Early Draft: Do not cite without permission of authors. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, California, April 3-6, 2013.

Framing Wartime Success: Reporting Enemy Body Counts in America's UAV Campaigns

William A. Boettcher III, Associate Professor Michael D. Cobb, Associate Professor

Kristina D. Hill, MIS Graduate

Department of Political Science School of Public & International Affairs

North Carolina State University Campus Box 8102

Raleigh, NC 27695-8102 Corresponding author email: William_boettcher@ncsu.edu

Authors’ Note: We would like to thank the members of the NCSU Political Science Research Subject Pool for participating in our survey. Of course, errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors alone.

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Abstract

Recent research on American wartime public opinion has focused on the importance of perceptions of battlefield success as a determinant of support for ongoing military operations. Unfortunately, only limited research has been conducted to illuminate the metrics of success used by the U.S. mass public faced with complex and sometimes conflicting information regarding nontraditional conflicts. The taking of major geographical objectives or definitive victory in a set piece battle has been replaced by reports regarding enemy body counts and the achievement of development objectives. As U.S. kill/capture UAV campaigns further distance military operations from the traditional battlefield, it is important to understand the impact of enemy casualty reports (and concomitant “collateral damage” from these efforts) on casualty tolerance and perceptions of operational success. This study employs experiments embedded in public opinion surveys to probe responses to the framing of casualty data, both combatant and noncombatant, associated with this type of warfare.

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After a decade of mostly covert use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, commonly

referred to as “drones”) to prosecute the United States’ Global War on Terrorism, the recent

nomination and confirmation of John O. Brennan to become Director of the Central Intelligence

Agency cast the public spotlight on the use of this tool of war (see Mazzetti and Shane, 2013). At

roughly the same time, the Federal Aviation Administration’s consideration of rules to govern

the domestic use of drone technology and burgeoning state and local interest in acquiring drones

for public safety applications, raised the specter of UAVs buzzing above one’s community and

perhaps being employed in non-lethal or even lethal attacks on American citizens (Savage, 2013;

Sengupta, 2013). In each of these debates, public opinion about the use of drone technology has

been cited as widespread evidence of support (mostly abroad) or opposition (mostly at home) to

current or planned policies regarding the deployment/employment of UAVs (consider Swift,

2012 versus Hudson, Owens, and Callen, 2012). Local communities in some states have gone so

far as to ban their police forces from acquiring drones for domestic enforcement tasks, while

President Obama and his advisers have regularly pointed to >55% support for drone strikes in

Pakistan and Yemen (see “Continued support…,” 2013). Issues within these debates have

focused on the technology itself, rules of warfare and “just war,” developing transparent

processes for the selection of UAV targets, the eventual acquisition of this technology by other

countries and the need to set norms of behavior, and apocalyptic visions of robot warriors guided

by artificial intelligence selecting humans for “death from above.” While a number of prominent

polling firms have been collecting data on American views on UAV warfare (Pew, Gallup),

scholars have only recently begun to compare this data to previous research on public opinion

regarding combatant and noncombatant casualties in warfare.

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In this paper we glean knowledge from earlier work (our own and others) to identify the

independent variables most likely to affect individual attitudes about drone warfare as part of

counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq or Afghanistan and the wider Global War on Terrorism.

We begin with a brief survey of the literature on the relationship between perceptions of the costs

of war (“blood and treasure,” and mostly just U.S. blood) and perceptions of the success of

individual attacks/battles and success of/support for the broader military efforts. We then

describe our approach to the study of casualty frames based in notions of subjective rationality

grounded in behavioral decision theory. Next, we develop a number of expectations regarding

the manner in which the independent variables will affect public support/opposition for drone

operations and select a subset of these variables (and accompanying demographic controls) for

study in an experiment embedded in a public opinion survey. We then discuss the survey itself

and its results. Finally, we consider the implications of our results for the current debates and

propose a future research agenda examining the role of the broader set of independent variables.

Casualties and War

In “traditional” warfare the metrics of success and failure are generally clearer and more

“objective” than counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaigns. Reaching a prominent

geographic salient, taking a hill or river, or laying siege to a capital city is no longer the sine qua

non of military operations. “Winning their hearts and minds” in Vietnam was as difficult to

quantify as making the civilian population the “center of gravity” in modern counterinsurgency

efforts. In particular, complex metrics of success/failure in counterinsurgency and

counterterrorism campaigns seldom appear in local or major newspapers, which instead tend to

focus on “body counts” (ours and theirs) to keep a running tally indicating future victory or

defeat (see Boettcher and Cobb, 2006). During the Iraq War in 2004 and 2005 public affairs

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officers began to release numbers on enemy killed in action (EKIA) to contextualize U.S.

casualties and give a better indication of the success or failure of a battle or engagement with

insurgents. In previous work we highlight the importance and impact of this type of casualty-

ratio data on perceptions of battlefield performance and overall support for war (Boettcher and

Cobb, 2006). Modern warfare using UAVs or drones complicates the matter even further.

Discrete, asynchronous, and stochastic drone attacks are reported only after information about

the attack is released by the Obama administration or is reported by journalists on the ground in

Yemen or Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This allows the

administration to control the information related to the “target” of the attack and judgments

regarding the success of the attack. Of course, no U.S. troops are at risk in a drone attack, so the

casualty-ratio of U.S. KIA to EKIA is not relevant. The new casualty-ratio of significance seems

to be the asserted value of the “target” and the number of civilians or noncombatants killed in the

attack. As Larson and Savych (2006) observed and Walsh (2012) empirically tested for UAVs,

perceptions of success/failure in air operations are conditioned on reasonable “collateral

damage” relative to the “importance” of the target.

Of great interest to us is that much of the recent polling on U.S. public support for UAV

strikes asks whether it is okay to kill “terrorists” or “high-level terrorists” (seldom “Americans”)

and the number of civilian casualties during the hypothesized attack is almost never stated (see

“U.S. Drone Strikes…,” 2013; “Drone Program Poll…,” 2013). Despite our earlier work on the

importance of casualty ratios, we know of no study that has attempted to calibrate the value of

the target and the number of civilian casualties that produce the greatest support for drone

operations (Walsh’s, 2012, path breaking study did not vary the value of the target and varied

civilian casualties as none or some undefined number). The general literature on casualties and

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wartime U.S. public opinion (summarized below) has identified a number of independent

variables that affect perceptions of success/failure and support for ongoing military operations.

Unfortunately, in the widespread belief that drone strikes are unique in some way, this literature

has been largely ignored (Walsh being the most prominent exception).

Wartime U.S. Public Opinion

The conventional wisdom that emerged after Vietnam and that dominated the discourse

until September 11, 2001 was that the American public was casualty-sensitive or, indeed,

casualty-phobic. John Mueller’s seminal work on War, Presidents and Public Opinion (1973)

established a clear relationship between increasing cumulative casualties and declining public

support for war. Support for the wars he examined appeared to be a function of the logarithm of

cumulative casualties (1973, p. 266), explaining an early monotonic decline in wartime public

support. This conventional wisdom was reinforced by reactions to U.S. interventions in Lebanon

and Somalia; the casualty sensitivity of decision makers planning operations in Iraq, Haiti, and

Kosovo; and the decision to avoid intervention altogether in Bosnia (early on) and Rwanda. By

the mid-1990s commentators lamented that the U.S. casualty-phobia would prevent it from

acting as a great power maintaining the international system.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 were interpreted as watershed events that would

quickly sweep casualty-phobia from the collective public and elite consciousness. The Triangle

Institute for Security Studies (TISS) project reported in Feaver and Gelpi (2004) provided the

most comprehensive analysis to date of both the impact of casualty sensitivity on opinions

regarding hypothetical U.S. military intervention and the determinants of casualty sensitivity in

the U.S. public. Unlike previous research efforts, Feaver and Gelpi were able to collect

individual-level data on casualty tolerance, rather than rely on aggregate-level data on

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cumulative or marginal casualties and presidential approval. Based on a new survey of elite and

mass opinion regarding hypothetical intervention scenarios, Feaver and Gelpi were able to test

specific hypotheses related to the respondent’s military status, demographic variables, attitudes

toward the use of force, political and social attitudes, and connection to those at risk (p. 170).

They found the public to be much less sensitive to casualties than previously thought but that

elites retained a phobia regarding U.S. casualties.1

During the lead-up to the Iraq War, Kaplan (2003) critiqued the casualty-sensitivity

assumptions of the U.S. military and political elite by pointing to the work of Feaver and Gelpi

(2004) and Larson (1996). Kaplan noted that a majority of Americans were willing to tolerate

“substantial” casualties and a long-term intervention in Iraq and that the mean response to an

“acceptable casualty” question regarding Iraq was 29,853. While Kaplan does go on to discuss

the more sophisticated explanations that Feaver and Gelpi (2004) and Larson (1996) offer for

their observations, his reporting of prospective means is a bit disingenuous. First, psychological

research has clearly shown that prospective cumulative utilities seldom predict contemporaneous

utility judgments that are often based on changes in state (i.e., gains or losses) rather than overall

asset levels (see Boettcher 2004; Jervis 1992; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Levy 1992).

Second, the mean response to acceptable-casualties questions is inflated by outliers—the use of

median or modal responses is much more appropriate (see Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Boettcher

2004). Third, as Kaplan subsequently acknowledges, estimates of acceptable casualties are

closely tied to the goal(s) of the military operation, and most of the casualty tolerance questions

1 Feaver and Gelpi (2004, 131) somewhat overstate casualty insensitivity by treating all-zero responses to their hypothetical casualty tolerance scenarios as spoiled ballots. They argue that these responses suggest “that the respondents are objecting to our phrasing of American deaths as ‘acceptable’ rather than offering a judgment of their actual willingness to suffer the human costs of war.” Of course, another interpretation might suggest that these individuals are simply consistent in their casualty sensitivity and worth including in the analysis.

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regarding Iraq offered the goal of preventing Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

This goal clearly was called into question when U.S. forces failed to locate these weapons.

Debates over casualty-sensitivity/-insensitivity in the American public continued through

the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Rationalist scholars argued that the “real world” mattered and

that the perceived legitimacy of the war, perceptions of the possibility of long-term success, the

worthiness of the goals of the interventions, and/or the performance of the president in press

conferences all affected public casualty tolerance. The dominant cost/benefit approach to

casualties and wartime public opinion is found in the work of Larson (1996), Gartner (2008

a&b), Eichenberg (2005), and Feaver and his colleagues (2004). This work was contrasted with

efforts by Berinsky (2005), Johnson & Tierney (2007), Thrall (2005), and Boettcher and Cobb

(2006, 2009) that focused on elite-driven cue taking and pathologies of decision making.

U.S. public opinion about UAV operations escapes the focus on U.S. casualties, but there

is a new conventional wisdom that suggests that casualty-sensitivity regarding civilians killed in

drone attacks may undermine public support for ongoing operations. Much less work has focused

on the impact of civilian “collateral damage” on wartime opinion regarding military operations.

Boettcher (2004) looked at the degree to which Americans “valued” the lives of foreign citizens,

though still in a casualty-ratio context. Larson and Savych (2006) offers the only systematic look

at perceptions of civilian casualties and wartime opinion in Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq

again. They observed that the public approaches civilian casualties in a rational manner and

wishes to avoid them, but not at the risk of American lives. They also found that the public

generally trusts military efforts to avoid civilian casualties and military explanations for

“accidents” as the exception rather than the norm. Without much systematic research to rely

upon, a debate rages over the blowback to drone strikes internationally (Swift, 2012; Plaw and

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Fricker, 2012) and the potential for waning support in the U.S. (Singer, 2012; “Continued

support…,” 2013).

Potential Independent Variables

PPO, Signature or Personality Strike, Target Value, Civilian Casualties (number and

description), US casualties, Drones vs. other platform, Potential or Actual Success/Failure,

Sovereignty vs. Failed State

Potential Dependent Variables

Operation Success/Support, War Support, Presidential Approval x 2, Constitutionality

Public Opinion Abroad

Yemen, FATA, Africa

Research Design and Data

We test our expectations experimentally. Our data come from embedding fictitious New

York Times news stories in a survey asking for opinions about a drone attack in Afghanistan (see

Appendix A for full survey). The news stories we created gave study participants different

information about the value of a target of the drone strike (none, low, or high) and the number of

civilian casualties (unspecified, zero, one or 19). Participants for the study were recruited from

the Political Science Research Subject Pool (PSRSP) at North Carolina State University. We

administered the survey online using Qualtrics software, and it was fielded March 11-19, 2013.

Approximately 350 students were taking part in the pool at the time, and 249 completed the

study. As with most samples in this subject pool, the majority of study participants were white

(83%), male (56%), and self-identified as Republicans (51%).

Dependent Variables

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To measure opinions about the utility of using drones, respondents were asked to evaluate

whether the strike the read about was successful, unsuccessful or evenly mixed. Next, following

prior PEW polls about drones, participants were asked how concerned they were that drone

strikes would lead to (1) civilian casualties or (2) retaliation by extremists. They were also asked

if how concerned they were about (3) the legality of drones and (4) whether using them damage

America’s reputation. Participants’ answers to these four questions were measured on identical

4-pt scales. Our final two dependent variables inquired about approval of Obama’s handling of

(a) the war in Afghanistan and (b) U.S. foreign policy.

Independent Variables

Our theoretically important independent variables were constructed by manipulating two

attributes of drone strikes (see Appendix A for stimulus materials). Prior to being exposed to the

manipulations, all study participants were presented with a generic description of a drone that

explained these were unmanned aircraft. They also all saw the same picture of a drone.

Participants were then randomly assigned to a control group or to one of six treatment conditions

in a 2 X 3 design that varied (1) the value of the target (low vs. high) and (2) the number of

citizen casualties (zero, one, or 19). The control group did not read any overt statements about

the value of the target or whether collateral damage occurred. We included a control group

because it allows us to measure respondents assumptions about a generic drone strike compared

to variation to in the value of the target and the number of civilian casualties. A control group

also generates more information by providing estimates of the effects of each treatment

compared to a baseline, as opposed to any potential effects across treatments (Boettcher & Cobb,

2009; Boettcher & Cobb, 2010, 2011).

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Although we rely on the logic of randomization to estimate the impact of varying these

two attributes of drone attacks, we also measured several characteristics of study participants that

in have been found to affect attitudes about the use of military force. These variables include

party identification, gender, awareness of the issue, and having prior or present military service.

Results

Before discussing the results of the study, we start by investigating first whether or not

participants were cognizant of the information we manipulated. Respondents were asked at the

end of the survey if they could recall (1) the value of the target of the strike and (2) how many

civilians were killed as a result of the attack. For each question, they were provided multiple

answer options, including incorrect answers and the ability to admit they did not remember. Our

results indicate the manipulations were successful. In the three treatments with high value

targets, for example, 86% of respondents correctly answered that they read about a high value

target. The comparable figure for those who read about low value targets was 78% accuracy.

Likewise, recall was high for the specific number of casualties. For treatments with zero

casualties, 69% recalled that information correctly, for one and nineteen casualties, 80% and

73%, respectively, were accurate. Conversely, participants in the control group recognized that

the value of the strike or mentions of casualties were absent in the story they read.

Success

We start by examining whether perceptions that the drone strike was successful are

dependent on the value of the target or the number of civilian casualties. In Tables 1 and 2, we

present results that reveal participants’ opinions are indeed shaped by these kinds of information.

Importantly, the control group also allows us to identify how the different treatments matter. For

example, it is clear that drone strikes targeting high value terrorists are on average deemed more

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successful than strikes killing low-value targets. Yet, when opinions among these groups are

compared to the answers of participants in the control group, it is clear that killing high value

targets doesn’t increase perceptions of success as much as killing low-target terrorists reduces

perceptions of success. These findings suggest respondents already have in mind that a generic

drone strike that targets someone of high value, since the opinion in the control group are nearly

identical to those reported in the high value conditions.

==Table 1 about here==

Next, it appears that perceptions of success decline linearly as a function of increasing

civilian casualties, from zero to 19. With zero deaths, for example, 77% rated the strike as

successful. That percentage falls to 36% when the death toll rises to 19 civilians. A more

complete picture, however, is revealed only after considering the opinions among the control

group. It turns out that when participants are explicitly told zero casualties occurred, they are

more likely to think the strike was successful than respondents in the control group. Those in the

control group, that is, judge the mission as equally successful as participants who read about

exactly one casualty. Apparently, the prototypical drone strike is assumed to include some

collateral damage, and thus the absence of collateral damage is a “cleaner” and “preferable” kind

of drone mission than ordinarily imagined.

==Table 2 about here==

Success: A multivariate Model

In this second set of analyses, we now consider whether the treatment effects identified

earlier are statistically significant, controlling for participants characteristics. To estimate these

effects, we created a dummy variable for each treatment, so that the control group is the excluded

group and all treatments are compared to it. Next, we regressed these dummy variables on

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perceptions of success using its original five-point measurement. These results are presented in

Table 3.

==Table 3 about here==

First, participants who said they were more aware about drones were more likely to rate

the drone attack as successful, regardless of the experimental condition. So too were males,

though this gender effect falls just short of conventional standards for significance (p <.10).

Next, treatments with low level targets paired with at least one casualty significantly decreased

perceptions of success. A low level target killed without a casualty, though, had no effect either

way. Conversely, neither vignettes describing high value targets paired with at least one casualty

significantly reduced the perception of success. Yet, a high level target killed without a casualty

significantly increased the perception the attack was successful. Overall, it appears that targeting

low-level terrorists lower perceptions of success, unless they are also absent of any collateral

damage. Meanwhile, missions that take-out high level targets will not be judged as less

successful even if they come with civilian casualties, and are judged as more successful when

they avoid casualties.

Concerned: Civilians, Retaliation, Constitutionality and Reputation

This section reports the results of four separate ordinal regression models of participants’

concerns about externalities of using drones. As before, the treatments effects are captured by six

dummy variables, and control variables are included that measure respondent characteristics.

These results are reported in different columns in Table 4.

==Table 4 about here==

First, we examine the impact on concern over drones causing civilian casualties. Males

and Republicans report being less concerned overall, as do participants who know someone who

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has served in Afghanistan, although the latter effect falls just short of achieving conventional

levels of statistical significance (p < .10). Similar to the prior analyses, attacking a low level

target that generates collateral damage increases participants’ concern about harming civilians.

Also similar, there is no effect for killing a low level target without casualties. Killing a high

level target with 19 civilians accidentally killed too increases concern, whereas the same value

target with just one civilian killed does not. Oddly, though, concern increases when no casualties

occur at the same a high level target is killed. It is unclear whether this latter result indicates the

mere mention of casualties in the stories tends to prime greater concern over civilian deaths, or

that, given the intuitive pattern of the outcomes for the other treatments, it is randomly

significant.

Concern about retaliation from extremists is affected by gender, and to a lesser extent

also by killing a high level target with 19 accompanying civilian casualties (p < .10). None of the

other treatment conditions have significant effects. Awareness and partisanship explain variation

in concern over the legality of using drones, with those who pay more attention to the issue being

more concerned and Republicans being less concerned. However, none of the treatments have

significant effects in this model. In the final model, concern about damaging America’s

reputation is lower among Republicans (p < .10), and among participants who read about 19

civilians being killed in the strike against a high level target. The only other treatment condition

to approach levels of significance is when the strike targets a low level terrorist and it kills one

civilian (p <.15). The pattern of results is puzzling, especially why the drone attack on a low

level target that also kills 19 civilians does not equally increase concerns about reputation.

Approval: War in Afghanistan and U.S. Foreign Policy

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The last set of analyses explores potential effects on approval of Obama’s handling of the

war in Afghanistan and foreign policy more generally. These results are presented in Table 5.

Repeating the same analyses described in the prior sections of the paper, we fail to find evidence

that the nature of the drone attack influences these judgments. Instead, both models reveal that

only participants’ party identification explains approval. In both cases, Republicans are less

likely to approve than are Democrats, a fairly obvious finding.

==Table 5 about here==

Discussion

Ddd

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Public Opinion on U.S. Use of Drone Strikes, by Country 2012. Pew Research Center, June 2012. http://www.statista.com/statistics/233004/global-opinion-on-us-drone-strikes/. Raghavan, Sudarsan. “In Yemen, U.S. Airstrikes Breed Anger, and Sympathy for al-Qaeda.” The Washington Post. Aden, Yemen, May 30, 2012, Online edition, sec. World. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-yemen-us-airstrikes-breed-anger-and-sympathy-for-al-qaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUmKI0U_story.html. Roggio, Bill. “AQAP’s Top Sharia Official Killed in Recent Drone Strike.” The Long War Journal. Medford, NJ, October 20, 2012, Online edition. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/aqaps_top_sharia_off.php. Roggio, Bill, and Bob Barry. Charting the Data for US Air Strikes in Yemen, 2002-2012. Medford, NJ: The Long War Journal, August 7, 2012. http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Yemen/code/Yemen-strike.php. Roggio, Bill. “US Drone Strike Kills 4 Al Qaeda ‘Militants’ in Southern Yemen.” The Long War Journal. Medford, NJ, October 4, 2012, Online edition. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/us_drone_strike_four.php. ———. “US Drone Strike Near Yemeni Capital Kills AQAP Commander, 2 Fighters.” The Long War Journal. Medford, NJ, November 8, 2012, Online edition. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/us_drone_strike_near.php. Rubenfeld, Samuel. “US Designates Ansar al-Sharia as Al Qaeda Alias.” The Wall Street Journal. New York, NY, October 4, 2012, Online edition, sec. Corruption Currents. http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/10/04/us-designates-ansar-al-sharia-as-al-qaeda-alias/. Savage, C. (2013, March 6). Senators press holder on use of military force on U.S. soil. The New York Times. Schmitt, Eric, and David E. Sanger. “Pakistan Shift Could Curtail Drone Strikes.” The New York Times. Washington, DC, February 22, 2008, Online edition. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/washington/22policy.html?_r=0. Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti, Eric, and Robert F. Worth. “Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen.” The New York Times. Washington, DC, September 30, 2011, Online edition, sec. World/Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html. Sengupta, S. (2013, February 15). Rise of drone in U.S. drives efforts to limit police use. The New York Times. Shane, Scott. “Yemen’s Leader Praises U.S. Drone Strikes.” The New York Times, September 29, 2012, sec. World / Middle East.

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Appendix A: 2013 Drone Survey How aware are you about the U.S. use of drones to monitor and occasionally attack terrorists and insurgents in other countries? Use the following scale that ranges from 1-10 to record your answer, where "1" stands for very unaware and "10" stands for very aware. Of course, you can use any number in-between. 1 (Very Unaware) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Very Aware) Since the middle of 2008, the United States government has been using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, commonly known as "drones") to monitor and occasionally attack members of the Taliban hiding in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the Pakistani side of their border with Afghanistan. The use of drones in this area is controlled by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and approval of drone strikes in Pakistan comes directly from President Obama. The main drone used by the CIA carries surveillance systems and can be configured with various strike packages of GPS and laser-guided bombs and missiles. The picture below is of a Predator drone with a standard weapons load. On the next page you will read a news item about a recent drone strike in the FATA region. Please read the news item carefully and then move on to answer the survey questions. News Item Article from New York Times (Low-level target, 0 civilian deaths) Peshawar, Pakistan-- A missile fired from a CIA-operated drone flying over North Waziristan hit a target near the village of Degan. The individual killed in the attack was described as a low-level operative associated with the Pakistani Taliban. The target was traveling alone and there were no reports of other casualties. Administration sources indicated they were satisfied with the strike, which was personally authorized by President Obama. News Item Article from New York Times (High-ranking target, 0 civilian deaths) Peshawar, Pakistan-- A missile fired from a CIA-operated drone flying over North Waziristan hit a target near the village of Degan. The individual killed in the attack was described as a high-ranking operative associated with the Pakistani Taliban. The target was traveling alone and there were no reports of other casualties. Administration sources indicated they were satisfied with the strike, which was personally authorized by President Obama. News Item Article from New York Times (Low-level target, 19 civilian deaths)

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Peshawar, Pakistan-- A missile fired from a CIA-operated drone flying over North Waziristan hit a target near the village of Degan. The individual killed in the attack was described as a low-level operative associated with the Pakistani Taliban. The target was traveling in a column of vehicles and nineteen civilians were killed. Administration sources indicated they were satisfied with the strike, which was personally authorized by President Obama. News Item Article from New York Times (High-ranking target, 19 civilian deaths) Peshawar, Pakistan-- A missile fired from a CIA-operated drone flying over North Waziristan hit a target near the village of Degan. The individual killed in the attack was described as a high-ranking operative associated with the Pakistani Taliban. The target was traveling in a column of vehicles and nineteen civilians were killed. Administration sources indicated they were satisfied with the strike, which was personally authorized by President Obama. News Item Article from New York Times (Low-level target, 1 civilian deaths) Peshawar, Pakistan-- A missile fired from a CIA-operated drone flying over North Waziristan hit a target near the village of Degan. The individual killed in the attack was described as a low-level operative associated with the Pakistani Taliban. The target was traveling in a column of vehicles and a civilian standing by the roadside was killed. Administration sources indicated they were satisfied with the strike, which was personally authorized by President Obama. News Item Article from New York Times (High-ranking target, 1 civilian deaths) Peshawar, Pakistan-- A missile fired from a CIA-operated drone flying over North Waziristan hit a target near the village of Degan. The individual killed in the attack was described as a high-ranking operative associated with the Pakistani Taliban. The target was traveling in a column of vehicles and a civilian standing by the roadside was killed. Administration sources indicated they were satisfied with the strike, which was personally authorized by President Obama. News Item Article from New York Times (No ranking for target, no casualty data) Peshawar, Pakistan-- A missile fired from a CIA-operated drone flying over North Waziristan hit a target near the village of Degan. One individual associated with the Pakistani Taliban was killed in the attack. Administration sources indicated they were satisfied with the strike, which was personally authorized by President Obama. How would you rate the outcome of this drone strike? Very Successful Somewhat Successful Evenly Mixed

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Somewhat Unsuccessful Very Unsuccessful How concerned are you about whether drones... Endanger civilian lives Lead to retaliation from extremists Are conducted legally Damage America's reputation Very Somewhat Not too Not at all Overall, do you approve or disapprove of President Obama's handling of the war in Afghanistan? Strongly Approve Approve Neutral Disapprove Strongly Disapprove Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Obama is handling U.S. foreign policy? Strongly Approve Approve Neutral Disapprove Strongly Disapprove Please answer the following demographic questions to make sure we have a representative sample, and can examine how different groups think about political issues. What is you gender? Male Female Generally, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or other? Republican Democrat Independent Other Do you think of yourself more like a Republican or more like a Democrat, or neither? More like a Republican

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More like a Democrat Neither Generally, when it comes to politics, do you consider yourself liberal, conservative, moderate, or what? Liberal Conservative Moderate Other Which of the following best describes your personal military background? I do not plan on serving in the military I plan to serve in the military I currently serve in the military I have already finished my military service Do you know someone in the military personally who has served, or is serving, in Afghanistan? Yes No What is your primary racial/ethnic identity? Caucasian/White African-American/Black Asian-American Hispanic Other If you voted in the 2012 election, who did you vote for for President? Obama Romney Other I did not vote Last, we wanted to see how well you recall information from the news story. According to the news item, what was the status of the Taliban operative targeted in the drone attack? High-ranking Low-level Can't recall

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Information not provided According to the news item, how many civilians were killed in the drone attacks? 19 1 0 Can't recall Information not provided

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Table1.EvaluationofDroneAttack,byTargetValue Unsuccessful Mixed SuccessfulControlGroup

10%

30%

60%

LowValueTarget

26%

28%

46%

HighValueTarget

8%

26%

66%

Note:Entriesarepercentages;ControlgroupN=40;LowvaluetargetN=111;HighvaluetargetN=97.

Table2.EvaluationofDroneAttack,byCollateralDamage Unsuccessful Mixed SuccessfulControlGroup

10%

30%

60%

Zero

9%

14%

77%

One

15%

28%

57%

Nineteen

27%

37%

36%

Note:Entriesarepercentages;ControlgroupN=40;ZerocasualtiesN=65;OnecasualtyN=65;NineteencasualtiesN=78

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Table3.EffectsofVaryingAttributesofaDroneAttackonPerceptionsofMissionSuccess

SuccessofMissionAwarenessofdrones .12*PartyID .17Sex .49+White .29Knowsomeonewhoserves .08LowLevelXZeroCasualties .37LowLevelXOneCasualty ‐.93*LowLevelX19Casualties ‐1.58*HighLevelXZeroCasualties 2.01*HighLevelXOneCasualty .36HighLevelX19Casualties ‐.44CoxandSnellPseudoR2 .30Note:Method is ordered logit; entries are regression coefficients. Dependent variable is is a 4-pt measure of perceived mission success; *p<.05; +p<.10; N=248.

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Table4.EffectsofVaryingAttributesofaDroneAttackonConcernabout

Casualties,ExtremistRetaliation,Legality,andReputation

CivilianCasualties

ExtremistsRetaliation

Legality America’sReputation

Awarenessofdrones

‐.00 ‐.07 .12* ‐.07

PartyID ‐.76* ‐.19* ‐.31* ‐.26+Sex ‐.35* ‐1.02* ‐.44 ‐.29White .18 ‐.12 .26 .22Knowsomeonewhoserves

‐.47+ .06 ‐.19 .32

LowLevelXZeroCasualties

‐.15 ‐.16 ‐.70 ‐.18

LowLevelXOneCasualty

1.52* ‐.01 ‐.16 .70

LowLevelX19Casualties

1.16* .23 ‐.16 .25

HighLevelXZeroCasualties

.90* .13 ‐.02 ‐.09

HighLevelXOneCasualty

.52 ‐.23 ‐.52 ‐.31

HighLevelX19Casualties

.80+ .78+ .35 1.18*

CoxandSnellPseudoR2

.14 .14 .07 .10

Note: Method is ordered logit; entries are regression coefficients. Dependent variable for all four models is a 4-pt measure of concern; *p<.05; +p<.10; N=248 for all four models.

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Table5.EffectsofVaryingAttributesofaDroneAttackonApprovalofObama’shandlingof(a)theWarinAfghanistanand(b)ForeignPolicy

Afghanistan ForeignPolicyAwarenessofdrones .06 ‐.06PartyID ‐.83* ‐1.10*Sex .31 .33White ‐.16 ‐.39Knowsomeonewhoserves

.08 ‐.04

LowLevelXZeroCasualties

.32 .41

LowLevelXOneCasualty ‐.56 ‐.26LowLevelX19Casualties ‐.37 ‐.02HighLevelXZeroCasualties

‐.01 .04

HighLevelXOneCasualty .19 .70HighLevelX19Casualties .18 .28CoxandSnellPseudoR2 .16 .26Note:Method is ordered logit; entries are regression coefficients. Dependent variable for each models is a 5-pt measure of job approval; *p<.05; +p<.10; N=248.