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I .O. 2EC-3590 PKG 15 -Numbers/Reference/Revision: Title: CFCU RETURN PIPING INSIDE CTMT,22lF TEM?. EFFECT

5alui. l ----X Salem 2

Common to Salem 1 & 2

COMPLE'l'ION AND APPPJ::1VAL .

__ Salem 3 (Gas Turbine)

----

Hope Creek

common to Hope Creek & Salem

mpa.rer: EJti.r ?!? s/rJd Date Z-S'-'i7 . ..

Date Peer Reviewer:

Approval:

z-,1-'11

~-~~,....~~-=------ oate ?..j3-o/q7 ~af ety Evaluation No •.

SORC Review:

G.M Appl:ovo.l;

'1')-l'2.'f Date .a/z.8/f;

~~tu.;:"-L......t...~~~=:::::;---- Date 2f Il:/"ff-Safety Evaluation and associated documentation sent to Offsi~e Safety Review (CSR):

~~~"" t~r.' LJ£J?Sh.,_ Date: 2/Z8./.t 7 .. . o r r ·

Nuclear Common. (~-----,9=7=0;;-;;;5;;;3~0;00;-6i.8~9~7ir0~5~2~7=~_ ---~\\

\'

PDR ADOCK 05000272 p PD~, I

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.1.0 10 CFR 50.59 AppJ..i~ability Review - 10 CFR 50.59 applies becau•e:

1.1 The proposal changes the fa~ility as des~ribed in the SAK ..

YES X NO

Bxplai~! . The maximum rated temperature for the discharge piping on the CFCUs has been revised from 191°F to 221°F. This requires a revision to the UFSAR, S.ec:tion 6. 2. 2. 2. A justification is required to show that pipe stress, pipe supports, piping components, I&C components, and Penetration Seals will continue to function as design~d for the increase in temperature. A discussion of the impact of the 221°F piping temperature on the room environment and High Energy piping classification is also required. Section 3.1 provides a detailed discussion of.chis Change Package and its proposed changes.

1~2 The proposal chm:Lges p~ocedures as described in the SAR.

YES NO x

Explain: This Change ~ackage does not impacc any procedures described or otherwise referenced in the UFSAR, including the Artificial Island.:Smergency Plan or Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

1.3 The proposal involves a test or experiment not described iD tbe SAit •

YES NO x

Bxplain: this proposal does not involve a test or experiment. Therefore, this Change Package does not involve a test or experiment not aeecribed in the SAR.

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I .D. 2EC-3590' PKG 15 · Numbers/Reference/Revision: Title: CFCU RETURN PIPINGJNSipE CIMT.2:21F 'fEMP. EFFECT

2.0 kICSl!SIHG BASIS DOctJMEN'l'A~?ON

: 2. l tJFSAR BEVISI.ON DETEJUaNATION - Poea the proposal :r:equ.ire a tJPSAll change?

YES X NO

TJFSAR Change Notice No.

2.2 TECHHZCAL SPECIFICATION REVISION OE'I'ERMINA~ION - Does the proposal ~equire a ~echz::i.ical Specif icatio~ change?

YES NO x

If a change_ is required, STOP. contact Nuclear Licensing -for assistance in preparation of a License Change Request:.

Identify the pertinent Technical Specification sections chat were reviewed to make the determina~ion:

ESF Actuation System Ins'trurnentation 3/4.3.2 B3/4.3.2 3/4.4.10 B.3/4.4.10 3/4......6.2.2 B3/4.6.2.2 3/4.6 .. 2.3 BJ/4·. 6. 2. 3 3/4.7.4 B3/4.7.4 5.2

Bases- ESF Actuation System Inst:rumentaL1on ASME Code Piping Bases- ASME Code ·Piping Containment Integrity Bases-Containment Integrity Containment Cooling System Bases-Containment Cooling System Service Water System Bases-Service Water system Containment Configuration

The proposed modifications (modification of five pipe suppores inside Containment, UFSAR Change to reflect 221°F pipe fluid temperature) do· not affect the Technical Specifications, .no~-do they r-equi,re a. Technical specification Change.

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. I .I). 2EC-3590 PKG :J...2. · Jlllumbers/.t<.eference/R.evision: · Title: ~PIPING INSIDE .C~F TEMP. EFfECT

3 • o psso:u11r:c01!

J.l Descril>e the modif~cation or activity being evaluated and :I.ts expec:ted ef·fe~ta.

The &cope of thi~ Safety Evaluation ia a• follows=

l.) :Oocument the piping ;reG.Ll~ly~is inc,;J..utii.i:1c:! pipe suppcrts and structural steel and concrete related to the Containment CFCU Discnarge piping from the discharge nozzle of the CFetrs to the Containment wall for the increase in temperature to 221°P (see calc S~C-CEV-t"lDC-1637 cc MS03) • The reanlaysis reeulted in five pipe suppo~t mQditications.

2.) Reconciliation cf piping components {valves, internals,· actuators) , I&C CotttJ:'onents, and Penetration seals to determine i! they will continue to. function as designed for t:he 221°F temperature. Diiscuss ~lle impa.~t: o.C Lbe 22l"F piping temperat'IJ.re on the room envirc>nment and High ~ergy piping classification.

3) Address ,the Configuration Baseline Document (CBD), Piping Specifiaacion, UFSAR, and Service Water T~c:c'mQl Modes Evaluation, through Change Documents (CDs) included in this DCP.

The S~l-em Service Water System can be oper~ted in a va~iety of configurations, depending on the cooling supply needs of the <.:ontainm.:i:i.t, the Auxiliary Bui.lding cooling loads ar...d the Turbine Building cooling loads. Immed~ately following a Lo~s Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) concurrent with a T,nf.1a Of Off!Jite Power (LOOP) , the SW system is configu:ed. to automatically isolate the Turbine Building leads and the Component Cooling Ht!i:ll.. Exche:mger (CCHX) . This· ~orces the SW tlow to the· CFCO's and to the EDG's which are required early in the injection phase of an accid~nt. Later in the accident 9equ.en~e ene CCHX is brought back into service by the operators in . preparatic~ for the r~circulation phas~. through procedures.

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I.D. Numbers/Reference/Revision;

A,EC-3590 PK{] 1,.2. -

Title~ CFCU P..'.gTIJRN PIPING INSIDE CTMIHJ21F TEMP. ~FF:SCT

Following the LOCA or MSLB signal concurrent with a LOO~, the CFct1 SW2.23 eontrol valves rm.urt open to the high •ervice wat·er flow position, the 21 ~ 23SW20 and SW26 valves (which control flow 1.v ·c.he Turtline Bulltl.Lu~) 'nu1:1t:. close and 1:.lJ.t:? SW122 va.l ves (which control flow to the component cooling wat::er heat exchangers) must close. The timing of these changes is critical to assuring the CFCU's will be fully operational at th.e desired time following the event. If a SW pump is out for maintenance

' . '

when the event occurs and the other pump on that buo f ~ila to start, there may only be two SW pumps supplying both SW headers. ~or these conditions, unless the Turo1ne Su1ld1ng and ~~Wt. heat · loads are isolated, it is possible the CFCU SW discharge. pressure may be low, possibly below atmospheric pressure. rhe temperature of the SW leaving the CFCU' s (return piping) may bP. i'IF.i hj.gh a.c:i

19l°F for the zero fouling case, or as high as 221°F if the SW223 ~on~rcller fails co set Che valve pos1c1on co the high flow rate and the flow remains at the normal flow rate. At the higher temperature of 221°F, no significant amount of calcium carbonate pr~cipitation on heat exchanger aurfacea will occur, and therefore no subsequent plugging of fan coolers is expected.

The Service Water return piping for the CFCU's has-been re­evaluated for the postulated, ''one time event", temperature of 221°F. The boundary for the piping analysis of this Change Package consists of the plplng !rom the aischarge of the 21,22,23,24,25 CFCU to the structu~al anchor at Elevation 130' (one stress calculation per CFCU) and from the structural anchor at Elevation 130' to the Containment Wall (one stress calculatinn per CFCUJ -for a maximum of ten stress calculations. Pipi._ng anAlysis for the 221°f' ,lJl!rl~ rluid ternpe:rature frdm 'the CTM'I' wall anchor through the Penetration Area to the Service Water Valve Rooms is documented in OCP 2EC-3590 PKGs 4&5. The documentation for the 221°F CFCU dischArge pipe fluid temperature ia found in Mechanical Group Calculation S-C-CEV-MOC-l637 (CD MSOJ). Although

. on1y one C.:1''C.:U Return pipe need.e to ce postulated at 221 gp (one single failure), all stress calculations were analyzed for the higher temperature. Pipe support structures con~aining more.than on•·CFCU ~eturn pipe, umed the 221aF tcmperQturc thermal load

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·Title; CFCO RETURN PIPDiG__lN~~D~ C'IMT.221F TE~P. EFFECT

trom one of tha pipes and 195°F cemperature cherma.1 loads tor che .remaining pipes, since only one CFCU Return pipe is postulated to be at 221°F. In addition to the ten large bore stress

. calculatione, .five small bore •tress caloulaticns were rco.n~lyzcd ·for the temperature increa~e to 221°F using revised end-point ·displacements from the decoupled main header piping. The stress calculations load.cases included deadweight, thermal, and

· seismic. The piping analysis was performed in accordance with ND.DE-PS.ZZ-0007 (Q) PSE&.G Pr~rammatic Standa~o fo~ Pipe Stress

'Analysis and ND.DErPS.ZZ-0023(Q) PSE&.G Programmatic Standard for Pipe Support Oeeign. This Design Change PackQ~e proposes to modify five pipe supports to restore the supports ta design.ba~i~ stress limits committed to in UFSAR 3.9.2 and 3.9.3. The supports are located on that porcion ot the SW system that is classified as Safety Related, Seismic Class I and Nuclear Class III (piping specification 27G) . The modific~tionc ·to the supports do not reduce the load carrying capabilities of the eupport.s while tney are being mod1t1ed. There!ore, chis LJC~ can be implemented while the SW system is ope~a~le. The modified supports are designed per the requirements of ANSI. EJl.1 and will be installed per the requirements of ANSI ~~1 .7.

LOads imposed on Civil ~tructur~l steel have been ~ornpdL~~ to the threshold levels contained in Technical Standard SC.PE­·i.·r:;.:.G:t;-420:L(Q), 'Salem Structural Design Criteria'. As a result, the structural steel beams located in the Containment Build~ng between elevations 130'-0" and 100'-0" were analyzed for revised pipe support loads due to incraased temperatures on the Fan Coil piping. The steel beams are adequate for the given loads and the integriey of the 1::3L.c:ut,;Lu..t·~ J.r:s me:dnti:lined.

The structural steel beams located in the Containment Building between elevations 100'-0# and 78'-on {commonly referred ~n ~~ the· annular steel) were analyzed for the revised pipe support leads due tc increased t~craturo~ on the Fan Coil pip~ng. The steel b@ama are adequate for .the given loades and the integrity of the struc~ure is ma1ncaineQ.

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I.D. 2EC·3590 PKG 15 Numbers/Reference/Revision: Title: C?CU RETURN PI'QINa TN'S:IpE CTMT,. 2.21F TEMP. IZFFECT

2) RECOlfC~Lh.AT~Ql(

Valyes

All valves and related components have been reviewed (see section 3.0 Dco:i.gn Analyoio) to d.:term'ine if they will continue co function as designed if the piping fluid reaches the 221°F temperatur!= for a maximum duration of one hour.· This is .ba.seci u~on recent PSB&G single failure analysis, the CFCU fluid discharge temperature drops to appro~imately l85°F in one hour ('see ca.le s-c-csv-MDC~l6:37 CD MS03) • The engine~.c:ing review included all valves and related components from the discharge of the CFctrs to the containment wall, from the containment wall · -through the pATI~r.r.~tinM ~r~~ 8nd valve rooms to the 24"0 ma.in header. The review demonstrated that the valves, internals, a.nd actua.tors will c::ontinue to functlu;u at:1 def;ligned for th.e cond.iticn of a 221°F pipe fluid temperature aa previously deecri~ed.

I&C Compgnente

The I&C ~omponente were reviewed to determine if they will continue to function as designed if the piping reaohes the 221~F temperature reviewed (see section 3.0 Design Analysis). ~~~~n upon review, it was deterrr~ned that the majority of I&C components were unaffected ~y the temperatur= in~rea~e. nowevei, the followi~g I&C ~omponents required further discussion:

• Temperature instrumentatio.n TA-5489, TA-5494, TA.-t:;Ci04, .and TA-. -5509 and their associated transmitters have a range of o~ 200°P. Sin~e the simul~L~Q rise in temperacure is ot short duration (max time of 1 hour) and the probability of occurrence is minimal (LOCA or MSLS required), ·no changes to the instrumentation is recommended. Under the i.nt'!T"lilll!l'ilRFH?

temperature condition the indicators will hit upscale and come back to ncrm.Ql reading when the temperature d~~L~~~~~. No damage to the instrumencation is expected. Since the temperature indicators listed above do not affect operation of the Service Water system, their loss of temperature indi~ation is acceptable. ·

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2• E[FECT

• Flow orifiC'e plates F-~15~,F-31G4.F-liGS,F-3l7l, and P-3175, are affec::~ed by the inc:reaeed temperature. .However, since the temperature increase is J.ess than 200°F the impact an the accuracy of these orifice pla~es would be les~ than a tenth of a percent which is considered negligible, an~ cherefore ac:iC'eptable.

• Kad1at1on Monitors RA-98~1,tl.A~ij~i, ancl KA-~~~~, have a temperature limit of l30°F which has been confirmed by the vendor. The limitation is tbe detector operating temperature. Under the inareaeed service water temperature there io o

·potential for these monitors to become damaged. These monitors are Techni~al 5pec1!1cacion Items and are theretore • required to function. These ra.d monitors were not qualified for the previous maximum temperatures of l60°F or the 195°F CI='CU !'Ze;c-c foulina ca.Se. 'I'herefQre r an AR~ 970122193 Waril assigned the task of tracking all issues regarding these rad mo11..i.L.u.c uun-co.t1.for1u4.m.a:u:i. No more at:tions within Chis pack:age are required.

Penetration Seal.s

Penetrati9n Seals materials were reviewed to determine if chey will continue co func~ion as Qesigned if the piping t!uia reaches the 221°F. The Pen $eal review included all penetrations from the discharge of the CFctl's to the containment wall( five oont~imncnt pcnetrationc), from.Che containment wall through ch~ penetration area and valve rooms ( five boot style penetrations N-2~43~l0, N-2S4J~-Ul4, N-25439-005, N-25439-008, N-25439-012, one grout@d penetration W-25438-028 (wall anchor)), and two embedded penetrations (wall anchors) exiting the Aux building to th@ undA'r'g'n:rund yarrl piving. ThQ boot A~yle penetration aeal_

material i~ designed for a temperature of 390°P, and is .acceptable. The remaining penetrations are acceptable s~nce the 221°F temperature has no effect on the structural properties of ehe concrete or grout. The concrete will be locally exposed to heat for a ghort period of time. The incident iQ regarded aa a ~one time event~ that may occur for a period of one hour. Based upon recent PSE&G slngle failure analysis the pip@ fluid temperature drops to approximately l8S 0 in one hour Csee calc NUclear Commo~ Rev. 5

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: s-c-CBV-MDC-1637 CD MS03}. Therefore, the risk of local ·deterioration of the c:cmcrete is considered insignificant.

·ROOM ENVTRO?:l.MlgJ1' /HIGH ENERGY PI};>ING

1 High Energy piping criceria for Salem Unit 2 is defined as piping whooe tempe:rature exceeds ~00°F or whose p~essure exceeds 275 psig during_norma.1 reactor operation (UFSAR 3.6.4.3.2). Since the 22laF fluid temperature only occurs during a poatulatea single failure f'ollowing a LOCA or MSLB (a faulted. plant condition) concurrent wich a LOOP, the 221°F pipe fluid temperature does not reela.asify the Service Water piping ~&5 IIi9h Energy Piping.

Based on the temperature protile in tne anaiysis for the present ~icensing aasia LOCA, the containment air temperature after 3500 seconds (i.e. approx. 58 minutes ) was 223aF (Westinghouse calc SECL ~6 17S,~SE~C ~6 ·740). UQing the Qpproved PS~&G G~09-1J c~cu heat: transfer model and the same methodology as Calc:ulacion s-c­CBV-MDC-16J7 (CD M~OJJ, this would result in an estimated CFCU SW fluid outlet temperature less than 200°F (i.e. 185°F). This short term temperature spike will have negligible impact on the tempcr~turc of the environment ~nd will not exoee~ the temperatures ataced in the Salem Generating station Environmental J.lesign Criteria (S-C-ZZ-SDC-J.4 :.L~) •

Change 09cuments {CDs) for the Service Water CBD (DE-CB.SW-0047), UFSAR, Pi~ing Specification (S~C·MPCO-MGS-000l-SPS27), Thermal Modes Evaluation (S-C-ZZ-M::eE-0784) are included in Section 15 of thiG Cha~a Packaga.

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I.D. 2EC-:3590 PKG 15 ·~urilbe~s/Reterence/~evieion;. Title: ~ :E'IPI...NG !NSI'QE CTMT.22JF TEMP. EFFECT

3.2 %dentify tb.e param.ete~s &D.d. ay~tems affe~ted by the ~haDge.

The primary system being af f ec~ed by the proposed change is the Service Water System. The CFCT.1 return piping from ~he.discharge of the CPctJa to the CTMT wall warQ rQanaly~ed for the inoreaDe in pipe fluid temperature of 221°F. Five pipe supports are being moditied inside Containment ~o restore the pipe supports to design bas~s stress limits committed to in UFSAR Sections 3.9.2 and 3.9.3. tJFSAR Change Notice _!7-aZA documents the revision to th~ U'FS.AR t•xt to ref l~et the maximum SW Outlet temperature change from l91aF to 22laF. UFSAR Change Notice No. 96-143 documented the 191°F CFCU zero-fouling temperacure. Piping components such as valves, valve internals, actuators, I&:C

·Components, and Penetration Seals are all affected. by the pipe fluid terriperature increase and muot be evaluated ~o determine if they will continue to function as designed for the 221°F temperature. In addition the impact of the 221°F piping temperature on the room envir~TimAnt: ~Tin B':igh. Energy piping classification must be evaluated.

3.3 l~tify the c~edible failure modes associated with the change.

Piping, pipe euppo~ts, and structural member~ along with piping components such as valves, valve internals, actuators, I&C components, and penecracion seals are all potentially affected by the pipe fluid temperature increase and must continue co function as designed for the 22l°F temperature. In addition, pgtential rcom temperature increases must be maintained below wharsh envircnmentw criteria in prcter to guarantee concinued operation of all equipmenc: in tho'se rooms. This OCP documents th~ough calculations and ~ngineering reviews that no credible failure mcdP.Sll .:.r~ i nf".rodl.1t:oed throucrh implementation of chis proposal.

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- •Title: CFCU RE:;rtlRN PIPUJG· INS.IDE CTMT. 2 21F "TEMP. RFFEC1,

3 .ii Pz:ovide refexencea ··tg J.;gcat.igu of iu:fgrmat.ioJ:1. used ior the Safej:y. llvaluatien •.

a). Re-viewed sections of the UFSAR are listed below: J.C Design of Structure, Components,· Equipment 3 . 5 ·. · Misaile Protect ion . . · ' 3. 4 · water Level (Flood) Design 3. t5

'3 .• 6.~ .. 3 3.6.5.10· 3.7

Ji'roL.~ction ·Against.· Oyn.amic E~.Cec.;r..i:s A111H:JC(;iated With the ·Postulated Ruptµre of Pipillg' High Energy Piping System Outside Containment 9rotec~ion Against·steam Flooding ~e:Lsmic Design

3. S. :L. 6. S Peneer.a.eions Arid Openings 3.9 : Mechanical System and Components

. 3. s:. 2 ASME Coc!.e Class 2 and. l ·Components · 3. 9. l. Seismic Analysis of .AS.;Eh1ilt Safety. Related Piping·. J.li Bnvironmental Design of Mechanical And Electrical

Equipment. · s. 2 .1. s .13 Accident conditions .

6 .. 2 • 2 • 2 Con.ta.inrnent ·i:'cm · Cccling Symt:ei:n

6.3 SCCS · · 6. 3 . 1.1 Range of Reactor Coolant. Ruptures and Leaks 6.J.2.11 System Reliability

·7.4 Systems .Required for Safe Shutdown. 7.5 Safety Related Oisplay Inst:-Umentation a .3 · . ori.site Power Systems · · 9.Z.l Servic~ W~~~~ Sy~tem

9.4.2 Auxiliary Building Ventilation System l3.5 -Plant Procedures

:. 15 A.coident ·Analysis 15.2 Ccndition II Faults of Moderate Frequency 15 .J .. 15.4

Infxe<Jl.lent Paulta ccndition IV Liimit:ing· Faults

b). CPCU Design capacity s-c-cav-·Mric-1637 Rev. lIRO · . '

c) • Salem Generating Station EnvironntQntal Cesign C::riteria S-C-ZZ-SDC-1419

d). Westinghouse ·calculation SECL-96-l78, .PSB&G-96-740

~-S· Other ~isC!uesion, if applicable. None.

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I.D. 2EC-3590 PI(G 15 , Numbcrs/Re£erence/Revieion; Title: CFCU RBTURlj PIPING INSJPE CIMT. 221F TEMP .. EFFECT

4 • 0 USO PIDRllt]'.D'l"I.oN - 1:1!!1 R.25. t1nr~iewied Saf'a~y Qucu:it:io:a. ('C'SQ) involved?

NO.

4.1 Which 1U1.ticipaced operational transients or postulated de•ign ba•ia aocidanta p~cvioua1y cv~iu~ted ~n the SAR are ~onsi~ered applicable to the proposal?

Condition II,III, and IV events are discussed in the tJFSAR Sections 15.1 through 15.4 are considered applicable to this proposal since the SAR .analysis ali.F111tru=11=1 that 'Che sw System is available to mitigate the ~onsequences of these events. 'l'hillJ ~ropcoal io intended to bring the SW sy5tem in conformance with the SAR accident analysis. Therefore, none of these ancicipated operational transiencs or postulated design basis accidents are cons~dered applicable to this proposal.

4. 2 ~ Che proposal•

a. Increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the SAB.?

YES NO x ---DI:SCtJSSXOli:

The Service Water System is an accident mitigator and not an aC?c:id1tn.t':. initiator. The proposed modifications incrco..ac the reliability' of the SW system for the CFCUs during and following design bai;sii:s accidents. Tl1:rcugh the reanal.ysis o! the piping system, the piping, pipe supports (with five modifications}, and the structural steel are proven adequate for the loadings imposed duz-ing the design basis accident~ an~Jyzed, The piping corriPonenee Cvalv@~. internals, actuators), I&C Components, and penet~ation seals will continue to function a.s designed if t.h~ piping fluid reaches the maximum temperature of 22l°F calculated for the CFCU Return piping during a LOCA/MSLB concurrent with a_ LOOP and··a Single Active Fa,ilure of ·the SW223 Valve to fail in its normal Nuclear CQJZIDIOn Rev. 5

~ROM PSE&G RESTART ENGINEERIN~ (TUE) 05. 20' 97 15:.T. 15:01/NO. 3561445305 P 14 ' . '

FORM NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0059·3 10 CFR 50 .59 SAFETY 2VAL'O'A'1'XON

Page 'l of .2. 0

Re1r.ision o

I.D. 2EC-3590, PKG 15 _ Numb'ers/R.eference/Revision: Title: CFCU RETQRN_PI_i>_JNG INSipE CTMT. :UlF TEMP. EFEECT

flow position. The potential for system failure is decreased through the implementation of this Design Change Package. Therefore, the implementation of this proposal will not increase the proba~ility of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.

b. Increase the c:cinsequenc:e• of an acciden.t previoualy evaluated in the SAX?

YES NO x

D::CSCIJSSlO!I':

The proposed i;nodifications will not change, degrade, or prevent actions descri~ed or assumed in the accident analyses described in the SAR. The increase in the Service Water CFCU discharge temperature to 22laF is the result of an accident and not an input to an accident. The accident analyses assume· the SW system is operable following an accident. The proposed modifications increase the reliability of those assumptions by preventing undesired loadings which could damage the SW·piping or its supporting structure.. Therefore, the proposed ch~ges do not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.

4.3 What malfunctions 0£ equipment important t;.g safety that were previous1y evaluated in the SAR. are ccnsidered app1ieable to the proposal?

The following is a list of equipment malfunctions consi~red for the SW system:

• CFCU• fans fail to start • SW pumps fail to start • Automatic valves fail to open • . Rupture of the SW piping in the EDG area • Rupture of a nuclear supply header downstream of the

tie valves' in the Aux Bldg. • Failure of a 21&23SW20 or SW26 valve to close .Nuclear Common Rev. 5

:TUE)05. 20' 97 15:0 •. 15;01/NO. 3501445305 F 15 '

. F'R91l ~S"E~G RESTART 1NGINEERIN.

' PORM NC.l!Q.-AP.ZZ~OOS~-J 10 C:FR .50. 59 SA.FliTY J:V,A.XrtJA'l'J:OR

Page 14 of~ Revisiczt. 0

I .D. 2EC-J590 I?XG 15 NumbertJ/lt~.C~.r:~nr.:e/R!ii!vision:

Title: CFCU::zRETURN PIEING !NSIPE CTMI. 22 lf' TEMP. ?Ef!CT

• Ruptur= of ~ melin yCLrd euppl:t 11t:sacie2:

• Rupture of a SW pipe inside containment

The rupt'.11-r.P. pf a SW pipe in.51idA t"!ont:::a i nmPn.t. is applicable to this proposal.

4.4 lf§J! the p~apcaal:

a. Increase the probal:lility of oc:c:urrence of a :malf1m.ction Qf equipment important 1:.o pa£pty previously evaluated in the SAR.?

YES NO x ---DI'.SC!USSION~

The Service Water retu:i.-n piping fP.r. 1..h~ CFCU'~ ha.s been re­evaluated for the postulated, "one time event", temperature of 221°F. The re~valuation of the piping did.not rec:;cuire High Energy piping analygie f!VP.:n tnotlgh t:hP. tP.mpt;!rature of the piping exc:eeda ·

200°F, since High Energy Pipe crite~ia requires the piping to exceed 2oowF.or 275 psig during normal reactor operation (UFSAR 3.6.4.3.2}. The 22l°F fluid temperature (see c:al~ ~-r'-rJ=W-MDC-1637 CD MS03) only occurs during a postulated single failure follcwing A LOCA or MSLD {a faulted pla~t c~ndition) concur~ent

with a LOOP. The boundary for the piping analysis (includes piping, pipe support and. struct~ral elements) of this Change J?ackage_c:onsists of the piping· from the discharqe of the 21,22,23,,24,25 CFCU to the atruccural anchor at Elevation l30' •nd from the structural anchor at Elevation llO' to the Containment Wall. This Design Change Package proposes to modify !!v~ pipe ~upports to restore tne supports co ~esign basis scress limits committed to in UFSAR 3.9.2 and 3.9.3.

Engineering reviews were performed on all valveA (v~Jve related componenca such as valve internals, actuators), penetration eca.la, I&.C component:.e, eLnci room environmente, to a.etermine c.lle potential impa~t of the 221a~ pipe fluid temperature on their function. Included, were all valves and their components; · penetration seals, I~C componencs, and room environments Nuclear Common Rev. s

. FROM- ~SE&,G RESTART ENGINEERI. :TUE) 05. 20' 97 15: .T. 15: 01/NO. 850 ! 445305 P l G

romc N'C.RA•Al.ZZ-0059-3 .• .

10 CFR 50.59 SAFE'l"Y EVALOATJ:OR' Pa.ge 1~-· _ of ..z.c._

Revision 0

I.D. 2EC-J590 Pl(G 15 Numbers/Reference/Revision: Title: c~ PIPING INSIDE CTM'l'.221F TEMP. EFFECT

.following the piping from the d~s~harge cf the CFCUs tc the :coptainment wall, from.the containment wall through the penetration area and valve rooms to the 24"0 main header. Eased upon T"P.~P.nt PSE&G single failure a.nalysisi, t':h~ <"!'J:'r.tT f 1 u:i ti discharge temperature drops from 22l°F to approximately lBS~F in

·one· hour (see calc s-C-CBV-MOC-15J7 co M503). The engineertng reviews document that the valves (valve related components such as valve internals, actuators), and penetration seals, and room environments will oontinue to fun~tion as designed for the 22l~F pipe fluid temperature condition previously described. The 111.d.jo.rity cf I&C components wel;e t.ma.ffected by Lht:i t.~mp~rg,1..1.1..n~

increase. However, four temperature transmitters, four flow orifices, and three rad monitors require further discussion. Under the increa~ed temperature condition, four tempe~ature indicators and their associated transmitte~s TA·5489,TA-5494, TA-5504, and TA-5509, having a range cf 0-2.00°F, will h.iL U£.Jl:lt:t:ih~ and come back to· a normal reading when the temperature decreases. No damage to the instrumentation is ~xpected. Since the simulated ~ise in temperature ia of short duration (max time of 1 hour) , the probability of occurrence is miriimal (LOCA or MSLB is re~ired concur~ent with a LOOP)t and the temperature indic~eor3 listed above do not affect operation of the Service Water system, their loss o! temperature indication is accepcable. ~our flow orifice plates F-3l59,F-3l64,F-3168,P-3171, an~ F-3175, are affected by the Jncreased temperature. However, since the temperature increase is leQQ than 200°F.the impact on the accuracy of these ozif ice plates i~ less than a tenth of a percent which is considered negligible, and. therefore acceptable. Radiation Monitors RA-98Sl,RA9852, and RA-9853, have a temperature limit of 130°F which has been confirmed by the vendor. The limitation ia the detector operating temperature. Under the increased service water temperature there is a fl\JL~!J.l...i.i:Ll £c;L· L.l.i.e1:u~ 1nuni tcrs to become damaged.. 'Ihese moni ~ors are Technical Specifi,cation Items and are therefore required to function as designed ·during accident conditions. These rad monitors were not qualified for the previous maximum temperatures of l60°F or the 195°F CFCU' zero fouling case. Therefore, an. AR# '70122193 wars a.1!!11!li9ned L.1.i.t: task of tracking all issues regarcU:ng these rad monitor non-conformances. No more actions within this package are required.

Nuclear Co111111C1n Rev. 5

. FR91l ?·E~G RESTA~.T ENGINEERI. :TUE) 05. 20' 97 15: .T. 15: 0 I/NO. 3561445805 P 17

FORJIJ RC!.HA-AP.ZZ-0059-3 ..

. lQ Ci'R 50 • !5i9 SAPBTY ZVALlJA'l':COH' P&g"e J w of ..1.£..._

Revi•ion. O

I.D. 2EC-3590 PKG 15 Numbers/Ref~rence/ReYi~ion:

'I'itle: CFCtJ RETURNJIPING INS.kDE CTMt.22lP TEMP. Ef'fECT

··The prob~bi1ity of occurr~n~e of a rupturP. ~fa SW pipe inside Containment is not increased since the piping, pipe supports, and

. stru.ctura.l mentbe.r5 have been eva.lu.ated f c:>r tJ;le increase i!l loa.d /stresses due to the increase in maximum pipe fluid temperature,

'and. alJ. ~aluations with the inclusion o:t the five pipe supports modifications meet original design basis criteria. 'The proposed pipe support modifications increa~e the reliability of the SW syatem during des1gn basis ac~idents. Tne engineering Qvaluations document the ability of the equipment valves , I&C components, penetration seals r.o perform thei:r intended design fui~c.:Llc.m1;1 i;1.l.. the increased temperat~re. Therefore, this proposal does not increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated.in the SAR.

b. :t:a.csrease t:ha c:oz:a.aaCJUe!loes of a. =alfuzz.ctio:a. o:E equipment important to safety previausly evaluated 1n the :IAR?

YES NO x

:C:tSC'C'SS:tONz

The proposed modifications will not alter any assumptions previously made in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident described in the SAR. The analyses described in the SAR include assumptions that the SW system maintains th.e containment within its design basi~ temperature and pressure limits following an accident. This assures chat tha ccnca1nmenc will !unction eftec~ively as a barrier to limit the radiological exposure of the operators in the control-room and the pul::>lic. The proposed modifications increase the reliability of the SW s:iy~t'-~m duri.ng ~nci following·deeign basis accidents.

Nuclear Common Rev. 5

. FRQM. ~SE&,G RESTART EN~INEERH. :TUE) 05. 20' 97 15: l.T. 15: 0 !/NO. 356: 44~·305 P 18

PORM NC.JO.-AP.ZZ~0059-3 . ..

!.D.

10 Cl'R. sro. 59 SAnl'n' ~AL'Cl\TXQH Page 11 of Z.o

R.eviaion O

2EC-3590 PKG l5 Nu.mbers/Ref erence/Revision: Title: CFJ:ll RETmUi..lll?ING INSIDE CTMT, 221F l'EMP. EFFECT

4.5 bZ th.a propo.11alt

a. Create the possibility cf fill accidant o' a d.1tterent: ~ frcnn any previcu~ly evaluated in the SAR?

YES NO x ---I>ISC'CJ'SSION:

The. proposed modifications will be performed usinq design criteria, material requirements, construction standards, inspection technic;rues and testing methods whioh are in accord.a.nee with l?SE&G standards. The proposed modifications will not ·change, u.~!:l.c.aut;: <.J.r: p~·f:lvf:l.tlL cs.t,.;L.luu~ c.lt:~c;;ribt::u {,,lr a::isumed in t.he a.c:c1c1em: 2lll.alyses described in the SAR.. The accident analyses assume the SW system is operable. The propose~ modifications increase the reliability of the SW system during and following design basis acc~dents. Ther@fore, the proposed changes do not create the pceeibility of an accident of a diffc:r-cnt type from any previously analy~ed in the SAR.

Q. c~eate the possibility of a malfunct:i.on of a gigEerent t~e from any previously Q~aluated in the SAR?

NO x

DISCUSSION:

The proposed modifications will not change, degrade or prevent 4ctions described or assumed in che ac=ident analy5es de~~Liu~~ in the SAR. The accident analyses assume the SW system is operable. The p~oposea modifications increase the reliability of those assumptions by analy~ing the pipinq, pipe supports and structural seeel for higher thermal loads due to the 22i•F pipe fluid temperature. The proposed chAnges do not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type from any previously evaluated. in the SAR.

Nuclear Common Rev. 5

. F~01t fS·E~G RESTART ENGINEERH. . . .. :TUE)05. 20'97 15:.T.15:01/NO. 3561445305 P 19

PO:RM NC.1Q'A~AP.ZZ~0059-3 :LO CJ'Jl !50. S9 ilAJ'J2'l'Y EVALtrA'l':Z:CH ·

Page Jf of~

Revision O

I.D. 2EC-359J) PKG 15 . Numbers/Reference/Revision: Title: CFCU RETURN PIPING INSIDE C'fMT.22lF TEMP. EFFECT

4.6 ~ the proposal reduce the margin of &afety a• defined iA the ba•i• for iil.l:l.Y Technical Specificac~ons?

YES NO x

Discuss the bases for the determinations and identify the pert~nent Tecl:mical. Spec1t1aat1on aect:i.ons that were reviewed to make the determination (~se cc~tinuaticm. sheets _if requ.ired).

The proposed modifications bring the SW system into conform.a.nee with :i:-elia:bility of che SW syst;~m. cu:u:1utned in che Safety and Accident analyses and the appl~ca.ble Technical Specifications. The proposed modifications do not change any SW ~ystem acceptance criteria of the function of the SW system.

The applicable Technical Specification sections are:

3/4.3.2 3.4.4.10 3.4.6.2.2 3/4.6.2.J ~/4.7.4

5.2

ESP Actuation System Inst.rumentation ASME Code Piping Containment Integrity Containment Cooling System Service ~~ter sy8t~m containmenc Conf.iguration

The-Proposed modifications do not affect the margin of safety for any of these specifications.

Ruc:lear Common Rev. S

. FRPM· ~S-E&,G RESTART ENGINEER!. ,.

:TUE) 05. 20' 9i 15: .T. 15: 0 l/NO. 3501445305 P 20

1011M NC.N'A·AP.ZZ-0059-3

I.D.

:10 =n. 50.59 S~ BVaLtrA'tl:ON' Page -1.:i...- of ~

Revision O

2EC-3590 PKG 15 Nu.rnbeL·1:1/Re[e;r:ence/Reviei~:m:

Title: <rf~EnJRN PI?!NG INSIDE cnrr.22iF TEM:PJ EFF§CT

5.0 1.D~ 50.§9(~) (2) R92o~t P:av:Lde.a :br:J.af description of the chsnge and a summary of th& S~fety Bvaluat~g~.

This OCP performs piping analysis to incorporate th:e increased pipe temperature of 221°F du~ to a LOCA./MSLS ocncurrent with a LOOP and a single active failure of a SW223 valve to reposition itself in the ncrmal .Clow .t'i;ll.~ ~1:1ltlon lut::iL~i:ld of t.he accident :flow rate once power is restored to the SW Pumps. A UFSAR Change Notice documents the increase in temperature to 221°F. The boundary of the pipP .q:i"JaJysiA f'nr t:hii;:: C:hangP. P.~~k.:otgP. r.nnRi1:;t.9 of the pipina from the CFCu discharge nozzle to the CTMT wall. Pipe stress, pipe supports and struc:tural l!Upporc eteel we;re evaluated fo.c. .iL.!.t.:Lt:!d.1:1~d. loadings. As a result of the analysia, fiva pipe support modifications were required to restore the supports to design basis stress limits. A review was ~erformed to evaluate penetration seals materials, valves and i~s associated components~ I&ce components, and rcom environments for inc~eaeed temperature effect. Cho.ngc Documents (CDs) for the CED, U'P'SAR, Piping Spec and The;rmal Modes ·oc~ument are provided to 1ncorporate a.discussion ot the increased temperature of 221°F on the CFCU Return Pip~ng. Since che CFCU Return piping is described in the SAR, a Change Notice is required to docutruii!nt the revi~ed ternperatura. However, this propocal doc~ not change procedures as described in the SAR, and does not involve te11ts or e.Apexlme:tll.IO uut.. de1:1c;;:ri~ed. in t.he SAR. J:n addition, this proposal does not involve a USQ.

Nuclear C:o:a:imon R.ev. 5

",

. FR9~l .~S°E&,G RESTART ENG INEERH. ,, ..

:ruE)05. 20' 97 15: .T. 15:01/NO. 3561445305 p 21

FORM NC.~-AP,ZZ-0059·3 10 Ci'K 50. 59 SUETY EVAL'DA'r'lO!i

Page _zt/J__ o~ .~ Reviaion 0

I .D. 2EC-.3590 PKG 15 Numbers/Reference/Revision: 'Title: C?CJ.1.....RETURN PIPING INSIDE CAM'f.221F TEMP. EFFECT

6 • 0 COHCLJZS::COB

If ALL answers in Section 4 are 11 HQ, 11 the proposal does NO.t. involve .a USQ.

If~ anlifwer in Sec::tion 4 j,s "XE.i," the proposal involves a USQ.

Is a USQ involved?

YES NO x

If a USQ is involved, refer to NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0035(Q) and obtain assistance from Licensing for additional processing.

LCR NUml::>er; _.N ......... 14..__ __ _

Nuclear Cammc::u:1 Rev. 5

· .. F·R9M. ~.~E~G RESTART ENGINEER!N. :TUE) 05. 20' 97 15: .T. 15: 02/NO. 3561445306 P 1/l 0

·()PS~G Number of Pages (Including cover sheet)

DATE: :?1~01/97

TO: L. ot...SfllltJ

LOCATION: . ~c_

Licensing & ~egulation

Fax# (609) 339-1448

10

~~--~~--~~--~~--~------

Phone/Fax I 3:J J - '-/ 15 - Zl ~ ?-

FROM: D Av'E D~DS orJ

LOCATION: . fSE C, ~~--~~~----~-------~-------

Phone: ~ ~ 1 ~ 3 3 '7 - I '2-g"l-.

COMMENTS:---------------

Phone: ~-------~~~~~~-----------

0

VERIFICATION#: (609) 339-7031 339-1212

~Rb¥ P~.,E&q RESTART ENGINEERiN. (TUE) 05. 20' 97 15 :.T. 15: 02/NO. 3561445306 P 2/10

r

PART 1 - ENGINEERING

i'O~ NC.DE-WB.ZZ-0001-B

SECTION .3. 0

DESIGN ANALYSES

CHANGE NO.: ·~EC

T-MOD NO. : N/A

- 3590

--~-----PACKAGE NO.: 15 ~--

CP REV NO.: 0

SECTION PAGE NO.: 1 2 J 4 s 6 7 a 9 I

SECTION PAGE REV. NO.:O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ArrAcu .3. I

A7r~11. 1.1 ~

P9.. I z. Jk,,.1. 1> f/J

3

t:i41nsU..i 2 .. s-~7

0 O:r:iginal Issue

Rev No.

Revision Summary

Preparer: and Date

Paqe l

Pap 2 uf 3 (Pa~e 1 contain• the instziic~ians)

7 Pee~ RevieW" and Oat.e

FROM. p~E&.fJ RESTART ENGINEERl. ~TUE) 05. 20' 97 l 5: .T. 15: 02/NO. 3561445306 P 3/l 0 . -~-

• I

•.

P.Aa'l' 1 - BRG:CJ.GBRING J'ORll WC.DE-WB.ZZ-0001·8·

SBCT%0H 3 .O

CHANGE NO.: 2EC - 3590 T-MOO NO.: N/A

PAC~2 NO.: -1~$.__ ______ ...._ __ _

·DBSIGN U'ALYS:IS (CON'l"INOED} CE' REV. NO , : 0 .,....._---======---

l) ..;

2) -

Document the piping reanalysis (includes piping, pipe supports and structural -steel) of the Containment CFCU Return piping from the discharge nozzles of the CFCUs to th.a aontainm.ant wall for eh• increase in tamperature to 22l°F. 'I'.he reanlaysis resulted in five pipe support moditications.

Document the reconciliation of piping components such as "Val V"aa, ISoC Component: ieJ, and Penetrat :i.on ~P.aJ.s tt'.'I dP.te:r.mi nP

if they will continue to func:tion as design1ed if the piping reaches che 221°F temperature (see. calc: S-C-C:SV..:._MDC .. 1637 CD

M503) described below .. Disc:uss the· impact of t:he 221°F piping temperature o~ the room environment and High Energy

. . piping claaeifioation. · ·

. ~) - Document: the rev£s1ng 6! t.he configuration aasel1ne oocumerit

(CBD)~ Piping Specific~tion, and Service Water Thermal Modes Evaluation, th.rough Change Documents (CDs) in~luded in this .

. n~J:1 ... . .

4) .- Implement end document the modifica.tio:i cf the' five pipe supports required t:o meet design basis requirements .. (Se~ Sec'Cion e. o - Modification Instructions- .of this Change · Package). ·

1) - P%PIHC ANALXS>S (IRCLDD~NQ CIVZL S'l'RUC'rtJ'RAL MINXEl:CS.)

. 'J'he ~Pll lAm SP.TV:i r.P. w~~A'T" ~YA1':An1 C"!;:9n hA t">:(>P.r.i9t:~d i.n ~ Val ri Aty 0 f c:onfiguratlona, liepending on _the cooling supply needs of the.·

. Contaimaent ,- the Awdlisry Building cooling loads and the Turbine Building cocling loads. Immediately following. a Loss Of Coolant Accident {LOCA). or Main Steam Line Break (MSL.B) concurrent with a. Loss Of Offsite I'ower (LOOP), the sw system is configured to automatically isolate the Turbine Building loads and the Component Cooling Haat Exchanger (CCHX). Thi• fo~oee th~ SW flow to the CFCU's· and. to the EDG's which are required. early in the

Page k' Rev.· 0

••sr• 3 of 3 Rev. 6

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CHANGE NO.: 2EC - 3590' PART 1 • JD'GDIEERDIG PoaM NC.~s-we.zz-oaoi-s

· SBCT::COlt 3 • 0 T-MOP NO. : ... ~_/"-It....__ ____ _

PACKAGE NO. : 15 DBStaN' AlQLYS:tS (~Olrl'nmm>) Cf? RSV. NO • : 0

injection phase of an accider.t. Later in the accident sequence the CCBX is brought oack into service by the operators in preparation :for the reciroulat:ion pha.'se, through procedures .. Following the LOCA or MSLB signal concurrent with a LOOP, the CP'ct.1 SW223 control valvAs:i must open t.o the high service water flow position, the 21 & 23SW20 and SW2o valves (which control flow t..u t.ha Tu.L"blLll! Building) must: close .and c.he SW:l22 v~lve~ (which control flew to tne component cooling water heat exchangers) must close. The timing of these changes is =ritical to assuring the CFCU's will be fully operational at tlie desired time following the event. If ~SW pump is out for maintenance when th.a event c=curg and the other pump on that bus fails to start, there may only be two SW PUltilS supplying both SW headers. ~o~ these conditions, unless the Turbine au1la1ng ana CCHX heat loads are isolated, it is possiple the CFCU SW discharge pressure may be low, po~eibly below atmospheric pressure. The temperature of the SW leaving the CFct.T's Creturn piping) ma.y be as high ~A 191°F for the zero fouling case, or as high as 22l°F if the SW223 controller faillil to fdel l..hf;! vg,lve position to t:he high ~low race and the flow remains at the normal flow rate. At the ·higher temperature of 221°F, no significant amount of calcium carbonate prscipication on heat •x~hacrnger su~faces w~ll ocou~, and therefore no subsequent plugging of .fan coolers is expecte~L

·Although the mAXimum temperature of Lh~ CFCTJ zero fouling case is 19.lgP, l95°F was conservatively used in, the piping, pipe support, and structural analysis.

The Servic::ie Water ;return piping for the Cf'CU' s ha.a been re­evaluated for the postulated, "one time event", temperature of 221°F. The boundary for the piping analymis of this Change p~~kage consists of the piping from the discharge of . the 21,22,23,24,25 CFCU to the structural ~nl"!h~:r' at Elevation 130' (one stress calculation per CFCUJ and from the structural anchor At alev~t:iren 130' to the Ccntcinment Wall (one stress ~al~~l~l..ion per CFCU) for a maximum of ten stress calculations. Piping analysis fo~ the 22l0 P pipe fluid temperature from the CTMT wall anchor through the Penetration A-rP.a r.ti f-. .hP. !;:P.Y.'V'ii:o@ Wat@r Valve Rooms is documented in DCP 2EC-3590 PKGs 4&5. The documenta~ion for the 221•F °CFctJ ~1scharge pipe fluid temperature is founa in Mechanical Group Calculation S-C-CBVNMDC-1637 (CD MS03), Although only one CFC:U Ret:urn pipe neede to be postulated at 221gF (one

J:lage Rev. 0

Page 3 of 3 Rev. &

I I

_j

:TUE) 05. 20' 97 15: .T. 15: 02/NO. 3501445306 P 5/10

PUT l - BlfGilmBRING POllK RC.J:JB-WB.ZZ~0001·8

til:&:c.r'tOR 3.0 DBS!GN ~YS~S (COH'l'XwtmD)

CHANGE NO.: T-MOO NO.:

PACKAGE NO . : CP REV. NO.:

2EC - :3590 N/A 1 !;

0

single failure) , all stress calculations were analyzed for the higher temperature, Pipe support structures containing more than cne CFCU return pipe, used th.e 22l°F temperatu:re thermal load

from one of the pipes and l95°F temperature thermal loads for the remaining pipes, since only one CFctr Return pipes is postulated to b~ at 22i0~. In ~ddition to the ten lar~e bore stress calculations, five small bore stress calculations were reanalyzed for the temperature increase to 221°?" u111.ng revised end-point displacements from the decoupled main header piping. The stress calculations loadcases included deadweight, thermal, and seismic. The piping analysis was performed in accordance with ND.DE~Ps.zz-0007 (Q) PSE&G Programma.tio Standara for Pipe Stress Analyaia Clnd ND.DE·~S.ZZ-0023{Q) PSE'-0 Programmati~ Stand~rd for Pipe Support Design. This Design Change Pac:kage proposes to modify five pipe supports to res~ore the supporcs ~o design basis stress limits committed to in UFSAR 3.9.2 and 3.9.3. The - . supports are located on that portion of the SW system that is. C'!1.-..AA1..fi.@d ;:&A Srifety Related, Seismic Class I and Nu~le~r Cla.i;:;s:i

III (piping specification 27G). The modifications to.the supports OQ ~t reduce the lo4d ca.rryins; c:a.pabilities of the supports while they are being modified. Therefore, this DCP c:an be implemented while the SW system is operabl.e. The modified sup-ports are designed per the requirements of ANSI B3l.1 and will be installed per the requirements of ANSI B31.7.

The following is a summary of the required pipe support modifications:

MP No. 'HOl H02 ti OJ H04 H.0!:1 H06 H07 'H'OR

Support: No. C-23SWG-3 NOT USED C- 24SWC:··3 C-23SWG-15C NO'l' llS.e:D NOT USED 2C-23SWG-~033

'-C-7.?.RWG-l 6

Page 4: Rev.

•av• 3 ci~ :s

Modification Summary Add weld

Add pl~te ~ weld Add tube steel & weld

Add angle iron & weld Atici Weld

.•

0

lill!llV. Ii

FR~¥ J~E&q RE~TART ENGINEERIN~ (TUE) 05. 20' 9_7 15 :.T. l 5: 02/NO. S561445306 P 6/10

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:PAlt'f 1 • EN'GIMERIJrG. FORM NC!.OE-WB.ZZ-0001-8

SEC't%0H' . 3 • O

DBS:tCJH A.HALYS0

IS (COMTIW'ED)

CHANGE NO.~ 2EC - 3590 T-MOD NO.:, N/A

--:--~------PACKAGE NO. : ;1.5 CP REV. NO. : O

The following is a list of the reanalyzed stress· calculation• and their associated CDs:

5671363 CD HSOl 5671364 CD H502 5671369 CD HSOJ 5671370 ClJ H504 56'7137.2 CD HSOS

567650 CD H506 567672 CD HSll. 567674 CD H512 567G75 CD H5l3 567679 CD HS17

567659 567669 567670 5673342 5673352

CD HS63 CD HS64 CD H565 CD HSS6 CD H567

Loads imposed on Civil structural steel have been comPared to the threshold levels contained in Technical Standard SC.DE­TS .ZZ-4201 (Q), 'Salem Structural Design Criteria'. As a resulc, the structural steel beams located in the Containment Building between elevations 130'-0" and 100'-0" were analyzed for revised p~pe support loads due to increased cemperatures on the Fan Coil piping. The steel beams are adequate for the given loads and the integrity of the structure is maintained.

The structural steel beams located in the Containment Building between elevations 100'-0" and 79'-0" (commonly referred to as the annular steel) were analyzed for the revised pipe support loads due to increased temperatures on the Fan Coil piping. The steel beams are adequate for the given loads and the integrity of the structure is maintained.

Detailed analysis is contained in the following Civil Calculations:

6S2-12Bl 662-1439 692-1727

..6S2-l 72S 6S2-1729

(CD 5501) (CD S502) (CD 6503) (CD S504) {CD SSOS)

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~R9~ f:E~G RESTART ENGiNEERI. :ruE)05. 20·97 1.5:.T..15:02/NO. 3561445306 P 7/10 : ..

PART 1 .- Ell'GDlEERDiG romc HC.~s-we.zz-0001-e

SBCTIO?f 3.0 DBS:CGJ!f AMALYSIS (CON'l'nroED)

2) - BIC::QNC!ILllTI:mf

Valvem

CHANGE NO.;· 2EC - 3590 'I-MOO NO.; N/A

~..__~~~~~~

PACKAGE NO.: 15 CP REV. NO. : · 0

All valves listed on the worksheets in Actachment 3.2 have been reviewed to determine if they will continue to function as deaigned if tne piping fluid reQchcs the 221°F temperature previously described. Based upon recent PSE&G single failure analy11is, the CFCFU fluid discharge temperature d.rops to approximately 185°F in one hour (see c:alc s-C-CBV-MDC-'1637 CD MS03) . This valve limt includes all valves from the discharge of the CFCO'm to the containment wall, from the cont~inmcnt w~ll through the penetration area and valve rooms to the 24P0 main header. A review of the valves_listed in Attaohm.en~ J.~ revealed tha.t the valves, ita internals, and actuators will continue to function as designed for the condition of a 221~F pipe fluid temperature a~ deac~ibed above.

IiC Components

Th.a ~&C componanes listed on work~heats in Attaohmant J.l we~e reviewed to'determine if they will continue to function as designed if the piping fluid reaches the 221wF temperature

·previouely described. Based upon review, it was deter.nined thac the majority of I&C components were unaffected by the temperature increa•e.

However, the following I&C ~ompunencs requ~red further discussion:

• Temperature instrumentation TA-54S9,TA-5494, TA-9904, and TA-5509 and their a•sociaced transmitters nave a range of o~ 200°Jr:"" Sinee the simulated rise in temperature is of short duration (max time of 1 hour) and ~he probability of occurrence is mini~al (LOCA or MSLB required), no ohanges to the inQtrumancation is reeommended. Under the inoraasQd temperature condition the indicators will hit upscale and come back t.a .oorma.l readin!:j whf:!n the temperature decreases . Ne damage to the instrumentation is expected. Since the temperature indicators listed above do not a~fect operation

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... :TUE)05. 20' 97 15:.T. 15:02/NO. 3501445300 P 8/10

. PUT" 1 .., Ji!NGINEDDJG l'CJU'I .C.DE-MS.ZZ-0001-t

SBC'l'tON 3.0 DESIGN AMU.YSIS (COIRINO'BD)

CE!ANGE NO. : T-MOD NO.:

PACKAGE NO • : CP REV. NO.:

2EC - 35~0 N/A 15 0

of the Service Water system, their lo•~ of temperature indication is acceptable.

• Flow orifice platee F-3lS~.F-3164,P-3l68,F-3171, and F-3175, are affected by the increased temper~:ure. llcwever,since che temperature in~rease is less than 200°F the impact on the accuracy of these orifice plates would be less than a tenth of a percent which is considered negligible, and therefore acc:eptal:>le.

• Radiation Monitors RA-9651,RA.9852, and RA-9S53, have a temperature limit of 130°F which has been confirmed by the vendor. The limitation is the detector opP.ri:tt.:i.ng temperature. Under the increased •ervice water temperature thorc ig ~ potential for these monitor~ to become d.a.ma.ged. These monitors are Technical Specification Items and are cherefore required to tunccion. Tneae rad monitors were not qualified for the preyioue maximum temperatures of t~0°F nr the 195°F CFCU zero fouling case. Therefore, an ARI 9703.22113 wa:J et.:uiigned the task of t..r.i:lt.:king all· 1asues regarding these rad monitor non-conformances. No more a~tions within thie package are required.

Penetration Seals

Penet:ration seals materials were reviewea to d.etermine if they will ccncinue to function as designed if the piping fluid reaches the 22l~F temperature previously described. The Pen Seal r•view included all penetrations from the diaQharge of the CPCVs to the containment wall( five containment penetrations), from the containment wall through the penetration area and v~ve rooms ( five bOOt..,!tyl~ penetrations ~-25438-o{o, N-25438-014, N~25439-oos, N~25439-0"08, N-25439-0ll, one grouted penetration W-25438-028 (wall anchor}), and.two embedded penet~~~jcns (wall anchors) exiting the Aux building to the underground yard piping. The boot :itylc penetration seal materia.l il!!I deeigned for 4·teull:'~rd.Lure of 390GF, and is acceptable. The remaining penetrations are also acceptable since the 221°F temperature (for a maximum time"of l hour) has no af fact on th• ~tructural properties of the concrete or grout. The concrete i• locally exposed to heat for a •hort

:e>age 7 l<.ev. a

Page ::I of 3 R.ev. S

~R.O~l fSE&.G RESTART ENGINEERn. • • ~ . :TUE) 05. 20' 97 15: .T. 15: 02/NO. 3561445306 P 9/10

PART l - DG:CN1UilRING · PORK RC.~B-WB.zz-oooi-B

. SBC't:CON 3.0

CHANGE NO. : 2EC - 3590 T-MOD NO.: _N~/_A~~~~~­

PACKAGE NO. : ~ I>BSIGN .AKALYS:Cli ( COm'IHO'ED) CP REV I NO. : 0

period of time. The incident is rega~ded as a ~one time event" that may qccur for approximately one hour. ~asea upon recent PSE&G single failure an~lysis, the CFCFU fluid aisoharge temperature drops to approximately 185°F in one hour (see calc s­c-cav-MDC-1637 CD M503) . Therefore, tha risk of loc~l deterioration of the concre~e is considered insignificant.

ROOM ENV'IRDNMBN'T/HIGH'. ENERGY PIPING

High Energy piping criteria for Salem Unit 2 is defined as p1p1ng whose temperature exceeds 200°F or whose pressure excee~s 275psig during normal reactor operation (UFSAR 3.6.4.3.2). Since the 221°F fluid temperature only occurs during a postulated single failure following a LOCA or MSLE (a faulted plant ccnaition) , =he 22l°F pipe fluid temperature does not reclassify the Service .• water piping as High Energy Piping. Based on the temperature profile in this analysis for the .present Licensing Basis LOCA the containment temperature after 3500 seconds (i.e. approx. 58 minutes ) w~a ~23°F. Ucin9 the ~pprov~d ~SE~G GLS~-li C~CTJ heAt transfer model and the same methodology as Calculation s-C-CEV~ MDC-io37 CCD MSOJ), chis would resulc in an estimated CFCU sw ·outlet temperature lees than 200°F (i.e. l85°P). Thie short cerm temperature spike will have negligible impact on the temperature of tn• envi~onment and will net ~x~eed the tempe~aturca stdt~d in ~he Salem Generating Station Environmental Design Criteria (S-C­zz-soc-i41~) .

Change Documents (CDS) fer the Service Water CEO (OE-CB.SW-0047), UFSAR, Piping Specification (S~C-MPCO-MGS-0001-SPS27) , Thermal Modes Eva!Uation (S-C-ZZ-MEE-0764) are included in Section 15 of this Change Package.

I? age __! Kev. 0

NUclear Comm.on h.ge 3 of 3 'Jl!.ev. 6

:TUE) 05. 20' 9i 15 ;.T. 15: 02/NO. 3501445306 P I 0/10

CHANGE NO.: . 2EC - 3590 PART 1 - l:lfG~HES:RlliG

PORK SC.DB~WB.ZZ-0001-8 SBCTI01' 3.0

T-MOO NO.: -=N-/.-A....._ ___ _ E'ACKAGE NO.: 15

....-... . :CSSJ:Clll ANALYS%S ( c:omnqueo) Ct' REV • NO I ; 0

Hate;

At the beginning of the Design Change Process the maximum fluid tempe'.:rature of the Ci'ctJ' Return piping wa.£1 determined t:o be 220°F. However, during the evolution of the Service Water Special Pro,ject the maximum :t.Luid tl!lmperature of the CFCU Return piping was revi11111n t:o 221°F. Worksheets dot:umeriti.ng the reviewg of thee I&C components a.p.d the valves for pipe fluid cemperatures of 22o~F are found as attachments 3.1 ~ 3.2 o! Che Section 3.U Design Analysis section of thia Change Paokage. The increase of 1°F is considered negligible and. will not affect the conclusions o~ ~hn~P revi~ws pr@viously performed .

· Page . " - Rev. o·

Jil&ifl!I 3 af J Rav. 6

_____ ,..,..-. .:.·-·--···--- ·--------- -- ---- ---~-·---- ·-···--

SENT B'f': · ' . _,o:!'l-il~ Fax Note 7671 PSE&G Lier 301 504 5369;# l/ 2 f, •

. ·f·t '~-~LS+/IH\J

Phorio f

CHANGE NO.: 2EC 3590

T-MOD NO.: N/A PACKAGE NO. : 15 CP REV. NO.~ 0

TO: Work Control Center/SNSS rzl SALEM ·0 HOPE CREEK

Project Team Lead r .-... - ~111"\<=o~r~ .,.......... ~ ., t"'ln

FROM: John Barkhamer

Project Team Lead] X-199G 573-2485

DATE: 1-15-97 ('I'el. No.) (Beeper No. )

*Implementation of this change package is scheduled to start: 2-1-97

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~-!

{i.e., date, event, etc.)

And will be construction complete by: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (i.e., dat~, Qtr&nt, ate.)

(* A graphical representation of a schedule can be attached)

r. Desc:ript:icn cf Change:

Five pipa supports will be modified o~ the CFCU Return Piping inside CTMT. Justification for the temperature increase for valves,I&C components, along with CD~ .i1.u • .:u.r.·IJu.r.·dLl.n'::J a. discussion (.Jr 1.1.i.l;l temperature affect in the CBD, Piping Spec, and Thermal Modes Document are included in this Chance Paokaae.

II. Reason for Change:

The piping fluid temperature increased to 221 Degrees F .

. . •· "

III. Operational Condition/Mode required for implementation:

Modes 3, 4,5,6, or Defueled.

IV. Technical Specification Action statementa affected during implementation Crequi~ed even if the equipment is not needed to be OPERABLE during implementation):

NONE.

Paqe -=l- of 2 Rev. -~o-

Nuel.ear Ccmanon ,Page 2 of 4 Kev. S (Page 1 contai~e the inetructicDB)

j

I 300 BY.: .• 5- 8-97 8:37 ; (, ....... , .....

FORM NC.DB-'NB.ZZ-0001-5

PSE&G LI c WG-+ CHANGE NO. ; 2EC

T-MOD NO.: N/A

301 504 5369;# 21 2

3590

~~~~~~~~-

·CHANGE PACICAGE EXECUT::cvE STJMMARY (CONTINUED)

PACKAGE NO. i

CP REV. NO.: 15

0

v. Special Plant conditions for installation and testing:

NONE.

VI. Installation and Functional Testing required to declare the change complete:

ViGual examination of modified pipe ~upports.

VII. Recommended Operability Retesting required t.n declare the system OPERABLE:

NONE.

V~II. OWDS affected:

NONE.

·. ~·

rx. Procedures/programs affected {identify the mode at which CAT l rReetart or Post Rest:art:, RP-A NC'!.N~ .. AP.ZZ-0008{Q) definitions] proo~dures need to be approved, include any training requirements, ~d c:ontact the NTC to detez:mine imp.-.cl&:1 lo the 11imulat:or}: NONE.·

Paqe _=2- of 2 Rev. 0

Page l cf 4 Rl!!IV. 5

_J

SENT BY: &. \ • •• - ) '

' ....

I .

5-19-97 ; 13:27 ; PSE&G LJC ~er • 10 CFR 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIO.

301 504 5369:# 1/ 3

Page 1 of 76 Revision %~- M"J&>/ir

1.0. Numbers/Reference/Revision: DCp 2EC-35RO, F°»Plckeges 3, 6, 11, & 17, RevO

Title: Generic Letter 06-06 Modifications

ADPlicability:

Salem 1 -- __ Salem 3 {Gas Turbine)

X Salem 2 __ Hope Creek

Common to Salem 1 & 2 -- __ Common tu Hupe Creek & Salem

Preparer:

AtJp1oval:

Safety Evaluation No. _;s .... 9 __ 7....;·1.;..00~-----

SORC Review:

G.M Approval:

Nuclear Common

-s-rr~rt:

3[zz{q:r-

Rev.5

l I

l

•5-19-SJ _;."_t~~2I .~, .... f.§.E~<J.J-J.Sif.G-t

10 CFR 50.59 SAFETY EVALUAl1uN ·Page 31 of --1!__..

Revision 0

301 504 5369;# 2/ 3

l.D. Numbers/Reference/Revision: DCP 2EC-3590, Packages 3, 6, 11, & 17, Reva

Title: Generic Letter 96-06 Modifications

The modified valve/operator assembly was evaluated for the new system design conditions and found to be acceptable. Thus, all appropriate design critAri~ ArA still satisfied.

• CFCU SW Piping Support Modifications (Work Package 15)

During normal operation. thA (';FCU mns run at 1200 rpm and the SW223 control valves are set at about 900 gpm (750 gpm minimum Tech. Spec. value). Following en accident, the fans reset to 000 rpm and the SWZ2:3 control valves reset to approximately 2650 gpm (2550 gpm minimum Teen. spec. value). 1 nese tlowrates each include 50 gpm diverted to tt1e CFCU motor cooler). The existinQ analyses for maximum heat transfer ln

· : the CFCU cpils (with zero fouling) show that the maximum CFCU outlet temperature reaches about 1 gs°F (Reference 23). If the SW223 control valve controller was in the low flow position due to the high speed fan breaker would failing to open, the CFCU outlet temperature w111 be greater .. The revised calculations in Reference 23 show that the maximum temperature for this case to be 221°F.

Work package 15 documents the piping analysis ·(irwludes tt-ie piping, · pipe supports and structural steel) of the CFCU discharge piJJir 1y fr um tt1e discharge of the nozzles of the 21, 22, 23. 24, & 25 CFCUs to the containment wall for the increase in pipe fluid temperature to 221 "F. The analysis resulted in five pipe support moditic-.atinns to restore the stress level in 1he supports to design basis limits.

Package·15 also discuses and documents the reconciliation of piping components such as valves. valve lntemals, I & C components, penetration seals, and room environments for the increase in pipe fluid temperature to 221"F. The maximum time duration for one CFCU return pipe to be at221°F Is about 1 hour. Tho v~lves, valve internals, valve operators and penetration seal materials are not affected by the 221()F pipe temperature. The l&C components w111 be unaffected by the increased temperature. A few temperature indicators will overranQe at 200°F. but Will continue to operate· (not sustaining any damage at 221°F), nnr.P. thA tAmperature_drops below 200°F. Since these temperature indicators do not affect operation of the Service Water system, the temporary loss of temperature indication has 11u cumsequences.

Nuclear Common Rev.5

~T uY: . .. • ~ l' I>·· .,

5-18-87 ; 13:28 ; PSE&G LIC.~

• 10 CFR 50.59 SAFETY EVA.LUA • 301 504 5369;# 3/ 3

Page 32 of 75

Revision O

l.D. Numbers/Reference/Revision: DCP 2EC-3590, Packages 3, 6, 11. & 17, Reva

Title: Generic Letter 96-06 Modifications

High Energy piping criteria for Salem Unit 2 Is fluid temperature at 200"F and/or 275 psig during norm'-11 operating conditions. Since the 221°F temperature only occurs during a postulated single failure following a LOCA or MSLB (a faulted planl cumJiliur1), the 221"F pipe temperature (for a duration of 1 hour) does not reclassify the Service Water piping as High Energy Piping. ·

Installation

ConstruetJon act1v1t1es will consider potential flooding, fire protection, and buildin~ breaches and ensure each is appropriately evaluated for the plant modes identified as applicable during installation of these modifications.

Specific Instructions and Hold Points are provided in the Modification instructions to minimize the time for which the exterior wall core bores will be open. These instructions include installation of Hilti~bolts and prefabrication of pipe spools with collars and blind flanges, prior to Initiating core boring .. When ;;i r.nrA horF! i~ r:nmplet~ the pipe spool will be immediately installed and the· collar secured to the Hilti-bolts. A silicone caulk will then be applied to create an air tight seal. The modification instructions and Huh.f Points Hre structured to ensure that the core bores can be sealed within one shift (full seal following cure time of .24 hrs).

Evaluation of possible accidents arising from the transporting and lifting of the SW storage tanks has been performed. ThG travel path of the lifting crane has been reviewed and it has been determined that although the c.rane will travel over burled safety related piping and electrical duct banks. they will not be damaged by the crane loads. The tanks will not be lifted over any safety­related structures, but will be carried over buried safety-related piping and electrietil ducti. Although the evaluations indicato that D dropped tank could damage the piping and cabling. crane configuration and operation will be conducted to provide "defense-in-depth" as Indicated in NUREG 0612 and NRC Generic Letter 85-11. This document permits the exclusion of possible dropping of the tank as a design consideration. The Design Change Package covering the storage tank Installation (Package 3) has R Hnld Point to evaluate wind speed and it's impact on crane operation. This Hold Point references the PSE&G safety m~mual (Reference 38) which defines the maximum allowable

Nuclear common Rev.5