foucault 25 feb. 1976 society must be defended

8/13/2019 FOUCAULT 25 Feb. 1976 Society Must Be Defended

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M I C H E L F O U C A U L T

Society Must Be DefendedL E C T U R E S A T T H E C O L L E G E D E F R A N C E ,

1 9 7 5 - 7 6

Edited by Ma ur o Bertani and Alessand ro FontanaGeneral Editors: Francois Ewald and Alessandro Fontana

English Series Editor: Arnold 1. Davidson

T R A N S L A T E D B Y D A V I D M A C E Y

P I C A D O RNEW YORK


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SOCIETY MUST BEDEFENDED .Copyr ight 1 9 9 7 by Editions de Seui l/Ga llima rd. Editionestablished, under the direction of Francois Ewald and Alessandro Fontana, by MauroBertani. Translation copyright 0 2 0 0 3 by David Macey. Introduction copyright 2 0 0 3by A rn ol d I. David son. Al l rights reserved. Printed in the United States of Ame rica . Nopart of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without writtenperm ission excep t in the case of brief quo tati ons emb odied in critical articles or reviews.Fo r information, address Picador, 175Fifth Avenue, N ew York, N.Y. 1 0 0 1 0 .

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2 5 F E B R U A R Y 1 9 7 6

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Boulainvilliers and the constitution of a historico-politkalcontinuum. ~Historicism. - Tragedy and public right. - The

central administration of history. ~ The problematic of theEnlightenment and the genealogy of knowledges. - The four

operations of disciplinary knowledge and theireffects. ~Philosophy and science. - Disciplining knowledges.

W H E N 1 T A L K E D TO yo u abou t Bo ula inv ilh ers , I wa s certain ly nottrying to prove to you that something resembling history began withhim, bec au se , after all, th er e is no reaso n to say that history beganwit h Boulain vi lhers rathe r than with, for example , the s i xte ent h-cent ury juri sts wh o colla ted the mo num ent s of pu bli c right, wi th thepariementaires who, th roughou t the seventeenth century, searched thearchives and ju risp rud enc e of the Stat e to dis cov er w ha t the basicl a w s of the ki ng do m mig ht be, or wi th the Bened icti nes , wh o h adbeen great collectors of cha rter s eve n since the lat e sixte enth cen tur y.Wh at w a s in fact estab lish ed by Boul ainv illie rs in the e a r l y e ighteenthcen tur y wasI thinka hi stori co-p ohti cal field. In wh at sense? First ,in this sense: By ta ki ng the na tion, or rat he r natio ns, as hi s object,Boulainvi lhers w a s able to di g ben eat h inst itut ions , events, kin gs andtheir power, an d to an al yz e some thin g else , nam ely those societ ies, asthey were cal led at the time, that were bound together by interests,customs, and l a w s . By taking them as his object, he changed twothings. One the one hand, he began to write (and I think it was the


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first ti me this had h a p p e n e d ) the his tor y of subj ects, or in othe rwords, to look at po we r from th e other side . He th us beg an to g iv ea historical status to something that would, with Michelet in thenin ete ent h c ent ury , beco me the hist ory of the peo ple or the hi stor yof pe opl es. ' He dis cov ere d a ce rta in form of, his tor y that e xi ste d onthe other side of the pow er rel ati on shi p. But he an aly ze d this newform of hist ory not a s th ou gh it we r e an iner t sub sta nce , bu t as aforceor forces; po we r its elf w a s no mor e than o ne of those forcesanun us ua l k in d of force, or the stra nge st of all the forces tha t w er efighting one anot her wi th in the social bod y. Po we r is the pow er ofthe litt le gr ou p th at exe rcis es it bu t ha s no force; an d yet, ul ti ma te ly ,thi s po we r bec ome s the str onge st force of al l, a force that no otherforce can resist , exc ept violen ce or reb elli on. Wh at Bou lai nvi lhe rs wa sdisco verin g wa s that histor y should not be the histo ry of po we r, bu tthe history of a monstrous, or at least strange, couple whose enigmaticnatu re coufcl not ex actly be redu ced or unde rsto od by any jur idi calfiction: th e cou ple formed by the p ri m al forces of th e peopl e, an d th eforce that had finally bee n con sti tu ted by so me thi ng tha t ha d no force,but that was power.B y d isplac ing the a x i s , the cen ter of gr av it y, of his a n a l y s i s , Bou-

la invi lhers did som eth ing imp orta nt. First , bec aus e he defined thepr inc ip le of wh at mi ght be called t he rela tion al char acter of power :po we r is not so me th in g tha t can be pos sess ed, an d it is not a form ofmigh t; power i s never any th in g more than a relation ship that can,an d must, be studied on ly by looki ng at the in terp lay bet wee n theter ms of tha t rel ati ons hip . One can not, therefore, wri te eithe r thehis tor y of ki ng s or the hi sto ry of peop les; one can wr it e the his tor yof wh at co nstitu tes those opp osin g terms , one of wh ic h is never i n-finity, and t he oth er of wh ic h is nev er zero. By wr it in g tha t hi sto ry,by definin g the rel atio nal cha rac ter of pow er, an d by an al yz in g it inhisto ry, Boul ainvi lhers wa s cha l leng ing and this , I think, is the otherside of wh at h e was doing the juri dica l mode l of sov ere ign ty wh ichhad, un til then, been t he only w a y of th in ki ng of the r elat ions hipbetween people and monarch, or between the people and those whogove rn. Boula inv ilh ers descr ibes the phen omen on of po wer not in


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2 5 February 1976 169jur idical terms of sov ere ign ty but in histo rical terms of d omi nat ionan d the p la y of re lat io ns of force. A n d he plac es the object of hishistorical analysis w i th in that field.

In do ing so, in ta ki n g as hi s object a pow er t ha t was essent iallyre la t ional and not a de qu at e to the ju ri di ca l form of sov ere ign ty, andb y defining a field of forces in wh ich th e po we r- re la ti on sh ip comesinto pla y, Bou lain vilh ers is tak ing as his object the histori cal kn ow ledge tha t Mac hia vel h analy zed, but only in prescrip t ive strategicterms or in term s of a stra teg y seen only thr oug h the eyes of powerand the Prince. 2 You might object tha t Machiavelh did not just givethe Pri nce adv ic e wh et he r it is seri ous or ironic is a different qu es -tionabout how to manage and org ani ze powe r, and tha t the text ofThe Prince itself is full of hist oric al reference s. You migh t say thatMachiave lh also wr ote the Discorsi. But for Mac hia vel h, his tor y is notthe do ma in in wh ic h he ana lyz es pow er re latio ns. For Ma ch iav el h,history is simply a source of examples, a so r t of collection of ju r i s -pru de nce or of tact ical models for the exerc ise of powe r. For M ac h-lavelh, history simply records relations of force and the calculationsto whi ch th ey gave rise.

For Boul ain vil her s, on the o ther han d ( a n d this, I thin k, is theimpor tant po in t) , rel atio ns of force and the pla y of po we r are thevery stuff of hist ory. His tor y ex is ts , ev ent s occur, and thi ng s thathappen can and must be remembered, to the extent tha t relations ofpo we r, rela tio ns of force, and a ce rt ai n pla y of po we r oper ate i n re -la t ions among men. Acco rdin g to Bou lai nvi lhe rs, historical nar rati vesand politi cal cal cul ati ons have ex ac tly the same object. Histor ical narra t ives and politic al calc ulat ions ma y not hav e the same goal, but th ereis a definite continuity in what they are talking abou t , and in w ha tis at stake in both n arra tive and calcu latio n. In Boulai nvi lhe rs, wetherefore findfor the first tim e, I th in k a his to nc o-p oh tic al conti nu um . One cou ld also say, in a sl ig ht ly different sense, that Boula invi lhers open s u p a his ton co- poh tic al field. Let me explai n. As Ihave already told youa nd I thi nk t his is of fundamen tal imp ort anc eif we are to und ersta nd Boula invi lh ers 's s tar t i ng pointhe wa s t ry ingto make a critique of the knowledge of the intendants, of the sor t of


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an a l y s i s and the projects for government tha t the intend ant s or, moregenerally, the monarc hical gover nmen t wa s cons tantl y dr aw in g up forpo we r' s benefit. It is tru e that Boulainvilhers was a radical opponentof this kno wle dge , but he challenges it by rei mpl ant ing it wi th in hisown discourse, and by using for his own ends the very analyses thatw e find in the kn ow le dg e of the in te nd an ts . Hi s goal wa s to confiscateit and to use it against the system of the absolute monarchy, whichwas bo th the birthplace and the field of application of this adminis-trative knowledge, this knowledge of the intendants, and this eco-nomic knowledge.

A n d b a s i c a l l y , whe n Bo ulai nvil hers anal yzes the historical evolu-tion of a wh ol e seri es of specific rel atio ns be tw ee n, if yo u l i k e , mil i taryorga nizat ion and t axati on, he is si mp ly acc lim ati zin g, or usi ng for hisown historical a n a l y s e s , the very form of relationship, the type ofi n t e l l i g i b i l i t y and the model of relations that ha d been defined byadministrative knowledge, fiscal knowledge, and the knowledge of theinten dant s. When , for example, Boul ainv ilhe rs expla ins the relationbet ween the emplo yme nt of merce narie s and increas ed taxati on, orbet wee n the deb ts of the peasa ntr y and the impossi bili ty of mar ket ingthe pro duc e of the l and , he is sim ply rai sin g the iss ues rai sed by theintendants and financiers of the reign of Louis XIV, but he is doingso wi th in the historic al dimension. You w i l l find ex ac tl y the samespecu latio ns in the wo rk of peo ple such as, for ex amp le , Boi sgu ilb ert 'and Vauban. ' The relation between rural indebtedness and urbanpro sp eri ty wa s another impo rtan t topic of discuss ion th roughout thelate seventeenth and early eight eenth centu ries. We find, then, thesame mode of intel lig ibi li t y in bo th the kn owl edg e of the inte ndan tsand Boulai nvilh ers 's historica l a n a l y s e s , bu t he is th e first to ma keth is type of rela tion function in the do mai n of hist oric al nar rat ive . Inother words, Boulainv i lhers mak es wh at had unt i l then be en no morethan Stat e mana gem ent 's prin cipl e of rat ion ali ty function as a pr in-ciple for unde rst and ing history. That a cont inu ity has been estab lishe dbet wee n hist oric al nar rat ive and the man age men t of the State is, Ibelieve, of vita l im po rt an ce. It is th e use of the S ta te' s model of ma n-agerial rat ion ali ty as a gr id for the spec ula tiv e und ers tan din g of hi s-


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society 's real strugg les str ateg y, or the element of calcu latio n inher-ent in such struggles, w i l l be artic ula ted wit h a historical know led gethat tak es the form of the inte rp ret ati on an d a n a l y s i s of forces. Wecannot un de rs ta nd the emerg enc e of this specifically modern di men-sion of polit ics unle ss we und ers tan d how, from the eigh teen th cen-tury onward, historical knowledge becomes an element of the struggle:it is bo th a des cri pti on of strug gles and a weapo n in the struggl e.Hi st or y gave us the i dea tha t we are at war; an d we wag e wa r thr oug hhistory.

Having established that, let me make two points before we go backto the wa r tha t is w a g e d thr oug hou t the hi sto ry of peo ple s. M y firstpoint concern s hi sto ric is m. Evervone k no ws of cour se that h isto rici smi s the most dreadfu l th ing in the wo rl d. A n y phil osop hy wo rt hy ofthe name, any theory of societv, anv self-respecting epistemology thathas anv claim to dist inc tio n obvi ous ly has to str ug gle agai nst the plat -itudes of his tori cism . No one wo ul d dare to adm it to bei ng a hist or-lcist. And it can, I think, e a s i l y be demonstrated that ever since theninet eenth centu rv, all the grea t philoso phies hav e, in one wa y oranother, been antihistoricist . One could also, I thi nk , demon strate thata l l the h um an scie nces sur viv e, or perha ps eve n exis t, only becau sethey are ant ihistoncist . 5 One c ould also dem ons tra te that whe n h i s -tory, or the his tor ica l di sc ip li ne , has recourse to either a phi los oph yof histo rv or a ju rid ic al an d moral i d e a l i t y , or to the human sciences( a l l of which it finds so enchanting), it is trying to escape its lataland secret penchant for historicism.

But wh at is this his tori cis m tha t every one phil osop hy, the hum ansciences, his tor yi s so suspic ious of? Wh at is this histo ricis m th atha s to be wa rd ed off at all cost, an d that ph il os op hi ca l, scie ntif ic, an deven political modernity have a l w a y s tried to ward off? W e l l , I thinkth at his tor ici sm is not hin g other th an wh at I have just bee n tal ki ngabout: the link , the unavo ida ble connection, bet ween w ar and history,an d convers ely, bet wee n historv and wa r. No matt er how far ba ck itgoes, his tori cal kn ow le dg e ne ver finds natu re, righ t, orde r, or peace.However far back it goes, historical knowledge discovers only anun en di ng war , or in othe r wo rd s, forces that r ela te to one an ot he r


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and come into conflict with one another, and the events in whichrelations of force are decided, but a l w a y s in a provision al wa y. Hi s-tory encounte rs not hing bu t war , bu t his tory can neve r real ly lookdo wn on this w ar from on hig h; hi st or y cann ot get away from war,or discove r its bas ic laws or impose lim its on it , quit e simpl y be-cause wa r i tself supports this kno wle dge , run s through th is kno wl -edge , and determi nes this kno wled ge. Knowl edge is never a nyt hin gmore th an a we ap on i n a wa r, or a tact ical de pl oy me nt w it hi n tha tw a r . Wa r is wa ge d throug hout historv , and thro ugh the history thattells the h istory of wa r. A n d hist ory , for its par t, can neve r do a ny -thi ng more th an in ter pr et the wa r it is wa gi ng or that is be in gwaged thr oug h it .

Well , then, I th in k it is thi s essential connection b et we en h istor icalkno wle dg e and the pract ice of wa r it is thi s, gen era lly spea king , thatcon stit utes the core of his tor ici sm, a core tha t both is i r red ucib le anda l w a y s has to be san iti zed , bec aus e of an ide a, wh ic h has been incircula t ion for the last one thousand or two thousand y e a r s , and whi chmight be describ ed as "pla ton ic" ( t ho ug h we sho uld a l w a y s be wa ryof blaming poor old Plato for ever yth ing we wa nt to ba n is h) . It is anidea that is pro bab ly bou nd up with the who le Wes ter n o rgan izat ionof kno wle dge , namel y, the idea that kn ow le dg e and t r u t h can not notbelong to the regist er of orde r and pea ce, that kn ow le dg e an d t ru thcan neve r be found on the side of viol ence , dis ord er, an d wa r. I t hi nkth at the imp or ta nt th in g ( a n d wh et he r it is or is not pla ton ic is ofno impor tanc e) about this idea that kn owl edg e and t r u t h cannot b e-lo ng to wa r, a n d can on ly belo ng to order a n d peace , is that themodern State has now r eim plan ted it in wh at we might c a l l the eigh -teenth centu ry 's "dis cip hna nza t io n" of kno wled ges. An d i t is this ideathat m ak es histo ricism unacce ptab le to us , tha t mean s that we cannotaccept something l i k e an indissociab le circu lari t y betw een historicalkno wle dge and the wa rs tha t i t ta lks about and wh ic h at the s ametim e go on in it. So th is is the pro bl em , an d th is , if yo u l i k e , is ourfirst task: We mu st t ry to be hist ori cis ts, or in othe r w or ds , try toanalyze this perpetual and unavoida ble relat ionsh ip bet wee n the wa rthat is rec oun ted b y his tor y an d the his tor y th at is tra ver sed b y th e


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w a r it is reco unti ng. A nd it is alon g these line s tha t I w i l l now tryto go on wi th th e lit tl e sto ry of the G au ls and th e Fra nk s tha t Istarted to tell.

So much for my first remark, for my first excursus on histoncism.To mov e on to the second: an objection can be ma de . Th ere m ig ht beano the r wa y of ap pro ach in g the theme I touc hed upon a mo me nt ago,or in other words the disc ipl ina riz ati on of kno wle dge s in the eigh -te en th cen tur v. If we ma ke his tory , the hi stor y of the wa rs that goon thro ugho ut history, the great disc ursi ve app ar atu s that make s pos-sible the e ight een th-c entu ry cri tiq ue of the Stat e, and if we make thehi st or y /w ar relat ionsh ip the prec ondi tion for the emerge nce of "pol-i t i c s [ . . . ] the function of or de r w a s to re est abl ish a con tin uit y inits discourse.*

[A t the time wh en the ju ris ts were exp lo ri ng the archi ves in anattempt to discover the basic l a w s of the king dom , a his tori ans ' historyw a s tak in g sh ape , an d it w a s not po we r' s ode to itself. It sh ou ld notbe forgotten that in the seventeenth century, and not only in France,t r agedy was one of the great ritual forms in which public right wasdisplayed and in whic h its pro ble ms we re discus sed. W e l l , S h a k e -spear e's "hist ori cal " tra ge di es are trag edi es about righ t and the king,and they are ess ent ial ly cente red on the p rob lem of the usur pe r anddet hro ne men t, of the mu rde r of ki ng s and the bi rt h of the new be ingwh o is con sti tute d by the coro nati on of a kin g. Ho w c an an in di vi du aluse vio len ce, int rig ue, murde r, a nd wa r to ac qu ir e a pu bl ic mig ht thatcan bring abou t the re ign of peace, just ice, order, and hap pi ne ss ? Ho wcan i l l e g i t i m a c y produce l a w ? At a tim e wh en the theory an d h istoryof rig ht are tr yi ng to we av e the unb rok en con tinu ity of publ ic m igh t,Shakespearean tragedy, in contrast, d w e l l s ] 6 on the wound, on therep eat ed inj ury that is inflicted on the body of the ki ng do m w h enkings d ie violent de aths and w h e n ille git ima te sovereig ns com e to thethro ne. I th in k tha t Sh ake spe are an traged y is, at lea st in ter ms of oneof its a x e s , a sort of cerem ony, a sort of re me mo ri al iz at io n of the

*It is difficult to establish the meaning on the basis of the tape recording. The firsteighteenpages of the manuscript w ere m fact moved to the end in the lecture itself.


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problems of public right. The same could be said of French tragedy,of that of Cor nei lle and, of course, espe cial ly Rac ine . Besi des , in ge n-eral terms, isn't Greek tragedy too a l w a y s , essent ially, a trage dy aboutr igh t? I th in k that the re is a funda menta l, esse ntial kin sh ip be tw ee nt r agedy a nd rig ht, be tw ee n trag edy and pu bl ic rig ht , just as the re ispro bab ly an esse ntia l kin shi p be tw ee n the novel and the probl em ofthe norm. Tragedy and right, the novel and the norm: perhaps weshould look into all this.

Be tha t as it ma y, tra ge dy is a sort of rep res en tat io n of pu bl ic r ig ht ,a pol i t ico-juridic al representa t ion of public might , in seventee nth-cen tury France too. There is , howe ver, one differenceand th is ( g e -n iu s a s i d e ) is wh er e it basical ly differs from Sh ak es pe ar e. On th e onehand, French classical t raged y usual ly dea ls only wi th ancien t kings.This codin g is no doubt a matter of political prudence. But after all,it sho ul d not be forgotten tha t one of the re ason s for thi s ref erenceto ant iq ui t y is this: In sevente enth-cen tury France, and esp ecial ly un -der Lou is XIV , mo narchi c ri ght wa s , be ca use of its form an d even thecont inui ty of i ts history, de pi ct ed as bei ng di re ct ly descen ded fromthe m onar chie s of an tiq ui ty. We find th e sam e ty pe of pow er an d thesame type of mona rchy in Au gu st us and Ne ro, or even Py rr hu s, 7 thatw e find wi th Lou is XI V. It is the sa me mo na rc hy in bo th substant iveand juri dic al terms . On the other hand, French classical tragedy con-ta ins a reference to antiquity, but we can also see the presence of anins titu tio n that a ppe ars to restrict in some wa y the tr ag ic pow ers oft ragedy, an d to make it t i p over int o a thea ter of gal lan try an d in -t r igue: the presence of the court. Anc ie nt trag edy, an d courtly trag edy .But wh at is the court, if notand this is da zz li ng ly obvi ous in thecase of Louis XI V ye t anot her lesson in public r ig ht ? The cour t 'sessential function is to const itut e, to org an iz e, a sp ace for the d a i l yan d per man ent di sp la y of royal po we r in all i ts sple ndo r. The courtis basically a kin d of per man ent ri tua l operation that begin s agai nevery day and requ alif ies a ma n wh o ge ts up, goes for a wa lk , eats ,has his loves and his passio ns, and w ho is at the same ti me t ha nk sto all that, because of all that, and because none of all th at is e l imi-nat ed a sovere ign. Th e specific ope rat ion of co urt ri tu al an d cour t


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ce re mo ni al is to ma ke his love affairs so ver eig n, to mak e hi s foodsovere ign, to mak e his levee an d his go ing -to -b ed ritual sovere ign.An d whi le the court constantly requahfi es his d a i l y routine as sov-ereign in the p ers on of a mo na rc h w h o is the very su bs ta nce of mo n-arch y, tra ge dy does the same thin g in rever se; tr ag ed y un doe s and, ifyou l i k e , recomp oses wha t court r i tu al estab lishes each day.

W h at is the p oint of c l a s s i c a l tragedy, of Racinian tragedy? Itsfun cti on or at leas t one of its axesis to constitute the underside ofthe cere mon y, to sh ow the ce rem on y in sh re ds , the moment w he n th esove reign , the possessor of publi c might , is gr ad ua ll y bro ken do wninto a man of passion, a man of anger, a man of vengeance, a man oflove, ince st, an d so on. In tr ag ed y, the prob lem is wh et he r or notstarting from this decomposition of the sovereign into a man of pas-sion, the so ve re ig n- ki ng can be reb orn a nd recompos ed: the deat h a ndres urr ect ion of the bo dy of the k in g in the hea rt of the mona rc h. Thati s the prob lem (a nd it is much more jur idi cal than psy ch olo gic al)that is pos ed by Rac ini an tra ge dy . In that s ense, you can w e l l under -stan d that wh en Lo uis XI V ask ed Rac ine to be his h istor iogr aphe r,he wa s simp ly bei ng true to the tra dit ion of wh at the his tor iog rap hyof the m ona rch y h ad been un ti l th en , or in oth er wo rd s, an ode topow er itself. But he is also al lo wi ng Raci ne to go on perfo rmi ng thefunction he ha d pl ay ed wh en he wro te h is tra ged ies . He w a s b a s i c a l l yas ki ng him to wri te , as a hi sto rio gra ph er, t he fifth act of a ha pp ytr ag ed y, or in other wo rd s, to trac e the rise of the priv at e man th ecou rti er wh o ha d a hea rt to th e point wh er e he bec ome s at oncewa rlo rd , monarch , and the holder of sover eignty . Entrusting his h i s -tor iog ra ph y to a trag ic poet did not dist ur b the order of ri gh t, nordi d it be tra y his tor y' s old function of est abl ish ing ri gh t, of est abl ish ingthe ri ght of the sover eign State. It mark ed t ha nk s to a necessity thati s bo un d up w ith the abs olut ism of the kin ga retu rn to the pure stan d most ele me nt ar y function of roya l his tor io gra ph y in an absol utemo na rc hy . It mus t not be forgot ten tha t as a re su lt of a sort of st ran gelapse into archaism, the absolute monarchy made the ceremony ofpo wer an intense po litic al momen t, or that the court, whi ch wa s oneof po we r' s cere monie s, wa s a d a i l y lesso n in public ri gh t, a d a i l y


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demon strati on of publi c right. We can now und ers tan d w hy Racin e'sapp oin tme nt al lo we d the history of the kin g to take on its pu restform and , in a sense , its ma gi co -p oe ti c form. The h istory of the ki ngcould not but become po we r' s ode to itself. So abso lutis m, court cer-emon ial, manif estat ions of publ ic right, classical t r age dy, and the h is -tor iog rap hy of the kin g: I th ink they are all pa rt of the same thin g.

Excuse my speculations about Racine and historiography. Let 's skipa century ( the very century t ha t began wi th Boul ain vi l l ier s) and takethe example of the last of the absolute monarchs and the last of hishisto riogr aphe rs: Louis XV I and Ja co b-N ico las Mor eau , the distantsucce ssor to Ra ci ne , of wh om I have al re ad y sai d a few wo rd s, as hew a s the mini ster of hist ory ap po in ted by Loui s XV I to wa rd the endof the 178 0s. Wh o wa s Mo re au , compared to Rac ine ? This is a d an -ger ous pa ra lle l, but you migh t be su rp ri se d wh o comes off wor se .Mo re au is the scho larl y defender of a ki ng who, obviously, nee ded tobe defended on a num ber of occasions du ri ng hi s l ifetim e. Mo re aucertainly pla ye d the role of defen der w he n he wa s app oint ed in the1780sat the ve ry time whe n the righ ts of the mona rch y wer e bein gatt ack ed in the nam e of his to ry, and from v er y different di re ct io ns not onl y by the n ob il ity , but also bv the parlementaires as well as thebourg eoisie . Thi s wa s the precis e moment when history became thediscourse t ha t every "natio n"in quotat ion marks or at least eve ryorder or every class use d to lay clai m to its rig ht; thi s is the momentwhen, if you l i k e , history became the general discourse of politicalstruggles . It was at this point , then, that a ministry of history wascreated. And at this point , you w i l l ask me: Did history really escapethe Sta te, give n that , a hundred years after Ra cin e, we see the em er-gence of a his tor iog rap her who h ad at least equally close lin ks w it hpo we r of the St ate becau se he ac tu al ly di d, as I have just sa id , hav ea m inis teri al or at least adm ini str ativ e function?So wha t was the point of creating this central ministry to admin-

ister hi st or y? Its pur pos e wa s to arm the ki ng for the politic al batt leinsofar a s he wa s , after al l, no mo re than one force among others, andwas being atta cked bv other forces. It pu rp ose w a s also to att emp t toimpose a sort of enforced peace on those hi storico politi cal st rug gl es.


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so on. Al l this has been d esc rib ed as , or sym bo li ze d by, lig ht gr ad ua ll ydispell ing darkness, and i t is this, I think, t ha t we have to get rid of[on the contrary,] when we look at the eighteenth centurywe haveto see, not this re la tio ns hi p be tw ee n day and night, kn ow le dg e andignorance, but something very different: an immense and mul t i p lebatt le, but not one be tw ee n kn ow le dg e an d igno ranc e, but an im -mense and mult ip le bat t le betw een know ledg es in the p lu ra lkn owl-edges t ha t a re in conflict bec au se of the ir ver y mor phol ogy, bec aus ethey are in the p osses sion of enemies , and because they have intrinsicpower-effects.

I w i l l take one or two examples that w i l l , for a moment , take usaway from hi story. Ta ke the pro bl em of techni cal or techn ologi calknowledge. I t is often sa id tha t the eig hte ent h century was the cent urytha t saw the emer gence of technical kn ow led ge s. Wh at actual ly hap-pened in the eig hte ent h ce ntu ry wa s qui te different. First of al l, wehave the plur al , polym orpho us, mu lt ipl e, and disp ersed existenc e ofdifferent kno wle dge s, wh ic h exis ted wi th thei r differencesdiffer-ences defined by geographical regions, by the size of the wo rk sh op sor factories, and so on. The differences among themI am speakingof technologica l exp erti se, re me mb er we re defined by local categ o-r i e s , edu cat ion , an d the wea lt h of their possessors. An d these k no w l-edges were struggling against one another , wi th one another , in asociety where kno wi ng the secret behin d technological kn owl edg e wa sa source of wealth, and in wh ic h the mu tua l indep ende nce of theseknowledges a lso made indivi dual s indepe ndent . So mul t ip le kn ow l-edge , kno wled ge-a s-se cret , kn owl edg e functioning as we alt h and asa guara ntee of inde pend ence : technological kno wle dge functionedwit hin th is pat chw ork . Now, as bo th the pro duc tiv e forces an d eco-nomic de ma nd deve loped , the pric e of these kno wle dge s rose, and thestruggle bet wee n them, the need to deli neate thei r inde pen denc e an dthe nee d for sec recy inten sified an d beca me , so to sp ea k, mor e tense .At the same tim e, w e sa w the deve lop me nt of processes t ha t a l lowedbigger , more general , or more in dus tr ia l iz ed know ledge s , or kn ow l-edges t ha t c i rcula ted more easily, to annex, confiscate, and take oversmaller , more par t ic ula r, more local , an d more art isanal kno wle dge s.


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Ther e wa s a sort of imm ens e eco nom ico -po liti cal str ugg le aro und orover these kno wle dg es, their d isper sal, or their het erogen eity, an im-mens e str ugg le over the econ omic ind uct ion s and power-effects thatw e re boun d up wi th the exc lusive ow ner sh ip of a kn ow le dg e, itsdispersal an d its secret. Wh at has be en cal led the de vel opm ent oftechnol ogical kn owl ed ge in the eightee nth ce ntury has to be though tof in te rm s of a form of mu lt ip li ci ty , an d not in ter ms of the tr iu mp hof light over darkness or of knowledge over ignorance.

Now, the State w i l l interv ene, either d irec tly or ind ire ctl y, in theseattem pts at annex ation , w hich are also att emp ts at genera lizatio n, infour main w a y s . First , by eli min ati ng or disqual ifyin g wh at mig ht beterme d useless and irredu cible li t t le kno wle dge s that are expen sive ineconomic ter ms: elim ina tio n and disqu alificat ion, then. Second, bynor mal izi ng the se know led ges ; th is makes it possible to fit th em to-geth er, to ma ke th em com mu nic ate wi th one anoth er, to br ea k do wnthe ba rri ers of secrecy and technolog ical and geo graph ical bound aries .In short, this mak es not only know led ge s, bu t also those wh o possessthem, inter chan geab le. The norma lization of disper sed knowle dges .Thi rd opera tion: the hie rarc hica l classification of kn owl edg es all owsthem to become, so to speak, interlocking, starting with the mostpar tic ula r and mater ial kno wle dge s, which are also subord inate dknowledges , and en din g wit h the most gener al forms, wi th the mostformal kn ow le dg es , whi ch are also the forms that en velop and di rec tknowledge . So, a hie rar chi cal classification. An d finally, once al l th ishas been done, a fourth ope rati on bec omes po ssible: a py ra mi da l cen-tral izat ion that all ows these knowl edg es to be controlled, wh ich en -sures that they can be selected, and both that the content of theseknowledges can be transmitted upward from the bottom, and th atthe overa ll directi ons and the gen era l organi zation s it wishe s to p ro-mote can be tra ns mit ted d o wn wa rd from the top.

The tenden cy to organize technological kno wle dge s brin gs wi th ita who le serie s of prac tices , projects, and ins titu tion s. The Encyclopedicfor example. The Encyclopedic is us ua ll y seen only in te rm s of its po-l i t i c a l or ideol ogi cal opp osi tio n to the mon ar ch y and at least one formof Ca th ol ic is m. Its inte res t in tec hnolo gy is not in fact a refl ecti on of


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tha t could centrali ze know ledg es around a sor t of de facto axiomati-zation. So every knowledge was organized into a discipline. Theseknowledges t ha t had been disci phn ariz ed from wit hi n were then a r -rang ed, mad e to comm unica te wi th one another, r edis tr ibu ted, andorg ani zed into a hier archy wi thi n a sor t of ov era ll field or o ve ra lld isc ipl ine tha t was known specifically as science. Sci enc e in th e s in-gular did not exis t before the eig hte ent h cen tury . Sciences exi ste d,kno wle dge s existed , and philosophy, if you l i k e , existed. Philosop hyw a s , precisel y, the organizat ional system , the system t h a t a l lowedkn ow le dg es to comm unica te wit h one anothe rand to t h a t ex ten t itcould pl ay an effective, real , and op erat iona l role wi th in the de ve l-opmen t of technical kno wled ges. The discip hnar izat ion of kn ow l-edges , and i ts poly morp hou s sin gul ari ty, now leads to the emergenc eof a phenomenon and a constraint t ha t is now a n inte gr al pa rt of oursociety. We c a l l it "sc ien ce. " A t the same time , an d for the sa mereason, philosophy loses its found ation al an d founding role. Philoso-phy no longe r has any real role to play w it h in scie nce an d the pr o-cesses of kn ow le dg e. A t the sa me tim e, and for the sam e reason s,mathesisor the project of a un iv ers al science tha t could serve as botha formal in str um en t for eve ry science an d a rig oro us found ation fora l l sciencesalso dis app ear s. Science, defined as a gener al domain, asthe disciplinary policing of knowledges, takes over from bo th ph i los -ophy and mathesis. From now on, it w i l l rais e specific pro ble ms rel ati ngto the di sc ip li na ry pol icin g of kn ow le dg es : pro ble ms of classification,pro ble ms of hie rar chi cah zat ion , pro bl em s of pro xim ity , and so on.

A belief in the pr ogress of reason wa s the eigh tee nth cen tur y's onlyawareness of this far-reaching change in the disciphnarization ofkno wle dge s and the subseq uent el im inati on of bo th the p hilos ophic aldisco urse opera tin g wi th in science and the scien ces' internal projectfor a mathesis. I think, howev er, t ha t if w e can gr as p wh at w as goin gon ben eat h w ha t is cal led the progress of reas on name ly the disc i-phnar iz at ion of polymorp hous a nd heterogeneous know ledg es wew i l l be able to un de rs tan d a cer tain num be r of thi ngs . First, the a p-peara nce of the un iv er si ty . Not of course in the str ict sense, as theuni ver sit ies had th eir function, role, an d exi ste nce lon g before th is.


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Bu t from th e end of th e eig hte ent h an d be gi nn in g of the nine teen thcenturies onwa rdt he N apol eonic u nive rsit y wa s establishe d at pre-c i s e l y this t imewe see the emergence of something l i k e a sort ofgreat uniform app ar atu s of kn ow le dg es , wi th its different stag es, i tsdifferent extensions, its different l e v e l s , and its pseudo podia. The u ni -vers i ty 's pr im ar y function is one of sele ction , not so muc h of peo ple( wh i c h is , after al l , basic ally not very i mp or ta nt ) as of kno wle dge s.It can play thi s selecti ve role bec aus e it has a sort of de factoandde juremonopoly, which means that any knowledge that is not bornor shaped within this sort of insti tutio nal fieldwho se lim it s ar e infact relativ ely fluid bu t w hi ch consists, rou ghl y spe aki ng, of the un i-vers i ty and official rese arc h bod ies th at an yt hi ng tha t exists outsideit, any knowledge tha t exists in the wild, any knowledge t h a t is bornelsewhere , is aut oma tic ally , and from the outse t, if not a ctu all y ex -cluded, disqualified a priori. That the amateur scholar ceased to existin the eigh teen th and ni netee nth cent urie s is a we ll -k no wn fact. Sothe uni ver sit y has a selec tive role: it selects kn ow le dg es . Its role is todist inguish bet wee n qual i tat i ve and quanti tat iv e l e v e l s of knowledge,and to dis tri bu te kn owl edg es acco rdin gly. Its role is to teach, wh ic hmeans respect ing the barr iers that ex is t be tw ee n the different floorsof the uni vers ity ap pa ra tu s. Its role is to homo geni ze kn ow led ge s byestabl ishing a sort of scientific com mun ity wi th a recog nized s tatu s;its r ole is to org an iz e a conse nsus. Its role is , f i n a l l y , to use, eitherdirect ly or indi rec t ly, State appar atuses to central ize know ledg e. W ecan now un derst and wh y something resem bling a univers i ty, wi th i tsi l l-defined extensions and frontiers, should have emerged at the be-gin nin g of the nin eteen th cent ury, or in o ther words at the very timewh en thi s discip hna nzat ion of know ledg es, this organizat ion ofknowle dges into disc ipl i nes, wa s goi ng on.

Th is also all ows us to unde rsta nd a seco nd phenomenon, or w ha tmi gh t be te rme d a ch an ge in th e form of do gm at is m. You see, oncethe mechanism, or the internal d isc ipl ine of kn owl edg es, incl ude s con-trols, and once those controls are exercis ed by a pur pos e-b uil t appa ra tu s; once w e hav e this form of contro lyou mus t un de rs ta ndthi sw e can do aw ay wit h wh at w e mig ht c a l l the orthodoxy of


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stateme nts. This old ort hod oxy wa s costly, for this pri nci ple , wh ic hfunctio ned as a re lig iou s or eccle sia stic al mod e of functio ning, ha dres ul ted in the con dem nat ion an d exc lus ion of a cer tai n nu mb er ofstateme nts th at w ere scientifically tru e and scientifically produ ctive .The dis cip lin e, the dis cip lin ariz ati on of kn owl ed ges estab lishe d in theeighteenth century, w i l l replace that orthodoxy, which applied tosta teme nts them selv es and sort ed those that we re acc epta ble out fromthose that were unacceptable, with something e l s e : a control tha t a p-plies not to the content of stat emen ts th emse lves , to their conform ityor nonc onfor mity to a cer tain t ru th , but to the regu la rit y of enu nci-ation s. The p rob lem is now : Wh o is sp ea ki ng , are the y qualif ied tosp ea k, at w h a t leve l is the st at em en t s it ua te d, wh a t set can it be fittedinto, an d how and to wh at ex ten t does it conform to other forms an dother typ olo gie s of kn ow le dg e? Th is allo ws a lib era lis m that is , if notbo un dle ss , at least more br oa d- mi nd ed in ter ms of the content ofsta tem ent s and , on the other han d, more rigoro us, more com pre hen -siveand ha s a mu ch gr eat er win g area at the level of en unc iato ryproc edur es. As a result , an d as yo u might have ded uce d, statem entscou ld rotate muc h more qui ck ly , and trut hs beca me obsolete muc hmore qu ick ly. As a resu lt, a num ber of epi stem olo gica l obsta cles couldbe removed . Ju st as an ortho dox y that c onc ent rate d on the content ofstatements had become an obstacle to the renewal of the stock ofscientific kn owl edg es, so, in contrast, dis cip lin ari zat ion at the level ofenun ciatio ns al lo we d the stock to be rene wed much mor e qui ckl y.We move, if you l i k e , from the ce nso rsh ip of st at em en ts to the di s-c ip l inar iza t ion of enunciations, or from orthodoxy to what I wouldc a l l "or th olo gy ," to a form of con trol th at is no w exe rc is ed on adiscipl inary basis.

Righ t I've st ra ye d a w a y from the point wi th all this . We ha ve beenstu dyi ng, lookin g at how the disc ipl ina ry tec hniq ues of power, 1 1 takenat their most subtle or elementary l ev e l , tak en at the lev el of in di vi d-ual bodies, succeeded in changing the political economy of power, andmodified its apparatuses; we have also seen how disciplinary tech-niques of power applied to bodies not only led to an accumulation ofknow ledg e, but also ident ified possible domai ns of kn owl edg e. W e


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est abl ish men t, at the end of the eig hte ent h ce ntu ry, of a mi ni st ry ofhisto ry, the estab lis hme nt of the gr eat repo sito ry of archives tha t wa sto become the Ecole des Chartes in the nineteenth century, whichmore or less coi ncid ed wi th the es tab lish men t of the Ecole des Min esan d the Ecole de s Ponts et Chau sse es th e Ecole des Po nts et Ch au s-sees is a li tt le different, not that it mat ter sa lso corre spon ds to thedisciplinarization of knowledge. Royal power's objective was to d i s -cipline historical kno wle dg e, or historical kno wle dge s, and thus toestablish a State kno wle dg e. The difference be twe en this and tech-nological kn ow le dg e is that insofar as histor y was indeedI thinkan ant i- State knowle dge , there wa s a perp etual confrontation betwe enthe history that had been d isc ipl ina riz ed by the State and that hadbeco me the con ten t of official tea chi ng, an d the his tor y th at wasbo un d up wi th s tru gg les bec aus e it wa s the consciousness of subje ctsinvolved in a str ugg le. Dis cip lin ari zat ion did not defuse the confron-tation. While it can be said that the dis cip lin ari zat ion introdu ced inthe eig hte en th cen tu ry was br oa dl y effective and successful in therealm of technology, whe re hist orical know le dg e is concerned, disci-plinarization did occur, but it not only failed to block the non-Statisthistory, the decente red history of subjects in stru ggle , but act ual lymad e it stro nge r t ha nk s to a wh ol e set of str ug gle s, confiscations, andmutu al ch alleng es. An d to that e xtent, you a l w a y s have two l e v e l s ofhistorical knowledge and consciousness, and the two l e v e l s obviouslydrift further an d further apa rt. But the ga p be tw ee n the two n everpr ev en ts eith er of the m from e xi st in g. So w e ha ve on the one han d akn owl ed ge tha t ha s effectively be en di sc ip li na ri ze d to form a his tori caldiscipline, and on the oth er ha nd, a hist oric al consciousn ess that ispo lym orp ho us , d ivi ded , and c ombative. It is si mp ly the other side,the other face of a pol itic al consciousness. I wo ul d l i k e to try to saya litt le ab ou t thes e thi ngs by look ing at the end of the eig hte ent hcent ury and the begi nnin g of the ninete enth.


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I.JulesMichelet, Le Peuple (Paris, 1946).2. Niccolo Machiavelh, II Principe (Rome, 1532); Discorsi sopra laprima deca di tito Livio, op.

at . ; Dell'arte della guerra Florence, 1521) ; htoriefiorentini( Florence, 1531) .There are manvFrench translations of II Principe (English translation by George Bull: ThePrince [Har-mondsworth: Penguin, 1961]) . The other texts referred to may be consulted in E. Barinou, ed., Machiavel, Oeuvres completes (Pan s: Bibliotheque de la Plei'ade, 1952); this is arevised and updated version ofJ . Guiraudet's old translations( 1 7 9 8 ) . Englishtranslationby Leslie J . Walker: The Discourse of Nkcolo Machiavel/i (London: Routledge and KeganPaul, 1 9 5 0 ) . Foucault discusses Machiavelli in Oranes et singulatim ( 1 9 8 1 ) and ThePolitical Technology of Individuals, and in his lecture On Governmentality ; cf. note13 to the lecture of 21January above.

3. Pierre le Pesant de Boisguilbert, Le Detail de la France (s.1, 1695) ; Factum de la France( 1 7 0 7 ) , m Economistes financiers du XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1843); Testament politique de M. deVauban, Marechal de France, 2 vols. (s.1. 1707); Dissertation sur la nature des richesses, deVargent et des tributs (Paris, n.d.).

4- Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban, Methode generate etacile pourfaire le de'nombrement des peu pies(Paris, 1 6 8 6 ) ; Pvjet d'une dixme royale (s.1. 1707).

5. On the antihistoncism of contemporary knowledge, see in particular chapter 4 of LesMots et les choses (English translation: The Order of Things).

6 . The passage in brackets has been reconstructed from Foucault's manuscript.7. Characters in, respectively, Corneille's Cinna and Racine's Britannkus and Andromaque.

[Trans.]8 . The results of the enormous task undertaken by Moreau will be found in his F*rincipes

de morale, depolitique, et de droit public; for examples of the crite ria used bv Moreau inpreparationfor this work , and for its histo ry, see also his Plan des travaux litte'raires ordonnes

par Sa Majeste.9- On the procedures of normalization in medical kno wledge, the reader is referred toNaissance de la clinique: uneaxhe'ologie du regard medical (Pans: PUF, 19 63 )(English trans-

lation bv Alan Sheridan: Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical F*reception [London:Tavistock, 1973]); the lecture given by Foucault in Brazil in 197 4 on the history ormedicine, El nacimento de la medicine social ( La Naissance de la medicine sociale,Dits et ecrits, vol. 3, pp. 207-27); Incorpoacion del hospital en la tecnologia moderna( L'incorporation de I'hopital dans la technologie moderne, in Dits et ecrits, vol. 3,pp . 508-21); and the analysis of medical policing made in La Politique de la sante auXVIIIe siecle, in Dits et ecrits, vol. 3, pp. 13-27 (English translation: The Politics ofHealth in the Eighteenth Century , in Power/Knowledge, pp. 16 6- 82 ); and La Politiquede la sante au XVIIIe siecle, in Dits et ecrits, vol. 3, pp.725-41.

1 0 . On disciplinary power and its effects on knowledge, see in particular Suweiller et punir:Naissance de la prison (Pans: Gallimard, 1975)- English translation by Alan Sheridan:Discipline and Finish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Allen Lane, 1977).

11, See in particular the lectures given at the College de France in 1 9 7 1 - 1 9 7 2 : Theories etinstitutions pe'nales, and in 1972-1973: La socie'te punitive, forthcoming.

12. Michel Foucault, Les Anormaux: Cours au College de France, 7 9 7 4 - 7 9 7 5 (Pans: Gallimardand Le Seuil, 1 9 9 9 ) .


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foucault 25 feb. 1976 society must be defended

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