former judge bobby delaughter asks judge to quash subpeona from dickie scruggs
TRANSCRIPT
1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 09 CR 002 v. ) Judge Glen H. Davidson ) RICHARD F. “DICKIE” SCRUGGS, ) ) Defendant. )
BOBBY B. DELAUGHTER’S EMERGENCY MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA
Co-Defendant, BOBBY B. DELAUGHTER, by and through his attorneys, THOMAS
ANTHONY DURKIN and LAWRENCE L. LITTLE, pursuant to Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, respectfully moves this Court, on an emergency basis, to quash
the subpoena that counsel for Co-Defendant Scruggs has served upon him in the above-captioned
case, which commands DeLaughter’s appearance on March 26, 2012, at 10:00 a.m.
In support of this motion, Defendant, through counsel, shows to the Court the following:
1. On July 28, 2009, DeLaughter pled guilty to one count of attempting to obstruct,
influence, and impede an official corruption investigation and grand jury proceeding in violation
of 18 USC § 1512(c)(2). On November 13, 2009, DeLaughter was sentenced to 18 months in the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons, and a period of two years supervised release. DeLaughter is
currently serving his supervised release portion of his sentence in the Eastern District of
Louisiana, and must request permission of the Court to travel outside that district.
2. On March 14, 2012, undersigned counsel, Durkin, received a letter from
Scruggs’s counsel containing a witness subpoena commanding DeLaughter’s appearance at the
Case: 3:09-cr-00002-GHD-SAA Doc #: 188 Filed: 03/23/12 1 of 6 PageID #: 1807
2
hearing.1 This subpoena requires DeLaughter to physically appear in the Federal District
Courthouse in Oxford, MS, in the context of the §2255 proceeding filed by Defendant Scruggs
on March 26, 2012, at 10:00 a.m. A copy of this letter, the subpoena, and the check for fees is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3. Counsel for DeLaughter have repeatedly informed Scruggs’s counsel that
DeLaughter will assert his Fifth Amendment privilege not to be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself. Counsel for DeLaughter also so notified government counsel of
DeLaughter’s position. Further, Scruggs’ lawyers have so acknowledged DeLaughter’s right to
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in its March 7, 2012, Motion in Limine regarding
DeLaughter’s potential testimony. (Docket #173.) In this pleading, Scruggs seeks either judicial
immunity for DeLaughter or an adverse inference against the government for its failure to seek
immunity for DeLaughter.
4. In its Response (Docket #185), the government cites Fifth Circuit precedent, U.S.
v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1982), to the effect that judicial immunity is not appropriate
under these circumstances. While undersigned counsel do not wish to argue the position of
either party on this issue, counsel feel compelled to remind the Court and the government that,
contrary to its suggestion in its response, “one of the Fifth Amendment’s basic functions is to
protect innocent men who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.” Ohio v.
Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (internal quotations and ellipses omitted). Further, while the
Court has yet to rule on Scruggs’ motion in limine, it would seem that should the Court not see
fit to issue judicial immunity as the government suggests is the law of the Circuit, there will be
no possibility that DeLaughter will have any testimony to give. Likewise, while undersigned
1 Counsel had agreed to accept service on DeLaughter’s behalf.
Case: 3:09-cr-00002-GHD-SAA Doc #: 188 Filed: 03/23/12 2 of 6 PageID #: 1808
3
counsel do not profess to be familiar enough with Scruggs’ claims in this § 2255 proceeding, at a
glance the very relevance of DeLaughter’s testimony—even if he were to be immunized—seems
questionable, at best.
5. Undersigned counsel had proposed that, under these circumstances, the parties
stipulate that if DeLaughter were called as a witness, he would assert his Fifth Amendment
privilege, so as to avoid the unnecessary and pointless process of requiring DeLaughter to seek
permission of the Court and travel from New Orleans to Oxford. While the government is
willing to enter into this stipulation, counsel for Scruggs rejected this proposal on March 22,
2012; and is insistent upon DeLaughter’s physical appearance at the Oxford courthouse on
Monday morning.
6. Scruggs’s counsel’s insistence on DeLaughter physically appearing in Court and
compelling DeLaughter to the witness stand only to assert his valid constitutional right is both
vexatious and wrong—not unlike the impropriety of a party calling a witness to the stand only
for that witness to assert his Fifth Amendment right in front of the jury. See, e.g., U.S. v.
Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981) (“There is strong Fifth Circuit precedent against
allowing witnesses to assert the Fifth Amendment in the jury’s presence. The general rule is that
once the trial court has satisfied itself as to the validity of the witness’s Fifth Amendment claim,
it may, in its discretion, decline to place the witness on the stand for the purpose of eliciting a
claim of privilege”); U.S. v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1239-40 (5th Cir. 1974) (affirming trial
court ruling that witness, who stated to court during in-chambers examination that she would
assert Fifth Amendment, could not testify before the jury and that counsel could not make
reference to her failure to testify); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir. 1973)
Case: 3:09-cr-00002-GHD-SAA Doc #: 188 Filed: 03/23/12 3 of 6 PageID #: 1809
4
(“[i]f it appears that a witness intends to claim the privilege as to essentially all questions, the
court may, in its discretion, refuse to allow him to take the stand”); Bowles v. United States, 439
F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (observing “the rule that a witness should not be put on the
witness stand for the purpose of having him exercise his privilege before the jury”).
7. Additionally, the insistence upon requiring DeLaughter to appear only to assert a
valid constitutional privilege, arguably runs counter to the spirit, if not the letter, of Rule 4.4 of
the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled “Respect for Rights of Third Persons.”
This section provides that: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of
obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.” While Scruggs’s attorneys no
doubt wish to represent their client zealously, this should not come at DeLaugter’s expense.
8. Lastly, as noted above, DeLaughter is currently serving the supervised release
portion of his sentence, which requires permission from the Court to travel outside the Eastern
District of Louisiana. It is incongruous to counsel that this Court would wish to grant such
permission for such a meaningless appearance. DeLaughter is making great personal strides to
put this painful episode with Scruggs, Peters and the like behind him and has relatively new
employment in New Orleans. Not only can he not afford to miss work and jeopardize his
employment, it is not in his interest to become part of the media circus this hearing for Scruggs is
likely to attract. In short, he simply should not be compelled to appear under all of the foregoing
circumstances.
Case: 3:09-cr-00002-GHD-SAA Doc #: 188 Filed: 03/23/12 4 of 6 PageID #: 1810
5
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Thomas Anthony Durkin
THOMAS ANTHONY DURKIN
s/ Lawrence L. Little LAWRENCE L. KITTLE, Attorneys for the Defendant Bobby B. DeLaughter.
DURKIN & ROBERTS 2446 North Clark Street Chicago, IL 60614 (312) 913-9300 LAWRENCE L. LITTLE & ASSOCIATES, PA 829 North Lamar Boulevard, Suite 6 Oxford, Mississippi 38655 (662) 236-9396
Case: 3:09-cr-00002-GHD-SAA Doc #: 188 Filed: 03/23/12 5 of 6 PageID #: 1811
6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing BOBBY B. DELAUGHTER’S EMERGENCY MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA was served on March 23, 2012, in accordance with Fed.R.Crim.P.49, Fed.R.Civ.P.5, LR 5.5, and the General Order on Electronic Case Filing (ECF) pursuant to the district court’s system as to ECF filers. /s/ Thomas Anthony Durkin THOMAS ANTHONY DURKIN 2446 North Clark Street Chicago, IL 60614 (312) 913-9300
Case: 3:09-cr-00002-GHD-SAA Doc #: 188 Filed: 03/23/12 6 of 6 PageID #: 1812
Case: 3:09-cr-00002-GHD-SAA Doc #: 188-1 Filed: 03/23/12 1 of 5 PageID #: 1813
Case: 3:09-cr-00002-GHD-SAA Doc #: 188-1 Filed: 03/23/12 2 of 5 PageID #: 1814
Case: 3:09-cr-00002-GHD-SAA Doc #: 188-1 Filed: 03/23/12 3 of 5 PageID #: 1815
Case: 3:09-cr-00002-GHD-SAA Doc #: 188-1 Filed: 03/23/12 4 of 5 PageID #: 1816
Case: 3:09-cr-00002-GHD-SAA Doc #: 188-1 Filed: 03/23/12 5 of 5 PageID #: 1817