oilandgas,banking,andinsurance.

Anewoilage?

AccordingtoprojectionsfromtheInternationalEnergyAgency,aswellasthoseoftheoil industryitself,energydemandcouldtripleby2050,with the greatest share of this increase coming from emergingeconomies.9Withthesignificantriskthatthisdemandcouldoutstriptheavailable supply, particularly of liquid fuels, most future scenariospredictaworldofhigherenergyprices–despitethesignificantoilpricefallsin2015.Farfrommovingtheworldbeyondfossilfuels,however,these increased prices could make extreme energy sources (notablydeep-seaoffshore installations, tar sands,oil shaleand shalegas) evermoreprofitable,aswellasincreasingtheprofitabilityandextendingthelifespan of existing fields. Oil, gas and coal companies are investingaccordingly in new oil and gas exploration, production facilities andrefineries.10It is worth underscoring just how marginal climate change is as a

factorindirectingfossil-fuelinvestmentdecisions,whicharebasedona‘price deck’, that is, a series of price projections centredon future oilprices and production cost estimates. Projected demand – as well aspotentialconflictsinproducingregions–arethemainfactorsaffectinglong-termoilprices.Thosecompaniesthatprojectahigh-demand,high-pricefuturetendtoseeunconventional(anddirtier)productionasmoreattractive.Althoughclimatechangeisincreasinglytakenintoaccountintheformofapotentialcarbonprice,theabilitytopassonthis(relativelymarginal)costtoconsumers,alongsidestrongpredictedgrowth,leavesmostoilcompaniesunworried.TaketheexampleofRoyalDutchShell,theworld’slargestnon-state

oil company by revenue, which likes to portray itself as an industry

leaderonclimatechange.Lookedatfromaninvestmentperspective,itis clear that Shell is both ramping up conventional oil and gasproduction (in Nigeria, Kazakhstan and Iraq, in particular), whilesimultaneouslyexpandingoil-sandsoperationsinCanada,gas-to-liquids(GTL) extraction in Qatar, liquid natural gas operations globally,offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico and Brazil, and offshoreexploration in the Arctic. As the company itself acknowledges, thisstrategy will lead to ‘more energy-intensive’ production and an‘associated increase in direct CO2 emissions’ from the company’sfacilities.11Even Shell’s claims to manage the company’s carbon footprint are

builtaroundfossil-fuelextraction,withanemphasisplacedon itsgas-sector investments and carbon capture and storage. This reflects astrategicchoicemadein2009tobackawayfromsolarandwindpower,claiming that they were uneconomical.12 The company has sinceincreased its agrofuel operations instead, despite a large body ofevidence that these put pressure on food crops whilst failing tocontributetoclimatemitigation.13Shelltreatsthethreatofclimatechangelargelyasarisk-management

exercise,with themain components being reputational and regulatoryrisk. The latter includes taking into account the possible influence ofCO2prices,althoughas ‘a leading traderofcarbon’, thecompanycanalsoprofitfromcarbonmarkets.14Thecompanyhasasmall,25-personteam working on climate strategy, which is organisationally removedfrom the company’s ‘upstream’ (exploration and production)activities.15InitsCarbonDisclosureProject(CDP)report,Shellclaimsthattheincreasedriskofstormsurgesasaresultofclimatechangeisacontributing factor in the refitting and operation of some offshoreplatforms.16With less fanfare but greater consequence, however, Shell’s CDP

reportingalsonotesthatclimatemodellingof‘futureseaiceconditions’(for2030–50)isaconsiderationinitsArcticoilexplorations.17Atacost

ofwellover$5billionsince2005,Shell’sArcticexplorationsaremostlikely the largestsingle financialcommitment it ismaking toadapt itsoperationsinlightofclimatechange,asitbetsonrapidreductionsinicecoverandsustainedhighoilprices,makingoffshoreoilrecoveryfromthe region profitable – despite repeated failures and setbacks.18Elsewhere, Peter Slaiby, the vice-president of ShellAlaska, stated thecompany’sviewin lessguarded terms:‘Iwillbeoneof thosepersonsmostcheeringforanendlesssummerinAlaska,’hesaid,thedayafterclimatescientistsreportedarecorddeclineinArcticseaice.19Amajorpartofthecompany’sclimate-relatedworktakestheformof

modellingfutureenergyscenarios.Ithasmappedoutvariousscenariosin which either new international social ‘blueprints’ emerge foraddressingclimatechangeandenergysecurityor,morelikely,nationalgovernments ‘scramble’ to secure their own supplies (SeeIntroduction).20 Pursuing Arctic drilling conforms to this scenario,helpingthecompanytohedgeitssupplybetsinacontextwherenationaloil companies are generally taking greater control of their countries’naturalresources.While no two companies are the same, a similar pattern can be

observedinthecaseofotheroilmajors,whichhaveallconcludedthatitisworthpursuingfurtheroilandgasreserves.SaudiAramco, theworld’s largest oil company in terms of both its

‘proven reserves’and thedaily rateofoilproduction, is committed toexploiting its reserves while developing offshore and unconventionalgas and oil as fast as possible.At the same time it is seeking greaterreturns from refinery or (oil-based) chemical industries. It treats thepotential impacts of climate change as a ‘carbon management’ issue,focusing its efforts on ‘carbon capture and injection’.21 This is notsimplyaboutreducingemissions:suchtechnologyisalsoanticipatedtoenhancetheabilitytorecovermoreoil.

Bankingonclimatechange

Whiletheoilindustryhasaclearvestedinterestincontinuingextractionforaslongaspossible,thesameisnotobviouslytruewiththebankingsector. If theirownliterature is tobebelieved,majorbanksare takinggreatstridestowardsaddressingclimatechange.Citibankdeclaresitselfthe ‘most innovative investment bank for climate change andsustainability’. Morgan Stanley claims to support measures to tackleclimatechange,andsponsorsitsownInstituteforSustainableInvesting,whileBankofAmericatalksof‘financingalow-carboneconomy’.Yetthese same three banks are theworld leaders in providing finance forcoalmining.22Thedetailsof the lendingportfoliosofmajorbanksare shrouded in

commercial secrecy. This allows them to put forward ambitious-soundingclaimsabouttheirfutureclimatelending.Forexample,Bankof America (BoA) claims to have in place a $70 billion commitment(over 16 years) to financing energy-efficiency projects, renewableenergyandother‘low-carbon’initiatives.23Butthis(non-binding)targetissovagueas tobealmostmeaningless.Climate-related investment isnot defined, althoughwe know fromBoA’s own presentations that itcan include structured financial instruments (the kind of speculativeproducts that were behind the 2008 financial crash) that have onlytenuous relations to climate change. If publicly accounted climatefinance is taken as a guide, it may also be used for anything frominstallingairconditioningtoexpandingoilrefineries.Moreover,BoAisnot suggesting that it will change its investment policies and trackclimatelendinginitsoverallportfolio,leavingopenthepossibilitythatmostofthefigureitclaimsissimplyaquestionofre-brandingroutinebusiness.Asimilarlackoftransparencyaffectsmostbanks’fossil-fuellending,

althoughresearchershavereconstructedknowndetailsoftheirportfoliotoshedsomelightonhowthisworks.Theyfoundthatbanksplayakey

role in providing corporate loans, as well as underwriting bond andshare issues thatmobilise finance for fossil-fuel extraction and fossil-fuel-basedelectricitygeneration.24Inaseriesofreports,Banktrackhaslookedatfinancialsupportprovidedtobothcoalminingandcoal-firedpower stations. It found that JPMorganChase,Citi,BankofAmerica,MorganStanleyandBarclayshad theworst recordglobally in lendinginsupportofcoalprojects(includingpowerplants).25Notably,allmajorbankscontinue toheavilyfundbothcoal-firedpowerstationsandcoalmining – even against the advice of aminority of their own analysts.Thesamepictureisbroadlytrueinrelationtooilandgaslending,withthe proviso that those sectors tend to see a greater proportion ofinvestmentcross-financedbytheirownprofits,ratherthanthefinancialsector.In short, the banking sector remains heavily invested in fossil fuels

andotherinfrastructurethataccentuatesclimatechange.Climatechangeremains largely an issue of reputation management, with vague andaspirational targets sometimes generated to face down criticisms offossil-fuellending,orusedas‘greenwash’forthePRdamagedonebythefinancialcrisis.26Butbanksarenotrequiredtoreportuponormakeany strategic assessmentof the climate-change risks that areposedbytheir overall investmentportfolios, nordoes there seemmuch realisticchancethatthiswouldhappenwithoutregulation.

Insurance:Passingthebuck

Insuranceistheonemajorbusinesssectorwheretheimpactsofclimatechangeonprofitmarginsand investmentdecisionsshouldbe themostobvious,withthegreaterfrequencyofextremeweatheralreadyresultinginsignificantincreasesinpay-outsforrelatedlossandpropertydamage.For example, Allianz forecast US$80–120 billion of annual damagegloballyfromweather-relateddisastersovertheperiod2010–19.27

Yet the structureof theworld’s largest insurancescompaniesmeansthat they do not always take a direct interest in steering investmentsawayfromclimate-changerisks. Insomeassessments,asteadystreamofclimate-relateddisastersmayactuallybegoodforbusiness,ascriticalgeographer Neil Smith points out, in so far as ‘they recharge home-ownerfearandinsecurityconcerningfinancial lossandtriggerasurgeof policies at inflated premiums.’28While this is not consistently thecase, other factors alsomitigate againstmore ambitious action acrossthewholesector.Significantdivergencesofapproachcanbeseenwithintheinsurance

industry.AIG,which once saw itself as a corporate leader on climatechange,changedtackandcloseditsclimateprogrammein2009–acaseof boardroom dynamics reflecting broader denials of the impact ofclimatechangeontherightoftheUSpoliticalspectrum.29Othershavefollowedasimilarpath,withBerkshireHathawayCEOWarrenBuffettevengoingsofarastoclaimthat‘climatechangeisnotamaterialrisk’tothecompany.30Amongst the other industry leading companies, AXA is seeking to

quantifythe‘emergingrisks’fromclimatechange(whichitregardsas‘proven beyond doubt’).31 Aside from the risks that more frequentextremes of weather pose to property insured by the company, it isworking to identify its implications for insurance in agriculture, thetransportsector,andprivatehealthcareservices.Allianz goes further, offering investors the option of sustainability-

focused financial products, whilst increasing its own holdings ofrenewableenergystocks.32Ithasstartedtoexperimentwithcatastrophebonds – a means to alleviate risks for insurance companies in caseswhere major disasters occur – driven, in part, by climate-changeconcerns.33Itsotherclimate-adaptationactivities,accordingtoareportAllianzmade to theUNFCCC, include an expandingmicro-insurancebusiness in six developing countries,which have gained the company100,000newclientsinIndiaalone.34Yettheseareallnicheinterestsin

an industrywhose largest players still often pay little heed to climatechangeandwhoseoverallbusinessstrategycontinuestobebusiness-as-usual.Inthecaseofclimatedisasters,thebuckrarelystopswiththefrontline

insurance companies. Most large corporates take out cover fromreinsurance companies, specialising in selling insurance to insurers, inorder to cover their risk. It is these re-insurers that have providedcorporate leadership on adaptation to climate change.MunichRe, theworld’slargestre-insurancefirm,setuptheMunichClimateInsuranceInitiative in 2005, which has concentrated on the inclusion of micro-insuranceandotherinsurance-basedapproachesininternationalpolicy.It has also published numerous reports on the climate impacts on theinsuranceindustry,showingthatre-insurerspickupthelargestshareofabillofaround$200billionperyear,hittingtheirbalancesheetsintheshort term, while stimulating some cost restructuring that ultimatelypassesthroughtoincreasedcoststopolicyholders.Atthesametime,re-insurancecompaniesareexpandingtheiroffering

of products that keep the wheels firmly on the fossil-fuels wagon.Alongside theWorldBankGroup’sMultilateral InvestmentGuaranteeAgency, re-insurers routinely now offer ‘political risk’ insuranceproducts,which have extractive industries as theirmain clients. Theircore business also includes underwriting loans, loan guarantees andotherinvestmentsmadeininfrastructureprojects,includingoffshoreoilexploration and production, and other projects controversially (andmisleadingly)labelled‘climatefriendly’.Forexample,theBeloMontedam inBrazil,which could decimate a large area of theAmazon anddisplace up to 40,000 people, is being underwritten by the Spanishinsurance company MAPFRE, Brazil Re, Munich Re and a host ofothers.35Re-insurancefirmshavealsobeguntooffer‘reputationalrisk’insurance,whichwouldpayouttosubsidiseaPRcampaigninresponseto damages sustained to brands by events such as the DeepwaterHorizonoilspill.Moregenerally, insurancecompaniesarebecomingindistinguishable

fromassetmanagers,with insurance just oneof several business linesthatincludemanagingstockholdings,tradingfutures,commoditiesandcurrency. The vast majority of the thousands of stock market fundscreatedbythesecompaniescontaininvestmentsinfossil-fuelindustries,while they are also increasingly involved in oil futuresmarkets.36Forexample, AllianceBernstein (majority owned by AXA) holds oil, gasandminingstocksworthoverUS$13billion.37Aswiththebanks,thereremains a stark disconnect between their pronouncements on climatechangeand their investmentportfolio.And foras longas thevalueofthese assets is centrally linked to projections on the value andaccessibility of proven reserves, the insurance sector (like otherbusinesses)isunlikelytobeareliableallyincontrollingandadaptingtoclimatechange.

Reducingclimatechangeto‘climaterisk’

Itisdifficulttogeneraliseabouttheinvestmentmotivesoftransnationalcorporationsasawhole,aproblem thatwould lookstillmoreacute ifwewere to cover a range of other business sectors, such as food andbeverages,carmanufacturingorinformationtechnology.Butacommonmethodologycanneverthelessbeobserved.Whenclimatechangeisfactoredintocorporateinvestmentstrategies

at all, it usually takes the form of a ‘climate risk [that] must beunderstoodandmanagedinthesamewayasanyothercorporaterisk’.38The major elements of this include regulatory risk, referring to ‘theimpactonthecompanyofcurrentandanticipatedlawsandregulationsrelating toclimatechange’, reputational risk,andavarietyofphysicalrisks, including the current or future impacts on supply chains ofchanging weather patterns, rising sea levels or diminishing watersupplies, and indirect risks posed by technological developments.Companiesrunningthisanalysishavenotedpotential impacts in termsof higher operating costs or reduced demand for certain products and

services.Abercrombie&Fitchestimates,forexample,thatitlostouton$10.7million in storeanddirect saleswhenSuperstormSandyhit theUS in 2012.39 But the models for quantifying any individual risksabstract from the systemic impact that climate changeas awholewillhave.A risk-management approach may have its uses in helping

corporations think through the climate-change implications of specificinvestmentchoices,but it alsohas significant limitations.By reducingclimate impacts to isolated categories of ‘risk’, corporate riskmanagementoffersa framework throughwhichclimatechangecanbenormalised and then dealt with by means of everyday, technocraticfixes: a big-box storemay be cited onmarginally higher ground in acoastal city, a car plant may be moved inshore, an oil rig may haveincreased stress testing, and so on. Risk management parcels out theclimate problem into isolated factors affecting particular assets andspecificorganisationalprocesses,but indoing so, it canmake itmoredifficultforfirmstoseethebigger-pictureeffectsoftheiractions,bothtotheirownlonger-termviabilityinaclimate-constrainedworld,andtosocietymoregenerally.Suchmeasuresspreadtherisksposedtoanindividualcorporation,but

alsogeneratesystemicriskinreducingtheincentivesfacedbyanyonecorporateactor todoanydifferently.Riskmanagementcanserveasasort of safety valve that allows corporations to continue to spread thesystemic damage that their fossil-fuel-related investments pose. Italmost never cautions: should we invest or not? But simply: havingdecidedtoinvest,howcanwesafeguardthisinvestment?A failure to address the bigger picture on climate change is

compounded by the fact that most corporations don’t consider thatcurrent or future climate-change regulations are likely to make asignificant difference, either in terms of directly restricting certainpollutingpractices,orthroughenergytaxation,subsidyshifts,orcarbonpricingrenderingcertainpracticesuncompetitive.ThecaseofExxonMobiloffersaclearexamplehere.InApril2014,

divestment campaigners forced the company to analyse its climate-changeriskexposure.Theresultingreportnotedtherigourwithwhichthe company considered ‘the risk of climate change in our planningbases and investments’, including stress testing against a conservativerange of economic assumptions and factoring in a cost of carbon ininvestment evaluations.40 It nevertheless concluded that governmentactionforcingExxon tokeepanyof itsoil reserves in thegroundwas‘highlyunlikely’,andargued that itcould thereforecontinue tosearchformoreoil andgaswithout restraint. ‘Basedon thisanalysis,weareconfidentthatnoneofourhydrocarbonreservesarenoworwillbecome“stranded”’,thecompanyproclaimed.That type of response represents a complacent – indeed, arrogant –

disregard for the planet.But it is based on a confident bet thatTNCswill continue to have significant influence on public policy making,both through their lobbying, and as a result of the anti-regulatoryneoliberalism shared by politicians of both the centre-left and centre-rightinmostindustrialisedcountries.Alackofregulatoryconstraint,orevenfearoffutureregulations,isa

significant problem because, left to their own devices, transnationalcorporations are profit-seeking machines that have little incentive tocurb their contributions to climate change. That canmean not simplyignoringclimatechange,butalsopositioningthemselvestoprofitfromsomeofitsworsteffects.

Profiteeringfromclimatechange

The ‘booming business of global warming’ was recently exposed byjournalistMcKenzie Funk, whose bookWindfall journeys around theworldinsearchofthepeopleandcorporationslookingtobenefitfromtheimpactsofclimatechange.IntheAlps,hefindsanIsraelicompanycapitalisingon thegreatervariabilityof snowconditionsbyproducingsnowmaking equipment, in what is now a billion dollar a year

business.41Over inCalifornia,private firefightersare teamingupwithinsurance companies to capitalise on the growing risks that wildfirespose toprivateproperty.42Climatechangehasalsoproven tobegoodbusiness for specialist consultants, such as catastrophe-modellingcompaniesadvisingtheinsurancesectoronwheretoraisepremiumsinresponsetoclimaterisks.Themainopportunitiestoprofitfromclimatechangelieinrelationto

energy,foodproductionandwaterdistribution(exploredinchapters8,9and10).Aswas recently documented by the Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change, global warming could be devastating for foodproduction,destroyingcropyieldsandpushinguppricestotheextentofdriving millions of people into poverty.43 But it is also a key factordriving farm land grabs in large parts of the world. From Canada toRomania, farm land is changinghandson the assumption that climatechangewill increaseyieldsathigher latitudes.44 InSouthSudan,Funkmeets an investment fundmanager positioning himself to profit fromclimate-inducedconflict,aswellasrisesinfoodprices.45The threat of drought,meanwhile, is driving a ‘climate-patent’ race

betweenmanyoftheworld’sbiggestbiotechcompanies.Waterscarcityis also high on the agenda for those investing on the assumption ofworsening climate change, with analysts talking up the chances ofwater-managementmultinationalssuchasSuezandVeolia.46In recentyears, that investmenthasbeen formalisedviaavarietyof

climate-change and environmental investment funds, which advertisethemselves as directing capital towards building a greener worldthrough investments in wind and solar energy as well as, morecontroversially,biofuels.Butthesesamefundstendtoexpendasmuchormorecapitalonbetsonacceleratingclimatechange:‘companiesthatfit the portfolio not because they could help fight climate change butbecause thewarmer theworld, the lesshabitable itbecame, thebiggerthewindfall’.47FunktracksthecaseoftheDeutscheBank’s$2.9billionDWS Climate Change Fund, whose portfolio includes Monsanto and

Syngenta, biotech giants hoping to expand a market in geneticallymodified ‘drought-resistant crops’, as well as water-treatment andfertilizercompanies.Elsewhere, Wall Street investors have interpreted the effects of

climate change as a green light for investment in gas extraction.‘They’re predictingmoreweather extremes,’ noted gas index investorSkip Aylesworth, in response to the landmark 2014 US NationalClimateAssessmentreport:‘Weatherextremesaregoodfortheenergybusiness.Moreenergyuse,betterfortheearnings.’48

Marketstructure

The structure of modern stock markets offers a further reason whyinvestorscontinuemyopicallybankrollingclimatechangeandavoidingmorefundamentalchange.Transnationalcorporationsare,forthemostpart, listedonpublicexchanges,whereinstitutionalinvestors(pension,savingsandinsurancefunds)controlmostshares.Themajorityoftheseare held in funds that invest on the basis of short-term measures ofeconomic performance. That translates into firms placing increasingpressure on senior executives to deliver on short-term financialperformance. The pressure is reinforced by an incentives culture inwhich share options can represent the largest share of multi-milliondollarpaysettlementsforseniorexecutives.Investments in oil and gas companies are a partial exception to this

trend,insofarastheirvalueismeasuredagainstreserves,whichwouldonly be exploited over the longer term. But this does not lessen theshort-term imperative to maximise the expansion of such reserves,againstwhichcompanyvalueiscreatedandbonusesarepaid.A further, structural issue relates to the interconnectedness of the

majorfossil-fuelcompaniesandthefinancialsector.In2011,agroupofSwissresearchersconductedthelargest-everstudyofthearchitectureofinternational corporate ownership, and found that ‘nearly 4/10 of the

control over the economic value of TNCs in the world is held, via acomplicatedwebofownershiprelations,byagroupof147TNCsinthecore.’49 Their conclusion was that ‘transnational corporations form agiant bow-tie structure and that a large portion of control flows to asmall tightly-knit core of financial institutions.’ Those firms, in turn,have significant assets invested in both fossil-fuel companies andspeculation on commodities (oil is the world’s most heavily tradedcommodity).Whatthatcreates,onaglobalscale,isasignificantvestedinterest in the continuation of the status quo: while big financialcorporations could survive a transition to renewable energy, theirpowerfulstatuswithin theeconomyaffords themtheability tosurvivewithouthavingtolearnorsignificantlyadapt.

Fromclimatedenialtocorporatemythmaking

Whenclimatechangecametoberecognisedasaglobalproblem,manyoftheworld’slargestcorporationssensedafundamentalthreattotheireconomicinterest.US-basedcorporationsinthefossil-fuel,automobile,electricity-generationandchemicalsectorsled theway.50Theyfundedextensiveefforts todelegitimiseclimatescience,using triedand testedtacticssummarizedbytheUnionofConcernedScientistsas

…exaggeratingtheuncertaintyassociatedwithclimatechangewhileignoringwhatisknown,fundingcontrarianscientistsandthinktanksengaged in spreading misinformation and blocking policy, andcontributing to politicians who proclaim they do not believe in thescienceofglobalwarming.51

At the same time, US politicians were subjected to fierce lobbyingagainstclimatelegislation,orratifyingthe1997KyotoProtocol,onthebasisofclaimsthatthehighcostsofreducingemissionswoulddestroyUScompetitiveness.

Mostnotably,theGlobalClimateCoalition(GCC)–afrontgroupforabout fortymajor oil, coal, auto and chemical corporations and tradeassociations–playedakeyroleindelayingandweakeninginternationalclimate agreements. The GCC successfully lobbied Washington toensure that no binding targets were included in the UN FrameworkConvention on Climate Change, agreed to at the 1992 Rio EarthSummit.Italsopromoteda1997SenateresolutionwhereUSlegislatorsexpressed unanimous opposition to legally binding greenhouse-gasreductionsunlessdevelopingcountries(responsibleforafractionofthecurrentandhistoricalemissions)acceptedsimilarlimits.ThetacticsidentifiedwiththeGCCanditsalliesarestilloccasionally

seen today. Most notably, the Koch brothers, whose Koch Industriesgroupisthesecond-largestprivatelyheldcompanyintheUS,bankrollclimate denial and provide millions of dollars annually to lobbyWashingtonpoliticiansagainstadoptingclimatelegislation.Forthemostpart,though,corporateresponsestoclimatechangehave

shifted. Since the early 2000s, most large corporations haveacknowledgedthatclimatechangeishappening,althoughthereremainsconsiderablediversityinwhatpolicyresponses,ifany,theyarewillingtocountenance.Andthereisstillgreaterreluctance,aswehaveseen,tomakesignificantchangestotheirownbusinesspractice.

Ecologicalmodernisation

We have already seen how investment based on the continuation offossilfuelstriestosecureapathforbusinessasusualtocontinue.Butthis is often accompanied by a ‘win-win’ discourse on ecologicalmodernisation.52From amarketing point of view, at least, it is now usually seen as

goodpractice toacknowledge thatclimatechange isaproblemand tohighlighthowcorporationsareactinginresponsetoit.Inarecentstudyon‘corporateresponsestoclimatechangeaspoliticalmyths’,business-

schoolresearchersChristopherWrightandDanielNyberginterviewedanumber of senior corporate managers and summarized the new‘corporate environmentalism’ thus: ‘while most of the businesses westudied acknowledged the issue of climate change as a threat andchallenge, they emphasised their central role in “solving” climatechange through technological innovation and the development of“green”productsandservices.’53Thiswasclearlyobservableinourexamplesfromboththeoilandgas

and financial sectors – and similar cases are easily found elsewhere,from airlines pioneering ‘climate-friendly’ agrofuels, to breweriesdeveloping‘carbon-neutral’beer.AsurveyofS&P500companies(the500 largest companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange orNASDAQ), based on self-reporting, found that they had $50 billioninvestedin‘emissions-reduction’and‘energy-savings’activities,about4percentoftheirtotalcapitalexpenditure.54Forexample,Walmart,theworld’slargestretailer,talksloudlyabout

sustainability, slashing emissions in its supply chain, and switching torenewable energy. To this end, the company produces a ‘globalresponsibility’report,documentingpocketsofprogressonreducingitsCO2 emissions intensity (for example, by reducingwaste). Yet at thesametime,itsannualgreenhouse-gasemissionscontinuetogrow.55A related aspect is that corporations tend to be flexible and

nonspecificindefiningthescaleoftheiraction–expressingaspirationalemissions reductions,or announcingprogrammes running intobillionsofdollarsthatsoundimpressiveinpressreleasesbutaredwarfedbytheactual impact of the company’s operations. The Bank of Americaexample cited above gives one illustration, andWalmart provides yetanother. Despite receiving media plaudits for setting a goal of being‘supplied by 100 per cent renewable energy’, the company wouldactually take about 300 years to achieve this at its current pace ofconvertingtorenewables.56Atpresent,Walmartderivesjust4percentoftheelectricityforitsUSstoresfromwindandsolarpower.

More damningly, the unsustainable nature of these majorcorporations’ business models remains unchallenged. In the case ofWalmart, that is manifested most obviously in its contribution to aglobalised,industrialfoodsystemthatisreliantonlongsupplychains–thecompanydoesnotcounttheimpactsofinternationalshippinginitsemissionsaccounting–aswellasinitscontributiontourbansprawlandincreasedcartravel.It is easy todismiss theeffortsofWalmartandothersas littlemore

thanpublicitystuntsdesignedtogreenwashtheircorporateimage.Butakeypartof theirresonancerelates to thewayithas legitimisedTNCs’attemptstobeconsideredgoodcorporatecitizens,seenasactingnotjustin the narrow interests of their shareholders but a broader range ofstakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, communities –indeed,globalsocietyaswhole.Againstabackdropofneoliberalpolicymaking, thispositioningcanserveascoverforcorporatelobbyingandincreased corporate involvement in national and internationalgovernance.

Corporatelobbying

Although climate change is the ultimate global problem, andtransnational corporations by definition operate across nationalboundaries,thecorefocusofclimatelobbyingremainsdomesticpolicymaking,with thepartial exceptionof theEU,whereBrussels is akeyfocus.Domestic lobbying happens both directly and indirectly. TNCs

directlysubmittheirownproposalstolegislators,hostpublicorclosed-doormeetings with senior civil servants andministers, place staff onsecondment to relevant government departments, and (where nationalrules allow) directly fund political parties to create leverage overdecision makers. But they also work through industry associationscovering individual sectors or (as in the case of groups like the

Confederation of British Industry, BusinessEurope or the AmericanChamberofCommerce)lobbyfortheinterestsof‘business’asawhole.These lobby activities have been extensively documented, but it is

worth underscoring that themessaging of individual corporations andbusiness associations has often diverged, and corporations often takepositionsthatarecontradictory.ThemostnotableexampleintheUSisthecaseoftheproposedclimateandenergybillin2010,where14largecorporations formed theUSClimateAction Partnership in support ofthebill,whiletheUSChamberofCommercepitcheditsstallagainstthelegislation.Anumberofcorporations,includingConocoPhillipsandtheGeneral Electric Company, were represented on both sides of thisdivide.57Themarket-basedframingof theUSclimatebill–whicheventually

fell victim to climate sceptics – and of other carbonmarket schemesbeforeitisalso,inpart,aresultofcorporateagendasetting.Emissionstradingschemes(ETS)areintendedtogivepollutersflexibility:insteadof simply putting a limit on greenhouse-gas emissions, companies aregivenpermitstopollutethattheycanuse,selliftheydon’tneedthem,orpurchasesothattheycanpollutemore.Corporationshaveplayedanimportantroleinsecuringtheadoptionofthis‘cap-and-trade’approach.Forexample,oilgiantBPrananinternalcarbon-tradingscheme,whichwasintendedtodemonstrateitsviabilitytoEuropeanpolicymakersandsoencouragethemtocreateacarbonmarketratherthansettingacarbontax.HistoriansoftheschemehaveshownhowemployeesofBP,Shellandahandfulofothercorporations formedpartofan informal ‘issue-specificpolicynetwork’withmembersof theEuropeanCommission’sDGEnvironmentthatadvocatedforthescheme.58Once the EU ETS was established, lobbying on the allocation of

emissions permits quickly became a form of rent-seeking, with thepower sector and heavy industries gaining generous allocations ofpermits topollute.Byamixofselling thesepermitsandhikingpricesforconsumersonthebackofover-statedassumptionsaboutwhatsuchpermitswouldcost, thepowersectorandheavyindustrieshavegained

billionsinunearnedwindfallprofitsfromtheETS,whiledoinglittletoreduceemissionsandnothing to restructure theeconomyawayfromarelianceonfossil fuels.59The schemehas alsobeen invoked timeandagain to undermine or block the adoption of a wide range of otherenvironmentalpolicies.

Pushingatanopendoor:Transnationalcorporationsandthestate

Thisbringsus,finally,totheroleofthestateinreinforcingthepoweroftransnational corporations and their business practices that neglect orexacerbate climate change.National governments often take a lead inlobbyingonbehalfofindustriestheydeemtobestrategicallyimportant.Forexample,Germanyroutinely lobbiesonbehalfof its ‘national’carindustry(whichproducesvehiclesacrosstheglobe)againstregulationsonvehicleemissionswithintheEuropeanUnion.60Lobbyingbynationstatesonbehalfoftransnationalcorporationsisacommonfeature,too,ofinternationalclimatenegotiations.AttheUNClimateConferenceinPoland,thePolishMinistryofEconomyeventeamedupwiththeWorldCoalAssociationtostageanInternationalCoalandClimateSummit,topromotethecontinueduseofcoalinpowerproduction.61Foot-draggingon the international stagecanalsobea resultof state

ownership. More than 10 per cent of the world’s 2,000 largestcompaniesaremajoritystateowned.62Publicownershipisparticularlyprevalent in the case of fossil fuels, with state-owned corporationsowningabout86percentofknownglobalreservesandaccountingforaround55percentofcurrentproduction.63State-ownedenterprisesarealso particularly prevalent in the mining sector, including mining forcoal and lignite. Many of these state-owned companies are highlycorporatised entities ‘whosemanagement has internalised the logic ofthe private sector, via the adoption of a market rationality primarily

focused on financial gains, with the subsequent deterioration of thepublicethos’.64Inshort,suchcompaniesseeaprofitablefutureinfossilfuels.But themaincontributionof thestate tocorporate inertiaonclimate

change arguably has less to do with fossil fuels than it does with anideological distaste for social and environmental regulation. Notably,this is not the same as distaste for regulation per se.While neoliberaltheory suggests that markets should be self-regulating and freelyfunctioning,themorecommonpracticeofneoliberalstateinterventionsis to ensure a ‘good business or investment climate’.65At a domesticlevel,forexample,theUKgovernmentscrappedacodeforsustainablehomesthatmandatedenergyaspartofadriveto‘simplify’regulationtohelp stimulate private investment. The Spanish government cutrenewables subsidies and placed a hefty tax on households andlandownerswho produce their own electricity from solar panels, as aresultoflobbyingfromlargeutilities(undertheguiseofausterity).66Therealdamageisdoneinternationally,though,intheterrainoftrade

policy.TheTrans-PacificPartnership(TPP),undernegotiationin2015,could include rules thatwould ‘harmonise’ environmental regulations,levelling themdown toa lowest commondenominator.67 Its proposed‘investment chapter’ would grant transnational corporations impunity,allowing themtobypass localcourts,opting for international tribunalsstackedintheirfavour.68TheEU’s existing and proposed free-trade agreements also serve to

weaken the hand of legislators in adopting tougher regulations. Forexample, the 2015-proposed Transatlantic Trade and InvestmentPartnership (TTIP)wouldputpressureon theEU to reduce its energyefficiencystandardstoUSlevels.69Itwouldalsostrengthenthehandofenergy-intensive industries,whicharearguing stronglyagainst theEUincreasingitsgreenhouse-gastargetswithoutsimilarcommitmentsfromotherindustrialisedcountries.More generally, the consequences of the EU’s pursuit of market

liberalisationcanbeseenintermsofitsincreasing‘emissionsembodiedin trade’, a consumption-based measure of responsibility forgreenhouse-gasemissions,whichshowsthat thebloc’sglobalshareofresponsibility for climate change has continued to rise. A plethora offree-tradeagreementsandbilateralinvestmenttreaties(BITs)thatallowtheEU to import goods fromunsustainable energy sources and evadeenvironmental regulations have encouraged this outsourcing ofemissions.70The state frequently acts as a backstop for corporate profitmaking,

sometimesevenopeningupnewbusinessopportunitiesby force.Thismanifestsitselfmostobviouslyinthewillingnessofstatestoengageinwarfare tosecureenergyresources.TheIraqWarof2003remains themostnotablerecentexample,andwhilstoilwasnotthesolemotiveforthe US and its allies in forcing that conflict, bringing Iraq’s reservesonto international markets in the hands of private corporations was aleadingstrategicinterest.The connection between military expansionism and securing oil

reserves is even clearer in the case of state oil companies, with theChinaNationalOffshoreOilCorporation(CNOOC)layingclaimtooilconcessions in the South China Sea on territory claimed by thePhilippines andVietnam,which has led tomilitary skirmishes.71 TheEastChinaSeahasseenasimilarstand-offinvolvingChina,JapanandTaiwan.Andwithmilitaryoperationsincreasinglybeingsupplementedbyprivatesecurity,corporationsarealsobudgetingforincreasesintheirsecurity operations in a climate-constrainedworld.For example,Shellspentatleast$1billiononsecuritybetween2007and2009,accordingtointernaldocumentsleakedtothecampaigngroupPlatform.72

Conclusion:Beyondcorporatecontrol

We have seen in this chapter how deeply entrenched the corporateaddiction tofossil fuels is,andhowaseriesoffactorsserve tofurther

embed corporations’ choice to keep investing in runaway climatechangeandavoidanyfundamentalchangesinbusinesspractice,puttingeconomic growth above all other priorities. Risk-managementtechniques parcel up climate impacts into quantifiable chunks,which,once thrown into a cost-benefit mixer, rarely emerge as sufficientlyindigestible todemandmuchaction.Financial-sector connectionswithfossil-fuelfirms,andinvestmentnormsthatfavourshort-termfinancialperformance irrespective of its environmental costs, create a powerfulblocwithvestedinterestsincontinuedgreenhouse-gaspollution.Atthesame time, some companies are readying themselves to profit fromcrisis with new services and products to address climate-changeimpacts, as well as offering corporate solutions to any perceivedinsecuritythatmightresultfromclimatechange.TNCs ‘greenwash’ their business practices with eye-catching

initiatives that do little of substance, on closer inspection, to changetheir destructive businessmodels.At the same time, corporations andindustryassociations lobbygovernments towaterdownenvironmentallegislation,oravoidregulationinfavourofmarket-basedsolutionsthatallow them to buy their way out of enacting environmental policies.Often, this lobbying is pushing at an open door, with politicians andcivil servants acting to avoid strong climate commitments at aninternational level, while at the same time promoting free-tradeagreements that undermine regulation and afford transnationalcorporationsimpunityfromdomesticlegalregimes.It should be clear from this mesh of factors reinforcing corporate

inaction on climate change and the evasion of responsibility for itsimpactsthatnosimple,singleremedycanbeapplied–butitisequallyclear that effortsmust bemade to rein in corporate power, if climatechangeanditsimpactsaretobeaddressedeffectively.Nationstatescanplayakeyrolehere,legislatingtophaseoutfossil-

fuel subsidies (starting with producer subsidies in industrialisedcountries)anddirectlyregulatinggreenhouseemissionsfromthepowersector and industry.73 They can also legislate to change the rules

accordingtowhichthefinancialsectoroperates,suchthatcentralbanksconsider fossil-fuel investments as systemic risks and regulateaccordingly, or even by applying capital and credit controls toinvestments that produce high levels of greenhouse-gas emissions.Chinese banking regulations already do this domestically, albeit withsignificantlapsesinimplementation.Atthesametime,statescouldusepublicprocurementpolicies to investmassively inmeasures to reducegreenhouse-gasemissionsandlessentheimpactsofclimatechange.Buttodosorequireschallengingtheideologicaldominanceofausterityand‘balanced budgets’, which encourage infrastructure investment to bepushedoffthepublicbooksandlongintothefuturebymeansofpublic-private partnerships. These schemes routinely deliver poor value fortaxpayers while, over the long term, they compromise the ability ofstates to invest inprojects thatcouldhelp themadapt to theeffectsofclimate change – be those flood defences, coastal protection, orimprovedhealthsystems.Reclaiming the public sphere is also vital in the case of the energy

sector,andisalreadyhappeninginthecaseofwaterservicesworldwideand, to a lesser extent, in the form of municipal energy grids (inGermanyinparticular).Increasingpublicownership,inparticularwhenthat takes the form of re-municipalisation, can help to break thestranglehold of the large corporate utilities that are delaying thetransformationoftheenergysystem.74Thatpointsthewaytoasecondareawhere the transformation of the state is closely linked to amoreambitioustacklingofclimatechangeandamorejustadaptationagenda.Aswehaveseen,corporatelobbyistscansetagendasandinfluencerulemaking on the environment, trade and broader economic policy.Tacklingthatmeansdemocratisingthestate(andregionalblocs,notablytheEU),throughnewrulestoenhancetransparencyandaccountability,and to rein in tradeand investment treaties thatbias laws in favourofcorporate polluters rather than citizens.75 Various campaigns andproposals, including that promoted by the Global Campaign againstCorporateImpunity,alsoexistthatarepushingforlegalchangestohold

transnational corporations and senior corporate leaders to account forenvironmentalandhuman-rightsabusescommittedundertheirwatch.76Athirddimensionof‘reclaimingthestate’isthede-corporatisationof

state-owned enterprises: restructuring them so that they are no longerheld as joint-stock,partiallyprivatisedcompanieson stockexchanges,and given instead a public-interest mandate that is reflected in theirinvestment priorities. In the case of public-energy companies, thatmeans retooling them away from extracting fossil fuels, or producingpowerfromthosefuels,andtowardsrenewableenergyinfrastructure–in theprocess,breaking the increased interdependencybetweenpublicandprivatefirmsintheextractivessector.77In practice, it remains extremely unlikely that states that depend

heavilyuponfossil-fuelextractionwouldtakesuchactionontheirowninitiative. International pressure, in the form of a strong and legallybinding internationalclimateagreement, therefore remainsanecessarystep to changing state fossil-fuel enterprises – and the achievement ofsuch an agreement, in turn, requires strong domestic pressure fromsocialmovementstoshifttheperspectiveofnegotiators.Afourthfrontintransformingthestaterestsonchanginghowpublic

money is invested. Considerable revenues from fossil-fuel extraction(principallyoil andgas)havebeenplaced inSovereignWealthFunds(SWFs),whichmanageover$5trillionininvestmentsglobally.78Theseare invested in a range of assets, from shares in transnationalcorporationstoinfrastructureandrealestate.SWFshavethepotentialtoinvest long term and in climate-friendly just transition measures thattheir more commercial counterparts find unattractive. In 2013, forexample,theNorwegianGovernmentPensionFundGlobal(theworld’slargest SWF) divested from 27 mining companies and 23 oil palmcompanies (which fuel deforestation).79 This was followed with thedeclaration of a new ‘renewable investment mandate’, although aparallelefforttoinvestigatewhethertowithdrawitsbillionsfromfossil-fuel stocks altogether recommended only a weak ‘conduct-based

exclusion’thatfallsalongwayshortofdivestment.80Moredirectly,pensionfundscouldalsoprovidesomeof thebillions

neededtofundajusttransitionandaddressadaptationneeds–althoughit’s worth recalling that there are clear limits in the transformativepotentialofsuchfunds,though,notleastintheirmarkedpreferenceformarket-basedsolutions.81Thetransformationoftheroleofcorporationsinoursocietyrequires

morethanjuststateaction,however.Statesdonotactwithoutpressurefrom their citizens, andwhile the solutions to reining in corporationsand addressing climate change lie mainly at the level of changes innationalandinternationallawsandpolicies,itissocialmovementsandcitizens’ organisations that drive such changes. To some extent, theemphasis should be on reasserting democratic control,which includesredefining legal definitions of what corporations are. Instead ofcorporations claiming ‘corporate personhood’, whilst acting aspathological profit-maximising machines, they could be legallymandated to seek benefits beyond profit – similar to the model of‘benefit corporations’ that already exists in a handful of US states.82Alongsidelegalchanges,corporategovernancecouldalsobeshiftedtoenhance employee ownership (including along cooperative lines) ormandating that workers take at least half the seats in corporateboardrooms(followingtheGermanmodel).83But reforming corporations is no substitute for diminishing their

poweraltogether,whichremainsakeygoalofmanysocialmovementsandcitizens’groups.Thetacticsaretoonumeroustomention,butinthecaseofclimate-changeactivismalone,thesehaveincludedreferendumsto retake control of energy systems, fossil-fuel divestment campaigns,protests and shareholder activism at corporate Annual GeneralMeetings, legal cases against environmental and rights abuses,occupationsofcorporateofficesorcorporate-sponsoredspaces,culturejamming, social-media campaigning, and direct action (includingoccupations) to stop land clearing, pipeline building, and mining anddrillingoperations.Thecreativespaceforinterventionisfairlylimitless,

but there are some common threads to what works, starting with arefusal to countenance support from the corporate players that are thesource of much of the problem, accompanied by a refusal to beconstrained bywhat corporations and governments deempragmatic atanygivenmoment.Onlybyrejectingcorporatecontrolanddependenceonfossilfuelscanwecreatethespaceforajustresponsetotheclimatecrisis.

Notes

1. ThankstoSteffenBoehm,JanetRedmanandPascoeSabidofortheircommentsonearlierversionsofthischapter.

2.

Tillerson,R.(2012).ThenewNorthAmericanenergyparadigm:Reshapingthefuture.SpeechpresentedatCouncilonForeignRelations.Retrievedfromhttp://www.cfr.org/north-america/new-north-american-energy-paradigm-reshaping-future/p2863.

3.

Walmart(22April2013).Walmarthighlightssustainabilityprogressinits2013GlobalResponsibilityReport(pressrelease).Retrievedfromhttp://news.walmart.com/news-archive/2013/04/22/walmart-highlights-sustainability-progress-in-its-2013-global-responsibility-report;EDFEnergy.(n.d.).OurSustainabilityCommitments(report).Retrievedhttp://www.edfenergy.com/sustainability/our-sustainability-commitments/.

4.

Upham,D.(2014).Trustus:Savvybusinessesunderstandtheirroleinfightingclimatechange.Retrievedfromhttp://www.edf.org/blog/2014/02/20/trust-us-savvy-businesses-understand-their-role-fighting-climate-change/.

5.

McKibben,B.(2012).Globalwarming’sterrifyingnewmath.RollingStone,p.1162.Retrievedfromhttp://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global

-warmings-terrifying-new-math-20120719#ixzz2BAAEi09H.

6.Heede,R.(2014).Tracinganthropogeniccarbondioxideandmethaneemissionstofossilfuelandcementproducers,1854–2010.ClimaticChange,122(1–2),229–41.Retrievedfromdoi:10.1007/s10584-013-0986-y.

7. Leaton,J.(2011).UnburnableCarbon–Aretheworld’sfinancialmarketscarryingacarbonbubble?London:CarbonTrackerInitiative,p.4.

8.

CarbonTrackeralsousesafigureof900Gt,butthatfigureassumessomeproportionofcarboncaptureandstorageby2050,whichiscontroversial.Leaton,J.etal.(2013).UnburnableCarbon2013:Wastedcapitalandstrandedassets.London:CarbonTrackerInitiative,p.4.

9. WorldEnergyOutlook2014.Paris:InternationalEnergyAgency.

10.

Forexample,Petrobras’scurrentinvestmentstrategyanticipatesalong-termpriceof$90to$100perbarrelofBrentcrude.SeePetrobras(2012).2012–2016BusinessPlan,pp.1–8(p.6).Shelluses$80–100asitsmedium-termpriceestimate(throughtotheendof2015),seeRoyalDutchShell.(2012a).BuildinganEnergyFuture:AnnualReport2011.TheHague:Shell,2012,p.20;RoyalDutchShell.(August2010).EvidenceontheSupplyandDemandforOil,p.4.Retrievedfromhttp://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/global%20climate%20change%20and%20energy/international%20energy/energy%20security/1789-shells-response-to-cfe-oil.pdf.

11. RoyalDutchShell(2012a),p.50.

12. Simms,A.(1May2012).Shell’sstanceonwindpowerrevealsaprofoundtruthofcapitalism.TheGuardian.

13.

FriendsoftheEarthInternational.(2013).GoodEnergy,BadEnergy:Transformingourenergysystemforpeopleandtheplanet.Amsterdam:FriendsoftheEarthInternational.Retrievedfromhttp://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Good-energy-bad-energy.pdf.

14.

RoyalDutchShell.2012b.CarbonDisclosureProject2012:RoyalDutchShell,p.9.Retrievedfromhttp://www-static.shell.com/static/environment_society/downloads/environment/climate_change/cdp_response_050912.

15. RoyalDutchShell.(2012a),p.3;RoyalDutchShell.(2012b),p.49.

16. RoyalDutchShell.(2012b),p.18.

17. Ibid.,p.20.

18.

Foster,J.(30January2014).Shellsuspends2014offshoredrillingplansinArctic.ClimateProgress.Retrievedfromhttp://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/01/30/3225831/shell-arctic-drilling-2014/.ForacriticalviewofShell’sarcticexplorations,seePlatformetal.(2012)OutintheCold:InvestorriskinShell’sArcticexplorationLondon:Greenpeace.

19.Bourne,J.(10September2012).Ice-breaking:U.S.oildrillingstartsasnationsmullchangedArctic.NationalGeographic.Retrievedfromhttp://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/09/120910-shell-begins-arctic-drilling.

20. RoyalDutchShell.(2011),p.30.

21.

Al-Anazi,D.(2009).CarbonmanagementeffortsinSaudiAramco.EnviroNews,18,2–3.Retrievedfromhttp://www.saudiaramco.com/content/dam/Publications/Environews/Environews%20Summer%202009/EnviroNewsSummer2009.pdf.

22. Schücking,H.(2013).BankingonCoal.Urgewald,Sassenberg:BankTrack,CEEBankwatchNetworkandPolskaZielonaSieć,p.17.

23.

BankofAmerica(2015).U.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgencyrecognizesBankofAmericaforclimatechangeleadership.Retrievedfromhttp://about.bankofamerica.com/en-us/global-impact/environmental-sustainability.html#fbid=icpqTLb07Z6.

24.Schücking(2013),p.10;seealsoReyes,O.(2013).CarbonCapital:HowtheCitybankrollsclimatechange.London:WDM.

25. Schücking,H.,Kroll,L.,Louvel,Y.andRichter,R.(2011).BankrollingClimateChange.Urgewald,Sassenberg:groundWork,EarthlifeAfricaJohannesburgandBankTrack,p.15.

26. Reuters(24May2012).GoldmanSachsoutlines$40bncleanenergyinvestmentplan.ClimateSpectator.

27.Allianz(n.d.).Insuringagainstclimateimpactsandrewardingsustainablebusinesspractices.Retrievedfromhttp://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/nairobi_work_programme/private_sector_initiative/application/pdf/allianz.pdf.

28.

Smith,N.(2007).Disastrousaccumulation.SouthAtlanticQuarterly,106(4),775.

29. Lehmann,E.(9July2009)Theclimateforclimate-relatedinsuranceatAIGturnsbleak.ClimateWire.

30.

Buffett’sstatementiscontradictedbyothercalculations,whichshowthat$30.6billion,or29percent,ofBerkshireHathaway’srevenueisheavilycontingentonclimateandenergyissues.SeeLichtenheld,M.(10February2012).WarrenBuffett’sbillionsatrisk;BerkshireHathawayislowest-ratedonsustainability.HIPInvestor.

31. AXA(2012).AnnualReport2011.Paris:AXA,p.222.

32. Sandhövel,A.(2012).Low-carbonInvestments:Perspectiveofaninstitutionalinvestor.Singapore:Allianz,p.11.

33.

Insurancecompaniesissue‘catastrophebonds’(underwrittenbyinvestmentbanks),whichpayacoupon(aperiodicpayment)toinvestorsifnocatastropheoccurs.Ifamajordisasterdoesoccurduringtheperiodofthebond,theprincipal(theoriginalamountofthebond)isreturnedtotheinsurancecompany,whichthenusesthismoneytopayclaimants.Foracriticaltake,seePhillips,L.(2014).CatBonds:Cashinginoncatastrophe.Retrievedfrom:http://roadtoparis.info/2014/11/18/cat-bonds-cashing-catastrophe/.

34.Allianz(n.d).InsuringAgainstClimateImpactsandRewardingSustainableBusinessPractices.Retrieved fromhttp://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/nairobi_work_programme/private_sector_initiative/application/pdf/allianz.pdf.

35.Banktrack(2014,April20).Dodgydeals:BeloMonteDam.Retrievedfromhttp://www.banktrack.org/manage/ajax/ems_dodgydeals/createPDF/belo_monte_dam.

36. Fattouh,B.andMahadeva,L.(2012).FinancializationinOilMarkets:Lessonsforpolicy.Oxford:OxfordInstituteforEnergyStudies.

37.Capel,A.(2011).AllianceBernsteinlikesthesebasicmaterialsstocksthemostin13Ffiling.Retrievedfromhttp://wallstcheatsheet.com/trading/alliancebernstein-likes-these-basic-materials-stocks-the-most-in-13f-filing.html/.

38. CBI(2009).FutureProof:Preparingyourbusinessforachangingclimate.London:CBI,p.1.

39. Bardeline,J.(23September2013).Numberof‘climateleaders’doublesinnewCDPreport.GreenBiz.Moregenerally,seewww.riskybusiness.org.

40.ExxonMobil(2014)EnergyandCarbon–Managingtherisks,p.21.Retrievedfromhttp://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~/media/Files/Other/2014/Report%20-%20Energy%20and%20Carbon%20-%20Managing%20the%20Risks.pdf.

41. Funk,M.(2014).Windfall:Theboomingbusinessofglobalwarming.NewYork:Penguin,pp.80,101.

42. Ibid.,pp.97–107.

43.IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(2014)ClimateChange2014:Impacts,Adaptation,andVulnerability.Summaryforpolicymakers.Geneva:IPCC.

44. Funk,M.(2014),p.152.

45. Ibid.,pp.139–51.

46. Ibid.,p.21.

47. Ibid.,p.3.

48. Polson,J.(9May2014).CleanestfossilfuelIsWallStreet’sbetonclimatechange.Bloomberg.

49.Vitali,S.,Glattfelder,J.B.andBattiston,S.(2011).Thenetworkofglobalcorporatecontrol.PLoSONE,6(10),4.SeealsoDraffan,G.(2013).DirtyMoney:Thefinanceandfossilfuelweb.Amsterdam:TransnationalInstitute.

50.

Newell,P.andPaterson,M.(1998).Aclimateforbusiness:Globalwarming,thestateandcapital.ReviewofInternationalPoliticalEconomy,5,682;Levy,D.andEgan,D.(2003).Aneo-Gramscianapproachtocorporatepoliticalstrategy:Conflictandaccommodationintheclimatechangenegotiations.Journa

lofManagementStudies,40,804.

51.

UnionofConcernedScientists.(2012).AClimateofCorporateControl:HowcorporationshaveinfluencedtheU.S.dialogueonclimatescienceandpolicy(report). Retrieved http://www.ucsusa.org/our-work/center-science-and-democracy/fighting-misinformation/a-climate-of-corporate-control.html#.VIGL01mIZco.

52. Hajer,M.(1995).ThePoliticsofEnvironmentalDiscourse:Ecologicalmodernizationandthepolicyprocess.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

53. Wright,C.andNyberg,D.(2014).Creativeself-destruction:Corporateresponsestoclimatechangeaspoliticalmyths.EnvironmentalPolitics,23,210.

54.Investment,transformationandleadership:CDPS&P500climatechangereport2013(report).(23September2013),p.19.Retrievedfromhttps://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/CDPSP500-climate-report-2013.pdf.

55.

2013WalmartGlobalResponsibilityReport(report).(2013).Retrievedfromhttp://corporate.walmart.com/microsites/global-responsibility-report-2013/;Sheppard,K.(13November2013).Walmart’ssustainabilityresultsdon’tmatchpromises,reportfinds.Retrievedfromhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/13/walmart-sustainability_n_4263032.html.

56.

Mitchell,S.(13November2013).Walmart’sAssaultontheClimate:ThetruthbehindoneofthebiggestclimatepollutersandslickestgreenwashersinAmerica(report).Retrievedfromhttp://ilsr.org/downloads/Walmart%27s+Assault+on+the+Climate.

57. UnionofConcernedScientists.(2012),pp.13–14.

58.

Braun,M.(2009).TheevolutionofemissionstradingintheEuropeanUnion–Theroleofpolicynetworks,knowledgeandpolicyentrepreneurs.Accounting,OrganizationsandSociety,34(3–4),469–87;CorporateEuropeObservatory.(2009).PuttingtheFoxinChargeoftheHenhouse:HowBP’semissionstradingschemewassoldtotheEU.Brussels:CorporateEuropeObservatory;Victor,D.andHouse,J.(2006).BP’semissionstradingsystem.EnergyPolicy,34.

59.Reyes,O.(2012).Whatgoesupmustcomedown–Carbontrading,industrialsubsidiesandcapitalmarketgovernance,inHallström,N.,ed.WhatNext:Climate,developmentandequity.Uppsala:DagHammarskjöldFoundation.

60.Hey,C.(2010).TheGermanparadox:Climateleaderandgreencarlaggard,inS.OberthürandM.Pallemaerts,eds.TheNewClimatePoliciesoftheEuropeanUnion.Brussels:VUBPress;GermanywinsbackingofEUministerstoblockcaremissionslaw.(15October2013).Euractiv.Retrievedfromwww.euractiv.com/…/germany-wins-backing-eu-minister-news-531085.

61.TheCOP19guidetocorporatelobbying:ClimatecrooksandthePolishgovernment’spartnersincrime.(2013).Amsterdam:CorporateEuropeObservatoryandTransnationalInstitute,p.19.

62.Kowalski,P.,etal.(2013).State-ownedenterprises:Tradeeffectsandpolicyimplications.OECDTradePolicyPapers,147,9.OECDPublishing.doi:10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en.

63. Mitchell,J.,Marcel,V.andMitchell,B.(2012).Whatnextfortheoilandgasindustry?London:ChathamHouse,p.18.

64. Chavez,D.(2014).Stateofthestate,inBuxton,N.(ed.).StateofPower2014:ExposingtheDavosclass.Amsterdam:TNI/Occupy,p.51.

65. Harvey,D.(2007).ABriefHistoryofNeoliberalism.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,p.70.

66.Galanova,M.(6October2013).Spain’ssunshinetoll:Rowoverproposedsolartax.BBC;Dunham,A.(21March2014).EnergygiantsouttokilloffSpain’ssolarsector.TheLocal.

67.

Solomon,I.(2012).RawDeal:HowtheTrans-PacificPartnershipcouldthreatenourclimate.Washington,DC:SierraClub;Wikileaks.(24November2013).TPPAEnvironmentChapterandChair’sCommentary(report).Retrievedfromhttps://wikileaks.org/tppa-environment-chapter.html.

68.Wallach,L.andTucker,T.(2012).PublicinterestanalysisofleakedTrans-PacificPartnership(TPP)investmenttext.PublicCitizen.Retrievedfromwww.citizen.org/documents/Leaked-TPP-Investment-Analysis.pdf.

69. Riley,B.(6June2013).Personalinterview.

70. Peters,G.,Minx,J.,Weber,C.andO.Edenhofer,O.(2011).Growthinemissiontransfersviainternationaltradefrom1990to2008.PNAS,108(21),5.

71.USEnergyInformationAdministration.(7February2013).SouthChinaSea:EIAAnalystBriefs.Retrievedfrom:http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf.

72. Amunwa,B.(2012).DirtyWork:Shell’ssecurityspendinginNigeriaandbeyond.London:Platform,p.3.

73.

Bast,E.,Kretzmann,S.,Krishnaswamy,S.andRomine,T.(2013).Low-hangingFruit:Fossilfuelsubsidies,climatefinance,andsustainabledevelopment(report).Washington,DC:OilChangeInternationalfortheHeinrichBöllStiftungNorthAmerica.

74.Whitfield,D.(2010)GlobalAuctionofPublicAssets:Publicsectoralternativestotheinfrastructuremarketandpublicprivatepartnerships.Nottingham:Spokesman.

75.See,forexample:Alter-EUSteeringCommittee.(2010).Awayforward,inH.Burley,W.Dinan,K.Haar,O.HoedemanandE.Wesselius,eds.BurstingtheBrusselsBubble.Brussels:Alter-EU,pp.197–9.

76. Seethewebsite:http://www.stopcorporateimpunity.org.

77.

Infact,theemergingpatternintheoilandgassectorsisofprivateandpublicfirmsactingtogetheratdifferentpointsinthesupplychain.Privatecompaniescontrolmostoftheworld’srefinerycapacityanddistributioninfrastructureforoilandgas.Thepicturegetsblurredevenfurtherbytheincreaseincooperationagreementsbetweenthemajorprivateandpubliccompanies.SeeMitchell,J.,Marcel,V.andMitchell,B.(2012),pp.19,38.

78.

Sovereignwealthfundassetssurpass$5tn.(11October2013).Emirates24/7.Retrievedfromhttp://www.emirates247.com/business/economy-finance/sovereign-wealth-fund-assets-surpass-5tn-2013-10-11-1.524222.

79. Lang,C.(7March2014).It’scertainlyprofitable.ButhowgreenisNorway’sGovernmentPensionFundGlobal?REDDMonitor.

80.

Holvand,K.(13March2014).Norwaytoraiseoilfund’sexposuretorenewableenergy.WallStreetJournal;Lokhandwala(10April2015).Norwegianoilfundadopts‘broadcriteria’forclimatechangeexclusion.Investment&PensionsEurope.

81. Lang,C.(7March2014).

82.Eberlein,S.andBaida,D.(9February2012).California’snewtriplebottomline.Yes!Magazine.Retrieved fromhttp://www.yesmagazine.org/new-economy/californias-new-triple-bottom-line.

83.

Foraseriesofpracticalsuggestionsonhowtoreformandreinincorporations,seeMarx,M.,Margil,M.,Cavanagh,J.,Anderson,S.,Collins,C.,Cray,C.andKelley,M.(2007).StrategicCorporateInitiative:TowardaGlobalCitizens’MovementtoBringCorporationsBackUnderControl.Washington,DC:CorporateEthicsInternational.Seealsowww.neweconomyworkinggroup.org.

PARTII

SECURITYFORWHOM?

4

APERMANENTSTATEOFEMERGENCY:CIVIL

CONTINGENCIES,RISKMANAGEMENTAND

HUMANRIGHTS

NafeezMosaddeqAhmed,BenHayesandNickBuxton

LetuslookatthecaseofNaziGermany.JustafterHitlercametopower(or,tobemoreprecise,justafterhewasofferedpower)heproclaimed,onFebruary28,1933, the Decree for the Protection of the People and the State. This decreesuspends all the articles in the Weimar Constitution maintaining individualliberties.Sincethisdecreewasneverrevoked,wecansaythattheentireThirdReichfromalegalpointofviewwasatwelve-yearlongstateofemergency.Andinthissensewecandefinemoderntotalitarianismastheinstitution,bywayofastateofemergency,ofa legalcivilwar thatpermits theeliminationnotonlyofpolitical adversaries, but whole categories of the population that resist beingintegratedintothepoliticalsystem.Thustheintentionalcreationofapermanentstate of emergency has become one of the most important measures ofcontemporary States, democracies included. And furthermore, it is notnecessary thata stateof emergencybedeclared in the technical senseof theterm.

(GiorgioAgamben,ItalianphilosopherandauthorofStateofException)

Introduction

Over eight days in September 2000, a small band of lorry driversprotesting fuel prices shocked thegovernment, thepublic andperhapseven themselves when they almost brought the United Kingdom to ahalt.Theirblockadesofseveraloilterminalsnotonlyforced90percentofpetrolstationstoclose,butalsoledtorationinginsupermarketsandcancellation of hospital surgeries. Above all, they demonstrated howdependenttheUK’seconomyandsocietywasonoilprocessedinafewrefineries andhowvulnerable the entirepopulationwas in its relianceonahighlycentralisedfoodsystemallsetup todelivergoods‘just intime’. Lord Cameron of Dillington, head of the UK CountrysideAgency, said the experience showed the UKwas ‘just 9meals awayfromanarchy’.In this case, it was a group of lorry drivers that exposed the thin

veneer that holdsmodern civilisation together.More recently, climatechangehasbeencitedasoneof themaindrivers forpotential societaldisruption.AstudybyAngliaRuskinUniversity’sGlobalSustainabilityInstitute(GSI)forLloydsofLondon,releasedinJune2015,warnedthata combination of just three catastrophic weather events could lead toshortfalls in the production of staple crops, prompt price spikes andunleash food riots andpolitical instabilityworldwide.Theglobal foodsystem, the authors argue, is ‘under chronicpressure tomeet an ever-risingdemand,anditsvulnerabilitytoacutedisruptionsiscompoundedby factors such as climate change,water stress, ongoing globalisationandheighteningpoliticalinstability.’1Asmuch of this book explores, the state’s response to these threats

can end up exacerbating them. The threats posed by disasters andemergencies–realorimagined–arenodifferent.Infact,asthischapterexposes,stateshavestartedtoseeriskseverywhereandaredeterminedtopreparefortheworst.Yetthesepreparationsappearcapableonlyofproducing legislation and contingencies that override democraticprocessesandunderminecivilliberties.

In theUK, the lorryprotest,whichwas followedbysevere floodingand the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, catalysed the UKgovernment into upgrading its emergency response and powers. Theevents of 9/11 and the incorporationof climate change issues into theUK’s first National Security Strategy (see Chapter 2) havecircumscribed these emergency preparations. In a similar vein, statesworldwide have similarly ramped up their ‘states of emergency’preparationstoaddressvulnerabilitiesexposedbyglobalisationandthethreatofclimatechangeandnew‘complexemergencies’.Thedraconiancontingenciesenvisagedhavebeenanotherboonforanever-expandingmilitary-security-industrial complex, but are deeply concerning foranyone committed to a progressive just response to climate-changeimpacts.Asthischapterexamines,thesestrategiesarelikelytofailastheydo

not appear to understand, let alone address, the causes of complexemergencies, nor identifywho ismade vulnerable in the process.Theirony is that the vulnerability of contemporary capitalism has createdvast new markets for crisis management that are predicated onincreasing the resilience of the capitalist system as a whole, thusperpetuating the cycle of crisis. This self-defeating cycle has set thesceneforapermanentstateofemergencythatmustberesisted.

Extremeweatherandclimatechange

Naturaldisasters appear evermorepresent.And it isnot justdown toperceptionor24hourrollingnews.Totalnaturaldisastersreportedeachyearhavebeensteadilyrisinginrecentdecades,from78in1970,to348in2004.Theaveragenumberofdisastersthroughoutthe1980swas400.It increased to630 in the1990s and to730 in thepast tenyears.Thehighestrecordednumberofnaturaldisasters,960,occurredin2007.2Ofcoursepartofthisincreaseisartificial–duetorapidadvancesin

communications technologies providing better reporting of disasters –

but about two-thirds of the increase is real and linked primarily tohydro-meteorologicaldisasters,namelydroughts, tsunamis,hurricanes,typhoons and floods. In contrast, natural geologic disasters, such asvolcanic eruptions, earthquakes, landslides and avalanches haveremainedsteadyinrecentdecades.Over the last three decades, reports of major floods have increased

fromanaverageof less than fifty to justbelow twohundredperyear.Tropicalstormshaveincreasedfromaroundtentoroughlyfifteen,andthe annual total of US tornadoes and global tsunamis has also risendramatically–andalongwiththem,sohavethefinancialcosts.GerhardBerz,formerheadofGeoRisksattheGermanreinsurancecorporationMunich Re, reports that ‘losses from natural disasters have increasedeightfold in economic terms during the last four decades.The insuredlosseshaveevenincreasedbyafactoroffourteen.’3Climatechangeisacriticalfactorinthisriseofhydro-meteorological

disasters – although it has always been difficult to quantify. In theirreview of the scientific literature, Anderson and Bausch notedcautiouslythat:

… in somecases, likeheatwavesand intense rainfall, the influence[of climate change] is already clear; in others, like hurricanes, theevidenceisjustemerging;insomeothercasesthereareasyetnoclearindications. However, in all cases the trend toward the future isworrying: modelling indicates that unless serious action is taken,globalwarmingwill reach levels atwhich several types of extremeeventsaremuchmorelikely.4

Theyalsonoted‘importantimpactsfrom‘secondary’effectsofclimaticevents–forexample,avalanches,rockfalls,landslidesduetoflooding,andforestfiresinareasofdrought.5For a long time, climate scientists refused to attribute specific

disasters to climate change, however a study by renowned climatescientistJamesHansenandothersin2012showedthatthefrequencyof

extremeweatherevents(whichhasincreasedbyafactorof50inthelastdecade compared to the decades prior to 1980) has made certaindisasters unexplainablewithout the influence of climate change. Theyconclude:

We can state, with a high degree of confidence, that extremeanomalies such as [the heatwaves] in Texas andOklahoma in 2011andMoscowin2010wereaconsequenceofglobalwarmingbecausetheir likelihood in the absence of global warming was exceedinglysmall.6

Buildingvulnerability

Yetwhilethefrequencyofnaturaldisastersiscertainlyfuelledbyover-dependenceonfossilfuelsandcorrespondingglobalwarming,itisalsoa reflection of other anthropogenic actions – in particular, populationgrowth, urbanisation and the destruction of ecological and socialresilience.Halfoftheglobalpopulationcurrentlylivesincities.Ifcurrenttrends

continue, this figurewill reach 75 per cent bymid-century.7Manyofthesecitiesareoncoasts,ornearearthquakefaultzones,ordeltasproneto flooding.A2007OECDstudypredicts thatby2070, the impactofclimate change andurbanisation couldmore than triple thenumberofpeople exposed to coastal flooding, to about 150 million. The mostvulnerable cities include Miami, Guangzhou, New York, Calcutta,Shanghai, Mumbai, Tianjin, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Bangkok.8Moreover,many vulnerable cities are home to some of theworld’s 1billion poorest people, who live in slums in ‘barely imaginable’conditionsofabsolutepoverty.9Theriseofthecityhasnotonlyincreasedthevulnerabilityofcertain

populations,ithasalsoincreasedtheeconomiccostsofthosedisasters.According to global risk analysis firm, Control Risks: ‘The

concentrationofhuman,physical,andfinancialcapitalincitiesrendersthemespeciallyvulnerabletobothimmediatedevastationandlingeringdisruptiontotransport,commerce,andcommunicationsintheaftermathofmajordisasters.’Another cause of worsening disasters has been the destruction of

ecological landscapes that traditionally protected populations. Forexample, in the constant search for economic growth, and underpressure to serve growing populations, developers, businesses andgovernments frequently eradicate the natural buffers, such as sanddunes,mangrove swamps and flood plains that traditionally protectedpopulations.AseventhelibertarianEconomistreportedin2012,privateindividuals and firms, ‘left topursue their own self-interest, put all ofsocietyat risk’.10TheEconomistwent on to argue that ‘growth is thebest disaster-mitigation policy of all’, as itwould provide the ‘humanand physical infrastructure needed to protect against, and respond to,naturaldisaster’.11This might make sense if the benefits of economic growth and the

effortsthatgointomitigationandpreventionweresharedequally,orifgrowthdidnotcomewithitsowncosts,butthisispatentlynotthecase.Theglobalinequalitiesembeddedincontemporarycapitalismmeanthatlarge swathesof theworld’spopulationhavebecomemorevulnerableas more prosperous areas grow. And even within the wealthiestsocieties, decisions about allocating the resources needed to reducevulnerabilityarehighlypoliticised,short-termistandofteninadequate.Itwas, for example, never a question of if the levees in New Orleanswouldbebreached,butwhen.The threats that climate change, urbanisation and economic growth

produce were famously described by British sociologist AnthonyGiddens as ‘manufactured risks’, in which the threats facing modernsocieties are no longer external acts of ‘God’ or ‘Nature’, butmanufacturedbythemodernisationprocessitself.Nucleardisaster, theemergence of vaccine-resistance diseases and the ‘blowback’ ofcontemporary‘Islamist’terrorismcanallbeseenasmanufacturedrisks

–unintendedconsequencesofmodern,industrialsocietiesthatwehavelittleexperienceinconfronting.AsGiddensnotes,‘Atacertainpoint…westartedworryinglessaboutwhatnaturecandotous,andmoreaboutwhat we have done to nature. This marks the transition from thepredominanceofexternalrisktothatofmanufacturedrisk.’12Ultimately,however, these impactsonlybecomeadisaster ifpeople

are unprepared and unable to deal with them. In and of itself, then,climate-change-inducedextremeweatherisnotadisaster;itisahazard–thatis,anenvironmentalconditionwhoseharmwilldependonwhereit happens and how prepared its population is to deal with thoseconditions.Thevaryingimpactofextremeweatheronpoorandrichcanbeseenineverydisaster,fromHurricaneKatrinain2005totheextremedrought in Brazil in 2015. In other words, it is not just risk that ismanufactured,butvulnerability. It is theway inwhich societies try toaddress those risks – or lack the resources to do so, or in some caseschosesimplytoignorethem–thatultimatelydetermineswhetherthoseharms and losses materialise, and if so, whom they will affect. As aPakistaniofficialobservedinrelationtotheearthquakethatdevastatedlargeareasofnorthernPakistaninOctober2005:‘Itisnotearthquakesthat kill people but building regulations and the failures of aid andrescue.’13

Facinguptocomplexemergencies

Underglobalisation, the relianceofmodern societiesonglobal supplylines, industrial foodproduction, transnational infrastructure andhigh-tech communications have exacerbated vulnerability by ensuring thatdisaster or catastrophe in one place now reverberates far beyond theinitial point of contact, producing what are known as ‘complexemergencies’.14 Put anotherway: as climate change, urbanisation, andman-made vulnerability interact with other elements of the globalsystem–suchasenergyandfoodproduction–thereisanincreasedrisk

ofknock-oneffectsthatcouldultimatelychallengethecapacityofstatestomaintainsocialstability.The provision of food, so long the cause of social unrest and

revolutions,isagoodexampletoseehowclimatechangeintersectswithother vulnerable globalised markets. As Chapter 8 explores in moredetail, climate change is already impactingon agriculture. In 2012, asfour-fifths of the United States as well as parts of Russia and Africaexperienceddrought,globalfoodproductionfellby2.6percent.15The‘Arab Spring’ in 2011, while catalysed by a range of factors – long-standing political grievances, rampant inequality, rocketingunemployment,staterepressionandlackofbasicsocialservices–wasalsotriggeredbypersistentlyrecord-highfoodprices.16The impacts of drought are made worse by the way the current

globalised food system interconnects with other markets, such as theenergymarkets.Asmuchas10percentofenergyconsumedannuallyintheUS,forinstance,isusedbythefoodindustry.Everymajorpointinindustrialfoodproduction–on-sitemachinery,productionandsynthesisofartificialfertilisers,processing,packaging,transportandstorage–isheavilydependentonfossil fuels.Fortypercentofenergy in thefoodsystem is used to produce fertilisers and pesticides.17 Another 14 percent goes to food transport, 16 per cent to processing, 7 per cent topackaging, 4 per cent to food retailing, 7 per cent to restaurants andcaterers,and32percent tohomerefrigerationandpreparation.18Thishas made the global industrial food system inherently vulnerable tovolatilityinoilmarkets.The six-fold rise inoil pricesbetween2003andmid-2008 therefore

haddirect and severeconsequences for foodproduction,by impactingon farmers’ fuel, fertiliser, pesticide, and transportation costs. AssciencejournalistJulianCribbsnotes,while‘financialpainwashigh’indeveloped countries, in the less developed world – from where thedevelopedcountriesimportmuchoftheirfood–‘farmerssimplycouldnotaffordtobuyfertilizer,andcropyieldsbegantoslip.’19

Soasoilbecomesmoreexpensive, thiswillplacemassive strainonindustrial food production – and the poorwill suffer the hardest. Theproblem is that thebest evidence suggests that the ageof cheapoil isover. Although prices dropped in 2014–15, the cost of productionremainsveryhigh,withglobalmarketsreflectingSaudiArabia’sdesiretoundermine its competitors and sustainhigh levelsof supplydespiteweakdemand.Mostseriousoil-industryobserversagree that the long-termtrendforoilprices,despitetherecentslump,willbeupwards.20Canadian academic Homer-Dixon argues that ‘negative synergy’

betweenmajor‘stressors’suchasfoodandoilpricesisexacerbatedbythe‘multiplier’, that is, the inter-connectivityof theglobalsystem.Ontheonehand,‘greaterconnectivityandspeedoftenmakeeconomiesandsocieties more resilient to shock because they can respond faster anddraw from their larger networks a wider range of skills, resources,capital and goods and services.’ Yet simultaneously, the very sameconnectivitymeans that a failure of one element of a tightly coupledsystem can propagate disturbances across large distances to otherelements of the system, creating negative synergy between multiplestressors.Resourcesdeployedtosolveparticularproblemsoftenfail toresolve the underlying causes, and therefore end up weakening thesysteminthelongterm,asthoseproblemscontinuetoescalate.This,inturn, canpotentially overwhelm the capacity of the system to respondeffectively,ultimatelyleadingto‘synchronousfailure’,whenthesystemis no longer able to respond, leading to systemic breakdown – or inHomer-Dixon’s words, ‘an abrupt breakdown in our vital social andtechnologicalsystems’.21Thiscanmanifestinmanydifferentways:the2008bankingcrisisandtheArabSpring,forinstance,canbothbeseenasexamplesofsynchronousfailure.Inbothcases,manycommentatorsnote that even the current fixes have failed to tackle the problems atsourceandarethereforestoringupbiggercrisesinthefuture.Concernsaboutsystemicfailurearenotjustcomingfromacademiaor

conspiracytheorists:evenpeopleliketheformerUKGovernmentChiefScientist John Beddington are warning of a ‘perfect storm’ of

converging food, water and energy crises increasingly generating aswathe of complex emergencies as states struggle, and inmany casesincreasingly fail, to retain control and deliver goods and services.22Conventional modelling techniques (which view these crises inisolation) project the era of the ‘perfect storm’ to emerge by 2030;however,itisalsosuggestedthatwehadalreadyenteredthiseraasoftheyear2008–whentheworldbecamesubjectedtocomplexsynergiesdrivingescalatingoilandfoodprices,whichinterconnectedwithlong-standingdebt-basedfinancialandeconomicvulnerabilities.23Whatthiscrisismeansforcapitalismandsocialjusticeinthefaceof

uncheckedemissionsgrowthandthethreatofrunawayglobalwarmingis the question of our times. While the Left can be relied upon topronouncetheendofcapitalismateveryopportunity–anddidsowithunderstandable relishwhen the financial system teetered on the brinkfollowingthecollapseofLehmanBrothers–theseproclamationsalmostalwaysunderestimatetheresilienceofthoseinvestedinthestatusquotomaintain their hegemony even amidst crisis. Rather than simplyassumingthatclimatechangemeansthat thewritingisonthewallforcapitalism, or that the ongoing global depression makes ‘post-capitalism’ inevitable,we shouldbe concernedwith theway inwhichthe elites are responding to the rise of complex emergencies and thegrowing vulnerability of certain populations. Unfortunately, theevidencesuggeststhatratherthanaddresstheunderlyingcauses,ortakemeasures to protect the most vulnerable, governments appear to befocused on preparing crisis measures that militarise emergencies andunderminehumanrights.

Crisismanagement

‘Crisismanagement’isshorthandforthewayinwhichstatesdealwithmajor events that cause or threaten to cause significant harm to thepublic.Itisalsousedbybusinessesandotherorganisationstoplanfor

events that threaten business continuity and other types of damage.Thereiscertainlynothingnewaboutcrisismanagement;societieshavehad to respond to ‘natural disasters’ and man-made harms since thedawn of the time. Nor is there anything particularly unique in thepreparation and response to extreme weather events as compared toother types of potential crisis such as pandemics or technologicalhazards(nuclearaccidents,chemicalspills,andsoon).Whathaschangedis thecomplexityofwhatplannerscall the‘crisis

cycle’.Traditionally,thisenvisagedthreebroadstagescoveringactionstakenbefore,duringandafter thecrisis:preparation,managementandevaluation. Today, inspired first by the ‘homeland security’ strategiesdevised in the wake of 9/11 – which forced states to ‘think theunthinkable’ in terms of not just terrorist but chemical, biological,radiological,nuclearandmostrecentlycyber-attacks–andthenbytheclimate-security strategies described inChapter 2, the crisis cycle haswidened significantly. At the same time, the powers adopted in thenameofemergencypreparednessandmanagementhavebecomemorecoercive, with a much greater role envisaged for the military andprivate-securityactors.This was superbly documented in Naomi Klein’s Shock Doctrine,

which linked the tendency to respond militarily to disasters with theattemptsofpowerfulcorporationsandintereststousedisasterstomakeshort-term profits and lay the ground for structural changes that willbenefitelitesinthelong-term.KleintellsthestoriesofhowthisplayedoutinHurricaneKatrina,the2004AsianTsunami,Iraq’spost-invasion‘reconstruction’ and other places where disaster struck andneoliberalismprofited.Retelling the shameful story of Iraq’s destruction bymilitarism and

privatisation,NaomiKleincomments:

Iraqunder[theseniorUSadministratorPaul]Bremerwasthelogicalconclusion of Chicago School theory: a public sector reduced to aminimal number of employees,mostly contractworkers, living in a

Halliburton city state, tasked with signing corporate friendly lawsdrafted by KPMG and handing out duffle bags of cash toWesterncontractors protected bymercenary soldiers, themselves shielded byfull legal immunity. All around them were furious people,increasinglyturningtoreligiousfundamentalismbecauseit’stheonlysource of power in a hollowed-out state. Like Russia’s gangsterismandBush’scronyism,contemporaryIraqisacreationofthefifty-yearcrusade to privatize the world. Rather than being disowned by itscreators, it deserves to be seen as the purest incarnation yet of theideologythatgaveitbirth.24

Contemporary capitalism has then become increasingly predatory,seeking out disasters in order to impose neoliberalism and maximiseprofitsforanexusofprivateinvestorsandcontractors,manywithcloserelationships togovernment.25Whathashappened in thedecade sincethe publication of the Shock Doctrine is that the disaster-capitalismindustryhasexploded,fuelledbyaglobalisationoftheUS’s‘homelandsecurity’ approach to terrorism.26 The proliferation of complexemergencythinkinghasmerelyaddedfueltothefireandledtogrowingsecuritisationoftransnational‘criticalinfrastructure’itself.TheEUdefinescriticalinfrastructureas‘anassetorsystemwhichis

essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions’;27 the US’sdefinition is synonymous.28 The EU therefore concludes that any‘damage to a critical infrastructure, its destruction or disruption bynatural disasters, terrorism, criminal activity or malicious behaviour,mayhavea significantnegative impact for thesecurityof theEUandthe well-being of its citizens.’ In turn, the transport system, supplychains, the means of production, information and communicationstechnologies, water and energy systems, and food distribution arebecomingsecuritisedinthequesttoprotectagainst‘allhazards’.But securitisationalone isof littleuse if the rootcausesofpotential

hazards are not addressed as well. In Brazil, in the summer of 2015,authorities have beenmakingmilitary preparations in themegacity of

São Paulo to defend water infrastructure amid an ongoing drought.Althoughwater supplies have beendwindling formanyyears, currentlow levels are unprecedented. In response, the Brazilian authoritiesinstructed the army to prepare for riots and attacks on the localwaterutility. Absent credible plans to save water, journalists reported thatapproximatelyseventysoldierswereinvolvedinexercisestopreparetheutility foranuprising,with thirtymenwithmachinegunsstationed inthefacility’scanteen.29

Thinkingtheunthinkable:thesearchforallrisks

Preparing forcrisesused tomeanadegreeof internalplanningon thepartofstatesandorganisationsforparticularscenariosandemergencies,including simulations and training. Now it means ‘thinking theunthinkable’anddevelopingappropriateriskanalysis,threatassessmentandmitigationstrategies.30 In theUK, for example, galvanisedby the9/11 terrorist attacks and theLondon bombings of 7 July 2005, crisismanagementhasbeencatapultedup thepolitical agendaover thepast15 years. The symbolism of preparedness – exercises involving firstresponders in radiation suits – have become a powerful sign of thetimes.The UK’s approach is founded on ‘Integrated Emergency

Management’ (IEM), an approach to preventing and managingemergencies that entails six key steps: anticipation, assessment,prevention, preparation, response, and recovery. The possibleemergencies that theUKmay face are identified in the government’sNationalRiskAssessment(NRA),aconfidentialassessmentconductedeach year, drawing on the expertise of a wide range of governmentdepartmentsandagencies. It focuseson threebroadcategoriesof risk:naturalevents,majoraccidentsandmaliciousattacks.TheNationalRiskRegister(NRR)isthepublicversionoftheNRA.

First published in 2008, it provides businesses and the public with

information regarding how they should prepare for civil emergencies.Therisksposedtonationalsecurityandhumanwelfarebylonger-termtrends, such as technological advances and climate change, remainshiddenintheclassifiedNationalSecurityRiskAssessment.

Figure4.1NRRRiskmatrix–‘Otherrisks’–excludingterrorismandothermaliciousattacks

Source:NationalRiskRegisterofCivilEmergencies,2013edn.

According to the NRR, the highest priority risks facing the UK –basedonboth likelihoodandimpact–arepandemic influenza,coastalflooding, catastrophic terrorist attacks, and severe effusive (gas-rich)volcaniceruptionsabroad.Otherrisksdeemedlesssevereincludeinlandflooding,newandemerginginfectiousdiseases,severeweather,severespace weather, wildfires, explosive volcanic eruption styles emittingmainly ash, animal diseases, major industrial and transport accidents,disruptive industrial action,malicious attacks and public disorder (seeFigure4.1).

Despitethehypearoundtherisks,astudyoftheimpactofmajorcivilsecuritycrisesintheUKforperiod2000–12showedthatduringthe13-yearperiodtherewereonly787documenteddeaths–equivalentto60peryear.Thevastmajorityofthesedeaths(84percent)weretheresultoftheheatwavein2003(301deaths)andthe‘SwineFlu’pandemicin2009 (362).31 By way of comparison, there were some 36,606 roadaccident fatalities in the UK over the same period – or 46 times thenumberofsecuritycrisisdeaths.32Butsecurityplannersareat leastasconcernedwitheconomicdisruptionasdeathtolls,andbythismeasure,themostsignificantUKcrisiseventsduring thestudyperiodwere the2001 foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, the 2007 floods and the 2010volcanicashcloud.A 2013 peer review of the UK’s crisis management framework

criticised government policy for focusing too much on emergencypreparednessandfailing toaddress longer-termvulnerabilities, findingthat

…riskswithpotentiallylargeimpactsandhighlikelihoods,especiallywhen these are growing, could be better managed throughvulnerability reduction than throughpreparingand responding to theevent.Floodsanddroughtsareexamplesofthetypesofrisksthatmayrequire more long-term, whole-of-society approaches to theirreduction, as climate change may have an impact on those in thefuture.33

Areviewofthecrisismanagementarrangementsinthe28EUmemberstates and five neighbouring non-EU states suggest that broadly thesamepreoccupations–thatis,short-termemergencymanagementratherthanlong-termvulnerabilities–prevailacrossthecontinent.34

Riskmanagementandcriticalinfrastructure

TheUKNationalSecurityStrategystatesthatoneofthegovernment’skeytasksistoimprovetheresilienceoftheinfrastructuremostcriticalto keeping the country running in the face of attacks, damage ordestruction. Accordingly, Cabinet Office guidance promotes thebuildingofamore‘resilient’societythatisbetterpreparedforandmoreabletorecoverfromemergencies.Itemphasisesthecollectivenatureofthisendeavour:‘Thisresponsibilityneedstobesharedbetweencentraland local government and the emergency services, the private sector(particularly those providing essential services to the public), civilsocietyandcommunities.’35The National Resilience Capabilities Programme is the core

framework through which the government seeks to build resilienceacrossallpartsoftheUK.Itidentifieschallengesandmonitorsprogressin22different‘workstreams’,eachoverseenbyaleadministry,withthegovernment’sCivilContingenciesSecretariat(CCS)responsiblefortheoverall management.36 The ‘essential services’ workstream assessesresilienceofsix‘keysectors’:health,foodandwater,transport,energy,telecommunications and postal services, and financial services. Anadditional Infrastructure and Corporate Resilience Programmeestablishedin2011,supportspublicandprivatesectororganisationstoimprove the resilience of their infrastructure, supply and distributionsystemsagainstpotentialdisruption.37The EU’s Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)

shares the same objectives of reducing vulnerability and increasingresilience against ‘terrorism, criminal activities, natural disasters andother causes of accidents’ through ‘an all-hazards cross-sectoralapproach’. To this end, the EU adopted a Directive in 2008 on‘European Critical Infrastructures’ (ECIs) in the fields of energy andtransport, requiring EU states to identify those infrastructures whosedisruption would adversely affect other member states and preparesecurityandbusinesscontinuityplans.38However,by2012,ayearaftertheDirectiveenteredintoforce,only14ECIshadbeenidentified.39At

issuewasnotsomuchalackoftransnationalcriticalinfrastructure,butapparently the belief in most member states that they were alreadyadequately designated and protected at the national level.40 Given thelackof interest in theEUDirective, theEuropeanCommission isnowfocusing its CIP efforts on European rather than transnationalinfrastructure: the EU’s electricity transmission grid, the EU’s gastransmission network, the EU’s Air Traffic Management system(EUROCONTROL) and the European programme for global satellitenavigation(GALILEO).41WhatisinterestingabouttherapiddevelopmentofCIPprogrammes,

asweshallseeinthenextsection,isnotsomuchthewaythattheyaremanaged but, the nature of the investments designed to ‘secure’ theinfrastructure.While theEUguidelinesonthis topicremainclassified,the EU established various programmes to assist the owners andoperators of critical infrastructure, including a European ReferenceNetworkforCIP,42aCriticalInfrastructurePreparednessandResilienceResearch Network,43 and funding for more than a hundred projectsunder the Prevention, Preparedness and ConsequenceManagement ofTerrorism and other Security-related Risks programme.44 Thisinvestmentmattersbecause,asLancasterUniversityProfessorMichaelDillonexplains,‘Ordinarilyriskissomethingtobeavoidedinsecuritypoliticsbecauseit isassociatedwithdanger.Butriskisnotsimplytheoccasionofdanger.Riskisalsotheoccasionofprofit.’45

Riskmanagementasindustry

Dillon isconcerned that theunderstandabledesireofpolicymakers tomaintaintheflowsofgoods,services,capitalandpeoplethatunderpinoursocialandmateriallivesisnotarationalresponsetotheirsystemicvulnerability,butareflectionofthe‘profitandinventionextractedfromtheradicalcontingencyofcomplexglobalcirculations’.Indeed,whereas

the modernist project aspired to security, neoliberalism embracesuncertaintyandriskasa‘creativeopportunity’necessarytocapitalism,and to freedom itself.46Wewill see this clearly in Chapter 7, whichshowshowcompanieslikeRaytheon,oneoftheworld’slargestdefencecontractors, have pursued ‘expanded business opportunities’ arisingfrom ‘security concerns and their possible consequences’, due to the‘effects of climate change’ in the form of ‘storms, droughts, andfloods’.47According to a 2015 market research report, the global market for

security technologies that support Critical Infrastructure Protection isexpectedtogrowfrom$72.3billionin2014to$114.8billionin2019,representingyear-on-yeargrowthofalmost10percent.49But it isnotjust that CIP policies are providing new opportunities for securitycontractors, it is the type of security that this market growth isdelivering, and the places that are being ‘securitised’. Much of thephysicalcontrolsandsurveillancetechnologydevelopedfortheborder(see Chapter 5) is now being deployed to protect public and privateinfrastructure, such as transport hubs, power stations and ‘sensitiveinfrastructures’suchas‘stadiums,holyplaces,defenceestablishments,IT and communication,BFSI and government facilities, chemical andmanufacturing’.AsChapter2 explored, the rapiddeploymentof thesetechnologiescanhaveaprofoundimpactoncivilliberties–particularlythoseof‘suspectcommunities’.It isalsoworthpointingout,as thenUKPrimeMinisterTonyBlair

did in the wake of the ‘7/7’ bombings in Britain, that ‘all thesurveillanceintheworld’couldnothavepreventedtheattacks.Norofcourse will it prove much use in the face of rising sea levels,temperatures, or systemic shocks. This is not to say that all criticalinfrastructure protection is simply a ruse to line the pockets of thesecurity industry– though a lackof research intowhere themoney isactuallygoingmeanswewouldn’tbetagainstit–butitiscertainlyanextremely narrow and potentially unhelpful way of addressing thevulnerabilitiesthatcreatedtheindustryinthefirstplace.

Perhaps more importantly, since the resilience industry needs avulnerable subject to thrive, it has to constantly re-produce thatvulnerable subject – a relationship that security scholars suggest is‘robbing human subjects of political options, especially options ofresistance’.50ThishasparticularlyprofoundimplicationsfortheGlobalSouth,where, an already problematic ‘development-security’ nexus isbeingtransformedbythecontemporaryobsessionwith‘resilience’.AsJens Stilhoff Sörensen and Fredrik Söderbaum have explained,development and security already constitute the world’s largestbusiness.51 But the idea of achieving security through materialdevelopment and the protection of the most vulnerable (once theirraison d’être) has been usurped by a politics of ‘resilience’ and‘sustainable development’ – a politicswhich requires ‘constant globaldisastermanagementaswellasintervention’.Theseparadigmshiftsalsoposesomeuncomfortablequestionsforthe

humanitarian sector, which is seen to be retreating into defensive aidbunkers.While aidworkers have genuine security concerns (and faceincreasinginsurancepremiums)astheyoperateinincreasinglycomplexsecurityenvironments,‘riskmanagementwithinthecivilianaidindustryhas been militarised’, segregating aid workers from the communitiestheyworkwith andat times forcing them intodifficult andpoliticallycompromised allianceswith oppressive security forces.52 Similarly, inits report ‘Aiding Surveillance’, the campaign group PrivacyInternational explains how information technology transfer is anincreasingly crucial element of development and humanitarian aidinitiatives, but warn that the unprecedented collection and use ofpersonal information in these initiatives is subject to few legalsafeguards:

Social protection programmes are incorporating digitisedManagement Information Systems and electronic transfers,registration and electoral systems are deploying biometrictechnologies, theproliferationofmobilephones isfacilitatingaccess

toincreasedamountsofdata,andtechnologiesarebeingtransferredtosupport security and rule of lawefforts.Manyof theseprogrammesand technologies involve thesurveillanceof individuals,groups,andentirepopulations.53

Emergenciesand‘emergencypowers’

Whenwehad the ideafor thisbook,back in2010,andbegantofleshout the contributions, we were concerned that the heavy-handed andracistresponsetoHurricaneKatrinabytheUSgovernmentwasnotonlya manifestation of Bush’s militarised Homeland Security programme,buttheshapeofthingstocomefordisastermanagementtheworldover.Thereisgoodreasontosupposethatthisisstillthecasebecause,inthewake of 9/11 and other high-profile emergencies, governments acrossthe world have updated their emergency powers to enable similarresponses. We also saw some of the same heavy-handed militaryresponses to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and the typhoon in ThePhilippinesin2013thatwehadseenafterKatrina.However,emergencyplanningisalsoabout‘lessonslearned’,andlike

theAmericanpublic,thewholeworldwas,asUSjournalistandauthorSusan Faludi put it, ‘forced to look at what lay behind the veneer ofchest-beating[and]sawtheconsequencesofhavingterriblegovernmentleadership’.54Doesthismeanthatfuturecrisismanagementwillbelesscoercive?Thisofcoursedependsuponthenatureofthecrisis,butstatescertainly appear to be accruing all of the coercive powers theymightneed.The UK’s emergency legislation is typical. Following a series of

emergencies, including the fuelcrisisandsevere flooding in late2000and the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in 2001, the UKgovernment initiated a review of its emergency planning regulations,including the 1920 Emergency Powers Act. The review was alsostronglyinfluencedbytheterroristattacksof9/11,followingwhichthe

UKgovernmentdeclareda‘stateofemergency’whichallowedittooptout of the provisions in the European Convention on Human Rightsprohibiting detention without trial. This enabled the government toreintroducethe internmentof terroristsuspects, thoughthispolicywasultimatelydeclaredunlawfulbytheBritishcourtsin2004.TheemergencypowersreviewresultedintheCivilContingenciesAct

2004, under which the government can declare a state of emergencywithout a parliamentary vote, and potentially without even publiclydeclaring a state of emergency. The term ‘emergency’ is definedbroadly as an ‘event or situation’which ‘threatens serious damage tohumanwelfare’or‘totheenvironment’of‘aplaceintheUK’,or‘war,or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of theUK’.55Having invoked an emergency,ministers can– ‘if it is necessary to

make provision urgently in order to prevent, control or mitigate anaspect or effect of the emergency when existing powers areinsufficient’56 – introduce ‘emergency regulations’ under the RoyalPrerogativewithout recourse toParliament; such regulations can ‘givedirections or orders’ of virtually unlimited scope, including thedestruction of property, prohibiting assemblies, banning travel andoutlawing ‘other specified activities.’ Failure to comply with theregulationswouldbecomeacriminaloffencepunishablebyuptothreemonths in jail. The armed services can be deployed withoutparliamentary notification or approval, and emergency regulations‘protectingorrestoringactivitiesofHerMajesty’sGovernment’maybepassed.57The UK emergency powers review – and many elements of the

subsequentlegislation–weremirroredinAustraliaandCanada.TherearealsostrikingsimilaritiesbetweentheUK’sandtheUS’semergencypowersstatutes.IntheUS,Section1042ofthe2007NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct(NDAA),‘UseoftheArmedForcesinMajorPublicEmergencies,’ authorises the president to activate the military inresponse to ‘anaturaldisaster, adiseaseoutbreak, a terrorist attackor

any other condition in which the President determines that domesticviolencehasoccurred to theextent that stateofficials cannotmaintainpublicorder’.58Whereas in the UK crisis management is of a civilian nature, with

military involvement sought only in extreme cases, some Europeanstates have a longer tradition of deploying paramilitary and militaryunitsinemergencysituations(andhaveagreedtoprovidetroopstooneanotherincertaincircumstances).AlmostallhavefollowedtheAnglo-Saxontrendofrevisingtheirstatutestotakeintoaccountnewthreats.59InFrance, for example, thePresidentialDefenceWhitePaperof2013declaresthat‘Theengagementofthearmedforcestosupporthomelandsecurityandcivilsecurityintheeventofamajorcrisiscouldinvolveupto 10,000 personnel from the land forces, together with appropriateresources provided by the navy and the air force.’60 TheWhite PaperalsodeterminestheNationalGendarmerie,asanarmedforceundertheoperational control of theMinistry of Interior, to be able to ‘respondrapidly to crisis situations or natural disasters, and it can therefore bedeployed alongside the armed forces.’61 Even Germany, where thedeploymentofthearmedforcesistightlyregulatedbytheConstitution,has recently determined that troops could be deployed domestically ifGermany faced an emergency of ‘catastrophic proportions’. It hashowever upheld the prohibition on the potential use of the army tocontroldemonstrations.62The geographer Ben Anderson has explained how, over the second

halfofthetwentiethcentury,‘emergency’hasshiftedfrombeingatermapplied to a limited number of events to a term that can be used inrelationtoalmostanyevent.But‘emergency’isstillaselectiveconcept.Manypeopleconsiderthe‘migrantcrisis’atCalaisthathittheheadlinesover the summer of 2015 to be a humanitarian emergency, as severalthousand refugees seeking to travel to Britain are living in terribleconditions. The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) hasdescribed the number of people there as ‘easilymanageable’, and the

conditions they are living in as ‘appalling’, but Britain and Franceinsteadrespondedwithmorefences,dogsandgendarmes–andarguedthattheonlygenuineemergencyistheporousnessofEurope’sborders.Meanwhile,thejobofprovidinghumanitarianassistancetotherefugeeshastodatebeentakenonbycharitiesandactivistsfrombothcountries,who are appalled by the response of their own governments. As thenumberofrefugeesfromNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEastcontinuestogrow, the humanitarian crisis atCalais is being replicated at locationsacrossEurope.Outsideofthemostprosperousnationsonearth,statesofemergency

areno lesspoliticised. InEcuador, thegovernmentdeclareda stateofemergency inAugust 2015using thepretext of a volcanic eruption inordertorepressmassiveprotestsagainstextractiveindustries.InIndia,the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Acts – introduced first by theBritishinanattempttoquashtheQuitIndiamovementandmaintainedby the Indian government to deal withmovements for autonomy andindependence–remainsinforceinpartsof theNorth-eastandJammuand Kashmir, granting the military extraordinary powers to break upprotests and shoot-to-kill law breakers. In Tunisia, the state ofemergency introduced after the 2015 attacks on tourists at theMediterranean resort of Port El Kantaoui remained in force threemonths later, while new anti-terrorism legislation re-introduces thedeathpenalty,allowssuspectstobedetainedfor15dayswithoutaccessto a lawyer, and fails to properly distinguish between protests andterroristacts.Obviouslyifthestatepowersintroducedafteremergenciesare almost always ‘draconian’,more ‘emergencies’ theworld over donotbodewellforcivillibertiesandfundamentalrights.

Predictingtheworst:Whennationalsecuritymeetssocialunrest

Whatkindsofscenariosemergewhennationalsecurityplannersstartto

trytopredictcomplexemergenciesandsocialunrest?Asthisandotherchapters explore, through the lens of the national security apparatus,criseslikeclimatechangeandenergydepletionareseennotassystemicproblemsrequiringsystemictransformation,butinsteadareexternalisedas ‘threats out there’ that therefore trigger reactionary‘containment’responses.One particularly dangerous development of this approach is the

conflation of protests against inequality and social injusticewith newcrisis-management paradigms. In other words, activism and protestbecome signs, not of a need for a change of policy, but of securitythreats that must be pre-empted, neutralised, or obstructed. As writerRebeccaSolnitobserves,therealviolenceinaworldofclimatechangeis not that caused by riots, it is the violence inflicted by fossil-fuelbaronsthatiscausingclimatechangeanddestroyingpeople’slivesasaresult:

Climate change is not suddenly bringing about an era of equitabledistribution. I suspect peoplewill be revolting in the coming futureagainst what they revolted against in the past: the injustices of thesystem.Theyshouldrevolt,andweshouldbegladtheydo,ifnotsogladthattheyneedto.63

Itisaworryingfeaturethenthatgovernmentriskassessmentsfrequentlycitepublicdisquietandresistanceasamajorsecuritythreat,ratherthana signof a failing system.TheUKNationalRiskRegister (illustratedabove), for example, lists ‘public disorder’ and ‘disruptive industrialaction’asamongthemostsevereandlikelysecurity threatsfacingtheUK.It is also instructive to lookcloselyat thekindsof security research

the US government is now funding, as it suggests how the securitycommunityisincreasinglyseekingtobuilditsunderstandingofactivismandsocialunrestinordertocombatit.Themostsignificantprogrammeunderway is the ‘Minerva Research Initiative’, set up by the USDepartment of Defense (DoD) in 2008, which has been funding

universities tomodel the dynamics, risks and tipping points for large-scalecivilunrestacrosstheworld,underthesupervisionofvariousUSmilitaryagencies.Some of the research is clearly of understandable merit to social

scientistsandofbroadpublicinterest.Forexample,theMinerva’scallfor research tracking ‘the factors that affect societal resilience toexternal “shock” events and corresponding tipping points’ in order tobetteranticipate‘potentialareasofunrest,instability,andconflict’.Butit is important to remember the underlying goals of the programme,whichevenusingtheirownlanguageisdesignedtodevelopimmediateand long-term ‘warfighter-relevant insights’ for senior officials anddecision makers in ‘the defense policy community’, and to informpolicy implemented by ‘combatant commands’.64 In this context, aproject grant awarded in 2014 to theUniversity ofWashingtonwhich‘seeks to uncover the conditions under which political movementsaimed at large-scale political and economic change originate’, alongwith their ‘characteristics and consequences’, looks less innocent andmoreanattempttopreventtheseoftennecessarymovementsforchangefrom flourishing. After all, one study does not only ask ‘whereorganized violence is likely to erupt, what factors might explain itsspread’, but also ‘how one might circumvent its dissemination’. Thefocusheremightbeonviolence,butgiventhatmostsocialunrestandindeedmostliberationandcivilrightsstrugglesofthelastcenturyhavefollowedthepatternofcombinedviolentandnonviolentresistance,theendresultistherepressionofboth.Several other projects have looked closely at protestors’ behaviour

andthedynamicsofpoliticaldissent.ThePentagonasksforproposalsinvestigating underlying mechanisms for social and politicalmobilisation; as well as factors that ‘foster or inhibit’ an individualmovingfrompassivesupportof‘fringe’socialmovementstowhatthePentagoncalls‘activepoliticalmobilization’.Thatalsoincludesminingdeep into the very structure and make-up of ‘change-drivenorganizations’ofanykind.ThePentagonwants researchers toanalyse

their‘topology,powerstructure,productivity’,howandwhytheymergeandsplinterwithothergroups,andtheiroverallresilience.Theresearchhas included developing advanced data-mining tools that canautomaticallycategoriseactivistgroupsandrankthemonathreat-scaletoUSinterests.Onesuchtool,called‘LookingGlass’,canidentifyandlocateindividuals,andevenranktheirallegedpropensityforviolenceorterrorism, just by automatically tracking and analysing their socialmediaposts.65IntheEU,ahostofresearchintotheuseofsocialmediaforpolicing,

emergencyresponse,crisismanagement,securityassessmentsandpro-activeemergenciesmanagementisunderway.66Althoughtheresearchisnot geared explicitly toward protests and activism, the tools andtechniques being developed represent the same overarching desire topredict andmanage unrest using surveillance and risk assessment.Aswehaveseen following the revelationsbyEdwardSnowden,once thetechnologicalgenieisoutofthebottleandinthehandsofthestate,itisverydifficulttoputitbackinagain.

Resistance–Therealresilience

The current state-corporate obsession with emergencies and newtechniques for crisis management capitalises on public fears bypromisingresilienceagainstdisasters.Butasthischapterhasshown,themaximumsecurityparadigmonwhichitisbasedcaneasilyunderminesocietalresiliencebyfacilitatingstaterepressionorprovidingcoverforthe militarised policing of vulnerable communities. This problemappears particularly acute when we consider its relationship to therepression of popular movements seeking to challenge the prevailingcrisis-proneorder.Here,theobjectiveofnewsecuritypoliciesisnotjustthe maintenance of law and order but the outright pacification ofvulnerableandrestivepopulations.Thesecuritisationofdisasterresponseisembeddedinpowerful,self-

reinforcinglogicsinwhichmoreemergenciesrequirebetteranticipationandmoreriskassessments; themorerisksthatare identified, themoreprotective and preparatory action that must be taken; the moreemergencies,thegreatertheinvestmentinresponse,andsoforth.Tobeclear,we are not saying that states should not be better preparing foremergencies,orindeedthatthereisnotarolefortheprivatesector.Butweare saying that so far it appears tohave increasedprofiteeringandmilitarisationinthefaceoftoolittlecriticalscrutiny.Orienting emergency preparedness around pacification also

fundamentally misses the point about the kind of resilience that canwithstandnaturaldisastersandcomplexemergencies,whichrequiresareduction of the vulnerability that turns hazards into disasters. In thecase of natural disasters, building resilience will involve providingbetterprotectionforvulnerablecommunities,andinthecaseofcomplexemergencies, it will involve addressing some of the systemicweaknessesinourglobalisedandcorporate-dominatedplanet.Thiswillrequireactionsatlocal,nationalandinternationallevels.There are many examples of communities successfully building

resilience,bothinrespondingtodisastersandsupportingflourishinginthe long term. The Huairou Commission, for example, a globalmembership and partnership organisation of grass-roots women’smovementsaroundtheworld,hasdevelopedalibraryoftoolkitsderivedfromconcrete,real-worldknowledgeandexperience.Thesetoolkitsaredesigned for both rural and urban communities. They show how toreduce vulnerability, deploy disaster-resistant technologies and enactpost-disasterrehabilitationandrebuilding.Thetoolkitsarecontinuouslytested and improved through actual hands-on execution andimprovement.67 Meanwhile in San Francisco, a NeighbourhoodEmpowerment Network (NEN) empowers residents to identifyneighbourhood goals relating to disaster preparedness and resiliencecollectively,andtothendevelopwaystoachievethemthroughaninter-agency Resilient Action Plan. Every month, NEN convenes fourworkinggroupsofchildrenandtheir families;seniorsandpeoplewith

disabilities; immigrant communities; and local businesses and non-profits.With or without such preparations, many communities have also

displayed a remarkable response to disasters when they occur. In adetailed examination of five major disasters, such as the flooding ofNewOrleans in 2005, Rachel Solnit shows that amidst the suffering,crises often bring out the best evidence of altruism and solidarity inpeople.Indisasterafterdisasterandoftenbelowthemediaradar,weseecommunities rally around,protect thevulnerable andmobilise supportandassistanceefficientlyandeffectively.Thisoftencontrastswith theinadequate or militarised responses by elites: ‘Disaster often revealswhatelsetheworldcouldbelike–revealsthestrengthofthathope,thatgenerosity and that solidarity. It reveals mutual aid as a defaultoperatingprincipleandcivilsocietyassomethingwaitinginthewingswhen it’s absent from the stage.’68 These inspiring experiences oftenalsoguide therebuildingprocess. In Italy, for instance, thepost-shockimpact of the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake prompted local residents todismiss the proposed neoliberal housing recovery solutions package,opting instead toconstructearthquake-proofhomesmadeofstrawandwood.The‘eco-village’continuestoexisttoday.69Atanational level,Cubahas shown that evenadevelopingcountry

with minimal resources can – with the right strategies – provideprotectionforitsvulnerablecommunities.Between1996and2002,forexample, sixmajor hurricanes hitCuba, yet a total of only 16 peopledied.WhenHurricaneSandyhitbothCubaandtheUSin2012,only11people died in Cuba yet 157 died in the US. As a report by Oxfamexplained, Cuba’s success is based on a highly effective communitymobilisation carried out by Civil Defence Structures backed up by apro-activestate.Underlyingitall,though,isalong-termfoundationofa

… socio-economic model that reduces vulnerability and invests insocial capital through universal access to government services andpromotion of social equity. The resulting high levels of literacy,

developed infrastructure in rural areas and access to reliable healthcare and other created capital function as ‘multiplier effects’ fornationaleffortsindisastermitigation,preparationandresponse.

Inotherwords,peopleinCuba,despitetheirpoverty,areeducatedaboutand prepared for disasters, live in houses built to regulated safetystandards,haveaccess to roadsandelectricity socaneasilybealertedand supported, and most of all are organised in a way that enablessolidaritywithneighboursandfacilitatesrapiddisasterrelief.Cuba’smodelpoints to theneed for localactions tobebolsteredby

effectivestateandattimesinternationalactiontoproviderealresilience.Italsoshowsthatlong-termresiliencerequiresasocio-economicmodelthat reduces rather than exacerbates vulnerability. Without universalaccesstobasicservices,educationforall,tacklingofinequalityandthecreation of a culture of collaboration and solidarity rather thancompetitionand individualism, it isveryhard tobuilda truly resilientsociety.This necessarily means redistribution of wealth at national and

internationallevelsinorderforthistohappen.Thepaltryresourcestherichestnationshavepromisedtodevelopingcountriesinclimatefinanceare completely inadequate to the task. Rich countries pledged $100billioninclimatefinancetohelpdevelopingcountriesperyearby2020but have so only succeeded in raising a third of that. Instead, theycontinuetospendmoreonsubsidisingfossilfuelswhichareworseningthe climate crisis.70 Money diverted from the current $1,776 billionspentworldwideon themilitarywouldbeagoodstep towardsamoresolidarity-basedresponsetotheimpactsofclimatechange.71Beyond redistribution, we need fundamentally to start tackling the

weakpoints thatcouldenablewhatHomer-Dixoncalled ‘synchronousfailure’, in other words, to tackle the root causes of complexemergencies. Michael Lewis and Pat Conaty suggest seven keycharacteristics thatwillmake a community a ‘resilient’ one: diversity,social capital, healthy ecosystems, innovation, collaboration, regular

systems for feedback, and modularity (the latter means designing asystemwhereifonethingbreaks,itdoesn’taffecteverythingelse).72Insomekeyrespects,thisistheantithesisofthesystemsandpracticesthatunderpinourcurrentglobalisedeconomy,whichhasinsteadencouragedcorporate monopolies, monocultures, the centralisation of power,environmental destruction and individualism. This in turn reinforcesNaomi Klein’s argument in This Changes Everything, that effectivesolutions to the climate crisis will necessarily involve wholesalechangestothecurrenteconomicsystem.Ultimately,however,thechangesweneedbothtoopposemilitarised

responses to crises and to advocate and develop alternatives will nothappen without sustained pressure by social movements. The onlycertainway toprevent the steadyerosionofcivil liberties becoming apermanent state of emergency is tomobilise a permanent resistance –one that obstructs militarised responses and advances alternatives.Resistanceisstillthebestformofresilienceonoffer.

Notes

1.

FoodSystemShock:Theinsuranceimpactsofacutedisruptiontoglobalfoodsupply(EmergingRiskReport:InnovationSeries,pp.1–30,report).(2015).London:Lloyds.Retrievedfromhttp://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/news%20and%20insight/risk%20insight/2015/food%20 system%20shock/food%20system%20shock_june%202015.pdf.

2. WorldwatchInstitute.(2013).Naturaldisastersbecomingmorefrequent.Retrievedfromhttp://www.worldwatch.org/node/5825.

3.Patrick,S.M.(14August2012).Man-madecitiesandnaturaldisasters:thegrowingthreat,TheInternationalist.Retrievedfromhttp://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2012/08/14/man-made-cities-and-natural-disasters-the-growing-threat/.

Anderson,J.andBausch,C.(25January2006).Climatechangeandnaturaldisasters:Scientificevidenceofapossiblerelationbetweennaturaldisastersandclimatechange,PolicyBrieffortheEuropeanParliamentEnvironmentCommi

4. ttee(InstituteforEuropeanEnvironmentalPolicy,p.5.Retrievedfromhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/envi/pdf/externalexpertise/ieep_6leg/naturaldisasters.pdf.

5. Ibid.,p.2.

6.

Hansen,J.,Sato,M.andRuedy,R.(6August2012).Perceptionofclimatechange,ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciencesoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica[PNAS]Retrievedfromhttp://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/07/30/1205276109.AlsoseeHolpuch,A.(7August2012).Nasascientist’sstudyquantifiesclimatechangelinktoextremeweather,Guardian.Retrievedfromhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/aug/07/nasa-scientist-high-temperatures-climate-change.

7. Patrick,S.M(14August2012).

8.

Nicholls,R.Hanson,S.et.al.(2007).Rankingoftheworld’scitiesmostexposedtocoastalfloodingtodayandinthefuture.Paris:OECDEnvironmentWorkingPaper.Retrievedfromhttp://www.oecd.org/env/climatechange/39721444.pdf.AlsoseeOECDpressrelease(4December2007)retrievedfromhttp://www.oecd.org/environment/climatechange/39729575.pdf.

9. Davis,M.(2006).PlanetofSlums.London:Verso,p.25.

10. Therisingcostofcatastrophes.TheEconomist(14January2012)Retrievedfromhttp://www.economist.com/node/21542771.

11. Countingthecostofcalamities,TheEconomist(14January2012)Retrievedfromhttp://www.economist.com/node/21542755.

12. Giddens,A.(14April1999).Risk.LecturepresentedatRunawayWorld,HongKong.

13. Theglobalizationofsecurity.ChathamHouse,2005,p.2–3(ISP/NSCBriefingPaper05/02),p.3.

14.Duffield,M.(1994).Complexemergenciesandthecrisisofdevelopmentism,IDSBulletin.Brighton:InstituteofDevelopmentStudies,25(4).Retrievedfromhttp://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/duffield254.pdf.

15.

FAOMediaCentre(4October2012).FAOFoodPriceIndexup1.4percentinSeptember.Retrieved fromhttp://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/161602/icode/.

16.

Ahmed,N.M.(February2011).TheGreatUnravelling:Tunisia,EgyptandtheprotractedcollapseoftheAmericanempire,LeMondediplomatique.Retrievedfromhttp://mondediplo.com/blogs/tunisia-egypt-and-the-protracted-collapse-of-the.AlsoseeAhmed,N.M.(2010).AUser’sGuidetotheCrisisofCivilisation:Andhowtosaveit.London:Pluto,2010.

17.

Heller,M.andKeoleian,G.(2000).LifeCycle-BasedSustainabilityIndicatorsforAssessmentoftheU.S.FoodSystem.AnnArbor,MI:CenterforSustainableSystems,UniversityofMichigan,p.42.Retrievedfromhttp://css.snre.umich.edu/css_doc/CSS00-04.pdf;Heinberg,R.(2005).Threatsofpeaktotheglobalfoodsupply.Museletter,July,No.159.Retrievedfromhttp://www.richardheinberg.com/museletter/159.

18.Murray,M.(9May2005).Oilandfood:arisingsecuritychallenge.PlanBUpdate.WashingtonDC:EarthPolicyInstitute,No.48.Retrievedfromhttp://www.earth-policy.org/index.php?/plan_b_updates/2005/update48.

19. Cribb,J.(2010).TheComingFamine:Theglobalfoodcrisisandwhatwecandoaboutit.Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,pp.6–7.

20. Rhodes,C.(2014,20February).Peakoilisnotamyth.Retrievedfromhttp://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/2014/02/peak-oil-not-myth-fracking.

21. Homer-Dixon,T.(2006).TheUpsideofDown:Catastrophe,creativityandtherenewalofcivilisation.London:SouvenirPress,pp.11–13,16.

22.

Beddington,J.(2009).Food,energy,waterandtheclimate:aperfectstormofglobalevents?,DepartmentofBusiness,Innovation&Skills.London:GovernmentOfficeforScience.Retrievedfromhttp://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/goscience/docs/p/perfect-storm-paper.pdf.

23.

Ahmed,N.(2011).Theinternationalrelationsofcrisisandthecrisisofinternationalrelations:fromthesecuritisationofscarcitytothemilitarisationofsociety.GlobalChange,Peace&Security,23(3),October.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14781158.2011.601854.

24. Klein,N.(2007).TheShockDoctrine:Theriseofdisastercapitalism.NewYork:MetropolitanBooks/HenryHolt,p.359.

25.

Gunewardena,N.(2008).CapitalizingonCatastrophe:NeoliberalStrategiesinDisasterReconstruction.London:AltaMiraPress.AlsoseeBroome,A.(2011).Negotiatingcrisis:TheIMFanddisastercapitalisminsmallstates.TheRoundTable:TheCommonwealthJournalofInternationalAffairs,100(413).Retri

evedfromhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358533.2011.565627.

26.

ItisnotablethatBremer,mentionedbyNaomiKleinabove,afterleavingIraqservedasChairoftheboardofGlobalSecureCorporation,whosestatedgoalwas‘securingthehomelandwithintegratedproductsandservicesforthecriticalincidentresponsecommunityworldwide’.Seehttp://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/19/17373886-iraq-war-10-years-later-where-are-they-now-paul-bremer-iraq-administrator?lite.

27.

TheScandinaviansinventedtheconceptof‘societalsecurity’anddefinethemasa)managementofgovernmentaffairs;b)internationalactivity;c)nationalmilitarydefence;d)internalsecurity;e)functioningoftheeconomyandinfrastructure;f)thepopulation’sincomesecurityandcapabilitytofunction,andg)psychologicalcrisistolerance.EUdefinitionof‘criticalinfrastructure’:retrievedfrom http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/critical-infrastructure/index_en.htm.

28.

USdefinitionof‘criticalinfrastructure’:retrievedfromhttp://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure.

29.

Brazil’swatercrisisissobadthatthearmyisstagingsimulationsofamassuprisingatthelocalwaterutility’,BusinessInsider,10August2015.Retrievedfromhttp://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-brazilian-army-is-training-for-a-water-uprising-2015-8.

30.FOCUS–Crisismanagementcycle–Wiki.(n.d.).Retrievedfromhttp://www.focusproject.eu/web/focus/wiki/-/wiki/ESG/Crisis+management+cycle;jsessionid=C1BE7F4BD0F10F1F3108FBBAAF92668A.

31.

Fanoulis,E.,Kirchner,E.andDorussen,H.(2014).ANVIL(AnalysisofCivilSecuritySystemsinEurope)CountryStudy:UnitedKingdom,February2014.Retrieved from http://anvil-project.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/United-Kingdom_v1.1.pdf.

32. UKDepartmentofTransport.(30June2011).AnnualRoadFatalities.Retrievedfromhttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/annual-road-fatalities.

33. Ibid.

34.DRIVERproject(2015)CrisisManagementPolicyandLegislationReport.Retrievedfrom:http://driver-project.eu/sites/default/files/driver/files/content-files/deliverables/D83%2011_CM_Policy_and_Legislation%20_report_v1.0.pdf.

35.UKCabinetOffice.(8May2015).2010to2015GovernmentPolicy:EmergencyResponsePlanning.Retrievedfromhttps://www.gov.uk/government/policies/improving-the-uks-ability-to-absorb-respond-to-and-recover-from-emergencies/supporting-pages/building-a-resilient-society.

36.

UKCabinetOffice.(20February2013).PreparationandPlanningforEmergencies:TheNationalResilienceCapabilitiesProgramme.Retrievedfromhttps://www.gov.uk/preparation-and-planning-for-emergencies-the-capabilities-programme.

37.

Individualplansareclassified,buttheCabinetOfficeproducesanannualsummaryofalldepartments’plansintooneoverallsectorresilienceplanforcriticalinfrastructure.Sectorresilienceplansforthelastfouryearscanbeviewedhere:https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/sector-resilience-plans.See furtherCabinetOfficeguidance:UKCabinetOffice(October2011)KeepingtheCountryRunning:Naturalhazardsandinfrastructure,p.5.Retrievedfromhttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61342/natural-hazards-infrastructure.pdf.

38.EuropeanUnion,CouncilDirective.(8December2008).CouncilDirective2008/114/EC.Retrievedfromhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:en:pdf.

39.

EuropeanCommission(22June2012).OnthereviewoftheEuropeanProgrammeforCriticalInfrastructureProtection(EPCIP)(Commissionstaffworkingdocument).Retrievedfromhttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/pdf/policies/crisis_and_terrorism/epcip_swd_2012_190_final.pdf.

40.

EuropeanCommission(28August2013).OnanewapproachtotheEuropeanProgrammeforCriticalInfrastructureProtection:MakingEuropeanCriticalInfrastructuresmoresecure(Commissionstaffworkingdocument).Retrievedfrom http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/critical-infrastructure/docs/swd_2013_318_on_epcip_en.pdf.

41. Ibid.

42. EuropeanReferenceNetworkforCriticalInfrastructureProtectionwebsite:https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.

43.

CIPRNET–CriticalInfrastructurePreparednessandResilienceResearchNetworkwebsite:https://www.ciprnet.eu/summary.html.

EuropeanCommission.TerrorismandotherSecurity-relatedRisks(CIPS).(n.

44. d.).Retrievedfromhttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/terrorism-and-other-risks/index_en.htm.

45. Dillon,M.(2005).Globalsecurityinthe21stcentury:Circulation,complexityandcontingency,ChathamHouseISP/NSCBriefingPaper05/02.

46.Stilhoff,S.andSöderbaum,F.(2012).Introduction.TheEndoftheDevelopment-SecurityNexus?,DevelopmentDialogue,No.58.Retrievedfromhttp://globalstudies.gu.se/digitalAssets/1430/1430267_enddvlpmsecurity.pdf.

47.Schulman,J.(14August2013).DefenseContractor:ClimateChangeCouldCreate‘BusinessOpportunities’.Retrievedfromhttp://www.motherjones.com/environment/2013/08/raytheon-climate-change-security.

49. Ibid.

50.DunnCavelty,M.,Kaufmann,M.andSøbyKristensen,K.(2015).Resilienceand(in)security:Practices,subjects,temporalities.SecurityDialogue,46(1),3–14.

51. Stilhoff,S.andSöderbaum,F.(2012).

52.

Duffield,M(2012).Riskmanagementandthebunkeringoftheaidindustry.TheEndoftheDevelopment-SecurityNexus?DevelopmentDialogue,No.58.Retrievedfromhttp://globalstudies.gu.se/digitalAssets/1430/1430096_riskmanagement1.pdfp.10.

53. Seewebsitehttps://www.privacyinternational.org/?q=node/310.

54. Interview:SusanFaludion9/11myths.(10July2007).Newsweek.Retrievedfromhttp://www.newsweek.com/interview-susan-faludi-911-myths-103359.

55. CivilContingenciesAct2004,Part1,Article1,Paragraph1.

56.

Itshouldbenotedthatsome‘emergencypowers’existinotherstatutorylegislation,includingtheControlofMajorAccidentHazardsRegulations1999(asamended2005and2008),thePipelinesSafetyRegulations1996,theRadiationEmergencyPreparednessandPublicInformationRegulations,theEnergyAct1976,theNuclearInstallationsAct1965,theIonisingRadiationsRegulations,theEnergyAct(CarbonCaptureandStorage)2008,theSafetyofSportsGroundsAct1975,theFireSafetyandSafetyofPlacesofSportAct1987,theHealthandSafetyatWorkAct1974,andtheFloodandWaterManagementAct2010.

StatewatchBriefing.(January2004).CivilContingenciesBill:Britain’sPatriot

57.Act–revised,andjustasdangerousasbefore.Retrievedfromhttp://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/jan/12uk-civil-contingencies-bill-revised.htm;Tyler,R.(21January2004).BritainpreparesitsownversionofUSpatriotact.WSWS.Retrievedfromhttp://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/jan2004/patri-j21.shtml.

58.

DespitesomeofitsworstprovisionsbeingrepealedbyJudgeKatherineForrestin2012as‘unconstitutional’,threejudgesintheUSCourtofAppeals–allObamaappointees–overruledthoserepeals.Alsoin2007,theWhiteHouseissuedNationalSecurityPresidentialDirective51(NSPD-51)toensure‘continuityofgovernment’intheeventofa‘catastrophicemergency’,inwhichcasethePresidentaloneisempoweredtodowhateverhedeemsnecessary–includingeverythingfromcancellingelectionstosuspendingtheConstitutiontolaunchinganuclearattack.

59.ArmedForces’SupporttoCivilianAuthorities:StudyonCapabilities,Organisations,Policies,andLegislation(COPL)ofusingarmedforcesincrisismanagementanddisasterresponse,DRIVER.EUproject,forthcoming.

60.

FrenchWhitePaperonDefenceandNationalSecurity.(2013),p.86.Retrievedfromhttp://www.rpfrance-otan.org/White-Paper-on-defence-and.

61. Ibid.,p.92.

62. Germanarmy’scrisisrolewidened.(17August2012).Retrievedfromhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19295351.

63.Solnit,R.(7April2014).Callclimatechangewhatitis:Violence.Retrievedfrom http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr07/climate-change-violence-occupy-earth.

64. Seehttp://minerva.dtic.mil/cois.html.

65.Ahmed,N.(19February2015).ThebleaksciencebankrolledbythePentagon.VICEMotherboard.Retrieved fromhttp://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-science-of-the-pentagon.

66.

See,respectively,theEU-fundedprojectsathttps://www.epoolice.eu/,http://www.westyorkshire.police.uk/athena,http://www.fp7-emergent.eu/,http://slandail.eu/,http://isar.i112.eu/,http://www.cosmic-project.eu/,andhttp://super-fp7.eu/.

67. Seehttp://huairou.org/resilience/community-resilience-toolkit.

Solnit,R.(2009).AParadiseBuiltinHell:Theextraordinarycommunitiestha

68. tariseindisasters.NewYork:Viking,p.312.

69.Fois,F.andForino,G.(October2014).Theself-builtecovillageinL’Aquila,Italy:communityresilienceasagrassrootsresponsetoenvironmentalshock.Disasters,38(4),719–39.

70.TheGlobalLandscapeofClimateFinance2014(report).(November2014).Retrieved http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2014/.

71. Perlo-Freeman,S.(13April2015).TrendsinWorldMilitaryExpenditure(report).Retrievedhttp://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/recent-trends.

72. Lewis,M.andConaty,P.(2012).TheResilienceImperative:Cooperativetransitionstoasteady-stateeconomy.Gabriola,BC:NewSociety.

5

FROMREFUGEEPROTECTIONTOMILITARISED

EXCLUSION:WHATFUTUREFOR‘CLIMATE

REFUGEES’?

BenHayes,SteveWrightandAprilHumble

OneofBritain’smostseniormilitarystrategistshaswarnedthatthethreatposedbymigrationtowesterncivilisationisonaparwiththebarbarianinvasionsthatdestroyed the Roman empire. Rear Admiral Chris Parry likened modernimmigrationtotheGothsandVandals,sayingthatEuropecouldbesubjectedto‘reverse colonisation’ over the next twelve years.Not since the days of EnochPowellhassuchapocalyptic languagebeensoacceptable,and itsmessagesowidelyaccepted.There isnorecognitionofresponsibilityfortherefugeesfromthe wars and anti-Muslim crusades of the Middle East, the resource wars ofAfrica,thefall-outwarsbornoftheperverseboundariesofcolonialismandtheproxywarsagainstcommunism,thosedisplacedbyeconomicwarsonthepooror by death squads. They, not the western policies and actions creating orcontributingtotheirdisplacement,areseenbywesternEuropeanpoliticiansandpopularmediaas ‘theproblem’.Tothe imageof locustsseekingtodescendonthecontinenttostripitbareissuperaddedthelabelofcriminal,justifiedbythenecessary illegalityof their travel,andnow,afterthetwintowers,afterMadridandafter7/7inLondon,theyarepotentialterroriststoo.

FrancesWebber,‘Borderwarsandasylumcrimes’,20061

Introduction

In the springof2015,Europe’smigrationpolicy–ormoreaccuratelyanti-immigrationpolicy –was highon theEUagenda after twoboatscontainingaround1,500peoplesankintheMediterraneaninthespaceof aweek. Itwas hard not to see the concern expressed byEuropeanofficialsasanythingotherthancrocodiletears,giventhedecisionbytheEUtoendfinancialsupportforItaly’sMareNostrumsearch-and-rescuemission just six months earlier. Representatives of the UK and otherpowerful member states had argued that the rescue missions weresimplyencouragingmorewould-be refugees to try tomakedangerouscrossings from North Africa to Europe. This was nothing short ofarguingthatthebestdeterrentagainstunwantedmigrantsismassdeath,andcompletely ignoredtheabjectdesperation thatmotivatespeople toleavetheirhomesathugecostandriskinthefirstplace.No one had outlined this policy option in 2008, when the EU’s

security and foreign policy chief had warned that climate change,droughts,poorharvestsandfoodshortages–alreadytentativelylinkedtoconflictandmigrationfromSyriaandEritrea,currentlythecountriesof origin of the two largest groups of refugees bound for Europe –would lead to ‘substantially increasedmigratory pressure’ fromNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEastby2020.2Butratherthancontributingtotheamelioration of the appalling conditions that underpin this kind ofemigration,orimprovingtheopportunitiesandmechanismsforrefugeeprotection in Europe, the EU has simply ratcheted up the securityrhetoric by sending in the army to go after the people traffickers anddestroy their boats. The United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees andAmnesty International havewarned that this will likelyworsentheplightofrefugees.Goneis theEU’smoralauthoritytotellSouth East Asian nations faced with boatloads of Rohingya fleeingethniccleansinginBurmatodotherightthingbytherefugees.The growing awareness of climate change as a factor in inducing

migrationhas ledmany in theenvironmental justicemovement tocall

on the international community to extend the Geneva Conventions torecognise the rights of ‘climate refugees’.We are concerned that thisobscures three trends in migration policy that long pre-date debatesabout the relationship between climate change and migration or itspotentialfuturescale.First, thesecuritisationofmigrationpolicyover thepast thirtyyears

or so has seen many rich countries long stop admitting refugees insignificant numbers, while re-casting migrants and asylum-seekers as‘illegal’,‘bogus’andasecuritythreattobecounteredwiththefullforceof the state. Central to this process has been a ‘tightening’ of allmigration controls and diminishing refugee protection asmeasured inbothqualitativeandquantitativeterms.Second, and intimately connected to the first trend, is the

militarisation of border controls: the development and implementationofhigh-tech,highlymilitarisedmeansofpreventingunauthorisedentry.Borderzoneshavebecomethedestinationforextremelycoercivemeansofsurveillanceandcontroldevelopedonthebattlefield–andalucrativemarket for the security anddefence contractorswho supply them.Wecan now speak of a burgeoning border security-industrial complexsellingeverythingfromsecurityfencestosurveillancetechnology,fromvisa-processingservicestodetentioncentres.Third,withtheactivesupportofthegovernmentsoftheGlobalNorth,

thelegalandphysicalcontrolsdevelopedtopreventunwantedmigrationhave increasingly been exported to developing countries and clientstates in theSouth. In thenameof ‘migrationmanagement’,wealthierstates – particularly those in the EU – have implemented migrationcontrols in poorer Third World countries to prevent the transit ofmigrantsandrefugeesandallowtheexpeditiousreturnofthosedeclared‘illegal’.Theleversofaidandtradearefrequentlyemployedtoachievethis.‘Technicalassistance’,‘exportcreditguarantees’andevenaidanddevelopmentfundinghavebeenusedtofundthetransferofmigration-controlsystems,boostingthecoffersofthedefencesectoryetfurther.Without challenging the overall direction of migration policy, it is

clearthatmostpoliticalresponseswillnotonlyfailtoproperlyaddressthe needs of environmental refugees, but will likely see anintensificationof controls andphysical infrastructure, forcing refugeesto seek protection in, or close to, their countries of origin, or to takeeven more dangerous risks in an attempt to migrate. The worst-casescenarios could see states panicked into emergency measures anddraconianrestrictionsonfreedomofmovement.Wheredoesallofthisleavepeoplewhocareaboutsocialjusticeand

universalhumanrights–whatshouldwedooradvocate?Whataretheparameters in which debates about ‘climate-induced migration’ takeplace?What does this say about the utility andviability of expandinginternational law to recogniseandaccommodate ‘climate refugees’,orwillasecuritisationnarrativeout-trumpalllegalobligations?Andhowbestcanweresistthesedisturbingdevelopments?

‘Climaterefugees’incontext

Migrantsandrefugeesoccupyacentralplaceinthediscourseonclimatechangeasa‘threatmultiplier’andsecurityissueinitsownright–withthe ‘threat’ofuncontrolled internationalmigration identifiedasacoreclimate-securityconcern(seeChapter2).Thehypothesisisthatclimatechangewillexacerbateexistingproblemsinpoorandunder-developedcountries,leadingtoincreasedconflictandmigratorypressurethatwillultimatelyhave tobe addressedby richer countries,whichwill be thedestinationofchoicefor‘climaterefugees’.Andit’snotjustthemilitarystrategistsandthesecurocratswhomake

thisargument. In their2007reportHumanTide,ChristianAidwarnedthat

The danger is that this new forced migration will fuel existingconflictsandgeneratenewonesintheareasoftheworld–thepoorest–where resources aremost scarce.Movement on this scale has the

potential to de-stabilize whole regions where increasingly desperatepopulationscompetefordwindlingfoodandwater.3

They also predicted that ‘on current trends, a further 1 billion peoplewillbeforcedfromtheirhomesbetweennowand2050.’ContextiseverythingandalthoughChristianAidwaswidelymis-(or

selectively)quotedashavingarguedthatclimatechange(andnotallofthe other things already resulting in forcedmigration)would producethe additional billion refugees, it suffered a barrage of criticism fromcommentatorsandacademicsforbeingoverlyalarmist, lackingaclearmethodology and using language (that is, ‘Human Tide’) thatcontributes to existing and overwhelmingly negative public discourseaboutthe‘threat’ofmigration.4ThefuroresurroundingChristianAid’sself-declaredattempttospark

an important debate has introduced some nuance into the discussionabout the likely relationship between climate change and internationalmigration, but this debate has not yet filtered into the regular updatesfromthemilitaryandsecuritythreatassessors.Forexample,initsfifthedition ofGlobal Strategic Trends – Out to 2045, published in June2014,theUKMinistryofDefencemaintainsthat‘Severefoodshortagescould lead to sudden mass migration of populations across nationalborders,triggeringwidespreadsocialunrest.’5Catastrophic predictions notwithstanding, recent scholarly debate

about ‘climate-induced migration’ recognises that crediting climatechange as a primary causal factor of migration is difficult, if notimpossible, due to the prevalence of other contributing factors. As aForesight Report on ‘Migration and Global Environmental Change’publishedbytheUKgovernmentin2011noted,whileextremeweatherevents such as storms will likely cause displacement, it is gradualenvironmental degradation that will ultimately cause migration in thelonger term.6 This may be compounded by an array of other social,economic andpolitical factors includingwater scarcity, salinisationofirrigated lands, deforestation, ineffectivegovernment responses, ethnic

disputes and economic problems, amongst others. This complexinterplay of factors, described as ‘disaggregated causality’,makes the‘climate-induced migrant’ a somewhat intangible figure, and moreimportantly,makesitverydifficulttocreatelegaldefinitionsofwhatisa ‘climate refugee’ and in turn develop effective frameworks forrecognitionandprotectionoftheirasylumrights.7Theissueismademorecomplexduetothetraditionaladaptationand

copingmechanismsthatmanymigrantsalreadyusetodealwithclimatevariations, suchas temporary andcircularmigration (basically, peoplemovingforemploymentorsubsistence).8Thisisimportantbecausetheresearch that has been conducted to date suggests that most climate-linked migration is likely to be internal rather than cross-border.9Moreover,themigration-as-adaptationagendaisseenbyitsproponentsas far more progressive and more focused on the needs of migrants:insteadofseeingmigrantsassecuritythreatsorobjectsofpity,theyareseenasagentswhocanadapttoclimatechangebymoving.10Thisisnotto say that such migration is unproblematic. On the contrary, newlyarrived internal migrants often face discrimination and poverty whenmovingfromruralareastourbancentres.Theymayalsobesubject to‘return migration’ initiatives, where governments try to move peoplebacktothecountryside.Climate changemight alsomake people less able, rather thanmore

likely to move.Migration usually requires resources, and as people’slivelihoodsareundermined(forexample,bydroughtordesertification),theybecomelessabletomove,eventhoughtheymightwantto.Whilesome people will be able to move, but prevented from doing so byborders,otherpeoplewillbecompletelyunabletomoveandtrappedinworsening conditions.Conversely, not allmovement linked to climatechange is or will be refugee-like, in so far as people must move tosurvive,sothedistinctionbetweenforcedandvoluntarymigrationwillremainasimportantasever.Manypeoplewhomoveinthecontextofclimate change will have some choice about where and when theymove, and will look more like the so-called ‘economic migrants’ of

today, seeking work in pastures new as climate change erodes theirexistinglivelihoods.As the IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange (IPCC)noted in

2007, ‘estimates of the number of people who may becomeenvironmentalmigrantsare,atbest,guesswork.’11Butwhilethelevel,extent and speed of climate change and its local impact on internalconflict and migration remains highly contested, this is largelyimmaterialtothosetaskedwithdefendingthebordersoftherichworldagainst the ‘human tide’ from the poor. This is because security-resourceexpenditureandprioritisation isneitherbased,norranked,onanobjectivecalculusofrelativerisk.Putanotherway:whereasactivistand scientific communities may rationalise and promote rights-basedsolutions tofuturerefugeecrises, theexploitationofmigrationpoliticsbypopulist decisionmakers ultimately serves tomeet thedemandsof‘securocrats’ fornewpowerswhileunderminingparadigmspredicatedonnotionsofhumansecurity,suchasthefreedomtomove.

Opensocietiesorglobalapartheid?

Allmodernstatesnowhavewell-oiledsystemsforcontrollingmigrationand preventing unauthorised entry and residence. These are highlysecuritisedapparatusesinwhichconcernsaboutillegalmigration,crimeand terrorism have converged to create a powerful populist narrativethatisdemandingofeverstrictercontrols.Indeed,migrationcontrolisnowfirmlyestablishedasatoppoliticalissueinmanywealthycountries–andalongsidehyped-upfearsabout‘Islamistterrorism’,isinexorablylinkedtothecurrentresurgenceofthefarrightacrossEurope.This has long meant that members of minority communities are

frequentlysubjectedtoenhancedscrutinyatborderscoupledwithstate-security prejudice and paranoia that invoke ethnicity and religion todetermineriskandstatus.Thereisnothingnovelinthis.AsSriLankanactivist A. Sivanandan wrote of the then European Economic

Community in1988: immigrationpolicieswereproducinga ‘commonmarketracism’that‘cannottelloneblackfromanother,acitizenfroman immigrant, an immigrant from a refugee – and classes all ThirdWorld peoples as immigrants and refugees and all immigrants andrefugeesasterroristsanddrugdealers’.12In security discourse, the reasons why people migrate have thus

become much less important than the threat they are perceived torepresent. Blind to social justice or cost, travelling for profit isencouraged,whiletravellingforsurvivaliscondemned.13Contemporaryborders have become sprawling security checkpointswhere all humantrafficisviewedasapotentialthreat.14Thebonafidearedistinguishedfromthesuspectandtheillegitimate;irregularmigrantsandrefugeesarecaughtina‘continuumofinsecurity’.15Borders thus reiterate (even reify) the distinction between the

‘civilised’FirstWorldandthe‘barbaric’ThirdWorld,orwhatZygmuntBaumancalledthe‘globalfrontierland’,16institutionalisingraciststatepracticeandfuellingracistattitudes.JosephNevinsandothercriticsofcontemporarybordercontrolshaveadoptedtheterm‘globalapartheid’to capture the distinctive role of immigration controls in maintainingraceandclassdisparitiesacrosstheworld.17Against this backdrop, according to the UN, global migration as a

whole has been increasing in recent years, to an unprecedented 232millionpeoplein2013(upfrom175millionin2000,and154millionin1990).18Of this total, 136millionmigrants lived in theGlobalNorth,while96millionresidedintheSouth,whereinternationalmigrationhasbeenincreasingmorerapidlysincetheturnofthecentury.Numbers of refugees have also grown significantly in recent years.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR),globaldisplacementhasrisentoanunparalleled50millionpeople,with theworld’s poorest nations hosting the vastmajority (86per cent of the world’s refugees in 2013). Some 5.5 million peoplebecamerefugeesorinternallydisplacedinthefirsthalfof2014alone.19

Some of thismovement is already being tentatively linked to climatechange.Asnotedelsewhereinthisbook,someanalystshavelinkedtheoutbreak of hostilities in Syria to food prices and drought.20 There issome tentative evidence linking the crisis in the Horn of Africa todroughtandclimatechange.21Yet as these crises increase, rich countries are shouldering less and

less of the human ‘burden’, not least because proportionately fewerrefugees are able to reach those countries because of the coercivemeasures they have imposed (this is compounded by decliningrecognition rates for refugees able to lodge asylum applications). Theoverwhelming preference is to fund refugee assistance programmesinsteadofhostingrefugees.Oneonlyhastoconsider thecurrentSyriarefugee crisis, the worst since the SecondWorldWar, with around 4million people – half of them children – having fled the country toTurkey,Lebanon,Jordan, IraqandEgyptbyDecember2014.Therestoftheinternationalcommunity,meanwhile,hadtakenjust1.7percentofthetotalnumberofrefugees.22Thesenumbersarenoaccident–theyreflectpreciselythepolicyobjectivesthattheEUandotherstatesintheMENA (MiddleEastNorthAfrica) regionhavepursuedover thepastdecadeandmore.

Migrationmanagementandthewarehousingofrefugees

The ‘Pacific solution’ pursued by successive Conservative Australiangovernments since 2001, whereby asylum seekers are prevented fromlanding on the Australian mainland and transported and detained onPacific islands, is the flag-bearer of rich countries’ restrictiveapproachestounauthorisedimmigration.IteffectivelypaidhundredsofmillionsofdollarsinaidtoPacificislandstatestooutsourceAustralia’srefugeeprotectionobligations.

The policy was suspended for a short period by Kevin Rudd’sintervening Labour administration, which brokered an immigrationcontrol deal with Indonesia, before being re-introduced in 2012, andsupplemented by a ‘Regional Resettlement Arrangement’ with PapuaNewGuinea in2013.This speltout thepurposeofAustralian refugeepolicyinnouncertainterms:

Fromnowon,anyasylumseekerwhoarrivesinAustraliabyboatwillhave no chance of being settled in Australia as refugees. AsylumseekerstakentoChristmasIslandwillbesenttoManusandelsewhereinPapuaNewGuinea for assessmentof their refugee status. If theyarefoundtobegenuinerefugees,theywillberesettledinPapuaNewGuinea…Iftheyarefoundnottobegenuinerefugees,theymayberepatriatedtotheircountryoforiginorbesenttoasafethirdcountryotherthanAustralia.23

TheLabouradministrationalso reopenedAustralia’soff-shore refugeeprocessing centre on the island of Nauru. At the time of writing thischapter (2015), the centre is the subject of substantive investigationsintoallegationsofwidespreadsexualandphysicalassaultofdetainees.‘Things happen’, said current Prime Minister Tony Abbot of therevelations.24 Indeed, the same things appear to be happening inimmigrationdetentioncentresacrosstheworld.Australia’s ‘PacificSolution’wonmanyadmirers and in2004Tony

Blair’s government proposed that the EU adopt a similar off-shoreprocessingand‘protectionintheregion’policyforrefugeesboundforEurope.Although off-shore processingwas a bridge too far formanyEUmemberstates,theEuropeanCommissionbegandevelopingpolicyon ‘regional protection plans’ that would provide funding forgovernments of third states thatwere hosting refugee camps,with theprospectofresettlementtoEuropeforatokenfew.25By this time, theUNHCRwas already lamentingwhat it called the

‘warehousing’ of refugees. Host states were ‘containing refugees in

isolatedandinsecurerefugeecamps,typicallyinborderregionsandfarfrom the governing regime’, with governments increasingly requiringthe majority of refugees to live in these camps and prohibiting themleaving to seek employment or education.26 ‘To envisage such a plan[the warehousing of refugees] is to imagine ghettos created by theworld’s most peaceful and richest countries in some of the world’spoorest andmost unstable regions’, wrote Raekha Prassad of theUKproposals.27Indeed,sincethelate1990s,theEUhas–likeAustralia–pursueda

policyofsolicitingthecooperationofcountriesoforiginandtransitofmigrantsandrefugeeswiththeobjectiveofcreatingimmigrationbufferzones. This was initially achieved in the countries of Central andEasternEurope,whowereoffered the carrot ofEUmembership, thenextendedtoencompassa‘Europeanneighbourhood’thatstretchesfromWestAfricatoCentralAsia.Althoughnotformallyadopteduntil2005,theEU’s‘GlobalApproach

toMigration’datesbackto1997andthearrivalinItalyandGreeceofthousandsofKurdishrefugeesfromIraq,whohadtravelledbyseafromTurkey.ThispromptedtheEUtodrafta46-pointActionPlantoensurethatthiskindof‘massinflux’didnotrecur.TheIraqplanwasfollowedbyanAustrianPresidencystrategypaperonmigration,whichsuggestedexplicitlythata

…modelofconcentriccirclesofmigrationpolicycouldreplacethatof ‘fortress Europe’… the Schengen states currently lay down themost intensive controlmeasures. Their neighbours should graduallybe linked into a similar system… particularly with regard to visacontrol and readmission policies. A third circle of states (CIS area,Turkey, andNorthAfrica)will then concentrate primarily on transitchecksandcombatingfacilitatornetworks,andafourthcircle(MiddleEast,China,blackAfrica)oneliminatingpushfactors.28

The Austrian strategy paper was widely condemned by migrant and

refugee organisations and officially disowned by the EU, but theprinciples it contained were embodied in a 2002 EU Action Plan onillegal immigration. The plan provided EU funding for migrationcontrols in the countries of origin ofmigrants and refugees, includingborder-management equipment and expertise, asylum-processinginfrastructures, public registration structures (that is,biometrics/databases),receptioncentresforillegalimmigrantsintransitcountries, and ‘awareness-raising campaigns’ for would-be ‘illegal’émigrés.TheActionPlanalsocalledfortheintroductionof‘migration-management’ clauses in EU agreements with third states, using the‘levers’ of aid-and-trade to ensure cooperation. The EuropeanCommission began funding ‘preparatory actions on cooperation withthird countries in the field of migration’ from the EC developmentbudget, and taking an increasing interest in ‘South-Southmigration’–allwiththeunderlyingobjectiveofpreventingpeopletryingtoreachtheEU. In addition to tighter andmore heavily fortified border controls,whichwediscuss furtherbelow,making refugeesstaywhere theyare,orasclosetotheircountriesoforiginaspossible,requiredaplethoraoffurtherEU initiatives including thecriminalisationof illegalentryandresidence (which saw ships’ captains prosecuted for rescuing boatpeople),theadoptionofthe‘safethird-countryrule’(meaningthatanyrefugee who has transited through a country where they could havesought asylum en route to the EU can be sent back there), andreadmissionagreementswiththosecountriestofacilitatetheirreturn.Whilethishasmadeitmoredifficultforrefugeestoenter theEUin

order to lodge an asylum claim, it hasn’t stopped them attempting tocome. On the contrary, all it has done is force them into ever moreperilous journeys and the hands of people traffickers, who give littleprioritytosafetyandattimeshaveactedruthlesslytoprotectaboomingtrade.Apoliticaleconomyofmigrationmanagementandcoercionhasdulyemerged,withblack-marketprofiteerscreatingevermorelucrativeand dangerous flights of passage and a legitimate commercial sectorincreasingly cashing in on processing those who get caught. It is

important to remember that as easy and convenient as it is to blameorganised crime, the ‘trafficker’ is no more responsible for irregularmigrationthanthetravelagentisfortourism.29For a very short time, the EU’s migration-management policy

appearedtoworkquitewellthankstothecooperationofstrongmenlikeLibya’sColonelGaddafiandTunisia’sBenAli,whosecureda raftofpoliticalandfinancialconcessionsfromEUmemberstatesinreturnforpolicing their borders for illegal emigrants and readmitting peopleexpelled from Europe. Never mind that they meted out appallingtreatmenttomigrantsandrefugeesinEurope’sname.Theeventsoftheso-called ‘Arab Spring’ – and in particular theNATO intervention inLibyaandthewarinSyria–putanendtothesecosyrelations,deposingtheEU’sfriendlydictators,increasinginsecurityacrosstheregion,andproducingmillionsofnewrefugees.ThenumberofEUasylumclaimshas been steadily rising ever since, topping 400,000 in 2013, andreaching 600,000 in 2014, helped also by the conflicts in Russia,Ukraine, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan.30 The number of documenteddeathsofpeopletryingtoreachtheEUhasalsorisen,toover3,500in2014alone.31Thesinkingofapackedfishingboat justhalf-a-mileoffthe coastof the Italian islandofLampedusa, inwhich366outof518people on board drowned (they had paid the trip’s organisersapproximately $1,000 each), galvanised the Italian government intolaunching a standing search-and-rescue operation, ‘Mare Nostrum’,which pluckedmore than 100,000migrants and refugees from unsafeboats before it was canned twelve months later as outlined in theintroduction.Itsreplacement,‘OperationTriton’,coordinatedbytheEUborder-management agency, FRONTEX, is primarily concerned withsurveillance(ratherthansearch-and-rescue),andlimitedto30milesoffItaly’scoast.In2015,theideaofoutsourcingtheprocessingrefugeesboundforthe

EU is back on the agenda, with Niger, Tunisia, Egypt,Morocco andTurkeyintheframeaspossiblelocations.32IftheAustralianexperienceisanythingtogoby,theseproposedcentrescouldsignalthebeginning

of the end of asylum protection in the EU. In this scenario, thoseseeking refuge in Europe from ‘climate-induced migration’ in Africawould indeed be hemmed into refugee camps in the borderlands ofcountriesthatlackthemeansandresourcestosupportthem,dependentoninternationalaidthatisalreadywoefullyinadequateinthecontextofthe existing refugee crisis (as shown by the repeated appeals by aidagenciessupportingSyrianrefugeesinneighbouringcountries).

Bordercontrolsassocialcontrols:Aworldofredzonesandgreenzones

Suchfearsarecompoundedbyanaccelerationinpaceofstatesbuildinghi-tech boundary fences along critical borders. So much so, that thepoliticsofexclusion,nowformabackdroptocontemporaryculture.InSeptember2013,theGuardianasked‘Areyouhemmedinbyafenceora separationwall?’33 Hollywood has also envisioned the dispossessedbeingleftinaninhospitablesprawlbackonplanetEarth,whilsttheeliteget toenjoytheblissofanextra-terrestrial luxurygatedcommunityinitsfilmElysium.Bordercontrolshaveundergonesignificantchangesoverthepasttwo

decades. From sprawling physical barriers manned by sentries andtypified by constructions like the Berlin Wall, security fences andborder zones have been a testing ground for new surveillancetechnologies and control systems initially developed for the military.Thesedevelopmentsarebynomeans limited to inter/nationalborders,andhaveinsteadcometocharacterisemyriadelementsofcontemporarysecurity planning – from ‘smart cities’, to ‘megavents’ like theOlympicsandsoccer’sWorldCup,totheprotectionofelitepopulationenclaves,crowdcontrolandcrisismanagement.Examining these developments, Stephen Graham at Newcastle

University says we are witnessing the emergence of a much more

brutalised and militarised urban policing to enforce apartheid-scaleinequalities,suchasthatwitnessedinplacesliketheoccupiedterritoriesof Palestine. What has already emerged, according to Graham, is anideology of amilitarised urban battle-space.34 The demands to policethis space and the border in particular – in the context of rapidtechnologicaldevelopments inpoliticalcontrol–hasbenefitedasmallgroupofmultinationalmilitaryconglomeratesor ‘primes’,whoseeanextraordinarily lucrative market opportunity for diversification intosecurity walls and weaponry. The border-exclusion technologiesdeployedagainst unauthorisedmigrants include concretewalls, virtualwalls,monitoringandsnipertowers,cameras, landradarsandwirelesstelecommunication infrared surveillance, carbon-dioxide probes,information technology, identification systems and immigrationdatabases. These technologies reinforce a massive proliferation ofglobal fence building in recent years, particularly in the period since9/11.Figure 5.1 represents empirical information on 54 border security

fences.Thesecuritycapacityandstageofdevelopmentvarygreatly,asdoesthepermeabilityoftheborders.Themapincludesfourcategoriesofborderfences,fromthemostrobustland(shownasaconsistentline)and maritime (diagonal dashes) security with multi-dimensionaltechnologies and surveillance, to the use of enhanced but incompletefences(dots),totheleastrobust(longdashes)wheretheborderremainsrelatively porous. Themap shows that the highest intensity of bordersecuritisationislargelyclusteredaroundEurope,America,theMiddle-East and southernAsia. Territorieswith similar developments includeNorth Africa, Central Asia and Russia; other isolated cases existelsewhere.ThebordersofAmericaarebecomingincreasinglyfortified,withthe

US–Mexicoborderhavingmultiplelayersofsecurity.Avirtualwallofsurveillance is being constructed along the Canadian border and themaritime area between the South East and the Caribbean is stronglyguarded.‘FortressEurope’haslongcharacterisedtheEU’sapproachto

bordercontrol,withrecentinvestmentfocusingonthemaritimeborderstotheSouth.TheGreece–Turkishlandborderisbelievedtobetheroutetaken bymany undocumentedmigrants’ entering Europe, and Greecehasbegun toconstruct a fencealongaportionof thecrossing.To theNorth West, barriers also exist intermittently along outer EuropeanborderswithRussia.InNorthandWestAfrica,Moroccohasincreasinglyguardedborders

withAlgeriaandsodoesMauritaniawithMali.TheSpanishenclavesofCuetaandMellilla,whereEuropehasalandborderwithMorocco,arehemmedinbyrazorwire.Fifteenmigrantsdrownedtherein2014afterSpanishpolicefiredrubberbulletsatagroupofseveralhundredpeoplewho hadmade a swim for it.35Morocco has its own 1,500-mile-longmixedsandandstonebarrierlinedwithminesalongtheWesternSaharaterritoryand,priortothefallofGaddafi,Libyahadenteredintoa€300millioncontractwithFinmeccanica tosecure itsborders. In theSouth,electricandbarbed-wirefencessecuretheZimbabwe–Botswanaborderand the Zimbabwean–South Africa border respectively. The MiddleEast has a large number of highly secured borders, most notablybetweenIsraelandthePalestinianTerritories.ThereisahighlysecuredbarrierunderconstructionbetweenOmanandtheUnitedArabEmiratesandbetweenSaudiArabia andYemen; in 2009,EuropeanAeronauticDefenceandSpaceCompany(EADS)wascontractedtosecuritiseallofSaudiArabia’sborders.

Figure5.1Mapindicating54bordersecurityfences(drawnbyAprilHumble)

The term ‘Fortress India’ has also been coined, following theconstruction of a heavily guarded 1,790-mile border fence aroundBangladesh,partsofwhichareelectrified.Indiaisalsodeployingbordersecuritisation across its borders with Pakistan, Tibet, Burma and theKashmiri region. Pakistan meanwhile has considered proposals for amine-linedfencewithAfghanistan.Central Asia also has some fortified border security zones, such as

betweenUzbekistanandKyrgyzstan,andUzbekistanandAfghanistan.Further east, Russia has an extensive low-security, barbed-wire fencealongitsborderswithChinaandMongolia.BothofNorthKorea’slandborders are becoming increasingly secured; Brunei and Limbang,Malaysia and Thailand both have heightened border security betweentheirrespectivesharedborders.Ofcourse, this summary isamere snapshotandmoreborder fences

havebeenerectedsince2011,whenourresearchwasundertaken.And

whiletherearewell-foundedfearsthatthespectreof‘climaterefugees’isdrivingtheborder-securitisationagenda,itistooearlytomakestrongclaimsabouttheextenttowhichthisishappening,as‘illegalmigration’still serves to justifymost developments.However, it isworth notingthat climate change is already being linked to attempted bordercrossingsfromMexicototheUS,36 tomigrationintheSahel,37and tothe border between India andBangladesh,whose vulnerability to sea-levelrisesisfrequentlycitedintheclimate-securitystrategiesdiscussedinChapter2.38 It isequally important topointout that themajorityofbordersinAfrica,SouthAmerica,CentralAmericaandSouthEastAsiaremainasyetwithoutbolsteredsecuritydeployments,allowingpeopletomovebetweenmanystatesintheGlobalSouthwithrelativefreedom.However, an absence of securitised border fences does not tell usanythingaboutconditionsinotherborderlandareas,whichareoftenattheforefrontofethnicandreligioustensionsandoutbreaksofviolence,and/or attempts to create or impose ethnically or religiously defined‘homelands’.Today,manycontestedorprizedborderzonesaresubjecttoquasi-military rule,draconian securitymeasures,widespreadhumanrights abuses (by state and non-state actors) and limited prospects fordemocratic governance. Consider, for example, the current picture incentralAfrica,withconflictsdottedalongthebordersbetweencountriesfromMali toYemen, thedisputesalongRussia’s internalandexternalborders to the east and south, and theborderlandsofAfghanistan andPakistan,NorthEastIndiaandSouthernChina.

Frombordersthatseetobordersthatbite

The2011studyonwhichtheabovemapisbasedshowedthatmorethanhalfofthe54bordershavedevelopedenhancedsecuritysince9/11,andthatthetotalnumberofsecuritisedbordershaseffectivelytripledsincethisdate.Thissuggeststhattheemergent,post-9/11paradigmofbordersecuritisationisnottheendofthenarrative,butthebeginning.

Wealreadyliveinaneraofubiquitoussurveillancethatisenvelopingour urban settlements and critical infrastructures. Border zones arealreadysomeofthemostintenselysurveilledplacesonearth.Overthepastdecade,billionshavebeenspentinupgradingcapacitiesatbordersto include everything from biometric identification systems(fingerprinting, face recognition, and so on) to cameras that can spotanomalousbehaviour,topredatordronesforwideareasurveillance.What isnowbeingdone in thenameofborder securitymayhavea

long-term bearing on how internally displaced migrants are treated,because national borders are simultaneously spreading inwards andoutwards. Inwards through the development of biometric profiling,populationregistersandrisk-profilingsystems,andthroughoperabilitywith local policing systems (mobile fingerprint checks, for example).Outwards through the creation of external border zones, which allowstates to imposesurveillanceandcontrolon territoriesother than theirown. Israel is very much the model, having established blanketsurveillancesystemsoverwhatremainsofPalestine.TheUSborderwithMexicoispolicedby21,000guards,tenPredator

drones, tower-mounted cameras and ground sensors thatmonitor landmovements.39 In Europe, the EU’s new external border surveillancesystem, EUROSUR,which links national border-control agencies andcoastal patrols with FRONTEX, the EU border management agency,envisages surveillance of the entire Mediterranean. To this end,EUROSUR is capable of integrating new surveillance technologies asthey come online.40 This will almost certainly include satellitesurveillanceandunmannedaerialvehicles(UAVs)or‘drones’.TheEUhas also already invested heavily in both areas, funding numerousborder-surveillance projects.41 The use of armed unmanned aerialvehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, for assassinationmissionsby theUS inPakistan,Afghanistan,SomaliaandYemenhassparked enormous controversy. A crucial concern for NGOs, such asHumanRightsWatchandtheInternationalCommitteeforRobotArmsControl (ICRAC), is the prospect of these systems becoming fully

autonomous.We already have semi-autonomous precursor operations:so-called ‘signature strikes’ – where targets are chosen automaticallybecause they resemble similar situations,where theuseof lethal forcecouldbejustified.R&D projects in military research institutes are pioneering new

capacities to immobilise individualsandcrowds,usingweaponswhichcausepain,maim,orparalysetheirtargets–thatcouldatsomepointbemobilised against refugees.This has not happened in a vacuum.Evenbefore9/11, theUSmilitary inparticularwas re-orientating towardsadifferent type of warfare where unconventional opponents would beoperatingwithinurbanterrainamongstordinarycivilians.Newmilitarydoctrinesemergedtojustifythisreframingaspartofthe

so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA), under which theUnited States would strive for ‘full spectrum dominance’ and hencemilitary superiority over all potential adversaries. These doctrinesincorporatednewandautonomoustargetingtactics,aswellashigh-techweaponry designed to be used against both combatants and civilians.ThiswaspromotedbythelikesofCol.JohnAlexander,whoadvocatedthe notion of a non-lethal set of alternatives for twenty-first-centurywarfare.Withsci-fiwritersJanetandChrisMorrisandAlvinandHeidiToffler,Alexandermanaged topersuade theUSDoD to set up anewprogrammeofworkexploringthisnewformofwarfare–theJointNon-LethalWeaponsDirectorate (JNLWD)–ofwhichhebecame the firstdirectorin1996.Post9/11,theJNLWD,basedattheMarineCorpHQat Quantico, has become the engine of soliciting and approving newsub-lethaltechnologies,borderprotectionandexclusionsystems.Someoftheseusingdirectenergysoundlikesciencefiction,42buttherehasinfactbeenarelentlesssearchfortechnologieswhichcanbridgethegapbetween‘shoutandshoot’overseveralhundredmetres.Criticsof suchalleged ‘non-lethality’ raise theirpotential for torture

andmasshumanrightsviolation.LandmineActionwasoneofthefirstNGOs to report onpotential configurationsof someof theseweaponsfor mass exclusion and perimeter protection, as new weapons were

researched for replacing antipersonnel landmines, in thewake of theOttawaTreatyBan.43TheRaytheonpain-beambasedonamillimetre-wave device, which heats up humans to over 130 degrees, has beenchampioned by the JNLWD and prototypes have been fielded, butwithout operational use yet because of understandable controversy.44Such powerful directed-energy systems capable of shockingwould-bemigrants, from very long distances away, are already now beyondprototype stage. Raytheon recently advertised related devices like theSilentGuardian,whicharebasedonnotionsof‘tuneablelethality’,butpromotedasharmless.45So-called ‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons (NLW) technologies have

subsequentlyglobalisedand formpartof thenewarsenalsofmilitary,police and special forces as their various roles and tactics converge.46Their key role is to provide enhanced coercion without the publicopprobrium that might accompany any state use of lethal force.Amnesty International has identified their deployment with manyhumanrightsviolationsincludingtorture.47Increasingly,suchweaponsare used in conjunction with other coercive tactics, including smallarms.In2014,JNLWDwastestingroboticshipsforinterceptingothervessels in maritime security operations, as well as promoting newresearchtoincapacitatevesselsandtheircontentsviaaircraft-andship-mounteddirected-energyweapons.48Other less ‘intelligent’ killing systems are more autonomous. For

example, the lethal ‘self-healing’ minefield uses neural networks torepositionminesifaborderzoneisbreached.49Anothervariant,whichcan be either lethal or sub-lethal, is Metal Storm’s virtual minefield,which designates where ‘mines’ are on a virtual map held by asurveillance systemwhich could be anything fromanUAVor even asatellite. Cameras react to any physical breach by launching multiplemortarstrikestothedesignatedspot.50In2013,NewScientist reportedondronesystemswhichcouldtagthosefoundinunauthorisedspaces–again setting off unsavoury images of tracking and hunting down un-

cooperativehumans.Again,wehave inklingsof futureconfigurations.Currently,droneswithin theUScanonlybeusedforsurveillance,buttheElectronic Frontier Foundation shows that at least oneUS agencyexplored arming them with less-lethal weapons.51 The securityvulnerabilities of long interstate borders or critical infrastructures areusedtojustify24/7surveillance–athanklessandrelentlesslydulltask,whichwillalwaysbepresentedasripeforautomation,eitherbyground-basedorUAVroboticsystemwitheithersurveillance,orguns,orboth.Putanotherway:aslongaswehavefortifiedborders,theywillremainatestinggroundfornewtechnologiesofsurveillanceandcontrol.The kind of ‘terminator’ scenarios outlined above may sound like

sciencefiction,buttherapidjustificationandescalatingdeploymentoftheUSdrone-ledassassinationstrategy,showshowquicklythingscanchange. South Korea has already fielded the armed Samsung SGR-1roboton itsborder, thedemilitarisedzonewithNorthKorea.52Whilstthe SGR-1 has autonomous surveillance functions, it needs humanpermission to open fire on live targets.More established democracieshave the same intent. The Pentagon made a call for contractors toprovide a ‘multi-robot pursuit system’ that will let a pack of robots‘search for anddetect anon-co-operativehuman’.Whatwehaveherearethebeginningsofsomethingdesignedtoenablerobotstohuntdownhumans like a pack of dogs. Once the software is perfected we canreasonably anticipate that they will become autonomous and becomearmed.53What will happenwhen suchmeans end up policing borderregimesofcountriesthathavelittleornorespectforhumanlifeortheruleoflaw?

Secureborders,secureprofits

TheprocessofproliferationisbeingacceleratedbyspecialistarmsfairssuchastheBorderSecurityExpo.Theindustryitselfislearninghowtonetworkmoreeffectively tosecure themassivesecuritycontractsnow

onoffer,suchasthemulti-billion,multi-year,multi-partnercontracttoprovideSaudiArabiawith a newborder fence ledbyEADS,54 or thetransnational upscaling of southern Arizona’s border withMexico byIsraeli security companyElbitSystems, seeking to benefit froma$40billion‘Securitytreasuretrove’.55AsChapter7explores,itisprimarilylarge multinational defence contractors, or ‘primes’, that service thismarket.InEurope,thefivebigmega-defenceconglomeratesareEADS,BAESystems,Finmeccanica,SAFRANandThales.IntheUS,thehugemilitary systems corporations are Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, NorthropGrumman, Raytheon and General Dynamics. Given the growingimportance of biometric borders, IT conglomerates such as L3Communications,HewlettPackard,Dell,Verizonand IBM in theUS,and Eriksson, Indra, Siemens Diehl and Sagem in Europe have allbecomekeyplayers inmany recent initiatives.Fewother corporationscouldmanage theenormityof thesecuritycontracts implementedpost9/11.Inevitably, the highly lucrative security-industry complex holds a

strong vested interest in the intensification and expansion of bordersecuritisation and in a ‘paradigm shift’ towards states militarisingborders.Within this context, researchershaveonly just started tomaptherapidlyemergingindustrywhichseekstoprofitfromeveryaspectofmigration management, including surveillance, interdiction, detentionand deportation. The Transnational Institute (TNI)’s NeoConOpticonreportin2009wasanearlyattempttogetahandleonthereframingofborder-security architecture now emerging and the significance of‘inter-operability’ in creating flexible systems of security capabilitysets.56 TNI’s follow-up report, Eurodrones Inc., showed how dronemanufacturershadcapturedtheEUpolicydevelopmentprocess.Ineachreport, the ‘primes’ are shown to be setting the security research anddevelopment agenda, securing generous research subsidies and thenpushingforpoliciesthatdependontheprocurementoftheirwares.57Martin Lemberg-Petersen has also provided significant insight into

this business by identifying the actors and dynamics in the European

‘borderscapes’ and performing an analysis of what is financing thepolitical economyof private security borderscaping.He toohighlightsthe rise of aggressively lobbying private security companies such asG4S,FinmeccanicaandThales, towhich lucrativebordersecurityandimmigrationcontrolcontractsareoutsourced.ThroughacomplexwebofprocurementandcollusionwithbanksandpolicymakersviaobscureandsecretiveEUsecuritypolicy-makingforums,thesecompanieshavebecome an integral part of accelerating hi-tech-based border policymaking.It is important to note that, despite the constant propaganda about

perfecttechnologicalsolutionstosocialproblems,thehigh-techborder-controlindustryhasalsohaditsfairshareofsetbacks.In2011,theUSpulled theplugon itsattempt tocreateavirtualborderfencealong itssouthern border with Mexico. The ‘SBInet project’, which began in2006, was beset by missed deadlines and cost overruns and theDepartment of Homeland Security ultimately acknowledged that theproject,ledbyBoeing,hadcostover$1billiontocoverjust53milesofArizonandesert.58Butonefailedtechnologycontractdoesnotachangeinpolicymake,eveniftheevidenceastotheutility,cost-effectivenessandsecondaryimpactsofthetechnologyisdamning.59Thevirtualfencehas been replaced by only slightly less ambitious but no less costlyinitiativesusingsimilartechnologysuppliedbydifferentcontractors.Asmigrationmanagement becomes increasingly globalised, so the supra-national reach of suchmega-security conglomerates has grown to thepointthatitcanconfidentlyseektoextractprofitsregardlessofhumanrights considerations, because the services and products on offer havealready been rolled out in democratic countries. Andwhilemigrationmanagement is currently focused on national borders, the mobile,scalableanddeployablesolutions thatarebeingdevelopedmaynotbelimitedtocontrolofourexternalbordersinthefuture.

Resistingcontainment

A dystopian future that sees refugees failed by governments andcrammed into camps and border zones owes asmuch to the (lack of)vision ofwestern security establishments and the laboratories of theirdefence research institutes than any evidence-based assessment of thelikelyimpactofclimatechangeonmigration.Asimmigrationandrefugeepoliciesbecomeharsher,andtheborder-

control industry consolidates its influence over national policy andprocurement,itishardenoughtoimagineajustsolutionfortheworld’s50 million existing refugees, never mind the 1 billion predicted byChristianAidinyearstocome.In this context, advocating for the rights of ‘climate refugees’ in

isolation – that is, ignoring wider developments in contemporarymigration control (and the treatment meted out to other categories ofrefugee andmigrant) –mayhave limited impact in the future.This isbecause international law is no longer the principal driving force fornationalrefugeepolicies;itisnationalism,populismandmilitarisation,coupled with the tightening high-tech border controls (and its exportfrom Global North to Global South), that is shaping contemporarypolicy.Scholarsandactivistsaredocumentingthesedevelopments–thedeaths,thedetentioncentres,thepolicies,thenewtechnologiesandthecorporate profiteering – but this work is currently at the margins ofsocialandenvironmentaljusticemovements.In the short-term, it is clearweneedcountries towork together and

through international organisations like theEU andUN to respond torefugeeandhumanitariancrises–whetherit’ssearch-and-rescueintheMediterranean or support for the admission of Syrian refugees. Theseinitiatives need proper resources, and they need to evolve into moredurablesolutions.It should be scandalous that the international community, and the

richest countries in the world in particular, are not doing more forrefugees;yetthenarrativeoftheEuropeanRightisthattheyarealreadydoingtoomuch.AndifcountriesthatgaveustheGenevaConventionsarenolongerwillingtofollowtheletterandspiritofthoselaws,dothey

reallyexpectcountriesthatarelesswell-equippedtodoso?We also need to think about ways to prevent the application-by-

application development of the most dystopian border-securitytechnologies described above. This includes checks on technologicaldevelopmentwithclearred lines(forexample, thosedemandedbythecampaign Stop Killer Robots) and global restrictions on the trade insecurityandlaw-enforcementequipment.Thoseinvestedinthebusinessofhomelandsecuritywillneverwillinglyacceptthis,buttheprocessofeducationandpersuasioncanleadtounexpectedbreakthroughs,aswesawthroughtheLandminesconvention,whichstartedwhensixNGOsdecided towork together towards thecommongoalofending theuse,productionandtradeinlandminesandclustermunitions.Butgiventhedifficulty of putting the technological genie back in the proverbialbottle, we also have to think about how to use new technologies ofsurveillanceandlocationtrackingtohelppeople–notjusttokeepthemwhere they are. With the political will, EUROSUR, the EU border-surveillance system, could for example easily be developed from anexclusorysystemtoonepredicatedonsavinglivesatsea.This opens the space to look at muchmore radical policy reforms.

Matt Carr, author of Fortress Europe: Dispatches from a GatedContinentsuggests that ifEuropewants towelcomethelivingandnotthedead,it‘needstoabandonanessentiallyrepressiveandexclusionaryapproachtoborderenforcement’whichineffect‘acceptsmigrantdeathsascollateraldamage’.60Refugeesreceiveourpitywhenwhattheyreallyneed is our solidarity. Yet in rich countries, the frequent appeals andhungerstrikesbyrefugeegroupsrarelymakethenews;itisonlymassdeath that commands periodic coverage. If solidarity begins with therecognitionandsupportofotherpeople’sdemands,thensolidaritywithrefugees and asylum seekers beginswith a defence of the right ofallpeople tomigrate, insupportof freemovement forsurvivalaswellasprofit. This can only come about if we end our acquiescence todetention centres, dispersal programmes, off-shoreprocessing, and theforcedrepatriationofmigrantsandrefugees.

We need alternatives to the emerging paradigm of global apartheidthat can trigger a reversal of restrictive policies in Europe andelsewhere.Thiswillonlybeachievedifimmigrationpolicycanbede-coupled from the toxic populist rhetoric and reclaimed from the‘securocrats’ of the post-9/11 policing and security revolution. Fromhere,itmaybehopedthatapositive,alternativeagendaaroundclimate-inducedmigrationthatlooksbeyondrestrictivemigrationcontrolscouldemerge.Wemight take inspiration fromScotland,where in stark contrast to

therestoftheUK,andindeedmuchoftheEU,apoliticalpartyswepttopower inMay 2015 on a broadly pro-immigration ticket. Greece andSpainarealsowitnessingpro-immigrationpartiesgaininginpopularity.Germanyisnowleadingbyexample.This, however, still begs the questionofwho is allowed tomigrate,

andwhy,inourcurrentexclusionarymigrationsystem.Fundamentally,migrationmanagementisn’tonlyaboutgovernmentskeepingpeopleoutormilitarising theirbordersagainstpeople they seeasa risk. It’s alsoaboutlettingthe‘right’peoplein–andindoingsoprovidingbusinesseswithacontinuedsupplyofcheaplabour.Borderscontinuetobeentirelyporous for elites, andmalleable for the people that they need to keepprofitsflowing.Insupportingandbuildingmovementsthatstandupformigrantsand

refugees we should also consign the idea that climate change willinevitablycausemigration–andmore importantly thepremise thatall‘climate refugees’ are powerless actors who pose a threat to theirneighbours’wayoflife–tothedustbin.Butunlesswemanagetoopenthe doors for people who need to migrate to actually do so, we willremaincomplicitintheirentrapmentindangerousplaces.

Notes

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19.UNHCR.(7January2015).UNHCRreportshowsworld’spoorestcountrieshostmostrefugees.Retrievedfromhttp://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/en/news/2015/unhcr-report-shows-worlds-poorest-countries-host-most-refugees.html.

20.Trombetta,M.J.(28August2014).Linkingclimate-inducedmigrationandsecuritywithintheEU:Insightsfromthesecuritizationdebate.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21624887.2014.923699.

21.OxfamInternationalSecretariat.(2011).BriefingontheHornofAfricadrought:Climatechangeandfutureimpactsonfoodsecurity.Retrievedfromhttp://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/publications/v.php?id=21118.

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31.Fargues,P.andDiBartolomeo,A.(2015).DrownedEurope(report).MigrationPolicyCentre,EuropeanUniversityInstitute.Retrievedfromhttp://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/35557/MPC_2015_05_PB.pdf?sequence=1.

32. Traynor,I.(6March2015).EUplantosetupmigrantcentersincountiesoutsideEUborders,Guardian,p.29.

33.GuardianWitness.(September2013).Areyouhemmedinbyaseparationwallorsecurityfence?Guardian.Retrievedfromhttps://witness.theguardian.com/a

ssignment/51f7a7c5e4b0472f65d02668?INTCMP=mic_2781.

34. Graham,S.(2009).Theurban‘battlespace.Theory,Culture&Society,26(7–8),278–88.Retrievedfromdoi:10.1177/0263276409349280.

35. BBC.(10March2014).Spainadmitsuseofrubberbulletsonmigrantswaswrong.Retrievedfromhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26516703.

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Feng,S.,Krueger,A.B.andOppenheimer,M.(2010).Linkagesamongclimatechange,cropyieldsandMexico-UScross-bordermigration.ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciences,107(32),14257–62.Retrievedfromdoi:10.1073/pnas.1002632107

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Hamro-Drotz,D.(2014).Conflict-sensitiveadaptationtoclimatechangeinAfrica,LivelihoodSecurity:Climatechange,migrationandconflictintheSahel,p. 195. Retrieved from http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Sahel_EN.pdf.

38.Panda,A.(n.d.).ClimateinducedmigrationfromBangladeshtoIndia:Issuesandchallenges.SSRNElectronicJournal.Retrievedfromdoi:10.2139/ssrn.2186397.

39.Secureenough.TheEconomist(22June2013).Retrievedfromhttp://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21579828-spending-billions-more-fences-and-drones-will-do-more-harm-good-secure-enough.

40.Hayes,B.andVermeulen,M.(2012).Borderline:theEU’snewbordersurveillanceinitiatives.HeinrichBöllFoundation.Retrievedfromwww.statewatch.org/news/2012/jun/borderline.pdf.

41. Hayes,B.,Jones,C.andToepfer,E.(5February2014).Eurodrones,Inc.Amsterdam:TransnationalInstitute.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tni.org/eurodrones.

42.

Theirofficialwish-listincluded:lasersandheatbeamsdesignedtodispersecrowds;nausea-inducingsoundwavestargetedatscubadivers;theImpulseSwimmerGun,describedasbeingableto‘suppressunderwaterswimmersanddivers’;systemdesignedtomovepeoplethroughanareabyemittinga‘heatsensation’causing‘involuntarymovement’;electro-muscularpulseswhich‘substantiallyincrease’thetimeahostilepersoncanbeincapacitated;aportablesystemwhichemitshigh-poweredmicrowavescapableofstallingacarengineatadistance,andanunmanned,airbornevesselequippedwithamicrowave-emittingdevicecapableofpreventingaship’spropulsionbycausing‘electricalsystemmalfunction’.

43. Doucet,I.andLloyd,R.(2001).AlternativeAnti-personnelMines:Thenextgenerations.LandmineAction.

44.Arthur,C.andWright,S.(5October2006).Targetingthepainbusiness.Guardian.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/technology/2006/oct/05/guardianweeklytechnologysection.

45.Raytheon.(n.d.).SilentGuardian®SG-R50:PointDefenseShort-RangeDeterrent. Retrieved from http://www.atmarine.fi/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Silent%20Guardian%20SG-R50.pdf.

46. Davison,N.(2009).‘Non-Lethal’Weapons.London:Palgrave.

47.AmnestyInternational(2003)ThePainMerchants–Securityequipmentanditsuseintortureandotherilltreatment.Retrievedfromhttp://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ACT40/008/2003/en/.

48.USDepartmentofDefenseNon-LethalWeaponsProgram.(June2012).Newsletter.Retrievedfromhttp://jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Press_Room/Newsletters/Newsletter_053112.pdf.

49.Vance,A.(11April2003).Theself-healing,self-hoppinglandmine.Register.Retrieved from http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/04/11/the_selfhealing_selfhopping_landmine/.

50.MetalStorm’svirtualminefieldgetsapatent.Gizmag.(26January2010).Retrievedfromhttp://www.ideaconnection.com/newinventions/metal-storm-virtual-minefield-03248.html.

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U.S.BorderAgencyhasconsideredweaponizingdomesticdronesto‘immobilize’people.Slate.(3July2013).Retrievedfromhttp://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/07/03/documents_show_customs_and_border_protection_considered_weaponized_domestic.html.

52. Koreanmachine-gunrobotsstartDMZduty.Cnet.com.(14July2010).Retrievedhttp://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-20010533-1.html.

53.Packsofrobotswillhuntdownuncooperativehumans.NewScientist.(22October2008).Retrievedfromhttp://www.newscientist.com/blogs/shortsharpscience/2008/10/packs-of-robots-will-hunt-down.html

54.

SaudiArabiaSecuringitsBorderswithSensorsandSoftware.NationalDefenseMagazine.(December2009).Retrievedfromhttp://www.nationaldefensemag

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Tomgram:MillerandSchivone,bringingthebattlefieldtotheborder.TomDispatch.com.(25January2015).Retrievedfromhttp://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175947/tomgram%3A_miller_and_schivone,_bringing_the_battlefield_to_the_border/.

56. Hayes,B.(2009).

57. Hayes,B.,Jones,C.andToepfer,E.(5February2014).

58.Pelofsky,J.(15January2011).Administrationgivinguponfull‘virtualfence’onborder.WashingtonPost.Retrievedfromhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/14/AR2011011406893.html.

59. Webber,F.(2012).BorderlineJustice:Thefightforrefugeeandmigrantrights.London:Pluto.SeealsoSecureenough.TheEconomist.(22June2013).

60.Carr,M.(2014).‘Wewanttowelcometheliving,notthedead’:Borders,deathsandresistance.StatewatchJournal,23(3/4),February.Retrievedfromhttp://www.statewatch.org/subscriber/protected/statewatch-journal-vol23n34.pdf.

6

THEFIXISIN:(GEO)ENGINEERINGOURWAYOUT

OFTHECLIMATECRISIS?

KathyJoWetterandSilviaRibeiro,ETCGroup

DavidKeith: ‘… youcouldactually spray sulphuricacid in the stratosphere20kilometersoverourheadandusethattostoptheplanetwarming…Youput,say,20,000 tons of sulphuric acid into the stratosphere every year and each yearyouhave toputa littlemore…sopeopleare terrifiedabout talkingabout thisbecausethey’rescaredthatitwillpreventuscuttingemissions.’

StephenColbert:‘Right,andalsothatitissulphuricacid.’

HarvardProfessorDavidKeithpromotinghisbook,ACaseforClimateEngineering,onTheColbertReport,9December2013

Introduction

When the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC)published the first instalment of its latest Assessment Report inSeptember2013, the final paragraphof itsSummary forPolicymakersinvokedgeoengineering–definedinthereportasproposalsthat‘aimtodeliberatelyaltertheclimatesystemtocounterclimatechange’.1The IPCC’s inclusion of geoengineering was a watershed moment.

The IPCC represents the consensus position of the internationalscientific community and this marked the first time the data-drivengroup mentioned speculative, climate-altering technologies in anAssessment Report.2 The paragraph alluded to geoengineering’sassociateduncertaintiesandrisksandfellfarshortofanendorsement;itpointed out that geoengineering schemes ‘carry side effects and long-termconsequencesonaglobalscale’.3ButthefactthattheIPCCgavethelastwordtoanunproventechnofixrevealsboththedismalstateofefforts to curb climate change and a willingness to contemplate aformerly taboo climate change response. Ken Caldeira, ageoengineering proponent and climate researcher at the CarnegieInstitutionforScience, toldNature thatheunderstood the inclusionofgeoengineering in the report as ‘a reflection of growing governmentalinterest in these ideas’.4 The author of the article inwhichCaldeira’squoteappearedpresentedtheIPCC’shat-tiptogeoengineeringasasignthat‘thecontroversialareaisnowfirmlyonthescientificagenda.’5The proof of principle – that cumulative, local interventions in

ecosystemscanbringaboutplanetary-leveleffects–isbeyonddispute.Thatwasdemonstratedby the IndustrialRevolutionandwhywehavehuman-inducedclimatechange.Nonetheless,asweapproachso-calledclimate‘tippingpoints’,thenotionofintentionallychangingtheclimateis gaining ground: the idea thatwe can apply new technologies as anemergency measure to purposefully intervene and correct theinadvertentbutseriousharmwe’vedonetotheplanet.Butgeoengineering’simplicationsgobeyondarisky(andspeculative)

corrective to climate change. Geoengineering offers the possibility ofbringingtogethercorporateandmilitaryaspirationsinanunprecedentedway:notjustowningnaturebutalsocontrollingnature.Whileweather-as-weaponisnotanewidea,thespectreof(theoretical)climatecontrolin themidst of intensified state-resource grabs (including food-relatedland and water grabs) and corporate profit seeking raises seriousconcerns related to global (climate) justice, in addition to the seriousrisks to environment and health. That geo-engineering is being

contemplated as a potentially unavoidable ‘Plan B’ by some ‘liberal’policymakers,scientistsandacademics–whileat thesame time, it isbeingembracedbyneoconservativesasanend-of-pipe innovation thatwillenableunrestrictedeconomicgrowth–increasesthelikelihoodthatgeoengineeringwillbepursued;and this increases theurgentneed forvigilantresistance.

(Re)defininggeoengineering

A wide range of approaches to alter the earth’s systems has beenvariously placed under the geoengineering umbrella, most commonlydivided (by governments and academics) into two categories:technologiesthatdeflectsunlightawayfromtheearthandtechnologiesthat remove, capture and/or store carbon dioxide (CO2).6 A thirdcategory of ‘weather-modification’ techniques, some of which havebeen practiced since the mid-twentieth century (for example, ‘cloudseeding’), is sometimes included in discussions of geoengineering.Whether or not weather modification is included depends largely onwho’s talking. Geoengineering advocates who exclude (or, morecommonly, ignore) weather modification often base the exclusion ondefinitional parameters related to scale or temporality,7 but weathermodification’s dubious efficacy and historical use as a clandestineweaponofwarmayalsohelpexplainthereluctanceofgeoengineeringadvocates to claim weather modification as a cohort of the climate-engineering project.8 Especially given the interdependent relationshipbetweenweatherandclimate(‘climateisanaveragepatternofweatherfor a particular region’, according to NASA9), the argument thatweather modification should be excluded from geoengineeringdiscussionsisnotpersuasive.Harvard physicist and geoengineering advocate David Keith has

described geoengineering in the context of climate change as ‘a

countervailing measure, one that uses additional technology tocounteractunwantedsideeffectswithouteliminatingtheirrootcause,“atechnicalfix”’.10However, as geoengineering is discussed in more contexts and its

circumscriptionbecomesmoreconsequential–withpossible legalandpublic-relations implications – there are attempts to fix a definition,which sometimesmeans getting away from the term ‘geoengineering’altogether. The scientists who gathered in 2010 for an internationalconference inAsilomar, California, to consider ‘voluntary guidelines’for research, for example, not only studiously avoided the term‘geoengineering’, but they also sought to re-brand ‘solar radiationmanagement’ as ‘climate intervention’ and carbon-dioxide removal as‘carbonremediation’.ThestatementmadebytheScientificOrganizingCommittee at the close of the meeting did not make mention ofgeoengineering(or,forthatmatter,thevoluntarystandardsthemeetingwasexplicitlyconvenedtodevelop).11While different governments, academic institutions and multilateral

bodiesmay endup circumscribinggeoengineeringdifferently, there isgeneral agreement on geoengineering’s defining features. First,geoengineering is deliberate (even if it has unintended impacts).Unintentionalharmtotheglobalenvironmentfromotheractivities(forexample, agriculture, industrial processes) is thus (far) excluded.Second, geoengineering will have global, or at least ‘large-scale’,effects, even if deployment/application is ‘local’. And third,geoengineering is understood to be a high-technology approachinvolving unknown risk to the environment: changing consumptionpatterns or adopting agro-ecological practices, for example, do notqualify, even though either could have a significant impact on theenvironment.These general definitional characteristics are useful; however, it is

important to recognise their problematic imprecisions. It is also likelythatifgeoengineeringtechniquesarerealised,theirdeploymentwillnotbe limited to instances of so-called ‘climate emergencies’.

Geoengineering schemes could be deployed to ‘manage’ other earthsystems, such as the hydrological or nitrogen cycles, or even to‘improve’conditions for foodproduction.12While itmaybeuseful torefer to climate impacts for descriptive purposes, it would beshortsighted to think that climate-change mitigation will be the soledeploymentcontext.It is also crucial to recognise that defining geoengineering is more

thandescribingthescopeandfeaturesofearth-alteringtechniques;itisa political act and a reflection of a particular worldview.Geoengineering contrasts sharply with the notion of stewardship:Geoengineersseeecosystemsasresourcestobeimproved,optimised,or‘fixed’ rather than systems to be protected and restored. Ecologist-activist Vandana Shiva has suggested that geoengineering reflects the‘paradigmthatcreatedthefossilfuelagethatgaveusclimatechange’.13Shiva argues, ‘Tonowoffer that samemindset as a solution is to nottakeseriouslywhatEinsteinsaid:thatyoucan’tsolvetheproblemsbyusing the same mindset that caused them.’14 The ETC Group hasreferredtogeoengineeringas‘geopiracy’ to underline our position that in the absence of globalgovernance – implying informed consent by the world’s peoples –geoengineeringisbothillegalandimmoral.

Abriefhistoryof‘climateengineering’

The idea that geoengineering could be a potential response toanthropogenic climate change isn’t new. As early as 1965, the USPresident’sScienceAdvisoryCommitteewarnedinareport,RestoringtheQualityofOurEnvironment,thatCO2pollutionwasmodifyingtheearth’s heat balance.15 That report, regarded as the first high-levelacknowledgmentofclimatechange,wentontorecommend–insteadofemissionsreductions–asuiteofgeoengineeringoptions.Theauthorsof

the report asserted, ‘The possibilities of deliberately bringing aboutcountervailing climatic changes…need to be thoroughly explored.’16Theysuggested reflectiveparticlescouldbedispersedon tropical seas(at an annual cost of around $500 million), which might also inhibithurricaneformation.TheCommitteealsospeculatedaboutusingcloudsto counteract warming. As James Fleming, a leading historian ofweathermodification,wrylynotes,thefirst-everofficialreportonwaysto address climate change ‘failed tomention themostobviousoption:reducing fossil fuel use’.17 Another report published in 1965, the USNational Science Foundation’s (NSF) Weather and ClimateModification, emphasised the ‘exciting’, long-range aspects of ‘man’sachievingtheabilitytomodifytheatmosphericenvironment’.18The mid-1970s’ revelations of clandestine acts of weather warfare

during the Vietnam War (leading to the ENMOD treaty) dampenedenthusiasm for weather and climate modification,19 but the reality ofclimate change helped revive it around the turn of themillennium. In2002,PaulJ.Crutzen–whowonaNobelPrizeforpioneeringworkonthe ozone layer and is a professor at the Max Planck Institute forChemistry in Mainz, Germany – offered grudging support forgeoengineering in the journal Nature. Since we are living in the‘Anthropocene’–theerainwhichhumansareincreasinglyaffectingtheclimate – Crutzen suggested our future ‘may well involveinternationally accepted, large-scale geoengineering projects’.20 Thesame year, Science published its own article that argued forgeoengineeringasalegitimateapproachtocombatingclimatechange.21Three years later in 2005, and forty years after the release of the

ScienceAdvisoryCommittee andNSF reports, everybody– includingthe sitting US president GeorgeW. Bush – was talking about globalwarming,asscientistswarnedthatthetemperatureriseontheArcticicecap and Siberian permafrost could ‘tip’ the planet into anenvironmentaltailspin.Thefailuretoreachameaningfulmultilateralconsensusonemissions

reduction at the UN Framework Climate on Climate Change’s 15thConferenceof theParties inCopenhagen in2009–despite the largestmobilisation for climate justice to date – offeredgeoengineers amorepopular public platform. As delegates were heading to the airport tocatch their flights home, entrepreneur and geoengineering advocateNathan Myhrvold gave a 30-minute interview to CNN, extolling thevirtuesofputtingsulphateparticlesintothestratosphereasasolutiontoglobal warming. He explained how a 25-kilometre hose held up byballoonscoulddelivertheparticlestotherightplacetoreflectsunlightawayfromtheearth.22Myhrvold,aformerchief technologyofficeratMicrosoft, isfounder

and CEO of Intellectual Ventures Management, LLC, which holdspatentsongeoengineeringtechnologies.KenCaldeiraandJohnLathamof theNationalCenter forAtmosphericResearch in theUS are listedamongthefirm’sseniorinventors,whomIntellectualVenturessupportswith fundingandbusinessexpertise.The firmfileshundredsofpatentapplications annually. Caldeira and Harvard’s David Keith jointlymanagetheFundforInnovativeClimateandEnergyResearch(FICER),bankrolledbyBillGates’spersonalfunds.Since2007,FICERhasgivenout $4.6 million in research grants, but recent information on itsactivities is scarce. (David Keith’s 2013 book, A Case for ClimateEngineering,meritedaback-coverendorsementblurbfromGates,whoclaimsthatKeith’sbooklaysout‘acompellingargumentabouttheneedfor serious research on geo-engineering and for a robust policydiscussiononitspossibleuse’.)TheUK’sRoyalSocietyandtheNationalAcademyofSciencesinthe

UShavebothalreadyspentmoneyandtimebringingexpertstogethertospeculateaboutgeoengineering’sprospectsandhavefound,thusfar,nosufficientlycompellingreasonstotakegeoengineering‘offthetable’.23Ahandfulofdedicatedgeoengineering researchprojectsareknown tobe currently funded by governments, and government-supportedgovernance initiatives, such as the Solar Radiation ManagementResearchGovernance Initiative (SRMGI), largely fundedby theUK’s

Royal Society; also the Gates-funded FICER, and the ClimateGeoengineering Governance project, supported by two UK ResearchCouncils, are up and running. (See below for a discussion ofgeoengineeringgovernance.)Just as its inclusion in the IPCCreportwas seen toconfer scientific

legitimacy on geoengineering, gatherings of august national sciencebodiesand theestablishmentofuniversity-based researchprogrammesfocused on geoengineering produce a similarly legitimising effect. (Itappears, however, that the effect of the involvement of the US‘intelligencecommunity’inaprojecttoevaluatethetechnicalmeritsofgeoengineeringproposalsislesssoothingformediacommentators.24)

Climatescepticsandprofitprophets:Geoengineeringintheserviceofcapitalism

One striking effect of geoengineering’s ascendency has been analignment of positions that were previously diametrically opposed.While some long-time climate scientists such asCrutzen andCaldeiraclaim tohaveonlygraduallyand reluctantlyembracedgeoengineeringout of a fear of global warming’s devastating effects, a new andpowerful lobbyfor geoengineering has emerged in recent years,madeupofpeoplewhosemotivationhasneverbeenconcernfortheplanetoritspoorestinhabitants.InJune2008,NewtGingrich,formerSpeakeroftheHouseintheUS

Congress, sent a letter tohundredsof thousandsofAmericans, urgingthemtoopposeproposedlegislationtoaddressglobalwarmingthroughemissions reductions. Gingrich argued for geoengineering theatmosphere with sulphates as a better option to fight climate change.‘Geoengineeringholdsforththepromiseofaddressingglobalwarmingconcernsforjustafewbilliondollarsayear’,wroteGingrich.‘InsteadofpenalizingordinaryAmericans,wewouldhaveanoptiontoaddress

global warming by rewarding scientific innovation … Bring on theAmericanIngenuity.Stopthegreenpig.’25Gingrich,authorofDrillHere,DrillNow,PayLessandseniorfellow

attheAmericanEnterpriseInstitute(AEI),aneoconservativethinktankpromoting free enterprise and limited government, was closelyassociatedwith theGeorgeW.Bush administration.AEI had its owngeoengineering project led by Lee Lane, an advisor to the Bushadministration, now at the Hudson Institute, another neoconservativethink tank. In 2009, Lane and co-author J. Eric Bickel published AnAnalysis ofClimateEngineering as aResponse toClimateChange, areport advocating the additionof geoengineering to existing responsesto climate change on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. Lane andBickelclaimedsprayingseawater intocloudscouldfixclimatechangeandtherebyadd$20trilliontotheglobaleconomy.The reportwaspublishedandwidelybroadcastbyBjørnLomborg’s

CopenhagenConsensusCenter(CCC).26Lomborgisbestknownastheself-styled and controversial ‘Skeptical Environmentalist’ who hasconsistentlydownplayedtheseriousnessofclimatechange.Lomborgisnow using his CCC and prominent media profile to push forgeoengineeringnotas‘PlanB’,butas‘PlanA’–thepreferredroutetocoolingtheplanet.The ‘Lomborg manoeuvre’ – switching from opposing action on

climatechangetosupportingthemostextremeactiononclimatechange– isnowseeminglyde rigueuramong industrialapologistsand formerclimate-change sceptics, especially in the United States. Besides theHudson Institute andAEI, political operators at theCato Institute, theThomas Jefferson Institute, the Hoover Institution, the CompetitiveEnterprise Institute, the International Policy Network and elsewherehave professed their faith in the geo-engineering gospel.GeoengineeringhasbeenamainstayofdiscussionforseveralyearsnowattheInternationalConferenceonClimateChange,anannualjamboreeforclimatedeniersorganisedbytheHeartlandInstitute,dubbedbytheNew York Times ‘the primaryAmerican organization pushing climate

changeskepticism’.27For thosewho previously doubted (or still do doubt) the science of

anthropogenicglobalwarming, thegeoengineering approach shifts thediscussion from reducing emissions to end-of-pipe ‘solutions’. Oncegeoengineeringisanoption,thereislessneedtobickeraboutwhoputtheCO2 in the atmosphere (and less need to ask them to stop). Ifwehave the means to suck up greenhouse gases or turn down thethermostat,emitterscan,inprinciple,continueunabated.

‘Owningtheweather’:Intellectualpropertyandgeoengineering

Adding to the controversy surrounding geoengineering are the criticalissues of ownership and control. An early survey of geoengineeringpatenting concludes that patents are broad, increasing in number, andconcentratedinasmallnumberofowners.28In multilateral fora, intellectual property (IP) is almost always a

contentious issue: governments from the Global South generallyadvocateforenablinggreater transferofuseful technologies, includingsignificantfinancingfromdevelopedcountries,arguingthatexistingIPregimesareabarriertoaccessingthetechnologiesnecessarytomitigateandadapttoclimatechange.TheNorthadvocates–andgenerallygets–strong protection of intellectual property, arguing that high profitsderived from IP drives innovation and, eventually, the transfer oftechnologies. If geoengineering techniques move toward deployment,theexistenceofpatentsheldbyindividualsandprivatecompaniescouldmean that decisions over the climate-commons will be effectivelyhandedovertotheprivatesector.Indeed,somegeoengineersarealreadyclaiming that theirpatentsgive themextendedcommercial rightsoverthecommonsinwhichtheyoperate.OneofseveralpatentsassignedtoIan S.F. Jones, founder and CEO of Ocean Nourishment Corporation

andprofessor at theUniversity ofSydney, for example, explains howthe described method of ocean fertilisation will increase fishpopulations; the patent claims ownership of the fish subsequentlyharvestedfromafertilisedpatchofocean.29Somegeoengineeringpatentsalsoeffectivelyprivatiseindigenousand

traditionalknowledge,mostclearlydemonstrableintheareaofbiochar.The technique of burying charcoal in soil was widely practiced bycommunities throughout the Amazonian Basin before the turn of thefirstmillennium,whereitwasknownasTerraPreta.Thistechnologyisnowthesubjectofseveralpatentapplications.30As other technology innovators have done (in software,

biotechnology, robotics), some geoengineers are considering forgoingtheir intellectual property claims in order to speed up development ofthe technology. David Keith has filed for patents on carbon-capturetechnologiesandheadsastart-upcompanycalledCarbonEngineering,but has saidmore recently that he believes that ‘core’ geoengineeringtechnologiesshouldremaininthepublicdomain.31

GoverningGaia?

Looking into the future to the time when field experiments withweather or climatemodification are expanded in scope and numberand involve actual attempts to introduce changes in the atmosphere,some form of international collaboration will be essential in theplanningandexecutionofprojects thatmayhaveaneffectnotonlyupontheimmediatelocalitiesbutonareasinothercountriesandevenuponothercontinentsdistantfromthesceneofwork…StepsshouldbetakenbytheUnitedStates,inconcertwithothernations,toexplorethe international institutionalmechanisms thatmaybeappropriate tofoster international cooperation and cope with the problems whichmaybeanticipated in the fieldofweather andclimatemodification.The United Nations and its specialized agencies (e.g., the World

Meteorological Organization) is suggested as a possibleintergovernmentalframework.USNationalScienceFoundation,ReportoftheSpecialCommission

onWeatherModification,WeatherandClimateModification,1965,pp.26,28.

The political context of climate manipulation has shifted in the fiftyyears since theNSF’sSpecialCommissionpublished its report.Whilethe ‘energy crisis’ of the 1970s and later, the spectre of ‘peak oil’,provided the early impetus for developing alternative energy and‘renewables’, the debate has moved beyond how much fossil fuelremainstohowmuchgreenhousegasourplanetanditsinhabitantscantolerate – and what happens to some very big economies andcorporations if fossil fuels stay in the ground and can no longer betalliedasassets.States in theGlobalNorth– thecountriesresponsibleformostofthehistoricgreenhouse-gasemissionsandwhichhaveeitherdenied climate change or prevaricated for decades – have fuelledgeoengineering’srecentmomentum.Geoengineering’s(re)emergenceasaproposedsolutiontotheclimate

crisis comes in the context of growingpublic unease and increasinglydevastating climate-change impacts, where OECD (Organisation forEconomic Cooperation and Development) member countries, inparticular, are feeling pressure to adopt policies to dramatically cutfossil-fuelconsumptionandconcomitantGHGemissions.Thisiswheregeoengineering technologies, ‘unconventional energy’ technologies toincrease reserves (for example, fracking,methane hydrate extraction),the interests of the ‘supermajors’ (theworld’s biggest oil companies),and the interests of theworld’s biggest greenhouse-gas emitters cometogether. If technologies are able to capture the carbon and lower thethermostat aswell as ‘enhance’ oil recovery, then there is no need toshake up the global economic status quo or to inconvenience theelectorate by asking citizens to change how they live their lives. AsClive Hamilton of Charles Sturt University, Canberra, puts it, the

politicalappealoftechnofixessuchasgeoengineeringisthattheyofferhope of solving a problem ‘that would otherwise require socialchange’.32Atthesametime,geoengineeringcouldofferalifelinetothemajorprivate-andstate-sectorplayers–the‘oldguardgeoengineers’–that profited from the climate-changing industries of the twentiethcentury.These are thegeopolitical realities that cannotbe set aside indiscussions of the development, deployment and governance ofgeoengineering.Gaia is complicated, and despite decades of modelling, we are still

unlikely to predict next month’s best picnic day. From stratosphericcurrentstounderseamethanehydrates–andfromplanktontopalmtreeemissions and sequestrations – quantifying and qualifying planetarysystems ischallengingandcontinuallyunder revision.Butweneed toknow–accurately–what lifeonearthwillbe like (ineveryplaceonearth) athigher levelsofGHGconcentrations.The IPCCcanofferusscenarios,butnotcertainty.Wealsoneedtoknow–accurately–who’sreducingemissionsandwho’seffectivelycookingthebooks,astheUSdidwhenitreportedsignificantlyloweremissionsbutexporteditscoal-relatedemissionsbysellingsurpluscoalsuppliestoAsia.33Withoutthatknowledge,howcouldwedecidethatit’stimetodeploygeoengineeringtechnologies? In other words, howwill we come to agreement that a‘climateemergency’isimminent,orevenalreadyunderway?ReducingGHGemissions is complicated.Not reducingemissions is

bound to prove more complicated. Moving perhaps a billion peoplefromcoastalplainstohighergroundwillbeextremelydifficult.Sortingout correctlywhich crops can growwherewill be hugely critical andequally complex. Responding to extreme hydrothermal events (forexample,floods,droughts,typhoons)willbeexcruciating–andcostly.That all of these challenges will also be political compounds theproblem,even thougheverygovernmentwill claim ‘soundscience’astheirbasisfordecisionmaking.Now,byadvancinggeoengineeringasapostponementofclimatechangeorevenaspartofasolution,scientistsare compounding the complexity by several orders of magnitude and

renderingthepoliticsofclimategovernancestillmoreopaque.Geoengineeringmayappear aprudentPlanBuntilweacknowledge

howitcompoundscomplexity,andhowexperimentalmanipulationsofearthsystemscouldchangeeverythingforeverybody,eventhoseliving‘distantfromthesceneofwork’,aswasunderstoodfiftyyearsagobytheauthorsofNSF’sreportonclimatemodificationbutseemstohavebeen forgotten in the interveningdecades.Similarly, attempts toworkout geoengineering governance frameworks may appear prudent andeven lamentably inchoate until we acknowledge how audaciouslyprematurethosediscussionsare,giventheuncertaintiesandrisks.Whohastherighttodeploygeoengineeringtechnologiesintheglobal

commons (seas, space, stratosphere)? Will there be liability forunintendedtransboundaryeffects?Howcouldthoseeffectsbeproven?What are the implications of one country, corporation, or even oneextremelyrichpersondecidingunilaterally–oraspartofa‘coalitionofthewilling’–topursuedeploymentofgeoengineeringtechnologies?Morally and politically, climate engineering requires global

governance.TheUnitedNationsConvention onBiologicalDiversity (CBD)was

the first multilateral body to begin tackling the issue of globalgeoengineering governance. Rather than establishing a framework tofacilitatepossibledeployment,theCBD,in2008,adoptedamoratoriumon one geoengineering technique: ocean fertilisation. At its 10thConference of the Parties in 2010 in Nagoya, Japan, the CBD’s 193Parties agreed to expand thatmoratorium to cover all geoengineeringtechnologies, marking geoengineering’s ‘definite coming of age’,according to The Economist.34 While carving out an exemption forsmall-scalescientificexperiments incontrolledsettingswithinnationaljurisdiction, the CBD decision invoked the precautionary approach toprohibit geoengineering activities until social, economic andenvironmental impactshavebeenproperlyconsideredandaregulatorymechanism is in place.35 (The CBD has almost universal statemembership; however, the United States, along with Andorra, the

VaticanandSouthSudan,havenotratifiedthetreaty.Significantly,theCBD has a mandate to not only consider biodiversity, but also toinvolvelocalcommunitiesandindigenouspeoplesinitsprocesses.)ThelikelihoodoftheUN’smembersagreeingthatthedeploymentof

geoengineering is in the best interest of all Parties is vanishinglyminuscule, but in the absence of global agreement, geoengineering isindefensible. Would governments, then, act unilaterally? Today’sclimate-change‘HotWar’couldcometoresemblethe‘ColdWar’thatdominated global politics after the Second World War. During thatperiod, countries, including theUnited States, Russia, China, theUK,France, India, IsraelandPakistan, feltmorallyqualified tounilaterallyjeopardise planetary security and risk nuclear war by exploding 459nuclear bombs (most above international waters) that were ultimatelyshown to damage the health and well-being of not only their owncitizens but of the world.36 The political/scientific complex initiallydenied the dangers of atmospheric nuclear testing and then tried tounderplaythedangersuntil forcedinto–decadeslater–anuclear testbantreaty.Similarly,unilateralgeoengineeringinitiativesrepresentadirectthreat

to global security and invite – almost require – responses from othergovernments.OceanandSRMinterventions,inparticular,wouldlikelyspuranescalationofmeteorologicalexperimentationthatcouldquicklyspinoutofcontrol.Beforethathappens,it’stimeforageoengineeringtestban.

Conclusion

InApril2010, theWorldPeoples’ConferenceonClimateChangeandthe Rights of Mother Earth, held in Cochabamba, Bolivia, broughttogether more than 25,000 campesinos, teachers, students, engineers,activists, diplomats, elders and ordinary folk to discuss how best tominimisetheimpactsofglobalwarmingandtorespondtothefailureof

negotiationsattheUNFrameworkClimateonClimateChangetobringabout reductions inglobalGHGemissions.Seventeenworkinggroupscontributed to a Peoples’ Agreement, which explicitly rejectedgeoengineering as a solution to climate change.37 From Cochabamba,the Hands Off Mother Earth (HOME) campaign to opposegeoengineeringexperimentswaslaunched.38In the meantime, a small but influential group of researchers has

increasedcallsforgovernmentstosupportgeoengineeringexperimentsas part of developing a ‘Plan B’39 in the event of a ‘climateemergency’40 – despite the adoption of the decision to restrict geo-engineeringactivitiesby theUN’sConventiononBiologicalDiversityinOctober2010.Governments are beingpersuaded:As this chapterwas in press, the

US’s National Academies, ‘Advisers to the Nation on Science,EngineeringandMedicine’,releasedtworeports:oneonCDRandoneonSRM(thelatterisreferredtobytheauthorsusingtheterm‘albedomodification’).41 The reports recommend government investment indedicatedresearchanddevelopmentprogramsforbothCDRandSRM.Notallauthorsagreed,however;oneauthor,aprofessorofgeophysicalsciences at theUniversity of Chicagowho contributed to the report’stechnical evaluation, warned: ‘Developing albedo-modificationtechnologywouldbelikegivingaloadedguntoachild.’42Fromsomeperspectives,itmayseemresponsibletokeepallclimate-

change response options and a ‘PlanB’ on the table, and support forgeoengineeringresearchhasbeenpromotedasaprudent,practicalandeven precautionary ‘insurance policy’.43 But geo-engineering’sprudencewillnotbeuniversallyobvious.Ifyouareoneofthemembersof the G8 that launched the Industrial Revolution responsible foranthropogenicclimatechangeandyourGHGemissionskeepgoingupinstead of down, it may be easier to appreciate the attraction of atechnofix. But for poor communities in the South, further tamperingwith the climate by unaccountable elites is, not surprisingly, seen

differently. As Professor Simon Dalby has argued, ‘old-fashionedgeopolitics’ may bring about ‘temporary violent fixes to some of thesymptomsofclimatechange.Butbynostretchoftheimaginationwillsuchgeopoliticsbeclimatesecurityinanysensethatmatterseitherforthe poorer parts of humanity in this generation or for futuregenerations.’44 For Dalby, ‘the key point now is not what climatechange will do for geopolitics, but what geopolitics does to climatechange’,which ‘now has to be about sharing a crowdedworld ratherthantryingtodominateadividedone’.45Areasonedrejectionofgeoengineering’stechnofixonprecautionary,

political, technical and/ormoral grounds does not imply a denial thatscience and technology have important roles to play in dealing withclimatechange.Itisurgentandimportantthatthescientificcommunityworkwithnationalaswellaslocalgovernmentstomonitor,accuratelyrelay and address the climate threats ahead. This collaborative effortwill require a lot of investment and focused energy. The practicalresponses to climate change must change with the latitudes, altitudesand ecosystems. However, once we acknowledge the currentgeopolitical realities of climate change, the ‘temporary violent fixes’that geoengineering offers are specious at best; at worst, they aregeopiracyandathreattousall.

ANNEX:OVERVIEWOFGEOENGINEERINGTECHNOLOGIESANDTHEIRPOSSIBLE

EFFECTS

Itcannotbeover-emphasisedthat1)geoengineeringisuntestedanditstechnologies remain largely in the realmof the theoretical,with somenotable exceptions (see below), and 2) the effects of geoengineeredclimate interventions are not known. Techniques that alter thecomposition of the stratosphere or the chemistry of the oceans are

expected to have unequal impacts on both ecosystems and societiesaround the world.46 Some anticipated effects are described below.Geoengineeringwillsurelyhaveunintendedconsequences,aswell,dueto any number of factors, including inadequate understanding ofecosystems, biodiversity and the earth’s climate; unforeseen naturalphenomena; mechanical failure; human error, irreversibility and/orfundinglapses.

Solarradiationmanagement

So-called solar radiation management (SRM) technologies aim tocounter the earth-warming effect of greenhouse gases (GHGs) byincreasingtheradiationofsunlightbackintospace.SRMencompassesa variety of proposed techniques, including blasting particles in thestratosphere to reflect the sun’s rays, blocking incoming sunlightwith‘space shades’, coveringdesertswith reflectiveplastic andgeneticallyengineeringcropsso their leavesmight reflectmoresunlight.Noneofthese technologies lowers concentrations ofGHGs in the atmosphere;the intention is only to counter some of the unwanted effects of highconcentrationsofGHGs.Despite SRM’s growing presence in both scientific literature and

popularculture,47itremainsatheoreticalclimate-changeresponse.Anddespitearangeofproposedwaysto‘manage’solarradiation(seeBox6.1, below), the ascendant vision is also the most radical: tocontinuously disperse particles of sulphur dioxide (or sulphuric acidvapour)intothestratospheretoscattersunlight–ineffect,tomimictheeffects of a volcanic eruption, which is known to produce a coolingeffect.Proponents have said so often that SRM would be easy and

inexpensivetodeploythatthequestionofmechanicsandcosthave,forthe moment, been largely set aside.48 An exception is the so-calledSPICE (Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering)

experiment, a major research project involving four UK universities,three of theUK’s research councils, and theMarshall Aerospace andDefence Group, which began in 2011 to investigate the feasibility ofputting particles into the stratosphere.One of the project’s streams ofwork included an outdoor trial of amini-version of a proposed SRMdeploymentmechanism,which involved a reinforced garden hose – 1kilometrelong–tetheredtoaballoon.(Thetrialwouldhavedispersedwaterinsteadofreflectiveparticles,andthehosewasone-twentieththelengththatactualstratosphericinjectionwouldrequire.)However,the‘testbed’portionofSPICEnevergotofftheground;it

was cancelled amid controversy,which included anopen letter signedbyseventyorganisationsfromaroundtheworld,expressingoppositionanddubbingtheexperimentthe‘TrojanHose’.49OpponentsconsideredtheexperimentpoliticallydamagingtotheUKgovernmentwithrespectto ongoing multilateral climate negotiations, as well as a dangerousdistraction from the need to cut GHG emissions – immediately anddeeply–inordertocurbclimatechange.Even proponents of SRM largely acknowledge that, as currently

envisioned, SRM has the potential to cause environmental harm,includingchangingweatherpatternsandreducingrainfall,damagingtheozone layer, diminishing biodiversity, reducing the effectiveness ofsolar cells and/or causing sudden and dramatic climatic changes ifdeployment is stopped, either intentionally or unintentionally.50 SRMmight be able to keep temperatures from rising – though this is not acertainty – but it will definitely not address the problem of oceanacidificationoratmosphericGHGs,bothofwhichwouldlikelyincreaseinasolar-managedworld.51

Box6.1GeoengineeringinvolvingSRMtechnologies

Artificial‘volcaniceruptions’:Continuously spraying particles (for example, sulphur, titanium

dioxide) into the stratosphere to increase reflection of incomingsolar radiation;particlescouldbe injected into thestratosphereby,forexample,airplanes,artillery,hosesheldaloftbygiantballoons.

Desertblankets:Coveringlargeexpansesofdesertwithreflectivematerial.

Spacesunshades:One suggestion describes launching trillions of small, free-flyingspacecraft a million miles above the Earth to form a cylindricalcloud60,000mileslongtodivertabout10percentofsunlightawayfromtheplanet.

Arcticicecovering:CoveringsnowpackorglaciersintheArcticwithinsulatingmaterialorananoscalefilmtoreflectsunlightandpreventmelting.

‘Climate-ready’crops:Includes genetically engineering plants to increase reflectivity, aswell as plans to engineer crops and trees to be drought, heat, orsalineresistant.

Spacemirrors:Puttingasuperfinereflectivemeshofaluminiumbetweentheearthandthesun.

Large-scaleland-usechange/rainwaterharvesting:Engineering large-scale changes in water movements in order toprovokecloudformationtoreflectsunlight.

Carbondioxideremoval,carboncaptureandstorage,bioenergywithcarboncaptureandstorage

In itsSummary forPolicymakers in 2013, the IPCCwasunequivocal:

‘A large fractionof anthropogenic climate change resulting fromCO2emissions is irreversible on a multi-century to millennial time scale,except in thecaseofa largenet removalofCO2 fromtheatmosphereoverasustainedperiod.’52Thatlargenetremovalreferstostilllargelytheoretical and/or problematic carbon dioxide removal (CDR)technologies that include biological means (such as biomass-basedenergy with carbon storage and ocean fertilisation) andmechanical/chemical means (such as direct air capture with carbonstorage) (seeBox6.2).While theSummary document does not assessthelikelihoodofasuccessfuland‘large’netremovalofCO2,thefullreport (over 1,500 pages long) dims the prospects considerably bydetailingthewaysCDRisbothspeculativeandrisky.AccordingtotheIPCC,mostCDRmethods

… cannot be scaled up indefinitely and are necessarily limited byvarious physical or environmental constraints, such as competingdemands for land… Direct air capture methods could in principleoperate much more rapidly, but may be limited by large-scaleimplementation, including energy use and environmentalconstraints.53

TheIPCCalsonotesthatthebiggestuncertaintyisthestoragecapacityand the permanence of stored carbon; this is true for both so-calledbiological carbon sinks, such as forests, and for carbon that ismechanicallyinjectedintotheearthordumpedintooceans.PermanentcarbonremovalandstoragebyCDRwoulddecreaseclimatewarminginthelongterm.However,non-permanentstoragestrategieswouldallowCO2 toreturntotheatmosphere,whereitwouldonceagaincontributetowarming.ThereportalsoacknowledgesthatCDRcouldalsohaveclimaticand

environmentalside-effects:

For instance, enhanced vegetation productivity may increase

emissionsofnitrousoxide(N2O),whichisamorepotentgreenhousegas than carbon dioxide (CO2). A large-scale increase in vegetationcoverage, for instance through afforestation or energy crops, couldaltersurfacecharacteristics,suchassurfacereflectivityandturbulentfluxes …. Ocean-based CDR methods that rely on biologicalproduction(i.e.,oceanfertilisation)wouldhavenumeroussideeffectsonoceanecosystemsandoceanacidityandmayproduceemissionsofnon-CO2greenhousegases.54

Box6.2GeoengineeringtechnologiesinvolvingCO2removalandcapture/storage

Oceanfertilizationwithironornitrogen:Adding nutrients to ocean water to stimulate the growth ofphytoplankton with the aim of promoting long-term, deep-seacarbonstorage.

Biochar:Burning biomass through pyrolysis (that is, low-oxygenenvironments so carbon is not released) and burying theconcentratedcarboninsoil.

Carbon-suckingmachinesoraircapture,andmineralsequestrationorsynthetictrees:Extracting CO2 from the air by using liquid sodium hydroxide,whichisconvertedtosodiumcarbonate,thenextractingtheCO2insolidformtobeburied.

Modifyingoceanupwellingordownwelling:Usingpipestobringupnutrient-richseawatertothesurfacetocoolsurfacewatersandenhanceoceansequestrationofCO2.

‘Enhancedweathering’(ocean):

Increasingoceanalkalinityinordertoincreasecarbonuptake.

‘Enhancedweathering’(terrestrial):ControllinglevelsofatmosphericCO2byspreadingfine-powderedolivine(magnesiumironsilicate)onfarmlandorforestland.

CropResidueOceanPermanentSequestration(CROPS):Storingcarbonbydumpingtreelogsorotherbiomassintoseawater.

Geneticallyengineeredalgaeandmarinemicrobes:EngineeringcommunitiesofsyntheticmicroorganismstosequesterhigherlevelsofCO2 (inoceancommunitiesor inclosedponds,oreventocoverbuildings).

TheIPCCrevealsthestateofuncertaintyina‘synthesis’sectionattheendofthechapter:‘ThelevelofconfidenceontheeffectsofbothCDRandSRMmethodson carbonandotherbiogeochemical cycles isverylow.’55WhiletheprospectofCCSasafutureclimate-changeresponsemayprovidesomeoptimismwhenoneconsidersthelikelystateoftheplanetattheturnofthenextcentury,ahardlookattherealityofCCS–and its role in protracting an unsustainable status quo – has led somescientists to conclude that CCS is specious and a dead end: ‘a large,expensive, and unnecessary fossil-fuel subsidywith an extremely lowprobabilityofeventualsocietalbenefit’.56

Weathermodification

The idea thathumanscan intentionally control theweatherhas a longhistoryand is theconceptual ancestorof thegeoengineeringproject.57Sincethe1830s,governmentsandprivatecompanieshaveattemptedtoapply technological know-how to increaseor decreaseprecipitationorto restrain storms by altering landforms, burning forests and dropping

chemicals into clouds – both for military and non-military purposes.Weather warfare by the US government during the Vietnam War(dubbed Operation POPEYE) included 2,600 cloud-seeding missionsovertheHoChiMinhTrail,withtheaimtomakeitimpassable.Whilethe efficacy of the covert operation couldn’t be verified, its eventualexposure did precipitate the UN Convention on the Prohibition ofMilitary or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental ModificationTechniques (ENMOD) of 1977, which the United States immediatelysigned,hatinhand.Predicting the weather is difficult; proving the efficacy of weather

interventionsisevenmoredifficult.However,asclimatechangebringsmore frequent and extreme weather events, ranging from drought totropicalstorms,interestinweathercontrolisontherise.Ifinterventionssuchasalteringthecourseofhurricanesbecomepossible, it iseasytoimagineweathermodificationdeployed in ‘self-defence’beingviewedas a hostile act by neighbours who find themselves in the eye of thestorm.Weathermodificationisaclassic‘end-of-pipe’responsethathasbeenconsidered, since the1960s, as anadaptation technology tocopewithclimaticchanges(seeBox6.3).

Box6.3Geoengineeringtechnologiesinvolvingweathermodification

Cloudseedingtoincreaseprecipitation:Sprayingchemicals(usuallysilveriodide)intocloudstoprecipitaterainorsnow–alreadypracticedonalargescaleintheUnitedStatesandChina,despitescepticismabouteffectiveness.

Stormmodification(forexample,redirectingorsuppressinghurricanes):Attempting to prevent the formation of storms or affect theirpathways.

Notes

1.IPCC.(27September2013).ClimateChange:Thephysicalsciencebasis(Summaryforpolicymakers)(report).RetrievedfromIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)website:http://www.climatechange2013.org/spm.

2.

TheSeptember2013publicationisnot,however,thefirstevidenceoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange’s(IPCC)considerationofgeoengineering:TheIPCCheldanexpertmeetingongeoengineeringin2011,whichincludedallthreeofitsWorkingGroups.Inresponsetothatmeeting,160civil-societyorganisationssentanOpenLettertotheIPCCquestioningthemeeting’spurposeandaskingthePanelnottostrayfromitsmandate(thatis,to‘providepolicy-relevantbutnotpolicy-prescriptiveinformation’).AstheIPCC’sroleistoprovidescientificandtechnicalinformationtotheUNFrameworkConventiononClimateChange,itappearslikelythatthepresenceofgeoengineeringinAR5willsoonresultintheofficialappearanceofgeoengineeringinnegotiatingtextsattheConvention.OpenLetter’stextisathttp://www.etcgroup.org/content/open-letter-ipcc-geoengineering.

3. IPCC.(2013),p.21.

4.Cressey,D.(2October2013).Climatereportputsgeoengineeringinthespotlight.Nature.Retrievedfromhttp://www.nature.com/news/climate-report-puts-geoengineering-in-the-spotlight-1.13871.

5. Ibid.

6.

Whetherornottoincludecarboncaptureandstorageorweathermodificationundertherubricofgeoengineering,forexample,ishotlydisputed.Atthesametime,asgovernmentsandmultilateralorganisationsbegintoarticulatepositionsontechnologicaldevelopments,theyrequiremoreprecisedefinitions.Anyonewhohasparticipatedininternationalnegotiationsknowsthelongandtedioushoursspentwranglingoverdefinitionsthatcanhavefar-reachingconsequenceswhentheyareincorporatedintointernationallawormultilateralagreements.

7.

See,forexample,therecordofthedebate:Theregulationofgeoengineering.(18March2010).InUKHouseofCommons2010ScienceandTechnologyCommittee.Retrievedfromhttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/221/22105.htm.

8. Formore,seeFleming,J.R.(2010).FixingtheSky:Thecheckeredhistoryofweatherandclimatecontrol.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.

9.

Dunbar,B.(1February2005).What’sthedifferencebetweenweatherandclimate?Retrievedfromhttp://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/noaa-n/climate/climate_weather.html.Seealsomemorandumoncloudseeding:Lee,J.(18March2010).HouseofCommons–ScienceandTechnologyCommittee–Minutesofevidence.Retrieved fromhttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/221/10011310.htm.

10. Keith,D.(2010).Engineeringtheplanet,inClimateChangeScienceandPolicy.Washington,DC:IslandPress,p.294.

11.

AsilomarScientificOrganizingCommittee.(November2010).TheAsilomarConferenceRecommendationsonPrinciplesofResearchintoClimateEngineeringTechniques(report),p.28.Retrievedfromhttp://www.climateresponsefund.org/images/Conference/finalfinalreport.pdf.

12.

SeedocumentationrelatedtoanoceanfertilisationdeploymentoffthecoastofBritishColumbia:http://www.etcgroup.org/tags/hsrc-geoengineering-russ-george-haida-gwaii-ocean-fertilizationTheostensiblereasonfortheirondumpwastoincreasethesalmonpopulationforthefinancialbenefitofthelocalfishercommunity.

13.

Goodman,A.andGonzalez,J.(producers).(8July2010).Adebateongeoengineering:VandanaShivavs.GwynneDyer(televisionseriesepisode).DemocracyNow!NewYork.Retrievedfromhttp://www.democracynow.org/2010/7/8/a_debate_on_geoengineering_vandana_shiva.

14.

Terrafutura2013:InterviewwithVandanaShivaaboutgeoengineering(interviewbyM.HeibelandNoGeoingegneria).(9July2013).Retrievedfromhttp://www.nogeoingegneria.com/interviste/terra-futura-2013-interview-with-vandana-shiva-about-geoengineering/.

15.[UnitedStates]President’sScientificAdvisoryCommittee(PSAC).(1965).RestoringtheQualityofourEnvironment,EnvironmentalPollutionPanel,1965,pp.121–4.

16. Ibid.,p.127.

17. Fleming,J.R.(2010),p.27.

18.NationalScienceFoundation.(1965).ReportoftheSpecialCommissiononWe

atherModification,WeatherandClimateModification,pp.27,119.

19. Fleming,J.R.(2007).Theclimateengineers.WilsonQuarterly,Spring,pp.56–8.

20. Crutzen,P.J.(3January2002).Geologyofmankind.Nature,vol.415.

21. Hoffert,M.I.etal.(1November2002).Advancedtechnologypathstoglobalclimatestability:Energyforagreenhouseplanet.Science,298(5595),981–7.

22.GPSPodcast(20December2009),FareedZakariainterviewsNathanMyhrvold,(online).Retrievedfromhttp://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/podcasts/fareedzakaria/site/2009/12/20/gps.podcast.12.20.cnn.

23.

Forexample,JohnHoldren,USSeniorScienceAdvisor,quotedinBorenstein,S.(8April2009).Obamalooksatclimateengineering.AssociatedPress:‘[Geoengineering’s]gottobelookedat.Wedon’thavetheluxuryoftakinganyapproachoffthetable.’

24.

Liebelson,D.andMooney,C.(17July2013).ClimateIntelligenceAgency.Slate.Retrievedfromhttp://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/07/cia_funds_nas_study_into_geoengineering_and_climate_change.html. Formoredetails,seetheUSNationalAcademieswebsite:http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49540.

25.

Gingrich,N.(3June2008).Cangeoengineeringaddressconcernsaboutglobalwarming?.HumanEvents.Retrievedfrom:http://www.humanevents.com/2008/06/03/stop-the-green-pig-defeat-the-boxerwarnerlieberman-green-pork-bill-capping-american-jobs-and-trading-americas-future/.

26. Seehttp://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/fix-climate-climate-engineering.

27.

Gillis,J.(30April2012).Clouds’effectonclimatechangeislastbastionfordissenters.NewYorkTimes.Retrievedfromhttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/science/earth/clouds-effect-on-climate-change-is-last-bastion-for-dissenters.html?_r=0.

28.Parthasarathy,S.,Avery,C.,Hedberg,N.,Mannisto,J.andMaguire,M.(22September2010).Apublicgood?Geoengineeringandintellectualproperty.Science,TechnologyandPublicPolicyWorkingPaper,pp.10–11.

29.Jones,I.S.F.(2008).Methodforattractingandconcentratingfish,WorldIntellectualPropertyOrganization,WO2008131485A1(PatentApplication),claim1

5.

30.ThereareseveralexamplesprovidedinETCGroup’sGeopiracy:Thecaseagainstgeoengineering,2010,CommuniqueNo.103,pp.31–2.Retrievedfromwww.etcgroup.org/content/geopiracy-case-against-geoengineering.

31.

Mulkern,A.C.(18April2012).Researcher:Banpatentsongeoengineeringtechnology.ClimateWire,ScientificAmerican.Retrievedfromhttp://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=researcher-ban-patents-on-geoengineering-technology.

32. Hamilton,C.(2013).Earthmasters:Thedawnoftheageofclimateengineering.NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,p.120.

33. Marshall,M.(25August2012).LowestUScarbonemissionswon’tslowclimatechange.NewScientist.

34. Anon.(4November2010).Geoengineering:Lift-off.TheEconomist.Retrievedfromhttp://www.economist.com/node/17414216.

35. Thetextofthedecisionisavailableonline:http://www.cbd.int/climate/geoengineering/.

36.

Higuchi,T.(2010).AtmosphericnuclearweaponstestingandthedebateonriskknowledgeinColdWarAmerica,1945–1963,inMcNeill,R.andUnger,C.R.,eds.EnvironmentalHistoriesoftheColdWar.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.301–22.

37. ThePeoples’Agreementisavailableonline:http://pwccc.wordpress.com/support/.

38. ETCGroupisafoundingmemberoftheHOMEcampaign:www.handsoffmotherearth.org.

39.

For‘PlanB’,seeJohnShepherd,quotedinConnor,S.(2September2009).Man-madeeruptions–‘PlanB’inthebattlefortheplanet.TheIndependent.Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/manmade-eruptions-ndash-plan-b-in-the-battle-for-the-planet-1780268.html.

40.

For‘ClimateEmergency’,seeCaldeira,K.andKeith,D.W.(2010).Theneedforclimateengineeringresearch.IssuesinScienceandTechnology.Retrievedfromhttp://www.issues.org/27.1/caldeira.html.

Thetworeportsare:NationalAcademies.(2015).CommitteeonGeoengineeri

41.

ngClimate:TechnicalEvaluationandDiscussionofImpacts;BoardonAtmosphericSciencesandClimate;OceanStudiesBoard;DivisiononEarthandLifeStudies;NationalResearchCouncil,ClimateIntervention:ReflectingSunlighttoCoolEarth.Washington,DC:NationalAcademiesPress,and,bythesameauthors,ClimateIntervention:CarbonDioxideRemovalandReliableSequestration,also2015.Pre-publicationcopiesofbothreportsareavailableonline:http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18988/climate-intervention-reflecting-sunlight-to-cool-earth.ThereportcallsSRM‘albedomodification’.

42.

Pierrehumbert,R.T.(15February2015).Climatehackingisbarkingmad.Slate.Retrievedfromhttp://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2015/02/nrc_geoengineering_report_climate_hacking_is_dangerous_and_barking_mad.single.html.

43.

PlanB:JohnShepherd,quotedinConnor,S.(2009);InsurancePolicy:JohnShepherd,quotedinAlleyne,R.(1September2009).Geo-engineeringshouldbedevelopedasinsuranceagainstdangerousclimatechange.TheTelegraph.Retrievedfromhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/6122322/Geo-engineering-should-be-developed-as-insurance-against-dangerous-climate-change.html.

44.Dalby,S.(25October2013).Rethinkinggeopolitics:ClimatesecurityintheAnthropocene.GlobalPolicy.Retrievedfromhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12074/full.

45. Ibid.

46. Shepard,J.G.(9September2009).GeoengineeringtheClimate:Opportunitiesanduncertainties(report).NewportPagnell:TheRoyalSociety,p.52.

47. Forexample,DavidKeith’sappearanceonStephenColbert’slate-nighttalkshow,TheColbertReport,10December2013.

48.

Forexample,Keith,D.W.(2013).ACaseforClimateEngineering.Cambridge,MA:MITPress:‘Deploymentisneitherhardnorexpensive.’GeoengineeringboostersLeeLaneandEricBickellarguethat‘thepotentialbenefitof[solarradiationmanagement]issoobviousthatonehardlyneedsaformaleconomicassessmenttoprovethatresearchingitsmeritscouldpaylargedividends.’Nonetheless,they‘roughlyestimate’thatthebenefit-to-costratioofresearchingSRMtechnologiesis‘ontheorderof1000to1’:Lane,L.andBickel,E.(May2012).Climatechange:ClimateengineeringR&D[Challengepaper].InThirdCopenhagenConsensus:CopenhagenConsensusCenter,pp.2–3.Retrievedfromhttp://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/climatechangeengine

eringr26d.pdf.

49. TheOpenLetterisavailableonline:http://www.etcgroup.org/fr/node/5282.

50.

Jones,A.etal.(2013).Theimpactofabruptsuspensionofsolarradiationmanagement(terminationeffect)inexperimentG2oftheGeoengineeringModelIntercomparisonProject(GeoMIP).JournalofGeophysicalResearch:Atmospheres,118(17),9743–52.Retrievedfromdoi:10.1002/jgrd.50762.

51.

Stocker,T.F.etal.,eds.(2013).ClimateChange2013:ThePhysicalScienceBasis,WorkingGroupIContributiontotheFifthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,pp.632–4.Retrievedfromwww.climatechange2013.org/report/full-report/.

52. IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC).(2013),p.28.

53. Stocker,T.F.etal.,eds.(2013),p.633.

54. Ibid.,p.633.

55. Ibid.,p.552,emphasisadded.

56.

Stephens,J.C.(20December2013).Timetostopinvestingincarboncaptureandstorageandreducegovernmentsubsidiesoffossil-fuels.WileyInterdisciplinaryReviews(WIREs):ClimateChange.Retrievedfromhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wcc.266/full.

57. Fleming,J.R.(2010),pp.165–88.

7

GREENWASHINGDEATH:CLIMATECHANGEAND

THEARMSTRADE

MarkAkkerman

I think [climatechange] isa realopportunity for the [aerospaceanddefence]industry.

LordDrayson,thenUKMinisterofStateforScienceandInnovationandMinister

ofStateforStrategicDefenceAcquisitionReform,in20091

Introduction

‘The military takes on climate change deniers’, read a headline inBusinessWeek in October 2014. The article told of the US military’sunlikely confrontation with some of its most outspoken supporters,Republican representatives, over the issue of climate change. Withclimate-change admission seen as heresy by a Tea Party-dominatedRepublican party, even the military top brass have faced an uphillstruggle. InMay 2014, Republicans had passed an amendment to theannual National Defense Authorization Act forbidding the DefenseDepartmentfromspendingmoneyonanyclimate-relatedinitiatives–anaction denounced by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel as ‘ideology

gettinginthewayofsoundplanning’.2So, has the military all of a sudden turned into an unlikely

environmental campaign group? In recent years, the US military hascertainly emerged as themost unlikely ally of environmentalists. Notonlyisitcallingforpoliticalaction,butitisalsoapparentlywalkingthewalk,switchingtoalternativefuelsandlookingtoaddress the impactsofclimatechange.Butacloser lookshows that themotivationsof themilitarydiffergreatlyfromenvironmentalistsoreventhegeneralpublic.Themilitary’sprimarystrategic interest is lessaboutclimatechange

itselfandmoreabouttheadjacentproblemsofenergyscarcity,seekingto safeguard fuel transit routes and reducing the military’s oildependency.Second,itisalsolookingaheadtoprotectitsinfrastructureandmilitaryassetsfromclimateimpacts.Inotherwords,themilitaryislooking forways tokeep itself running,mainlyby trying to switch toalternative fuels. Its third focus is an attempt to identify perceivedsecurity threats caused by the impact of climate instability – fromincreased humanitarian disasters to the possible rise of conflict,migration and disruption – that the military believes it will need torespond to. Fourth, the military’s interest in the new field ofenvironmental security is strongly driven by commercial interests andthe defence industry, which has a very poor record on issues ofsustainabilityandthrivesonfuellinginsecurityratherthanresolvingit.Thischapterfocusesonthe intersectionsbetweenthemilitary,green

technologies and thedefence industry. I suggest that the ‘greening’ofthemilitary is actually a ‘greenwashing’ exercise; in otherwords, themilitaryspinspositivecommunicationabouttheenvironmentinordertoobscure poor environmental performance. Alternative fuels and other‘green’measuresnotonlyensurethatthemilitaryremainsoperational,they also create new markets for the defence industry. Thegreenwashingalsoprojectsthemilitaryasasuitablepartnerfortacklingclimate-change impacts, justifying an increased role and budgets.Altogether,theyservetocastanenvironmentallyfriendlyimageoveranotherwisetoxicbrandintheeyesofmuchofthepublic.

Themilitaryandalternativeenergy

Themost touted evidence of themilitary’s new-found commitment totheenvironmentis its increasinguseofalternativefuels.Traditionally,armiesareknownfortheirhigh-energyuse–especiallyfossilfuels.TheUSmilitaryspendsabout$22billionayearonenergyandistheworld’ssingle-largestuserofpetrol.3Militaryoperationsaccount for about80percentofthetotalUSfederalgovernment’senergyuse.4The dependency on oil causes problems in two ways. First, fuel

transported through war zones is vulnerable to attacks. Battlefieldexperiences in Afghanistan and Iraq caused military commanders tosoundthealarmaboutthehighnumberofcasualtiesconnectedtosuchattacks.TheUSDepartmentofDefenseOperationalEnergyStrategy:ImplementationPlan (2012)warns that ‘the security of energy supplyinfrastructure for critical missions at fixed installations is not alwaysrobust.’5Ontheotherhand,loomingenergyscarcityandvolatilityinoilprices

willmeanadrasticriseincostsforfossilfuels,atatimewhenmilitariesalready face ballooning budgets. This might cause new securityproblems around obtaining oil and protecting supply routes. DeputySecretary ofDefenseWilliamLynn said at a Pentagon briefing, ‘Ouradversariesare increasinglyemployingasymmetric tactics, andenergycanbeasofttarget.’Hementionedimprovisedexplosivedevice(IED)attacks on supply convoys in operational zones and cyber attacks onhomelandenergyinfrastructureasprimaryexamples.6‘The armed forces recognize that their dependence on energy is a

strategic and operational vulnerability that must be addressed’, wroteUKRearAdmiralNeilMorisetti,theUK’sclimateandenergysecurityenvoy, andAmandaDory,USDeputyAssistant Secretary ofDefensefor Strategy.7 The UKMinistry of Defence Climate Change Strategy2010takesthisissuefurther:‘Notonlydoesthereductionofemissionsacross all business areas reduce costs and our vulnerability to energy

price spikes, but reduction in fuel use at the front line has a directbenefitinreducingthelogisticalcostsandrisksofgettingittotheatre.’8AnditsSustainableDevelopmentStrategy(2011–30)listsasoneofitsobjectives:‘TohavesignificantlyreducedtheArmedForcesrelianceonfossilfuelstoprovideoperationalenergy,therebymitigatingoperationalandfinancialrisk’.9Theconcernisnotjustaboutsupplyroutesandfuelinsecuritybutalso

the challenges posed by global temperature increases. As onespokespersonfortheUKMinistryofDefenceputit:‘Onekeyconcernisensuringthatourequipmentisrobustenoughtodealwiththerangeoftemperatureextremes.Wenowdemandthiswhenplacingcontractswithindustry.’10Tad Davis, the US Army’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for

Environment,SafetyandOccupationalHealth,boasted,‘Inessence,theArmy is building green, buying green and going green.’11 Measurestakenor tobe takenby theUSmilitary include theuseof all kindofstand-alonesolar-andwind-powerequipmentonbases, theacquisitionofelectricvehicles,tentsthattrapwarmandcoolairandsolar-poweredwater-purificationsystems.All parts of the armed forces are involved. InAugust 2012, theUS

Armyopenedbids tobuy$7billion in renewableenergy fordomesticbases.12 Tests by theUSAir Force suggested that airplanes could flyfurtherwithlessfuelwhenusingagrofuels.13And inSeptember2014,the USDepartment of Defense awarded three companies contracts toconstruct and commission agro-refineries capable of producingagrofuelstomeetthetransportationneedsoftheNavy.14TheDepartmentofDefenseisrequiredtoproduceorprocure25per

centof its total facilityenergyuse fromrenewable sources from2025on.15However,itisquestionablewhetherthisgoalwillbereached.Themilitary failed tomeet thegoalof sourcingat least5percentof theirenergyconsumptionfromrenewablesin2012.16Themostambitiousplaninprogressmightbetheso-calledUS‘Great

GreenFleet’,whichwasexpectedtobeoperationalin2016.‘TheGreatGreen Fleet will signal to the world America’s continued navalsupremacy,unleashedfromthetetherofforeignoil,’wroteSecretaryoftheNavyRayMabus.17 TheGreatGreen Fleet ismade up of planes,submarinesandshipspoweredentirelybyagrofuelsandnuclearpower.A demonstration in 2012 showed off ships and aircraft powered bynuclearpoweroradvancedagrofuelblendsandusingenergy-efficiencymeasures,includingLEDs.18Whilethemilitaryispromotingnuclearpowerasmoresustainable,to

callit‘green’ishighlydubious,sincehugeamountsofenergy(mostlyfossil fuels) are needed in some parts of its generation process, apartfromtheunsolvableproblemsdealingwithnuclearwasteandthesafetyandhealthrisksinvolvedinthenuclearcycle.In theUK,where theMinistryofDefence is responsibleforabout1

per cent of the totalUKCO2 emissions (5.6megatonnes a year), thefocusliesonbuying‘equipmentandinfrastructurethatcanoperateinawide variety of climatic and environmental conditions, and to reduceour reliance on hydrocarbon fuels and other finite resources’.19 Oneexampleistheeffortto‘green’forwardoperatingbaseswiththeaimofmaking them self-sustainable, including installing solar panels onsmaller bases in southernAfghanistan.A number of contractorswereinvitedtoputforwardideasabouthowbasescouldswitchtoalternativeenergy sources, to ‘remove the logisticsburdenof transporting fuel tothebase’.20The US and the UK are regarded as forerunners in adapting their

militaries to climate change. Michael Brzoska, Professor of PoliticalScience at the University of Hamburg, concludes that, for example,‘Both the Russian and the Chinese military seem to have only paidminor attention to the consequencesof climate change for their futureactivities.’21Militaries in some other countries are trying to clean uptheir act. TheBundeswehr, for example, has reduced its emissions ofcarbondioxideby70percentsince1991,byswitchingtolesspolluting

fuels.22Italsoconductedabreakthroughstudyonoil,warning‘peakoilisunavoidable’andit’s‘necessaryandsensibletopreparefor’it.23Butin general, most efforts seem to be aimed at educating individualsoldiersaboutissuessuchasenergysavingandwasteseparation.USNavy Secretary RayMabus is honest about the real purpose of

‘greening’themilitary:‘WearemovingtowardalternativefuelsintheNavy andMarine Corps for onemain reason, and that is tomake usbetter fighters.’24 Lower carbon emissions are only ‘a byproduct’,according toMabus; somuchabyproduct that theUSevenexemptedUSmilitaryoperationsfromthe1998KyotoAgreement,whichlaysoutbindingcommitmentstoreduce‘greenhouse-gas’emissions.

Greenwashingandthemilitary:Fossil-fuelnexus

What the turn to alternative energies obscures is how entwined themilitary is with the fossil-fuel industry. Not only is the military thelargestsingleuseroffossilfuels,itsprimarypurposeinrecentdecadeshas been to secure the supply and transport of fossil fuels – and to alesser extent ensure the smooth operation of a consumer-based, high-carbon-emittingglobalisedeconomy.Thisalsoputs the ‘green’effortsof themilitary in perspective asmore propaganda than a real change,because ‘energy security emerges as the primary focus for innovationandinvestment tocombatgeopoliticalconcernsaroundtherelianceonforeignoilandthethreattomilitarypersonnelinthefield.’25Itisthetoxicmilitary-oilnexusthathasturnedtheMiddleEastintoa

cauldronofconflict,andwhichgovernsmilitaryinterventionandrisingtension (and subsequent booming arms sales) in every corner of theglobe. It is a nexus that completely overrides ethical or human rightsconsiderations–letaloneconcernforenvironmentalsustainability.FortheUS,theMiddleEasthastraditionallybeenthemostimportant

regionforoilsupplies.Sincethe1960s,thishasculminatedinconstant

intervention to control resources, support of autocratic regimes (forexample,SaudiArabiaandIraqinthe1980s)–includingasteadyflowof arms deliveries, and a largemilitary presence in the region. In his1980 State of the Union address, then-president Jimmy Carterproclaimed his so-called Carter Doctrine with the words: ‘Let ourposition be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gaincontrolofthePersianGulfregionwillberegardedasanassaultonthevitalinterestsoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,andsuchanassaultwillberepelledbyanymeansnecessary,includingmilitaryforce.’26Inlinewiththis,thewarsagainstIraqinthe1990sandthe2000shave

been,toanarguableextent,motivatedbyoildependency.In recent times, the central role of the Middle East for US energy

securityhasbeensomewhat indeclineandthefocushasspreadout toinclude other regions. Newly discovered oil reserves have turned theattentionoftheUS,aswellasotherplayerssuchasRussia,CanadaandNorway,totheArctic.Obama’s‘PivottoAsia’alsohasalottodowithkeeping open oil-supply routes. The same goes for international anti-piracymissions,whichconcealacompetition–mainlybetweentheUSandChina–forcontroloversupplylines.Chinais justas implicated.ThroughoutLatinAmericaandAfrica, it

provides arms-for-oil exports. China came heavily under fire for itsarmsexportstoSudanduringtheDarfurwar,accompaniedastheywerebyrapidlygrowingSudaneseoilexports toChina.Chinabuilt similar,thoughlessovert,relationsbasedonoilandarmswithVenezuela.TheVenezuelan government used weapons purchased in China inconfrontationswithstreetprotestersinearly2014.27Britain’s largest ever arms deal also uses oil as currency. The so-

called‘Al-Yamamaharmsdeal’,agreedin1985,isastill-ongoingseriesof arms sales from the UK to the autocratic regime of Saudi Arabia,largely consisting of aircraft and missiles. In turn, Saudi Arabia hasdelivered up to 600,000 barrels of crude oil per day to the Britishgovernment.28 The UK’s main contractor, BAE Systems, has earnedtensofbillionsofpoundsfromthesesales,whichhelpstosubsidisethe

UK’sownarmspurchases.Thedealhasbeensurroundedbyallegationsof fraud,with theUKSerious FraudOffice controversially ending itsinvestigationintothis,citing‘thepublicinterest’asthereason.29France,foritspart,started‘oilforarms’dealsinthe1970s,inabidto

finance its rapidly growing dependence on oil imports. This includedsubstantial arms dealswith SaudiArabia andAbuDhabi. Evenwhentherewasn’tadirectexchangeofoilforarms,Frencharmssaleshavepaid for a substantial percentage of its oil imports. There is a highcorrelation in the countries concerned between arms exports and oilimports:ImportantoilsupplierssuchasNigeria,IraqandSaudiArabiaarealsoimportantclientsoftheFrenchmilitaryindustry.Themostwell-knownprolongedinternalconflictthatcentresonoilis

probably the conflict in the Niger Delta in Nigeria. In May 2011,HumanRightsWatch (HRW)wrote, ‘The ruling elite has squanderedandsiphonedoffthenation’stremendousoilrevenues,whileneglectingbasic health and education services for the vast majority of ordinarycitizens.’30 While calling on Nigeria’s then-president GoodluckJonathantotakeaction,HRWdeclared,‘Governmentsecurityforcesarewidelyimplicatedinseriousabuses,includingextrajudicialkillingsandtorture.’31Allthisdidn’tstopDutchcompanyTPMarinefrombuildingaclose

relationshipwiththeNigerianNavy,includingthe2009saleoftwentyhigh-speed troop-carryingcatamarans for€4.8million.SecurityexpertDaniel Volmanwrote that the catamaranswere acquired to ‘transportsoldiers up the creeks and small rivers of the Delta region’.32 Inresponsetoparliamentaryquestions,theDutchgovernmentshamelesslynamed theprotectionof the interestsofShell inNigeria asoneof themainreasonsforallowingthecontroversialexport.33

Greenbullets

Themilitary’ssupposedenvironmentalconcernshavequicklyextendedinto the arms industry – where its absurdity has become ever moreapparent. In 2006, BAE Systems was one of the first major arms-producing companies to promote a whole new series of‘environmentally friendly weapons’, including reduced-lead bullets,rockets with fewer toxins and armoured vehicles with lower carbonemissions.TheBAEspokespersonsaid:‘Weaponsaregoingtobeusedandwhentheyare,wetrytomakethemassafefortheuseraspossible,to limit thecollateraldamageandto impactas littleaspossibleontheenvironment.’34A response from Symon Hill from Campaign Against Arms Trade

(CAAT) expressed the scorn of many: ‘BAE is determined to try tomakeitself lookethical,buttheymakeweaponstokillpeopleandit’sutterlyridiculoustosuggesttheyareenvironmentallyfriendly.’35Nevertheless, other companies followed the lead ofBAE,mostly in

theareaofalternative-fueluse.Boeingdevelopedanagrofuel-poweredfighter jet, the ‘Green Hornet’, first tested by the US Navy in April2010.GeneralDynamics isdevelopinga ‘green’ jetenginefor theUSAirForce.36Raytheon ispartneringwithCyclonePowerTechnologiesin thedevelopment of an all-fuel engine,which can runon algae fuelandwasteoilandwillhave lowercarbonemissions.AndEADS(nowcalledAirbusGroup)modified aDiamondAircraftDA42Twin to flyonpurealgaefuel.37In general, the burgeoning American agrofuels industry is very

dependent on military demand: ‘… the value chain of the nascentbiofuelsindustryinresponseto…militarytargetswillcreatethousandsof jobs and billions of dollars in new revenue, especially in states orregionswith biorefineries.’38 And themilitary is a willing partner: in2010, theUSDepartmentofDefense’sDefenseLogisticsAgencyandtheUSDepartment ofAgriculture signed a strategic alliancewith thegoalofcreating‘ademandsignalforthebiofuelsindustry,forventurecapital,forallthosepeoplestandingupforthebiofuelindustry’.39

The green arms race is also on in the sector of unmanned aerialvehicles(UAVs),ordrones,withtheideaofdevelopingdronesthatcanusesolarpowerorotheralternativefuels,inordertostayintheairforextendedperiods.In2010,Boeingwona$89millioncontractfromthePentagontodeveloptheso-called‘SolarEagle’drone,withQinetiQandtheCentreforAdvancedElectricalDrivesfromNewcastleUniversityinthe UK to build the actual plane.40 India’s Defence Research andDevelopment Organisation is also planning to develop solar-poweredUAVs,forusebytheIndianarmedforcesandparamilitariesoncounter-insurgencymissions.41There isevennowagreenerwaytodieat thehandsofasoldier. In

2003,theUSDepartmentofDefenseawardedAlliantTechsystemsa$5million contract to develop lead-free combat bullets. US ArmyspokespersonBobDiMichele said, ‘Wewant [Alliant] to developonelead-freebulletthatwillworkallthetime.Onethatcankillyouorthatyoucanshootatargetwithandthat’snotanenvironmentalhazard.Weare talking about green ammunition for pistols, rifles and machineguns.’42SincethentheUSArmyhasadoptedthesenewbulletswithacopper

coreinsteadofaleadoneasitsstandardcombatammunition.Despiteitsabsurdity,thepenchantforgreeningallsectorsofeconomy

isstillhardtoresistforpoliticiansandbusinesspeople.In1999,thelateDutchGreenLeftMPAbHarrewijnaskedtheMinistryofDefencetodosomecalculationsonthepossibilityofequippingbattletankswithsolarpanels.Itturnedoutthatthiscouldbedone–withasolarpanelaslargeas two soccer fields. According to then-Defence Minister De Grave,‘because of practical and tactical considerations, there remained apreferencefortheuseoffossilfuels.’43

Greenwashingthemilitary-industrialcomplex

Explaining the military embrace of all things green also requires anunderstandingofthepurposeofthemilitary-industrialcomplexandhowit has successfully adapted itself to new challenges and situations andcontinued to grow – despite the end of the Cold War and the clearfailureofmilitaryinterventionsinAfghanistanandIraq.Theterm‘military-industrialcomplex’describes

…coalitionsofvested interestswithin the state and industry,whichcould lead todecisionsbeingmadewhichwere in the interestof thecoalition members and not necessarily in the interests of nationalsecurity.Thesecoalitionscould includesomemembersof thearmedservices,oftheciviliandefencebureaucracy,ofthelegislature,ofthearmsmanufacturersandoftheirworkers.44

The military-industrial complex revolves around the often-closerelationships between the military and government in general on oneside, and (large) military producers on the other side. The term wasfamously used byUS President Eisenhower in his farewell speech in1961, inwhichhewarnedof thegrowing influenceof thecomplex inpromotingandshapingcertainpolicies.Militarythinkingcentresontheuseofforceorthethreatoftheuseof

forceasa‘deterrence’todefendsomethingortoattaincertaingoals.Tobe able to reach those goals, one needs to havemore power than theenemy.Moreover, the ability to use external and internal force is thebasis of the modern state; it guarantees the continuing of the currentorderandofthepoweroftheelites.PresidentObamastateditthiswayinMay2014,sayingthattheUSshouldalwaysleadontheworldstage,explaining:‘Themilitary...is,andalwayswillbe,thebackboneofthatleadership.’45Apart frommanpower and the capacity to form coalitions, military

power is largelybasedon theweaponsarsenalastatehas, in termsofnumbers and how advanced the equipment is. This iswhere the armsindustrystepsin.Inordertomakeeverincreasingprofits,thisindustry

needs to sell as many weapons as possible. In 2014, world militaryspendingreachedthedizzyingheightsof$1,776billion,orabout2.3percentoftheglobalGDP.TheUSaloneisresponsiblefor$610billionofthis–athirdoftotalworldmilitaryspending.46Thisseeminglyunstoppableraceispartlyspurredbythenotionthata

country needs to have more and better equipment than its potentialenemies (suchaswe saw in theUS–USSRarms raceduring theColdWar), but it is alsodrivenby the international arms trade,whichovertheyearshasbecomemoreandmoreasupply-drivenmarket.Thearmsindustry offers so-called ‘solutions’ for threats nations haven’t evenidentifiedorupuntilnowhaven’tregardedassecurity-relatedproblems.Tofendoff talkof thepeacedividendafter theBerlinWall fell, the

military-industrial complex first turned to the idea of humanitarianinterventionism, and then through the War on Terror justified aperpetual military campaign. Rising tensions between the NATOalliance and Russia, and growing unrest in the Middle East, haveresultedincallsformoredefencespendingwithinNATO.Theimpactoftheseinterventionsandothermilitaryoperationscaused

immensehumansuffering,largenumbersofrefugeesandenvironmentaldestruction; yet, sadly, this is exactly what is needed to keep themilitary-industrial complex –which feeds onwar and chaos – going,andevenbroaden its scopeofwork intonewareas.BritisharmsgiantBAESystemswassurprisinglyopenaboutthisinitsAnnualReportin2005: ‘New threats and conflict arenas are placing unprecedenteddemands on military forces and presenting BAE Systems with newchallengesandopportunities.’47Themilitarythrivesoninsecurityandperceptionsofinsecurity–and

climate change and its consequences fit perfectly into thispattern.USSecretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, in a speech in November 2013,listed as possible security-related consequences, ‘Food and watershortages,pandemicdisease,disputesoverrefugeesandresources,moresevere natural disasters’.48 The Department of Defense furtherelaborated upon these threats in its October 2014 ‘Climate Change

AdaptationRoadmap’,whichfocusesonadaptationandmitigation.49Themilitary is already being called uponmore often to respond to

disasters–whicharelikelytoincreaseinmagnitudeandregularityasaresultofclimatechange. InMarch2014,AdmiralSamuelJ.Locklear,thencommanderofUSPacificCommand(PACOM),notedthat:

If you look atmyAOR [areaof responsibility] this year howmanypeoplelosttheirlivesorgothurtbyanyevent,itwasn’tthroughanykindofmilitaryactivity,itwasthroughnaturaldisaster…Imean,ifthere’sonethingItelleverybodythatcomestoworkforme–everycommander–Isaid‘Whileyou’rehere,youmaynothaveaconflictwith another military, but you will have a natural disaster that youhavetoeitherassistin,orbepreparedtomanagetheconsequencesontheotherside.Andthathasbeentrueeveryyear.’50

The arms industry is, not surprisingly, keen to promote itself asproviding the solutions to deal with these consequences. In anadvertorial,AirbusMilitary,partoftheAirbusGroup(formerlyknownasEADS),promotes itsversatilemilitaryaircraft, claiming that itwillbring ‘hope for 375 million people worldwide’, who need urgent aidbecause of human conflict, natural disasters or ‘unstable borders’.51TheyrefertoareportbyOxfamthatindicatesthatby2015,onaverage375millionpeopleayearwillbeaffectedbyclimaticdisasters.52Thisdoes not suggest thatOxfam endorses governments to spendmore onthe military; however, Airbus sees no obstacle in abusing Oxfam’sreporttoportrayitselfwithahumanitarianface.Another area that has prompted increased military involvement has

been border security, which has become more and more militarised,leadingtoaboominprofitsforthesecurityindustry(seeChapter5).AsresearcherEmilyGilbertwrites,‘Militarismencouragestheuseofforceagainst foreigners,withbarrierserected toexclude thosewhobear theimmediate impactofclimatechange,even though theyareusually theleastresponsibleforclimatechange.’53

Anticipatednewmarkets related toclimatechangearecausingsomeexcitement in the defence industry. In 2011, the second EnergyEnvironmentalDefenceandSecurity(E2DS)conferenceinWashington,DC,was certainly jubilant about the potential business opportunity ofexpandingthedefenceindustryintoenvironmentalmarkets:

The defence market worldwide is worth a trillion dollars annually.Theenergyandenvironmentalmarketisworthatleasteighttimesthisamount. The former is set to contract as governments address theeconomic realities of the coming decade; the latter is set to expandexponentially, especially in the renewables arena. Far from beingexcluded from this opportunity, the aerospace, defence and securitysector is gearing up to address what looks set to become its mostsignificant adjacent market since the strong emergence of thecivil/homelandsecuritybusinessalmostadecadeago.54

This conference was followed by another one, called E3DS, inNovember 2012 in London, with speakers from the arms industry,severalmilitaries andNATO.The conferencewas sponsored by largearms-producingcompanies,suchasRaytheon,LockheedMartin,Saab,Finmeccanica, EADS, Thales and Northrop Grumman. LockheedMartin trumpeted its expansion into the alternative-energy market,providingenergy-efficiencyprogrammesanddevelopingocean-thermalandsolarplants.Perhapsthemostpromisingnewmarketfordefencecompaniesliesin

satellite observations, monitoring, data collecting and analysis. Oneexample of this is the European initiative Global Monitoring forEnvironmentandSecurity (GMES), renamedCopernicus inDecember2012.55Thissatellitesystemwassetupin1998tomonitortheearthandprovidedataforpreparinglegislationonenvironmentalmatters.Shortlythereafter(1999),itsmissionbroadenedtoincludesecurityissues,suchas maritime surveillance and border control. This clearly shows howcertaintechnology,usedinitiallyforcivilianpurposes,cansoontakeon

astrongsecurityandmilitaristictone.Thisisnottodiscountthatsomehigh-techandotherinventionsbythe

defence industry may be useful to address some aspects of climatechangeand itsconsequences,particularly if the researchandskillsaretransferred to civilian use (see accompanying online chapter byWainwright and Cock56). Many high-skilled workers in the armsindustrycoulddeploymanyoftheirskillsinthegreensector;similarlygovernment-supported arms-conversion plans could boost investmentsinrenewableenergy.57However, this shouldnotdistract attentionand resourcesaway from

the real solution toworseningclimate change: a radical change inourcarbon and globalised economy. Nor should it hide the fact that themilitary has more potential to thrive from our failure to do this thanfrom our success. According to journalist David Cronin, the defenceindustry ‘could be one of the few beneficiaries from ecologicalcatastrophes’ by ‘turning an environmental question into a securityissue’andbepropelledbytheimpactsof‘globalwarmingexpectedtoincreasecompetitionbetweennationsoverenergysources’.58AuthorDavidSirotaadds:

… the military’s message is designed to have us believe that thePentagon can somehow continue the energy-expensiveenvironmentally destructive policy of permanent war whileconserving energy. It’s as fantastical a notion as an oil companysayingitaimstohelpreducecarbonemissionsbyproducingmoreoil,butthepropagandahasagoal:makingwarthatmuchmoreacceptabletoafrugalpublic.59

Strangebedcompanions?Environmentalists,themilitaryandthearmsindustry

While themilitary ismostly clear that security-relatedmatters –withsome greenwashing efforts on the side – drive its transition tosustainableenergy,somepartsoftheenvironmentalistmovementnonethe less embrace it as a forerunner in the struggle against climatechange.Curiousasthismayseem,theyapparentlyareeitherfooledbythe military’s ‘green’ propaganda or feel that having the military ontheir sidemay be one of the fewways to swing reluctant or resistantconservativesintoembracingclimateaction,particularlyintheUS.Itisalso a result of a tunnel vision amongst some environmentalists thatfocuses on certain aspects of environmentalism (mainly natureconservation)withoutkeeping thebroaderenvironmentaland/or socialcontexts in sight. In some cases, it is sadly fuelled by the expectationthattheirenvironmentalcharitymightevengainfromsuchalliancesinterms of both funding and profile.Whatever the reason, it has led tosomeunlikelyandmorallydubiousalliances.As early as 1993, retired General Schwarzkopf joined the national

board of The Nature Conservancy, the largest US environmentalorganisation, saying: ‘Anyone who doesn’t think the military isenvironmentally involved doesn’t know the military.’60 His statementfocusedonlandscapemaintenanceonmilitarybasesandpracticeareas,ignoring the enormous environmental damage caused by themilitary.TheNatureConservancystillliststheDepartmentofDefenseasoneofits‘PartnersinConservation’.TheNationalResourcesDefenseCouncil(NRDC)isalso‘partnering

withtheDepartmentofDefensetohelpexpedite thesitingprocessforrenewableenergyprojectsnearDOD[DepartmentofDefense]facilitiesand ensure that both environmental and military considerations aretaken into account’.61 ExecutiveDirector Peter Lehner knows exactlywhy the military is going ‘green’: ‘The military services know theymustembracecleanenergy–notbecauseitiscutting-edgeorpoliticallycorrect but because it makes sense for our troops and our country’ssecurity.’62ItraisesseriousquestionswhyanNGOdescribingitselfasagrassrootsenvironmentalactiongroupwitha‘purposetosafeguardthe

earth’ thinks along with the militarist mindset of one of the majorpollutersintheworld.Conservation International goes further, embracing many arms

industries– includinghighlycontroversialonessuchasdefencegiantsNorthropGrumman andUnitedTechnologies – in greenwashing theirimage.JohnStauberfromtheCenterforMediaandDemocracyargues,‘Itis

obsceneforanyonetolaudthemilitaryforbeinggreen.TheUSmilitarypossessesthousandsofnuclearbombsandpridesitselfonobeyinganyorder to use them. It is stupid to greenwash history’smost lethal anddestructiveorganization.’63Friends of the Earth Brisbane, which protested a US-Australian

military exercise in 2010, also denounced the greenwashing of themilitary: ‘… despite the greenwashing, the U.S. and Australianmilitaries are not clean and green. They leave a legacy of toxicmunitionspollution,physicaldamagetothelandscape,floraandfauna,and frequently impingeupon the human rights of thosewho live neartheiroperationalareas.’64Not all greenwash attempts go smoothly. The announcement of a

partnershiptoworkonclean-energyprojectswithLockheedMartinbytheUScityofBurlington,Vermont,causedanuproaramongstthelargeenvironmentalist and peace community, culminating in LockheedMartin pulling out of the partnership agreement. A video by twojournalists using a hidden camera that showed ConservationInternational employeeswillingly supporting the ideaofgreenwashinghorrificweaponry by LockheedMartin similarly cast a bad light (seeBox7.1).

Fightback

Therearenomilitarystrategiesthatfocusontherootcausesofclimatechangeandwhatshouldbedonetochangethese,becausethemilitary’s

primary objective is to secure the currentworld order, nomatter howunjust or unsustainable it is. Themilitary’s only goal is to adapt to achangingsecuritysituation,withtheaimofmaintainingitsownpowerandinfluenceaswellasdefendingtheinterestsofthosewhohavebeenthe main actors causing the climate crisis. As a consequence, themilitary,defenceandsecurityindustries,ratherthanbeingasolutiontoclimatechange,arepartoftheproblem.Itisthedominanceofmilitarypoweronourplanetthatbolstersasystematicfailuretotackletherootcausesofclimatechange.

Box7.1ConservationInternationalandLockheedMartin

When two journalists from the British magazine Don’t Panic approachedConservationInternational,posingasrepresentativesofLockheedMartin–andsecretly filmed the encounter – the environmental organisation gladly offeredthecompanywaystopolishupitsgreenimage,includingassistingitsgreenPRefforts and associating it with conservation activities – all in return for largesponsorshipfees.WhilethefakeLockheedMartinrepresentativesmadeitveryclear

that they were only interested in a greener image, ConservationInternationaldidn’tquestiontheirdisastrousactivitiesatall.HeydonProwsefromDon’tPanicrecounted,‘Wetoldthemthatoneofourkey environmental strategies was to recycle bomb shrapnel frombattlezonestouseagaininnewbombsandthatwewereadaptingourclusterbombtechnologytodropseedssoastore-forestremoteregions.Wewaitedforthemtobeoutraged…theyneverwere.’65Instead of at least pushing LockheedMartin to clean up its act,

Conservation Internationalmerely suggested the company becomepartof itsBusiness&SustainabilityCouncil,where for$37,500ayear it could join companies such as Shell,Monsanto and fellowarmsproducerNorthropGrumman.OthersuggestionsforLockheedMartin included buying a forest inMozambique and adopting theendangeredMiddleEastvultureasamascot.

Absurd as this all may seem, according to former ConservationInternational media manager Christine MacDonald, it is commonpractice: ‘I found it rather odd that the filmmakers presented theidea of C.I. taking money from Lockheed Martin as utterlyshocking. The Nature Conservancy, after all, has already takenmoney from Lockheed. And C.I. has funding ties to B-2 bombermaker,NorthropGrumman.’66

It is therefore critical that environmental, peace and internationaljusticeactivistsjoinforcestochallengethisproblematthecrossroadsoftheirdistinctareasofwork.Thefirststepistodevelopacommonvisionofhow tounmask the so-called ‘green’ efforts of themilitary and thearmstradeandtostrategiseonhowtocommunicatethistothebroaderpublic.Mostcampaignsagainstcertainaspectsofthearmstradetendtofocus

oneitherso-called‘controversial’weapons,suchaslandmines,clusterbombs, or nuclear weapons, or arms sales to areas of conflict,developing countries, or regimes known for human rights abuses. Inthose cases, the urgency of action is clear, with images of theconsequencesofarmsexportsclearlyvisible.Thewaysarmscompaniesprofitfromclimatechangearemoreinsidious,withlong-lastingeffects,andtheycannotbepinpointedtoacertainpointintimeorrelatedtoaspecific weapon or arms deal. Nevertheless, the process needs to beunveiled.Thesecondstepistomobilisebroadsupporttofightclimatechange,

militarism and the arms trade. This support should be translated intoaction thatbuilds theneededpressureongovernmentsandcompanies.Howthiscanbestbedonediffersgreatlyfromcountrytocountry,butamix of activities aimed at informing the public, broadening publicsupport and engaging in radical but nonviolent direct action againststrategictargetshasthegreatestchanceofsuccess.There are some examples of crossover activism, such as the above-

mentioned successful joint effort by environmentalists and peaceactivists to get LockheedMartin out of a partnershipwith the city ofBurlington.In2014,theUK’sCampaignAgainstArmsTrade(CAAT)launched a call for trade unionists to get involved in its ‘Arms toRenewables’campaign,67stating:

Large scalemilitary procurement and arms exports only reinforce amilitaristicapproachtointernationalproblems.Realsecurityrequirestackling the negative effects of climate change, with its associatedfoodandwater shortages,aswellasdevelopinga reliableandcleanenergysupply…armstrademakestheworldamoredangerousplace,whereas renewable energy is vital for a fairer, saferworld. Shiftingresourceswouldhelptackleproblemsratherthancreatethem.68

To counter trade unions’ fears of losing jobs, CAAT argues thatgovernment needs to shift financial support to the renewable energyindustry:‘Manyoftheworkers[inthearmsindustry]arehighlyskilledengineers. These aremuch needed to tackle problems such as climatechange.’69Such initiativesare rare,however.Manyactivists tend to focusvery

muchontheirownparticularissue, leavinglittletimeandresourcestoconnectwithothermovements.Yetstrengtheningeachother’sstrugglesinabroadercontextwillgivemorepowertoeachmovement.Andwehavenochoicebuttobuildastrongercounterpowerinordertoconfrontandovercomethetremendouspowerofthemilitary-industrialcomplexanditsdevastatingeffectontheearthandhumanity.

Notes

1. Cook,N.(2009).Engagingthechallengesahead,E2DI.TheJournal,Dynamixx,2(Autumn/Winter).

Hertsgaard,M.(23October2014).Themilitarytakesonclimatechangedenier

2. s.Businessweek.Retrievedfromhttp://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-10-23/the-military-takes-on-climate-change-deniers.

3.

Bennet,J.R.(14February2011).Themeangreenmilitarymachine,ISNInsights;USDepartmentofDefense.(April2013).DefenseBudgetPrioritiesandChoices–Fiscalyear2014.Retrievedfromwww.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id….

4. Peck,L.(8December2010).NewmissionforU.S.military:breakingitsdependenceonoil.YaleEnvironment,360.

5.USDepartmentofDefense.(2-12).OperationalEnergyStrategy:ImplementationPlan,March2012.Retrievedfromhttp://energy.defense.gov/Portals/25/Documents/Reports/20120306_OE_Strategy_Implementation_Plan.pdf.

6. WilliamJ.Lynn,RemarksattheDepartmentofDefenseOperationalEnergyStrategyRollout,PentagonBriefingRoom,14June2011.

7. Morisetti,UKRearAdm.N.andDory,A.(29March2010).Theclimatevariable:worldmilitariesgrapplewithnewsecuritycalculus.DefenseNews.

8. UKMinistryofDefence.(April2010).MODClimateChangeStrategy2010.

9. UKMinistryofDefence.(1May2011).SustainableDevelopmentStrategy:Asub-strategyoftheStrategyforDefence(2011–2030).

10. Moss,T.(22April2009).Climateofwar.Jane’sDefenceWeekly.

11. Sheftick,G.(4June2010).Armybuilding,buying,going‘green’.Retrievedfromhttp://www.army.mil/article/40399/.

12. Brewin,B.(7August2012).Armykicksoff$7billionrenewableenergyprocurement.Nextgov.com.

13. Lane,J.(13April2014).Canwarplanesflyfarther,carrymoreweapons,withadvancedagrofuels?Morenewdata.AgrofuelsDigest.

14.USDepartmentoftheNavy.(19September2014).DepartmentsoftheNavy,EnergyandAgricultureinvestinconstructionofthreebiorefineriestoproducedrop-inagrofuelformilitary[pressrelease].

15.USDepartmentofDefense.10USC2911:EnergyperformancegoalsandmasterplanfortheDepartmentofDefense.Retrievedfromuscode.house.gov/quicksearch/get.plx?title=10&section=2911.

Danko,P.(27June2013).USmilitaryfacestrioofrenewableenergygoals.Ea

16. rthTechling.

17. Mabus,R.(2012).SeekingalternativeenergysourceskeytoNavymission.Currents:theNavy’senergy&environmentalmagazine,Summer.

18. http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/energy/great-green-fleet/.

19. MinistryofDefence,MODClimateChangeStrategy2010,April2010.

20. Marsden,S.(6February2011).Greenenergyplanatmilitarybases.TheIndependent.

21. Brzoska,M.(16March2012).Climatechangeandthemilitary.E-InternationalRelations.

22. Bundeswehr.(31July2014).BundeswehrundUmweltschutz–dieunbekanntePartnerschaft.

23.

BundeswehrTransformationCentre–FutureAnalysisBranch.(2010).ArmedForces,CapabilitiesandTechnologiesinthe21stCentury:Environmentaldimensionsofsecurity–Sub-study1:PeakOil–Securitypolicyimplicationsofscarceresources,November.

24. RayMabus,Remarks,CenterforNationalPolicy,Washington,DC,12May2010.

25. Gilbert,E.(2012).Themilitarizationofclimatechange.ACME:AnInternationalE-JournalforCriticalGeographies,11(1).

26. JimmyCarter,TheStateoftheUnionaddressdeliveredbeforeaJointSessionoftheCongress,23January1980.

27. FisherJr.,R.D.(27February2014).Chinesesystemsget‘combatexperience’inVenezuela.Jane’sDefenceWeekly.

28. BBCNews.(25February1999).ArmssalesfuelBAe’sprofits.

29.Vranckx,A.,ed.(2010).RhetoricorRestraint?:TradeinmilitaryequipmentundertheEUtransfercontrolsystem–AReporttotheEUPresidency,Ghent:AcademiaPress,November.

30. HumanRightsWatch.(28May2011).Nigeria:presidentshouldmakerightsapriority[pressrelease].

31.BBCNews.(23October2012).StolenNigerianoil‘goestoBalkansandSinga

pore’.

32. Volman,D.(13September2009).Nigeria:govtgearsupforanotheroffensiveintheDelta.InterPressService.

33. TweedeKamer(25January2010).Wapenexportbeleid–lijstvanvragenenantwoorden,22054–no.157.

34. Haines,L.(18September2006).Armsmanufacturerloadslead-freebullets.TheRegister.

35. Ungoed-Thomas,J.(17September2006).Watchout,sarge!:it’senvironmentallyfriendlyfire.SundayTimes.

36. Vogelaar,R.(23April2010).USNavytestsbiofuel-powered‘GreenHornet’.Aviationnews.eu.

37. Pew,G.(9June2010).EADS:algae-fueledDA42a‘world’sfirst’(andbetter).AVweb.

38.EnvironmentalEntrepreneurs(E2).(10November2012).Theeconomicbenefitsofmilitaryagrofuelprograms;Woody,T.(24September2012).TheU.S.military’sgreatgreengamblespursagrofuelstartups.Forbes.

39. AgrofuelsDigest.(16December2010).Militarysignalsadvancedagrofuelsdemand:336milliongallonsperyearby2020.

40.QinetiQandtheCentreforAdvancedElectricalDriveswereearlier‘successful’incollaboratingontheZephyr,theUAVwiththelongestunmannedaerialflighttodate(336hours).

41. DefenceNow.(24August2011).DRDOtodevelopsolar-powereddronesforarmedforces.

42. Buncombe,A.(5September2009).Pentagonspendsmillionsseekingenvironmentallyfriendlybullets.TheIndependent.

43. TweedeKamer(15November1999).Verslaghoudendeeenlijstvanvragenenantwoorden,26800X–no.12.

44. Dunne,J.P.andSköns,E.(2010).Themilitaryindustrialcomplex,inTan,A.,ed.TheGlobalArmsTrade.LondonandNewYork:Routledge.

45. TheWhiteHouse,RemarksbythePresidentattheUnitedStatesMilitaryAcademyCommencementCeremony,WestPoint,NewYork,28May2014.

46. Perlo-Freeman,S.,Wezeman,S.,Weizman,P.andFleurant,A.(13April2015).Trendsinworldmilitaryexpenditure[factsheet].Retrievedfromhttp://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1504.pdf.

47. BAESystems.AnnualReport2005:Deliveringrealadvantage.Retrievedfrominvestors.baesystems.com/~/media/Files/B/BAE-Systems…/ar-2005.pdf.

48. Parrish,K.(22November2013).HagelannouncesDOD’sArcticstrategy.AmericanForcesPressService.

49.USDepartmentofDefense.(2014).2014ClimateChangeAdaptationRoadmap[report].Retrievedfromdoi:http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/CCARprint_wForeword_c.pdf.

50. DiscussionatAtlanticCouncil’sBrentScowcroftCenteronInternationalSecurity,6March2014:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V0y83FE_cJc.

51. Slijper,F.(4April2011).AirbusmilitarymanipulatesOxfamfiguretobolsterarmsales.CampagnetegenWapenhandel.

52. Oxfam.(2009).TheRighttoSurvive–Thehumanitarianchallengeforthetwenty-firstcentury,April.

53. Gilbert,E.(2012).

54. http://home.janes.com/events/conferences/e2ds2011/.

55. http://www.un-spider.org/about-us/news/en/6357/2013-01-08t075900/gmes-renamed-copernicus.

56. Seewww.climatesecurityagenda.org.

57. Schofield,S.(2008).Makingarms,wastingskills:alternativestomilitarismandarmsproduction,CampaignAgainstArmsTrade,April.

58. Cronin,D.(16February2010).Armslobbylicksitslipsoverclimatechange.TheSamosa.

59. Sirota,D.(23May2011).ThePentagon’sattempttogreenwashthemilitary.Salon.

60. Loughlin,S.(12April1993).Environmentalistsfindallyinmilitary.TimesDaily.

61. http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/plehner/the_department_of_defense_know.html.

62. Lehner,P.(11October2011).Militarytopbrasssupportcleanenergydevelopment:It’samatterofnationalsecurity,NRDCStaffblog.

63. http://desmogblog.com/pentagon-back-tried-and-true-pr-tactic-greenwashing.

64. http://indymedia.org.au/2010/12/10/friends-of-the-earth-respond-to-military-greenwashing-of-us-aust-joint-war-games.

65. TheEcologist.(11May2011).ConservationInternational‘agreedtogreenwasharmscompany’.

66. See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/17/conservation-international-lockheed-martin-video_n_863205.html.

67. Seewebsitehttps://arms-to-renewables.org.uk.

68.CAAT.(2014).Armstorenewables:Tradeunioninfosheet.Retrievedfromhttps://www.caat.org.uk/issues/jobs-economy/resources/trade-union-infosheet.pdf.

69. CAAT.(29July2014).Getinvolved:Tradeunionists.

PARTIII

ACQUISITIONTHROUGHDISPOSSESSION

8

SOWINGINSECURITY:FOODANDAGRICULTURE

INATIMEOFCLIMATECRISIS

NickBuxton,ZoeW.BrentandAnnieShattuck1

Agroecology ispolitical; itrequiresustochallengeandtransformstructuresofpower in society. We need to put the control of seeds, biodiversity, land andterritories, waters, knowledge, culture and the commons in the hands of thepeopleswhofeedtheworld.

DeclarationoftheInternationalForumforAgroecology,Nyéléni,Mali,27February2015

Introduction

‘The food-pocalypse is already upon us’, blared a headline in theGuardian inMarch 2014,2 as it warned of how food price increases,changingclimateandincreaseddemandwereharbingersofhungerandangerthatwouldincreasinglyexplodeontotheworldstage.Thearticledrewonthe2014IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange’sreportreleasedthesamemonththatwarnedofpredictedtemperatureincreasesof7.2degreesFahrenheitormorebytheendofthecenturythat‘wouldposelargeriskstofoodsecuritygloballyandregionally.’3

Food prices and political conflict have a long, intertwined history.Think of the French Revolution: the guillotines came out after wheatpricesshotup88percentfollowingtwofailedharvests.Butfoodandconflictseemstohavebecomeaparticularlyhotissueinthelastdecade.Twoeventsinparticularsparkedtherenewedinterest.Thefirstwasthefoodcrisisin2007–08,whenthepriceofbasicfoodsspiked,fuellinganewwaveoflarge-scalelanddeals,or‘landgrabs’,ascorporations,thefinancial sector and new state players sought to secure land.4 ThesecondwasthewaveofrevolutionsthatunfurledwiththeArabSpring,alongwith food riots elsewhere in theworld,bothpromptedby risingfood prices.5 Scientific predictions of looming, devastating climate-change impacts thatwill compound these pressures have added to thefears that our food supply, and hence our very political systems, aremorefragilethanwethink.The trouble, as this chapter explores and documents, is that the

proposedcureforafoodsystemviewedinthiswaycanbeworsethanthe disease. The narrative of food scarcity and impending conflict isgatheringsteaminpolicycircles,emphasisinga‘need’todramaticallyincreasefoodsupplybyexpandingtheindustrialmodelofagriculture.Stepping back, the conventional framework for explaining the

relationship between hunger, land and climate change is anchoredaround a common, singular notion of ‘security’: that pursuing large-scaleinvestmentsinlandandagribusinesscanleadtofoodsecurity,andthe bestway to do this is to put in place governance instruments thatwould guarantee security to investors. The drive for this security –includingsecureprofitstreamscapitalisingonvolatile,highfoodpricesand increased commodities demand – has led to land grabs anddispossession across wide swathes of the world, with disastrousimplications for the security of human lives and dignity. Meanwhile,importantquestionsarenotbeingaddressed:whowillcarryoutthisnewproduction, who will consume it, and who will control the land andresourcesneededtodoso?

Currentconsensusontheimpactsofclimatechangeonagriculture

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) WorkingGroup II report is unequivocal on the negative impacts of climatechange on agriculture and food.The reportwarns that ‘All aspects offoodsecurityarepotentiallyaffectedbyclimatechange,includingfoodaccess,utilization,andpricestability.’6Itpredictsdeclinesofupto25per cent for major crops (wheat, rice and maize) in tropical andtemperateregions.Thereportfindsthatrisingsealevelsandincreasedsalinisationaredestroyingagriculturallandonvulnerableislandsandinimportant food-richdeltas.And itwarns thatcoastalareasandnationsdependentuponfishingforfoodandrevenuearelikelytosuffer,too,aswarmingandincreasinglyacidicseascausespeciestodieoutormoveto different parts of the ocean. Analysts, from the international aidcommunity to theUSmilitary,havepaired thesedirepredictionswithfears of rising food prices and resulting global unrest.7 The figureopposite,forexample,fromareportondemocracyintheMiddleEast,warnsofmoreArabSpring-likepolitical unrest and food rebellions iffoodsuppliesarenotsecured.Climatescientistsagreethattheeffectsofclimatechangewillimpact

some communities more than others. Projections vary across studies,however. In their survey of global studies carried out over the pasttwentyyears,TimWheelerandJoachimvanBraunfindoneconsistentpattern: ‘Cropyieldsaremorenegativelyaffectedacrossmost tropicalareas than at higher latitudes, and… climate change will exacerbatefoodinsecurityinareasthatalreadycurrentlyhaveahighprevalenceofhungerandundernutrition.’8ThisisechoedbytheIPCCandtheWorldBank,whichhighlighthowtheeffectsofclimatechangewillbeunevenandwillimpacttropicalcountriesoftheGlobalSouthmostnegatively.This includes the six countries – India,China,Bangladesh, Indonesia,Pakistan andEthiopia – inwhich, according toFAO, over half of the

world’sfood-insecurepeoplelive.9

Figure8.1Foodpriceincreaseprojectionsduetoclimatechangeoverthenexttwentyyears

Source:‘ExploringFoodPriceScenariostowards2030withaGlobalMulti-RegionModel’,OxfamResearchReports,June2011.

Thisuneven impact is alreadyplayingout in countless communitiesacrosstheglobe.InPakistan,forexample,extremefloodingin2010ledto income losses of up to 50 per cent among three-fifths of affectedhouseholds, particularly those in rural areas.10 In Kirabati, thecommunityofTebunginakohasalreadybeenforcedtorelocatebecauseofseawater intrusiondestroyingcoconutandtarotrees;withKiribati’s33 coral atolls and islands standing at an average of just two metersabovesealevel,thereisonlysofartheycango.Increased extreme weather conditions can also affect vulnerable

developingcountries,nomatterwhereontheglobetheytakeplace,dueto outsized dependence in some countries on global food markets.Research published in Nature revealed how drought in Russia andUkraine in 2010 reduced their harvests by 32.7 per cent and 19.3 per

cent,respectively,promptingadoublinginglobalwheatpricesineightmonths.11 This had a major impact on wheat-importing countries,particularlyinNorthAfrica.Aspoorpeoplespendahigherproportionof their income on food, they are particularly affected by priceincreases.Very poor farmers may also be affected disproportionately by the

kindsofclimatedisturbancesthatnevermakeheadlines.Toafarmeronmarginal soils,with little access to credit or capital, even a two-weekdelayintherainyseasoncanspelldisaster.Resource-poorfarmers,theurbanpoor,thoseinwater-stretchedareaswherenaturalresourceshavebeen depleted and thosewith little access to political power aremorevulnerablethanothers,evenwhenexposedtothesameevents.Theemergingscientificconsensuson theuneven impactsofclimate

change is pushing adaptation efforts toward the lower-income tropicalareasidentifiedasmostvulnerable,especiallyinAfrica.Inthewordsofthe UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), ‘Agriculture indevelopingcountriesmustundergoasignificanttransformationinordertomeettherelatedchallengesoffoodsecurityandclimatechange.’12Policy makers unfortunately focus less on the role of agricultural

systems in industrialised countries and give less weight to theconclusion in the IPCC Working Group II report that warns againstbecomingover-distractedby climate-change impacts to the extent thatwe lose theoverallpictureofhowworldagricultureandfoodsystemsoperate. It saliently notes: ‘At the same time, it is likely that socio-economicandtechnologicaltrends,includingchangesininstitutionsandpolicies,will remain a relatively stronger driver of food security overthenext fewdecades thanclimatechange.’13Those trends include thedeephistoricalrootsofthevulnerabilitytoswingsinglobalfoodprices.Itistotheserootswebrieflyturn.

Globalfoodregimesandfoodsecurity

Flooding the global market with cheap food is not the only way topreventthekindsoffoodriotsandhungerthatpeoplefear.Infact,thehistoryofthesekindsofcheapfoodpolicieshavealottodowithwhypeople are so vulnerable to swings in the global market today. Tounderstandglobalfoodsecurity,itisusefultolookattherecenthistoryoftheglobalfoodregimeanditsimplicationsforlanduseandcontrol.Afoodregimeanalysislooksathowfoodisproduced,distributedand

consumed in the context of an international political economy andpresided over by a constellation of power holders. Harriet Friedmannand Philip McMichael use the term ‘food regime’ to highlight theformal and informal rules in specific periods that governed theproduction, distribution and consumption of food globally.14 The firstfoodregimewasanchoredbytheBritishEmpire,startinginthe1870sandlastinguntiltheeveoftheFirstWorldWar,basedoncolonialandsettler economies producing cheap grains andmeat through extensiveagricultureinordertoexportthemtothecentresofcapitalandworking-class populations in Europe. In the second food regime, which lastedfromthe1930suntiltheearly1970s,powershiftedfromtheUKtotheUS, where large-scale, chemical-based, mechanised and heavilysubsidised agriculture beganproducingmassive food surpluses,whichwereoftendumpedindevelopingcountriesviafoodaid.Transnational corporations (TNCs) are the presiding power in what

McMichaelcategorisesasthethird,corporate,foodregimethatemergedin tandem with neoliberalism.15 Structural adjustment policies in the1980s and 1990s bankrupted national agricultural research programs,and free-trade agreements unleashed a flood of cheap commodities,whichputmillionsofproducersintheGlobalSouthoutofbusiness.Bythe early 2000s, many low-income countries were left with a strongtradedeficitinfoodandvulnerabletoglobalmarketswings.Partof thenewlyemerging reality involvesa reconfigurationofkey

hubs of global capital,with awhole new set of players emerging andvying forpowerand influence in reshaping the international rules thatgoverntheproduction,distributionandconsumptionoffoodandother

closely related commodities. The new actors include the BRICScountries (Brazil,Russia, India,China and SouthAfrica), someMICs(middle-incomecountries)andtheGulfStates.Manyofthesecountrieshave moved from being only big food importers/consumers to alsobecoming importantproducersofkeycommodities;othersareseekingto ensure food supplies to their national populations, as didEuropeancountriesacenturyago.This does not mean that the emergence of challengers to the

traditionally North Atlantic-based food regime has marginalised theconventionalpowerholders:EuropeandtheUSstillremainkeyplayersin theglobal foodsystemand in thedynamicsof regime rulemaking.The top ten food producers globally, measured by income, assets,turnover,ormarketcapitalisation,areallcorporationsbased in theUSorEurope.16Thisdominance isstillespecially truewithrespect to thefinancialisation of agricultural production, in which North Atlantic-basedfinancecapitalhasplayedagrowingroleinlanddeals.17Thefluid,still-unfoldingtransitiontoamorepolycentricglobalfood

regimeneverthelessmarks a further expansionof agribusiness inboththe Global North and South, in which farmland itself has become aglobalisedasset,alteringthelivelihoodsofmillionsofpeople.

Expansionofindustrialagriculturedeepenstheclimatecrisis

Therisingdominanceofthisagro-industrialglobaleconomymeansthatagricultureandlandconversionforagriculturalexpansionarecurrentlyresponsibleforasignificantportionofgreenhouse-gasemissions.18ThedatapresentedbelowinFigure8.2breaksdownallemissionsbysector.However, it is important to note theway industrial agriculture is tiedintoemissionsofothersectorsaswell.Landuse,forexample,referstoemissions from deforestation and forestry practices, which may be

fuelledbyagriculturalexpansionormonoculturetreeplantations.Powerrefers to energy supply which, as the agrofuels boom has shown, isincreasingly intertwined with agriculture. Agricultural production, ofcourse, relies on transportation to reachmarkets, generateswaste andrequires building infrastructure, so agriculture’s contribution togreenhouse-gasemissionsgoeswellbeyondthe13.5percentattributedtofarminginFigure8.2.

Figure8.2Greenhouse-gasemissionsandagriculture19

Source:IAASTD/IPCC,2009.

Changing global diets driving the growth of livestock production isalso having serious impacts on our climate. Not only is livestock thelargestproducerofmethaneandN2O(GHGsthataremorepotentthanCO2),much of the feed given to animals also uses nutritional energylessefficientlythanifitwasuseddirectlybyhumans.Thismeansmoreandmore land is required asmeat consumption rises, leading towhatTonyWeiscalls:

… an expanding ‘ecological hoofprint.’ This involves the loss offorests,grasslandsandwetlands,whichinturnhasamajorimpactonthecarboncycle,bothinthereleaseofcarbonasdiverseecosystems

areconvertedtoagriculture,andinthediminishedcapacityforcarbonsequestration.20

Moreover, as author Michael Pollan points out, there is also ageopoliticalexternality,asthissystemisultimately‘defendedbytheUSmilitary, another never-counted cost of cheap food’, given that ‘one-fifth of America’s petroleum consumption goes to producing andtransportingour food.’21Any strategies for addressing climate changeanditsimpactsthatdonotaddresstherealityofmilitaryinvolvementinsecuringfoodanditsrelatedoilresourceswillthereforecomeupshortbothintermsofeffectivenessandjustice.

Fooddistributionandaccess:Themissingpiecesoftheclimatepuzzle

Even so, scarcity and supply remain the dominant themes of climatediscourse,ignoringthefactthathungerisasymptomofadeeperlack–alackofincome,equalityandpoliticalpower–ratherthananissueofmaterialscarcity.22AsEricHolt-Giménezandcolleaguesexplain:‘Theworldalreadyproducesenoughfoodtofeed10billionpeople.But thepeoplemaking less than $2 a day –most ofwhom are resource-poorfarmerscultivatingun-viablysmallplotsofland–cannotaffordtobuythisfood.’23Theproblemofglobalhungerisnot thatthereisnotenoughfoodto

goaround,orduetoafailuretoclosethe‘yieldgap’betweenobservedyields and potential yields (which, it is argued, can only be resolvedwith the help of increased agricultural technology).24 Helping smallfarmers increase their incomes – not just their yields – is a political,ratherthantechnical,challenge.Highlightingthiscontradictionbetweenrisingyieldsandhunger, the

FAOreportedthatworldcerealoutputin2013brokerecords,reachinga

newhighofaround2,500milliontonnes,evenwhileitwarnedthatfoodsecurity in the Sahel, Central Africa, Southern Africa, parts of theMiddleEastandthePhilippinesisdeterioratingduetoinstabilityand/ordrought, other types of severe weather and land degradation.25Dominant TNC players – usually in alliance with national states –generated huge profits producing industrial food during the 2008–12yearsofglobalhighpricesandfoodscares.The‘ABCD’ofagribusiness–ADM,Bunge,CargillandLouisDreyfus–control75–90percentofthe global grain trade;26 in 2014, ADM reported a 25 per cent profitincrease on net sales of over $81 billion, while in the same year,Cargill’s profits had fallen in comparison to the previous year but thecompanystillgeneratedsalesandrevenueofover$134billion.27A focus on supply also ignores the role of other factors in fuelling

food price increases, notably agrofuel production and the increasedspeculationinfoodcommoditiesbythefinancialsector.Atthepeakofthe 2008 financial crisis, Euromoney declared: ‘Farmland is the newgold: There are not many markets left in which it would be safe toinvest,butagricultureshouldbeasafebet.’28Seenasaperfectinflationhedge, speculation in food commodities exploded between 2004 and2014, as the commodities sectorwas steadily deregulated, particularlyafter the US approval of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act(CFMA) in 2000. Speculation on food commodities increased tenfoldbetween2000and2011.29While there remainssomedebateabout theexactcontributionoffinancialisationtofoodpriceincreases,researchershaveshownhowfuturesmarketsdoimpactactualcommoditypricesbyshaping expectationsbyprivate actors.30Moreover, financialisation ineverypartoftheindustrial-agriculturalsupplychainhasclearlyplayedarole in strengthening the most powerful actors – in particular, foodretailers–andconsistentlydiscriminated-againstsmall-scalefarmers.31One of the resulting problems of the structural organisation of our

currentfoodregimeiswaste–orinthewordsoftheFAOfoodsecuritydefinition: ‘utilisation’. Between 30 and 50 per cent of the food

producedglobally–about1.2–2billiontonnesoffood,and550billioncubic meters of water – is wasted, according to a 2013 study by theUK’s Institution ofMechanical Engineers.32 The global food system,dominated by supermarkets and agro-industries, has a major role ingeneratingsuchwaste.TheFAOrecognisesthatimproveddistribution,utilisationandaccess

arecriticaltofoodsecurity,buttherehasbeenmuchlessfocusonthesefactors.Inonestudyofpeer-reviewedjournalarticlesonfoodsecurityandclimatechangesince the first IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)reportin1990,theauthorsfoundthat70percentofthepapersfocusedonfoodavailability,whileonly11.9percentdealtwithfoodaccess.33

Proposedsolutions:Climate-smartagriculture

With demand projections rising, climate change threatens the bottomlineofthecompaniesseekingtofillthatdemandaswellasnationstatesfacinggeopolitical instabilitydue to risingprices. InSeptember2014,the Obama administration announced the new Global Alliance forClimate-Smart Agriculture at the UN Climate Summit in New York.Theallianceincludesthegovernmentsof14countries,theConsultativeGroupforInternationalAgricultureResearch(CGIAR)institutions,UNagencies,privatecorporations–includingMosaicFertilizer–andmajorconservation organisations such as the Nature Conservancy and theInternational Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Offering a‘triple win’, ‘Climate-smart agriculture’ (CSA) rests on three pillars:increasingproductivity, strengthening farmers’ resilience and reducingagriculture’sgreenhouse-gasemissions.34CSAisaboutbothadaptingtoand mitigating climate change. The adaptation strategy involvesincreasing investment and technical assistance in order to maintainproductivity at a time of rising temperatures and less predictableweather.Themitigationstrategypromoteslinkingagriculturetocarbon

markets such as REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation andForestDegradation),REDD+,oraproposedsoil-carbonmarket,sothatfarmersinAfricaandelsewherecanselltheircarbonoffsetstopollutersintheNorth.‘Climate-smart agriculture’ is an umbrella term that includes

everything from efforts to genetically engineer drought tolerance intomaizeandotherstaplecrops,privateinvestmentinagribusinesssupplychains, efforts to increase productivity per unit-area, new index-basedcrop insurance products, improved weather data delivered by mobilephone, more energy-efficient machinery, incorporating livestock intosmall-scalefarmsandintercroppingwithnitrogen-fixing‘fertiliser’treespecies. So far, many commitments to action are vague. An AfricanUnion project, for example, aims to make ‘CSA practices andtechnologies’ more accessible and strengthen ‘evidence-based policy’onthecontinent.35Thereispotentiallyasignificantamountofmoneyforinitiativesthat

fallundertheCSAumbrella–andthatumbrellaseemstobeexpanding.TheWorldBankGrouppledged$5billionover thenext fouryears to‘mainstream’ CSA in its development projects,making sure all of itsagricultural investments adhere to a rubric of productivity, resilienceand emissions reductions. In 2012, the International Fund forAgricultural Development requested $350 million to ‘mainstream’ itsCSA work, including trainings, participatory risk management andmakingland-managementpracticesmoreresilient.TheFeedtheFutureinitiative, begun in 2009, with a $3.5 billion commitment from theObama administration, is now part of the Alliance for Climate-SmartAgriculture, focusingonefforts to improveagriculturalproductivity.36Major food corporations are coming on board as well: Kellogg’s, forexample,haspromisedanundisclosedsumtohelpsmall-scalefarmersintheirsupplychainadapttoclimatechange,improvetheiragronomicpractices and upgrade their business skills. To start, Kellogg’s willtarget rice farmers in Bangladesh, India, South Africa, Thailand andVietnam.37Whatalltheseinitiativeshaveincommonisastrongfocus

onthesustainabilityoftheprivatesector.Not everyone is excited about these new initiatives, however. For

SimonMwambaoftheEastandSouthernAfricanSmall-ScaleFarmersForum (ESAFF), ‘Climate Smart Agriculture is being presented assustainableagriculture,butthetermissobroadthatwefearitisafrontfor promoting industrial, green revolution agriculture too,which trapsfarmers into cycles of debt and poverty.’38 Calls by Kofi Anan for a‘uniquely African Green Revolution’39 seem to have learned nothingfrom the growing body of research on the negative social andenvironmentalimpactsofthefirstGreenRevolution.AsNickCullathernotes in his bookTheHungryWorld, a cutting critique of the GreenRevolutionmyth:

… the green revolution epicenters – Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka,Bangladesh,Mexico, thePhilippines, and Indonesia– are all amongthemostundernourishednations,eachwithhigherratesofadultandchildhood malnutrition and deficiency diseases … than most Sub-Saharancountries.40

Similarly,Climate-smartagriculturealsoproposestomitigateclimatechange by linking agriculture to carbon markets and providing a‘potential source of finance for improved agriculture in the future.’41However,with transactioncostshigh, ahistoryof abuse, and fraud inoffsetprogrammes,andwithvoluntarycarbonmarkets laggingbehindexpectations and the EU carbon markets currently in turmoil, it isdifficult to imagine that small-scale farmers will receive a carbonwindfall. TosiMpanu-Mpanu, chair of theAfricanGroup on ClimateChangeNegotiations,arguesitisunlikelythepromiseofcarboncreditsfrom soil-carbon sequestration will actually benefit African farmers,mostofwhomhavelessthantwohectaresofland,‘whichisnotenoughto sequester an amount of carbon that would be meaningful to sell.We’revery suspicious thatoffset schemeswill lead toaperversionofAfrican agriculture with farmers farming what is incentivized, and

givinguptraditionalcrops.’42Small-farmers’organisationsandsocialmovementshavebeenlargely

excluded from international planning on climate-change adaptation.Instead, climate-smart agriculture is consistently framed as away thatforeign investors can help farmers deal with the problem of climatechange. The buzzword is ‘sustainable intensification’ – one of thetechniquesthatfallunderthebigtentofCSA,whichseekstouseinputsmore efficiently, produce more per unit-area and thereby reduceemissions by avoiding deforestation of new land for agriculture. TheObama administration’s Feed the Future initiative backs this strategywith agricultural aid in twenty developing countries. It activelypromotes genetically modified (GM) crops (with 28 per cent of itsresearch funding), the integration of small farmers into commercialmarkets,andpublic/privatepartnershipswithagribusinessgiantssuchasDuPont and Syngenta,which plan to expand business inAfrica to $1billionbetween2015and2025.43An FAO report argues, ‘Investing in climate-smart agriculture at a

landscape scale will have a large price tag.’ To meet rising globaldemand, the FAO estimates itwill take $83 billion of investment peryearindevelopingcountries,themajorityofwhichwill‘needtocomefrom private investors.’44 Yet meeting the demand for agriculturalcommodities isclearlynot thesameasbuildingfoodsystemsthatwillcontinue toserve thepoorunderan increasinglyunstableclimate.Theestimateisaboutgrowingagribusiness,notadaptingtoclimatechange.Thereisampleevidencethatitisnotjusthowmuchfoodisproduced,

but who controls the resources needed to produce food that makes adifferencewhenitcomestocombatinghunger.Callsforinvestmentsinclimate-smart agriculture could include a wealth of agroecologicalpractices, local infrastructure improvements and institutionalarrangements thatbenefitsmall-scalefarmersandprovideresilience toextremeweather.Butmanyof thesearenotprofitableenoughtodrawprivate-sector support.Public financing isbeingused instead to createenablingconditionsforinvestors,monitorandverifysoil-carbonstocks,

develop GM crops and invest in infrastructure for export agriculture.Theseallcomewithasignificantopportunitycost.Andtheycomewithapotentiallypowerfuldiscourse that justifies theconsolidationof landandterritory,whichunderminesfoodsecurity.

Thelandquestion:Investment,landgrabsandsecuritynarratives

The call for food security, powered by the underlying myth ofimpending global food scarcity, plays a key role in justifying thecontemporary cycle of land grabbing – and on the pretext of tacklingclimatechangemayevenexacerbateit.Theglobalphenomenonoflandgrabbing was initially reported with alarm by nongovernmentalorganisations (NGOs) and the media, but it is persistently beingreframedas‘landinvestment’bythoseseekingtoprofitfromit.Thecaseofclimate-smartagriculture,forexample,demonstratesthis

dark irony. Proposed climate-mitigation strategies in the arena ofagriculturehavethemselvesbecomekeydriversinlandgrabbing.Thishas been the case with the promotion of agrofuels that receivedsignificantstatesubsidiesandsupportworldwideandwerepaintedasasolutiontoboththeenergycrisisandclimatechange.Thistrendmustbeunderstood in the context of the rise of what Saturnino Borras andcolleagues call ‘flex crops and commodities’ – one offshoot of therecent convergence of multiple crises (food, energy, climate andfinance).45Flexcropsandcommoditieshavemultipleuses(food,feed,fueland

industrial material) that can be easily and flexibly interchanged: soya(feed,foodandbiodiesel),sugarcane(foodandethanol),palmoil(food,biodieselandcommercial/industrialuses),corn(food,feedandethanol)andnowcarbonsequestration.Ithasresolvedonedifficultchallengeinagriculture, that of fluctuating prices: diversified product portfolios

avoid devastating price shocks, meaning more security to capitalinvestments. The fact that key crops and commodities can ‘flex’underminestheargumentthatthemainmotivebehindagriculturallandexpansion is specifically food security while exposing the mainmotivation,whichistosecureprofits.With the emergence of relevant markets (including financialised

speculative ones) and the development and availability of technology(for example, flexiblemills) that allowsmultiple and flexible uses ofthesecrops,diversificationofproductshascertainlybeenachieved,butonlywithin a single crop sector.When sugarcaneprices arehigh, sellsugarcane;whenethanolpricesarehigh,sellethanol.When theactualmarketforbiodieselisnotthereyet,sellpalmoilforcookingoil,whilewaiting(orspeculating)foramorelucrativebiodieselmarkettoemerge.Yet, as we know now, rather than reducing use of fuel or avoidingdeforestation and forest degradation in order to curb runaway GHGemissions, agrofuels endedupcontributingGHGemissions, especiallythroughmassiveforestclearing.46Tree plantations are another sector where global land grabbing is

implicated. It is inmanywaysakindof ‘flexcommodity’– thesearetrees and forests with multiple and flexible uses, the emergence ofwhichistraceabletothesamechangesintheglobalpoliticaleconomythatushered in the riseof flexcrops.Treeplantationscanbeused fortimberextractionforindustrialpurposesandforthegrowingpaperandpulp industry (forexample, forpackaging), largely forexport.But thesameplantationcanbeanticipatedforpossibleriseinwoodchip-basedenergycomplex,whileat thesametimeitcanbeusedtospeculateoncarbon-offset schemes such as REDD+. During the past decade, thissectorhashadarisingimpactonlanduse.47Widespreadconcernaboutthenegativeimpactsonlocalcommunities

has ledmanyadvocatesof land investment,suchasHernandodeSotoand theWorld Bank, to argue thatWestern-style property rights willshield poor people from land grabbing and by implication preventabusesunder thebannerof ‘climate-smartagriculture’.Thishas led to

the development of a number of codes and standards, notably the‘principlesofresponsibleagriculturalinvestments’(RAIprinciples)putforwardbytheWorldBank,andtheCodeofConductinitiallyproposedby the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).48 Yetefforts to codify Western-style property rights and make them moretransparent have not turned the tide against land grabbing.49Unfortunately,even‘goodtransparentdeals’canstillendupinvolvinggrabbing,becausewhatisbeing‘grabbed’isnotjusttheactualphysicalresource itself but, more profoundly, the political control over it: inotherwords,theverypowertodecidehowitwillbeusedandforwhatpurposes–andnotjustnow,butintothefuture,aswell.Landgrabbingdoes not always or automaticallymean the expulsion of communitiesfromtheirlands;itcanalsomeantheirincorporation–forgood,orforill,orboth–intoneweconomicarrangementsthroughlease,labourandgrowing contracts. Justifying a deal with the argument that relevantauthoritieswere‘consulted’ignorestheweakpoliticalpositionofpoorpeoplethatenterintoland-dealnegotiations,aswellasthedangersandinsecuritycreatedbytheprivatisationandcommoditisationoflandthatcanquicklyleadtodispossession.50

From‘security’to‘sovereignty’;agro-industrytoagroecology

The singular focus on production eclipses the power and politics thatcausehungertoday.AstheformerUNSpecialRapporteurontheRighttoFoodremindsus:

…investmentsthatincreasefoodproductionwillnotmakesignificantprogress incombatinghungerandmalnutrition ifnotcombinedwithhigherincomesandimprovedlivelihoodsforthepoorest–particularlysmall-scalefarmersindevelopingcountries.Andshort-termgainswill

be offset by long-term losses if they lead to further degradation ofecosystems,therebythreateningourfutureabilitytomaintaincurrentlevelsofproduction.Thequestionthereforeisnotsimplyhowmuch,but also how. Pouringmoney into agriculturewill not be sufficient.We need to take steps that facilitate the transition towards a low-carbon, resource-preserving type of agriculture that benefits thepoorestfarmers.51

Attheheartofthenew(andstillevolving)debateoverlandgrabbingisan old question:which agriculturalmodel can producemore food (orenergy) – small-scale, less-mechanised, non-industrial, localised anddiversified farming, or monocrop, large-scale industrial, mechanised,fossil-fuel-based farming? This time, however, the question must beaskedwithin a changed context: that is, in the era of climate change.Which system is best able to adapt to and mitigate the impacts ofclimatechange?Whichagricultureandfoodsystemismoreresilient?Farmers’ movements are already advancing resilient alternatives

basedonagroecology.52Agroecologyseeks toadaptagriculture to theecosystem in which it operates, minimises off-farm inputs andmaximisesthesystem’sownresilienceanddiversityinordertoreducepests, improve soils and harvest water. It also integrates forestry,aquacultureandlivestockintofarmingsystems.53Peasant-based agroecology systems may be more ecologically

resilient to climate stress, if not to the ravages of the market. In anextensive comparison of more than 150 studies54 that examinedagroecological systems and industrial agriculture, Brenda Lin andcolleaguesshowthatnotonlyislarge-scale,fossil-fuel-basedindustrialagriculturemorelikelytorelyonpracticesthatemitGHGs,itisalsofarless effective at sequestering carbon than agroecological methods.Agroecological functions, such as nutrient cycling, micro-climatecontrol, soil-moisture retention and pest management have also beenprovedtohelpanagroecosystemmaintainvitalservices–suchasyield– even if challenged by a disturbance, such as a severe drought.55

Genetic diversity can also buffer against risk. In an oft-cited study ofheterogeneousriceplantingsinYunnan,China,Zhufoundthatdisease-susceptiblericevarietiesplantedinmixtureswithresistantvarietieshad89percentgreateryield,andincidenceofdiseasewas94percentlessseverethanwhengrowninmonoculture.56The study corroborates recent empirical experiences of increased

resilience in diversified agroecosystems. Peter Michael Rosset andBraulioMachín-Sosa describe the experience of one ofCuba’sCreditand Service Cooperatives (CCS) after Hurricane Ike tore through theregion in 2008. The authors ranked and grouped individual farms ontheirlevelsofagroecologicalintegration,whichincludesdiversification,andestimatedboth thepercentageofdamage(resistance)and the timetorecovery(resilience)ofthefarms.After30days,farmsthatshowedthe highest degree of agroecological integration – a measure thatincludes diversification and on-farm production of inputs – were anestimated80percentrecoveredfromthedisaster.Thosewiththelowestlevelofintegrationhadrecoveredby60percent.Butthisrecoverywasalso aided not just by agricultural diversity, but also by the concertedeffortsofsocialmovementsand theCubanstate.57AnotherstudyofathousandfarmsinCentralAmericaintheaftermathofHurricaneMitchfound that farmers using the agroecological agricultural methods had30–40percentmoretopsoil,halfasmanylandslides,muchlesserosionand,mostimportantly,hadfewereconomiclossesafterthehurricane.58Meanwhile,proposed technicalsolutionspromotedbybiotechnology

giants – such as the use of genetic modification to create drought-tolerant seeds–haveproved tobeoverblown.TheUSDepartmentofAgriculture’s (USDA) analysis of Monsanto’s trumpetedDroughtGuard™ corn (using the engineered gene cspB), for example,showed very modest results – and only under moderate droughtconditions.Itpredictedthat,atmost,itsusewouldincreaseproductivitybyabout1percent.59Perhaps more important than yields and techniques at a time of

climate crisis is the role agroecology plays in protecting the

environmental conditions required for community health and survival.Small-scalefarmers–whoalreadyprovide70percentof thefoodweeat – more efficiently use water, light and nutrients, which will becriticalinregionswheretheseresourcesbecomescarce.This awareness that agroecology offers a better path at a time of

climatecrisis thanagroindustryisgainingincreasingtraction,althoughnotwithoutastrongbacklashfromthepowerfulcorporateintereststhatseek to profit from crisis. In 2008, the International Assessment ofAgricultureScienceandDevelopment (IAASTD),a three-yearprocesssponsoredby theUNEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP), theUNFoodand Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Bank and otherinstitutions, and involvingover fourhundredexperts fromover eightycountries,madeasurprisinglyboldcall fora radical transformationoftheworld’sfoodandagriculturesystem.TheIAASTDreportconcludedthat chemical-intensive industrial agriculture had degraded ourenvironmentandthreatenedwater,energyandclimate;itwarnedagainstreliance on unproved technological fixes and it critiqued transnationalagribusiness’s influence over public policy and their responsibility forunjustglobaltradepoliciesthatleavemillionsundernourished.60In place of chemical-intensive industrial agriculture, the IAASTD

report called for investment in agroecology, such as supportingagroecological research and education and providing incentives forresource-conserving practices. It argued for more support for small-scalefarmers–particularlywomen–byinvestingininfrastructureandsupporting community-based organisations that produce and processfood. It called formoreequitable regional andglobal tradepolicies tosupport communities and developing countries in meeting their ownfood and livelihood security needs. The IAASTD’s bold conclusionsunsurprisingly rankled some of the participants: biotechnologycorporationswalkedout,andthreegovernments(theUS,AustraliaandtheUK)refused toendorse the texts.Evenso,58governmentsvoicedtheirsupport.Growing climate impacts on agriculture and foodwill clearly put a

testonanyfoodsystem.Turningaroundanagroindustrialjuggernautisalsonoeasytask.OrganicagricultureintheUS,forexample,comprisesamere0.52percentoftotalcropacreageandreceivesonly1percentofUSDAresearchfunds.61Butthegrowingclimatecrisisisawarningthatrather than deepening an unsustainable land, agriculture and foodsystem,weneedaradicaltransformationthatreturnspowertofarmersandcommunitiesandreintegratesecologyintothewaywegrowfood.Onetermthatencapsulatesthatvisionfortransformationisthecallfor

‘food sovereignty’, made originally by the international peasantmovementLaViaCampesina in the early 1990s. Food sovereignty isbroadly defined as the right of peoples to produce, distribute andconsume safe, healthy and culturally appropriate food in sustainableways in andnear their territory– all issues ignoredby the term ‘foodsecurity’.62 Food sovereignty addresses the issue of ‘distancing’(producer-consumer,geographicdistance,rural-urban)thatisahallmarkofindustrialagricultureandamajorcauseofgreenhouse-gasemissions.The food sovereignty alternative emphasises ‘localisation’ of the foodsystems, (although this concept is not without its own problems),essentially taking the control away from industrial corporations andputtingitbackinthehandsoflocalcommunities.As agrarian scholars Saturnino Borras, Jennifer Franco and Sofia

Monsalvehaveargued,63foodsovereigntyneedstobeaccompaniedby‘land sovereignty’: supporting the demand for land by rural workingpeoples. The term connotes ‘belongingness’: the land belongs to thepeoplewhowork it, care for it and live on it.Conversely, the peoplebelong toaparticular landasapeople.Landsovereigntyalsoremindsusthatindividualandcollectiveplotsoflandarepartoflarger,sociallyconstructed landscapes andwaterscapes inwhichwemust strive for arenewed relationship with land – one that supports workers’ rights,bolstersandstrengthenscommunitiesandengagesconsumers,allwithinecologicalboundaries.Ultimately, the growing demand for sovereignty over our land and

foodisaresoundingcalltoditchsecuritynarrativesthatfocusonlyon

securing food supplies and not on securing dignified livelihoods andfighting hunger. This demand is only becoming more urgent ascorporateactorsproposefalsesolutionsinthefaceofgrowingclimate-change-inducedstressinouragriculturalsystems.

Notes

1. ThankyoutoJennyFrancoandSaturnino‘Jun’Borraswhoworkedonearlierdraftsandinformedmuchoftheland-basedworkinthischapter.

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Schiffman,R.(31March2014).Thinkthenewclimatereportisscary?Thefood-pocalypseisalreadyuponus.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/31/new-climate-report-food-prices-already-here.

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IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC).(2014).Summaryforpolicymakers(p.18).InClimateChange2014:Impacts,adaptation,andvulnerability.WorkinggroupcontributiontotheFifthAssessmentReport.CambridgeandNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

4.Holt-Giménez,E.,Patel,R.andShattuck,A.(2009).FoodRebellions!Crisisandthehungerforjustice.Oakland:FoodFirstBooks;Bello,W.(2009).TheFoodWars.London:Verso.

5.Mabey,N.etal.(2013).UnderpinningtheMENADemocraticTransition:Deliveringclimate,energyandresourcesecurity.London,Berlin,BrusselsandWashington,DC:ThirdGenerationEnvironmentalismLtd.(E3G).

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FoodandAgricultureOrganization,InternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment,andWorldFoodProgramme.(2014).TheStateofFoodInsecurityintheWorld2014:Strengtheningtheenablingenvironmentforfoodsecurityandnutrition.Rome:FoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations.

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23.Holt-Giménez,E.,Shattuck,A.,Altieri,M.,Herren,H.andGliessman,S.(2012).Wealreadyproduceenoughfoodfor10billionpeople…andwestillcan’tendhunger.JournalofSustainableAgriculture,36(6).

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51. FIAN.(2011).RighttoFoodQuarterly,6(1),p.2.

52.

Agroecologyisthescienceandpracticeofapplyingecologicalconceptsandprinciplestothestudy,designandmanagementofsustainableagroecosystems.Itsharessomecommonelementswithorganicagriculturebutisnotweddedtoaparticularpracticeorcode,nordoesitnecessarilyruleouttechnologicalinputs.Rather,itassesseseverythingfromaholisticperspective:itincludessocial,political,culturalandeconomicdimensionsandintegratesstate-of-the-artformalsciencewithtraditionalandcommunity-basedknowledge,localfood-systemexperiences,andinnovationsthatarelow-cost,readilyadaptablebysmall-andm

edium-scalefarmersandlikelytoadvancesocialequitywhileconservingbiodiversity,naturalresourcesandecosystemfunction.

53.Altieri,M.A.andToledo,V.(2011).TheagroecologicalrevolutioninLatinAmerica:rescuingnature,ensuringfoodsovereigntyandempoweringpeasants.JournalofPeasantStudies,38(3).

54.

Lin,B.etal.(2011).Effectsofindustrialagricultureonclimatechangeandthemitigationpotentialofsmall-scaleagro-ecologicalfarms.CABReviews:PerspectivesinAgriculture,VeterinaryScience,NutritionandNaturalResources,6(20).

55.

Gattinger,A.,Muller,A.,Haeni,M.,Skinner,C.,Fliessbach,A.,Buchmann,N.,andNiggli,U.(2012).Enhancedtopsoilcarbonstocksunderorganicfarming.ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciencesoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,109(44):18226–31.

56.

ZhuY.H.,Chen,J.,Fan,Y.,Wang,Y.,Li,J.,Chen,J.,Fan,S.,Yang,L.,Hu,H.,Leung,T.W.,Mew,P.S.,Teng,Z.,Wang,C.andMundt,C.(2000).Geneticdiversityanddiseasecontrolinrice.Nature,406(6797),718–22.Researchalsoshowsthatitcanalsoincreaseyields:oneofthelargeststudiescarriedoutthatanalyzed286projectsin57countriesshowed64percentincreasesinyieldsoverfouryears:Pretty,J.(2006).AgroecologicalApproachestoAgriculturalDevelopment.Washington,DC:WorldBank.Retrievedfromhttps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9044.

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Rosset,P.,MachínSosa,B.,RoqueJaime,A.M.andÁvilaLozano,D.R.(2011).Thecampesino-to-campesinoagroecologymovementofANAPinCuba:Socialprocessmethodologyintheconstructionofsustainablepeasantagricultureandfoodsovereignty.JournalofPeasantStudies,38(1),161–91.

58.

Gimenez,E.H.(2002).Measuringfarmers’agroecologicalresistanceafterHurricaneMitchinNicaragua:Acasestudyinparticipatory,sustainablelandmanagementimpactmonitoring.Agriculture,Ecosystems&Environment,93(1–3),87–105.Retrievedfromdoi:10.1016/S0167-8809(02)00006-3.

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Gurian-Sherman,D.(2012).HighandDry:Whygeneticengineeringisnotsolvingagriculture’sdroughtprobleminathirstyworld.UnionofConcernedScientists.Retrieved fromhttp://www.ucsusa.org/food_and_agriculture/our-failing-food-system/genetic-engineering/high-and-dry.html.

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62.Martínez-Torres,M.E.andRosset,P.M.(2010).LaVíaCampesina:Thebirthandevolutionofatransnationalsocialmovement.JournalofPeasantStudies,37(1),149–75.

63. Borras,S.,Franco,J.andMonsalve,S.(2015).Landandfoodsovereignty,ThirdWorldQuarterly,36(3).

9

INDEEPWATER:CONFRONTINGTHECLIMATE

ANDWATERCRISES

MaryAnnManahan

Whatwedotowater,wedotoourselvesandtheoneswelove.

PopolVuh,ancientMayantext

Introduction

Asthelifebloodoftheearth,thehydrologicalcycleistheprimarylinkbetweentheclimatesystem,humansociety,theenvironment,food,andeconomicdevelopment.Anychanges to thewatercyclewillaffect thenatural,socio-cultural,politicalandeconomicsystemsoftheworld.Butatthesametime,thereverseistrue.Ourmanagementofwaterresourcescanhaveasgreatanimpactonwatershedsandbiodiversityasoncitiesand people.What ecological sciences and hydrology teach is that anyinterruption in these interlinked and overlapping systems will have adomino effect. Removing trees, for example, reduces the water-absorptivecapacityof landscapes, leadingeither to lossofrainfallandreducedcapacityofthesoiltosequestercarbonortowaterrun-offs,soilerosionandlandslidesthatcanwipeoutcommunities.

Thegrowingimpactsofclimatechangeonwaterare looming,whilethe world has failed to ensure access to clean water for hundreds ofmillions of people. This is not because of a lack of resources, nornecessarily of political will, but, as this chapter explores, due to anoverridingdetermination to treatwaterasacommodityanda resourceto be exploited and secured, rather than considering water as a fluid,holistic,integratedanddynamicsystemoflifeinwhichhumansshouldplayonlyasmallrole.Theimpactsofclimatechangeofferthechanceto re-establish an ethicofwaterusebasedon theprinciplesofhumanrights,publictrustandcommons,butthiswillonlyhappenifdominantstate and corporate actors end their agenda of resource capture andcontrolforthefew,andmarginalisationandinsecurityforthemany.

Water,watereverywhere,notadroptodrink?

Theglobal supplyof freshwater is limited.Only2.41per centof theworld’s total water resources is fresh water, the majority of which(about 26.32 million cubic meters or 1.88 per cent of total waterresources) is trapped in polar ice caps and glaciers. The remainingresources are found in groundwater, soil moisture and surface water,suchasriversandlakes.Thereisstillenoughfreshwaterontheplanetforeveryonetoshare,butit isunevenlydistributedandtoomuchofithas become polluted and is unsustainably managed, exploited andwasted.Inshort,waterscarcityisbothhumanmadeandnatural,or,asscholarLylaMehtaputsit,‘scarcityisboth“real”and‘constructed.’1A fundamental reasonwhy it is ‘real’ is the fact that the supply of

fresh water cannot be increased, despite human ingenuity andinnovation.Thefresh-watersupplycanbereplenishedbynature,as inthecaseofgroundwaterandaquifers,butitwilltakecenturiesoreventhousandsofyearsbeforethesecanachievefullcapacityagain.Annualglobalwaterwithdrawal is expected to growby about 10–12per centeach decade through 2025,which is 1.38 times greater than in 1995.2

Further estimates predict, that by 2040, water demand will outstripcurrentsupplyby40percent.3According to UN estimates, 783 million people are living without

improved access to safe drinking water,4 and 2.5 billion people livewithoutbasicaccess to sanitation:Every20secondsachilddies frompreventable diseases, such as diarrhoea, dysentery and cholera, due tothe lackofproperhygieneand safedrinkingwater, particularly in themega-citiesoftheSouth.Climate change is compounding this already fragile situation. The

IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)projectsadecreaseinwateravailabilityof10–30percent indry regions in lowandmid-latitudes.Meanwhile,currentprojectionssuggest thatwaterdemand islikelytodoubleby2050.Theresult todayis thatmanyregionsarealreadyexperiencingwater

shortages – the Middle East, Central Asia, the Americas (themidwestern US, Mexico and the Andes), Pakistan, eastern Australia,Spain, southern India and northern China. The UN argues that waterscarcity5 will affect over 1.8 billion people by 2025,6 with majorimpacts on agricultural production, health, urban settlements andpeople’slivelihoods.Other regions are expected to experience increased flooding, while

rising sea levels threaten many coastal communities. Climate changedoesnotjustaffectsupply.It impactsthevariationofstreamflowandgroundwater recharge, and consequently water quality and seasonalwateravailability.Italsoincreasestheintensityandfrequencyofstormsduring themonsoon season anddroughtduring the summer.Sea-levelrise also causes saltwater intrusion into surface and groundwater,affectingtheamountandqualityofwatersupplies.These climatic changes interconnect with human-caused

environmental impacts, such as industrial pollution, overuse anddeforestation.Thelatter,forexample,leadstosoilerosionandsiltationor sedimentation of rivers and lakes, which obstructs waterways andaffectsthewaterqualityandcanleadtoincreasedrun-off,causingflash

floodsinmountainousareas.These are all very serious threats to people and the environment;

however,itisimportanttolookmoredeeplyathowscarcityisdefined.Thedominantnarrativeofscarcityisskewedtowardsphysical,naturaland economic forces rather than focused on ‘human-induced land andwaterusepracticesandatsocio-politicalconsiderations’.7

Figure9.1Increasingglobalwaterstress

Source:UnitedNationsEnvironmentalProgramme.(2008).Vitalstatistics:Anoverviewofthestateoftheworld’sfreshandmarinewaters(2ndedn).

Thedemandsonthislimitedresourceareverymuchdrivenbyman-made systems,particularly industrial and irrigated agriculture, affluentlifestyles, extractive industries, and population increase. Agricultureaccounts for nearly 70 per cent of global water consumption (someestimates are as high as 85 per cent),8 with 10 per cent going todomesticuseand20percent to industrialproduction.While therearemajorregionaldifferences,calculationssuggest50percentofwateruseindevelopedcountriesgoestoindustry,andagricultureaccountsfor80per cent of water use in developing countries. The interconnectionsbetween agriculture, water and urbanisation are playing out, forexample, in2014and2015in theseveredrought inSãoPaulo,oneofBrazil’s fastest growing cities. Studies suggest the drought has been

partly caused by massive deforestation in the Amazon due toagribusiness expansion – soya and cattle breeding. Not only doesagribusiness account for nearly 70 per cent of the country’s waterconsumption,but theresultingdeforestationalsocontributes torainfalldecrease.9LylaMehtaargues,throughhercase-studyonthesemi-aridregionof

KutchinGujarat,India,thatthelanguageofwaterscarcitytoooftenisusedbycorporationsandgovernmentstojustifyincreasesinsupplyforwater-intensive development projects, such as the Narmada WaterProject, that often end upworsening scarcity formarginalised groupswhile enriching a few rich farmers and industries. Meanwhile,traditionalandmoreeffectivegrassrootswater-securityprojects,suchasrain harvesting, are neglected and underfunded.Mehta declares, ‘Thestoryofdecliningrainfallobscuresthefactthatwaterhasbeenmisusedandregulationsconstantlycircumvented.Thepowerof thewaterlordsremainsunquestionedandtheirgreedisexonerated.’10Larry Swatuk, a professor at the University of Waterloo, also

questionsthebasisonwhichmostscarcityismeasured:

Thedominant‘freshwateravailability’mapsthatonefindsaroundtheworld turn on our accepting the fact that if a country has less than1700cubicmetrespercapitaperyearofwater,thenitsuffersseriouswaterissues.However,thismeasuresonlybluewateravailability(i.e.,groundwater recharge and runoff availability) relative to population.Yet,ofthewaterthatweindividuallyconsume,about80–90percentofthatisinourfood,mostofwhichderivesfromrain-fedagriculture,which is green water – i.e., transpired rainfall. So the dominantscarcity indicator is in fact a fiction. Ifyoucast thenarrativenot asone of scarcity due to population divided by freshwater availability,butoneofresourcecapturebythefewandecologicalmarginalizationofthemany,youseethatwehavelotsofwaterbut,inMehta’sterms‘sociallyconstructedthescarcity’.11

Thelanguageofscarcityhideshowwateriscurrentlydistributedandisalsowasted.Waterscarcityisbothapovertyandequityissue.Notonlydooneinfivepeopleinthedevelopingworldlackaccesstocleanwater,but daily per capita use ofwater varies dramatically too, from 10–20litres in residential areasof sub-SaharanAfrica, compared to200–600litres in Japan, the US, and developed countries in Europe. The pooralsotendtopayasmuchasfivetotentimesmoreinslumcommunitiesofdevelopingcountriesthanpeoplewhohaveaccesstopipedwater.12Wealthiercommunitiesalsotendtousemorewater,becauseitisless

expensive for them. The historic drought in California of 2013–15showedhow,evenintheUS,percapitaconsumptionofwaterdifferedwildlybetween rich andpoor neighbourhoods andbetween residentialand industrial areas. Affluent residential Hillsborough has the highestpercapitawateruse,atanaverage334gallonsaday,comparedtothe79 gallons a day used by residents in working-class East Palo Alto,which is just 14miles away.Golf courses are also known to be largegulpersofwater,andinPalmSprings,ashocking736gallonsadayperpersonareusedandwastedtomaintainvastlawns.13Thisinequalityalsoofcourseaffectshowscarcityisexperienced.For

poor and marginalised people who rely on these resources for theirlivelihood,sustenanceandwayoflife,waterscarcityisdevastatingandhasalreadycausedmanytomigratetocitiesthatincreasinglyfacetheirownpressurestodeliverwatertoall theircitizens.Therearealsoreal,physical changes in communities’ landscapes when floods ravage awholetownorwhenriversdryup.

Thescrambleforwatersecurity

The language of water scarcity and climate change-induced relatedconflicts is nevertheless shaping how many prominent actors areapproaching the future. Swatuk writes: ‘Securitizing water through ascarcityandconflictnarrative,however,allowsfortheusualsuspectsto

creepinandcapturewater–notonlytheresourcebutalsothewaysandmeansofthinkingandactinginthenameofwaterscarcity.’14Onesuch‘suspect’istheUSintelligencesector.According to the US Intelligence Community Assessment, Global

WaterSecurity,releasedinFebruary2012:

… during the next 10 years, water problems will contribute toinstabilityinstatesimportanttoU.S.nationalsecurityinterests.Watershortages,poorwaterquality,andfloodsbythemselvesareunlikelytoresult in state failure. However, water problems – when combinedwith poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectualleadership, and weak political institutions – contribute to socialdisruptions that can result in state failure…we judge that aswatershortages become more acute beyond the next 10 years, water insharedbasinswillincreasinglybeusedasleverage;theuseofwaterasa weapon or to further terrorist objectives also will become morelikelybeyond10years.

Waterhaslongbeentiedtosecurityissuesandattributedasthesourceofconflicts.ThePacificInstitutehasdocumentedmorethan300water-relatedconflictsandinstancesofviolencesince3000bce.15Theyarguethatdisputesoveraccesstowaterhavebeenaconstantfeatureofmanyancient andmodern societies.The risksof these conflicts aregrowingwiththeincreaseofpopulation,demandforresourcesandeconomicandenvironmentalpressuresonwater.Forexample,battlesoverwatertookcentre stage in the annexation of territories and the occupation of theWest Bank, Golan Heights and Gaza Strip by Israel in 1967. Morerecently, analysis of the 2012 Syrian uprising suggests that droughtplayedasignificantroleinthecountry’supheaval.16Asia,inparticular,isconsideredtobeattheforefrontofhotspotsfor

‘waterwars’.In2010,PakistansuedIndiaattheInternationalCourtofArbitration over the latter’s Kishanganga hydropower project on thecontested area of theNeelumRiver inKashmir, saying it violates the

IndusTreatyof1960.NepalandIndiaarealsoinsimilardisputesoverthe governance of the Kosi River. Control of Tibet’s glaciers andplateauliesattheheartofmanyoftheseconflicts,asitisthesourceoftheworld’sgreatestriversystemsandthusalifelineorsourceofwaterfor China, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Cambodia, Pakistan, Laos,Thailand,VietnamandMyanmar–countries that together account for47percentoftheworld’spopulation.Theseconflictsaddfueltothecommonadagethatthenextworldwar

will be about water, rather than oil or ideology. However, a closeranalysisofhistorysuggests thatwater issueshavemoreoftenthannotbeen grounds for cooperation, rather than conflict. Irina Bokova,director-generalofUNESCO,pointsoutthatnearly‘450agreementsoninternationalwatersweresignedbetween1820and2007.’17Similarly,aseminal paper published in 1998 by ProfessorAaronWolf ofOregonState University notes that during the twentieth century, ‘only sevenminorskirmishes’occurredand‘nowarhaseverbeenfoughtoverwater…while145water-relatedtreatiesweresignedinthesameperiod.’18‘A lot of timeswe believe that scarcity drives conflict,’ saysWolf,

wheninfact,‘scarcityisnotthesoledriverofconflict;it’snoteventheprimary driver of conflict.’19 His studies show that conflicts aroseprimarily when rapid change overwhelmed the existing institutionalcapacitytoabsorbthatchange.Inpractice,thismeansthatconflict(andavoiding it) has more to do with governance mechanisms thangeography.The likelihood of conflict increases, however, when powerful

countries such as India and China have tried to exploit their riparianpositionanddominance,andtreatedwatersecurityasazero-sumgame.PrimeMinisterWenJibao’sstatementthat‘waterscarcitythreatensthevery“survivaloftheChinesenation”’istellinginthisregard,anditisreflectedinChina’semphasisonsovereigncontrolofTibet.20However,itisalsoexpressedinChina’smassiveandextensiveeffortstodamitsriverstosolveitsownwatercrisesandenergydemandsbroughtaboutby the spread of intensive farming, export-oriented agriculture,water-

intensive industries such as mining, a burgeoning middle class thatwants high water-consuming comforts such as washing machines,rapidlyincreasinghouseholdconsumptionandgrowingcities.The growing nationalism, self-interest and narrowly technical

approaches to water management – in the context of climate-changeimpacts – are already creating a scenario in which regional playersjustify a more aggressive foreign policy. Indeed, even hegemonicnationsoutsidetheregionareseekingtousethedivisionstointervene.Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton justified increased USinvolvement in the strategic region as an ‘expert in watermanagement’21thatcanprovidelegalandinstitutionalarrangementsforwater-dispute resolution, especially for seven major river basins,includingtheNileandMekong.Ofcourse,itisnocoincidencethattheUSinterestinthisareaemergesatthesametimeasits‘pivottoAsia’,inanattempttocounteractgrowingChinesepower.

Corporatewatergrabbing

Whilegovernmentsseek tobothconfrontand takeadvantageofwaterinsecurity,globalfinancialcapital–privateinvestors,hedgefundsandotherspeculators–seektoprofit.Corporateleadersforsometimehavearguedthatwater,asthesinglemostimportantresource,isthenewoilof the twenty-first century. Thismeans that investing in this ‘blue orliquidgold’isano-brainer(evenifinpracticemanyprivatecompanieshave found that delivering water services is not as easy or publiclypalatable as theyhad initiallyhoped).Still,water remains the ‘perfectcommodity’: it is inflation proof, it can be sold any time, everyoneneeds it, and demand will continue to grow, especially as populouscountriesandemergingmarkets likeChinaandIndiaexperiencewaterstress.The ‘scarcity card’ is used as a pretext to justify the corporate

scramble to secure water. One glaring example is how corporate

investors in agriculture are often as keen to securewater resources asland, given the importance of water to agriculture. Behind the recentsurgeinlandgrabbinglaysanevenmoresignificantexpansionofwatergrabbing. Environmental scientists peg that water grabbing bycorporationsworldwide amounts to 454billion cubicmetres annually,whichisabout5percentofglobalwateruseperyear.22Inmanycases,corporations have received backing from nation states such as China,and Middle Eastern and Gulf countries, as well as the US and EUmemberstates,whichthroughleasesinothercountriesbothobscureandoutsourcetheirlackofwatersustainabilitytoothercountries.Thewaterneeds of local communities, fromwherewater is grabbed, are all toooftenignoredorforgotten.This was the case, for example, in Mozambique, where a 30,000-

hectare sugarcane plantation for ethanol was set up by the ProCanacorporation for the British company Bioenergy Africa and theMozambicangovernment.The land isnear theMassingirDam,whichpresently generates electricity for export; however, the Mozambicangovernment earlier granted ProCana extensive rights for irrigationwatersfromthedam.23AccordingtoresearchgroupFIAN,such

… [re]allocation of water resources undermines the autonomy andcapacityofadjacentlocalcommunitiestoproducefood.Moreovertheprojectwouldaffectthepastoralistsbydisruptingspacesforlivestockgrazing and pastoralist routes. There is a great risk that thesecommunitieswouldlosetheirlandsandlivelihoodsagainsttheirwillandwithoutbeingproperlyreallocatedandcompensated.24

Agrofuel production is in fact one of the key drivers for the surge inland andwater grabbing.Agrofuel production is verywater intensive.EstimatessuggesttheamountofwaterrequiredforproducingonelitreofethanolintheUScanrangefrom5litresupto2,138litres,dependingonregionalirrigationpractices.25Waterconsumptionandagrochemicaluse during agrofuel production also adversely impacts both the

availabilityandqualityofwater.Whereverithappens,watergrabbinghasgravehumanandecological

costs;whencompaniespolluteriversbymismanagingwaterresources,theentirewaterflowisaffected,aswellasthelivesofallthosethatrelyon them. In the USMidwest, agrofuel production has contributed tosignificantcontaminationoftheMississippiRiverandoxygendepletionin theGulf ofMexico,whichhave causedhigh levels of fishkill andloss of marine diversity. In Ethiopia’s Gambela region, a Saudibillionaire acquired a plantation and diverted water from the AlweroRiver,whichisthesourceoflivelihoodforthousandsofpeople,mostlyrelyingonfishingandfarming.26

Waterprofiteers

Thespectreofwatershortagesandhighdemandhasledtoanewkindof water profiteer. PICOHoldings, a US private company which hasbusiness interests inwaterresourcesandstorage,agribusinessandrealestate,spottedthepotentialgapandhasacquiredmorethan54hectares(134,130 acres) of water rights in Nevada, Arizona and Colorado.27

With an averagevalueof$3,500per acre,28 the company can earn asmuchas$469million–turningwaterintomoney.Similarly,legendaryUS-basedoil investorT.BoonePickens spent$100million tobuyupwaterrightsinTexasandbuilda250-milepipelinetothecityofDallas,wherehehopestosellwater.Pickensownsmorewaterrightsthananyother individual in theUS, having acquired the right to drain over 65billion gallons of water per year from the Ogallala Aquifer.29 RoyalDutchShell is reportedly buying rights toColorado’s groundwater, asthe corporation plans to extract oil from the shale deposits there30

throughhydraulicfracturing,orfracking.31Theconfluenceofinterestsinoil/energyandwaterhasemergedasa

permanentnexusamonginvestors,becausetheyareinextricablylinked.

On the one hand, energy and power production requires water forthermoelectric cooling, hydropower, mining and extractive industries,and fossil-fuel production and use. On the other hand, production ofpotable water requires electricity for extraction, transportation anddelivery.In fact, all corporations that use large of quantities of water are

seeking to secure their supplies, expecting climate-induced scarcity.Some of the active buyers of land andwater rights in theUS includemultinational investors Nile Trading and Development, BHP Billiton,UnitechandmediamagnateTedTurner.32Theresultisaboomingprivatewaterindustryandagrowingtradein

water rights andwater-related investments.According toMarcRobertofWaterAssetManagement,aNewYorkhedgefund,‘climatechangeforusisadriver.’33Already, thehedgefundiscashinginondrought,with about $400 million allocated for the purchase of water rights,creatingprivateequityandmakingstockmarket investments inwater-treatmentcompanies.Forinvestors,waterisa‘naturalgrowthmarket’,as demands for technology, infrastructure and ways to provide watercontinuetorisesteadily,alongwithwaterprices.Withthemarketfastmaturingandstilllargelyunregulated,thewaterindustryisexpectedtogrow annually from 5 to 7 per cent; its value set to grow from $425billionto$1trillionwithinfiveyears.RoughlythreehundredglobalwatercompaniesfromtheUS,Europe

and Japan that dominate the water-industry market are the majorbeneficiaries of this speculative boom.34 The big players include theUK’sprivateutilities,SuezEnvironmentandFrance’sVeolia,aswellasbottling companies such as Coca-Cola. Manufacturers andinfrastructure-serviceproviderssuchasSwiss-basedPentairLtd,Texas-based Flowserve Corporation, New York-based Xylem, Japan-basedKuritaWater Industries, Ltd and Hong Kong-based China EverbrightInternational are also expected to cash in.35 These companies havecarvedoutaspecialnicheinwaterefficiency,recyclingandtreatment,byprovidingsupplyengineeringandtechnology,includingdesalination,

filtration,conservationandwastemanagement.Theirgrowthratesmaybeevenhigher than thoseofwaterutilities.TheCalvertGlobalWaterFund, for instance, hasholdings in infrastructure stocks to the tuneof$197million.Theinvestmentboomhascreatedanincreasinglyfinancialisedwater

sector. Specialised water-targeted investment funds (exchange-tradedwater funds, hedge funds and water certificates) are already beingoffered by major investment banks in stock markets. These includesubsidiariesofNetherland’sRabobank’sSAMSustainableWaterFundand Sarasin Sustainable Water Fund, Pictet Water Fund, SwisscantoEquityFundWater,andTarenoWaterfund.AccordingtotheAmericanecologicalplannerandengineerJoShing

Yang:

… the real story of the global water sector is a convoluted oneinvolving ‘interlocking globalized capital’: Wall Street and globalinvestment firms, banks, and other elite private-equity firms – oftentranscending national boundaries to partner with each other, withbanks and hedge funds,with technology corporations and insurancegiants,withregionalpublic-sectorpensionfunds,andwithsovereignwealthfunds–aremovingrapidlyintothewatersectortobuyupnotonly water rights and water-treatment technologies, but also toprivatizepublicwaterutilitiesandinfrastructure.36

There is much reason to worry about the corporate profiteering andcontrol ofwater. Thewater demands of agribusiness out-compete theneedsofotherusers,suchassmallandfamilyfarmers.Miningandotherextractiveindustriesarenotonlywaterintensive,theyalsopolluteandpoisonlandsandwatersourcesandthreatenthelivesandlivelihoodsofrural communities, especially indigenous peoples. In Latin America,mining operations are in constant conflict with local indigenouscommunities.InEcuador,forexample,ChevronOilhasbeenfined$18billionforcontaminatingwaterresources.InthePhilippines,morethanhalf of the ancestral domains of indigenous peoples are affected by

miningoperations,72percentofwhichoperatewithoutsecuringpriorandinformedconsent(FPIC).37Furthermore,thelargestcorporateusersofwater,suchasNestléand

Coca-Cola, have been embroiled in a number of conflicts aroundextraction of water at the expense of local communities. In drought-strickenCalifornia,Nestléisunderattackfordrainingthestate’saquiferand thensellingbottledwaterback to thepublicatasteepprofit.Thecompanyreportedthatin2014,itused705milliongallons–enoughtofill 1,068Olympic-size swimming pools.38 Coca-Colameanwhile hadits recent application to operate in Varanasi, North India, rejected in2014bylocalauthoritiesduetomassiveprotestsbylocalactivistsandNGOs.Yetwecanexpectmanymoresuchstrugglesandconflict,sincethecompanyhasaggressiveplanstogrowinIndiaandotherdevelopingnations,asitsmarketsintheUSdeclineduetoincreasingpublichealthconcerns.

Greenwatergrabbing

Theintricatewebofwaterprofiteersisabletothriveinpartbecauseofitssuccess inrecentyears inremakinginternationalwatergovernance.First,aseriesof internationaldeclarationsdeclaredwateraneconomicgood, including the 1992Dublin Statement onWater and SustainableDevelopment,reinforcedinAgenda21,andtheministerialdeclarationsof theWorldWaterForum39 inTheHague andKyoto.Now, under anew framework called the ‘green economy’, promoted heavily at theUnited Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012(Rio+20),waterandthewholeofnaturearenowdeemedcapital.Under the rubric of the ‘green economy’, water and other

environmental services are treated as an economic asset, in which aprice is put on all the dimensions, services and functions of water.Proponentsarguethattheinstrumentsofthemarketarepowerfultoolsforconservingwater,improvingwaterquality,ensuringefficientwater

useandprotectingwateritself.However,puttingapriceonnaturegoesbeyondtheprivatisationandcommodificationofwaterasapublicgoodandservice;itsetsthestageforthecreationofmarketswherewaterandits ecosystem functions (for example, water purification by pristinewatershedsorcarbonsequestrationbyforestsandoceans)canbetraded,whilepeople’srightsandcommoninterestsareignored.Theresulthasbeenamajorfilliptowater-rightstrading,aproperty-

rights approach encouraged by the World Bank as a cornerstone ofwater management for both solving water scarcity and encouragingprivate-sector investment. Virtual platforms, such as EcosystemMarketplace,40 provide the latest updates and investment possibilitiesforcarbon,wateranddiversitymarkets,enabling thecorporateprivatesectorandspeculatorstoprofitfromecologicalcrises.The agriculture sector in particular is being eyed for water-rights

trading.Australiacurrentlyhasoneofthemostdevelopedwater-rightssystemsin theworld.AccordingtowaterbrokerWaterfind, temporaryandpermanentwater-rightstradingacrossspecialisedexchangesinthecountry totalled$1.3billion in2010,and it isexpected togrowby20per cent per year.41 However, this approach in practice hasdiscriminated against small farmers and indigenous communities whodepend on these resources for their livelihoods.A 2013 report by theInstituteofAgricultureandTradePolicy,pennedbyShineyVarghese,whoalsoservesontheUNCommitteeonFoodSecurity’sHighLevelPanel of Experts (CFS-HLPE), notes that the experience for localagriculturalwaterusersand family farmershasbeen that ‘thecostsofconveyance facilities forwater transfers are to be borne by the publicwhile the benefits accrue to those engaged inwater trading.To them,thisprocessappearstobeaprivateappropriationofpublicresources.’42Globalwatertradingforfinancialgainsisstillinitsinfancy,anditis

part of a broader move towards using market mechanisms to tackleecologicalcrises.Carbontradingisthemostinfamous.Whiletherearestillnoglobalwater-offsetmarkets,aswater is stillpubliclyowned inmostcountries,proposalsareunderwaytoestablishtradingschemesthat

will separate land ownership and entitlements to water resources toallowfor their transfer toprivateparties.Supplyanddemandcan thendeterminethemarketprice.The nearest example of a water-offset market is the so-called

mitigation banking or wetland savings account in the US, whichwasestablished through the 2004 Federal Clean Water Act and theEndangeredSpeciesAct.UndertheCleanWaterAct,anyonewhoplanstodredgeawetlandthatnurturesotherwaterbodiesismandatedtofindaway toavoid theirdestruction, that is, ‘establish,enhance, restoreorpreserve’ an amount ofwetland equal to or greater thanwhatwill bedredged, usually within the same watershed. The goal of mitigationbanks is to generate credits that can be sold to developers laterasoffsets.43However, whose interests would such a system serve? Critics of

carbon trading point out that the big polluters – corporations andpowerfulgovernments–canbestaffordcreditswhiledoingnothingtochangetheirdamagingpractices.Withwater,similaractorswouldprofitwiththesamenegativeconsequences.

Adaptationforwhom?

Under the dominant corporate mindset, it doesn’t take long beforetechnical and infrastructure solutions are sought for issues of waterdistribution. As far back as 1825, vainglorious engineers proposedcapturingicebergsandmovingthemtoplaceswithoutwater.44In2008,suchmadcapproposalscamealittleclosertoreality,whentheCanadianhedge fund Sextant reportedly bought 95-year water rights to threeglaciers in northernEurope.According to the hedge fund, one glacierwouldbeusedtocreatebottledwaterandtheothertwowouldprovidebulkwater transported tocustomers in24,000-litrecontainersor supertankers.TheproposalwaseventuallyexposedasaPonzischeme,as itbecame clear that the costs would be too high to be economically

feasible (transporting water costs more than expensive desalinationprocesses).However, the scheme still lives on, this time as awebsiteofferingbottledglacierwater(drinksnowater.com).45Expensivewaterworks havebeen the staple solution for decades for

countrieswishingtohavewaterwhereit isn’ttobefound.Inthemid-nineteenth century, they were pioneered by Sir Arthur Cotton, anirrigation engineer, who by the time of Indian Independence hadbequeatheda legacyof100,000kilometresof irrigationcanals inbothIndia and Pakistan. During the New Deal years, California built aconduitofdamsandcanalstodiverttheColoradoRivertoaprominentagriculturalregion,theImperialValley.Thiswasfollowedin1960withtheworld’slargestwater-conveyancesystem–theStateWaterProject–whichtransportswaterfromnorthernCaliforniatomeettheneedsofthemorepopulousandwater-scarcesouth.Mostofthesecanalshavereliedondams.Inthetwentiethcentury,a

dambecamethesymbolofdevelopment,andtheycontinuetobebuilttoday, notably in China and Brazil, as governments seek to stock,harvestandfunnelanevengreatershareofrainwatertowardsirrigation,electricity, domestic and other uses.46Meanwhile in the PersianGulf,where options for transporting water are less feasible, close to threehundred desalination plants have been constructed, the majority ofwhicharelocatedinSaudiArabia.47These engineering marvels have not been without their costs. The

iconicColoradoRiver,forexample,nowtopsthe2013listoftheUS’stenmostendangeredrivers.Ithasbecomesodrythattherivernolongerenters theGulf ofMexico. In Pakistan, irrigation schemes have left alegacyofwaterloggingand salination that affectsmore than3millionhectaresintheIndusBasin,andleadstomanyfarmersabandoningsalt-encrusted farmland each year.48 Meanwhile, the most extensiveevaluationofdamsbytheWorldCommissiononDamsconcludedthat,whiledamshavebroughtbenefitsforhumandevelopment,‘intoomanycases an unacceptable and often unnecessary price has been paid tosecure thosebenefits,especially insocialandenvironmental terms,by

peopledisplaced,bycommunitiesdownstream,bytaxpayersandbythenaturalenvironment.’49Inthecontextofclimatechange,relianceoninfrastructuretoresolve

water distribution has further uncertainties.As theUNwarns, ‘Large-scale structural measures, for example, often require accurateinformationregardingflows,sedimentloads,extremeeventfrequenciesandotherhydrologicalcharacteristics’thatnolongerexist.Itnotesthatapproaches that are smaller in scale, locally controlled and rely onnaturalsystems,suchasthe‘absorptivecapacityofriparianandwetlandareas,maybemoreresilientunderhighlyvariableconditions’.50Nevertheless, some companies are gearing up for some of the

infrastructureandtechnologythatispredictedtobeappliedtoadaptingto climate change, particularly in the field of flood control. Dutchengineering firmArcadis is one such company, and its revenues havegrowndramatically–increasingby26percentin2012to$3.25billion,thanks partly to Superstorm Sandy.51 The company has baggedcontracts inNewYorkCity, NewOrleans and San Francisco to dealwithfloodprotectionandrisingsealevelsandhassecuredmorethan$3billioninrevenuesin2014.InCalifornia,engineeringgiantCHM2Hillis gearing up to benefit from the $15 billion expected to be spent onbuilding a new water-conveyance infrastructure, designed in part toaddressclimate-changeimpacts.

Bluewashing

Thecorporatetakeoveroftheclimate-adaptationagendaiscoupledwithagooddoseofcorporategreenwashing,perhapsmoreaccuratelycalled‘bluewashing’.Muchofthis takestheformofcorporations’promisingto reduce their ‘water footprint’,52 that is, the total volume of waterdirectlyor indirectly consumed/used in theproductionof aproductorservice.Multi-billion-dollarfoodgiantNestlé,forexample,claimsitis

reducing its water footprint throughout its supply chain. Yet, as theworld’sleadingdistributorofbottledwater,Nestléisbuiltonamodelofmakingprofitoutofscarceresources,andbypromotingbottledwater,itunderminesthepublicprovisionofwaterforall.Moreover,theseeffortstoreducerarelyprovidelong-termsolutionsto

the over-extraction ofwater in regionswheremany plants operate. InIndia, 9 out of 34 PepsiCo bottling plants operate in areas officiallydesignated as water-stressed (‘over-exploited’, ‘critical’, or ‘semi-critical’).53 More often than not, corporations seek to pay otherproducers, such as peasant farmers in India, to conserve water ratherthanmakeradicalreductionsthemselves.Thevoluntarynatureoftheseinitiativesalsomeansthereislittlescopeforindependentverificationofcompanyclaims.Thesecorporationsusetheirshowcaseefforts(insignificantcompared

to their overall impact) to justify their broader involvement in waterpolicy.Onesuchinstitutionisthe2030WaterResourcesGroup(WRG),a public-private platform established under theWorldBank’s private-sectorarm,theInternationalFinanceCorporation(IFC).Thecompaniesmost involved in the water industry dominate the group: beverages,mining, engineering and service companies.ChairedbyNestlé’sPeterBrabeck-Lethmathe, who is on record as saying that water should betreated like any other commodity, the WRG provides technical andanalyticalassistancetogovernmentsto‘transform’theirwaterpolicybyprivileging economically productive uses and linking them withcorporate partners. It has established active partnerships with thegovernments of South Africa, India, Jordan, Mongolia, Peru andMexico.Theircentralmessage,argued inmostof their reports, is thatwaterscarcitywillneedtoberesolvedthroughwaterefficiency,clearerwater rights and, of course, corporations’ involvement in institutionaldecisionmaking.Corporations argue that they share the risks fromwater scarcity and

therefore have a vested interest, alongwith other actors, in protectingwater.Whattheyfailtomentionisthatthe‘sharedrisk’theyfacelooks

very different from the perspective of a community losing access tocleanwaterduetoabottlingplantorashale-gasplant.As explored in a special issue of the journalWater Alternatives in

2012, increased corporate involvement in water policy opens up a‘Pandora’sbox’ofproblems.Theseincludeconflictingintereststhatpitthe public good against companies’ legal obligations to distantshareholders. But they also include a) policy and regulatory capturewherecorporationshavetheresourcesandknow-howtosteerpolicyintheir favour;b) inequities indecisionmaking,due tocorporateaccess,knowledgeandpower that invariably sideline themostvulnerableandmarginalised, and c) a tendency to displace and undermine localsustainablesolutionsinfavourofcorporatesolutionsthatdonotalwayshave benign effects and usually end up allocating water based on itshighesteconomicvalueratherthanitsoptimalvalue.54

Climatejustice=waterjustice

Asmanyactivistsunderthebannerof‘ClimateJustice’haveadvocated,addressing climate change in a socially just waywill require ‘systemchange’,andnowheremoresothanintheworldofwaterpolitics.Manyofthealternativesalreadyexist:fromapplyingagroecologicalmethodsinagriculture,toharvestingandconservingwater,tochangingwastefulpractices (bottled-water bans, grey-water systems utilising recycledhouseholdwastewaterfortoiletflushing)inurbanareas,toendingtheextractionoffossilfuelsandothernon-renewableresourcesthatleadtothe overuse and contamination of water. These alternatives can bothmitigatetheimpactsofclimatechangeaswellasbuildtheresiliencetorespondtoitsimpacts.Thekeywillbere-engineeringtheeconomyandpublicpolicytoallowtheseapproachestoflourish,andbeingpreparedtotacklethevestedpowersthatseektosustainanunsustainablesystem.It requiresapublicmodelofwatermanagement that ismoreable to

addressissuesofdistribution,justiceandfunctioningecosystemsthana

private-sectormodelthatseekstomaximisecapital.55Inmanycases,itwill defer to local decisionmaking: climate adaptation is best done atthe local level, where the impacts of both climate change and waterstressesare felt,andwheremore flexibleandappropriate responses towatermanagementcanemerge.InthewakeofSuperTyphoonHaiyan(localnameYolanda) in theprovinceofLeyte in thePhilippines, twopublicwaterutilities–theBaybayCityWaterDistrictandLeyteMetroWater District – were able to restore service and undertake rationingwithin24hours of the storm.According to on-the-ground reports, themanagement’s foresight and leadership became decisive, while theworkers’ determination also helped restore crucial municipal servicesdespitethembeingvictimsofthetyphoonthemselves.56Ensuring real popular participation is essential to empowering and

assisting communities with drought and flood planning, as well asdisastermanagement.Atthesametime,itwillbeimportanttolinklocaldecisionmakingwith internationalsolidarity,whichwillbecomeever-morecriticaltorespondingtotheunevenimpactsofclimatechange.Fortunately,theexistingpracticeofpublicandcommunityallocation

and management of water services and resources has already createdalternativemodels.One of these options is Public-Public Partnerships(PuPs):not-for-profit,mutuallybeneficialpartnershipsbetweenpublic-sectorwateroperators,localcommunities,tradeunionsandothersocial-economic groups. PuPs aim ‘to link up public water operators on anonprofit basis to strengthenmanagement and technical capacity’. Asopposed to Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), which look to marryprivate gain with public guarantees, PuPs are about sharing goodpractices and ideas, going beyond efficiency to look at issues ofreachingexcludedwaterusers, respectingworkers’ rightsandbuildingpopular and democratic participation in water services. A number ofPuPsaregearedtowardshealthywatershed-protectionprogrammesandclimate-adaptationplans.Anotherinnovativemodelthathasparticularrelevanceforadaptingto

climatechangeistheexampleofpublicutilitiesseekingtoprotecttheir

whole watershed, bridging urban and rural communities. In thePhilippines, public utilities in the Visayas and Mindanao invest inagroecologicalfarmingpracticesandincommunitylivelihoods,withthephilosophythat‘agoodenvironmentwillproducegoodwater.’Meanwhile in Thailand, the Ping River Basin Committee brought

together various upstream and downstream water users, along withfarmers and indigenous people relying on the river for livelihood andsustenance.Thegroupagreed towork toamutuallyagreedgoalofanecologically sustainable and equitable system of water allocation forall.57 Their example of ‘river diplomacy’ shows the potential forresolvingtransboundarywaterconflictsduringatimeofclimatechange,aspartiesrealisethatasituationofcooperationcanensurewaterforallmuchbetterthanazero-sumgame.Community collaboration has also proved highly effective in

protectingwatershedsandsourcesofwater inwater-scarce regions. InNew Mexico, in the US, an ancient system of communal irrigationcalledacequiashassustainedagricultureinanerstwhilearidregionandhas respected nature at the same time for the last four centuries. ThesystemwasintroducedbytheMoorsinsouthernSpain,whichwasthenbrought to the New World by the Spanish colonisers. The acequiasincluded

…specific governanceoverwater distribution,water scarcity plans,and all othermatters pertaining towhatwas viewed as a communalresource. The mayordomo, or watermaster, of the acequia madedecisionsaboutwaterdistributionamongcommunitymembers,withtheconsentandadviceoftheacequiamembers.58

To this day, this ancient system thrives, even in the US’s hyper-individualisedcapitalistsociety.

Newwatervision

Such models and examples promote a new vision for watermanagement,59onethatre-establisheswaterascommonsandprioritisessocial and ecological justice and democratisation within watergovernance.Theydrawonasetofprinciplesforwatergovernance,thatconsider:

•Water is a public good, a shared commons and a human right. Itbrings life, is a gift of nature, and its nurture remains theresponsibilityofeveryone.

• Ecosystems are interconnected,whichnecessitates breakingdownthefalsedivisionbetweenurbanandruralwatersystems.

• Wateraspartofnaturehasitsownlogic,whichmeansthatthelawsofnatureandtheintegrityofthewatercyclemustbemaintained.

•Water citizenship in themanagement andgovernanceofwater ortheactofstewardshipandprotectionofwater iscriticalandmustinvolveactivepopularparticipation.

• Social justice and just distribution must be central to any waterresourcemanagementpolicies.

• Aconservation-firstapproachmusttakeprecedenceover‘returnoninvestment’approaches.

•The state, or at least public utilities (whether local, regional ornational), have a critical role in ensuring the right to water andsanitation.

•Publicfundingisneededtoinvestinpublicsystemsandinstitutionsinordertocopewiththeadditionalpressuresofclimatechangeonwatersystems.

•

The power of corporations over water resources and watergovernance – especially that wielded by transnational watercompanies and extractive industry companies – must be rolledback.60

Adoptingtheseprincipleswillmeanthatitispossibletoachievewaterjusticeevenata timeofadditionalstress.But there isstillmuchtobedone in terms of implementing progressive models of watermanagement and governance as a strategy in shaping a progressiveadaptation to climate change. Learning from the past and thinking ofcreativewaystoachieve‘thefuturewewant’willbenecessary.As this chapter stated at the outset, the nature ofwater has a lot to

teach us as we face the growing challenge of climate change.Waterconnects everyone, from the farmer upstream to the city dwellerdownstream. It ignores all political boundaries and separations. Itspollution or over-extraction in one region will affect people, animalsand plants in another region. And it is likely to become the visualsymbol of ever increasing climate change, as countries faceunprecedented droughts in some regions and devastating floodselsewhere.Thegoodnews is that,despite thedoom-ladenwarningsof‘waterwars’,ourhistoryhasshownthatwaterismoreoftenacauseforcooperationthanconflict.InthewordsofAaronT.Wolf,water‘offersavehicleforbringingthosewhoshareittogetherand,sinceittouchesallwedoandexperience,itsuggestsalanguagebywhichwemaydiscussourcommonfuture.’61

Notes

1. Mehta,L.(2003).Contextsandconstructionsofscarcity.EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,38(48).Retrievedfromdoi:10.2307/4414344.

2.

UnitedNationsEnvironmentalProgramme.(2008).Waterwithdrawalandconsumption:Thebiggap,inS.DiopandP.Rekacewicz,eds.VitalStatistics:Anoverviewofthestateoftheworld’sfreshandmarinewaters(2ndedn).Nairobi,Kenya:UNEP.Retrievedfromhttp://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/article42.html.

3.OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence.(2012).TheIntelligenceCommunityAssessment(ICA):Globalwatersecurity.Retrievedfromhttp://www.dni.

gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/ICA_Global%20Water%20Security.pdf.

4.

TheJointMonitoringProgramforWaterSupplyandSanitationoftheWorldHealthOrganisationandtheUnitedNationsChildren’sFunddefinesanimproveddrinking-watersourceas‘onethat,bynatureofitsconstructionorthroughactiveintervention,isprotectedfromoutsidecontamination,inparticularfromcontaminationwithfaecalmatter’.Improveddrinking-watersourcesincludepipesonpremises,protectedsprings,publictapsorstandpipes,protecteddugwellsorboreholes,andrainwatercollection.Retrievedfromhttp://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/

5.

Theparameterswidelyadoptedindevelopmentpolicycircles,includingtheUNEnvironmentalProgramme,isMalinFalkenmark’s‘waterstressindex’,calculatedonthebasisofannualresourcesandpopulation.Thisdefinitionproposesathresholdof1,700cubicmeters(m3)perpersonperyear,belowwhichcountriesarecategorisedaswaterstressed;absolutescarcityislessthan50cubicmetersperpersonperyear.

6. UnitedNations.(n.d.).WaterScarcity.Retrievedfromhttp://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml.

7. Mehta,L.(2005).

8. UnitedNations–Water.(2014).Statistics.Retrievedfromhttp://www.unwater.org/statistics.

9.Vigna,A.(2015April).WhenSaoPaulo’swaterranout.LeMondediplomatique,Englishedition,April.Retrievedfromhttp://mondediplo.com/2015/04/10saopaulo.

10. Mehta,L.(2003).Contextsandconstructionsofwaterscarcity.EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,5066–72.

11.

Swatuk,L.(September2014).Correspondencewithauthor.Fordetails,seeSwatuk,L.A.,McMorris,M.,Leung,C.andZu,Y.(2015).Seeing‘invisiblewater’:Challengingconceptionsofwaterforfood,agricultureandhumansecurity.CanadianJournalofDevelopmentStudies,36(1),24–37.

12.UN–WaterandFoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations.(2007).CopingwithWaterScarcity:Challengeofthetwenty-firstcentury.Retrievedfromhttp://www.fao.org/nr/water/docs/escarcity.pdf.

13.CaliforniaDrought:Databaseshowsbigdifferencebetweenwaterguzzlersandsippers.(7February2014).MercuryNews.Retrievedfromhttp://www.mercurynews.com/science/ci_25090363/california-drought-water-use-varies-widely-around-state.

14. Swatuk,L.(September2014).

15. PacificInstitute.(n.d.).IssuesWeworkOn:Waterandconflict.Retrievedfromhttp://pacinst.org/issues/water-and-conflict/.

16.Mohtadi,S.(16August2012).ClimatechangeandtheSyrianuprising.BulletinoftheAtomicScientists.Retrievedfromhttp://thebulletin.org/climate-change-and-syrian-uprising.

17.Deen,T.(2September2013).Waterscarcitycoulddriveconflictorcooperation.InterPressServiceNewsAgency.Retrievedfromhttp://www.ipsnews.net/2013/09/water-scarcity-could-drive-conflict-or-cooperation/.

18.Wolf,A.T.(1998).Conflictandcooperationalonginternationalwaterways.WaterPolicy,1(2),251–65.Retrievedfromhttp://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/conflict_coop/.

19.

Jackson,M.(8April2014).USAIDlaunchesnewwater,conflict,andpeacebuildingtoolkit.NewSecurityBeat.Retrievedfromhttp://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2014/04/usaid-launches-water-conflict-peacebuilding-toolkit/#.U0gr-cYi5uZ.

20.

Klare,M.T.(2013).Enteringaresource-shockworld:Howresourcesscarcityandclimatechangeproduceaglobalexplosion.Tomdispatch.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175690/michale_klare_the_coming_global_explosion.

21.Biron,C.L.(9May2012).WaterconflictsmoveuponUSsecurityagenda.InterPressServiceNewsAgency.Retrievedfromhttp://www.ipsnews.net/2012/05/water-conflicts-move-upon-us-security-agenda.

22.

Rulli,M.C.,Saviori,A.andD’Odorico,P.(2012).Globallandandwatergrabbing.ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciencesoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,110(3),892–7.Retrievedfromhttp://www.pnas.org/content/110/3/892.full.

23.

Duetoprotestsandcontroversieshoundingthebioethanolproject,in2009,theMozambiquegovernmentrevokedtheconcessionduetonon-complianceofco

ntractualobligations.TheBritishinvestor,CAMECalsoannouncedthatitwillshiftitsinvestmenttomininginstead.

24.

FoodFirstInformationandActionNetwork.(2010).LandGrabbinginKenyaandMozambique:Areportontworesearchmissions–andahumanrightsanalysisoflandgrabbing.Germany:FIANInternationalSecretariat.Retrievedfrom https://www.inkota.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Themen_Kampagnen/Ernaehrung_und_Landwirtschaft/Land_Grabbing/Land_grabbing_in_Kenya_and_Mozambique_FIAN_EN.pdf.

25.Chiu,Yi-Wen,BrianWalseth,andSangwonSuh(2009).‘WaterEmbodiedinBioethanolintheUnitedStates.’EnvironmentalScienceandTechnology43.8:2688–692

26.GRAIN.(11June2012).SqueezingAfricaDry:Behindeverylandgrabisawatergrab.GRAINReport.Retrievedfromhttp://www.grain.org/article/entries/4516-squeezing-africa-dry-behind-every-land-grab-is-a-water-grab.

27.

Dwinnell,T.(17January2007).T.BoonePickensinvestsinwater–shouldyou?Retrieved fromhttp://seekingalpha.com/article/24410-t-boone-pickens-invests-in-water-should-you.Alsosee,Rees-Mogg,J.(11May2007)Howtoprofitfromtheworld’swatercrisis.MoneyWeek.Retrievedfromhttp://moneyweek.com/how-to-profit-from-the-worlds-water-crisis/.ForPICOHoldings,visittheirwebsite,http://www.picoholdings.com/index.html.

28.

ThevalueoflandandwaterrightsdifferssignificantlybetweenNevada,ColoradoandArizona.Therangeisfrom$2,100toasmuchas$7,500.Someanalystssaythatitcanclimbtoasmuchas$10,000duetothewatercrisis.IntheUS,seniorwaterrightsaremorevaluableandsoughtafter.

29.

Yang,J.(6May2014).WallStreetmega-banksarebuyinguptheworld’swater.PopularResistanceDailyMovementNewsandResources.Retrievedfromhttp://www.popularresistance.org/wall-street-mega-banks-are-buying-up-the-worlds-water/.

30.Befield,S.(11June2008).Therewillbewater.BloombergBusinessweekMagazine.Retrievedfromhttp://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-06-11/there-will-be-water.

31.Frackingisthenaturalgasandoilextractionpracticethatpumpsmillionsofgallonsofwater,sandandchemicalsintothegroundtobreakopenshaleformationstoaccesstheenergysourcesinside.

32. Bienkowski,B.(12February2013).Corporations,investors‘grabbing’landandwateroverseas.EnvironmentalHealthNews.Retrievedfromhttp://www.environmentalhealthnews.org/ehs/news/2013/land-grabbing.

33.

Campbell,M.andNicholson,C.V.(7March2013).Investorsseekwaystoprofitfromglobalwarming.BloombergBusinessweekMarkets&Finance.Retrievedfromhttp://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-07/investors-seek-ways-to-profit-from-global-warming.

34. WaterFund.(2013).Turningwaterintogold.Retrievedfromhttp://worldswaterfund.com/turning-water-into-gold.html.

35. Ibid.

36.Yang,J.(31October2008).Whybigbanksmaybetryingtobuyupyourpublicwatersystem.Alternet.Retrievedfromhttp://www.alternet.org/story/105083/why_big_banks_may_be_trying_to_buy_up_your_public_water_system.

37. PhilippinePartnershipfortheDevelopmentofHumanResourcesinRuralAreas.(2008).PhilippineAssetReformReportCard.QuezonCity:PhilDHRRA.

38.James,I.(8March2015).Bottlingwaterwithoutscrutiny.TheDesertSun.RetrievedApril8,2015,fromhttp://www.desertsun.com/story/news/2015/03/05/bottling-water-california-drought/24389417/.

39.

Everythreeyears,theWorldWaterCouncil(WWC),aMarseilles-basedpolicythinktankrunbytheWorldBank,developmentaidagenciesliketheUnitedNations,themajorwatercorporationssuchasVivendiandSuez,waterministriesofanumberofNortherncountries,andwaterexpertsandprofessionals,hoststheWorldWaterForum(WWF).

40. Visithttp://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/.

41.O’Connor,S.(23July2008).Thirstymarketseyewater.FinancialTimes.Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ff3e5756-58c8-11dd-a093-000077b07658.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3YvfRlu7i.

42.Varghese,S.(March2013).Watergovernanceinthe21stcentury:LessonsfromwatertradingintheUSandAustralia.InstituteforAgricultureandTradePolicy,7.

43.Kenny,A.(31March2008).NewEPAwetlandguidelinestoboostmitigationbanks.Retrievedfromhttp://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=5706&section=home&eod=1.

44. Merton,T.(1825).TheLiteraryMagnetoftheBellesLettres,Science,andtheFineArts.London:W.C.Wright.

45.McKenzie,F.(14June2013).Glaciersforsale.TheInvestigativeFund.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theinvestigativefund.org/investigations/envirohealth/1806/glaciers_for_sale.

46. Everard,M.(2013).HydropoliticsofDams:Engineeringorecosystems?NewYork:ZedBooks.

47.AhmedZainAidrous,I.(18August2008).HowtoovercomethefreshwatercrisisintheGulf.RussianInternationalAffairsCouncil:MiddleEastAnalysis.Retrievedfromhttp://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=4190#top.

48.Qureshi,A.S.,McCornick,P.G.,Qadir,M.M.andAslam,Z.Z.(2008).ManagingsalinityandwaterloggingintheIndusBasinofPakistan.AgriculturalWaterManagement,95(1),1–10.

49. WorldCommissiononDams.(2000).DamsandDevelopment:Anewframeworkfordecision-making.London:Earthscan.

50. UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforEurope.(2009).GuidanceonWaterandAdaptationtoClimateChange.NewYork:UnitedNations.

51. SeeArcadiswebsite:www.arcadis.com.

52.

ThistermwascoinedbyProfessorArjenY.HoekstraoftheNetherlands.Hefurtherstatesthatwaterproblemsareconnectedwiththestructureoftheglobaleconomy.Formorereadingmaterialsaboutwaterfootprint,seehttp://www.waterfootprint.org.

53.

Hall,D.andLobina,E.(2012).Conflicts,companies,humanrightsandwater:Acriticalreviewoflocalcorporatepracticesandglobalcorporateinitiatives.Retrieved from http://www.world-psi.org/sites/default/files/documents/research/psiru_conflicts_human_rights_and_water.pdf.

54.Hepworth,N.D.(2012).OpenforbusinessoropeningPandora’sbox?Aconstructivecritiqueofcorporateengagementinwaterpolicy:Anintroduction.WaterAlternatives,5(3),543–62.

55.Schlosberg,D.(2013).Politicalchallengesoftheclimate-changedsociety.PS:PoliticalScience&Politics,46,13–17.

56.Manahan,M.A.(30June2014).Philippines’publicwatersystemsinthefaceofdisastersandclimatechange.MunicipalServicesProjectExploringAlternativestoPrivatization.Retrievedfromhttp://www.municipalservicesproject.org/blog/philippines-public-water-systems-face-disasters-and-climate-change#sthash.MsNoNZr8.dpuf.

57.

Dargantes,B.B.,Manahan,M.A.andBatistel,C.(2012).Springsofhope:AlternativestocommercializationofwaterresourcesandservicesinAsia,inMcDonald,D.A.andRuiters,G.,eds.AlternativestoPrivatizationPublicOptionsforEssentialServicesintheGlobalSouth.London:Routledge:RoutledgeStudiesinDevelopmentandSocietySeries.

58.Sandoval,A.(May2010).Ancienttraditionskeepdesertwatersflowing.YesMagazine.Retrievedfromhttp://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/water-solutions/ancient-traditions-keep-desert-waters-flowing.

59.

Formoreexamples,readDargantes,B.,Manahan,M.A.,Moss,D.andSuresh,V.(2012).WaterCommons,WaterCitizenshipandWaterSecurity.Retrievedfrom http://www.focusweb.org/content/water-commons-water-citizenship-and-water-security,orhttp://www.ourwatercommons.org/water-commons-citizenship-security.

60.

Manahan,M.A.(June2010).AlternativeModelsforWaterGovernanceandManagement:Thepeople’schallengeto‘greeneconomy’.Retrievedfromhttp://focusweb.org/content/alternative-models-water-governance-and-management-people%E2%80%99s-challenge%E2%80%9Cgreen-economy%E2%80%9D.

61. Wolf,A.T.(2012).Spiritualunderstandingsofconflictandtransformationandtheircontributiontowaterdialogue.WaterPolicy,14(S1),73–88.

10

POWERTOTHEPEOPLE:RETHINKING‘ENERGY

SECURITY’

ThePlatformCollective1

He who is firmly seated in authority soon learns to think security, and notprogress,thehighestlessonofstatecraft.

JamesRusselLowell,USdiplomat,1870

Inrecentyears, theconceptof‘energysecurity’hascometodominatemediaandpolicydebateson theprovisionofheat, lightandpower. Ithas been adopted both by oil corporations and increasingly by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as away of talking about energyprovisionandfutures.However, the term‘energysecurity’embracesanumberofdifferent–andoftencontradictory–elementsdependingonwhether thediscussion isaboutsupplying theeconomy,consumers,orpeople.Forsome,itmeanshavingaccesstoawarmhomeorthemeansto cook; for a government, it might mean producing more oildomestically or guaranteeing access to oil and gas fields; for an oilcorporation, it could mean preserving a delicate balance betweenabundanceandscarcity(that is,ensuring theyhaveenoughreserves tokeeptheirsharepricehighbutnotsomuchoilavailablethatthepriceofoil starts to fall). The phrase has multifarious meanings that are

groundedindifferenthistoriesandpromotedifferentassumptions.Energycompaniesandpoliticaleliteshavebeensuccessfulinpushing

energy security to the topof thepolitical agenda, andmaximising theterm’sambiguitytoadvancetheirowninterests.2Theimprecisenotionof energy securitymakes it easier for politicians and their advisers topush regressive,militaristic, social and environmental programmes byevoking an ill-defined threat to ‘energy’ and reinforcing a narrowlydefinedexclusionarytypeofsecurity.Inthischapter,welookatexamplesofhowenergysecurityisusedto

furtherjustifytheaggressiveexpansionof‘unconventional’fossilfuels,the use of military resources to secure energy transport routes, thesuppression of protests against further fossil fuel extraction with thethreat that otherwise ‘the lights will go out’, and the expansion ofrenewable energy in away that ignores concerns about human rights,democraticgovernance,orenergyaccess.Weconsiderwhoseinterestsare being evoked in discussions of energy security, which voices aregranted credence and which are excluded – in other words, what isbeingsecuredandforwhom?3

Ahistoryofenergysecurity

Anearlyandsignificantmanifestationofenergysecuritypolicycanbefoundintherun-uptotheFirstWorldWar,whenstrategicdecisionsbyBritishmilitaryplannerstofueltheBritishNavywithoilinsteadofcoalset in motion a literal sea-change in thinking about energy sources.ForeignSecretaryLordCurzon,afterthewar,remarkedthat‘theAllieshadfloated tovictoryuponawaveofoil.’Thegovernment’sstrategicdecisioninfavourofoilensuredthatAnglo-PersianOil–aforerunnerofBP–wasabletostartextractingoilinvolume.4Thisshifttopetroleumasakeysourceofenergyfortheindustrialised

West – and the need to acquire oil supplies from halfway across theglobe, in contrast to relying on readily abundant domestic reserves of

coal – set in motion a century of geopolitical turmoil, conflict andcompetitionthathasdominatedworldaffairseversince.Thecontentionbetween Turkey and Britain in the early 1920s over Iraq’s oil-richMosul, Imperial Japan’sexpansionistpolicyof the1930s that led toafour-year war in the Pacific, Adolf Hitler’s invasion of Russia, andAmerica’srepeatedmilitaryinterventionsintheMiddleEastsince1945–allwerespurredonbyanincreasingdependenceonoil,andaneedtosecureitssupply.5Thefirstappearanceof‘energysecurity’asa terminmodernpolicy

debateswasduringthe1970senergycrisis.Then,governmentsinvokednow-familiar energy-security refrains as a response to OPEC-inducedoil-price shocks abroad, and strikes by coal-mining unions at home.While some environmentalists at the time attempted to use energy-security arguments to advocate alternative energy strategies, such asusing renewables and reducing fossil-fuel demand, the debate wasdriven by the policy establishment. The International Energy Agency(IEA),foundedattheheightofthe1974oilcrisisthanksinlargeparttothelobbyingeffortsofUSSecretaryofStateHenryKissinger,wassetup to be an ‘energyNATO’.6 Energy security lay at its heart: in thewords of Edward Morse, former US representative to the IEA, thefoundingmemberstatessoughtto‘blunttheuseoftheoilweapon’.7Energysecurityhasresurfacedasakeyconcernofstatesanddefence

forces in the past few years because of the unprecedented oil pricespikes of 2007–08 and the ‘endof cheapoil’.8 (Most analysts believethattheslumpinoilpricesin2014–15islikelytobetemporaryduetothecontinualriseinproductioncostsanddecliningratesofextraction.)Securityofsupplyisnowanimportantgoalofenergypolicyformanycountries,andalwayssupersedeslookingathowenergyisusedandthedamaging impacts of our current energy model. It is unthinkinglyequated with well-being: as the European Commission Energy 2020puts it: ‘Energy is the lifebloodofoursociety.Thewell-beingofourpeople,industryandeconomydependsonsafe,secure,sustainableand

affordableenergy.’9TheEUisnotaloneinprioritisingenergysecurityoverclimateinsecurity–theObamaadministrationintheUShasdoneeverything it can to increase petroleum production in US territory,includingexpansionintooffshoreareasthatwerelongclosedtodrillingduetoenvironmentalconcerns.ThisactionhasbeentakentoboostUSdomestic energy consumption and according to Tom Donilon, thepresident’ssenioradviseronnational security, to ‘affordusastrongerhandinpursuingandimplementingourinternationalsecuritygoals’.10The current usage of energy security in public discourse reinforces

threedistinctlogicsthatdownplayconcernaboutenvironmentalthreats–inparticularclimatechange.Theseareanationalist logic–‘that theenergy needs of the nation can only be met at the expense of otherpeoples’;acorporate logic– ‘that aprivate,marketised systemwhereprofitisthemaingoalisthebestwayofmeetingourenergyneeds’,andamilitary logic – ‘that, the nation is in “competition” for a scarceresourceanditisthereforenecessarytomilitariseenergyinfrastructure.’Withintheselogics,thesolutiontoenergyprovisionistosecuremoreofit,ratherthanreduceconsumption–energyisascarcitywhichmustbe‘secured’bycontrollingitasmuchaspossible.From the start of the ‘petroleum age’, scarcity was built into the

energysystem.Asoilbegantoreplacecoalasthekeyenergysource,oilcompanies introduced delays and interruptions to limit the flow ofenergyandraisepricesbyensuringaconstantshortageofoil.Shortagewas manufactured via government quotas and price controls, cartelarrangementstogovernworldwidedistribution,consortiumagreementstoslowthedevelopmentofnewoildiscoveriesintheMiddleEastandsometimesdeliberateactsofsabotage.11Anothermethodofpreventingenergy abundance involved the rapid construction of lifestyles in theUnited States that were dependent on the increasing consumption ofextraordinaryquantitiesofenergy.The concept of energy security arose at a time when energy was

relativelyabundant,butextractionratesweredeliberatelyreduced.Nowthe scenario isdifferent:oil extraction rates are rapidlydeclining.The

finitenatureof fossil fuels isbecoming increasinglyapparent: tokeepoil reserves (and share prices) at a stable level, oil companies areattemptingtoextractoilfromincreasinglyriskyanddangerousplaces.Entwinedwiththeideaofscarcity,istheseeminglycontradictory,but

in practice complementary, concept of abundance. The IndustrialRevolution was described by one historian as an ‘escape from theconstraintsofanorganiceconomy’,12thatis,anescapefromthelimitsof land, soil time and space.With the tapping ofmillions of years of‘fossilisedsunshine’,seasonalrhythmscouldbedisregarded.Asenergybecameunlimited,massproductionandconsumptionbecamepossible.Itisthismassconsumption(consumptionwhichplayedafundamental

part in creating energy scarcity)without limits that policymakers areattempting tokeep ‘secure’.Energy securityhencebecomesnot aboutmeetingthebasicneedsofpeople,butrathercreatingandrespondingtotheexpansionofaconsumersociety.

Energysecurityandclimatechange

Thecurrentenergysystembringswith itaplethoraof insecurities,yetdebatesonenergysecuritytendtofocusonjustone:howthecontinuedsupply of oil, gas and coal to the market will be achieved. Thisobsessivefocusensuresthatthelargestthreattohumanexistence–theclimate crisis – is ignored.The devastation of a changing climate hasbeen created by a network of powerful institutions formed of bothfossil-fuel corporations and an array of legal, cultural, financial andgovernmentorganisationsthatprovidecrucialsupporttooilcompanies.This vast carbon web prevents democratic decision making aboutsocieties’ systems of energy provision and their responses to climatechange.Decisionsaboutenergyaremadebehindcloseddoors incorporation

headquarters, at parliamentary bars and during $2,000-a-ticketconferences that lockusall intodecadesof fossil-fueluse. Individuals

andwealthflowthroughtherevolvingdoorsbetweenthestate,oilandfinance. To entrench themselves further, oil companies actively setabout influencing and shaping our values and politics, placingthemselves at the heart of both the establishment and our culturalconsciousness – for example, through their sponsorship of culturalinstitutions – all with the intention of making the needed urgenttransitiontoalow-carboneconomyseemimpracticalorimpossible.Faced with a crisis that threatens the continuation of human life,

Westerncountriesarenotonlycontinuingbutactually increasing theirinvestmentsinanenergymodelthatcreatedthethreatinthefirstplace.In2013,globalcarbon-dioxideemissionswere61percenthigherthantheywerein1990,whennegotiationstowardsaclimatetreatybegan.13Why are Northern countries utterly failing in the face of this crisis?Precisely because the dominant elite will do anything to keep ourcurrent energy systems intact, despite these systems’ role in causingclimatechange.Ourcurrentenergysystemsgiveusneitherthemeanstostopclimate

change, nor to adapt to its impacts. European decision makers areinvesting inarapidlyexpandingwebof importpipelines to‘diversify’energysuppliesandsuckgas fromacross theglobe to thecontinent.14SuchaninfrastructurewouldlockEuropeintohigh-carbondependencyforthenextfiftyyears.Theblindingshort-sightednessofsuchpoliciesis staggering, yet also utterly predictable. Neoliberalism created theconditions under which our governments would be co-opted bycorporations and therefore iswedded to short-term strategies of profitseekingthatcannotdeliverafair,efficient,orpeacefulresponsetothedevastatingimpactsofclimatechange.

Re-tellingenergystories

Thewordsandimagesweusehaveanimpactontheworldaroundus.Decision makers, corporate spokespeople, community representatives

andNGOsareallpartofaday-to-daystruggleoverlanguage.Humanshave become adept at promoting arguments that win support andlegitimacy.Butareweasadeptat considering the full implicationsofhowargumentsaboutkeyresourcesareframed?Inordertodoso,thereareanumberofquestionsweshouldaskourselves:howhasthisstorybeen told andwhywas it told thisway?Howcould it havebeen tolddifferently? How does the dominant framing of this issue impact onpublicunderstanding?Wecan consider thesequestions in relation to debates about energy

security.In2014,Russia’sinvasionofCrimearenewedthedebateaboutwhereEuropegetsitsgasfrom,promptingadominantnarrativethatwe(Europe)aretooreliantonRussiangasandthatthisreliancemakesusenergyinsecure.AtypicalarticleappearedintheBritishnewspaper,TheTimes inApril 2014 titled ‘West seeks to endPutin strangleholdoverenergy’. The article, written by journalist Ben Webster, states that‘Britain is to lead an international effort to stopRussia fromusing itsvastnaturalenergysuppliestoholdtheworldtoransom.’HereWebsterisdrawingonaframethatdatesbacktotheColdWar,evokingtheideathatRussiaisimplacablypittedinbattleagainstthe‘West’,thatithasasignificantweapon(beitanucleararsenaloragaspipetap)andthattheWest must stand up to this unaccountable power to ensure its ownsurvival.Webster isn’t alone in using this frame. Webster’s article quotes

Energy and Climate Change Minister Ed Davey, who says the UKgovernment’sactionshows‘Russiawemeanbusinessbyimprovingourenergysecurityandresilience’.Daveymakesitapparentwhoseenergysecurityheisconcernedwithbyadding‘becauseofRussianaction,EUgas prices go up, that affects consumers and businesses here veryquickly.’ It is the private, individual concerns of consumers andbusinesses thatmatter forDavey – thosewith spending power, whilethosestrugglingtopurchaseenergyandfoodareoverlooked.Itisworthconsideringalternativeframesthatcouldbeused.Despite

constantreferencestotheEU’sover-dependenceonRussiangas,there

hasnotbeenariseinoveralldependenceonRussiangasoverthepastdecade. What has changed is that Russia has altered the conditionsunderwhichitsuppliescountriesoftheformerSovietUnion.Gasisnolongersoldatsubsidisedrates,but insteadathigherandmorevariablemarketprices.15Analternativeframecouldthereforebetheinadequacyofthegasmarkettoprovidepeoplewithaffordableenergy.ItwouldhavebeenpossibleforWebstertoofferapositiverebuttalof

theColdWarnarrative–emphasisingthatrelationsbetweenEuropeandRussia have fundamentally changed since that period – the headlinemight have read ‘Putin threatens European and Russian energy co-operation’.Alternatively, the article could have looked atWestern oilcompanies’ cooperation with the Russian oil sector, emphasising thatBP,forexample,owns20percentofRosneftandisthereforeconcernedwith any drop in share price as a result of punitivemeasures againstRussia. In this case, the headline might have been ‘Oil companies’collusionwithPutinunderminesEuropeanenergysovereignty’.The US sanctions designed to hit ‘Putin’s inner circle’ notably

excludedRussianheadsofoilcompanies,andinMay2014,BPsignedashale-oildealwithRussia.BPCEOBobDudleywouldattendameetingwithPutinandafterwardsstatethat:‘Wehavearesponsibilitytostandwithourpartnersindifficulttimes.’Thecloserelationsandoverlappinginterests of ‘our’ energy companies and ‘Russian’ energy companiescomplicatestheideathatRussiais‘holdingustoransom’overenergy,andisthereforeoftenexcludedfromthediscussionofEuropeanenergysecurity.This example highlights how stories about energy can be framed in

waysthathighlightcertainelementsandexcludeothers.Inthiscase,theconcept of energy security is used to privilege national, private andmilitaryinterestsinwaysthatexcludethediscussionofcomplexityandcollaboration.

Energysecurityandforeignpolicy

Overemphasisofenergysecurityimperativesbymostcountrieshasledto policies and initiatives designed to influence and control theextraction and flowof energy resources abroadand todirectlybenefittheir own companies involved in the energy sector. Take Britain, forexample. The equation of British corporate interests with the wider‘national interest’ is suchacentral tenetofUKforeignpolicy (andofmanyothernationstates)thatitisalmostuniversallyunquestioned.ForaslongastherehasbeenaForeignOfficeinBritain,therehasbeenanautomatic assumption that ‘British corporations’ represent British‘national interests’. In 1840, Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston wasunequivocalonthispoint:‘ItisthebusinessoftheGovernmenttoopenandsecuretheroadsforthemerchant.’16Over150yearslater,in2007,Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett reiterated this premise: ‘It is theGovernment’scoreresponsibilitytomakesurethattherestoftheworldwassafeandwell-disposedforourbusinesses.’17Related to ‘energy security’, this approach includes pressuring oil-

producing countries to allow foreign control over their resources,supportingBritishcompaniesingaininglong-termoilandgascontractsand asserting military and diplomatic dominance over resource-richareas and ‘energy corridors’. British civil servants and ministersintervenegeopolitically inpursuitof theirperceived‘energy interests’,alongsidealliesinEuropeandtheUS.This not only ensures that resources flow towards Britain’s power

plantsandrefineries.Crucially,theforeignenergypolicyapparatusalsoseeks to guarantee high profits for its fossil-fuel companies andconfigures the physical, legal, political and financial infrastructure toensure fossil fuels are pumped onto the ‘openmarket’. The supply offossilfuelstoopenmarketsensuresthatresourcesaren’tjustdeliveredtowhere there is a gap in demand, but instead towhere theywill bemustprofitable.Supplymustbecarefullycontrolled toensure there isnotan‘over-supply’offuel,whichwoulddeflatethemarketvalue.AsthePlatformCollectiveobservedinthebookTheOilRoad:

Themassrelocationofgreatvolumesoffossilfuelsrequiresconstantcoordinationoflogisticalandfinancialresources.AnalystsinGenevaand London assess and counter-assess the profitability of particularshipments,aimingtomaximisetheirreturn.Somedeliveriesarebasedonlong-termcommitments,butmanyothersareshort-termcontractsbettingonswingsintheglobaloilprice.18

Aslongasenergyresourcesaremobilisedwithinmarketstructures,theworld’s most powerful economies will be able to maintain energydominance, as they can ultimately afford to pay more. Hence thepressure for greater ‘market opening’ in both producing and transitcountries,asexpressedinpolicydocumentspreparedbytheG8,theEUCommissionandtheUKDepartmentforEnergyandClimateChange.19As in other countries, UK energy-security policy tends to create

perceivedthreatsandprivilegemilitarisationasasolution,sparkingandexacerbating conflict inmany countries.20 Its pursuit can mean usingarmed force toguardoil pipelines and tankers fromguerrillaorpirateattacks, or even invading countries to ensure energy flows. Humanrightsandenvironmentalsafeguardsarecomparativelylowonthelistofpriorities,whiletheimportanceplacedonmaintainingoil,gasandcoalsupply ensures continued dependence on fossil fuels and delays intransitiontolow-carbonlifestylesandcommunities.

Pushingbackthefossil-fuelfrontier

Reserves of traditional fossil fuels are becoming more and morechallenging to reach, and as a result, international oil companies andmanygovernmentsareincreasinglyinvestingfinanciallyandpoliticallyin ‘unconventional’ oil and gas. This encompasses both tar-sandsextraction and operations in ever more inaccessible and inhospitablelocations (such as the Arctic, or ever deeper offshore sites).Unconventionaloilandgassourcestendtobemorepollutingandcause

greater impacts on local communities and ecosystems. For instance,extracting tarsands insitu requires large amountsofgas andwater tosteamthebitumenoutoftheground,whiledrillingintheArcticcarriesagreaterriskofpollutionimpactsduetoitsinaccessibilityforclean-upoperations. It also locks us into a high-carbon future by creatinginfrastructurethatwillkeepusdependentonfossilfuelsfordecadestocome,andunderminingseriousinvestmentinrenewables.‘Energy security’ is routinely rolled out to legitimise these extreme

operationsandoverridepopularconcerns.PublicandpoliticalanxietyintheUSaroundoilimportsfromtheMiddleEastandVenezuelahasbeenused tomake fuel sources closer tohomemore attractive, such as thevast reserves of tar sands inAlberta orUS shale gas.Energy securityhascometobeviewedassynonymouswithagreaterdegreeofenergyindependence.Mary Landrieu, the Democrat Senator for Louisiana, is typical of

manydefendingtheexpansionofoffshoreoildrilling:

Imeanthegallons[resultingfromspills]aresominusculecomparedtothebenefitsofUSstrengthandsecurity,thebenefitsofjobcreationand energy security. So while there are risks associated witheverything, I think you understand that they are quite, quiteminimal.21

Similarly, Shell downplays the severe environmental risks of Arcticdrilling,forbothoilandgas,duetoinaccessibilityandreducedefficacyof spill control techniques. In the opening paragraph for their Arcticdrilling webpage, Shell writes: it is ‘essential to securing energysupplies for the future, but it will mean balancing economic,environmental and social challenges.’22 So energy supply is essential,whileenvironmentaldamageisa‘challenge’tobeovercomeratherthanaseriousconcernwhichmustbeaddressedbeforedrillingcommences.Debates about energy security in relation to Arctic drilling are

premisedaroundnationalsecurity.TheArcticstatesofCanada,Russia,

Denmark, Norway and the United States share their claim to Arcticterritory and have enjoyed a relatively peaceful relationship formanyyears.Thediscoveryoffossil-fuelresourcesbeneaththemeltingtundra,as a result of climate change, though, has prompted an escalation ofmilitarisationintheregion.23In 2009, the Harper government in Canada published its Northern

Strategy, calling for the construction of six to eight Arctic offshorevessels, expansion of theArcticRangers programme, building a largeArctic-capable icebreaker, developing indigenous surveillancecapabilities, creating a Northern Reserve Unit based in the Arctic,constructingadeepwaterresupplyportinNanisivik,anddevelopinganArctic training base in Resolute, Nunavut. Not all of these proposalshave come to fruition, but the emphasis was clearly on conflictpreparationratherthancoordinationwithotherArcticcountries.24OtherArctic states are making similar preparations. Norway defended itsbuilding of five combat naval vessels – its most expensive singledefenceprojectever:

Norway’s position as a significant energy exporter and as a countryresponsible for the administration of important natural resourcesextending over large sea areas has an important bearing on securitypolicy.Wemustbeabletoupholdoursovereigntyandoursovereignrights.25

Militarisingtheseas

SincetheshipSiriusStar,carryingtwomillionbarrelsofSaudioil,wascaptured in November 2008 by Somalis and held for a $3 millionransom, a spate of kidnappings led the north-western IndianOcean tobecomeanothermilitarised region in thenameof ‘energysecurity’.AvasttriangleofopenseabetweenIndia,MadagascarandDjiboutiisnowheavily patrolled by warships and scoured by Reaper spy-drones. A

EuropeanUnionnavalpresence, aNATO task force and theUSFifthFleetdeployingoutofBahrainhavebeenempoweredbytheUNtouse‘allnecessarymeans’toeliminatepiracy.26Theanti-piracymissionisrunoutofNorthwoodHQ,anunderground

military complex in leafy north-west London. Many storeys deep,behind steel blast doors, navy officers use charts and screens toconstantly co-ordinate tanker and trade traffic with nearby warships.Shipsareadvisedtotravelingroupsandatnight:‘thisenablesmilitaryforcesto“sanitise”theareaaheadofthemerchantships.’27While piracy does present a danger to both cargo and crew, the

militarisedreactionseemsdisproportionategiventhatmostvesselsandcrew were released unharmed once a ransom was paid, and that lessthan1percentoftankerstravellingthroughtheGulfofAdenhaveeverbeen hijacked.Yet international shipping describes itself as a ‘systemunder attack’. Jan Kopernicki, in his former role as president of theBritish Chamber of Shipping, did the rounds of political andmilitaryleaders in Britain and the EU, exaggerating the danger to Europeanenergysupplies:‘Idon’twanttobealarmistbutIprovidetransportforessentialoilandgasforthiscountryandIwanttobesurethatthelightsare on in Birmingham, my home city.’ The fact that Birmingham’slightshavenodependenceonoilwasconvenientlyignored.Kopernicki,alsovice-presidentofShell’sshippingarm,gaveafurther

filliptothearmsindustry,sayingtherewasa‘gapingholeintheUK’sdefencestrategy’,demandinganincreaseinnavalspendingandtobringforward the acquisition of a new generation of warships currentlyscheduled for 2020.28 Kopernicki’s intervention came in November2010,inacontextofpublicausteritycutshittingmillionsofpeople,andyet he found a sympathetic ear in the debating chambers of Britishpolitics. In thinking reminiscent of the Suez war, Liberal DemocratBaronJohnBurnettargued,‘Shouldwenotnowbethinkingthatitisalegitimatesecurity interest forus toconsider the trade routesas farastheGulfofAdenaspartofournationalconcern?’29Alongside an increasing militarisation of the seas, some countries

have even begun renting out their military personnel to privatecorporations. Since 2012, the Dutch government has been providingunits to escort ships.Total costs for theDutch teams are estimated atUS$29million, but the shipping companies are only expected to payhalf of this, leaving the Dutch government to make up the US$14.5millionshortfall.30Hiringout navypersonnel toprivate companies at a reduced fee, or

even for free, means the public taxpayer is subsidising corporations’securitycosts.Companies’privateuseofmilitarypersonnelalsoraisesarangeoflegalandpoliticalquestions.AsJamesBrown,militaryfellowof the Lowry Institute, observes, putting national military personnelunder the control of a commercial ship captain ‘essentially makes acommercialvesselawarship’.31Althoughtheuseofmarinesoncommercialshipsisfairlynew,there

has already been one incident demonstrating the potential dangers. InFebruary2012,twoItalianmarineswereplacedonboardtheoiltankerMVEnricaLexie.Whileservingonthetanker,theyshotandkilledtwoIndianfishermenthattheyincorrectlysuspectedofpiracy.Theincidentsparked a diplomatic row between India and Italy.Both of the ItalianmarineswerearrestedbytheIndianpoliceandinearly2015werestillawaitingtrialformurder.32

Suppressingdissentto‘keepthelightson’

Repression of civil dissent runs in tandem to increasedmilitarisation,with energy security promoted as its alibi. In the summer of 2008, aquiet corner of Kent was transformed into one of the most contestedsitesofenergypoliticsinBritain.Anexistingcoal-firedplantownedbyenergygiantE.ONwasdue tobedecommissionedby2015,butE.ONcontroversially announced plans to construct Britain’s first new coal-firedplantforoverthirtyyearsatthesite.Theplansweremetwithwidespreadresistancebyclimateactivistsin

the country, ranging from NGOs to faith groups and grass-rootsactivists. The Camp for Climate Action hosted a week-long protestcampneartheproposedsiteatKingsnorthinAugust2008.‘Energy security’ was given as a justification for the draconian

policingoftheClimateCampthatcost£5million,amidclaimsthatthepolice were protecting the electricity supply to millions of homes.Protestershadmorethan2,000possessionsconfiscatedincludingsoap,board games and a clown costume, and were subject to over 8,000indiscriminatestop-and-searches,someofwhichwerelatersuccessfullychallengedincourt.33A subsequent Freedom of Information Act request made by David

Howarth MP revealed that the police, E.ON and Department forBusiness, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) sharedintelligenceaboutthemovementsofprotestersandtheirmeetingsintherun-uptothecamp.TheUKnewspaper,theGuardianconcludedthat‘itis as thoughBERRwas treating thepolice as an extensionofE.ON’sprivatesecurityoperation.’34AspokeswomanforBERRarguedthat‘giventhepotentialthreatsto

thesecurityofenergysuppliesposedbytheprotests,itisonlyrightthatthe government liaised with the police and the owner of the powerstation to exchange factual information and discuss contingencyplans.’35 Documents later obtained by the Guardian showed thatofficialsprivatelyknewthatitwas‘unlikelythatdisruptionatanyofthepowerstationsintheareainthisweekwouldcauseanationalelectricalpower supply problem’, because demandwas low and power stationshadgoodstocks.36Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) spokesperson Jon

Murphyhasalsojustifiedtheuseofundercoversurveillancesuchasthecase of Mark Kennedy (who spent seven years infiltratingenvironmentalgroupsintheUK):

Unfortunately…thereareasmallnumberofpeoplewhoareintentoncausingharm,committingcrimeandonoccasionsdisablingpartsof

the national critical infrastructure. That has the potential to denyutilitiestohospitals,schools,businessesandyourgranny.37

ThecryofenergysecurityisalsousedtosilenceprotestsintheGlobalSouth.Theopen-pit Phulbari coal project in north-westBangladesh isone example. The project, proposed by Asia Energy, a subsidiary ofGCMresources,willtakeupalmost6,000hectaresofland(60sq.km)and,willphysicallyandeconomicallydisplace50,000–220,000people.Over 80 per cent of the land taken for this project will be fertile,agricultural land, leaving farmers dependent on the land with fewoptions for employment.38Theminewill alsodeplete thewater table,leading towater scarcityand likely significantcontaminationof riversand landforcommunitiesaround themine. Inaddition, itmay lead tothe degradation of the Sundarbans, a UNESCO-protected mangroveforest,becausethecoalwillbetransportedthroughthisareainbarges.A determined grass-roots resistance campaign against the mine

mobilised tens of thousands formarches, general strikes and highwayblockades. The government and company response to such large andsustainedprotestwasvicious.InAugust2006,theBangladeshRifles,aparamilitary force,opened fireon50,000peacefulprotesters–at leastthree people were killed, including a 14-year-old boy, and over ahundred people were wounded. In February 2007, Mr S.M.Nuruzzaman, one of the protest leaders, was falsely arrested andsubsequentlytortured;hisarrestwasreportedlyrequestedbyofficialsofAsiaEnergy.39GCM refuses to comment on the perpetrated human rights abuses,

insteadsaying,‘TheProjectwillmakeasignificantcontributiontothecountry’senergysecuritybyprovidingreliablesuppliesofgoodqualitycoaltonewpowerstations.’40Despite theproject’sgrandclaims,only20percentofthecoalextractedisfordomesticenergyconsumption–80 per cent is destined for foreign markets.41 Serving internationalmarkets rather than providing Bangladesh with reliable energy isGCM’srealpriority.

Renewablesas‘energysecurity’–PrioritisingEurope’senergywishesovereveryoneelse

Energysecurityisn’tonlybeingusedtojustifyfossil-fuelprojects–itisalso mobilised to argue in favour of unjust and environmentallydamaging renewable projects. Even though renewable energy hassignificantly lesscarbon impact than fossil-fueldevelopment, it is stillimportanttoaskwhoseinterestsarebeingservedandwhoserightsarebeingdeniedbylarge-scale,renewableenergyprojects.A case in point is Desertec, an ambitious plan to build large,

concentratedsolarthermalpowerplantsintheNorthAfricandesertanddirect the electricity northwards across the Mediterranean via HighVoltageDirectCurrenttransmissionline.TheSaharaoffersproximitytoEurope, a sparsely populated area and intense sunlight. Originallyestimatedtocost€400billion, theproject involvedmajorshareholdersincludingGermanpowercompaniesE.ONandRWE, the internationalinsurance company Munich Re, Siemens engineering and Unicreditbank(asofOctober2014,theprojecthasbeenscaleddownduetothemajority of shareholders pulling out – of the above list only RWEremainintheconsortium).The corporations behind the project repeatedly described it as ‘a

comprehensive concept, combining energy security and climateprotection’.42TheDesertecIndustrialInitiativeaimedtoprovide15percentofEurope’selectricityby2050.Theproposalwastoutedbysomeas the great solution to Europe’s ‘energy needs’, or perhaps morehonestly,tosustainourcurrentlevelsofconsumption.JustdaysbeforetheTunisianrevoltbeganinFebruary2011,German

Prime Minister Angela Merkel met autocratic Algerian PresidentAbdelazizBouteflikainBerlintodiscussDesertec’sfuture.AsuprisingsspreadacrossNorthAfrica,companyexecutiveswerequestionedabouthowtheirprojectwouldrelatetotherepressionandlackofdemocracyin their targetcountries.Their responsewasframedin the languageof

ensuringsecurity,stabilityandcontrol:‘Theprojectplannersemphasizetheimportanceoftheirenergyconcepttothelong-termstabilizationoftheregionofNorthAfrica…Desertecplannersarenowmorethaneverconvinced that they can shape the political upheaval in Egypt andTunisia.’43The project’s supporters cite the creation of local jobs and export

earnings,aswellas inexpensiveelectricityandtheuseofextraenergytodesalinateseawaterinitsdefence,44butaswithfossil-fuelprojects,avoidtheunderlyingissueofpowerimbalances.Onmanylevels,theprojectwasfoundedonquestionableapproaches

to resource sovereignty, landuseandenergyconsumption.TheuseofAfricanlandandenergyresourcesforEuropeanconsumptionandprofitreinforces traditional exploitative ties between Europe and its formercolonies.Renewableenergyisaresourcethatcanequallybeenclosed,privatised,controlledandprofitedfrom.Therearecurrently600millionpeople inAfricawithoutaccess toelectricity; the InternationalEnergyAgencypredictsthatnumberwillriseto645millionpeopleby2030.45YetinthediscussionofDesertec,itwastheenergysecurityofEuropeanconsumersthatwasprioritised.Desertecisjustoneexampleofalarge-scalerenewable-energyproject

that involves Northern countries extracting further resources fromSouthern ones. Other examples include agrofuel plantations in SouthAmerica,46 huge hydroelectric dams in the Democratic Republic ofCongo,47orlarge-scalewindfarmsinMexico.48

Afailedenergymodel

The predominant focus of the energy-security debate on providingsecurity for corporations and nation states has obscured the failure ofcurrent systems of energy provision to provide affordable, sustainableenergy for people to heat their homes, cook their food, or light their

rooms.In Southern countries, infrastructure is developed primarily for

industry–itoftenbypassesthepeoplewholivethere.InNigeria,72percentof thepopulationare forced tousewood forcooking,while theircountryexports950billioncubicfeetofgaseveryyear.InIndia,45percent of households do not have electricity – only 11 per cent ofhouseholds consumemore than100kwhpermonth,while at theotherendof thescaletheUSaverageconsumptionis900kwh.49 Inefficientcentralised infrastructure serves producers rather than consumers.Decentralisedmodels of energy provisionwould be farmore resilientand effective, particularly at a time of increasing climate-changeimpacts,butinsteadenergyisprovidedthroughlargegrids,ownedoftenby private monopolies (who have no interest in empoweringhouseholds).InNortherncountries,energysystemsarealsofailing.WhenUKcivil

societygroupPlatformbroughtNigerDeltaactivistCelestineAkpoBaritoLondon,hewasastoundedtohearthatBritainsufferstheworstlevelsof fuel poverty inWestern Europe – in 2010, one in five householdswereclassifiedasinfuelpoverty,andin2012,onepersondiedofcoldeverysixsecondsduringthewinter–asenergybillscontinuetorise.50The current problems will only be exacerbated by the growing

financialisationofenergyinfrastructure,astradersandspeculatorslooktowardspipelines,oil rigs,gaswells andwind turbines as a sourceofprofit. Key decisions relating to infrastructure investment areincreasingly beingmade by a tiny elite of fundmanagers from about120–150 private institutions. That severely biases energy investmentagainstprojectswhichbenefitthepoor,aresensitivetolocalneeds,andarelesscarbonintensive.51Currently, Northern countries consume, on average, around 8000W

per person per year.52 The energy ‘needs’ of such consumption-saturatedcountriesareenormous.Yetwhenpolicymakersconsiderhowwemight transition to a low-carbon economy, they almost invariablyassumethattheremustbeenoughenergyavailablefor‘lifeasusualto

continue’.While increased energy efficiency is accepted as a way ofreducingenergyconsumption,changesthatwouldhavealargerimpact,suchasalteringthewayourlivesareorganised,arefirmlyoffthetable.IndividualsinboththeNorthandtheSoutharestillencouragedtobuy

asmanyproductsanduseasmuchenergyastheycanafford.Inmanycountries,itisthenormtodriveyourowncar(despitethehundredsofothersmaking the same journey), to buy individually packaged items,andto‘upgrade’yourmobilephoneevery twoyears(evenifyouroldoneisstillworking).Societies are structured so that people consumemassive amounts of

energy every single day without even noticing. Plans for low-carbontransitions toooften assume thatour lives areunchangeable.Theyarebased on the premise that societies need to secure large amounts ofenergy to meet current consumption patterns. Of course, it is notpossible to change cultures, structures and habits overnight, but byuncriticallybolsteringtheideathatoursocietiesneedlargeamountsofenergy,weareensuringenergycontinues tobe scarce–a resourceofwhichwecanneverhaveenough.

Energyalternatives

Theaboveexamplesshowhowtheconceptof‘energysecurity’isusedtoprioritisecorporate,nationalandmilitaryinterestsaboveinternationalcooperation and the needs of people. It is clear that social-justiceactivists need newnarratives to talk about energy futures – narrativesthatframeenergyasacommonresourceandabasicright,thatputtheenvironmentandpeopleatthecentreofdebates,andthatde-linkenergyfrom the corporate, national and military contexts they are currentlyembedded in. We need this, not just to prevent worsening climatechange,butalsotobuildanenergymodelthatworks,asthestressesofclimatechangehithome.Newnarrativeswillnotspringupready-formed,butwillemergeout

of the grass-roots movements and communities currently organisingaround energy – groups that stand in opposition to the corporatemonopolisationofenergy.Thefollowingfewcasestudiesprovidejustapartialpictureofthesealternatives,buttheyareneverthelessinstructive– they suggest it is possible to create a very different relationshipbetweenpeopleandenergy,wrestingbackcontrolfromprofit-motivatedmonopolies,askingverydifferentquestionsaboutenergyprovision,andcreatingnewnarrativeswithwhichtodiscussenergyfutures.

Takingbackcontrol

Agrowingnumberofcommunitiesaredemandingcontroloverenergyresourcesandtakingbackownershipfromprivatecompanies. Insomecountries, community control of energy is nothing new.Denmark hashadremarkablesuccessatendingdependenceonimportedfuel,whichhasinlargepartbeenreplacedwithlocalrenewables.Denmark’swind-powerrevolutionhasbeendescribedas‘agrassroots,community-basedinitiative, underpinned by decentralised, cooperative and municipalownershipalongsidesmall-scaleprivateownership’.53Thiscameaboutafteranintensepoliticalstruggleinthelate1970s,whenacoalitionofleftists,greensandconservativerural interestsunitedagainstproposalsbased on centralised forms of energy (oil and nuclear-based). Insteadthey promoted an alternative vision of a more localised non-nuclearfuturebasedonrenewablesandmoreradicaldemocraticpractices.Andthey achieved remarkable success. Within twenty years, the countrywent from dependence on oil imports for 90 per cent of its energydemand to self-sufficiency in energy. Crucially, 80 per cent of windturbinesinDenmarkareownedbyco-operativesorfamilies.Ownershipof the electricity-distribution system is alsodecentralised inDenmark,with55percentof thegridownedbyuser-runco-ops,12percentbymunicipalities and 26 per cent by Denmark’s state oil company. Thestateplayedanenablingrolebysettingtargets,rulesaroundownership,

andprices.Germany’s energy economy is currently being transformed by its

policy of Energiewende (Energy transition), supported by both mainpolitical parties. Germany is witnessing a mass movement towardscommunity- and city-controlled renewables. In September 2013,Germany’s second biggest city, Hamburg, voted to take over theelectricity, gas and district heating networks that had been sold toVattenfall and German energy company E.ON a decade earlier.54Hamburgisjustoneof170municipalitiesinGermanythathavetakenbackcontrolof their energy services fromprivate companies,55whichhas changed the relationship between people and energy from beingpassiveconsumerstocollectiveowners.Energy is not the only resource that communities are demanding

return to public control: there are now over 235 cases of water re-municipalisationinover37countries56Theseexamplespointtoapracticalanddiscursiveshiftfromamodel

driven by corporate and individual purchases of resources such as ofenergy and water to a collective model of resource ownership whereprofit is not the key concern.As re-municipalisation struggles link upacross national borders, they also challenge the notion of nationalcompetition for energy – instead, the competition is betweencommunitiesandcorporations.

Alternativesforgedoutofresistance

Many examples of collective energy ownership arise directly out ofstrugglesagainstcorporate-ornational-controlledinfrastructure.Nepalhasthelargesthydroelectricpotentialofalmostanycountry,with6,000orsorivers.Buthydroelectricdevelopmenthas,untilrecently,consistedofbuildinglargedams,notasarationalassessmentofwhatwouldbestserve the needs of poorer groups, but as the result of decisions bygovernment departments and international financial institutions whose

economic, bureaucratic and political interests are intimately bound upwith the large dam industry and its chief industrial clients.57 Popularopposition to one of the largest dams planned in Nepal, Arun III,coupledwith the restoration ofmulti-party democracy in 1990, led tothe energy sector being opened up to small producers, resulting innumerousvillagesintroducingtheirownmini-hydroschemes,someruncollectively, someprivately.Theoutcomewas toproducealmostone-thirdmoreelectricity at close tohalf the cost andhalf the timeof theproposedArunIIIproject.In the UK, villagers in Balcombe resisting energy firm Caudrilla’s

attempts to frack their backyards, started to think about the currentstructures of energy provision and then set up a locally ownedrenewable-energyscheme.Similarly,communitiesinPuglia,insouthernItalyresistingtheEuro-CaspianMegaPipeline–adestructivepieceofgasinfrastructurethatwillharmPuglia’sworldheritagecoastlineanditspeople’slivelihoods–areworkingtocreateacommunity-ownedco-opthatcanproduceenoughelectricityforthetownthroughwindturbinesandsolarpanels.58

Energyjusticenotsecurity

Confronting the reality of hundreds of thousands of UK householdsunabletopayforheatingor light,fuel-povertycampaigners in theUKhavefocusedonunfairdistributionofenergyaccordingtowealth,ratherthan engaging in nationalist discourses around security of energysupply. They have juxtaposed energy-company monopolies and theirrisingprofitswith the reality for the25per centofUKhouseholds infuelpoverty,andthethousandswhodieeachwinterbecausetheycan’taffordtoheattheirhomes.In2014,FuelPovertyActionlaunchedtheir‘Energy Bill of Rights’ – declaring that ‘We all have the right toaffordableenergytomeetourbasicneeds.Everyoneshouldbeabletocook food and keep warm when it’s cold.’59 The commonly touted

conceptofenergysecurityforconsumersisreplacedwithenergyjusticeforpeople.FuelPovertyActionbackuptheiractionswithpracticalcasework– supporting individualsandcommunitygroups tochallenge theinstalment of pre-payment meters – used by companies as a way ofcuttingpoorpeopleofffromenergy.

Conclusion

Our energy system is in crisis. Each year, more and more energy isgenerated and yet 1.6 billion people, 20 per cent of the world’spopulation, do not have regular access to electricity.60 In the comingyears, a significant increase in fossil-fuel use is projected – this willmakeourabilitytocontrolglobalwarmingalmostimpossible.Itisclearthatwhenpolicymakers talkaboutenergy security, theydonotmeanensuringthebasicneedsofpeoplearemet,oravertingclimatedisaster.Insteadtheyareobsessedwithoneissue–howthecontinuedsupplyofoil,gasandcoaltothemarketwillbeachieved.As thischapterhasexplored, thehistoryofhowenergysecurityhas

been used – to bolster particular geopolitical relationships, defendmilitarisation and national security, and advance increasingly‘unconventional’fossil-fuelextraction–meansitistimeforconcernedcitizenstoditchtheterm.Callingfor‘energysecurity’ismostlikelytojustify exactly the kinds of unsustainable, undemocratic and unjustenergy practices that concerned citizens are working to abolish. Asurvivable and just energy future means breaking the grip of eliteinterests on our energy systems, ending dependency, increasingautonomy,buildingdiversepowerstructuresthroughwhichwecanholdoneanothertoaccount,andleavingfossilfuelsintheground.In the last two years, the term ‘energy democracy’ has gained

increasingpopularity–arisingoutofclimate-justicemovements,itisaconcept that is capable of integrating energy and climate debates toconsider both the needs of people and the planet. The nature of

democracy is diversity: there is not one blueprint that applies to allsituations,butthatisalsoitsstrength.Aresilientenergyfuturewillbecomposedofdiverseenergycommons,solidarities,practicesandideas.Itisalsoacriticalstepinacreativere-imaginingofourcurrentsociety,one that challenges a neoliberal order which is concerned with‘securing’ frontiers and resources for the most powerful, and insteadseekscollectivelytomeettheneedsofall.

Platform (www.platformlondon.org), a UK collective of artists andactivistsworkingonsocialandenvironmentalissues,hasparticipatedinenergy debates for a long time. This chapter was conceived byprogressive activists, researchers and academics working on issuesrelatedtoenergypolicyandpractice.

Notes

1. SeethePlatformCollective’swebsitewww.platformlondon.org.

2.

Labban,M.(2011).Thegeopoliticsofenergysecurityandthewaronterror:Thecaseformarketexpansionandthemilitarizationofglobalspace,inPeet,R.,Robbins,P.andWatts,M.,eds.GlobalPoliticalEcology.London:Routledge,pp.325–44.

3.Hildyard,N.,Lohmann,L.andSexton,S.(16February2012).Energysecurityforwhom?Forwhat?Retrievedfromhttp://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what.

4. Longhurst,H.(1959).AdventureinOil:ThestoryofBritishPetroleum.London:Sidgwick&Jackson.

5.Foramoredetailedaccountofthedrivetosecureoilresourcesintheseconflicts,see:Yergin,D.(1992).ThePrize:Theepicquestforoil,money,andpower.NewYork:Simon&Schuster.

6. Shaffer,B.(2008).EnergyPolitics.Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress.

7. Ibid.

8.AphraseoriginallycoinedinCampbell,C.J.andLaherrère,J.H.(1998).Theendofcheapoil.ScientificAmerican,278(3),78–83.Retrievedfromdoi:10.1038/scientificamerican0398-78.

9.

CommissiontotheEuropeanParliament,theCouncil,theEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommitteeandtheCommitteeoftheRegions.(10November2010).Energy2020Astrategyforcompetitive,sustainableandsecureenergy.Retrievedfromhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52010DC0639.

10.Henderson,J.(2011).DomesticgaspricesinRussia–Towardsexportnetback?OxfordInstituteforEnergyStudies,57.Retrievedfromhttp://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/NG_57.pdf.

11. Mitchell,T.(2013).CarbonDemocracy:Politicalpowerintheageofoil.London:Verso.

12. Wrigley,E.A.(2010).EnergyandtheEnglishIndustrialRevolution.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

13. Klein,N.(2014).ThisChangesEverything:Capitalismvs.theclimate.NewYork:Simon&Schuster.

14.EuropeanCommission.(n.d.).Projectsofcommoninterest–Energy–EuropeanCommission.Retrieved fromhttp://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/projects-common-interest.

15. Henderson,J.(2011).

16.Platt,D.C.(1968).Theimperialismoffreetrade:Somereservations.EconomicHistoryReview,21(2),296–306.Retrievedfromdoi:10.1111/j.1468-0289.1968.tb01768.x.

17.Ukwatch(07May07).TheFutureofBritishForeignPolicy.NewLeftProjecthttp://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/the_future_of_british_foreign_policy.

18. Marriott,J.andMinio-Paluello,M.(2012).TheOilRoad:JourneysfromtheCaspianSeatotheCityofLondon.London:Verso.

GlobalEnergySecurity.(16July2006).Retrievedfromhttp://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2006/energy.html;CommissiontotheEuropeanParliament,TheCouncil,&TheEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommitteeandtheCommitteeoftheRegions.(September2011).TheEUenergypolicy:Engagin

19.gwithpartnersbeyondourborders.Retrievedfromhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0539;Wicks,M.andDepartmentofEnergyandClimateChange.(August2009).Energysecurity:Anationalchallengeinachangingworld.RetrievedMay4,2015,fromhttps://books.google.com/books?id=E43yMgEACAAJ&dq=%22Energy%2BSecurity%3A%2BA%2Bnational%2Bchallenge%2Bin%2Ba%2Bchanging%2Bworld%22%2BDECC&hl=en&sa=X&ei=JGVIVae9Co_GogT--oAo&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAA.

20.Florini,A.(2010).Globalgovernanceandenergy,inPascual,C.andElkind,J.eds.EnergySecurity:Economics,politics,strategies,andimplications.Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitutionPress,pp.149–84.

21.ObamabiggestrecipientofBPcash.(5May2010).Reuters.Retrievedfromhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/05/us-politico-obama-bp-idUSTRE64420A20100505.

22. ShellintheArctic.(n.d.).Retrievedfromhttp://www.shell.com/global/future-energy/arctic.html.

23.Singh,A.(16October2013).ThecreepingmilitarizationoftheArctic.Retrievedfromhttp://thediplomat.com/2013/10/the-creeping-militarization-of-the-arctic/.

24.GovernmentofCanada.(12December2012).Ournorth,ourheritage,ourfuture:Canada’snorthernstrategy.Retrievedfromhttp://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp.

25.NorwegianGovernment.(4February2007).TheSoriaMoriadeclarationoninternationalpolicy.Retrievedfromhttps://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-soria-moria-declaration-on-internati/id438515/.

26.

Nincic,D.J.(19February2009).Maritimepiracy:Implicationsformaritimeenergysecurity.JournalofEnergySecurity.Retrievedfromhttp://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=180%3Amaritime-piracy-implications-for-maritime-energy-secu rity&catid=92%3Aissuecontent&Itemid=341.

27.MSCHOA.(n.d.).TheMaritimeSecurityCentre–HornofAfrica(MSCHOA):Safeguardingtradethroughthehighriskarea.Retrievedfromhttp://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mschoa/.

28.Jeory,T.andGiannangeli,M.(7November2010).Piracywillleadtopowercuts.DailyExpress.Retrievedfromhttp://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/210035/

Piracy-will-lead-to-power-cuts.

29.Strategicdefenceandsecurityreview—Motiontotakenote.(12November2010).Retrievedfromhttp://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2010-11-12a.393.2.

30.Hughes,E.andMinio-Paluello,M.(2012).Asecretsubsidy:Oilcompanies,theNavy&theresponsetopiracy.PlatformLondon.Retrievedfromhttp://platformlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/A-Secret-Subsidy-piracy.pdf.

31. Felton,R.Y.(16September2012).Herecomethenavies.Retrievedfromhttp://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3595/Here_Come_the_Navies.

32.AsiaNews.(17February2012).Kerala:ThefishermenkilledbyItalianmarineswereCatholic.Retrievedfromhttp://www.asianews.it/news-en/Kerala:-the-fishermen-killed-by-Italian-marines-were-Catholic-24008.html.

33.Evans,R.andLewis,P.(12January2010).Policeadmitstopandsearcheson11-year-oldsatKingsnorthprotest.Retrievedfromhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/12/kingsnorth-stop-search-boys-illegal.

34.Taylor,M.andLewis,P.(20April2009).SecretpoliceintelligencewasgiventoE.ONbeforeplanneddemo.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/apr/20/police-intelligence-e-on-berr.

35. Ibid.

36.Evans,R.andLewis,P.(26October2009).Kingsnorth:Howclimateprotestersweretreatedasthreattothecountry.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/oct/26/kingsnorth-protests-climate-change-campaign.

37. BBCNews.(20January2011).Acpodefendsuseofundercoverofficersamidnewclaims.Retrievedfromhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12238445.

38. Banktrack.(n.d.).Phulbaricoalmine,Bangladesh.Retrievedfromhttp://www.banktrack.org/manage/ajax/ems_dodgydeals/createPDF/phulbari_coal_mine.

39.Dasgupta,G.(30April2011).Anothertime:Comingup–anotheroccasiontodisplacepeople.Retrievedfromhttp://refugeewatchonline.blogspot.co.uk/2011/04/another-time-coming-up-another-occasion.html.

40. Ibid.

41. PhulbariCoalProject.(2015,March16).Retrievedfromhttp://www.sourcewat

ch.org/index.php/Phulbari_Coal_Project.

42. DESERTECFoundation:Concept.(n.d.).Retrievedfromhttp://www.desertec.org/en/concept/.

43.Hädicke,G.andWernerK.(4February2011).DesertecsollNordafrikastabilisieren.Retrievedfromhttp://www.ftd.de/unternehmen/industrie/:unruhen-in-aegypten-desertec-sollnordafrika-stabilisieren/60007469.html.

44. FirststepstobringSaharansolartoEurope.(n.d.).Retrievedfromhttp://www.euractiv.com/energy/steps-bring-saharan-solar-europe/article-184274.

45.

OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopmentandInternationalEnergyAgency.(2011).EnergyforAll:Financingaccessforthepoor.WorldEnergyOutlook.Retrievedfromhttp://www.iea.org/media/weowebsite/energydevelopment/weo2011_energy_for_all.pdf.

46.

Biofuelcropscultivatedasacombustionfuelhavebeenrejectedbyindigenouspopulationsandlocalcommunitiestheworldoverduetothedestructionofforestsandlandgrabsofareaspreviouslyusedforsubsistenceagricultureorsmall-scalefarming.NumerousdeclarationsrejectingbiofuelprojectshavebeensignedbysocialmovementsfromtheGlobalSouthoverthepastdecade.

47.

Howden,D.(25August2009).Thebigquestion:ShouldAfricabegeneratingmuchofEurope’spower?Retrievedfromhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-big-question-should-africa-be-generating-much-of-europes-power-1776802.html.

48.Altamirano-Jimenez,I.(17April2014).Indigenouslandhasneverbeenmodern.Retrievedfromhttp://nationsrising.org/indigenous-land-has-never-been-modern/.

49.

Bidwai,P.(3October2010).Indiaisimplementingactivemeasurestocombatitsever-growingriseinenergyconsumption.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tni.org/article/india-implementing-active-measures-combat-its-ever-growing-rise-energy-consumption.

50.

InstituteofHealthEquity.(2014).LocalActiononHealthInequalities:Fuelpovertyandcoldhome-relatedhealthproblems.Retrievedfromhttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/355790/Briefing7_Fuel_poverty_health_inequalities.pdf.

Lohmann,L.andHildyard,N.(31March20141).Energy,workandfinance.R

51. etrievedfromhttp://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-work-and-finance.

52.Bardi,U.(30May2014).Thetransitiontosustainableenergy:Howmuchwillitcost?Retrievedfromhttp://cassandralegacy.blogspot.co.uk/2014/05/the-transition-to-sustainable-energy.html.

53. Cumbers,A.(2012).ReclaimingPublicOwnership:Makingspaceforeconomicdemocracy.London:ZedBooks.

54.Leidreiter,A.(8October2013).Hamburgcitizensvotetobuybackenergygrid.Retrievedfromhttp://energytransition.de/2013/10/hamburg-citizens-buy-back-energy-grid.

55. Ibid.

56.Kishimoto,S.,Lobina,E.andPetitjean,O.(3April2015).Ourpublicwaterfuture:Theglobalexperiencewithremunicipalisation.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tni.org/briefing/our-public-water-future.

57.Gyawali,D.andDixit,A.(2010).Theconstructionanddestructionofscarcityindevelopment:WaterandpowerexperiencesinNepal,inMehta,L.,ed.ThelimitstoScarcity:Contestingthepoliticsofallocation.London:Earthscan.

58.Platform.(19February2014).Wedon’twanttheoilcompanies–Italiancommunitysaysnotopipeline.Retrievedfromhttp://platformlondon.org/2014/02/19/we-dont-want-the-oil-companies-italian-community-says-no-to-pipeline/.

59. FuelPovertyAction.(n.d.).EnergyBillofRights.Retrievedfromhttp://www.fuelpovertyaction.org.uk/home-alternative/energy-bill-of-rights-2/.

60. Thisiswhatenergydemocracylookslike.(n.d.).Retrievedfromhttp://unionsforenergydemocracy.org/.

CONCLUSION:FINDINGSECURITYINACLIMATE-

CHANGEDWORLD

NickBuxtonandBenHayes

On 29 October 2012, Hurricane Sandy slammed into the New Yorkmetropolitanarea.Builtalongapeninsulathatnarrowstoalmostarightangle,NewYorkwasat theendofafunnel intowhich90-milewindsand13-footwavessurged.Withinminutes,largeswathesofNewYorkCitywerefloodedwithamixofseawaterandsewage.Waterstreamedinto the subwaysystem,anumberofpublichospitalswereevacuated,andhundredsofthousandsofresidentslosttheirelectricity.ThefamousManhattan skyline was plunged into darkness. But one buildingcontinued to glow in defiance of the storm: 200 West Street, theheadquarters of investment bank Goldman Sachs, shielded behind25,000sandbagsandpoweredbyahugebackupgenerator.1LikeHurricaneKatrinabefore it,Sandyexposed thedeep inequality

inUSsociety.Again,itwasthepoorestdistrictsthatsufferedthemost–Hardscrabble,RedHook,ConeyIsland,theRockaways.Amonthafterthedisaster,thousandswerestillwithoutpowerandheat;threemonthslater, few had received the promised support and repairs to theirdamagedflatsandhouses.2Manyalsosuffered long-termeffects fromcontaminationdue to the floodingofnearby toxic industries, typicallyplacedinthelowest-incomeareas.Oneyearlater,astudyshowedthatthe poorest residents affected by the hurricane were still enduringmaterial hardship and an inability to meet their routine daily livingexpenses.3

NewYorkStateGovernorAndrewCuomorespondedtothehurricaneby sending in the military: 61,000 soldiers in total. Many of thembacked up Federal EmergencyManagementAgency (FEMA) staff byclearingdebrisanddistributingfoodandwater.Therewascertainlynorepeat of the violence and repression witnessed after Katrina in NewOrleans,buttheoperationboremanyofthesamehallmarks,includingan emphasis on crowd control, the protection of petrol stations, andconductingneighbourhoodpatrolstopreventlooting.4Thearmy’sowninternal evaluation found that the mission lacked coordination andclarityofpurpose.5Incredibly, the state’s response was soon overshadowed by Occupy

Sandy,anoffshootof theglobalOccupymovement thathadstarted inNewYorkCityinSeptember2011.6Basedoutoftenhubs,atitspeak60,000volunteerswererunningremarkablyefficientcentresacrossthecity for people to donate and receive food and clothing.On one day,Michael Premo, one of the volunteers, estimated the effort included2,500 volunteers, 15,000 meals and 120 carloads of supplies sent torecovery sites. Another volunteer, Ethan Murphy, explained therewasn’t any kind of official decision or declaration that ‘occupiers’wouldnowtrytohelpwiththehurricaneaftermath:‘Thisiswhatwedoalready:buildcommunity,helpneighbours,andcreateaworldwithoutthehelpoffinance.’7The story of Sandy prefigures many dimensions of our world’s

unfolding climate crisis. These kinds of extreme weather events arebecoming more frequent as the climate changes. Extreme inequalitydictatesthatcorporationslikeGoldmanSachsarewellprotected,whilethe poor and marginalised are exposed. After a tweeted photo of theGoldmanSachsbuilding’slightswentviral,thebankturnedonthePR,explainingthatithadprovidedwaterfornearbyresidentsandhadsetupafreemobilephone-chargingstation.Thisofcoursemissedthepointofthe popular outrage.Having been bailed outwith billions of taxpayerdollars a fewyears earlier,GoldmanSachs had abundant resources toprotect itself, while local hospitals and the community apparently did

not.These inequalitieswerereplicatedacrossnationalborders.While the

US government eventually spent $60 billion to help businesses andresidents rebuild after the storm,8 theUNwas still scrambling a yearlater to raise $40 million to alleviate the hunger and malnutrition inimpoverishedHaitithatresultedfromtheimpactofHurricaneSandy.9BackinNewYork,themostimportantpartoftheSandystoryishow

an ‘army’ of volunteers self-organised amore effective response thanmany could have imagined possible. Their success was motivated bycompassion, justice and solidarity, rather than self-interest and a‘security state confrontational mentality’ that views the victims ofclimatechangeasapopulation tobe ‘carefullycontrolled’. In itsownway,theSandystoryremindsusthatourresponsetotheclimatecrisiscanandshouldhaveverydifferentstartandendpointstothemilitary-corporate-ledapproachexposedbythisbook.

Amirroronourselves

‘Climatechange is amirror inwhichwewill all come to see thebestand the worst of ourselves’, says the UK’s former climate-changenegotiatorJohnAshton.10 In looking at themirror through the lens ofthe militarisation and the corporate capture of climate-change policymaking,asthiscollectionhas,wecertainlyseetheworst.Thereflectionis one of paranoid and overextended state-security apparatuses whichlack the imagination and, more importantly, the mandate to envisageanything other than disaster and social unrest. Lurking in thebackground are those corporate elites who see only risks andopportunities, anduse the languageof climate change and fears aboutsecuritytoprofitfromboth.Securityusedtomeantheabilityofpeopletocareforthemselvesand

each other. In many senses it still does, with survey after surveyshowing thatpeople are farmoreconcernedabout job security,or the

security of having a long-term home, even climate change andenvironmental security, than they are worried about the threat of‘terrorism’ and other supposed threats to the national security and theintegrityofthestate.Butthepromiseofhumansecurity–freedomfromwant,freedomfromfear–thatwasnurturedbytheUNisbeingeclipsedbyastate-corporatesecuritythatoffersacatch-allforarangeofdubiousandimmoralpolicies.Forthesecurity/military-industrialcomplex,climatechangeisjustthe

latestinalonglineofthreatsconstructedinsuchawayastoconsolidateitsgriponpowerandpublicfinance.Forcorporations,theriskposedbyclimatechangeisalsoanopportunityforprofit,andnowheremoresoina security industry that offers an endless supply of resilience- anddisaster-related services. Whether it is written into a US defencemanual, a retail giant’s corporate risk strategy, or a World Bankagricultureproposal,securitynowprovidesaubiquitousframeworkforpolicies that seek to consolidate the interests of the powerful. ‘Watersecurity’, for example, becomes justification for a soft-drinksmultinationaltosecurewatersuppliesindrought-proneregionsinIndia,even if itdenies localvillagerscleandrinkingwater.For thepowerfulmilitarygiants,particularlyoftheUSandEU,securitymeansprotectingshipping routes that allow the resources and profits of the world tocontinue to flow North, while militarising borders to ensure thatimpoverishedpeopledon’ttakethesamerouteoroftendieinthetrying.Intheeyesoftheelites,thecommunitiesandindividualsthatsuffertheconsequences have become disposable people: invisible or ignored, aminorfootnoteinmediastories,regrettableperhaps,butultimatelynotas important as the ‘security’ that is gained as a result. Through theirlens, those people most vulnerable to climate change are more oftenidentified as a potential threat to national security, by virtue of theirvulnerableorfailingstates,ratherthanseenasprioritiesforassistance.Territoriesarebeingdemarcatedanddividedbymoreandmoreborders,not just between countries but within them; corporate power is beinggiven ever more control of our resources, with the support of state-

sponsoredviolenceandcoercionifnecessary.None of these trends, of course, are new or exclusive to a time of

climatecrisis.Landandwatergrabbingwashappeninglongbeforethe2008foodcrisisputclimatechangeintheframe.Repressionandracismagainst migrants has been a troubling reality in most countriesworldwide. In termsof dwindling reserves of fossil fuel, the ‘race forwhat’s left’ would still be causing environmental and social havocregardlessofitsimpactontheclimate.However,alloftheseconditionsare being intensified. And in true Orwellian fashion, much of themodern-daystructuralviolenceisdoneinthenameoftacklingclimatechangeandcreatinggreatersecurityforeveryone.Sometimes the rhetoric of environmentalists on climate change

contributes to thisproblem.The idea thatclimatechange isa threat toeveryone,andthereforethesharedresponsibilityofeveryonetoaddressit, can allow dissent about the problems of certain approaches to bedismissed, even in progressive circles. This also limits the space fortalkingaboutthewayinwhichclimatechangeaffectsdifferentgroupsof people in markedly different ways depending on economic status,race, gender and location. Climate change interacts with existingsystemsofexploitation,andinturnourresponsestothethreatcanalsoexacerbateclassandracedivides.11Brushingoverthesedifferences,todemandurgentactionatallcosts,canalltooeasilyplayintothehandsofamilitaristicPentagonplanneroraself-servingcorporateexecutive.One tangible result of the widespread adoption of ‘security’ as the

approach to follow has been to further expand national securityapparatuses that have grown tomonstrous proportions in the name ofkeeping ‘us’ safe from ‘them’, be they poor people, refugees, orterrorists. This is a perverse and irrational response that promises todismantlehard-woncivilliberties,entrenchexistinginequalityandstiflepoliticaldebate,allthewhilehelpingtoprotectthecurrentpoliticalandeconomic system from the meaningful, systemic changes that arenecessarytoovercomethechallengesweface.

Adaptationorresilienceasalternatives?

In looking foralternatives toa security-ledapproach,manyconcernedcitizenshave invested instead in efforts focusedon climate adaptationandresilience.Thereismuchtocommendtheseapproacheswhichofferaninherentlymoredemocraticandaccountableresponsetotheclimatecrisis. Adaptation is what people have been doing from timeimmemorial to cope with change, including variations in the climate.Theclimate-adaptationplansdrawnupbymanycities,forexample,arerooted in the best traditions of devolved power and are makingnecessary preparations for climate impacts. Green buildings that canprovidecoolingduringheatwaves,reduceenergycosts,andmakecitiesmoreliveableareagoodexampleofthesortofinitiativesweneed.12However, the success of adaptation locally also highlights themain

problemwith theprevailingadaptationnarrative,which is intrinsicallyrelatedtoscale.Ontheonehand, the impactofadaptationat the locallevel is de facto undermined by the behaviour of nation states andmultinational corporations. On the other hand, the language ofadaptationcanfavouracquiescenceandalackofresistancetopreciselythese drivers of climate change. The suggestion is that people – andnevermindanyotherspeciesontheplanet–should‘adapt’ toclimatechange, rather than arguing that it is the structures of power andprocessesthatarecreatingclimatechangethathavetochange.Inthehandsoftheworstoffenders,climateadaptationisevenusedas

a reason not to take effective action against the causes of climatechange, particularly by those climate sceptics and free marketideologueswho,forcedtoadmitthatclimatechangeexists,havequicklyswitchedtoarguingthatitischeapertoadapttoclimatechangeoreven‘fix’climatechangewithgeo-engineering rather than to try topreventit.13Moreover,manycommunitiesworldwide lack theresources tomake

anymeaningful preparations.Where adaptationpolicies are applied in

theSouth, they canoften endup reinforcing inequalities, as shown inthechaptersonfood,waterandenergysecurity.AnEUresearchprojectin 2013 focused on theMediterranean, theMiddleEast and theSahelshowedthatpoorlydesignedclimate-adaptationpolicies(interconnectedwith systemic inequalitiesand lackofdemocraticaccountability)werethe prime cause of human insecurity in their 14 case studies.14 Trulyeffective adaptation policies, such as building a strong social-welfarestateorsupportingtraditionalformsofcommunityresiliencearerarelymentioned,letaloneprioritised.Perhapsthemostdangerousassumptionistheideathatwecaneasily

adapt to climate change, as if all that is required is small increases insea-wallheights, thediversionofaroad,orsomenewgreenkit. If,asNafeezAhmedandotherswarn,thetriggeringoffeedbackmechanismswithin our atmosphere more dramatically disrupts intenselyinterconnected systems for providing food, water and energy, suchpiecemealmeasureswillsoonseemridiculous.Asimilarcritiquecanbemadeofresilience.Again,thereismuchto

commendthenotionalpursuitofresiliencethatenhancesthe‘abilityofasystemtoabsorbchangewhileretainingessentialfunction;tohavetheability for self-organization; and to have the capacity to adapt andlearn’.15Butpartofthereasonthatwefaceaclimatecrisisisduetotheresilienceofaglobalcapitalisteconomicsystem,acarbon-basedenergysystemandacompromisedpoliticalsystem–thathaveallsurvivedandpersisted despite the global economic and ecological crisis and thegrowing distrust of corporate politicians. As environmental-securityscholar David Schlosberg puts it: ‘Power is incredibly resilient,ignorance is resilient, compromisedpoliticiansare resilient.Resilienceisnot,initself,necessarilyaredeemablefeature.’16

Boldlytacklingtheunderlyingcauses

Theunderlyingcausesofboth theclimatecrisisandhuman insecurity

are well-known, if still widely ignored. Capitalism, militarism andimperialism are disastrously intertwined with the fossil-fuel economyand are, in many places in the world, creating seemingly intractablesecurity problems at every turn. A globalised economy predicated ongrowth at any social or environmental cost, carbon-dependentinternational trade, the limitless extraction of natural resources and aviewofcitizensasnothingmorethanconsumerscannotbethebasisforeithertacklingclimatechange,orforcreatingthekindofsocietiesthatcan respond justly to the challenges climate change poses. Littlewonder, then, that elites have nothing to offer beyond continuedmilitarisationandtrustintechno-fixes.AsenvironmentalscholarSimonDalbyreflects:

Thechallengefacingthoseofuswhostruggletorethinkgeopoliticsinthesenoveltimes,andtomakeusefulcontributionstothediscussionsof transitions to a more sustainable world, is to facilitate shiftinganalysisfromfocusingonquestionsofdominanceonadividedworldto modes of sharing a crowded planet which is actively beingtransformed by human action … Who we are is now irretrievablyinterlinked towhatkindofabiosphereweare remaking; there isnonatureoutthereforustodominate.17

There is little point in downplaying the enormity of this task. Thepursuit of off-shore capital and the satisfaction of the demands ofcorporations has become the priority of government.18 Neoliberalismhas done its utmost to replace moral values with commercial values,caringwithindifference,altruismwithselfishness,andgenerositywithgreed.19Thearchitectsofthedystopianvisionsdescribedinthisbook–themilitary,securityandcorporatestrategists–representaformidablealliance.Itisnotsurprisingthatsomeactivistshavefeltthebattleisnotworth

fighting.People likePaulKingsnorth,a formerenvironmentalactivist,nowof theDarkMountainProject, argue that it is time to ‘withdraw’

fromthefightinordertoreflectmoredeeply.20Hisargumentsvividlycapturesomeofthegriefassociatedwithenvironmentaldamageandthefrequenthubrisandarroganceinour(lackof)response,butwithdrawalsimplyhandsmorepoweroverourfuturetothosewhostandinthewayofenvironmentaljustice.Resistance is crucial – and it must be nonviolent, bold and

confrontational. As the great Frederick Douglass, a former slave,observedin1857:

Ifthereisnostrugglethereisnoprogress.Thosewhoprofesstofavorfreedomandyetdeprecateagitationaremenwhowantcropswithoutplowinguptheground;theywantrainwithoutthunderandlightning.Theywanttheoceanwithouttheawfulroarofitsmanywaters.Thisstrugglemaybeamoralone,oritmaybeaphysicalone,anditmaybebothmoralandphysical,butitmustbeastruggle.Powerconcedesnothingwithoutademand.Itneverdidanditneverwill.21

Resistancealsomeansbeingawake to the subtle shifts inmilitaryandcorporatestrategies thatseektomakepreviouslyunacceptablepoliciesseem increasingly natural and therefore acceptable. Environmentalpsychologists call this ‘shifting baselines’, which is the phenomenonthat‘perceptionofchangesinthesocialandpsychologicalenvironmentis never absolute but always relative to one’s own observationalstandpoint.’22Inotherwords,weassumethatwhatweseearoundusiswhathasalwaysbeenaroundusandisthereforenatural–weforgetorbecomeblindtothefactthatourlocalriverwasoncefilledwithfish,orthat people used towalk down city streetswithout cameras followingthem.Indeed,perhapsnowherearetheshiftingbaselinesmoreterrifyingthan in the gradual legitimisation and acceptance ofmilitarised policyand practices – in the gradual acceptance of the US programme ofassassinationbydrone strike, or theEU’s substitutionof its legal andmoral obligations toward refugees with a military blockade in theMediterraneanSea.Byitsverynature,climatechangepromisestomake

the unimaginable tangible; in doing so, it also threatens to make theexceptionalnormal.The frequently depressing nature of the material in this collection

presentsaconstantintellectualstruggle.Anyreasonedassessmentoftheclimatescience,whencoupledwithcontemporarypowerstructuresandthemultiple sourcesof today’swidespread insecurities point toward afrighteningmid-termtrajectoryfortheworld.Howcanwerespondinawaythatputsthefuturefirmlyinourhands,yetproperlyacknowledgesthe challenges and structures of power we need to overcome? Inworking through some of these issues and thinking through theirvulnerabilitiesandfault-lines,thefirstthingwewouldwanttostressishow this doom and gloom is being socially constructed and cynicallyexploited and therefore needs to be challenged. As others who havegrappledwiththistopichaveexplained:

Wecanneverescapefear.Neithercanweescapelanguagerhetoricorperformance.These are currencies of life in the twenty-first century… understanding fear and anxieties is one of the pressing politicalprojects of our time. To develop and enact a progressive politicalagenda,wemustunravel thedense thicketof ideology,politics, andeconomiesthatareimbricatedinthedramasoffearsandthreats.23

Wehopethisbookcontributestothistask.Secondly, asmostof thechapters in thiscollection stress, it is clear

thatthekeytoresistingthefutureworldwehaveattemptedtorevealisembedded in the seeds of the resistance to current inequalities andinjustice.While elitesmay consider people disposable, the fact is thatpeople everywhere are refusing to be victims and are both activelyresisting the power structures described in this book, and developingcreative and empowering alternatives.They are the other reflection inthe climate change mirror: the ‘best of ourselves’. We should beamplifying their efforts, not overwhelming the spirit with fears aboutsomenightmarefuturethatdoesn’tyetexist.With this in mind, we finish by outlining some practical principles

based on the lessons and experiences we have drawn from thescholarshipandadvocacyinthisbook.

Stayfocusedonstoppingtheextractionandproductionoffossilfuels

Whereas the climate security and corporate strategists emphasised inthisbooktendtopaylipservicetotheneedtopreventrunawayclimatechange, some analysts are more circumspect. In its 2014 report ‘TheGathering Storm: Climate Change, Security and Conflict’, theEnvironmentalJusticeFoundationlamentsthewayinwhich‘Thepotentsignificance of the fact that the world’s major military powers andsecurity institutions consistently and increasingly voice their concernsregarding the impacts of climate change jarswith the simple fact thattherehasbeenafailuretoactontheissue.’This‘collectivefailure’,itsuggested, ‘is the defining global human rights issue of the 21stCentury.’24 Indeed, there can be no doubt that in terms of potentialimpact, the difference between global temperature rises of 1–2°C, letalonescenariosof4°C,ishuge.Putsimply,thelongerittakestoreplaceour carboniferous economy, theworse the impact is likely to be. Thenumberoneprioritymustbetoleaveasmuchoil,gas,andothercarbon-based fossil fuels in theground, and todo this asquicklyaspossible.Thisactioncantakemanyforms–taxes,regulation,directaction,andsoon–butultimatelywemustconfrontanddismantletheoilindustry,usherinaplannedreductionoffossil-fueluse, leavefossilfuelsintheground,andswitchtoalternativeandrenewableformsofenergy.

Playnopartingreenwashing

Itisnaiveintheextremeforenvironmentaliststoallythemselveswith

military and big corporate polluters on the grounds that we are allsomehowpushinginthesamedirection.Toomanytimes,wehaveseenthat partnerships between civil society and corporations result in thegreenwashingofcorporatemalpractice;atworst,theyhavestrengthenedcorporatecontrolovercriticalresources.Weneedlooknofurther thancarbon trading, which is supported by many large environmentalorganisationsandhasendedupprovidingcashwindfallsforthedirtiestcompanies on the planet, while doing almost nothing to reduceemissions.25 As to looking to the military to speak ‘green’ in order(unsuccessfully we might add) to bring on board right-wing climatesceptics, or to somehow scare their political masters into action: weshould be absolutely clear that uncritical acceptance of this discoursehas merely strengthened the emerging consensus that authoritarianpolicies will be needed to control populations at times of crisis.Environmental activist Tim DeChristopher is exactly right when hesays:

Idon’tcareifthemilitaryistakingclimatechangeseriously.Butyoucan be sure they are not a group whose power I want to reinforcewhenthingsbecomeugly…Soinallouractionsweneedtolooktooverturn these power structures. We should not be asking majorcorporationslikeWalmartorinstitutionslikethemilitarytobekinderandgentler.Weneedtostartworkingnowonputtinginplacepowerstructures that share our values as we enter difficult times. Whenthingsgetugly,andaccesstoresourcesbecomesdifficult,wewanttohave trust that those making decisions will act justly, and not justfavourthestrong.26

Atthesametimewecannotbeanti-everything.Theoutrightrejectionofscientific adventure, of innovation, of large-scale production, of‘security’ – in favour of some kind of small-is-beautiful, organiclocalism–offersnochallengetothepowerstructureswemustconfront(nor is it by any means a desirable state of affairs for the world’s 7

billion inhabitants).Byanalogy, surveillanceandcorporatedominanceoftheInternetisnotareasonforactiviststostopusingtheInternet;it’sareasonforthemtotakestepstoprotecttheirprivacyandcampaignfora freer Internet. The same is true for technology and the forces ofproduction: it’s a question of ‘how best’, not ‘what else’. In anotheronlinechapterpreparedfor thiscollection,27 twoeminentscholarsandlabour-movementactivists,HilaryWainwrightandJacklynCock,focuson the transformative potential of labour and environmental activistsworking together, particularly when workers and unions shift from anarrow focus on workplace rights to advocate for worker-basedsolutionsdoneincollaborationwithothercitizengroups.Theycite,forexample, the work done by the National Union of Metalworkers inSouthAfrica(NUMSA),whichhassetupawholerangeofworker-ledResearch and Development Groups exploring how to producerenewable-energyinfrastructureandcreateclimatejobsinSouthAfrica.

Defenddemocracyandchallengeauthoritarianism

A just response to climate-change impacts will require a renewedemphasisondemocracy,whichhasbeenhollowedoutbytransnationalcapital and neoliberalism, and is threatened further still by climate-security narratives. This book has focused on the suspension ofdemocracy in the name of ‘disaster’ response, but the trend is alsoincreasingly found in other areas of public life. At the internationallevel, more and more important global-policy decisions are taken bythinly accountable multi-stakeholder forums. Projects like the GlobalRedesign Initiative, championed by the corporate-dominated WorldEconomicForum,haveseenself-selectedgroupsofelites,corporationsand big NGOs start to dictate policy to the UN, circumventing whatfragiledemocracyexistsatthatscale.28Itisalsothecasethatmanyofthetransnationalsecurityframeworks

that are closing in on environmental activists and otherswho threaten

the status quo have been devised and implemented in largely orcompletely undemocratic forums. This includes the internationalframeworks underpinning mass surveillance, counter-terrorism andglobalmigrationmanagement.Thisanti-democratictrendisalsoevidencedbythepowerfulandtheir

media’sdisdainfordemocraticelectionsthatdeliverresultselitesdon’twant,whether it isHamas inGaza or Syriza inGreece.29 The rise ofone-party-stateChina on the global stage is only likely to deepen thistrend. The ‘threat’ of climate change has even led scientists such asJamesLovelocktoarguethat‘itmaybenecessarytoputdemocracyonhold for a while’, saying that we need ‘a more authoritative world’where there are ‘a few people with authority who you trust who arerunningit’.30Theconvergenceofthesethreads–combinedwithfearofclimate-change impacts – is creating a powerful trend towardsauthoritarian environmentalism, which could have dangerousconsequencesfordemocracy.AsSussexacademicAndyStirlingnotes

… themore assertive andapocalyptic the envisaged threat themoreseeminglydesperatelynecessarytheFaustianpactwithpower…Andneither history nor current affairs suggest any guarantee that suchbargainswillbedelivered…timeandagaintheseactuallyreproducethe old incumbent structures in new forms, often being even moreentrenched.31

Today’sChina–bornofanagrarianrevolutionandnowdispossessingpeasantswithanironfist–isamodern-dayexampleofthis.Democracyis obviously messy and slow, and clearly needs invigorating andrenewing through the engagement of social movements in order tocounteritscapturebyelitesandcorporations,butitistheonlywaywehavetocounterauthoritarianenvironmentalism.Thereisclearlyaroleforreinvigoratedformsofsovereigntyheretoo.

As the chapters on food, energy and water have demonstrated,

marginalisedcommunitiesworldwideareconfrontingpowerfulinterests(which are using the language of climate security to justify resourcegrabs and repression)with their own calls for food, energy andwater‘sovereignty’.Whatthesecommunitiesareseekingisthepowertotakedecisionsovertheuseoftheseresourcesintheinterestsofthemajorityofthosewhoselivelihoodsdependonthem.Theglobalpeasantfarmers’federation, for example, defined food sovereignty in away that couldeasilybeextendedtootherresourcedomains:

Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturallyappropriatefoodproducedthroughecologicallysoundandsustainablemethods, and their right to define their own food and agriculturesystems.Itputsthosewhoproduce,distributeandconsumefoodattheheartoffoodsystemsandpoliciesratherthanthedemandsofmarketsand corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of thenextgeneration.32

In thecontextofclimatechange,resistingauthoritarianismalsomeansgiving people a say in how they are policed, democratising thoseapparatuses involved in disaster preparedness and crisis management,andholdingsecurityforcestoaccount.Thisisanotherareaofactivismthat has for too long been at the margins of the concerns of socialmovements;indangeroustimes,itisimperativethatadvocatesofsocialjusticestepuptheirengagementwiththecoerciveapparatusesofpower.

Ensurethatadaptationandresiliencedeliversforpeople,notprofit

Previouschaptershaveshownhowconceptslike‘security’,‘adaptation’and ‘resilience’ have joined the ranks of modern-day weasel-words:hollowed-out,appropriatedandtwistedtothepointthattheycanmeananythingandnothingatthesametime.Thisrequirescriticalthinkersto

keep their spin-detectors finely tuned toward corporate and securityelitespromisingtotackletheproblemsposedbyclimatechange.Morethanthat,wemustsimultaneouslysupportthesystems,structures,ideasandcapacities thatwillgenuinelycontribute toa justadaptationwhileresistingthosedesignedtoentrenchprofiteeringandauthoritarianism.One example is investment in, and large-scale adoption of,

agroecology,proposedinthefoodchapter,thatpromisestoproducefarless carbon dioxide than current industrial farming practices, whilebuilding a more ecologically diverse food system that has a betterchanceofadaptingtoclimatechange.Butitslong-termsuccessintermsofmeeting the human right to foodwill depend also on redistributinglandanddemocratisingfoodsupplyanddistributionchains.Inthefieldofenergy,citiessuchasBerlintakingbackcontroloftheir

energy utilities are another important example. Not only have theseinitiatives to end privatisation allowed these cities to adopt bolderrenewable-energyplans,theyhavealsohelpeddecentralisepower(bothelectrical and democratic) that will be key to a more robust energysystem. This initiative is also building community cohesiveness andparticipation–allinvaluableassetsforrespondingtoclimatechanges.33

Technology platform Ushahidi,34 which has grown out of citizenjournalism and the mapping of post-election violence in Kenya andoffersarangeofopen-sourcetoolsforbottom-up,community-ledcrisismanagementanddevelopment,isanotherinspiringexample.In termsof resilience,wealsoneed to revisit the letter and spiritof

human and environmental security as developed in opposition tonarrower, state-centric concepts. Various scholars have laid out inmeticulousdetail thewayinwhichhumansecuritycanbewrittenintoclimate-changestrategies,offeringtangiblealternativestothehubrisonofferfromthemilitary.35

Allyourselveswiththosewhosufferthemostfrom

climatechange

Concomitant to the rejection of elite visions of how to profit fromclimatechange,isourembraceandsolidaritywiththosewhowillsufferitsconsequencesmost–thecommunitythatlosescontrolofwatertoanagribusiness,themigrantsseekingtocrosstheMediterranean,thelow-incomeneighbourhoodsinourcitiessitednexttooilrefineries.Actionsofsolidaritywilloftenmovetheterrainandevenfocusofstruggle,so‘climate change’ will not always be the headline cause of socialinjustice. As the migration chapter explored, climate refugees will inpracticebedifficulttodiscernfromotherpeoplewhoareforcedtoleavetheirhomes,butinpractice,ifwedon’tresistEUpoliciespredicatedonmilitaryactionagainstmigrants,whatkindofaworldarewecreatingfor future refugees, whether they seek protection across borders orinternally?Thereare,however,encouragingsignsthatenvironmentalmovements

are more frequently joining the struggles against racism, inequality,injusticeand insupportofhumanrights–afterachequeredhistory inwhich some environmentalists have either isolated themselves fromothersocialstruggles,oreventakenthesideofoppressiveforces.IntheUS, for example, the leadership ofmajor rallies and convergences ofaction,suchasthemassiveClimateMarchthattookplaceinSeptember2014, is increasingly led by indigenous, black and grass-rootscommunity groups. The result has been greater collaboration withstruggles against racism, corporate power and economic injustice, andactsofsolidaritybyenvironmentalactivistswithanti-racistmovements,respondingtopolicekillingsofblackmeninFerguson,NewYorkandBaltimore. AsDeidre Smith of theUS climate activist group 350.orgputs it: this cross-linking ofmovements comes from a realisation thatthe‘fightisnotsimplywiththecarboninthesky,butwiththepowersontheground.’Ultimately, theonlyway toconfront the injusticeat theheartof the

climatecrisis–thatthosewhohadtheleastresponsibilityforthecrisis

will suffer the most – is for power and wealth to be redistributed atlocal,nationalandgloballevels.Thiswillrequiretaxation,financingforclimate adaptation, and the (re)building of a strong social-welfaresystemforall.Public-publicpartnerships,wherewell-performingpublicutilities partnerwith their counterparts in other areas or countries, areinitiatives that theclimate-justicemovement should support.Waternet,Amsterdam’s public water utility is one such example: it has workedwithcitiesinIndonesia,Egypt,SurinameandSouthAfricaandcouldbeamodelforotherpublic-sectorsolidarityinitiatives.

Drawoncommons-based,collectiveandecologicallyrootedresponsestoclimatechange

In an accompanying online chapter, Henfrey and Kenrick provide aninspiring insight into the growing globalmovement for just transitionand the role played by the Transition Townsmovement.36 They notethat this is essential work aimed at creating a ‘new commons’ whichtheydescribeas ‘the relationships that constituteaplace, and thecareweneedtotaketoensurethatall(humanandnonhuman)aspectsofthisplaceflourish’.They cite examples of age-old commons-based regimes in Kenya,

AustraliaandGuyanathatsuccessfullyconserveforestsanddrylands,aswellasmorerecentexperimentsbyTransitionTownsthatarecreatingtheir own currencies, community-owned energy companies, andcommunity farms; ideas and practices that are sharedwith a growingglobal movement. According to Kenrick and Henfrey, transition- andcommons-basedresponsestoclimatechangehelpus

…dis-identifyfrom,andoppose,asystemweareall toagreaterorlesserextentimplicatedinandaddictedto;andsecondly[enablesus]tobuildsustainablecommunitiesthatcanbothprefigureandhelpsetthedirectionweall need to take todiminish theclimateand related

crises,andtocultivatenetworksofcooperationamongthese.

Inthisbook,wehavealsoseenthepowerofcommons-basedresponsesto disaster. This book cited the incredible impact of the OccupymovementinrespondingtoHurricaneSandy–notbecausewewanttoendorsesomekindofpoliticsofapocalypseandrebirth–butbecauseitoffersanalternativevisionofsocietythanthatposedbythedystopiansandclimatesecurocrats.AnothertellingexampleisthatofCuba,whoseexperience of Hurricane Sandy is often overlooked. Sandy hit CubaevenmoreseverelythanNewYork,yettheCaribbeannationlostveryfew lives and recovered more rapidly. The challenge is to takeinspiration from these local initiatives and to replicate them at muchlargerscales.StudiesofCuba’ssuccessinrespondingtodisastershowthat it relies on a very successful collaboration between the state andwell-organised communities to identify and minimise hazards tovulnerablepopulations, toencourageacultureofsafetyandsolidarity,and then to implement good planning and successful mobilisation ofcommunity resources to respond to the disaster and to promoterecovery.In developing local responses, it is crucial, however, that we don’t

romanticisethelocalwhilefailingtoactglobally,asthiswillnotdelivertheinternationalgovernanceortransformationweneed.

Reclaimthestate

Amidst all this, social movements will need to have a necessary butdifficult relationship with the state. This may seem counter-intuitive.After all, many states are the prime agents of the militarisation ofclimate change and the dystopian security strategies and practicesdescribed in this book. It is the state that feeds themilitary-industrialcomplex, and the state that acts as the prime backer of the corporatetakeover of land, water, food and energy, removing regulations and

openingupmarketstothem,negotiatingtradedealsontheirbehalf,andcreatingwhat somescholarscall an international legal ‘architectureofimpunity’ for corporations, which has escalated human rights abusesandcorporatecrimesworldwide.37Thisisbecausecorporationshaveinmany ways captured states; populating their ministries with staff,designing their policies, lobbying against regulation, and threateningboycottandwithdrawalifanystatedarestochallengethem.Intoday’sworld, we are no longer talking about states, but rather a hybrid: thecorporate-state.Itishardlysurprisingthatmanymovementsandcivil-societyactors–

not just anarchists – choose to either reject or ignore states and theirpotentialrolefortransformationandfocusonbuildinglocalalternatives.Thetroubleisthatthisstrategydoesnotweakenorremovestatesfromour lives,but rather leads themdownamoreandmore repressiveandcorporate-directed route. It also ignores the fact that despite threedecadesofneoliberalism,thestateisstilloneoftheremainingguardiansofthe‘publicsector’andofvictoriesfoughthardforinthefirsthalfofthe twentieth century: the National Health Service in the UK, thewelfarestateinNordiccountries,statecorporationsinmanycountriesintheSouth, toname just a fewexamples.More than10percentof theworld’s biggest companies are owned by the state, with a turnoverequivalent to 6 per cent of global GDP, exceeding the gross nationalproductofcountriessuchasGermany,France,ortheUnitedKingdom.The fact that state enterprises and services such aswater, education

andhealth fornowstill largelyremain in the‘public’sector–andarestillwidelycelebratedforthisdespiteyearsofcorporateattack–showstheimportanceforretainingavisionofthecommonsinthetwenty-firstcentury.Italsoheraldsthepossibilitythattheycanbereshapedtowardssocialandenvironmentalpurposes.Moreover,inrecentyears,therehaseven been a resurgence of companies returning to the public sector,particularlyinLatinAmerica,butalsointheUSandEurope.Manyofthese large state enterprises are highly corporatised and financialised,andsomearealsodeeplyembeddedinthefossil-fuelindustry,butthere

are smallexamples– suchas the state telecommunications industry inUruguayandtheelectricitysupplyindustryinCostaRica–ofstatesthatareeffectivelyintegratingsocialandenvironmentalobjectivesintotheirwork.Thetruthisthatwewillneedthestatetodevelopthere-engineering

of our economy and infrastructure that will be necessary to preventworsening climate change. And we will need a state to respond toclimate-changeimpacts,whether theyareslowanddrawn-out,suchasthe unfolding drought in California in 2015, or sudden and dramatic,such as TyphoonHaiyan in the Philippines. Localised adaptation andjusttransitionarecrucialpartsofthepuzzle,butitwillrequireastatetoensure they boost and interconnect their efforts and most of all toprovide the infrastructure, economic framework and policies that canenablethemtoflourish.

Rejectdystopianandneo-Malthusiannarratives

Perhaps the most important lesson of this book is that by portrayingpeopleassomekindofHobbesianmassthatwill inevitablymeetfoodshortageswithviolence,orashordesofwould-bemigrantsmassingatour borders, we are giving succour to the security strategists and thepoliticsoffearthatmakepeoplemorewillingtocontemplategivinguptheir freedoms. Instead of fuelling dystopia, we need to uncover thesocial basis of all that is truly horrifying and catastrophic about ourworldaspartofacriticalpracticedesignedtochangeit.38Andweonlyneedscratchthesurfaceofhowelitesarepreparingforclimatechangeto understandwhere the real ‘threatmultipliers’ lies.We should thencontrastthiswiththewaypeople–asopposedinmanycasestothoseinpositionsofpowerandauthority–actuallyrespondtodisaster.Inherdeeplyimportantbook,AParadiseBuiltinHell,RachelSolnit

studiedfivemajordisastersindepth,fromtheSanFranciscoearthquakeof 1906 to the flooding of New Orleans in 2005. While there is

obviouslynothinggoodaboutdisasteritself,shediscoveredthatcrises,moreoftenthannot,leadnottocivilisationalcollapse,butaltruismandsolidarity. The fear of disorder, mayhem and the justification formilitaryresponsesistheinstinctoftherichest–thosewithmosttolose.ThisiswhatSolnitdescribesas‘elitepanic’.Incontrast,whatemergedfromthedisastersshestudied,areminiephemeralutopiansocietiesbuilton precisely the solidarity, democracy and accountability thatneoliberalism and authoritarianism have stripped from contemporarypolitical systems: ‘Disasteroften revealswhat else theworldcouldbelike – reveals the strength of that hope, that generosity and thatsolidarity.Itrevealsmutualaidasadefaultoperatingprincipleandcivilsociety as something waiting in the wings when it’s absent from thestage.’39 Hurricane Sandy is a case in point. While New York PostcorrespondentHeatherMacDonaldwrote about stories of looting, and‘theThinBlueLine’between‘civilizationandanarchy’,40NewYork’scitizenswereformingcitizenbrigadestorescuevulnerablepeople,handoutfoodandwater,andprovideloveandcareforatraumatisedcity.As noted in Chapter 2, and in contrast to the ‘perspective of

Malthusiandog-eat-dogresourcecompetition’,theissuesengenderedorexacerbatedbyclimatechangehave just asmuchpotential toproducecooperation among peoples.41 In other words, when you have lots tolose,youaremorecompelledtocollaboratethancompete.Faced with the sure knowledge of worsening climate change,

corporations determined to continue business-as-usual, and a securityindustry promoting a politics of fear and insecurity, humanity faces acriticalchoice.Ontheonehand,wecanthrowupourhandsindespairand darkly predict our demise – in which case we will entrench thepowerofthosethrivingfromthepoliticsofdystopiaandhastensomeoftheworst-casescenariosthattheypredict.Orontheotherhand,wecanrejecttheirforecastsandbelieveinthepowerofpopularmovementstoadvanceadifferentvisionof thefuture,one thatharnesseshumanity’scompassion,creativityandcooperation.Asthechaptersinthisbookonenergy,water and food showed, countless communities are not sitting

backbutactivelyadvancingajustresponsetoclimatechange–showingthat alternatives not only exist but are thriving. The environmentalistandauthorPaulHawken,whenaskedifhewasoptimisticorpessimisticaboutthefuture,said:

Ifyoulookatthescienceaboutwhatishappeningonearthandaren’tpessimistic, you don’t understand data. But if you meet the peoplewho areworking to restore this earth and the lives of the poor, andyouaren’toptimistic,youhaven’tgotapulse.WhatIseeeverywherein theworld are ordinary peoplewilling to confront despair, power,and incalculable odds in order to restore some semblance of grace,justice,andbeautytothisworld.42

Notes

1.Greenhough,C.(30October2012).HurricaneSandyrages,butthelightsstayonatGoldmanSachs.Retrievedfromhttp://www.inquisitr.com/381743/hurricane-sandy-rages-but-the-lights-stay-on-at-goldman-sachs/.

2.Nessen,S.(24January2013).ThousandsstillcoldandstrugglingmonthsafterSuperstormSandy.Retrievedfromhttp://www.npr.org/2013/01/24/170198110/thousands-still-cold-and-struggling-months-after-superstorm-sandy.

3.

Wimer,C.andRaker,E.(2014).NewYorkersNegativelyImpactedbyHurricaneSandy:Howaretheyfaringsince?ColumbiaPopulationResearchCenter,pp.1–10.Retrievedfromhttps://courseworks.columbia.edu/access/content/group/c5a1ef92-c03c-4d88-0018-ea43dd3cc5db/Working%20Papers%20for%20website/Working%20Papers_2014/Working%20Papers_14-03_New%20York%20Negatively%20Impacted%20by%20Sandy_24oct14.pdf.

4.Hoarn,S.(30October2012).HurricaneSandymilitaryresponse:Preparationandearlyresponse.Retrievedfromhttp://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/hurricane-sandy-military-response-l-photos/.

5.Kilkenney,A.(5November2012).OccupySandyeffortshighlightneedforsolidarity,notcharity.Retrievedfromhttp://www.thenation.com/blog/171020/occupy-sandy-efforts-highlight-need-solidarity-not-charity.

6.Ambinder,E.andJennings,D.M.(2013).TheResilientSocialNetwork.HomelandSecurityStudies&AnalysisInstitute,pp.1–103.Retrievedfromhttp://homelandsecurity.org/docs/the%20resilient%20social%20network.pdf.

7.Goldstein,K.(4November2012).IsOWSoutperformingtheRedCrossindisasterrelief?Retrievedfromhttp://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2012/11/04/occupy_sandy_hurricane_relief_being_led_by_occupy_wall_street.xhtml.

8.Rowley,J.(15January2013).Housecompletes$60billioninHurricaneSandyrelief.Bloomberg.Retrievedfromhttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-15/house-supports-17-billion-in-hurricane-sandy-relief.

9.Haiti:UNappealsfor$40milliontohelppeopleaffectedbyHurricaneSandy.(12November2012).Retrievedfromhttp://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/haiti-un-appeals-40-million-help-people-affected-hurricane-sandy.

10.Ashton,J.(30March2015).OpenlettertoShell’sBenvanBeurdenfromJohnAshton.Guardian.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/30/open-letter-shell-ben-van-beurden-john-ashton-climate-change.

11.Stirling,A.(2014).EmancipatingTransformations:Fromcontrolling‘thetransition’toculturingpluralradicalprogress.STEPSCentre,64,pp.1–48.Retrievedfromhttp://steps-centre.org/wp-content/uploads/Transformations.pdf.

12.

Lee,M.,Willmott,E.,LeCourtois,A.,Gallegos,J.B.andDatta,N.(2011).GuidetoClimateChangeAdaptationinCities,pp.1–106.Retrievedfromhttp://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTURBANDEVELOPMENT/Resources/336387-1318995974398/GuideClimChangeAdaptCities.pdf.Approachedmorecritically,however,municipalclimateadaptationplansoftencontainlittlemorethanaspirationalgoals,withlittleinthewayofconcretestepstopreventanddealwithclimatechange:Gallucci,M.(20June2013).6oftheworld’smostextensiveclimateadaptationplans.Retrievedfromhttp://insideclimatenews.org/news/20130620/6-worlds-most-extensive-climate-adaptation-plans.

13.Lawson,N.(22December2009).Timeforaclimatechangeplanb.WallStreetJournal.Retrievedfromhttp://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704107604574607793378860698.

14.Zografos,C.etal.(2013)Sourcesofhumaninsecurityinthefaceofhydro-climaticchange.GlobalEnvironmentalChange.Retrievedfromhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.11.002.

Adger,N.,Brown,K.andWaters,J.(2011).Resilience,inDryzek,J.S.,Norga

15. ard,R.B.andSchlosberg,D.,eds.,OxfordHandbookofClimateChangeandSociety(p.696).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,p.696.

16.Schlosberg,D.(January2013).Politicalchallengesoftheclimate-changedsociety.Retrievedfromhttps://www.academia.edu/2372945/Political_Challenges_of_the_Climate-Changed_Society.

17. Dalby,S.(2014).Environmentalgeopoliticsinthetwentyfirstcentury.Alternatives:Global,Local,Political39(1),15.

18. Monbiot,G.(2000).CaptiveState:ThecorporatetakeoverofBritain.London:Macmillan.

19.Sivanandan,A.(16October2005).WhyMuslimsrejectBritishvalues.Guardian.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/oct/16/race.world.

20. Kingsnorth,P.(December2012).Darkecology.Retrievedfromhttps://orionmagazine.org/article/dark-ecology/.

21.Douglass,F.(n.d.).‘Ifthereisnostruggle,thereisnoprogress’.Retrievedfromhttp://www.blackpast.org/1857-frederick-douglass-if-there-no-struggle-there-no-progress#sthash.O2JamUGR.dpuf.

22. Welzer,H.andCamiller,P.(2012).ClimateWars:Whypeoplewillbekilledinthetwenty-firstcentury.Cambridge:PolityPress,p.140.

23. Hartmann,B.,Subramaniam,B.andZerner,C.(2005).MakingThreats:Biofearsandenvironmentalanxieties.Oxford:RowmanandLittlefield,p.250.

24.EnvironmentalJusticeFoundation(2014).TheGatheringStorm:Climatechange,securityandconflict.Retrievedfromhttp://ejfoundation.org/sites/default/files/public/EJF_climate_conflict_report_web-ok.pdf.

25.Gilbertson,T.andReyes,O.(23November2009).Carbontrading:Howitworksandwhyitfails.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tni.org/tnibook/carbon-trading-how-it-works-and-why-it-fails.

26. Buxton,N.(May2011).Timetobehonest–InterviewwithTimDeChristopher.Retrievedfromhttp://www.redpepper.org.uk/time-to-be-honest/.

27. Seewww.climatesecurityagenda.org.

28.Buxton,N.(2June2014).Thegreatdivide:ExposingtheDavosclassbehindglobaleconomicinequality.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tni.org/article/great-divi

de-exposing-davos-class-behind-global-economic-inequality.

29.

Phillips,L.(2013).Kick’emallout?:Anti-politicsandpost-democracyintheEuropeanUnion.Statewatch,23(1),9–19.Retrievedfromhttp://www.statewatch.org/subscriber/protected/statewatch-journal-vol23n1-march-2013.pdf; Buxton,N.(2014).TheGreatDivide:ExposingtheDavosClassbehindglobalinequality,inCivicusStateofCivilSocietyReport2014,Civicus.Retrievedfromhttp://www.civicus.org/images/The%20Great%20Divide%20Exposing%20the%20Davos%20class.pdf.

30. Phillips,L.(5November2014).Thesolutionisdemocracy.Retrievedfromhttps://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/11/the-solution-is-democracy/.

31.Stirling,A.(2014).EmancipatingTransformations:Fromcontrolling‘thetransition’toculturingpluralradicalprogress.STEPSCentre,64,1–48.Retrievedfromhttp://steps-centre.org/wp-content/uploads/Transformations.pdf.

32. DeclarationofNyéléni.(27February2007).Retrievedfromhttp://www.nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290.

33.

Attimesofdisasters,localisedsystemsbuiltonrenewableenergycanbeparticularlyimportant,astheRedCrossprescientlydiscoveredinApril2015whentheirsolar-poweredbloodbank(madeoutofrecycledshippingcontainers)provedcriticaltoitsrescueeffortsaftertheearthquakehadknockedoutpowersystemsandkilledseveralthousandpeopleinNepal:Burnett,C.(7October2014).Nepal’ssolar-poweredbloodbankswillsavelivesafterdeadlyearthquakes.Retrieved from http://blogs.redcross.org.uk/emergencies/2014/10/nepals-solar-powered-blood-bank-will-save-lives-deadly-earthquakes/.

34. Seehttp://www.ushaidi.comformoredetails.

35.

Redclift,M.andGrasso,M.(2013).HandbookonClimateChangeandHumanSecurity.Cheltenham:EdwardElgar.SeealsoMatthew,R.andFloyd,R.(2013).EnvironmentalSecurity.London:Routledge.SeealsoBrauch,H.G.(2015)HexagonSeriesonHumanandEnvironmentalSecurityandPeace.Berline:Springer.

36. Seewww.climatesecurityagenda.org.

37.TransnationalInstituteandObservatoryonDebtinGlobalisation.(24June2014).Reflectionsonthe‘super-rights’and‘super-powers’ofcorporatecapital.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tni.org/briefing/impunity-inc.

38. Lilley,S.,McNally,D.,Yuen,E.andDavis,J.(2012).Catastrophism:Theapocalypticpoliticsofcollapseandrebirth.Oakland,CA:PMPress.

39. Solnit,R.(2009).AParadiseBuiltinHell:Theextraordinarycommunitiesthatariseindisasters.NewYork:Viking,p.312.

40. MacDonald,H.(5November2012).Looters&theNYPD.NewYorkPost.Retrievedfromhttp://nypost.com/2012/11/05/looters-the-nypd/.

41.Pan,W.(2December2013).Morethanlocal:HowPHEcanhelpsolvehumanity’sbiggestproblems.Retrievedfromhttp://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2013/12/local-phe-solve-humanitys-biggest-problems/.

42.Hawken,P.(3May2009).CommencementaddresstotheClassof2009,UniversityofPortland,Oregon.Retrievedfromhttp://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/columns/you-are-brilliant-and-the-earth-is-hiring.

NOTESONCONTRIBUTORS

Editors

Nick Buxton is Communications Manager for Transnational Institute(TNI)andhasbeeninvolvedinglobaljusticeandenvironmentaljusticemovements for over 20 years. He is editor of TNI’s annual State ofPower reports and the book Shifting Power: Critical Perspectives onEmergingEconomies(2015).Healsowrote‘Politicsofdebt’inDignityand Defiance: Bolivia’s Challenge to Globalisation (University ofCaliforniaPress,2009)and‘Civilsocietyanddebtcancellation’inCivilSocietyandHumanRights(Routledge,2004).Ben Hayes is a TNI fellow who has worked for the civil libertiesorganisation Statewatch since 1996, specialising in international andnationalsecuritypolicies.Benalsoworksasanindependentresearcherandconsultant.He is theauthorofNeoConOpticon:TheEUSecurity-IndustrialComplex(TNI,2009)andhaswrittenwidelyontheimpactofcounter-terrorismonhumanrights,peace-buildingandcivilsociety;onborder control and the development of ‘Fortress Europe’; and onsurveillancebeforeandafterEdwardSnowden.

Contributors

Nafeez Ahmed is an author, investigative journalist and internationalsecurityscholar.HisbooksincludeZeropoint(2014),AUser’sGuidetotheCrisisofCivilization:AndHow toSave It (2010)andTheLondonBombings:AnIndependentInquiry(2006).MarkAkkerman is a researcher at theCampagne tegenWapenhandel,

theDutchCampaignagainstArmsTrade.HisreportsinDutchincludePiracy, Private Security and the Arms trade (2013) and The Rise ofMercenaries: Private services in the Military and Security Sector(2011).

ZoeW.Brent isa researcheronagrarian justice issuesanda fellowatFood First, Institute for Food & Development Policy in Oakland,California. Her recent papers include Territorial Restructuring andResistance inArgentina (2015)andContextualisingFoodSovereignty:ThePoliticsofConvergenceAmongMovementsintheUSA(2015).SusanGeorge is thePresidentof theTransnational Institute,HonoraryPresident of ATTAC-France, the author of 17 books and holds adoctorate in political science. Her latest book is Shadow Sovereigns:HowGlobalCorporationsareSeizingPower(Polity,2015).AprilHumble isascientificresearcherandawriteronclimatechange,border security,human security andmigration.Shecurrentlyworksatthe secretariat for theEarthLeagueand theClimateServiceCentre inGermany.

MaryAnnManahanisafeministresearcherandactivistatFocusontheGlobalSouthwheresheworksonissuesrelatedtoland,food,agrarianreform,water,andreclaimingthecommons.Sheco-authoredthebook,StateofFragmentation:ThePhilippinesinTransition(2014).Christian Parenti is an author, journalist and teaches in New YorkUniversity’s Global Liberal Studies program. He has published fourbooks,themostrecentbeing,TropicofChaos:ClimateChangeandtheNewGeographyofViolence(2011).OscarReyes is anAssociateFellowof the Institute forPolicyStudiesand a freelance consultant focusing on climate finance.His publishedworkincludestheco-authoredbookCarbonTrading:HowitWorksandWhyitFails(2009).Platform is an arts, activism, education and research organisation

supporting and engaged in struggles for social and ecological justice.ContributorstothechapterincludeEmmaHughes,AnnaGalkina,MikaMinio-Paluello,MelEvans,KevinSmithandthePlatformCollective.

Silvia Ribeiro is a journalist, campaigner and the Latin AmericaDirector for ETC group and on the editorial committee of the LatinAmerican magazine Biodiversidad, sustento y culturas. She writesregularlyforthenewspaperLaJornadainMexico.

Annie Shattuck is a Fellow at Food First and co-author of FoodRebellions!CrisisandtheHungerforJustice(2010).Kathy-JoWetter isa researcher forETCGroupandhascontributed totheir analyses of the ownership, control, social and environmentalimpacts of new technologies, including nanotechnology, syntheticbiologyandgeoengineering.

SteveWrightisaprofessoratLeedsBeckettUniversityandanexpertontechnologiesofpoliticalcontrol,includingnewpolicingsystemssuchassub-lethalweapons systems, torture technologies and surveillance.HisbooksincludeCyberwar,NetwarandtheRevolutioninMilitaryAffairs(2006).

INDEX

CompiledbySueCarlton

9/11terroristattacksref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5andbordercontrolsref1,ref2,ref3andemergencypowersref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5andincreasedsurveillanceref1,ref22030WaterResourcesGroup(WRG)ref1

Abbot,Tonyref1Abercrombie&Fitchref1AbuDhabiref1acequias(communalirrigationsystem)ref1acquisition,throughdispossessionref1adaptationref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5aggravatingsocialunrestref1,ref2costofref1InternationalForumforref1militarisedref1andrisingsealevelsref1andsocialjusticeref1,ref2technicalandpoliticalchallengeref1seealsoagroecology;Climate-SmartAgriculture;resilienceADMref1Afghanistanref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5anddroughtref1AfricaandClimate-SmartAgricultureref1andfoodsecurityref1,ref2andmigrationref1,ref2,ref3,ref4Agamben,Giorgioref1AgeofConsequencesref1,ref2,ref3

Agendaref1ref2agribusinessanddeforestationref1andfoodsecurityref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6influenceonpublicpolicyref1wateruseref1,ref2agricultureadaptationtoclimatechangeref1seealsoagroecology;Climate-SmartAgriculture

contributiontogreenhousegasemissionsref1impactofclimatechangeref1,ref2,ref3landseelandgrabbinglivestockproductionref1militaryinvolvementref1organicref1sustainableintensificationref1,ref2waterconsumptionref1,ref2agroecologyref1,ref2,ref3agrofuelsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4impactonfoodpricesref1militaryuseref1,ref2andwaterconsumptionref1seealsobiofuels;flexcropsandcommoditiesAhmed,Nafeezref1,ref2Aidid,MohamedFarrahref1AIGref1AirbusGroupref1,ref2seealsoEADSAkpoBari,Celestineref1‘Al-Yamamaharmsdeal’ref1albedomodificationref1seealsosolarradiationmanagementAlexander,Col.Johnref1Ali,Benref1AllianceBernsteinref1AlliantTechsystemsref1Allianzref1

Amazonianrainforestsref1,ref2AmericanEnterpriseInstitute(AEI)ref1Anderson,Benref1Anderson,J.ref1Anderson,Kevinref1Anglo-PersianOilref1Annan,Kofiref1Anthropoceneref1,ref2ArabSpringref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5seealsoNorthAfrica,uprisingsArcadisref1,ref2Arcticconflictref1,ref2,ref3andglobalwarmingref1,ref2newlydiscoveredreservesref1,ref2oilexplorationsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6armsindustryref1,ref2allianceswithenvironmentalistsref1armsfairsref1environmentallyfriendlyweaponsref1transferableskillsref1,ref2seealsomilitary-industrialcomplex‘ArmstoRenewables’campaignref1ArunIIIproject(Nepal)ref1Ashton,Johnref1AsiaEnergyref1AsianTsunami(2004)ref1AsilomarConference(2010)ref1AssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers(ACPO)ref1austerityref1,ref2,ref3,ref4Australiaemergencypowersref1migrationmanagementref1,ref2,ref3water-rightstradingref1Austria,migrationpolicyref1authoritarianismref1,ref2challengingref1greenref1

AXAref1,ref2Aylesworth,Skipref1

BAESystemsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4Baltimoreprotests(2015)ref1,ref2Bangladeshref1,ref2,ref3,ref4Phulbaricoalprojectref1BangladeshRiflesref1BankofAmerica(BoA)ref1,ref2bankingcrisis(2008)ref1,ref2bankingsectorref1,ref2andgreenwashref1Banktrackref1Barclaysref1Bassey,Nnimmoref1,ref2Bauman,Zygmuntref1Bausch,C.ref1Beckett,Margaretref1Beddington,Johnref1BeloMontedam(Brazil)ref1BerkshireHathawayref1BHPBillitonref1Bickel,J.Ericref1biocharref1,ref2biodiversityref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7bioenergyref1BioenergyAfricaref1biofuelsref1,ref2,ref3seealsoagrofuelsbiometrictechnologiesref1,ref2,ref3,ref4‘BlackLivesMatter’protests(2015)ref1Blackwatercommandosref1Blair,Tonyref1,ref2,ref3Blueprintscenarioref1bluewashingref1seealsogreenwashBoeingref1,ref2,ref3Boghosian,Heidiref1Bokova,Irinaref1

bordercontrolsref1,ref2,ref3failedtechnologiesref1militarisationofbordersref1,ref2andnewsurveillancetechnologiesref1,ref2andnewweaponsref1andprofitref1securityfencesref1associalcontrolsref1seealsomigrationBorras,Saturninoref1,ref2Bouteflika,Abdelazizref1Bows,Aliceref1BPref1,ref2,ref3Brabeck-Lethmathe,Peterref1Brazilref1,ref2damsref1,ref2droughtpreparationsref1offshoredrillingref1BrazilReref1Bremer,Paulref1BrettonWoodsinstitutionsref1BRICScountriesref1opposedtoclimate-securityagendaref1Brown,Jamesref1Brzoska,Michaelref1Buffett,Warrenref1bullets,lead-freeref1Burnett,John,BaronBurnettref1Bush,GeorgeW.ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5Buxton,Nickref1

Caldeira,Kenref1,ref2CalvertGlobalWaterFundref1Cameron,Ewen,BaronCameronofDillingtonref1CampforClimateActionref1CampaignAgainstArmsTrade(CAAT)ref1,ref2CanadaandArcticoilref1,ref2borderwithAmericaref1

emergencypowersref1oil-sandsoperationsref1cap-and-tradeschemeref1,ref2seealsocarbontrading;emissionstradingcapitalismref1,ref2,ref3‘disastercapitalism’ref1,ref2andemergenciesandcrisesref1,ref2,ref3,ref4andglobalinequalitiesref1andmarketsaturationref1andriskref1carboncaptureandstorageref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8carbondioxideremoval(CDR)ref1,ref2,ref3,carbonemissionsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5reducingref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6CarbonEngineeringref1carbonsequestrationref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6CarbonTrackerInitiative(CTI)ref1carbontradingref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6Cargillref1Carr,Mattref1Carter,Jimmyref1catastrophebondsref1catastrophismref1,ref2CenterforClimateandEnergySolutionsref1CenterforInternationalEarthScienceInformationNetwork(CIESIN)ref1CentreforAdvancedElectricalDrives(NewcastleUniversity)ref1ChevronOilref1Chinaref1,ref2,ref3anti-democratictrendref1andarms-for-oilexportsref1borderwithRussiaref1andcloudseedingref1opposedtoclimate-securityagendaref1andwatersecurityref1,ref2ChinaNationalOffshoreOilCorporation(CNOOC)ref1chlorofluorocarbonsref1CHM2Hillref1ChristianAidref1,ref2

CIA(CentralIntelligenceAgency)ref1,ref2Citibankref1CivilContingenciesAct(2004)ref1CivilContingenciesSecretariat(CCS)(UK)ref1civilunrestref1,ref2,ref3,ref4seealsoconflictClapper,Jamesref1,ref2climate,negativefeedbackloopsref1climatechangeref1commons-basedresponsesref1copingwithseeadaptation;mitigation;resilienceanddenialref1,ref2,ref3exacerbatingpre-existingcrisesref1,ref2forecasts/scenariosref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6andmigrationseeclimaterefugeesneedforinternationalagreementref1asopportunityforchangeref1preparednessforref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6seealsoemergencypreparations

reducedtoclimateriskref1tacklingcausesofcrisisref1asthreatmultiplierref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5unevenimpactref1,ref2,ref3,ref4seealsoglobalwarmingClimateGeoengineeringGovernanceprojectref1climatejusticeref1,ref2,ref3,ref4ClimateMarch(2014)ref1climaterefugeesref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7Climate-SmartAgriculture(CSA)ref1doubtsaboutref1fundingref1,ref2andlandgrabbingref1,ref2Clinton,Hillaryref1cloudseedingref1,ref2,ref3CNACorporationref1coalminingref1strikesref1coal-firedpowerstationsref1,ref2,ref3

Coca-Colaref1,ref2Cock,Jacklynref1,ref2ColdWarref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6Colombiaref1ColoradoRiverref1,ref2CommodityFuturesModernizationAct(CFMA)ref1CommonButDifferentiatedResponsibility(CBDR)ref1commonsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4andgeoengineeringref1,ref2waterasref1Conaty,Patref1conflictaggravatedbyadaptationeffortsref1climatechange-fuelledref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7andfoodsecurityref1,ref2forecastsofref1,ref2military-industrialcomplexthrivingonref1andoilref1andwatersecurityref1,ref2seealsocivilunrestConocoPhillipsref1ConservationInternationalref1,ref2ConsultativeGroupforInternationalAgriculturalResearch(CGIAR)ref1,ref2containmentstrategyref1,ref2,ref3,ref4resistingref1Copenhagenclimatetalks(COP15)(2009)ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5seealsoUN,FrameworkConventiononClimateChangeCopenhagenConsensusCenter(CCC)ref1CopernicusseeGlobalMonitoringforEnvironmentandSecurityCornerHouseref1,ref2,ref3corporationsbluewashingref1buyingwaterrightsref1andgreenwashref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5seealsoecologicalmodernisation

hiringmilitarypersonnelref1andnationalinterestsref1andnewsecurityagendaref1

profitingfromimpactofclimatechangeref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8,ref9,ref10

seealsoriskmanagement,asindustryreformingref1riskmanagementref1,ref2,ref3,ref4spyingandinfiltrationref1state-ownedref1,ref2and‘sustainable’activitiesref1waterscarcityaspretexttosecurewaterref1,ref2seealsowatergrabbingseealsotransnationalcorporations(TNCs)Cotton,SirArthurref1counter-insurgencyref1CreditandServiceCooperatives(CCS)(Cuba)ref1Cribbs,Julianref1crisiscycleref1,ref2crisismanagementref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6criticalinfrastructureref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5securitisationofref1,ref2andsurveillanceref1,ref2CriticalInfrastructureProtection(CIP)(EU)ref1,ref2CriticalInfrastructureSecurityandResilienceMonthref1Cronin,Davidref1CropResidueOceanPermanentSequestration(CROPS)ref1crowd-controltechnologiesref1Crutzen,PaulJ.ref1,ref2Cuba,resilienceref1,ref2,ref3Cullather,Nickref1Cuomo,Andrewref1CyclonePowerTechnologiesref1

Dabelko,Geoffref1Dalby,Simonref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5damsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5Darfur,genocideref1Davey,Edref1Davis,Tadref1DeGrave,Frankref1de-growthref1

DeChristopher,Timref1,ref2DeepwaterHorizonoilspillref1defenceindustryandalternativefuelsref1andgreenammunitionref1profitingfromclimatechangeref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5satellitesurveillanceref1transferableskillsref1,ref2deforestationref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6democracy,defenceofref1Denmark,community-controlledwindpowerref1DepartmentforBusiness,EnterpriseandRegulatoryReform(BERR)ref1DepartmentofHomelandSecurityref1,ref2seealsohomelandsecuritydesalinationplantsref1DesertecIndustrialInitiativeref1DeutscheBankref1developingcountriesseeGlobalSouthDillon,Michaelref1DiMento,J.F.ref1DiMichele,Bobref1DirectorofNationalIntelligence(DNI)ref1disastercapitalismref1,ref2disastersseenaturaldisastersdispossessionref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5divestmentcampaignsref1,ref2,ref3Donilon,Tomref1Dory,Amandaref1Douglass,Frederickref1Drayson,PaulRudd,BaronDraysonref1droughtref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,274DublinStatementonWaterandSustainableDevelopmentref1DWSClimateChangeFundref1dystopiaref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6

EADS(EuropeanAeronauticDefenceandSpaceCompany)ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4seealsoAirbusGroupearthquakesref1,ref2,ref3earthquake-proofhomesref1

Eckersley,Robynref1eco-terrorismref1,ref2ecologicalmodernisationref1Economistref1,ref2EcosystemMarketplaceref1Ecuadorref1,ref2EDFref1Einstein,Albertref1Eisenhower,DwightD.ref1ElSalvadorref1,ref2ElbitSystemsref1ElectronicFrontierFoundationref1elitepanicref1,ref2,ref3EmergencyPowersAct(1920)(UK)ref1emergencypreparationsref1,ref2complexemergenciesref1crisismanagementref1,ref2andemergencypowersref1preparingforworst-casescenarioref1,ref2,ref3useofterm‘emergency’ref1emissionstradingschemes(ETS)ref1seealsocarbontradingEnergiewende(Energytransition)ref1Energy2020(EuropeanCommission)ref1energydemocracyref1EnergyEnvironmentalDefenceandSecurity(E2DS)conferencesref1energysecurityref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref51970senergycrisisref1alternativemodelsref1communitiestakingbackcontrolref1,ref2asfailedenergymodelref1,ref2andfinancialisationofenergyinfrastructureref1andforeignpolicyref1framingargumentsaboutkeyresourcesref1historyofref1ignoringclimatechangethreatref1increasingdemandref1,ref2justificationforsuppressingdissentref1

meaningsofref1andmilitarisationofseasref1andscarcityref1andsocialjusticeref1,ref2seealsofossilfuels;renewableenergysourcesenhancedweatheringref1EnvironmentalDefenseFund,CorporatePartnershipsProgramref1environmentaldegradationref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6EnvironmentalJusticeFoundationref1environmentaljusticemovementref1,ref2,ref3environmentalregulations,harmonisingref1environmentalsecurityref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6environmentalists/environmentalmovementallianceswithmilitaryref1,ref2continuedresistanceref1andeffectiveactionref1emphasisondemocracyref1andgreenwashingref1murderedactivistsref1seenasthreatref1,ref2E.ONref1,ref2,ref3essentialservicesref1ETCGroupref1Ethiopiaref1EuropeanUnion(EU)ActionPlanonillegalimmigrationref1AirTrafficManagementsystem(EUROCONTROL)ref1bordersurveillanceref1,ref2containmentstrategyref1emissionstradingschemes(ETS)ref1energyefficiencystandardsref1EuropeanConventiononHumanRightsref1EuropeanCriticalInfrastructures(ECIs)Directiveref1EuropeanSecurityStrategyref1GlobalApproachtoMigrationref1migrationpolicyref1,ref2,ref3Securesocietiesprogrammeref1securityimplicationsofclimatechangeref1

EUROSURref1,ref2extremeweatherref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8,ref9ExxonMobilref1,ref2

Faludi,Susanref1FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)ref1FeedtheFutureinitiativeref1,ref2Fergusonprotests(2015)ref1,ref2financialsectorandfossil-fuelcompaniesref1,ref2,ref3,ref4investmentandmarketstructureref1speculationinfoodcommoditiesref1Finmeccanicaref1,ref2,ref3,ref4FirstWorldWar,andenergysecurityref1fishingref1,ref2,ref3Fleming,Jamesref1flexcropsandcommoditiesref1floodingref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8companiesprofitingfromfloodprotectionref1,ref2foodsecurityref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5andconflictref1,ref2dependenceonfossilfuelsref1distributionandaccessref1foodcrisis(1997-08)ref1foodpriceincreasesref1,ref2,ref3foodsovereigntyref1,ref2andglobalfoodregimesref1vulnerabilityofglobalfoodsystemref1,ref2andwasteref1fossilfuelsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4investmentinref1,ref2,ref3,ref4seealsoArctic,oilexplorationsoffshoredrillingref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6projectedincreaseinuseofref1roleofmilitaryref1stoppingextractionref1unconventionalsourcesref1seealsooilfracking,anduseofwaterref1,ref2

Franceandemergencypowersref1oilforarmsdealsref1Franco,Jenniferref1FreedomofInformationActref1FrenchRevolutionref1Friedmann,Harrietref1FriendsoftheEarthref1FRONTEXref1,ref2FuelPovertyActionref1fullspectrumdominanceref1FundforInnovativeClimateandEnergyResearch(FICER)ref1Funk,McKenzieref1

G4Sref1Gaddafi,Colonelref1Gaiaref1GALILEO(EUsatellitenavigationsystem)ref1gas-to-liquids(GTL)extraction(Qatar)ref1Gates,Billref1GazaStripref1GCMResourcesref1GeneralDynamicsref1,ref2GeneralElectricCompanyref1,ref2geneticallymodified(GM)cropsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7GenevaConventionsref1,ref2geoengineeringref1,ref2,ref3campaignagainstref1andcontinuedgreenhousegasemissionsref1definingref1historyofref1needforinternationalcollaborationref1andownershipandcontrolofweatherref1patentsref1possibleconsequencesref1andprofitref1recommendedtogovernmentsref1‘geopiracy’ref1,ref2,ref3Germany

community-controlledrenewablesref1andemergencypowersref1lobbyingonbehalfofcarindustryref1reductioninemissionsbymilitaryref1Giddens,Anthonyref1Gilbert,Emilyref1Gingrich,Newtref1GlobalAllianceforClimate-SmartAgricultureref1globalapartheidref1,ref2GlobalCampaignagainstCorporateImpunityref1GlobalClimateCoalition(GCC)ref1GlobalMilitaryAdvisoryCouncilonClimateChange(GMACCC)ref1,ref2GlobalMonitoringforEnvironmentandSecurity(GMES)(nowCopernicus)ref1GlobalRedesignInitiativeref1GlobalSouth/developingcountriesandColdWarmilitarismref1energyprovisionref1impactofclimatechangeref1,ref2andneoliberalismref1GlobalSustainabilityInstitute(GSI)ref1globalwarmingref1,ref2,ref3forecastsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5greenhouseanalogyref1impactonfoodproductionref1seealsoclimatechangeGlobalWitnessref1,ref2GolanHeightsref1GoldmanSachsref1,ref2Graham,Stephenref1Grandin,Gregref1GreatGreenFleetref1Greece,andrefugeesref1,ref2,ref3greeneconomyref1GreenNewDealref1GreenRevolutionref1greenhousegasesref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7andagricultureref1,ref2,ref3seealsoClimate-SmartAgriculture

emissionstradingref1andgeoengineeringstrategiesref1reducingref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6Greenpeaceref1greenwashbankingsectorref1corporationsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5environmentalists/environmentalmovementref1military-industrialcomplexref1,ref2,ref3,ref4seealsobluewashingGristmagazineref1Guardianref1,ref2,ref3Guatemalaref1GulfofMexicoref1,ref2

Hagel,Chuckref1,ref2Haitiearthquake(2010)ref1,ref2HurricaneSandyref1Hamilton,Cliveref1,ref2HandsOffMotherEarth(HOME)campaignref1Hansen,Jamesref1Harrewijn,Abref1Hawken,Paulref1Henfrey,Tomref1,ref2Hill,Symonref1Holt-Giménez,Ericref1homelandsecurityref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7seealsoDepartmentofHomelandSecurityHomer-Dixon,T.ref1,ref2Howarth,Davidref1HuairouCommissionref1HumanRightsWatch(HRW)ref1,ref2hurricanesref1,ref2andagroecologyref1andgeoengineeringref1,ref2HurricaneKatrinaref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5HurricaneSandyref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7

hydropowerref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5

icebergsandglaciers,assolutiontowaterscarcityref1IMF(InternationalMonetaryFund)ref1,ref2import-substitutionindustrialisation(ISI)ref1improvisedexplosivedevice(IED)ref1Indiaref1,ref2,ref3andBangladeshimigrantsref1andemergencypowersref1andenvironmentalactivistsref1governanceofKosiRiverref1Kishangangahydropowerprojectref1andsolar-poweredUAVsref1andwatersecurityref1,ref2Indonesiaref1,ref2IndusTreaty(1960)ref1IndustrialRevolutionref1,ref2,ref3,ref4informationtechnologyref1,ref2,ref3infrastructureseecriticalinfrastructureInfrastructureandCorporateResilienceProgramme(2011)(UK)ref1

icebergsandglaciers,assolutiontowaterscarcityref1IMF(InternationalMonetaryFund)ref1,ref2import-substitutionindustrialisation(ISI)ref1improvisedexplosivedevice(IED)ref1Indiaref1,ref2,ref3andBangladeshimigrantsref1andemergencypowersref1andenvironmentalactivistsref1governanceofKosiRiverref1Kishangangahydropowerprojectref1andsolar-poweredUAVsref1andwatersecurityref1,ref2Indonesiaref1,ref2IndusTreaty(1960)ref1IndustrialRevolutionref1,ref2,ref3,ref4informationtechnologyref1,ref2,ref3infrastructureseecriticalinfrastructureInfrastructureandCorporateResilienceProgramme(2011)(UK)ref1

InstituteforEnvironmentalSecurityref1InstitutionofMechanicalEngineers(UK)ref1insurancesector,profitingfromclimatechangeref1,ref2IntegratedEmergencyManagement(IEM)ref1intellectualproperty(IP)ref1IntellectualVenturesManagementref1IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4andenvironmentalmigrationref1andfoodsecurityref1,ref2,ref3,ref4andgeoengineeringref1,ref2andwateravailabilityref1InternationalAssessmentofAgricultureScienceandDevelopment(IAASTD)ref1InternationalCoalandClimateSummitref1InternationalCommitteeforRobotArmsControl(ICRAC)ref1InternationalConferenceonClimateChangeref1InternationalCrisisGroupref1InternationalEnergyAgency(IEA)ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4InternationalFinanceCorporation(IFC)ref1InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute(IFPRI)ref1InternationalForumforAgroecology,Nyéléniref1InternationalNetworkofCivilLibertiesOrganisationsref1InternationalUnionforConservationofNature(IUCN)ref1interventionismref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8,ref9Iran,revolution(1979)ref1Iraqref1,ref2,ref3Kurdishmigrantsref1warsagainstref1,ref2,ref3,ref4irrigationref1,ref2,ref3IslamicStateref1Israelbordersurveillanceref1watersecurityref1Italyref1L’Aquilaearthquakeref1andrefugeerescueref1,ref2

Jamaat-u-Dawaref1JointNon-LethalWeaponsDirectorate(JNLWD)ref1Jonathan,Goodluckref1

Jones,Chrisref1Jones,IanS.F.ref1JPMorganChaseref1

Keith,Davidref1,ref2,ref3,ref4Kellogg’sref1Kennedy,Markref1Kenrick,Justinref1,ref2Keynesianismref1,ref2Kingsnorth,Paulref1Kingsnorthprotest(2008)ref1Kirabatiref1Kissinger,Henryref1Klare,Michaelref1Klein,Naomiref1,ref2,ref3,ref4Kochbrothersref1Kopernicki,Janref1KosiRiverref1KyotoProtocol(1997)ref1,ref2

Labban,Mazenref1landgrabbingref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5andlandinvestmentref1landsovereigntyref1landminesref1,ref2Landrieu,Maryref1Lane,Leeref1L’Aquilaearthquake(2009)(Italy)ref1Latham,Johnref1LatinAmericandebtcrisis(1978–1982),austeritysolutionref1LehmanBrothersref1,ref2Lehner,Peterref1Lemberg-Petersen,Martinref1Lewis,Michaelref1Lin,Brendaref1liquidnaturalgasref1lobbyingbycorporationsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7bynationalgovernmentsref1

Lockheed-Martinref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5Locklear,AdmiralSamuelJ.ref1,ref2Lomborg,Bjørnref1LondonBombings(July2005)ref1,ref2LouisDreyfusref1Lovelock,Jamesref1Lowell,JamesRusselref1Lubbers,Evelineref1Lynn,Williamref1

Mabus,Rayref1,ref2MacDonald,Christineref1MacDonald,Heatherref1McDonald’sref1Machín-Sosa,Braulioref1McMichael,Philipref1Malthusianismref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5MaoZedongref1MAPFREref1MarshallAerospaceandDefenceGroupref1Mehta,Lylaref1,ref2Merkel,Angelaref1MetalStorm’svirtualminefieldref1methaneref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5MexicoborderwithUSref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6andneoliberalismref1migrationref1controlsexportedtoThirdWorldref1,ref2illegalref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5managementref1,ref2massmigrationref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6resistingcontainmentref1securitisationofpoliciesref1seealsobordercontrols;climaterefugees;refugeesmilitarism/militarisationref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5ofbordersref1,ref2,ref3causedbyelitepanicref1,ref2andenergysecurityref1,ref2,ref3

legacyofColdWarref1,ref2,ref3,ref4militaryexpansionismref1andgeoengineeringref1,ref2,ref3greenpivotref1growinginterestinclimatechangeref1,ref2involvementindisasterreliefref1,ref2,ref3useofalternativefuelsref1,ref2seealsomilitary-industrialcomplex;securityagendamilitary-industrialcomplexref1,ref2allianceswithenvironmentalgroupsref1andgreenwashref1,ref2,ref3,ref4stepsinchallengingref1thrivingonconflictref1seealsomilitary;securityagendaMiller,Toddref1MinervaResearchInitiativeref1,ref2MississippiRiverref1mitigationref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8mitigationbankingref1seealsoClimate-SmartAgriculturemodernisation,andmanufacturedrisksref1Modi,Narendraref1Mogadishu,Somaliaref1Monsalve,Sofiaref1Monsantoref1,ref2,ref3MorganStanley,InstituteforSustainableInvestingref1Morisetti,UKRearAdmiralNeilref1Morris,JanetandChrisref1Morse,Edwardref1MosaicFertilizerref1Mpanu-Mpanu,Tosiref1MultilateralInvestmentGuaranteeAgencyref1MunichReref1,ref2Muniruzzaman,A.N.M.ref1Murphy,Ethanref1Murphy,Jonref1Murray,Tomref1

MVEnricaLexieref1Mwamba,Simonref1Myhrvold,Nathanref1

NarmadaWaterProjectref1NationalAcademyofSciences(US)ref1NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct(NDAA)(US)ref1,ref2NationalHealthService(UK)ref1NationalIntelligenceCouncil(NIC)ref1nationalparksref1NationalResourcesDefenseCouncil(NRDC)ref1NationalRiskAssessment(NRA)ref1NationalRiskRegister(NRR)ref1NationalSecurityRiskAssessment(NSRA)ref1NationalUnionofMetalworkersinSouthAfrica(NUMSA)ref1NATOref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5naturaldisastersref1exposinginequalitiesref1,ref2,ref3increasingref1andinsurancepay-outsref1preparationforref1seealsoemergencypreparations

andre-insuranceref1andresilienceref1,ref2responsestoref1,ref2,ref3,ref4andsolidarityref1andsuppressionofcivilrightsref1TheNatureConservancyref1,ref2,ref3,ref4Naururef1NeighbourhoodEmpowermentNetwork(NEN)(SanFrancisco)ref1Neocleous,Markref1,ref2neoliberalismref1,ref2,ref3,ref4andcrisismanagementref1,ref2,ref3anddemocracyref1,ref2,ref3andinequalityref1,ref2andtransnationalcorporationsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6Nepalref1,ref2,ref3Nestléref1,ref2,ref3Nevins,Josephref1

NewOrleansref1,ref2,ref3,ref4NewScientistref1NewYork,andHurricaneSandyref1NGOs,partnershipswithTNCsref1Nigeriaref1,ref2,ref3,ref4NileTradingandDevelopmentref1Non-LethalWeapons(NLW)ref1,ref2NorthAfricauprisings(2011)ref1seealsoArabSpring

NorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA)ref1NorthropGrummanref1,ref2,ref3Norway,Arcticdrillingref1NorwegianGovernmentPensionFundGlobalref1nuclearpowerref1Nuruzzaman,S.M.ref1Nyberg,Danielref1

Obama,Barackref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7FeedtheFutureinitiativeref1,ref2Occupymovementref1,ref2OccupySandyref1,ref2oceanfertilizationref1,ref2,ref3OceanNourishmentCorporationref1OgallalaAquiferref1oilarms-for-oildealsref1andconflictref1dependenceonref1,ref2,ref3extractionref1,ref2,ref3pricesref1,ref2seealsofossilfuelsoilandgascorporationsref1andecologicalmodernisationref1increasingproductionref1investmentbybankingsectorref1oil-sands(Canada)ref1OperationPOPEYEref1OperationTritonref1

Orr,Jackieref1OttawaTreatyBanref1Oxfamref1,ref2,ref3

PacificCommand(PACOM)(US)ref1,ref2Pakistanfloods(2010)ref1andIndia’shydropowerprojectref1irrigationschemesref1Palmerston,HenryJohnTemple,ViscountPalmerstonref1PapuaNewGuinearef1Parenti,Christianref1,ref2,ref3Parry,Chris,RearAdmiralref1peopletraffickersref1,ref2PepsiCoref1,ref2Philippinesref1,ref2,ref3,ref4watermanagementref1,ref2,ref3Phillips,Leighref1Phulbaricoalprojectref1Pickens,T.Booneref1PICOHoldingsref1PingRiverBasinCommitteeref1piracyref1,ref2,ref3PlatformCollectiveref1police/policingand‘megavents’ref1andprotestsref1andundercoversurveillanceref1Pollan,Michaelref1pollutionref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7populationgrowthref1,ref2Prassad,Raekharef1Premo,Michaelref1PricewaterhouseCoopersref1prison,privatecompaniesref1PrivacyInternationalref1privatisationref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5ProjectforaNewAmericanCentury(PNAC)ref1propertyrightsref1,ref2

protests,repressionofref1,ref2,ref3,ref4Prowse,Heydonref1publicsphere,reclaimingref1Public-PublicPartnerships(PuPs)ref1,ref2Putin,Vladimirref1

QinetiQref1QuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR)(US)ref1

RANDcorporationref1,ref2Randall,Dougref1,ref2Raytheonref1,ref2,ref3pain-beamref1REDD(ReducingEmissionsfromDeforestationandForestDegradation)ref1,ref2refugeesref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5andasylumapplicationsref1,ref2off-shoreprocessingref1outsourcingofprocessingref1Pacificsolutionref1onunsafeboatsref1warehousingref1seealsoclimaterefugees;migrationrenewableenergysourcesref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5andcommunitycontrolref1asenergysecurityref1environmentallydamagingprojectsref1andmilitaryref1,ref2seealsoagrofuelsreputationmanagementref1andriskref1resilienceref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5inbusinessandfinancialsystemref1,ref2communityref1,ref2Cubanmodelref1,ref2,ref3andhumansecurityref1infrastructureref1personalref1andpreparednessref1

seealsoadaptation;resistanceresistanceref1,ref2,ref3,ref4alternativesforgedoutofref1ResistenciaNacional(Guatemala)ref1resourcewarsref1,ref2,ref3,ref4RevolutioninMilitaryAffairs(RMA)ref1Richardson,Michaelref1Rijsberman,Frankref1Rio+20(2012)ref1RioEarthSummit(1992)ref1RiosMontt,Generalref1riskmanagementref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7andcriticalinfrastructureref1asindustryref1riskassessmentref1ofsocialunrestandactivismref1,ref2Robert,Marcref1Rogers,Paulref1RollingStoneref1Rosset,PeterMichaelref1RoyalSociety(UK)ref1Rudd,Kevinref1Russiaandcontroloveroilref1droughtref1opposedtoclimate-securityagendaref1RWEref1

Saabref1SAFRANref1Saharadesert,andsolarthermalpowerplantsref1salinisationref1,ref2SamsungSGR-1robotref1sanitationref1,ref2Sano,Yebref1SãoPauloref1satellitesurveillanceref1,ref2SaudiArabia,borderfenceref1,ref2

SaudiAramcoref1SBInetprojectref1Scahill,Jeremyref1scarcityref1duetomal-distributionofresourcesref1Schellnhuber,Johnref1Schlosberg,Davidref1Schwartz,Peterref1,ref2Schwarzkopf,GeneralNormanref1ScientificOrganizingCommitteeref1Scotlandref1Scramblescenarioref1,ref2,ref3,ref4sealevels,risingref1,ref2,ref3,ref4securityref1,ref2climate-securityagendaref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7andhumanrightsref1insecurityasopportunityref1internationalsecuritystrategiesref1militarisedadaptationref1newstrategiesref1newtechnologiesref1publicorderref1,ref2restrictionofcivillibertiesref1,ref2,ref3throughresilienceref1usedagainstpeopleref1,ref2,ref3,ref4seealsoenergysecurity;foodsecurity;watersecuritysecurity-industrialcomplexref1,ref2,ref3,ref4seealsomilitary-industrialcomplexseeds,drought-tolerantref1‘self-healing’minefieldref2Sextantref1Seymour,Richardref1shalegasref1,ref2Shellref1,ref2Arcticdrillingref1,ref2buyingwaterrightsref1CarbonDisclosureProject(CDP)reportref1scenariosref1,ref2

Shiva,Vandanaref1Siemensengineeringref1SilentGuardianref1SiriusStarref1Sirota,Davidref1Sivanandan,A.ref1Slaiby,Peterref1Smith,Deidreref1Smith,Neilref1Smith,Zadieref1Snowden,Edwardref1,ref2,ref3,ref4socialmedia,usedforriskassessmentref1,ref2Söderbaum,Fredrikref1solarpowerref1,ref2,ref3,ref4usebymilitaryref5SolarRadiationManagementResearchGovernanceInitiative(SRMGI)ref1solarradiationmanagement(SRM)ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6seealsoalbedomodificationsolidarityref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7Solnit,Rebeccaref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5Solón,Pabloref1sonicweaponsref1Sörensen,JensStilhoffref1Soto,Hernandoderef1SouthKorea,borderwithNorthKorearef1SovereignWealthFunds(SWFs)ref1sovereigntyref1,ref2overenergyref1,ref2overlandandfoodref1,ref2Spainref1,ref2cuttingrenewablesubsidiesref1SPICE(StratosphericParticleInjectionforClimateEngineering)experimentref1stateinvestmentofpublicmoneyref1lobbyingonbehalfofTNCsref1ownershipofcompaniesref1,ref2,ref3reclaimingref1roleinemissionsreductionref1StateWaterProject,Californiaref1

Stauber,Johnref1Steele,Jamesref1SternReviewref1stewardshipref1,ref2,ref3Stirling,Andyref1stockmarkets,structureofref1structuraladjustmentpoliciesref1,ref2structuredfinancialinstrumentsref1SuezEnvironmentref1,ref2Sugihara,Georgeref1sulphuricacid,dispersingintostratosphereref1,ref2Summerfield,Derekref1SuperTyphoonHaiyanref1SuperstormSandyseehurricanes,HurricaneSandysurveillanceref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6bordersref1,ref2,ref3Swatuk,Larryref1,ref2Syngentaref1Syriancivilwarref1,ref2,ref3anddroughtref1,ref2

tarsandsextractionref1seealsooilsandsterrorismref1,ref2,ref3,ref4Islamistref1,ref2,ref3measurestocombatref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5andpreparednessref1,ref2seealsohomelandsecurity

Thailandref3Thalesref1,ref2,ref3Tibet,sourceofwaterref1Tillerson,Rexref1Toffler,AlvinandHeidiref1TPMarineref1tradeunionsref1,ref2,ref3Trans-PacificPartnership(TPP)ref1TransatlanticTradeandInvestmentPartnership(TTIP)ref1TransitionTownmovementref1,ref2transnationalcorporations(TNCs)climatedenialref1

andecologicalmodernisationref1andglobalfoodregimesref1lobbyingref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7andmarketstructureref1partnershipswithNGOsref1profitfromfoodproductionref1roleincausingclimatechangeref1androleofstateref1,ref2watermanagementref1seealsocorporationsTransnationalInstitute(TNI)ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4treeplantationsref1,ref2Tunisiaref1,ref2Turkanaref1Turner,Tedref1TyphoonHaiyanref1,ref2

Unicreditbankref1UnionofConcernedScientistsref1Unitechref1UnitedKingdom(UK)arms-for-oildealwithSaudiArabiaref1andemergencypowersref1emergencyresponsesref1foreignpolicyandenergysecurityref1andfuelpovertyref1,ref2migrationpredictionsref1NationalResilienceCapabilitiesProgrammeref1,ref2NationalSecurityStrategyref1,ref2andrefugeesref1scrappingcodeforsustainablehomesref1UnitedNations(UN)ref1,ref2,ref3climateconferencesref1,ref2,ref3,ref4ConventiononBiologicalDiversity(CBD)ref1ConventiononEnvironmentalModificationTechniques(ENMOD)ref1EnvironmentProgramme(UNEP)ref1FoodandAgricultureOrganization(FAO)ref1,ref2FrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4seealsoCopenhagenclimatetalks

HighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)ref1,ref2,ref3High-levelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChangeref1Planofactionondisasterriskandresilienceref1ResponsibilitytoProtectref1UnitedStates(US)bordercontrolref1,ref2,ref3,ref4ClimateActionPartnershipref1CouncilonClimatePreparednessandResilienceref1emergencypowersref1andenergysecurityref1intelligencecommunityref1,ref2militarisationofpoliceref1NationalClimateAssessmentreportref1NationalIntelligenceStrategyref1NationalScienceFoundation(NSF)ref1,ref2OperationDamayanref1Pentagonref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8President’sScienceAdvisoryCommitteeref1proposedclimateandenergybill(2010)ref1reactiontoimpactofclimatechangeref1andwatersecurityref1,ref2unmannedaerialvehicles(UAVs)(drones)ref1,ref2,ref3usingsolarpowerref1urbanisationref1,ref2,ref3,ref4US-ledalliance,mandatetointerveneref1

Varghese,Shineyref1Veoliaref1,ref2Verizonref1VietnamWarref1,ref2Volcker,Paulref1,ref2Volman,Danielref1vonBraun,Joachimref1vulnerability,man-maderef1

Wainwright,Hilaryref1,ref2Walmartref1,ref2,ref3WaronTerrorref1WaterAlternativesref1

WaterAssetManagementref1waterfootprintref1,ref2watergrabbingref1,ref2,ref3watersecurityref1,ref2,ref3,ref4andbluewashingref1communitycontrolofresourcesref1,ref2distributionandwasteref1financialisationofwatersectorref1fresh-watersupplyref1impactofclimatechangeref1,ref2justiceinwatermanagementref1newvisionforwatermanagementref1andPublic-PublicPartnerships(PuPs)ref1scarcityref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6andprofiteeringref1,ref2technicalsolutionsref1

assourceofconflictref1water-rightstradingref1,ref2waterwarsref1,ref2Waterfindref1Waternetref1weather,ownershipandcontrolofref1weathermodificationref1,ref2weather-as-weaponref1,ref2Webber,Francesref1Webster,Benref1Weis,Tonyref1Weisbrot,Markref1WenJibaoref1WestBankref1Wheeler,Timref1windpowerref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5Wolf,AaronT.ref1,ref2WorldBankref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6WorldCoalAssociationref1WorldPeoples’ConferenceonClimateChangeandtheRightsofMotherEarthref1WorldWaterForumref1WorldWildlifeFundref1

Wright,Christopherref1

Yang,JoShingref1YomKippurWar(1973)ref1

ZapatistaNationalLiberationArmyref1Zhu,Y.H.ref1ZurichPolytechnicInstituteref1