Maria Elisabetta Lanzone

PhD Candidate, University of Pavia

lanzone.lisa@gmail.com

Grillo and Berlusconi: web vs tv?

Forza italia and MoVimento 5 Stelle. Two examples of “mediatic populism” in comparison

1. Introduction

The first part of this work was presented during the Annual Sisp Conference, which was held last

September in Rome. This was the first attempt to place the movement started by Beppe Grillo, the

so called Movimento 5 Stelle (abbreviated as M5S), within conceptual schemes which highlight the

common characteristics of the most important populist phenomena of the post-war era, especially in

Italy.

The thesis begins by analysing the structure of this new political movement and in particular the

means of communication and participation it uses, relying almost entirely on the internet and

especially the Web 2.0 technology. Therefore M5S was included among those populist phenomena

that employ new forms of political participation (web populism). Three tools are used for the

following analysis: first of all a theoretical background that follows Yves Mény and Yves Surel’s

analysis (Mény-Surel 2000: 35-38) it does not consider populism as “a democracy’s enemy” but a

symptom of the democratic unease that emerges under specific circumstances, such as the

progressive weakening of the traditional media systems (the political parties), the growth of power’s

personalisation and the development of media’s influence. As a result, populism is considered as

“an appeal to the people referring to ‘the simple man’s pathos” (Canovan 1981: 7). Secondly, M5S’s

programmes and development phases between the end of 2008 and the end of 2012 that contributed

to its success are analysed. In this context M5S’s structure and the relationships between leadership

and membership are taken into consideration. Finally, the movement’s internet activity was

monitored for six months from two different points of view: on a qualitative level, posts and

comments on its Facebook group page and its blog (www.beppegrillo.it) which shows populist

characteristics both from leaders and followers, and on a quantitative level, the popularity of Beppe

Grillo’s posts are analysed counting the number of “likes”, comments, shared posts and data from

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other national political leader’s pages that use social networks.

From the analysis it emerged that most populist messages come from the leaders, whereas members

show a more fragmented and undefined use of populist messages (this is why a survey to find out

who the “Grillini” are will start); Beppe Grillo is very popular and remains at the top of the chart of

leaders that use the internet as their favourite means of communication; M5S’s future remains

uncertain as far as national elections are concerned.

That being stated, the following analysis aims to provide a further contribution to a new political

subject that can be compared to other political phenomena which characterised Italy between its

First and Second Republic. More specifically, this thesis aims to compare Beppe Grillo’s M5S to

Forza Italia, the party founded by Berlusconi in 1994. Nevertheless, it will not be a simple

comparison between Grillo and Berlusconi: assuming that Beppe Grillo is only “a continuation of

Berlusconi’s work using different media” (Santoro, 2012: 107) would be a simplification that might

lead to schematism. As a matter of fact, the following analysis aims to go beyond this comparison

and to place the two political subjects in the picture of populism and in particular in its mediatic

form, where means of communication are the main mobilization tool, often turned into a political

show. Subsequently, the structure of what is defined as “TV party” (Forza Italia) will be compared

to the first “web party” (M5S). In this context, the two leading figures who brought the two parties

to life will be analyzed in their relationship leadership/membership.

Finally, the two subjects will be placed in their context of political and social development, showing

more analogies and differences in their rise: here it emerges how Berlusconi’s gradual decline could

correspond to Grillo’s rise. The final part of this thesis will provide a web survey started in

November 2012 about different components of M5S in order to clarify specific aspects regarding

leaders and members. In the analysis, qualitative and quantitative data about M5S will be compared

with Forza Italia’s data from 1994 and the current decline of Pdl (People of Freedom, a centre-right

political party). The first element to be analysed is the survey that Epokè1 ran six months before

the elections in Parma, which saw the first M5S mayor as a winner in a provincial city. Data about

trust in the parties and their leaders, the voting location and the use of new media will be presented.

In particular, these are the questions this analysis will try to answer:

Which features should a political party/movement have in order to be considered an

example of mediatic populism?

Does the leader build the followers?

1 About Epokè-Ricerche Sociali Applicate see www.epokericerche.it

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Is it necessary to analyse the political subjects’ structures in order to understand the

relationship between leader and followers?

What are the consequences of the foundation of a TV party and a web party?

Can M5S be included in the web populism and post-modern politics context to which

Berlusconi’s decline belongs? Can the latter be considered as a symbol of the Second

Republic (after Tangentopoli) and Grillo as an icon for the birth of the Third Republic?

2. About “mediatic populism”

Referring to the term “populism” means approaching a controversial field of political science that

for a long time was neither defined nor classified. This analysis attempts to create a common

nucleus that defines the most important characteristics of populism following Yves Mény and Yves

Surel’s work, who integrate it fully in the democratic system. Considering populism not as an

ideology but more as an “ideological scheme” or a “conversational register”, one finds that at its

core there is the conviction that “the people are, politically, a sovereign entity that deserves the

monopoly of legitimacy that the leading classes betrayed, therefore it is the people’s duty to directly

restore their own supremacy” (Mény-Surel 2000: 18). For the purpose of this analysis the

innovative element introduced by Margaret Canovan is worth mentioning: she acknowledges in

populism a “common man pathos, an appreciation for public virtues of simple citizens in contrast

with their governors’ vice” (Canovan 1981: 9). This view is supported by Hans Georg Bets, who

defines populism as “an appeal to the ordinary man and his common sense, which is considered

superior” (Mény-Surel 2000: 19). These definitions will occur very often in the following analysis.

Furthermore, Mény and Surel add three conditions to these definitions that historically might have

promoted populism’s development.

As previously mentioned these conditions are:

• the progressive weakening of traditional mediation apparatuses, in particular of political

parties , around which the representative democracy was structured

• the continuous growth of power’s personalisation (predominance of personal parties)

• the development of media’s influence (see Sartori 1999: “videopolitics”)

This is the starting point for the following analysis: both political subjects that will be taken into

consideration (Forza Italia and M5S) appear to have the three conditions that Mény and Surel

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identified. As it will be explained later, they both fit in the periods of major crisis for political

parties, playing on the growing personalisation of power (on speaks about two political parties

starting with two very personal leader, Silvio Berlusconi e Beppe Grillo). Finally, on both parties –

and on both leaders – it's important the media influence (but different media).

The crisis of the traditional mediation systems (the parties) is the context to which the development

of the two political subjects and their growing election success belong, whereas the personalisation

of power represents the construction of the two political subjects and their structure, which will be

analysed in terms of the relationship between leadership and membership. Finally, the influence

from the media represents a double tool for political communication and participation that generates

the so called “mediatic populism”.

First of all it will be necessary to concentrate on the political life’s media world: again according to

Mény and Surel it redifines the relationship between power and people (leader – followers and

leadership – membership). With the rise of mass media a progressive redefinition of traditional

means of mediation between citizens and political world takes place: parties and square gatherings

are replaced by television, newspapers and finally Web 2.0, blogs and social networks. Media take

the parties’ place in terms of selection mechanisms of the political class and as mobilization of the

public opinion or definition of the political programme. At first television becomes a public ground

for comparison often based on turning politics into a show with strong messages that can affect the

viewer/voter easily, quickly and effectively. This is exactly what Sartori defined as “videopolitics”

(Sartori 1999) and Pier André Taguieff as “tele-populism” (Taguieff 2001).

The growth of media’s influence went at the same pace of parties’ decline, such as militant

organisations (élite or mass ones) which were able to gather people’s opinions and interests

(Pasquino 2010: 169)2. Furthermore, the increasing use of new communication techniques made it

possible to address messages to citizens that could be adapted by the media on the left and right

wing like a commercial product. In addition, according to Sartori “videopolitics” caused voters to

identify themselves more and more with a leader, a face, a persona and as a result they would vote

for a person and not always for a party. They would vote for a man that uses clever slogans that

mobilize masses rather than political programmes. This is what happened to all the new political

subjects that became popular at the beginning of the Second Republic: their development, their

success and often their declined was bound to one only political figure, whether leader or founder,

around which the party or movement was built. The most relevant examples are Umberto Bossi’s

2 Parties’ decline was underlined between 80s and 90s in almost all Europe, in particular in Italy. About this, also see

survey and new record (2011-2012).

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Lega Nord, Antonio di Pietro’s Italia dei Valori, Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and more recently

Nichi Vendola’s Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà and Beppe Grillo’s M5S.

These are some of the examples that Marco Tarchi lebeled as populist (Tarchi 2003: 7-11). This

analysis will, however, focus on Forza Italia and M5S. The former, upon the “Tangentopoli” scandal

and the “Mani Pulite” investigation, represents the “television party” par excellance founded by

businessman from Milan Silvio Berlusconi, whose intent was to “interpret the dreams of the Italian

people” in 1994; the latter was founded as a “non party”3 by the comedian from Genoa Beppe

Grillo, who made internet his main political communication and mobilization tool once he

disappeared from the TV screens.

More specifically, the question this analysis will attempt to answer is the following: what kind of

structure should a political party have in order to align with the populist strategy (or ideology?) in a

context of politics turned into a mediatic show? In order to answer this question it is important first

of all to distinguish the populist leadership (Berlusconi and Grillo) from the leadership of populist

movements (Forza Italia and M5S) meant as membership (voters and political class). By doing this

there will also be an attempt to find differences between the two media used by the parties: TV for

Forza Italia and web for M5S. As a matter of fact, in both cases one can define it as the construction

of politics through media, using different tools that can have partially different structures but, more

importantly, different consequences in terms of constituency.

This thesis will proceed with a brief analysis on the two leading founders and their origins, pointing

out the context in which their political subjects developed. Subsequently a distinction of the

structure of the two subjects will be looked into on three levels: leadership (charisma,

spokesperson), membership (political class) and simple followers (supporters, voters and militants).

From this it will be possible to see how the different use of media can cause differences in the

relation of these three levels despite analogies in the structure.

Finally this analysis will focus on M5S, which will be looked into in the decline phase of the

Berlusconi era. Data about the success of the new political subject will be presented in relation to

the decline of the current Pdl (amongst others), considering also M5S’s future in the context of the

next national elections.

3 “non party” is a definition of the same M5S. See “non association” at http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/Regolamento-Movimento-5-Stelle.pdf

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3. The man of TV and the man from TV

Forza Italia was organized during the summer of 1993, when Silvio Berlusconi left his role of

successful entrepreneur to give voice to the “need for a new class.” On June 29, with the signatures

of Berlusconi, Marcello Dell’Utri, Cesare Previti, Antonio Martino and Mario Valducci, Forza Italia

was born, in Milan, as an organization for “good governance”. On December 10, in Brigherio, the

first club was funded, and its first grass-roots Weapon, the anthem, was made public. But the Forza

Italia Political Movement will only appear the following year, on 18 January 1994. On January 26,

through a 9 minute message broadcast by his own tv-channels and even by Rai television news,

Berlusconi announced his “descent in the political arena” nefore the national elections. His

message contains a new “recipe” for the Italian people: dissatisfaction with the old political elite,

the “self-made man” myth, an appeal to the Catholic world, the anti-communist rhetoric, trust in

free enterprise and, most of all, the promise of a “new Italian miracle”:

“I enter the ield with a new movement and I ask of you to do the same, now. The political

movement I introduce to you is called Forza Italia. It’s a free organization of voters of a completely

new kind: it’s not just another party, another faction whose aim is only to divide, but on the contrary

a force whose goal is to unite, to give Italy, at last, a government who can understand the most

deeply felt needs of the common people. A political force made of brand new men. A program with

only sensible and understandable projects. What we want is to renew Italian society and make space

for those who are willing to build their own future, both in the North and in the South. We want to

promote environmental politics and say no to crime and corruption. It’s a turning point: I’m an

entrepreneur, a citizen who took to the field for the sake of Italy. It’s possible to defeat the politics

of endless chatter and no-good politicians. Together we can make a fairer Italy (Silvio Berlusconi)4.

On 28 March 1994 Forza Italia wins the election, and the era of Berlusconismo begins: a series of

changes in power that lasted until 2011: almost twenty years mared by the ascent, the success and

the decline of th “tv party” led by its own funder Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi can be considered

the man of the tv, one who used television as a medium for political propaganda, and as a means of

social influence: the messages conveyed during the berlusconismo golden age belong to two

different kinds, both of a populist character, having the ability “make dream” that Guy Hermet has

pointed out. According to Hermet “populism consists of different strategies for mass-manipulation.

An appeal to the people, which can be defined as charismatic patronage, operating instantly and

aiming at ‘making dream’ (which is often the same as ‘making believe’). Furthermore, the speech of

the modern demagogue (populist or neo-populist) prefers representation with a highly imaginative-

4 Berlusconi’s speech is taken from the videohttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8-uIYqnk5A .

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emotional content” (Hermet 2003: 103). In Berlusconi’s case, the first kind of messages are, strictly

speaking, of a “political” kind and are tied to the propaganda for Forza Italia and, later, for the

Popolo della Libertà. The second type is non-political messages, which are none the less able to

influence and gain votes, still through tv.5 As Giovanni Cominetti reminds us: “Berlusconi’s

television has been decisive not only for the mighty propaganda coverage during electoral

campaigns, but even more for the cultural hegemony it has express in all these years […] The

Fininvest network, a sort of modern grass-roots organic intellectual, has built common sense and

been hegemonic for more than 10 years” (Fiori 2004: 28).

As an example of “media populism”, berlusconismo can be compared to a recent phenomenon in

Italian politics: that which started when the Genoese comedian Beppe Grillo “took to the field” with

his MoVimento 5 Stelle. Apparently, Grillo’s interest for politics developed on the web, when in

2005the ex-comedian (banned from tv) created a blog which in few months became one of the

most read in the world. Then together with the first activists, he developed the project of the

meetups, a digital platform aimed at creating a net on citizens, to help dialogue and experience-

sharing. Two years later, in 2007, came the first V-Day, to support the “Clean Parliament” initiative,

and in 2008 the second V-Day for freedom o the press. A movement born on the web but that soon

took to the streets, with groups of people joining to create the civil list “Beppe Grillo’s Friends”,

supported by the comedian, which run for local elections and conquered some seats, for example in

Rome.

In 2009, then, the Movimento 5 Stelle was born (the 5 stars stand for the five themes at the core of

the movement’s ideology: public water supply, transport, development, connectivity, environment).

In 2010 the Woodstock event was organized in Cesena, showing how strong the new-born

movement was. The birth of the movement was announced by Grillo himself on his blog (Political

press release n. 25): “4 October 2009 will see the creation of the new “Movimento Nazionale a

Cinque Stelle” (National Five Stars Movement). It will come into life on the Internet. Every Italian

citizen with a clean record and not signed up to a political party will be able to join. Two years have

gone by since September 2007, since the first V-day in Bologna and a little over a year since the

second V-day in Turin. In those days, millions of people informed via the Internet asked for two

things: a Parliament that is an expression of the citizens without convicts and with the possibility of

choosing a candidate and the freedom of information. These informed people were derided by the

parties, by the TV stations and by the newspapers”6. Since that moment until today the M5S has

kept growing – as shown by polls and by the results in the regional and local elections –

5 See Novelli (Comunicazione Politica a. V, n. 1 pp.143-154).

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conquering, last May, four municipalities: Parma (Federico Pizzarotti), Comacchio (Marco Fabbri),

Mira (Alvise Maniero) e Sarego (Roberto Castiglion).

The map of Italy below shows how five-star mayors are located in Northern Italy and especially in

Veneto and Emilia Romagna.

Then, in October 2012, there was the extraordinary result in Sicily regional elections: “The

Spokesman candidate for President Giancarlo Cancelleri has gained the confidence of 368.006

people, which make up for 18,2% of voters. Together with all other Spokespersons Candidates in

the region, M5S has become the first political force with 15% of consent among Sicilian voters.

Thanks to your engagement 15 citizens without previous convictions have made their way into the

Sicilian Regional Assembly. Thaks to all citizens who have supported us.”7 (from Facebook 22

October 2012). As a matter of fact, in Sicily, the 5 star list has elected 15 coucillors in the regional

Assembly and the Movement was confirmed as the first political force in the region. A success

confirmed by polls in the following weeks, with the M5S as the second party on a national scale,

behind the PD, with a 18% of consent.8

But where does the movement funder, Beppe Grillo, come from? In middle-class Genoa, in the 50s,

Grillo – after leaving school and the family business – made his way in the show business, making

6 Beppe Grillo’s Political Press Realese n. 25. Blog Archives www.beppegrillo.it .

7 Post on Facebook 26 October 2012, “Candidato Portavoce” MoVimento 5 Stelle Sicilia.

8 For the survey results, see www.epokericerche.it .

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his debut on tv in 1976, after meeting the Sicilian tv host Pippo Baudo. In 1979 he participated in

the first season of Fantastico, the new Saturday night tv-show. The true turning point in Grillo’s

carrer came when he met Antonio Ricci, the man behind Canale 5 satirical news programme Striscia

la notizia.

In 1983 Grillo, back in Rai, “discoverd” political satire, in the same time as Democrazia Cristiana

reached a low of 35%. In the same years Grillo shot some commercials for Yomo yoghurt. In 1990

he made his debut in theatres with a show that – according to an Abacus survey – got him chosen as

Italy’s “most popular” comedian – although he had not been on tv for a couple. of years. In 1990 he

then brought his Beppe Grillo Show on tv, a programme followed by 15 million Italians: “A cross-

party audience confused after Tangentopoli, and post-ideological. Those who decreed its success

were the same that a few months later elected Silvio Berlusconi as Prime Minister.” (Santoro 2012:

22).

Understanding where Beppe Grillo comes from is then necessary to understand, on the one hand,

his ties to italian popo culture and, on the other hand, the laguage of televisione devolpped during

Berlusconi’s ascent, the success of his tv-channels and of the people who stood for it, as Antonio

Ricci.

The tie betwee Grillo and tv has been decisive for his step form satire to politics. His path led him

away from television (whose language and functioning he nonetheless learnt from) and brought him

to the web as a new instrument for communication and political agitation.

So, as Berlusconi was preparing Forza Italia and his descent into the politicl arena, Beppe Grillo

was shouting in theatres (and n TV) about the political crisi, scandals and corruption.

There’s a common thread between berlusconismo and Grillo,9 which is manifest in their political

language, as Massimiliano Panarari10 notices when he describes Ricci’s influence on Grillo, using

Gur Debord’s theories about the “soociety of the spectacle” (which are also used in the language of

advertisement). Panarari shows how Ricci’s goal was “appropriating words for propaganda,

emtying them of their meaning in order to conquer the audience”. This aspect demonstrates the

importance of language and of the relationship between populism – considered as the ability to

engage the masses telling them exactly what they expect to be told – and pop culture, as reassuring

and disengaged mass language (Santoro 2012: 26).

9 To this day, the analogies do not refer the Silvio berlusconi and Beppe grillo on a personal level. They refer to the “Tv culture” born with berlusconismo and the schemes used by Grillo during his shows, which recur in his speeches and political battles.

10 Massimiliano Panarari teaches Analysis of Political Lnguage and political Communication at Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia and Political Marketing in the School of Government of Università luiss "Guido Carli" in Rome. See L'egemonia sottoculturale.

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The same context can be found in the messages Grillo sent as a leader, once he asserted himself as

the M5S political leader. 11 We have here to consider two phenomena – berlusconismo and grillismo

– which apparently are very distant but which share common roots: we can first of all see

Berlusconi as the man of the tv, that is the man who build his image throgh television and who, in so

doing, brought about the language of the “society of the spectacle” Pananari mentions. Beppe Grillo

is, on the contrary, the man from TV that learnt its communicative schemes and transfered those

messages to another media, more innovative and effective, the web 2.0. That’s for the conceptual

schemes considered.

Considering the leaders themselves, Berlusconi and Grillo can seem even more different: the first

one is entrepreneur, the second one a comedian. Two personalities, two images that are quite

different but that both carry populist messages which partly overlap:12 first of all, both leaders make

a direct appeal to the people, both speak for the renewal of the political class, both evoke the

neccessity of changement and need an enemy to fight (“communism”, “the left” for Berlusconi, the

entire political class and the “parties” for Grillo) (Grillo-Casaleggio 2011). These are elements that

brought about a highly individual leadership, where personal popularity can be used to gain political

consent. Anyhow, these are characteristics that Marco tarchi has found in every populist leader who

has created a personal party in post-world war Italy (see Tarchi 2003). What Berlusconi and grillo

really have in common is a political language derived from the media and based on

spectacularization. Furthermore, one has to look at the level of membership built around the

leadership: can one compare the two structures, which have made the success of Forza Italia and

M5S possible? Which elements do they share? And above all what consequences will the Internet

have as communicative and participatory strategy to build a new political-communicational subject?

It will be seen that the web – by definition interactive and participatory – is used in different ways

and can have different consequences than tv. M5S communications and Grillo’s personal campaigns

will be analyzed, in the effects brought about on the Internet on in the real world, combining new

and old communicative elements (the square and traditional media)13. Lastly, it will be shown how

the interactive character of the web 2.0 could even cause internal problems to the new political

11 It is schemes used by “communication leader” Beppe Grillo to appeal to his “people”, different from the schemes

and contents which can be inda t the membership level trying to break free of the leader. This aspect will be taken up in the final part of this paper and will be the subject of following research, aiming at reconstructing the history of M5S.

12 On the leader “image” and the way it is constructed, see Belpoliti 2009.

13 As during Grillo’s campaign in Sicily before the regional elections last October.

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subject and in the relationship between membership and leadership (problems of 2internal

democracy”). The horizontal character of web-mediated communication might not be ideal for the

highly polarized structure built aorund Grillo’s leadership, and might even been more suitable for

Berlusconi’s tv-party, that through television has made possible a “non-mobilitation” which or more

than 15 years has enabled the entrepreneur from Milan to mantain his populartity and be the only

charismatic leader in Forza Italia and in the PDL.14

4. Forza Italia and M5S: structure in comparison

To answer the initial question, that is “which structures a political subject is supposed to have in

order to be considered a populist phenomenon” one has to analyze the development of Forza Italia

and M5S in order to find out similarities and differences in the two forces that have brought

Berlusconi and Grillo to success. One has to ask whether the structures – and the media used – are

ideal for the highly personal leadership which characterizes both cases, and what consequences

ensued. First of all, one needs to consider the context in which the two movements evolved; Forza

Italia, as has been said, was born in 1994, taking advantage of the crisis of the political parties, of

the Tangentopoli scandal and Mani Pulite inquiry. A political vacuum and a need for renewal to

which Berlusconi responded taking to the field with Forza Italia. The trust in political parties

seemed to have reached a low, but today a new record is about to be set, as pollsters point out

comparing the years of Tangentopoli with the current situation. “The data show – explains Renato

Mannheimer, President of Ispo – “that there are many convergences between the current crisis and

the one that followed Tangentopoli in 1992-94. Then, Berlusconi succeeded in finding a potential

market among voters, with original proposals and initiatives which seemed to be pragmatic enough.

How that ended, is a different story, but the situation is similar. Of course, 1994 will hardly repeat

itself, the same proposals that seemd so innovative then are now unlikely to gain consent. The

actual crisis is certainly a consequence of the disappointment caused by the end of berlusconismo,

in which many had believed. But there’s a huge electoral market for those who can project an image

of novelty and pragmatism,”15.

Grillo thrives in the vacuum left by berlusconismo and the crisis of parties – with only 3% of

Italians still trusting them. The data, registered in October by Demopolis’ Political Barometre, is the

lowest ever registered in thirty years of analyses of the country’s public opinion.

14 I twill be shown that, in Berlusconi’s case, the same problems took longer to manifest themselves.

15 See Ispo www.ispo.it and interview by Stefano Caselli “Il fatto quotidiano”, 16 marzo 2012.

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“The latest scandals – Demopolis director Pietro Vento explains - seemed to have annihilated the

citizens’ trust in politics: the parties’ legitimation itself seems to be in a crisis. Italians’ growing

resentment towards the parties that have governed the country in the last years is bring about an

increase in abstentionism (32% today) and in the number of voters who do not know whom to

choose: it’s mainly voters – Vento concludes – in the moderate area who are looking for good

reasons to go back to the polls”16.

According to Demopolis analysis, if Italy were to vote today, the Partito Democratico would be

around 26%, as the first party in the country, 10 points over PDL, which might aim at 16%, with a

deeply confused electorate. Grillo’s M5S would get 18%, becoming virtually the country’s second

party. Casini’s UDC (8%) and Maroni’s Lega (5.5 %) increase slightly, as do also Vendola’s SEL,

which, as IDV, is between 6 and 7%. All other parties are at the moment under 3%.17

Both subjects then develop in a moment of crisis if political parties, overcome by scandals: a

situation that manifested itself in 1994 and in both cases citizens, who desire pragmatism and a

16 See http://www.demopolis.it/news.php?subaction=showfull&id=1350062265&archive=&start_from=&ucat=39&template=HomeDemo&category=39&sortby=5&PHP_SELF=news.php

17 The survey has been carried out by Istituto Nazionale di Ricerche Demòpolis from 7 to 10 October 2012, on a sample of 1.206 interviewees, representative of all Italian adult citizens, subdivided according to gender, age and place of residence. The Barometro Politico is directed and coordinated by Pietro Vento, with Maria Sabrina Titone. Contribute by Giusy Montalbano; cati-cawi research supervised by Marco E. Tabacchi.

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renewal of the political class, are given a populist answer.

As to the internal structure, in both cases the two subjects are at first referred to as “movements”,

not as traditional parties18. Forza Italia is thus described as a “free association of citizens”, and the

same description can be be read on M5S website. M5S is not a political party, nor wants to become

one in the future. No ideology, neither rirght nor left-wing, just ideas. It wants to create an effective

and efficiente exchange of opinion, an arena for democratic confrontation, free of associational and

partitical ties, without representative or directive organs, giving back to citizens a decisional power

usually granted some lucky”19.

In both cases can one speak of “political liquidism”, which Forza Italia maintained until 1996, when

it was decided to give the party some organizational structures, similar to those present in traditional

mass-parties. In the history of For a Italia – as Emanuela Poli shows in her essay20 - three phases

can be distinguished: it was first born as a movement, an electoral committee on which Berlusconi

worked from autumn 1993; then, in the years at the opposition (1996-2001), it became a party well

organized in the whole country; and finally, as a government party, after the electoral success in

2002 (Poli 2001: 34). In the first phase, going into details, five interconnected levels can be

distinguished, on which the new political subject was built. Firstly, different intellectual and

entrepeneurial wre involved, converging on a political manifesto created by liberal political scientist

elites Giuliano Urbani, who in November 1993 founded the association “Looking or Good

Governance”. Secondly, in December, the forst “Forza Italia! Clubs” were launched, supporting

associations whose goal was promoting liberal democratic ideals and activating local activism.

Thirdly, an institute monitoring public opinion and analysing vote tendencies – Diakron, operative

since October – was created in order to identify potential electorial constituency . Fourth, candidates

were selecting for the approaching political elections. Fifth, an advertisment campaign was planned,

of unprecedented strength, which aimed at getting people to know the new political subject, its

symbol, its programme and, most importantly, its leader Silvio Berlusconi.

Once the elections were won and government conquered, the “electorial machine” started to show

some organizational problems and within Forza Italia someone started to lament the absence of

organizational orientation and territorial structures, the dominance of Publitalia and Fininvest staff

members put in the mosto prestigious positions in the movement, and the blurred definition of the

role of the clubs. So, in Autumn 1994, the movement leadership gave a first answer: and extremely

18 On “parties”, their structure, typologies and characteristics see Panebianco 1982; see also Sartori 1982.

19 See http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/elezioni-politiche-2013.html

20 See Poli 2001, capitolo 1.

13

light organization contemplating a central steering level (made up by the movement’s president and

by a closed presidential commitee whose members were nominated by the president) and only two

peripheral levels: regional (with 20 coordinators also nominated by the president) and collegial,

steered by Forza Italia Perliament members. This first organizational model did not contemplate any

representatives for municipality, township and provincial level, typical o traditional parties, and was

highly top-steered: it was decided that in Forza Italia there would not have been elections and

subscriptions rom the lower levels. Institutionalization came only after the defeat in 1996, when

Berlusconi understood that the time had come for Forza Italia to become a real party, with

traditional structures but preserving the original strive towards simplicity.

In Summer 1996, a group of Parliament members with organizational skills was chosen to devise a

new model of organization ; in January 1997 the new charter was approved. It contempletad a series

of local coordinations which mirrored Italy’s traditional political-administrative subdivisions in

regions, provinces, municipalities, townships and districts. At the head of regional structures were

coordinators nominated by the president, while for lower levels elections were allowed and

coordinators chosen by committee and assembly members. One of the main innovations was that

the party was now open to all members, a decision which ended one of the biggest anomalies tht

since 1994 had set Forza Italia apart rom all other Italian and Europeaan parties (in Spring 1997 the

first recruiting campaign was started). Between 1997 and 2001 Forza Italia’s structure became

heavier and heavier, until it became a “goverment party”, in which decisions were made at the top

but which had a great local network, to facilitate mobilization before th national elections. We have

then, at first, a movement with a flexible and “light” structure which apparently allows for local

decision-making but is centred aroung a popular leader, which lter becomes institutionalized and is

transformed into a “traditional party”. What about Grillo’s M5S then? Before analyzing the phass of

its development, two aspects have to be stressed out: first, the moment of creation. Forza Italia was

created extremely rapidly – between 1993 and 1994 – and the “electorial machine” went straight to

national confrontation. M5S’s development on the contrary was slower and mirroring local

organization: two dierent paths then, but with peculiar organizational similarities. First of all, the

Movement-phased, anticipated by the creation of the blog in 2005 which set its political and

programmatic tendencies. In the same phase the association “Beppe Grillo’s friends” was born, as

happened in the first phase of Forza Italia with the association “Looking or Good Governance”.

This first stage started presumably in 2005 and went on until 2008, (in the meantime the two V-

Days took place, the first one in 2007 with the “Clen Parliament” initiative, the second one at the

beginning of 2008 with the “Free information” campaign). Activities started with the creation of the

14

Meet-ups, which were also to gauge the movement’s appeal. These were the one innovative

instrument used by Beppe Grillo to bring his people together. Meetup is a digital platform, a social

network allowing local groups of citizens to get together to discuss political matters and meet on a

regular basis via the web. To this day21 the groups Meetup are 591 and subscribers amount to

90.739; people who take an interest in the activities of the groups (even if they do not subscribe to

any one of them in particular) are 33.386; groups have appeared in 482 cities, not only in Italy, but

in 14 countries. Obviously, meetups have no “physical” premises and they do not respect any

traditionl territorial subdivision and they provide no information to help us map the local consent to

M5S, its supporters and members. In 2008 came the “5 star civic lists”, getting five candidates

elected in Rome municipalities and presented lists in other cities in Northern Italy where communal

elections took place. Here starts the M5S “political” phase strictly speaking: the following year, in

2009, the MoVimento 5 Stelle is officially born. On October 4 Grillo himself announces it on his

blog with the “Political Press Release 25”. From 2009 until 2012 the “electoral phase” starts with

the presentation of the movement’s list, certified by grillo himself through an online procedure

activated on his blog. In 2010 the movement’s candidates run in five regions on 13 which went to

the polls (two regional counselors are elected in Emilia Romagna and two in Piemonte); in 2011 it

runs in administrative elections in 75 municipalities electing his first town counselors. In 2012 it

presents lists in 101 municipalities and gets 300 candidates elected. Finally, in the Sicilian regional

elections, M5S became the first party got 15 councillors on almost 300 in the island’s regional

assembly. A development that still has not started the institutionalization necessary before national

elections: a process called for by supporters and the party’s membership, made up by more than 300

municipality councillors and 19 regional councillors. The same process Forza Italia started in 1996

and which was inevitable after the election of the first Parliament Members. The national phase for

M5S started right after the Sicilian vote, through a press release from grillo who, on 29 October

2012 on Youtube,22 explained the rules for members elegibility and the formation of the momevent’s

lists for the national elections which are to be held in Spring 2013. Before that announcement, to

become a member of Grillo’s non-party one just had to fill in an online form, indicating one’s name

surname, address and e-mail; while only those who have also indicated an ID number by October

might participate to the internal primary elections. No party cards and no premises, so far. Just

online subscriptions and elections: locally, there are only some Spokespersons, who are not equally

21 Up to date as at 19 November 2012, at 16.00.

22 Political Press Realease n. 53, on www.bebbegrillo.it; video messagge “Grillo’s Rules” on You Tube channel http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pZnwdrt0lCI

15

distributed in every part of the country: the movement’s map still has to be drawn. Its structure is

thus evolving: born as a movement now it has to become a party, following the same path as Forza

italia, which led to the foundation of the PDL – a transformation M5S still has to complete. What

sets the two political experiences apart is their constituency: in 1994, 53.4% of Forza Italia voters

were women, 46.6% were men (Fiori 2004). The largest group was housewives, 21.6%, in a higher

percentage than other categories who supported Berlusconi (entrepreneurs, traders, freelance

professionals, ruling class and movement members made up, all together, for 17.1%). Among the

original Forza Italia voters, less than a half, 47.3%, has an employment. There’s also a low

percentage of graduates, 3.8%. Those who read a newspaper very day were less than a third, 29.6%.

Still, many of them watched tv: at least two hours a day for 68 voters on 100, most of them were

fans of the soap operas broadcast on Rete 4. Moreover, 48.8% of forza Italia supporters, before

voting Berlusconi, had no interest in politics. On the contrary, the two first web surveys carried out

about M5S show that its constituency is competely different23; Men and women are evenly present

(men slightly more so, 56.6%); they are quite young, under 50; graduates, habitual Internet users

from Northern-Central Italy dominate. In Parma more the 7 voters out of 10 stated they had voted

M5S not only for its local policies but for national reasons as well. They felt that the party they

voted for in 2008 national elections represented them “not at all” or “just a little”. 43% of them

would vote again M5S to “change the present political class”, 27% “feel no longer represented by

traditional parties”. Moreover, more than 20% of M5S voters come from the “no vote area” as a

Swg survey, carried out immediately after the local elections in May 2012 confirms. On M5S

facebook profile24 its voters seem even younger: followers age ranges from 25 to 34, most are from

Rome; in total, subscriptors are 218.56625. Most contacts took place on 21 October, during the

elections in Sicily.

The data, however, might not be confirmed by later surveys, showing a new phase in M5S

development: during the first election phase, 2010-2012, the grillini were mainly voted by web

users, while after the sicilian elections, the campaign abandoned the web as television started to talk

about it, gaining the right wing vote: according to political scientist Roberto Biorcio: “Up to a

certain point M5S developed on the web and among the young. Then it became a global media

phenomenon. Even if Grillo refuses to appear on tv, he has been the political figured who most

23 The first one has a more general character and was carried out on a sample of Facebook users; the second gauged Trust in Fedrico Pizzarotti six months after the elections. Studies have been carried out thanks to Epokè - Ricerche Sociali Applicate.

24 http://www.facebook.com/#!/movimentocinquestelle/likes

25 Up to date as at 19 November 2012 at 17.00.

16

frequently appeared on the tv screen during the last electoral campaign. As a tv celebrity, investing

his capital on the web, he went back to occupy television. his constituency has accordingly changed,

from being young and left-wing to collecting votes even from the right field, taking advantage of

the crisis of the PDL (Santoro 2012: 152).

Similar structure and leadership but a different constituency, which is mainly due to communicative

strategies. In the first case television is dominant, being the media that allowed Berlusconi’s party to

convince voters who were less informed than those selected by Grillo through the web.

In both cases we find a hierarchic structure - aiming at keeping the leader’s popularity at high levels

and centering on him the electoral campaigns – which has nonetheless met and is still meeting

organizational problems: Forza Italia after two years was in any case institutionalized, still

preserving Berlusconi’s leadership. M5S is still defendig its “liquid” nature, which is already

causing problems of “internal democracy”, due to Grillo’s decisional role and the interactive nature

of the web, which might not be able to stem “dissenters”26.

Both political formations have at first launched their “media-populist” message, giving birth to a

“Liquid movement” built around the leader’s image: in the first case, a process of

institutionalization has ensued -still conserving centralizing structures – which brought to the

formation of a “party”: in the second case, we are still in an intermediate phase, which will have to

be monitored under the coming elections. Three aspects will have to be considered: the leadership’s

evolution; the composition, the characteristics and the behaviour of the membership; how the

followers, the party’s present and future constituency will change.

5. Berlusconi's decline and Grillo's boom

The steady rise of M5S takes place against the backdrop of the steady decline of Berlusconi and

berlusconismo: as soon as in 38-39 March 2010 regional elections, the centre-right coalition was in

some difficulty: the economic crisis worsens and citizens show increasing discontents with the

goverment’s decisions. The Prime Minister suffers a low in popularity and the majority sustaining

his government is no longer stable27. The PDL steady decline has effects on the lists presented for

regional elections. It will conquer six regions out of thirteen: the collapse of the executive is so put

off by two years.

The protagonist of the latest elections was anyhow Beppe Grillo: M5S lists were presented in five

26 On this, see the whole story of the “purges” within M5S, as in the episodes concerning Tavolazzi, Defrancesci, Favia e Salsi; cfr. al link http://it.ibtimes.com/articles/37885/20121102/salsi-grillo-come-berlusconi.htm

27 Most PMs coming from ex AN are now supporting their ex Secretary Gianfranco Fini, disrupting the unity of Berlusconi charismatic party.

17

regions, getting almost half a million votes. The best results were obtained in Piemonte and Emilia

Romagna, the regions where the V-days were held in 2007 and 2008 (Turin and Bologna). In

Emilia-Romagna, the centre-left won by large, as is typical in the region’s history, ma the M5S

candidate president, Giuseppe Favia (30 years old) got 6% of votes and two representatives of the

grillini were elected into the regional council. In Piemonte the M5S Candidate President was the

young Alessandro Bono got a little over 4%, while the list that supported him got 3.6% gaining two

seats in the council.

The M5S could already in 2010 fill the void left by traditional parties. The true “boom” anywau

came in 2012, when 941 municipalities went to the polls and the movement presented 101 lists,

gaining almost 200.000 votes (almost 9%). In many municipalities, M5S ran for elections for the

first time. In others it had already run in the 2010 regional elections. In Alessandria for example

M5S votes have increased fourold, going from 1.248 in 2010 to 4.687 in 2012. In Verona they have

increased threefold, in Parma, Monza and Cuneo they have more than redoubled.

The Cattaneo Institute in Bologna has observed, calculating votes flow, that most votes co

ntributing to the movement’s success came from the right. Between three and four votes out of of

ten came from Lega nord, and two or three more from the PDL. Just as many come from non-

voters. It’s voters who felt left behind by Lega and Pdl, disappointed with politics and struck by the

economic crisis. This is the situation in which the M5S “boom” took place, a hard crisis of political

parties to which one has to add the declina o berlusconismo, which made place for the M5S: the

second phase Biorcio talks of and that was mentioned before. In the beginning, M5S was stealing

votes mainly from IDV and Partly from PD; but now, with Berlusconi disappearing, Grillo is a new

charimastic leader catalysing diffused discontent. So, already in May 2012, Berlusconi’s popularity

had gone down below 30%: the chart below shows the leaders over 30%, with Grillo in the first

place.

18

Trust stays high not only for Grillo, but even for the first M5S mayor elected in provincial capital

like Parma, where after six months mayor Pizzarotti’s position has consolidated, as the chart below

shows.

19

The M5S's mayor won on second bellot covering the 20 points that separated him from his

opponent nd gaining 20 more. Votes from all those who on first ballot had not voted for Bernazzoli

(the left candidate) converged on him. Six months later he seems to be able to mantain a consent

etremely precarious in the beginning. 26% of citizens have complete trust in him and more than

30% have enough trust in him. Nonetheless, even negative opinion increases: the “no trust” sector

has reached 21%.

Even voting intensions are interesting: the PDL condition of weakness is confirmed, with the party

reaching a low, while the M5S is gaining consent reaching 40% in the town. The way Pizzarotti is

playing his role appeals to those voters who look favourably at the movement but still have not

voted for it. To the leading position of the movement corresponds the almost total disappearance of

the centre-right. Pdl is below 5% and Lega Nord below 3%28.

28 For methods see http://www.epokericerche.it/2012/11/tosi-e-pizzarotti-fiducia-10-e-lode/

20

Its success and popularity come not only from the web, but also from its local ties with the voters,

ties which have become stronger after Grillo’s campaign in Sicily.29 On the one hand we have than

Grillo and his massive use of the web and the social networks, making him the most present

politicians in social network – Facebook and Twitter – as the table below shows:

Silvio Berlusconi is only fourth, which is due to the fact that he doesn’t have an official Twitter

account. In the first positions, one should remrk the presence of the mayor of Milan Giuliano

Pisapia, who pushes out of the Top-Ten Pdl Secretary (11th), with only a few hundreds followers less

than Brunetta and Serracchiani30.

29 http://www.epokericerche.it/2012/11/nasce-la-tv-a-5-stelle-rete-e-territorio-dietro-il-successo-in-sicilia/

30 See http://www.epokericerche.it/2012/10/social-media-la-top-10-dei-politici/socialchart-ottobre/

21

On the other hand we have stronger local ties, which tells the difference between the leadership of

M5S and its membership31; the party is not only based on the web but can combine “new” and “old”

media and means of political participation. A step Forza Italia (for temporal reasons as well) has not

taken, using television as the only means to spread the image of its leader32.

6. Conclusion (Future beyond leadership)

This study has first of all set the case of M5S among populist phenomena, according to the ideas of

Yves Mény and Yves Surel. The new political organ has been analyzed in comparison with other

populist phenomena which have left a mark in Italian history after World War II.

Then some characteristics within the M5S have been highlighted, which can make one thick of the

Movement as a “media phenomenon”, and they have been compared with another similar

phenomenon, Forza Italia, the political movement founded by Silvio Berlusconi in 1994. The two

cases have been put in comparison, and M5S has been put in the context of the decline of

berlusconismo. The populist analogies have been taken up, with regard to their development, helped

by the crisis of traditional parties: something that was actual in 1994 Italy and that has manifested

itself again today, in 2012, with an even greater loss of trust.

The different levels of articulation of the political forces have then been analyzed: the leadership –

represented by Silvio Berlusconi and Beppe Grillo - the membership and the followers. The most

populist messages come from the leadership: in Berlusconi’s case, we have seen how a “TV party”

has been created in order to keep the leader’s popularity at its maximum and concentrate on him all

party activity. The same characteristics have been maintained when the movement evolved into a

party with a more traditional structure, similar to other Italian parties. In the second case, M5S has

been analyzed as the “web party”, with an as personal leadership, built on the leader’s popularity.

The most interesting aspect is how Grillo came to the web and built his own “media party”. On the

one hand we have Berlusconi as the man of televisione, on the other there is Grillo as the man who

have come from television. The Genoese comedian’s career developed in the years when Berlusconi

was gaining political consent; a career through which Grillo came in contact with tv-pop culture, the

same background Forza Italia came from. Grillo has been able to adapt tv communication to a

different context, the world wide web, and to different needs.

31 More on this in the conclusions. The issue will be the subject of further research.

32 Silvio Berlusconi has tried twice to get on the web. First, with www.forzasilvio.it and then with www.silviopresidente.it. Both cases were but experiments, quite unilateral and isolated. These instruments might be reconsidered in case “berlusconi’s party” should be recreated, in opposition with the proposal of holding primary elections.

22

The last part of this study is mostly centerd on M5S, tracing its development and success in post-

berlusconismo era, analysing the movement’s constituency, which is draining votes from the decling

centre-left.33

In sum, a few remarks can be made: the context in which the two movements have developed is

one and the sme: a crisis of politicalpopulist parties and citizens’ discontent with traditional

mediating systems; same similarities can be noticed in the structure and development phases of both

Forza Italia and M5S. the analysis focuses on the personal leadership and on the progression from

an initial “liquid” structure to an institutionalized one; analogies can be seen even on the media

image of the two political forces, with the M5S taking TV-communication schemes and transfering

them to the web. Different media, television and the web, which might not yield the same results,

so that thee to forces may have different fates. Irst of all the interactive nature of the web might not

suit a personal leadership, which is the reason why M5s is already having “internal problems”, with

a scattered membership that doesn’t follow the leadership and escapes central control. Prima di tutto

il carattere interattivo del web potrebbe non essere congeniale alla struttura centralizzata della

leadership, per questo il M5S sta affrontando già da subito “problemi interni”, producendo una

membership. Even if the web is not the only media Grillo seems to be using, invoking off-line

mobilization as well (public protests, for example) and featuring also in TV news and other

traditional media. This idea of continuity between media and of a return to TV is supported by

Antonio Tursi, who claims. “Grillo demonstrates that the media are not completely separated from

one another. A new media establishes itself when new needs arise. These new need are often created

by older media. Of course TV and web are different, but there are also similarities, and it would be a

sham to deny it” (Tursi 2012: 75).

Finally, the way constituency is changing needs monitoring. Both aspects – political class and

voters – will have to studied in connection with the test the next national elections represent for

M5S.

even for the centre-right the future is unclear: there’s is a void in leadership left by Berlusconi, that

PDL will try to fill with primary elections. Grillo’s idea of primary elections is totally different: a

selection of candidates will be presented online, to be chosen by a procedure announced on the M5S

homepage34, which will concern cadidates parliament members and senators.

In sum, the grillismo phenomenon can be seen as a sympton of the convergence of new and old

33 One might then ask: “Can Grillo’s ascent be thought of as one of the factors that are leading to the end of a phase in Italian politics, the Second Republic, characterized by berluconism and started after a period of scandals which lead to a crisis of political parties similar to the one we are experiencing today.? Can Grillo be considered as a symbol of post.modern politics and of the advent of a Third Republic, following the government of technicians , the discontent with political parties and a new wave of populism?”

23

media, capturing the discontent among voters, but that now might face organizational problems,

regarding the use of the web and the evlotion of its structure. Any future study will have to consider

two aspects: first of all the relationship between leadership and membership, to understand whether

one can distinguish the massage of the leader Grillo and that of the M5S. For this reason, a

questionnaire has been devised, to analyze the behaviour of M5S councillors and representatives.

The analysis of the actual political class in the last two years is moving in the same direction.35 The

procedure of candidate selection will also have to be studied.

A second field of work will be the study of the movement’s constituency, through web surveys

submitted to supported and members, in order to “map” the phenomenon and understand its

characteristics, background and evolution.

34 See www.beppegrillo.t/movimento/candidature

35 The study analyses the documents made public by the Regional Parliaments of Piemonte and Emilia Romagna, where M5S councillors have operated since 2010: laws, proposals etc are taken into account… The study will later focus on activities on the web, where representatives maintain contact with voters, through Facebook profiles, blogs and web broadcast of official meetings.

24

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- Pasquino, G. (2010), Nuovo corso di scienza politica, Il Mulino, Bologna, pp.61-166.

- Poli, E. (2001), Forza Italia: strutture, leadership e radicamento territoriale, Bologna, Il Mulino.

- Raniolo, F. (2007), La partecipazione politica, Il Mulino, Bologna.

- Ricolfi, L. (2004), Elezioni e mass media: quanti voti ha spostato la TV?, in “Il Mulino” v. 43, n. 356, pp. 1031-1146.

- Santoro, G.(2012), Un grillo qualunque. Il MoVimento 5 Stelle e il populismo digitale nella crisi crisi dei partiti italiani, Roma, Castelvecchi.

- Sanzi, A. (2012), Ve lo do io Beppe Grillo, Milano, Mondadori.

- Sartori, G. (2007), Democrazia che cosa è, Rizzoli, Roma.

- Sartori, G. (2000), Homo videns, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari.

- Sartori G. (1976), Parties and Party Systems, New York, Cambdridge University Press, pp. 63-67.

- Sartori, G. (1982), Teoria dei partiti e caso italiano, SugarCo, Roma.

- Setta, S. (1995), L’Uomo Qualunque. 1944-1948, Laterza, Roma-Bari, pp. 58-60.

- Sorice, M. (2011), La comunicazione politica, Roma, Carocci.

- Statera, G. (1994), Il volto seduttivo del potere. Berlusconi, i media, il consenso, Roma, Edizioni Seam.

- Stringa, P. (2011), Blog Democrazia. Come si forma oggi l’opinione pubblica, Carocci, Roma.

- Taguieff, P. A. (2006), L’illusione populista, Milano, Bruno Mondadori.

- Tarchi, M. (2003), L’Italia populista, Il Mulino, Bologna.

- Tursi, A. (2011), Politica 2.0, Milano, Mimesis.

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- Vaccari, C. (2012), La politica online, Bologna, Il Mulino.

- Van Zoonen, L. (2005), Enterteining the Citizen. When Politics and Popular Culture Converge, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

- Ventura, S., (2012), Il racconto del capo. Berlusconi e Sarkozy, Roma-Bari, Laterza.

- Vespa, B. (2012), Il palazzo e la piazza. Crisi, consenso e protesta da Mussolini a Beppe Grillo, Milano, Mondadori-Rai Eri.

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INTERNET QUOTATION

- Beppe Grillo's Blog, 27 novembre 2012, <http://www.beppegrillo.it>, home page of Beppe Grillo's Blog (27 novembre 2012)

- Movimento 5 Stelle, 26 novembre 2012, <http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/>, home page of Movimento 5 Stelle in Beppe Grillo's blog(26 novembre 2012)

- Liste civiche Movimento 5 Stelle, 21 ottobre 2012, <http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/elenco_liste.php>, page about M5S's lists and candidates (30 novembre 2012)

- Movimento Cinque Stelle, 30 novembre 2012, <http://www.facebook.com/movimentocinquestelle>, Facebook's page of M5S (30 novembre 2012)

- Movimento 5 Stelle, 30 novembre 2012, <http://twitter.com/mov5stelle>, Twitter's page of M5S (30 novembre 2012)

- Programma Movimento 5 Stelle, 4 ottobre 2009, <http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/Programma-Movimento-5-Stelle.pdf>, M5S's programme (26 novembre 2012)

- “Non-statuto” Movimento 5 Stelle, 4 ottobre 2012, <http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/Regolamento-Movimento-5-Stelle.pdf>, M5S's guide with principles (27 novembre agosto 2012)

- “Crea la tua lista”, 30 settembre 2012, <http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/crea-la-tua-lista.html>, online form about creation of political list (30 novembre 2012)

- Beppe Grillo's Meetup, 27 novembre agosto 2012, <http://beppegrillo.meetup.com>, home page for research meetup's groups in the world (30 novembre 2012)

- Epokè – Ricerche Sociali Applicate, 27 novembre 2012, <http://www.epokericerche.it/>, home page about non profit association of political and electoral studies (30 novembre 2012)

- Beppe Persichella, Repubblica Bologna, “Bologna, Grillo licenzia via web il suo consigliere regionale, 3 gennaio 2012, <http://bologna.repubblica.it/cronaca/2012/01/03/news /bologna_resa_dei_conti_online_per_il_movimento_cinque_stelle-27516292>, Repubblica about Unità's case and M5S (30 agosto 2012)

- Istituto Nazionale Ricerche Demopolis “Barometro Politico”, 20 ottobre 2012, <http://www.demopolis.it/news.php?subaction=showfull&id=1350062265&archive=&start_from=&ucat=39&template=HomeD

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emo&category=39&sortby=5&PHP_SELF=news.php>, intentions' poll survey and confidence in parties by Demopolis Institute (30 novembre 2012)

- Casaleggio Associati – Consulenza per la rete, 27 novembre 2012,<http://www.casaleggio.it>, home page about Gianroberto Casaleggio and his communication society (30 novembre 2012)

- Beppe Grillo, “Comunicato politico numero venticinque”, 9 settembre 2009, <http://www.beppegrillo.it/2009/09/comunicato_politico_numero_venticinque.html>, Beppe Grillo's Post Beppe Grillo about M5S (30 novembre 2012)

- Istituto Cattaneo di Bologna, 30 luglio 2012, <http://www.cattaneo.org/index.asp? l1=seminari&l2=convegni>, home page (30 novembre 2012)

- You Tube's video, “1994 – Discesa in campo di Silvio Berlusconi”, 19 agosto 2009, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8-uIYqnk5A>, video (27 novembre 2012)

- Giancarlo Cancelleri facebook's Profile, 26 ottobre 2012, <http://www.facebook.com/giancarlo.cancelleri>, “Candidato Portavoce” M5S in Sicilie (30 novembre 2012)

- Ispo - "Istituto per gli studi sulla pubblica opinione”, 27 novembre 2012, <www.ispo.it>, home page (30 novembre 2012)

- Beppe Grillo's Blog, “Passaparola”, 29 ottobre 2012, <http://www.beppegrillo.it/2012/10/passaparola_-_comunicato_politico_numero_cinquantatre_-_beppe_grillo.html>, “Comunicato Politico n.53” by Beppe Grillo (30 novembre 2012)

- You Tube's video, “Le regole del Grillo”, 29 ottobre 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pZnwdrt0lCI>, video about Beppe Grillo's Movements and candidates (30 novembre 2012)

- Stefano Caselli “Partiti in crisi dopo Tangentopoli”, 16 marzo 2012, <http://www.100news.it/site/2012/03/19/partiti-in-crisi-di-identita-cresce-il-consenso-per-monti-che-raccoglie-oltre-il-60-di-fiducia/>, “Il Fatto Quotidiano” (30 novembre 2012)

- Caso Salsi http://it.ibtimes.com/articles/37885/20121102/salsi-grillo-come-berlusconi.htm

- Lisa Lanzone “Nasce la TV a 5 Stelle: rete e territorio dietro il successo in Sicilia”, 7 novembre 2012, <http://www.epokericerche.it/2012/11/nasce-la-tv-a-5-stelle-rete-e-territorio-dietro-il-successo-in-sicilia/>, Epoké (30 novembre 2012)

- Epoké Ricerche “Tosi e Pizzarotti: fiducia 10 e lode”, 9 novembre 2012, <http://www.epokericerche.it/2012/11/tosi-e-pizzarotti-fiducia-10-e-lode/>, methods about opinion survey in Parma (30 novembre 2012)

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- Forzasilvio.it, 26 novembre 2012,<https://www.forzasilvio.it/>, Silvio Berlusconi's official network (30 novembre 2012)

- “I Governi Berlusconi” 30 novembre 2012, <http://noveanni.governoberlusconi.it/>, about berlusconi's politics during his government (30 novembre 2012)

- “Il Popolo della Libertà”, 30 novembre 2012, <http://www.pdl.it/>, home page (30 novembre)

- Silvio Berlusconi Facebook's profile, 26 novembre 2012, <http://www.facebook.com/SilvioBerlusconi?ref=stream>, Facebook's page (30 novembre 2012)

- “Movimento Spontaneo Cittadini Silvio Presidente”, 30 novembre 2012,

<http://www.silviopresidente.it/>, home page (30 novembre 2012)

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