ARTICLES

Framing MOVE: A Press’ Complicity in the Murderof Women and Children in the City of (Un) Brotherly Love

Kimberly Sanders & Judson L. Jeffries

Published online: 27 March 2013# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Abstract This article examines local press coverage of the 1985 police bomb-ing of MOVE, which resulted in the deaths of eleven people, as well as thedestruction of two city blocks leaving 250 people homeless. According topublic opinion polls many Philadelphians seemingly showed little concern aboutthe heavy-handed tactics used by the police; in fact, many praised the mayorand the efforts of law enforcement. News accounts from the PhiladelphiaInquirer were content analyzed to determine whether or not the coverage wasframed in a manner that may have influenced the public’s attitude toward theorganization and its members, thus cultivating within the populace an attitudeof indifference.

Keywords MOVE .Media . Bombing . Black radicals . Philadelphia

How can any American ever defend a course of action that results in firefighters and police searchingthrough rubble and pulling out pieces of dead children? (Graziul 1985).

Introduction

In 1985, America was in the midst of the Reagan Revolution as the president had justtrounced Democratic challenger Walter Mondale, securing a second term in office,and thus becoming, the first Republican President to do so since Dwight David

J Afr Am St (2013) 17:566–586DOI 10.1007/s12111-013-9252-7

K. Sanders : J. L. Jeffries (*)Department of African American and African Studies, The Ohio State University, Columbus,OH, USAe-mail: Jeffries.70@osu.edu

Eisenhower. The first lady’s “Just Say No” campaign, which encouraged youth toabstain from using illegal drugs and alcohol, was plastered on billboards across thecountry. Earlier that year “We Are the World,” a charity single performed by suchartists as Michael Jackson, Lionel Ritchie, Stevie Wonder, and Diana Ross topped themusic charts. On April 1, 1985, Philadelphians rejoiced as Villanova’s men’s basket-ball team upset the heavily favored Georgetown Hoyas to win the national champi-onship. Six weeks later, the euphoria that enveloped the city had all but dissipated asPhiladelphians along with the rest of the country watched in horror as Osage Avenuewent up in flames after police dropped a plastic explosive on the home of a groupknown as MOVE; that it occurred a day after Mother’s Day made it all the more gut-wrenching.

Tensions between MOVE and the Philadelphia Police Department had beenmounting for years. In 1981, 3 years after city officials bulldozed a MOVE homeas a result of a major confrontation between the two, several MOVE membersrelocated to 6221 Osage Avenue in the Cobbs Creek area of West Philadelphia. Inthe early 1980s, some Osage Avenue residents complained constantly about MOVE’sloud harangues and the piles of garbage and human waste that accumulated in theiryard. On Monday, May 13, 1985, Philadelphia officials succumbed to public pres-sure, obtaining a warrant to search the MOVE residence and take four members intocustody for illegally possessing firearms, inspection code violations, and delinquentgas bills. MOVE members resisted, and a stand-off ensued. Police officers respondedby firing 10,000 rounds of ammunition into the home, containing women andchildren; still, MOVE members refused to evacuate the premises. Police officers thenproceeded to use tear gas and high-powered fire hoses, to no avail.

When it became evident that MOVE would not surrender, law enforcementofficers dropped a plastic explosive on the roof of the home, which caught fire,killing 11 MOVE members, including 5 children, and destroying 61 homes, whiledamaging 110 additional dwellings. With the exception of a few sympathizers,Philadelphians on the whole did not appear overly concerned about the heavy-handed tactics employed by the police; in fact, many praised law enforcement. Apoll conducted on May 14, 1985 suggested that many were in support of the way inwhich the MOVE situation was handled. A survey of 400 randomly selectedPhiladelphians1, conducted by Teichner Associates of Philadelphia for WCAU-TV,found that 69 % of the respondents believed that the “mayor did a good or excellentjob” handling the MOVE confrontation while only 24 % rated his performance as“not very good or poor” (Teichner Associates 1985). Despite the controversy sur-rounding the event, 7 % of the respondents indicated that they were undecided on thematter. Interestingly, the data showed that support for the mayor did not vary much byrace (Eichel and Clark 1985a). Though Blacks2 around the country were outragedwith the city’s handling of the incident, Black Philadelphians “seemed to be moreunderstanding” (Ransom 1987).

Public support for the mayor’s office raises several interesting questions: Why wasthere no mass public outcry (i.e., large organized marches or demonstrations) over the

1 The poll has a margin of error of plus or minus 5 %.2 The words Black and African American are used interchangeably throughout this article according tosound and context and to avoid repetition.

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deaths of eleven civilians? Did Philadelphians believe that officers exercised reason-able force? Did Philadelphians believe that MOVE got what it deserved? Couldmedia representation be responsible for public sentiment following the incident? Inthis article, we examine local press coverage of the MOVE tragedy in an effort toascertain whether or not it may have influenced public sentiment toward MOVEgenerally and/or the bombing of MOVE.

MOVE: A Brief History

Vincent Leaphart, a grade school dropout who changed his name to John Africa,founded the MOVE organization in 1972. Although the group was initially majorityBlack, Whites were permitted to join. Donald Glassey3, a white college instructor andson of a former National Vice President of the Boy Scouts of America, was one suchmember. An unlikely bond formed between Africa and Glassey when they beganengaging in long talks following meetings the two attended at a West Philadelphiahousing cooperative. Glassey said: “I found the philosophy he was espousing attrac-tive . . . it was basically a philosophy that the world is beset by not living in harmonywith natural laws and natural principles, and that if we would just gradually return toliving in harmony with nature, that gradually our problems would be solved . . . if oneis working toward living in harmony with nature, then one should not allow animalsto be exploited in any manner” (Curry 1985).

MOVE members adopted the surname “Africa” and adhered to a strict diet of rawfruits, vegetables, nuts, and eggs (Dickson 2002). Because they advocated freedom ofall living creatures, MOVE members frequently demonstrated at zoos, pet stores,political rallies, and other public spaces, which more often than not, resulted in theirarrest. Espousing a “back-to-nature” way of life, members shunned technology,medicine, and Western attire. MOVE’s philosophy prohibited its children fromattending school or wearing many articles of clothing because social and politicalinstitutions were believed to be corrupt and enslaving. The children had neverwatched television or eaten cooked foods. They were to be the first generation ofpure MOVE members (Assefa and Wahrhaftig 1990; Wagner-Pacifici 1994).Unfortunately, many of them were illiterate.

In the early years, MOVE members lived communally in three adjacent rowhouses in West Philadelphia’s Powelton Village area, but MOVE’s alternative life-style was off-putting to some. During this time, MOVE also had several run-ins withthe police, which sometimes resulted in members being beaten by officers; and in oneinstance, police allegedly killed an infant (Boyette 1989). By the late 1970s, tensionsbetween the police and MOVE reached an all-time high, resulting in a majorconfrontation in August 1978. Following a 55-day siege, city officials cut off waterto the home and employed a blockade (of food stuffs), preventing anyone fromentering or leaving the residence located at 307–309 N. 33rd Street.

Police officers used high-pressure water hoses, a battering ram, bulldozers, andautomatic weapons in an attempt to force MOVE out of its residence. Eventually,

3 Years later, Glassey became a police informant. According to Glassey, “federal agents were about to file afirearms charge against him, but offered to drop it if he would agree to become an informant” (Curry 1985).

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MOVE members relinquished the home, but not before Officer James Ramp was shotand killed. Though it is widely believed that Ramp’s death was a result of friendly fire,nine MOVE members were convicted of his murder and each sentenced to prison forthirty or more years (Harry 1987). Three years later, the members of MOVE along withtheir children, including those of the imprisoned MOVE 9, moved to Osage Avenue.Before long, tensions arose between MOVE and their new neighbors (Wagner-Pacifici1994). OnMarch 13, 1985, members of the city’s police department descended upon theMOVE residence, resulting in one of the most horrific violations of Black human rightsin late twentieth century America. Given the destruction and mayhem left in the wake ofthe bombing, it is not surprising that the event became the subject of news stories, books,journal articles, and other more poplar writings.

Literature Review

In the years following the catastrophe, there was a surge of literature on MOVE; nearlyall of which focused on the 1985 bombing, with rarely any mention of media coverage.The works mainly fall within two categories—books and pamphlets that cater to thelayperson and casual reader and scholarly monographs and articles written by aca-demics. Eleven years after the bombing, MOVE members told their own story (in theself-published) 25 Years on the MOVE4 in an attempt to publicize what they believed tobe unjust treatment of their organization by city officials. The text begins with a briefhistory of MOVE, chronicling early protests, goals, and run-ins with police. MOVEaccuses the media of publishing “inaccurate, distorted, and misleading” coverage ofthem by focusing on their appearance and unconventional protest methods, rather thanaddressing the group’s positive community engagement. The book not only details the1978 and 1985 MOVE confrontations with police, but also the trial of MOVE sympa-thizer and former Black Panther Mumia Abu-Jamal, who many believed was falselyconvicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a White Philadelphia police officer.

Pulitzer Prize winning novelist John Edgar Wideman, a native of Philadelphiapublished Philadelphia Fire (1990), a fictionalized account of a writer who returns tohis native Philadelphia to investigate the 1985 bombing. A New York Times bestsellerPhiladelphia Fire tells the story of Cudjoe, who after ending a 10-year self-imposedexile in Greece is determined to locate Simba, a boy who is rumored to have survivedthe fire before mysteriously disappearing. Cudjoe never finds Simba; rather heinadvertently embarks on a journey of self-discovery as he explores black manhoodin inner city Philadelphia. The novel ends rather abruptly with Cudjoe at a memorialservice for the eleven murdered MOVE members. It is at the service that theprotagonist learns that he can no longer run from the problems of his past.

Charles Bowser, a member of the Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission(The MOVE Commission) appointed by Mayor W. Wilson Goode to investigate theactions of the police following the 1985 massacre penned a work titled Let the BunkerBurn, which is a personal narrative of the event (Bowser 1989). This book does notprovide any information about the confrontation that cannot be found in news

4 This is a revised, updated, and expanded edition of 20 Years on the MOVE (1996). There is no author(s)credited with writing the book.

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accounts; however, it does give insight into the commission’s investigation. Thetext’s greatest asset is the glossary, which identifies key individuals involved in theplanning and execution of the siege.

Lavon Wright Bracy’s Making Them Whole: A Philadelphia Neighborhood andthe City’s Recovery from the MOVE Tragedy (1990) chronicles the experiences ofOsage Avenue and Pine Street residents and the city’s efforts to “make them whole,” areference to Mayor Goode’s promise to restore the community. Bracy, who misspellsMOVE members’ names throughout the text, may be a less than impartial observer asshe was the Assistant Managing Director for the city of Philadelphia at the time ofpublication.

Turning to works of a scholarly nature, we find a body of work that varies in bothapproach and methodology. Comparing MOVE to Rastafarians and Black Power eraorganizations, such as the Black Panther Party, J.M. Floyd-Thomas (2002) argues thatMOVE represented a form of revolutionary, African-centered humanism in the article“The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts: MOVE as Revolutionary Black Humanisms.”Floyd-Thomas asserts that MOVE came under municipal scrutiny because thegroup’s radicalism was analogous to the militancy associated with the BlackPanther Party—an organization that was the target of much police hostility andbrutality in the 1970s. The idea that MOVE’s militancy compares favorably to theBlack Panther Party is debatable, but we understand the general idea that Floyd-Thomas attempts to get across. Floyd-Thomas also maintains that MOVE’s blackconsciousness “illustrates the confluence of black religiosity, political insurgency andcultural agency that forms the heart of revolutionary black humanism” (Floyd-Thomas 2002).

Employing discourse analysis, Robin Wagner-Pacifici (1994) demonstrates inDiscourse and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia versus MOVE how “competingnarratives are produced and contested within a formal public investigation.” Sheexplores how opposing views of MOVE led to a discourse of war, violence, andultimately destruction. Through examining records of the Philadelphia SpecialInvestigation Committee, appointed by Mayor Goode to investigate the fire, Wagner-Pacifici highlights the role of discourse in political conflict. In The MOVE Crisis inPhiladelphia: Extremist Groups and Conflict Resolution, Hizkias Assefa and PaulWahrhaftig (1990) submit that both international and domestic “extremist groups” posechallenges to conflict resolution. They assert that there are similarities betweenMOVE’sconfrontations with police and international conflicts, and how both involved similartechniques of conflict resolution. The purpose of this study is to offer suggestions foreffectively negotiating with radical groups that have alternative lifestyles.

Michael and Randi Boyette (1989), who resided in Philadelphia during both the1978 shootout as well as the 1985 bombing, offer a narrative account in “Let ItBurn!” The Philadelphia Tragedy. The Boyettes detail various confrontations be-tween MOVE and Philadelphia police over the preceding years; interestingly, theissue of accountability on the part of the police, however, is noticeably absent. TheBoyettes’ believe strongly that the police were incompetent, but not racist or brutal orguilty of extra-legal force. One interesting note about Michael Boyette: he was amember of the grand jury that investigated police conduct following the 1985incident. Similar to other scholars, University of Pennsylvania professors JohnAnderson and Hilary Hevenor (1987) in Burning Down the House: MOVE and the

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Tragedy of Philadelphia produced a rather comprehensive record of the eventsleading up to the conflagration; however, little analysis of the event and its aftermathis provided.

Condemning the actions ofMayorW.Wilson Goode, the police, and firemen,MargotHarry’s (1987) Attention MOVE! This is America! is both a polemic and quasi-scholarlywork. Harry provides a brief history of the communities in which MOVE was locatedand offers insight into not only the organization and their conflicts with police, but alsoPhiladelphia’s history of police brutality—particularly during the tenure of PoliceCommissioner Frank Rizzo (who as mayor oversaw the 1978 shootout). According toHarry, during the 1985 siege, police used tactics established years earlier by formerMayor Rizzo. Harry firmly believes that the bombing of MOVE was not merely a resultof improper police training or an error, but rather a “conscious execution of determinedand unapologetic rebels” (Harry 1987).

That same year, Political Scientist Georgia Persons published an article titled “ThePhiladelphia Move Incident as an Anomaly in Models of Mayoral Leadership”(Persons 1987). In this essay, Persons couched the Philadelphia bombing of MOVEas a “scientific anomaly” for analyses of mayoral leadership, which she contends, isgoverned by and derivative of a pluralist paradigm (Persons 1987). Persons astutelypoints out that this major event involving African Americans in a city with aBlack mayor contradicts general expectations of Black mayoral leadership. Sheasserts that the event was anomalous in that many people would not expect aBlack mayor to approve the dropping of a bomb on his own people. Personsgoes on to explain that the behavior of the black community following thebombing was anomalous as well.

Media Coverage and Social Movements

Both social scientists and media scholars have spent long hours studying the waysnews media cover social movements and organizations. Many studies have found thatthe presentation of issues in the news plays a major role in shaping peoples’ attitudes.Studies indicate that media serve as the primary means through which elite opinion isconveyed to the public (Jasperson et al. 1998). Through framing—focusing on someaspects of the story in order to promote a “problem definition, causal interpretation,moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”—jour-nalists are able to influence public opinion (Entman 1993). In his article Framing:Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, Robert Entman emphasizes thatframing determines how most individuals understand and remember an issue andwhether they decide to act upon it (Entman 1993).

In The Whole World is Watching: The Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking ofthe New Left, Todd Gitlin (1980) utilizes in-depth interviews, qualitative analysis, andarchival research to study media coverage of the anti-Vietnam war movement from1965 to 1972. In this work, Gitlin focuses on Student for a Democratic Society and itstreatment by CBS Evening News and The New York Times. Among Gitlin’s keyfindings is that major news sources rarely cover opposition movements as legitimatepolitical forces; rather news sources trivialize movement activities and marginalize itsparticipants (Gitlin 1980).

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Media coverage of political groups vary according to how different the groups arefrom the status quo. The more deviant a group is perceived by those in mainstreamsociety, the more likely some journalists will ridicule it, discrediting it in the process.The labels that news personnel ascribe to groups and the extent to which those groupsare covered in the media will affect the audience’s perception of these groups(Shoemaker 1984). In his (2004) study of media representation of Black PantherParty branches in Baltimore, Cleveland, and New Orleans, Jeffries (2004) argues thatthe manner in which media cover black radical groups in particular has importantimplications concerning how the public views these groups and how these groupswill be remembered historically. Because the “average person reads few scholarlybooks in his/her lifetime, most of the information that he/she learns about blackradicals comes from news reports” (p. 21). Consequently, how the media portray anorganization may affect how people respond to or view incidents where the supposeddeviant group is actually the oppressed, and the state is the oppressor (Jeffries 2004).

This article is different from the works described above, as this work explores animportant, but neglected area of study—local news coverage of a Black radical and/orBlack nonconformist organization and citizen reaction. To some extent, this workbuilds on, yet at the same time, moves beyond what has been done since that fatefulMother’s Day nearly 30 years ago. As has already been stated, the relationshipbetween news coverage and public sentiment toward social movements has beendebated for decades, but no one has investigated the correlation between the MOVEbombing, media representation, and citizen response.

Hypothesis

In this article, we argue that press coverage of MOVE dehumanized its members, thuscultivating within the public a sense of indifference about the 1985 bombing thatkilled eleven MOVE members and destroyed two city blocks.

Theoretical Significance

The goal of this research is to ascertain why Philadelphians appeared desensitized tothe horrific events of May 13, 1985. This article provides further insight into the waysin which media perhaps influences public opinion about people, places, and events,generally and about nonconformist Black groups specifically. Despite the killing ofeleven American citizens, including five children, public opinion polls show thatlarge sectors of the Philadelphia public supported the Mayor’s administration, ofwhich the Philadelphia Police Department is a part. Could individuals be so impres-sionable that they trust and accept reports circulated by the media without scrutiny?When reading news reports, did the public fail to take into account the personalprejudices that the writers may have had about Blacks and radical Blacks in partic-ular? If so, then society can easily be manipulated into supporting regimes andpolicies through propaganda—much in the same manner that Adolph Hitler usedpropaganda to popularize his theories of Aryan superiority throughout Germany inthe 1930s and 1940s.

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Americans’ experience with propaganda is not new. President George W. Bush’s2002 proclamation that Iraq was harboring weapons of mass destruction is but oneexample. Using the Secretary of State Colin Powell as the White House’s front-man,the president and defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld was able to convince somemedia personnel, and by extension, the segments of the American public that SaddamHussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, thus setting the stage for theinvasion of Iraq. Despite what the American people were presented, with what theWhite House called compelling evidence, no weapons of mass destruction were everfound.

The way in which media portray movements and protestors has important socio-politico ramifications. If news reporters and their editors consistently portray aparticular group in an unsavory and barbaric fashion, it will provide law enforcementwith a convenient excuse to employ excessive force when dealing with such groupswithout fear of backlash. In the weeks and months following the bombing of MOVE,the general public was largely in support of the Goode administration and lawenforcement. Perhaps because MOVE members were depicted as criminals ratherthan victims, large sectors of the public were unfazed by the casualties incurred by thebombing. It was crucial that MOVE not be couched as victims; had the public viewedthem that way, it is likely that it may have demanded that certain parties be heldresponsible for the murders of the eleven MOVE members, several of whom werewomen and children. By framing MOVE members as deviant and disruptive, theorganization came off looking like the aggressors while the police were viewed asimpartial guardians of the law, waging battle with the forces of evil. In the process,both the mayor and the police were absolved of any wrongdoing.

Methods

To test our hypothesis, a content analysis of the Philadelphia Inquirer was done.Specifically, every news article in the Philadelphia Inquirer from January 1 to June 1,1985 that mentioned MOVE was copied from microfilm and analyzed, totaling 171articles. The bombing of MOVE by city officials is well known; however, few outsidePhiladelphia are aware of the acrimony that had built up between the police andMOVE over the preceding years. We selected this period of investigation hoping toamass a swath of news that might give us a sense of the level of enmity that existedbetween MOVE and city officials. The Inquirer was chosen for three reasons: (a) it isthe newspaper of note in the city of Philadelphia and (b) it is highly regarded in thenewspaper industry, having won a total of eighteen Pulitzer Prices5 (“Top MediaOutlets”). In 1985, the year of the bombing, two staff members were awarded thiscoveted prize; one of whom was William K. Marimow, who covered the MOVEbombing. Another reporter contributing to the MOVE coverage, David Zucchino,was a Pulitzer Prize Finalist (Pulitzer Prizes Website 2011) and (c) because of its large

5 The Pulitzer Prize, which is administered by Columbia University, is awarded for achievement inAmerican journalism, literature, and musical composition. Prizes are awarded annually in twenty-onecategories. Marimow won for Investigative Reporting, while Zucchino was a finalist in the category ofInternational Reporting (Pulitzer Prizes Website 2011).

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reading audience. According to the Philadelphia Press Association’s website, hun-dreds of thousands of people read this periodical daily and more than two millionweekly, making it one of America’s largest circulating newspapers (Wilkinson 2011).

All relevant coverage, including feature stories, editorials, opinion columns, andletters to the editor that mentioned MOVE, were coded for focus of story/piece, toneof words, and overall tone of story/letter or piece (Table 1). Each news items wasclassified as favorable, somewhat favorable, unfavorable, somewhat unfavorable orneutral (see appendix). News coverage was also coded in order for frequency ofrecurring topics or themes that may have transpired over the 5-month period underexamination.

Results

Although this study uncovered a total of 171 articles, the coverage of MOVE was notevenly distributed over our period of investigation. Between January and April, not asingle article mentioned MOVE. The first time MOVE appeared in an article was onMay 2nd—11 days before police bombed the residence on Osage Avenue. In the10 days leading up to the massacre, eight stories featured the organization, seven ofwhich portrayed MOVE unfavorably. To some extent, an editorial published on May15th set the tone for the coverage that followed; it reminded the reader that this tragicevent “came about because MOVE had created intolerable conditions in a WestPhiladelphia neighborhood. If blame is to be assessed, MOVE must be at the top ofthe list” (“In the Wake” 1985). Inquirer correspondent Rich Heidorn, Jr. reported,“They shunned artificial heat, electricity and technology . . . They shunned baths . . .They . . . collected so much garbage and human waste on their property thatneighbors complained it attracted rats and insects” (Heidorn 1985a). These earlydepictions characterized the MOVE lifestyle as “primitive” and its members ashaving “hostility toward current social structures” (Kaufman 1985a).

Of these eight news items mentioned earlier, five covered the possible eviction ofMOVE while two others referred to MOVE as dangerous and deviant. For example,an article entitled, “For Children on Block, MOVE Spurs Unease,” published on May12th, states that several neighborhood children were so scared of the group that theyhad nightmares (Lopez 1985). One 6-year-old girl explained, “I dream about the timeone of the MOVE people was climbing on the house. It was across the street. He hadon a mask. I have dreams about it.” One little boy added, “It’s crazy, because youdon’t know what they might do” (Lopez 1985). In another story, City CouncilwomanJoan Scepter was quoted as saying, “It is outrageous that this city is being heldhostage by MOVE, but it is even more outrageous that city residents are unwittinglysubsidizing these terrorists”6 (Cooke and Kauffman 1985).

The Monday May 13th newspaper contained eight MOVE-related articles, equal-ing the entire total of the previous first four and a half months of 1985. On May 13th,three quarters of the news reports was unfavorable portrayals of the organization. Halfof them detailed the MOVE siege, while others recounted the events leading up to the

6 This is in reference to the fact that MOVE members living on Osage Avenue allegedly had not paid theirwater bill in 2 years or their gas bill in over a year.

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bombing on that fateful Sunday. One article was especially crass; in it, journalistsHoward Goodman and Marc Kaufman described how MOVE members had gottenthemselves in such an inauspicious situation: “With its bull-horned threats andobscenities, its disdain for ordinary standards of cleanliness, had long used up itscredit with the people who [lived] nearby” (Goodman and Kauffman 1985). In thesame article, a neighbor was quoted as saying that police should kill everyone, eventhe children, because they “had passed up on many opportunities to leave and hadsteadily pushed toward a confrontation” (Goodman and Kauffman 1985). Inquirercorrespondents covering the story seemed to absolve city officials of any responsi-bility, instead placing it on MOVE members, who “had dared the army of officers tostorm their fortified rowhouse” (Gibbons et al. 1985b). Michel Brooks characterizedthe decision to drop a bomb on a residential neighborhood as merely a “grossmiscalculation” (Brooks 1985). Richard Costello, recording secretary for the localFraternal Order of Police lodge, commented crudely that no one was killed on May13th, but rather “eleven people committed suicide” (Eichel and M. Odum 1985).Echoing the sentiments contained in the May 15th editorial almost verbatim oneneighbor put it, “Whatever happens, they [MOVE] brought it on themselves”(Goodman and Kaufman 1985a).

In just 4 days (May 14–17), a total of 81 articles pertaining to MOVE werepublished (see Fig. 1). Only three articles were sympathetic toward MOVE (2.5 %favorable and 1.2 % somewhat favorable), while 69 % of the articles either portrayedthe group unfavorably or somewhat unfavorably (55.5 % unfavorably and 13.6 %somewhat unfavorably; Fig. 2). The remaining 27 % was neutral in tone (see Fig. 3).Several of these reports claimed that as many as “four adult members of the group hadfled their burning house and fired shots” at police before possibly escaping through“underground tunnels,” despite the fact that no evidence of subterranean passagesexisted (Gibbons et al. 1985a).

The press conferences held before and after the bombing were telling. Before thebombing, Goode stated, “We intend to take control of the house by any meansnecessary…I am totally convinced the group is bent on violent confrontation”(“The MOVE Siege” 1985). When asked about possible alternatives the mayorresponded that he did not think there was “any other way other than this way toresolve the issue” because MOVE would “resist with deadly force any effort to servelawful process” (Ditzen 1985). At a press conference immediately following thebombing, officials were asked why firemen did not immediately extinguish theflames, to which Fire Commissioner William Richmond responded by saying “fire-fighters ‘backed down’ after hearing shots fired shortly after the blaze started”

Table 1 Overall tone of articlesOverall tone of article Percentage (no. of articles)

Favorable 4.7 (8)

Somewhat favorable 1.8 (3)

Neutral 30.4 (52)

Somewhat unfavorable 11.1 (19)

Unfavorable 52.0 (89)

TOTAL 100.0 (171)

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(Nussbaum et al. 1985). Another article suggested that “MOVE [had] snipersscattered throughout the neighborhood,” preventing firemen from doing their jobs(McMillan et al. 1985).

In the days following the bombing, Goode stood by his decision to bomb theMOVE residence stating, “If I had to make the decision all over again, knowing whatI know now, I could make the same decision…because I think we cannot permit anyterrorist group, any revolutionary group in this city, to hold a whole neighborhood ora whole city hostage” (Eichel and R. Clark 1985b). As if to justify his actions, Goodeaccused MOVE of possessing explosives in hopes of creating “an international eventof some kind” (Loeb 1985a). In spite of the tremendous loss of life and property, tohis credit, Goode did not attempt to deflect responsibility away from himself statingthat he was “fully accountable” for the manner in which the confrontation washandled (Loeb and Cooke 1985).

Other city officials whose comments on the bombing appeared in the press includeseveral city council persons, the city’s police commissioner, and its managingdirector. Councilwoman Joan Scepter was “devastated at the thought that…properties

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60

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Neutral SomewhatUnfavorable

Unfavorable

Overall Tone of Articles by Percentage

Fig. 2 Overall tone of articles by percentage

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of

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Fig. 1 Number of articles per day

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[were] burning” and expressed outrage over the destruction of property, whileempathizing with the people whose homes were destroyed. Council PresidentJoseph Coleman lauded the mayor saying that he did “what he had to do” in orderto cure “an ill that was festering in the community” (Ferrick 1985). Not every cityofficial heaped praise on the mayor and his minions. Councilman ThatcherLongstretch believed the dropping of an explosive on a residential neighborhoodwas “irresponsible” and described the actions of the police as “incredibly inept” and“stupid” (Sutton and Ferrick 1985).

As expected the city’s Police Commissioner Gregore Sambor was resolute in hissupport of the police department. Sambor “had no apologies for the performance ofhis department.” In fact, he had “never been as proud” as he was of his officers, who“epitomized what it means to be a professional” (Eichel and Clark 1985a). Incredibly,Sambor said that the dropping of the bomb was a “tactical necessity” and that MOVEstarted the fire themselves to prevent police officers from forcefully entering theirhome (Wolf et al. 1985; Loeb 1985b). In concurrence with Sambor, ManagingDirector Leo Brooks, a career military man and like Goode, also an AfricanAmerican, offered a similar refrain:“primary blame” for the fiery confrontationshould be placed “squarely on the MOVE anarchists,” because they refused tonegotiate and were obsessed with destruction (“Police-command failure worsenedMOVE crisis” 1985).

Reporter, Beth Gitlin, interviewed Philadelphians on the street and found that overall“there were few harsh words for Mayor Goode”; that he had “emerged relativelyuntarnished in the view of those interviewed in the neighborhood outside of WestPhiladelphia” (Gitlin 1985). Interviewees “described Goode as the victim of a tragicaccident, an official who did the best he could.”One woman called “MOVEmembers ‘apack of pigs’ that had to be driven from the neighborhood at any cost” (Gitlin 1985).

Not everyone found MOVE repulsive however. In a more sympathetic account, aWest Philadelphia neighbor offered that though MOVE members were “different and

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Tone of articles by Percentage for May 14

Fig. 3 Tone of articles by percentage for May 14–17

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sometimes behaved strangely,” they were “friendly…nice people…[who] don’t both-er nobody.” This sympathizer believed that the victims were not responsible for theconflict and that the police were “leeches looking for blood” (Torok et al. 1985).Another man asked exasperatingly what MOVE had done “to deserve having theirbabies killed” (McMillan et al. 1985). Reports such as these, however, were theexception, not the rule.

Letters to the editor written by Philadelphians may be indicative of the popularsentiment regarding the bombing of MOVE. Overwhelmingly, they were sympathetictoward the displaced residents, but at the same time condemned MOVE, who hadbeen “a trial and tribulation to their neighbors and a serious problem to the city”(Waldman 1985). One writer, E.C. Guenther criticized municipal officials who calledfor an investigation following the bombing, saying that he would “gladly kick theJoan Scepters in their shins,” because Mayor good was honest and needed the supportof the city. Guenther ended his letter by thanking God “that no city employees died”during the confrontation (Guenther 1985). Another letter from Earl Weldon referredto the MOVE row house as a “combination battle station and garbage dump withunsanitary conditions and an outward show of arms” (Weldon 1985). Weldon saidthat MOVE was to blame since they had “terrorized” their neighbors and armedthemselves before firing upon police, and because of this, they got what theydeserved (Weldon 1985). In one bizarre letter, one writer condemned MOVE forusing procreation as the “most efficient means of providing hostages for future use.”He attributed this behavior to their having a “universal death wish,” hoping to killeveryone (Blythe 1985).

Several letter writers disapproved of the city’s handling of the situation. Few,however, appeared indignant over the deaths of nearly a dozen MOVE members.Most of the critical statements demanded that someone be held accountable for thedestruction of property, not the loss of lives. Tony Errichetti called for the resignationof the mayor and the police commissioner, because of what he believed to be their“blatant political attempt to avoid liability” (Errichetti 1985). Errichetti was “puz-zled” by the public’s lack of outrage over the city’s “paramilitary action” and “lack ofremorse for the MOVE victims” (Errichetti 1985).

In the days following the bombing, police received several phone calls fromconcerned citizens who feared that MOVE members were in their neighborhood.One distraught woman in West Philadelphia called police stating that MOVE wasbuilding another “rooftop fortress” near her home. Police raided the alleged MOVEresidence, only to find a landlord constructing a studio apartment and installing newroofing (Eichel and Clark 1985b; McMillan 1985). The elderly landlord was under-standably agitated with police for busting into his home, but acknowledged heunderstood that “police have to check out these possible MOVE homes” (McMillan1985).

The first news article to reference the deceased MOVE members was a May 15tharticle, three days after the bombing. In this story, incredibly, Goode urged the publicnot to “cry over spilled milk,” and warned them of armed MOVE escapees who fledfrom the scene of the fire through underground tunnels (Eichel and Clark 1985a).When analyzing the news accounts, the authors identified issues that were frequentlymentioned throughout the press coverage and recorded the number of articles thatexplicitly referred to each. Of the 171 articles analyzed, over half (52.6 %) of the

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stories referred to MOVE as threatening or exhibiting abnormal social behavior.Nearly 40 % stated that MOVE had weapons in their possession (see Table 3).Though just over 40 % (40.4 %) of the articles mentioned the category ofinjured or deceased MOVE members, there is no discussion of responsibility forthe carnage left in the wake of the bombing. For example, Eichel and Schogolstated matter of factly, “The events Monday…left at least 11 people dead”;nothing about how these people died or under what circumstances (Eichel &Schogol 1985). About a quarter (23.4 %) of the articles placed blame onMOVE for the fire, the deaths, or both, while only 6.4 % cited any outrageover the deceased and the children that were left without a mother and father.Nearly 8 % (7.6 %) discussed the category of possible MOVE fugitives;10.5 %, MOVE’s animals; 12.3 %, the use of excessive force by police; and12.9 %, MOVE’s members as unsanitary or unhygienic.

Turning our attention to the stories foci, some interesting findings emerge.The focus of a story differs from the issues mentioned in that the focus issimply the story’s main topic. Roughly 26 % of the articles focused on thecategory destruction of property and displaced residents, while only 3 %focused on the outrage expressed over the deaths of eleven MOVE members(see Table 2). Just over 9 % concentrated on MOVE as deviant and dangerous;that is three times the amount that focused on public outrage over the elevendeaths. Not surprisingly, a significant number of stories (20.5 %) focused onthe events leading up to the bombing. Approximately 13 % focused on theaftermath and excavation of the MOVE residence and another 5 % focusedsolely on the MOVE Commission appointed by Mayor Goode. Two percent ofthe coverage focused on the reporters who covered the incident. The threeremaining categories (stories pertaining to the city’s image, the 1978 confron-tation, and holding the city accountable) were the focus of fewer than 2 % ofthe articles with the remaining 14.6 % comprising of articles focusing on

Table 2 Focus of articlesFocus Percentage (no. of

articles)

Destruction of property/displaced residents 25.7 (44)

The events of May 12–13 20.5 (35)

Aftermath/excavation of MOVE residence 12.9 (22)

MOVE as deviant/dangerous 9.4 (16)

MOVE Commission 4.7 (8)

Possible eviction (prior to May 12) 2.9 (5)

Outrage over deaths 2.9 (5)

Reporters who covered the incident 2.3 (4)

City’s image 1.8 (3)

1978 Confrontation 1.2 (2)

Holding the city accountable 1.2 (2)

Other (e.g., history of MOVE, city officials’response to bombing, etc.)

14.6 (25)

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various other topics, such as the history of MOVE, city officials’ response tothe bombing, and Birdie’s reunion with his estranged father (see Table 2).

It was widely reported that police fired a minimum of 10,000 rounds, but only14 % of the articles mentioned that fact while nearly as many articles (12.9 %)commented on the unsanitary conditions of the MOVE home and the members’personal hygienic practices (see Table 3). Nearly a quarter (23.4 %) of the storiesplaced responsibility for the catastrophe solely on MOVE.

Discussion

News accounts as well as official reports confirm that police fired at least 10,000rounds of ammunition; however, “city officials estimated…that about 75 percent ofthe gunfire emanated from the MOVE home” (Marimow 1985), making the claims bycity officials mathematically impossible. It is worth noting that the owner of theMOVE home on Osage Avenue, Louise James, never consented to having anyoneevicted from her property. In fact, her son Frank James Africa was reared in thatresidence before perishing in the blaze that engulfed the dwelling on that fateful day(Williams and Preston 1985). In a press conference following the bombing, DeputyCity Solicitor Barbara S. Gilbert informed the media that Louise James would becharged for the demolition of her home. If, for some reason, she did not or was unableto pay the fee, a lien would be placed against the property. When asked whether theother homeowners would be billed, Gilbert responded, “There’s no intent to lien their

Table 3 Issues mentioned in articlesa

Issue Percentage of articles

Destruction of property/displaced residents 66.7 (114)

Threatening/abnormal social behavior 52.6 (90)

MOVE’s deceased/injured members 40.4 (69)

MOVE allegedly possessing weapons 39.8 (68)

1978 Confrontation 26.9 (46)

Placing blame on MOVE 23.4 (40)

Police discharging their firearms 14.0 (24)

MOVE as unsanitary/unhygienic 12.9 (22)

Excessive police force 12.3 (21)

MOVE’s animals 10.5 (18)

Possible MOVE fugitives 7.6 (13)

Outrage over MOVE deaths 6.4 (11)

a This figure was calculated by taking the total number of articles that mentioned each issue and dividing bythe total number of articles. For example, 114 of the 171 articles collected referenced the destruction ofproperty and displaced residents at least once. We realize that any particular issue may appear multiplestimes in a single article. However, our intention is not to determine the precise number of times each issuewas mentioned over a five month period. Our goal is simply to capture the number of stories that exposedthe reader to each individual topic

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properties for the demolition costs because they were actual victims of the fire.Nothing they did resulted in the fire” (Kaufman 1985b).

Neither police officers nor city officials faced criminal charges following the “forcefuleviction” of the MOVE organization from a home they rightfully occupied (Bowser1989). Ramona Africa, on the other hand, was subsequently charged and convicted ofconspiracy and multiple counts of simple and aggravated assault and served 7 years inprison (Bowser 1989; MOVE 1996). Despite the fact that five children and six adults diedas a result of the bombing, few Philadelphians publicly demanded that the mayor or lawenforcement be held responsible.7 It is possible that news coverage of MOVEand the bombing may have been so impactful that the public was convincedthat MOVE got what it deserved. Consequently, it saw no reason to protest thePhiladelphia Police Department—a department with a legacy of police brutalityagainst Black residents (Collins 1998). One might have thought that such acalamity would have triggered protests and demonstrations within the AfricanAmerican Philadelphia community, but because Philadelphians were inculcatedwith the message that MOVE, including the deceased women and children wereincorrigible villains, no such demonstrations occurred.

Inquirer correspondent BethGitlin’s assessment that Goode emerged from the horrificbombing of MOVE relatively untarnished is not without merit. Indeed, the results of the1987 mayoral election corroborate that fact. When Goode was elected in 1983 becomingthe city’s first African American mayor, he received 97–98 % of the black vote and 23 %of the white vote (Atwater 2010; Kaniss 1995). Two years after the bombing in 1987, heagain won 97 % of the black vote, but with only 18 % of the white vote; a slightly lowerpercentage than what he garnered 4 years earlier (Featherman 1988).

The depiction of MOVE as deviant was essential to cultivating a sense of fearamong Philadelphians; a fear that city officials played upon to justify dropping abomb on a row house in a densely populated Black area that ultimately killed elevenpeople and destroyed two city blocks. The press seemingly did such a fine job ofmolding public opinion about MOVE that the idea that city officials should be heldaccountable for the egregious violation of people’s basic human rights was apparent-ly, for many, never a consideration. The public did not demand that parties be heldresponsible for the horrific tragedy, because the average citizen felt little empathy forMOVE. In order to feel any empathy towards the deceased, Philadelphians wouldhave to relate to the victims on some level; sadly, however, many were unable orunwilling to do so perhaps because of the influence that the press held over them orperhaps because of MOVE’s unconventional lifestyle or the group’s penchant forverbally harassing its neighbors via loudspeakers or bull horns at odd hours of thenight or because in some ways MOVE was undoubtedly a public nuisance.

As demonstrated in the works of Robert Entman and Andrew Rojecki (2001),negative stereotyping of individuals in the news supported by comparisons to whitenormativity, evoke negative emotions toward those subjects. Furthermore, media de-pictions often contain racial messages that shape reader’s emotional responses andunderstanding or misunderstanding of people, places, and events (Entman and Rojecki

7 Following the ruling by the Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, which stated that thechildren’s deaths appeared to be homicides, two grand juries refused to press charges against any lawenforcement or city officials (Bowser 1989; Brown 1986).

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2001). For the most part, MOVE members were depicted as uncouth and ungroomedsavages who were dead-set on waging war with the city’s police force. Absent within thepages of the Philadelphia Inquirer was any substantive discussion of the long ignomin-ious history between Blacks and law enforcement in the city. During Rizzo’s first term(1971–1975) as mayor, in addition to condoning an unwritten policy of police brutalityagainst Blacks that ultimately led to a federal investigation of the Philadelphia PoliceDepartment, Rizzo systematically waged war on the city’s Black leadership. Perhapssome reporters and their editors believed these facts were beside the point.

In Mediating the Message: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, EdwardHerman and Noam Chomsky (1988) explain how media serve to mobilize support forspecial interests. They conclude that “the media serve the ends of a dominant elite,”which exploits the “inequality of . . . power and its multilevel effects on mass mediainterests and choices” (pp. 1–2). Moreover, news is filtered in several ways, includingthe reliance of media sources on information provided by agents of power (governmentofficials, businesses, etc.). Race undoubtedly played a role in the city’s decision to drop abomb on the MOVE home. The group lived in a predominately black, lower middle-class neighborhood where nearly everyone owned his or her own home. It is difficult toimagine, however, that had the same community been predominatelyWhite, a Black (ora White mayor for that matter) and his police department would have handled thissituation in similar fashion. It seems doubtful that the Philadelphia Bomb Disposal Unitwould have dropped an incendiary device containing C-4 plastic explosive, the same C-4 that was utilized in the Vietnam War, on a home containing White children.

Through the use of questionable and often unsubstantiated claims at times aboutguns, tunnels, and the like, news correspondents and municipal officials fostered fearsabout the alleged “urban terrorists” both by “what they play[ed] up and what theyplay[ed] down” (Brownworth 1985; Glassner 1999). Consider an article written byVictoria Brownworth for example. In this particular story, Brownworth concentrates onthe death of Officer James Ramp due to what she calls MOVE’s “lunacy” in the 1978confrontation. She briefly addresses the eleven deceasedMOVEmembers, “whose alienpresence [had] created fear and anger wherever they [had] gone” (Brownworth 1985).Brownworth instructs the audience not to mourn the deaths of the murdered adults ofMOVE because they were “guilty” parties in this conflict with police (Brownworth1985). By focusing on the nine MOVE members, who were convicted of allegedlymurdering an officer while ignoring the militaristic tactics of police, Brownworth bothreinforced negative sentiments toward MOVE that already existed as well as cultivatedsome that may have otherwise lay dormant. Had Brownworth and other reportersdepicted the murdered individuals as human beings—as victims—as opposed to crim-inals or some form of subhuman species, more people throughout the city may havebeen inclined to express sympathy for the loss of eleven lives.

Conclusion

The public’s response to the bombing and the manner in which the police dealt withMOVE, an organization that professed to value all forms of life—both human andanimal—was unusual. Because many Philadelphians (some of whom were Black)lacked empathy with these radical back to nature activists, viewing them as alien

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outsiders rather than fellow citizens, they did not feel compelled to hold the mayor orthe police department accountable for the unprecedented moves that produced sub-stantial amounts of destruction, murder, and mayhem. The decision to bomb theMOVE residence is noteworthy considering other events that occurred weeks earlierin another part of the country. For example, a month before the Philadelphia MOVEbombing, law enforcement in Marion County8, Arkansas raided a compound belong-ing to a “militia-style” white supremacist organization, The Covenant, the Sword andthe Arm of the Lord (CSAL). After years of complaints from neighbors and otherinformants and discovering evidence that the CSAL was harboring illegal weapons,more than 300 officers, including agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation andthe Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, surrounded the compound for threedays demanding that the members of CSAL surrender and handover all illegalweapons in their possession. On April 22, 1985 following a three-day standoff,officers entered the compound, and without incident, seized hundreds of weapons,ammunition, explosives, gold, and thirty gallons of potassium cyanide, which theybelieved the group intended to use to poison the water supply of several major cities.

The CSAL was a well-known terrorist group; police had documented proof andwitnesses that confirmed the organization was harboring weapons and planned toattack an unidentified town. However, no CSAL members lost their lives in the siege.On the other hand, law enforcement had no proof that MOVE possessed illegalweapons, yet ultimately killed eleven Americans (Ford 2012; Strock 1985).

Most social scientists and media scholars agree that attributing readers’ responseto media coverage remains a work in progress. What seems clear in this case,however, is that the press depicted MOVE members as the “other,” an uncivilizedform of subhuman creature that needed to be tamed, thus justifying the actions of thepolice and other city officials; at the same time placing responsibility solely onMOVE and its members. The demonization of MOVE by the press fomented inmany Philadelphians (many of whom were Black) an abhorrence toward the group,that at best, manifested in indifference toward both the survivors of thebombing and the eleven members who were incinerated on that gruesomeday. The media framing of MOVE was seemingly so effective that not onlydid comparatively few Black Philadelphians express outrage over the slaughterof women and children, but many of them, apparently so swayed by the press’sdepiction of MOVE as the “other,” were (according to public opinion polls)induced to exonerate both the mayor and the city’s police department of anyculpability for what is undoubtedly one of the most egregious violations ofAmerican human rights of the past 50 years.

Code Manual

Focus of articles/items:

Displaced residents who lost their homes/destruction of property

The details of May 12-13, 1985

8 The compound was located near Bull Shoals Lake in Marion County in northern Arkansas.

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Aftermath following the bombing/Excavation of bombing site

MOVE being deviant and/or dangerous

The MOVE Commission

Coverage of the possible eviction of MOVE (prior to May 12)

Outrage over MOVE deaths

Reporters who covered the incident

Concerns over the city’s and/or mayor’s image following the bombing

The 1978 confrontation with police/Officer James Ramp

Holding law enforcement/Goode/other officials accountable for their actions

Other

Issues mentioned (at least once) in article:

1978 confrontation in Powelton Village

MOVE possessing weapons/shooting at police

MOVE’s animals

MOVE as unsanitary/unhygienic

Possible MOVE escapees

MOVE being responsible for the bombing/confrontation/fire/deaths, etc.

Deceased/Injured MOVE members

Police shooting

Excessive force by police

Outrage over MOVE deaths

Displaced residents/Destruction of property

MOVE being deviant and/or dangerous

Overall tone of the articles/items:

Favorable: Any story that points only to positive attributes of the MOVEOrganization and/or its members.Somewhat favorable: A story that discusses both favorable and unfavorableattributes of MOVE, but the number of favorable attributes outnumbers theunfavorable attributes.Balanced: Any story that mentions an equal number of positive and negativeattributes of MOVE and/or its members.Neutral: A story that is absent of bias of any kind.

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Somewhat unfavorable: A story that discusses both favorable and unfavorableattributes of MOVE, but the unfavorable attributes outnumber the favorableattributes.Unfavorable: Any story that points out only negative attributes of MOVE.

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