forging social order and its breakdown: riot and reform in

Forging Social Order and Its Breakdown: Riot and Reform in U.S. PrisonsAuthor(s): Bert Useem and Jack A. GoldstoneSource: American Sociological Review, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Aug., 2002), pp. 499-525Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3088943Accessed: 18/11/2009 20:42

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asa.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toAmerican Sociological Review.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3088943?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asa

FORGING SOCIAL ORDER AND ITS BREAKDOWN: RIOT AND REFORM IN U.S. PRISONS

BERT USEEM

University of New Mexico JACK A. GOLDSTONE

University of California, Davis

Two cases of prison reform in the 1990s had widely divergent results. New Mexico

privatized several prisons and these prisons were quickly beset by multiple riots. New York's publicly run Rikers Island prison, by contrast, adopted reforms that ended many years of riots and violence. Prevailing theories of prison riots cannot account for these divergent outcomes. A state-centered theory of social order ex-

plains both cases, showing how prison administrators and state and national governments can create the conditions under which social order breaks down or is restored. This analysis has implications for forging social order in other hierarchical institutions, such as schools, that are responsible for the welfare of their depen- dent clients.

n 1980, the Penitentiary of New Mexico suffered one of the bloodiest prison riots

in U.S. history. The costly reforms that followed left the state with some of the highest per-inmate costs in the nation. To control those costs, New Mexico in 1997 authorized two private firms to construct and manage prisons for high-security prisoners. The result was not what was hoped for: In the first year of operation, all three of the privately run facilities erupted in riots.

At about the same time, the New York City Department of Correction began reforms at the extremely violent Rikers Island jail facilities. Rikers Island had experienced major riots in 1986 and 1990, and remained disorderly and violent through the first half of the 1990s. Yet after the reforms under- taken in 1995 through 1999, inmate violence dropped by over 90 percent, and fears of riots went from rampant to almost non- existent.

Direct all correspondence to Bert Useem, De- partment of Sociology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131 (useem@ unm.edu). We thank Charles Bidwell, Aki Rob- erts, John Roberts, and the ASR Editors and re- viewers for their helpful comments. Travel funds were provided by the Research Allocations Com- mittee of the University of New Mexico.

We seek to explain these divergent cases. (1) Our analysis challenges existing theories of prison riots, which treat prison disorders as a result of inmate demographics or the reaction of inmates to administrative sanctions and/or poor management. No existing theory can explain both the onset of riots in New Mexico and the attenuation of riots in Rikers Island. (2) We counter structural theories of social disorder, which treat rebellion as the unavoidable outcome of structural conditions. We demonstrate that policy interven- tions can have a rapid and decisive impact on social stability. In the two case studies, the situations shifted from riot-tor to stable, or the reverse, within two years or less of the implementation of policies that affected crucial conditions underpinning the social order. (3) We also challenge current views of prison privatization, showing that a focus on cost-savings and efficiency must be balanced against concerns for maintaining social order in prisons.

Our explanatory framework is derived from theories of revolution. A "state-centered" theory of social order, stressing how external and internal demands on prison administrations combine to create institutional breakdown, shows promise in explaining prison riots (Goldstone and Useem 1999). However, we argue for a significant revi-

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2002, VOL. 67 (AUGUST:499-525) 499

500 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

sion in this strongly structural theory as it was originally introduced by Skocpol (1979, 1994). Skocpol asserts first, that revolutions are not made-they come. Rebels cannot "choose" to make revolutions outside of narrowly defined structural conditions. Second, state leaders are unable to take actions to avoid revolutions when the structural conditions summon them forth. While other analyses have already challenged the first point (Goldstone 2001; Sewell 1992), our disagreement is with the second.

Consistent with state-centered theory, the two case studies we address show that prison riots occur when prison administrations are unable to reconcile external demands imposed by state and national governments with internal demands from staff and inmates regarding conditions within the prisons. Yet, following recent works that seek to restore the role of agency to studies of social order and disorder (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1996; Foran 1997; Goldstone 2001; Goodwin 1997; Selbin 1993), we argue that administrative actions can create or curtail the causal conditions for riots. Agency thus looms large in our view.

SOCIAL ORDER AND PRISON RIOTS: A STATE-CENTERED THEORY

The state-centered theory of revolutions argues that revolutions arise from the combination of five conditions: (1) external pressures on the state; (2) internal pressures on the state from elites; (3) internal pressures on the state from popular groups; (4) ideologies that unify rebels and justify their actions; and (5) ineffective state actions that demonstrate state weakness or injustice (Goldstone 2001). We have argued that the conditions leading to revolution have ana- logs in prison riot situations (Goldstone and Useem 1999). We need only substitute "prison administration" for "state," "correctional officers and staff' for "elites," and "inmates" for "popular groups." As with revolution, a combination of several conditions must be present for prison riots to occur; when all or most of these conditions are absent, prison riots will not arise. How are these conditions manifested in prisons?

CONDITIONS LEADING TO PRISON RIOTS

(1) EXTERNAL PRESSURES. State or national officials may impose new or increased demands on prison administrations without augmenting prison resources. These new demands may be fiscal (e.g., periods of budget-cutting, or changes in laws or sentenc- ing practices that increase the number of inmates), or they may be procedural (e.g., ju- dicial mandates to reform prison practices). Such demands often result in cuts in staff, maintenance, or ancillary services relative to the number of inmates, or an expansion of inmates' rights.

(2) INTERNAL PRESSURES FROM COR- RECTIONS STAFF. Administration policies or reforms may arouse the opposition of corrections staff. Divisions and alienation among correctional officers may then produce high absenteeism, high turnover, failure to follow prison routines, or even harsh confrontations between groups of staff or staff unions and the prison administration.

(3) INTERNAL PRESSURES FROM IN- MATES. While prison conditions may be good or terrible, what matters for inmate demands is whether conditions are worse than they should be, according to broadly visible and externally validated standards. Such standards may be established by past practices within the prison system or other jurisdictions, or by explicit statements of external authorities such as courts or legis- latures. When prisoners are able to appeal to external authorities to validate their grievances, this fuels their demands with the expectation that they will be upheld. External validation may center on court decisions finding that prison conditions vio- late inmates' legal rights, or on indictments of prison staff for failures to comply with court- or state-mandated procedures. De- bates within legislative bodies may have a similar impact. Arbitrary rule enforcement and excessive use of force by staff, loss of inmate services considered as rightfully due, and extreme violence and lack of safety for inmates also provide the basis for inmates to make demands and act against prison authorities.

(4) INMATE IDEOLOGIES THAT JUSTIFY REVOLT. Inmate ideologies are sometimes

sophisticated, more often coarse; but either

RIOT AND REFORM IN U.S. PRISONS 501

way they undercut the legitimacy of the prison and unite inmates by providing a common framework for establishing opposition and justifying rebellion. Inmate ideologies claim that conditions in prison are not just bad, but "wrong," and that "if we riot, people will see what's wrong in here," where "wrong" is judged in terms of the failure of the prison administration to meet standards (often its own explicit and public standards) of just imprisonment.

(5) UNJUST PRISON ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS. Prison administrations may take actions that are widely seen as demonstrating the administration's injustice or ineffec- tiveness. Poorly implemented responses to inmate complaints or actions may further le- gitimize rebellion while demonstrating that authorities are vulnerable. Ineffective actions include weak responses to prison escapes, to assaults on officers or other inmates, or to inmate grievances, as well as ineffective or bungled attempts to separate prisoners or conduct operations such as lockdowns.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

In our previous paper, we examined the role of these five conditions in the genesis of 13 prison riots (Goldstone and Useem 1999). For each prison, we compared the incidence of the five conditions in two different periods: one period just prior to the riot, the other a stable period two to five years earlier. The five conditions were not equally present in all cases of riots. However, in no case did a riot occur without at least three of the five conditions being present, and in a majority of the cases all five conditions were evident. In contrast, the five conditions were largely absent in the stable periods, and no riots occurred in any prison where three or more of the conditions were absent. A formal data analysis found that these five conditions, especially in combination, were significantly associated with the occurrence of prison riots.

However, we did not investigate how these five causal conditions arise. Nor did we present evidence regarding the consequences of deliberate changes in these causal conditions, thus leaving it unclear whether such deliberate changes are possible, and if so,

over how long a time-frame before such changes would have an impact.

We hypothesize that these five conditions are not simply "structural" causes of prison riots and thus beyond control: They are the result of poor choices or the poor implementation of policy by state and prison authorities. To the extent that authorities establish a context in which these five conditions are absent, stability can be expected. Con- versely, when prison authorities' actions produce these five conditions, organizational breakdown will ensue.

The cases of the New York City and New Mexico prisons allow us to test both aspects of this hypothesis. (See Appendix A for a description of data sources.)

NYC DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION: FROM DISORDER TO ORDER

The New York City Department of Correc- tion (NYCDOC) is larger than 35 state prison systems, holding nearly 20,000 inmates in primarily high- and medium-security facilities. Most inmates are housed in 10 facilities on Rikers Island, an island located on the East River. Two-thirds of the inmates are detainees awaiting trial for crimes committed in New York City-crimes that include assault, murder, and other felonies. Another 18 percent are convicted state prisoners, either parole violators or inmates awaiting a transfer to a state facility. The re- maining 15 percent are convicted prisoners serving a sentence of one year or less. Prior to 1995, the average length of stay for inmates was about 50 days. This high turnover rate was often cited by corrections experts and agency insiders to explain Rikers' reputation as a violent and unmanageable place. Yet by 1999 Rikers Island-despite no change in this turnover rate-had become exceptionally orderly and violence free.

In 1989, New York Mayor David Dinkins appointed Allyn Sielaff as corrections commissioner. Sielaff had earned a national reputation as a pioneer for inmate rights ("New Approach on Virginia Prisons; Cor- rections Chief Criticized, Praised as Lib- eral," Washington Post, November 30, 1984; "Jails Chief Is Criticized for Being too Iso- lated," New York Times [NYT], August 26,


1990). Yet in New York City, Sielaff's reform agenda went largely unfulfilled, crippled by a fiscal crisis and divisions within the agency. Sielaff's actions, however well intentioned, within two years had combined with circumstances in NYCDOC to create all the key conditions for a prison riot. The 1990 riot showed the full panoply of riot conditions we noted in Goldstone and Useem (1999). Indeed, administrative conflicts were so severe that the riot began with a strike by corrections officers against the prison administration and was followed by an uprising by inmates.

THE CAUSES OF THE 1990 RIOT

RISING EXTERNAL DEMANDS AND RE-

DUCED RESOURCES. The crack cocaine epi- demic of the 1980s hit New York City hard. Crime rose rapidly, and the city's political leadership directed police to make more arrests (New York State, Division of Criminal Services [NYS, DCS] 2000). As a result, the DOC's population tripled from 7,000 inmates in 1980 to 21,000 when Sielaff took office (Citizens Budget Commission [CBC] 1993: 9, 11). To accommodate the influx, the city spent more than $1 billion to build additional prison housing. However, the other compo- nents of the prison system that differentiate a fully functioning prison from a mere dormitory or housing unit (namely the corrections staff, food preparation, medical care, and recreation), failed to keep pace. Quickly constructed modular units lacked adequate ancillary facilities, such as dining, recreational, and visiting areas (CBC 1993:14). Meals often arrived late and cold ("City Studies Op- tions for Overflowing Jails," Newsday, March 12, 1990). The punitive segregation unit had a waiting list ("A Rikers Facility for Most Violent," Newsday, July 20, 1990). Cor- rectional officers were rapidly hired, but they were poorly screened and given only minimal training (authors' interview; "Chief of Correction Faults Rikers's Way of Hiring Officers," NYT, August 25, 1990).

While Sielaff promised sweeping reforms (Allyn Sielaff, "More Jail Space Provides Only Part of the Answer to Crowding," Op- ed, NYT, November 21, 1990), little of his agenda was achieved. Dinkins's administration inherited the city's worst fiscal crisis in

15 years ("Why Did New York Hire 49,000 Workers in 7 Years?" NYT, October 7, 1990). Several of Sielaff's key programs, such as restoring inmate work programs to reduce inmate idle time, foundered because of underfunding (CBC 1993:10), and the city put pressure on the DOC to cut positions to meet budget.

CONFLICT WITH THE CORRECTIONS STAFF. With administrative cutbacks and foundering reforms, tensions between correctional officers and Sielaff rose sharply. The lightning rod for the officers' discontent was a directive governing the use of force by correctional officers that had taken effect on February 1, 1990. The guidelines had been developed to satisfy a 1983 federal lawsuit brought by Legal Aid Society that challenged the conditions at a Rikers facility, but was later expanded to include issues of violence by officers against inmates. In the officers' eyes, the directive mollified the courts and inmates at the officers' expense. Inmates would now be able to strike an officer with near impunity, given the feeble- ness of the inmate disciplinary process. Of- ficers felt attacked by the new use-of-force directive, which they believed crippled their ability to do their jobs and put them at severe risk.

INMATE DEMANDS. Even to inmates, a key indicator of whether a corrections agency is working properly is the level of serious violence among prisoners. During the early 1990s, inmate stabbings and slashings were routine occurrences. In the first six months of 1990, inmates at Rikers Island stabbed or assaulted each other an average of 137 times a month. Correctional officers often found themselves rushing from one violent incident to the next (authors' interviews). An officer stated in 1990, "When I first joined three years ago, . . . we had slashing and violence, but now it's a constant ("Inside Rikers Island: A Bloody Struggle for Control," NYT, September 1, 1990). Inmates blamed the administration and corrections staff for a failure to protect them from daily assaults.

IDEOLOGIES OF RFAFI I ION. There is no evidence that radical or critical perspectives were present among inmates, or that a gang "ideology" had developed. Organized gangs did not develop a presence in NYCDOC fa-


cilities until about 1993 (authors' interviews), later than in most other major jail systems. Still, inmates reported that what might be called a "Hobbesian" ideology prevailed-a belief that "weak" inmates do not have a right to their possessions, to use the telephones, or to move freely on the yard. One inmate commented, "It's hell full-time. You don't think you'll live from morning to night" ("Rikers, Armed Rule by Inmates," Newsday, July 18, 1990). Inmates thus came to view the prison authorities as ineffective and illegitimate, as they could not control the prison or provide even minimal safety and security for the inmates.

WEAK OR INEFFECTIVE ADMINISTRA-

TIVEACTIONS. Two events leading up to the riot had escalated conflicts and shown inmates that collective action could succeed. On July 12, 1990, inmates seized control of a portion of the Otis Bantum Correctional Center (OBCC) on Rikers Island. OBCC was a newer unit, housing 1,200 inmates in 16 dormitory-style units. Prison officials ac- ceded to the inmates' demand for longer telephone conversations. Correctional officers reportedly felt that the OBCC administration had "sold out," and the event raised tension in the unit.

Three weeks later, three OBCC inmates robbed and severely beat an officer. Officers became furious when the inmates were charged with robbery, assault, and possession of contraband rather than attempted murder. Officers saw this as kid-glove treatment and part of a pattern of inmate appease- ment. In an open letter to the Commissioner, a group of Rikers officers stated: "An inmate should not be able to assault an Officer without paying a price.... You and your subor- dinates have lost the jail to inmates" (De- partment of Investigation, City of New York [DOI, CNY] 1991, app. A-21). According to inmate accounts, correctional officers became more confrontational following the incident (authors' interview).

OUTBREAK OF THE AUGUST 1990 RIOT

On August 14, 1990, a riot broke out at OBCC, although all the facilities on Rikers were on the verge of disturbances (New York State Commission of Correction [NYSCC]

1991; DOI, CNY 1991; authors' interviews). Tensions between the prison administration and corrections staff were crucial to the genesis of this riot.

On August 11, the correctional officers' union notified the DOC that officers might engage in a job action because their working conditions were unsafe. Union complaints focused on the undercharging of the three inmates, the policy limiting use of force, and 200 budget-related cuts in the number of officers assigned to shifts and 385 more cuts slated for the following fiscal year (NYSCC 1991; "Rikers Tension Erupts," The Record [Northern New Jersey], August 15, 1990; authors' interviews).

On August 13, 600 off-duty officers block- aded the only bridge to Rikers Island. City officials massed police for a possible assault to end the blockade, but instead sought a ne- gotiated settlement. This would take 30 hours to achieve. Meanwhile, the blockade disrupted all routine activities. Hundreds of prisoners were unable to make court appear- ances, and those slated for release had to re- main in custody. Employees could not go home, and their replacements were turned away, as were visitors. Food deliveries were brought to a halt; most inmate activities, such as recreation and visiting the law li- brary, were suspended.

By August 14, all Rikers' facilities were in crisis. OBCC was typical rather than exceptional. Staff observed inmates stockpiling brooms, buckets, and other potential make- shift weapons. The commissary was burglar- ized, and the perpetrators went unpunished. The number of staff was down to 50 percent of normal, and those who remained were ex- hausted from 38 hours of continuous duty. Inmates followed the negotiations on the bridge over live television broadcasts. By the afternoon on the second day, managers were fearful that a massive rebellion in many facilities would allow inmates to seize control of the entire island and take hundreds of hostages (authors' interviews).

At 6:00 P.M. on August 14, a settlement was reached. The DOC agreed to modify the use-of-force policy, subject to the approval of the federal judge. In addition, the Depart- ment would restore 195 of the staff-shift assignments, as well as forgo disciplining employees for participating in the blockade


(DOI, CNY 1991 :A-23-A-30). Covered live by local television, the union president stated to cheering officers, "We got just about everything we wanted," and that "the use-of-force directive has been eliminated" (authors' interviews; "Correction Union Chief Blasted," Newsday, August 18, 1990). Moments later, a riot erupted at the Otis Bantum facility.

The riot broke out when an OBCC inmate refused to obey an order, and three officers were sent to handle the situation. They were met by a crowd of inmates poised for a physical confrontation. One inmate slashed the three officers in rapid succession, while other inmates threw beds and lockers. An officer called for backup, but within minutes disorder had spread to almost the entire facility ("47 Are Injured as Inmates Rebel Just as Impasse Ends at Rikers," NYT, July 15, 1990).

The disorganization that helped bring forth the riot was evident in the response. The chain of command collapsed. About 200 un- ruly and angry correctional officers, who had been protesting at the bridge, rushed to the facility. Groups of officers competed with each other to enter a dormitory to subdue inmates. Control of the prison was regained mainly by extreme use of force against prisoners by a virtually unsupervised staff.

To sum up, these were the key factors behind the 1990 riot: (1) Budget cuts and a rising inmate population frustrated Sielaff's attempts at reform and led to constant conflicts between the city government and prison administration; they also reduced delivery of inmate services-food, recreation, work, medical care; (2) a court-imposed use-of- force directive and budget cuts alienated corrections staff, putting them in sharp opposition to the prison administration; (3) a dis- tracted administration and resentful corrections staff allowed inmate violence to build to extreme levels, creating inmate grievances over disorder as well as poor delivery of services; (4) inmates developed an ideology that "anything goes" and that staff and administration actions were illegitimate, based on lawlessness in the prison and the officers' overthrow of the use-of-force directive; and (5) the administration was slow and ineffective in dealing with early signs of rebellion and protest by corrections staff and inmates.

INTERREGNUM: RIOT SITUATION CONTINUED, 1991 TO 1995

After the riot, tensions between the city government and the wardens, and between wardens and staff, continued with high administrative turnover. Under heavy criticism in the wake of the riot, Sielaff resigned at the end of 1991. Three subsequent commissioners, each serving short terms, were unable to gain the confidence of correctional staff and high levels of violence persisted. One officer told a journalist in 1994, "The Department is in crisis and there's no one who seems to know how to take control and restore stability" (Horowitz 1994:31). Yet by the end of the decade, this war of all against all had come to an end, the situation turned from hopeless to secure. How was this accom- plished?

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND

LEADERSHIP, 1995 TO 1999

In 1994, Rudolph Giuliani replaced Dinkins as mayor of New York. In 1995, Mayor Giuliani appointed Michael Jacobson as Commissioner and Bernard Kerik as First Deputy Commissioner of the DOC. In Janu- ary 1998, Jacobson left the agency and Kerik became Commissioner. Under their leadership, the Department was transformed. This was achieved neither through "liberalizing" reforms, sought by previous administrative regimes, nor by imposing stricter conditions on inmates, as is often associated with con- servative regimes. Rather, the riot situation was ended by attacking the root causes of disorder.

The new administration (1) balanced resources and demands on the administration and ended conflict with the city; (2) created unity and coherence in policy among the warden and corrections staff; (3) increased safety for prisoners, curbing excessive use of force by staff while also providing security for corrections officers; (4) undercut the "Hobbesian" ideology that justified rebellion; and (5) enforced swift and effective responses to inmate provocations.

BALANCING RESOURCES AND DE- MANDS. By the middle of the decade, New York City had entered a period of economic and social revival. In addition, Giuliani's ap-


proach to crime was to mobilize officers to prevent crime, rather than merely to increase arrests (Kelling and Sousa 2001). From 1993 to 1997, the number of serious violent and property crimes dropped 40 percent (New York City Department of City Planning [NYCDCP] 1999:15). This, in turn, helped stem the growth of the DOC's population. However, these favorable trends did not mean a sudden increase in resources per inmate. Although the average daily population of NYCDOC fell from a peak of 21,500 inmates in 1992 to 17,520 in 1998, budgets declined as well. Both expenditures per prisoner and uniformed employees per prisoner were higher in 1993-1994, when the prison was still violence-ridden, than in 1998- 1999, when violence had dramatically declined. Thus, stability cannot be attributed mainly to additional resources. Instead, the relative stability in external demands let the prison administration focus on dealing with internal issues.

SMOOTHING ADMINISTRATION/STAFF RELATIONS: TEAMS AND ACCOUNTABIL- ITY. If the key cause of the 1990 riot was tension between the prison administration and corrections officers, the key reform of the new administration was directed at that problem. A management forum, given the acronym TEAMS (Total Efficiency Account- ability Management System), effected the reform. TEAMS assembles the Commis- sioner, his senior staff, heads of civilian and uniformed units, and three or four wardens and their senior staff in a single room, once every three to four weeks to examine events and trends in their facility (authors' interviews and observation).

To support the forum, the TEAMS staff collects and verifies data on facility performance. The data play a crucial role in direct- ing the TEAMS meetings. Any spikes in the trends of these indicators, whether the number of inmate complaints or sick-leave days taken by officers, are noticed. If the trend is negative, then a remedy must be developed; if the spike is positive, the warden is asked to explain, so others can learn from this po- tentially best practice. Each and every unusual event, such as a stabbing or slashing, is singled out for discussion. In addition, the warden is typically asked what are the two or three most frequent complaints made by

inmates in the time period covered and what has been done to address them.

Prior to TEAMS, wardens rarely toured their facilities and were generally unaware of the details of their operation, not even knowing their daily inmate count (authors' interview). After TEAMS, wardens became deeply involved in the management of their facility. Administrators who clung to past practices were forced out of the agency (authors' interviews).

By quickly and consistently identifying and defusing inmate complaints, and clamp- ing down on inmate violence, the safety of both officers and inmates was greatly increased. Officers were far less exposed to danger after the reforms. From fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year 2001, incidents in which staff used major force in confrontations with inmates fell from 240 to 73 incidents per 10,000, a decline of 70 percent (personal communication, Frank Ciaccio, NYCDOC, February 6, 2002). Officers felt less stressed and more committed to their jobs. Prior to TEAMS, correctional staff averaged 21 sick- days per year; this dropped to an average of 14 sick-days per year five years later (Kerik 2000:124).

INMATE GRIEVANCES AND IDEOLOGY: PROTECTING INMATE SAFETY. Rikers had been notorious for its violence among inmates. Prisoners lived under constant fear of violence and held the prison authorities in contempt for their failure to provide secure conditions. To change this situation, the department reversed a key policy regarding penalties for crimes committed while in custody. Traditionally, an inmate found to have a weapon, attacking another inmate, or in possession of narcotics was punished admin- istratively rather than charged with a crime. Under a new policy, inmates committing crimes behind bars were to be rearrested, charged with a new crime, and if convicted, given a new sentence to be served after any existing sentence.

Previously, three officers were assigned to investigate inmate crimes for the entire agency. Not only was the task overwhelm- ing, but this small group felt poorly supported and insufficiently trained (authors' interviews). Under Jacobson and Kerik, a regular staff unit was charged with investi- gating inmate crimes. The unit consisted of


36 officers under the direction of a deputy warden. The arrest-initiative would have foundered without the cooperation of the local district attorney's office, but this cooperation was secured. Inmate crimes were thus investigated and vigorously prosecuted.

Within a short period, the new policies and external support from prosecutors changed inmate ideology regarding violence within the prison. From 1996 to 1999, the number of inmate arrests increased by 400 percent. One inmate stated, "In here, you do the crime, you will do the time. They'll nail you" (authors' interview). In a press interview, another inmate compared his current incarceration to an earlier one in 1990: "The brothers know that if I cut somebody, I will get arrested. And one thing the brothers are not trying to do is get more jail time" ("An Iron Hand at Rikers Island Drastically Reduces Violence," NYT, November 8, 1999).

To again use felony violence as an indicator of basic order, the number of inmate assaults and stabbings decreased dramatically. The rate of violent incidents per 10,000 inmates just before the 1990 riot compared with the rate two years after the new administration took power had dropped by 75 percent. The contrast is even sharper if we examine the period just before Jacobson and Kerik took charge with the period five years after they took office. Focusing on the single month of July for illustrative purposes, in 1994 there were 139 violent incidents in that month; in July 1999, there were 7 violent incidents; in July 2001, there were 3 (NYCDOC 2000). An inmate commented that whereas formerly he had to "sleep with one eye open," now he can "go to sleep without worrying." An officer said, "It's like night and day. I'm a whole lot safer now, as are inmates" (authors' interviews).

EFFECTIVE RESPONSE AND IMPLEMEN- TATION. The effectiveness of an administration is often revealed by how well changes in policy are implemented. Implementation that is careless to the concerns of staff and inmates often fails and provokes more disorder; in contrast, implementation that is de- signed to meet staff and inmate demands and gain acceptance helps establish the authority of the administration.

For example, to reduce provocations that could lead to violence, the NYCDOC banned gang identifiers, such as gang symbols and jewelry. Commissioner Jacobson first ensured that he had support from external legal authorities for the policy change. Previously, a suit in federal court had given inmates the right to wear jewelry if it was not expensive and could not be fashioned into a weapon. The City returned to court and sought to modify this right and prohibit gang-identifying jewelry. For the first time in almost 20 years, the City prevailed in a major condition-of-confinement suit in the federal courts (Sandler 1995).

Jacobson then sought to ensure that the order was implemented skillfully within the prison, so as not to generate resistance or rebellion. This stands in contrast to the actions leading up to a riot in 1993 in an Ohio prison, when the warden enforced a policy of requiring tuberculosis tests of inmates against the objections of Muslim inmates, but without attention to overcoming those objections (Goldstone and Useem 1999: 1007-1008). In New York, officials explained the new policy patiently and care- fully to inmates. Posters gave inmates 15 days advance notice; wardens advised the inmate councils of the prohibition and an- swered all questions about the policy; all staff were given roll-call training in its implementation; and a deputy warden for programs at each facility was given responsibility for the process to ensure uniformity. During the 15-day transition, inmates were given the option of mailing home prohibited items or surrendering them for safekeeping. The policy was implemented without major disruption (authors' interview).

In sum, the new administration established a solid social order in which external agen- cies provided support and resources to meet administration needs; administration and staff shared a solid information base on conditions in the prison; and inmates felt secure but were also aware that the staff and administration were united in enforcing the rules. This created a situation in which inmates saw a safe, secure, and well-managed system that was responsive to their needs and not gratuitously abusive. Furthermore, the reforms greatly enhanced the morale and sense of commitment of correctional staff.


These changes occurred without significant changes in the inmate composition, inmate turnover, or resources per prisoner in the system.

DESCENT INTO DISORDER: THE NEW MEXICO PRIVATE PRISON RIOTS

In 1998, New Mexico opened three prisons that were built and operated by private contractors. Within a year, each of them experienced a major riot or riots. On August 5, 1998, at the County Detention Facility in Estancia, five officers were injured by inmates; 12 days later, five inmates and two officers were injured, including one who was nearly beaten to death and left in a coma. On April 6, 1999, at the Lea Country Correctional Facility in Hobbs, about 170 inmates rioted, resulting in injuries to 13 officers and 1 prisoner. Finally, on August 31, 1999, at the Guadalupe County Correctional Facility in Santa Rosa, inmates stabbed and critically wounded an inmate and stabbed to death a correctional officer. One-third of the prison itself was severely damaged. This is a great deal of riot activity for one state over a short time. Until then, there had been no other riots in the New Mexico prison system in the 1990s. Nationally, none of the 28 other states or jurisdictions with private prisons, which comprised 88 facilities housing over 67,000 inmates, had had any fatal incidents in 1999; New Mexico's private prisons-three facilities with 1,718 inmates-had four distinct episodes resulting in inmate and/or officer fatalities. In short, by any standard, New Mexico's private facilities showed an extraordinary breakdown of order in this period. Here we analyze only the riots at Hobbs and Santa Rosa because data on the Estancia riots were not made available to us.

PRISON PRIVATIZATION AND SOCIAL ORDER

The state-centered theory argues that social order in prisons rests on the prison administration being supported and regarded as effective and legitimate by external government authorities, staff, and inmates. In New Mexico's private facilities, the conditions of

privatization and operation of the facilities undermined these bases of support.

The intent behind private prisons is to save money for the public authorities while still delivering profits to the private contractor. This is particularly difficult for high-security prisons, where needs for control and super- vision are extremely high. Cost-cutting almost inevitably means reductions in staff training, pay, and benefits; 60 to 80 percent of the costs of operating a prison are labor expenses (Camp and Gaes 2002:428). Cost- cutting is always difficult to carry out, and this is especially problematic when the prison administration is both burdened by extreme demands and is under attack from external authorities. In New Mexico, government specifically mandated the private prisons to impose unusual disamenities on inmates; at the same time, many New Mexi- can and national political leaders were sharply criticizing the validity of giving private companies control of state prisons.

Thus, from the outset New Mexico's new private facilities faced attacks from government authorities, external pressure to cut costs, conflicts with staff and inmates over cost-reducing measures, and questionable legitimacy. When prison administrators re- acted weakly to inmate provocations and violence, the stage was set for serious disorder and multiple riots.

RISING EXTERNAL DEMANDS AND REDUCED RESOURCES

In the 1990s, New Mexico corrections was in a fiscal bind. The state was at or near the bottom on many indicators of economic wealth, yet near the top in state expenditures per inmate. New Mexico ranked 50th in persons below the poverty line (U.S. Census Bureau 2000a), 50th in the percentage of the workforce unemployed (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1999), and 48th in per capita income (U.S. Census Bureau 2000b). None- theless, the state was fifth among all states in expenditures per inmate, spending more than twice as much per inmate as did many other states (Criminal Justice Institute 1997:74).

These high costs were the legacy of the 1980 riot at the Penitentiary of New Mexico. Following the riot, the state entered a con-


sent decree (Duran v. Apodaca Civ. No. 77- 721-C [D.N.M. July 14, 1980]) to settle a lawsuit filed by inmates in federal court. While in some areas the Duran decree only obligated the state to meet federal courts standards, in others it exceeded these requirements, imposing significant costs. For example, the decree prohibited doubling up inmates in cells, even though the federal courts have permitted this in other jurisdictions, and much additional prison space was built to accommodate the state's prison population in single cells. In addition, to avoid a reoccurrence of the 1980 riot, the state committed itself to building small facilities in different parts of the state. Al- though this decentralization was intended to enhance safety, it also raised costs.

After 1984, however, no medium-custody bed spaces for males were constructed for over a decade (New Mexico Corrections De- partment [NMCD] 1996:13). By 1997, New Mexico had 4,700 inmates but only 3,500 bed spaces (NMCD 1998). Some inmates were sent to county jails, others to out-of- state facilities, and still others slept on cots in day rooms at the medium-security prisons. The federal judge overseeing the Duran decree threatened to release inmates if the state did not add new beds.

Yet the state government was divided over the prison question. The Republican gover- nor, a business entrepreneur turned politi- cian, asserted that privatization would increase the number of beds while reducing costs. He was opposed by the Secretary of Corrections and the Democratically con- trolled legislature. When the Secretary and his deputy expressed their skepticism in legislative hearings, claiming that the cost savings of privatization were minimal, the Gov- ernor fired them ("Johnson Fires Top Prison Officials," Santa Fe New Mexican, August 6, 1996).

The Governor also found a way to circum- vent the opposition of the state legislature. Two county governments signed contracts with private firms to build, staff, and operate county "jails" ("Deal to Privatize New Mexico Prisons Will Allow State to Cancel Bond Issues," Bond Buyer, August 25, 1998). Although there was never any question that the "jail" facilities would be used to house state prison inmates, this arrange-

ment could be effected without legislative approval. Once the facilities were built, the pressure on the legislature to appropriate funds for their operation would overwhelm antiprivatization opponents. The Corrections Department still needed new beds; the federal judge overseeing Duran ordered the old Penitentiary (site of the 1980 riot) closed by October 1997 and its 400 inmates transferred, making the crowding problem even more acute; and the two counties selected as prison sites were eager to bring new jobs to their high unemployment regions (Crane 2000:55-56). The Lea County Correctional Facility (Hobbs) opened in May 1998 with a capacity of 1,250; Guadalupe County Cor- rectional Facility (Santa Rosa) began operation in January 1999 with a capacity of 600. The new facilities dramatically reduced the overcrowding in the New Mexico prison system, yet instead of increasing order, they produced disorder and riots almost immediately.

Adding fuel to the privatization fire was the emergence, in the mid-1990s, of a national prison reform movement that sought to reduce the amenities and programs available to inmates. If inmates were provided fewer amenities, activists argued, prisons would deter crime more effectively (Finn 1996; McGinnis 2000; O'Bryant 1996). New Mexico's governor openly agreed with this "no frills" position and committed the state to using the new private prisons to achieve it.

TENSIONS WITH CORRECTIONS STAFF

The new private prisons at Hobbs and Santa Rosa faced problems almost from the outset, with staff feeling insecure and losing control of their facilities. The staff at the two private facilities, in both the management and line levels, was inexperienced (O'Brien 2000:167, 214; Vose 2000:306). There were several reasons for this: The facilities were new, they were located in remote parts of the state with little population base from which to recruit, and the firm offered low pay for correctional officers. A starting correctional officer was paid under $8.00 per hour. "War- dens and staff complained that correctional staff members are difficult to recruit because of the low entry-level salary" (Vose 2000: 306). Because recruitment and turnover were


so problematic, there was a damaging reli- ance on overtime work (O'Brien 2000:124).

The prison staff was also disturbed by what they saw as a top-level ineffective response to violence in their facilities. At Hobbs, and to a somewhat lesser extent at Santa Rosa, violence became pervasive (Vose 2000:331). From August 1998 to September 1999, three inmates were stabbed to death at Hobbs, and an inmate was bludgeoned to death at Santa Rosa. At Hobbs, there were 17 major incidents, several of them resulting in injuries to staff or inmates (Vose 2000:331). Yet, quite unlike the NYCDOC, New Mexico prison authorities made little concerted effort to impose heavy penalties on inmate violence. Inmates were rarely prosecuted, and their custody level or eligibility for parole often was unaffected by serious acts of violence (O'Brien 2000:189-90, 263-65). In addition, because of a shortage of punitive segregation cells, assignments to those cells were often trimmed in length.

One consequence of this failure to impose consistent penalties is that violent offenders remained in the general population. A second consequence was that the staff "lost confidence in the disciplinary system which does not effectively deter or adequately punish serious rule infractions" (O'Brien 2000: 122). Officers became less willing to issue disciplinary reports, in the expectation that they would likely have little effect.

INMATE DEMANDS AND IDEOLOGY

In part as conscious penal policy, in part as a strategy to hold down costs, New Mexico's private facilities offered a level of amenities and incarceration clearly below the standard of the state's public prisons. Inmates' mate- rial grievances were amplified by the spread of Native American rights ideology at Hobbs and by rampant threats to inmate safety in both prisons.

INMATE DEMANDS: AMENITIES AND DEP- RIVATION. New Mexico state corrections officials informed the private contractor that- in contrast to other state facilities-their new prisons should have cells constructed for two inmates rather than one, and that the cells should not have electrical outlets (Vose 2000:295). Also, once the private prisons were operating, inmates found that being

transferred to them meant somewhat lower wages for work, higher prices at the commissary, and fewer available vending ma- chines (Zoley 1999). A state audit found that prices at Hobbs were 16.4 percent higher than prices in state facilities (NMCD 1999). The decision to reduce inmate amenities grew out of a commitment by state officials, under the governor's leadership, to make prison life harder for prisoners.

No national standards exist for inmate amenities. Still, inmates entering the private prisons were experiencing a cutback in the amenities available compared with those they were accustomed to in the state's public prisons. Most salient was that an inmate in a public facility, but not a private facility, was allowed an in-cell television and a water-heating device. If inmates in the public facilities could heat water or watch television in their cells, why couldn't inmates in the private facilities? In addition, Duran specifically prohibited doubling up in cells in the public facilities. Duran governed the operation of the two private facilities, but the settlement agreement permitted double occupancy in new facilities. The CEO of the private firm, in the month prior to the Santa Rosa riot, identified the problem: "Prisoners do not like being housed in two- person cells given they came from state prisons where they were housed in single person cells, . . . [where they also] had the benefit of in-cell electricity to watch television, listen to music, and make hot drinks" (Zoley 1999; also see Griego 2000:108; Vose 2000:296, 331).

Moreover, the controversy over private prisons-first brought to the public's attention with the firing of a Secretary of Correc- tions-stayed alive. As both individual and collective violence escalated in the private prisons, calls to abandon the privatization "experiment" were made by inmate advocacy groups and by some state legislators as well. The inmates' attorney in the Duran case told the press that the situation at Hobbs was "an unmitigated disaster" ("Problems at Private Jails Worry Governor," Albuquerque Journal (AJ), January 15, 1999).

INMATE IDEOLOGY AND NATIVE AMERI- CAN RIGHTS. In 1993, the New Mexico legislature passed a law (strengthening a 1983 law) that gave Native American prisoners a


set of specifically defined rights to practice their religion (New Mexico, Native Ameri- can Counseling Act, Freedom of Worship [1993] Sec. 33-10-4). Native American inmates were given these rights: to have a sweat lodge on the grounds of the correctional facility; to not cut one's hair if doing so conflicts with one's traditional beliefs; to possess religious and ceremonial items, including eagle and other feathers, drums, gourds, and medicine bundles-as long as their possession does not threaten the "reasonable" security of the prison. The philoso- phy behind the Act is that Native American inmates are culturally and religiously distinct, and, if they are to rehabilitate themselves, they must be given certain cultural allowances (New Mexico, Purpose of Native American Counseling Act [1993] Sec. 33-10- 2). While prisons must accommodate a variety of faiths, the historical situation of Na- tive Americans in New Mexico warranted exceptional efforts.

Hobbs prison housed about half of the state's 240 Native American inmates. This group took full advantage of the Native American Counseling Act. Soon after the prison opened, several Native American inmates met with the warden to discuss how to implement the Act (authors' interviews). With the warden's approval, they formed the Red Nation Indian Society and organized extensive activities for Native American inmates. They included, on successive eve- nings, Indian Pipe Ceremony, Talking Circles, Native American Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous, Native American arts and crafts, and Native American videos. Sun- days were used for sweat lodge ceremonies.

Inmates developed a strong ideology of Native American entitlement. The Counsel- ing Act seemed to legitimate, if not legally guarantee, Native American inmates a relatively broad set of rights to exercise their religion. When those rights were qualified (a practice could not constitute a security threat), some additional burden of proof seemed to be placed on prison officials to show that a valid threat existed. At Hobbs, not a single event had occurred to suggest that the activities organized under the Act posed a security threat.

The policy of allowing Native American religious practices also received strong ex-

ternal support. National advocacy groups working within the U.S. prison systems, and in New Mexico in particular, included the Native American Rights Fund, the Na- tional Congress of American Indians, the International Indian Treaty Council, and the Navajo Nation (Foster 1998). The state legislature also made itself clear. For example, the chair of the New Mexico Senate Judi- ciary Committee (himself an attorney) would later comment, "[T]he spirit and intent of the [Counseling Act] law [is to] guarantee Native American inmates the right to practice their religion" ("Experts Contend the Corrections Department's Ban Violates the Native American Counseling Act," AJ, April 22, 2001). From the point of view of the Red Society inmates, their program was rational, very important to them, and legitimated as advancing the goals set forth in the Act.

Yet in the months before the riot at Hobbs, the prison authorities and staff undertook what amounted to an attack on what the Na- tive American inmates perceived as their legitimate rights. Under pressure to take steps to reduce the rampant violence, the warden- as part of an effort to impose greater control within the prison-terminated all of the Red Nation Indian Society's evening programs (authors' interviews). A series of incidents occurred that greatly inflamed emotions. In one, a correctional officer confiscated an inmate's (to him) sacred eagle feather, crumpled it, and threw it on the floor; in another, a correctional officer confiscated an inmates' cut hair, which he had planned to mail to his family. Several times, correctional officers prematurely terminated sweat lodge ceremonies with no explanation. Then, the day before the riot, an officer confiscated a sacred drum that an inmate had been assigned to maintain and bring to ceremonial events.

In one fell swoop, this last incident encap- sulated not merely the two months of losses, but the historical oppression of Native Americans-at least in the eyes of the inmates (authors' interviews). While the Red Nation inmates recognized that the prison was out of control, this rationale to cut their programs appeared pretextual, just camou- flage. The assaults on inmates were plainly the work of gangs, and the Red Society was not a gang. Also, the Native American in-

RIOT AND REFORM IN U.S. PRISONS 51 1

mates could hardly be blamed for the lack of discipline among the correctional force. No effort was made by correctional authorities to explain the decision to close down the Society's programs, and the treatment by correctional officers seemed gratuitously abusive. One inmate stated that the sudden elimination of the program "hurt, deep down" (authors' interview).

The next day, a group of Native American inmates started the riot in a coordinated, planned manner in the cafeteria during the lunch hour. The group arose on a yelled sig- nal and began striking correctional officers. According to numerous accounts, once the riot started, inmates of all ethnic back- grounds joined the ensuing pandemonium. Thirteen officers were severely beaten. One Native American inmate explained his mo- tivation: "I wanted them to feel some of the pain that I had felt. The warden took everything from us. And there was no justifica- tion" (authors' interview). Another inmate stated, "We have done nothing wrong, and I didn't understand why" (NMCD 1999:170).

Deprivations that are perceived to be in- evitable or a fair response to past actions tend to be accepted as just; those that are perceived otherwise are likely to be galling (Stinchcombe 1978:33-35, 37-41; Useem and Kimball 1989:204-205). Prisoners in private facilities saw no reason why they should be "punished" by double-celling and suffer other deprivations relative to inmates in the state's public prisons. Prisoners knew the consent decree between the State and federal courts had prescribed one standard of treatment; now, they were being subjected to a lower standard. In addition, prisoners at both Hobbs and Santa Rosa faced unreason- able levels of violence as inmates intimi- dated correctional officers and took control of the prisons. Finally, at Hobbs the Native American inmates perceived severe viola- tions of their rights. Under these conditions, it was almost unavoidable that the private prison authorities appeared both illegitimate and ineffective.

WEAK AND INEFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

In the period immediately preceding the riots, responses to inmate provocations were

obviously weak. This was clearly evident at both Santa Rosa and Hobbs. During Hobbs's first six months of operation, there were eight inmate stabbings and two stabbing deaths, yet no new disciplinary measures were imposed.

Three days prior to the riot at Santa Rosa, the governor warned the contractor that if any more inmates were killed, he would order all private-facility inmates transferred to public facilities. The warning was reported in the press ("Private Prisons Warned," AJ, September 27,1999). To reinforce and clarify the message to inmates, the NMCD posted a notice in the private facilities stating that transfers would be to an out-of-state prison, not to a more desirable in-state public facility. This notice, according to some observ- ers on the scene, was perceived by inmates as a challenge to "get" the contractor by dis- rupting the facility (Fresquez 2000) and was later criticized along these lines (Vose 2000: 292). Even more striking is that the warning implied that, for the felonious act of riot, inmates' most severe penalty would be a transfer to a less desirable facility. Inmates could have been told to expect new sentences for rioting, but they were not.

Just prior to the Santa Rosa riot, numerous inmate actions occurred that should have signaled trouble, yet these went largely unpunished and unheeded. These actions included: (1) Three days before the riot, 15 inmates in a group were observed to be "pad- ding up" (putting on extra clothing in antici- pation of violence) and acting in a threaten- ing manner. The 15 included known gang leaders. No administrative action was taken, and the inmates were allowed to stay in the general population (Vose 2000:293). (2) Two days before the riot, two inmates were assaulted. The alleged assailants were identified, but no action was taken pending an investigation (Vose 2000:294). (3) On the day of the riot, rumors were circulating among both inmates and officers that a major disorder was going to happen (Weber 2000:12). The rumor was not communicated to the warden or members of his executive staff, nor was it acted on in any way.

To restate the conditions in the New Mexico private prisons, by 1999: (1) The state had made demands on private prisons that prison administrators found difficult to


justify or handle, including mandating a lower level of amenities than were available at public institutions in the same system. In addition, segments within a deeply divided state government frequently attacked the legitimacy of conditions in the private prisons and the privatization experiment itself. (2) Corrections staff members were recently re- cruited and given lower pay and less training than were the officers in the public prisons. (3) Prisoners were subjected to reduced amenities, arbitrary suppression of state-recognized religious rights, and high levels of inmate violence. (4) An ideology stressing the illegitimacy of the private prison administration, and of specific conditions of confinement in the private prisons, was fueled by external debate and criticism by both national advocacy groups and state officials. (5) Prison authorities were lax in responding to provocative and violent behavior by inmates. Under these five conditions, state- centered theory would predict riots as a highly likely outcome.

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES AND DATA

We have argued that the state-centered model is a useful guide to the causes of prison riots but, in addition, that the five causal conditions can be altered by the policy actions of state and prison authorities. We now consider three alternative explana- tions for the New York City and New Mexico riots, and for the reduction of violence in New York City after 1995.

The simplest alternative explanation is that there were demographic changes in these institutions-changes in the inmate population, spending per inmate, staff levels per inmate, crowding, and inmate turnover. Two other theories we examine are the prevailing theories of riots in the corrections literature. "Inmate-balance theory" argues that social order in prisons is maintained by the inmates' own social organization, using their own resources and sanctions (Bright 1996; Cloward et al. 1960; Sykes 1958). Riots therefore follow from administrative "crackdowns," which curtail inmates' ability to regulate their own af- fairs. The other theory, "administrative control theory," explains riots in terms of inef-

fective prison administrations, focusing on internal divisions within the prison administration, weaknesses in staff training, flawed execution of routine, and tolerance of gangs and violence (DiIulio 1987; Useem and Kimball 1989).

DEMOGRAPHY OF THE PRISON POPULATIONS

Tables 1 and 2 present data on the number and composition of inmates at New York City and New Mexico from 1990 to 1999. For New York City, Table 1 shows that there was a gradual decline in total inmate population in New York City over this period, from a peak of 21,450 inmates in 1992 to a low of 17,520 in 1998. Crowding also dropped, albeit more slowly, from 103 percent of capacity in 1990 to 98.1 percent in 1999. However, these gradual trends corre- late poorly with the dramatic shifts in violence that occurred after the Jacobson/Kerik regime took charge in 1995.

We look at the years 1994-1995, immediately before the change in regime, compared with 1996-1997. In 1994 and 1995, the average daily inmate populations were 18,090 and 18,870; these numbers increased to 18,330 and 19,200 in 1996 and 1997. Pres- sures on capacity also increased, from 93.6 percent and 98.5 percent in 1994 and 1995 to 99.2 percent and 99.2 percent in 1996 and 1997. Population was thus stable or even slightly increasing over these years. Yet a key violence measure in Table 1-the rate of inmate slashings and stabbings-fell from 44.3 per 1,000 inmates in 1994 and 54.5 in 1995 to 22.5 in 1996 and 20.9 in 1997-a sudden decline of well over 50 percent. In the years from 1996-1997 to 1998-1999, there was a further fall in average inmate population by less than 10 percent, yet the rate of inmate slashings fell another 72 percent between 1997 and 1999. And in the same period the use of force by officers against inmates fell by two-thirds. In short, the decline in violence was rapid and massive, and particularly for the difference between 1994-1995 and 1995-1996, the decline cannot be explained by changes in inmate population or crowding.

Earlier we pointed out that some authorities blamed the high level of violence in


Table 1. Administrative Infrastructure and Violence Measures: New York City Department of Corrections, 1990 to 1999

Fiscal Year

Variable 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Administrative Infrastructure Average daily population 19.64 21.07 21.45 19.34 18.09 18.87 18.33 19.20 17.52 17.56

(in 1,000s)

Population as a percentage 102.8 102.6 97.4 93.7 93.6 98.5 99.2 99.2 98.8 98.1 of capacity

Operating expenditures 1,319 1,311 1,321 1,317 1,302 1,306 1,255 1,203 1,151 1,149 (in constant 1999 U.S. millions of dollars) a

Operating expenditures 67.16 62.22 61.58 68.10 71.97 69.21 68.47 62.66 65.70 65.43 per prisoner (in $1,000s)

Ratio of inmates to 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.6 uniformed staff

Prisoner turnover (average 57 67 71 66 60 55 53 53 49 51 length of stay, in days)

Staff Cooperation Uniformed staff absence 16.1 15.2 18.7 18.6 18.0 19.6 17.0 13.7 14.6 14.1

rate b

Inmate Characteristics Number of inmates admitted - - - - 30,694 32,161 32,573 32,639 31,653 29,189

charged with violent crime c

Percentage of total admissions - - - - 27.8 25.5 25.5 24.5 24.3 23.0 charged with violent crime

Ratio of violent to property - - - 2.04 2.01 2.08 2.13 2.12 2.22 crimes, new admissions

Violence Measures Inmate-on-inmate slashings 77.7 65.7 42.3 42.1 44.3 54.5 22.5 20.9 13.1 5.8

and stabbings, per 1,000 inmates

Use of force by officers 62.7 43.0 32.1 32.1 37.1 42.4 32.2 34.7 26.4 12.1 against inmates, per 1,000 correctional officers d

Comparison Agency New York State Department 19.2 18.0 19.3 19.5 6.5 24.2 22.4 10.7 20.9 17.3

of Correctional Services; Inmate assaults against inmates requiring medical attention per 1,000 inmates

Sources: Average daily population, operating expenditures, ratio of inmates to uniformed staff, prisoner turnover come from CBC (2001); population as a percentage of capacity and use of force by officers, Mead (1997) and Frank Ciaccio (personal communication, NYCDOC, February 6, 2002, on file); uniformed staff absence rate, Frank Ciaccio (personal communication); inmate-on-inmate slashings, Mead (1997) and NYCDOC (2000); New York State Department of Correctional Services, inmate violence, Criminal Justice Institute (various years).

a Operating expenditures are the agency's total expenditures and exclude only capital expenditures. b Average number of days absent per employee. c Admission by "highest" or most serious charge. d Serious or "Class A" force only (results in injury, or a correctional officer uses a weapon, such as a gun,

baton, or flashlight).


Table 2. Administrative Infrastructure and Violence Measures: New Mexico Corrections Department, 1990 to 1999

Year

Variable 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Administrative Infrastructure Population

Population as a percentage of capacity

Operating expenditures (in constant 1999 U.S. millions of dollars)a

Operating expenditures per prisoner (in $ 1,000s)b

Ratio of inmates to uniformed staff

[National average]

Prisoner turnover: Rate of new admission to total population (%, males only)

Average length of stay, in months (males only)

Staff Cooperation Uniformed staff turnover

[National average]

Violence Measures Inmate assaults against

inmates or staff, requiring medical attention, per 100 prisoners

3,134 3,164 3,325 3,472 3,716 4,151 4,549 4,701 4,884 5,127

103.7 98.0 102.7 110.0 112.5 124.7 132.0 127.5 135.5 100.4

124.3 120.0 122.2 120.2 119.1 115.0 147.9 149.4 151.4 155.8

39.66 37.93 36.75 34.62 32.05 27.70 32.51 31.78 31.00 30.39

2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.1 3.2

[4.1] [4.4] [4.3] [4.4] [4.4] [4.6] [4.5] [4.5] [4.8]

70.2 68.3 74.1 74.6 77.5 73.2 66.9 63.7 59.7 59.5

16.4 17.9 16.0 17.8 17.5 17.9 19.4 21.0 21.2 22.0

17.0 15.9 11.4 13.2 20.5 17.6 15.7 17.9 18.9 17.9

[14.6] [9.6] [11.6] [12.0] [11.6] [12.7] [12.9] [14.9] [15.4] [16.0]

- - 3.6 1.8 1.8 1.5 3.0 3.3 10.1

Sources: Population, population as a percentage of capacity, prisoner turnover (both measures) come from NMCD (2001); operating expenditures, ratio of inmates to uniformed staff, and inmate assaults, national average uniformed staff turnover, Corrections Yearbook, various years; New Mexico uniformed staff turnover, Robert Alford (personal communication, NMCD, February 15, 2002, on file).

a Operating expenditures reflect the agency's total budget, excluding only capital budget. b Average daily cost per inmate for inmates confined in institutions, calculated by the agency.

Rikers on the high rate of turnover of inmates. Yet the data show this is not true. Prisoner turnover in Rikers in the late 1990s (given by length of stay in Table 1) was higher than in the early 1990s; indeed prison stays were 15 to 20 percent shorter. None- theless, slashings and stabbings among inmates were reduced by over 90 percent during the decade.

While population size and turnover were stable or worsening, perhaps the prison population had become less dangerous by 1999, with fewer violent offenders. Yet the

classification of the incoming inmates by crimes committed shows little change in the number or proportion of violent inmates. In New York City in 1994, 30,694 violent offenders were admitted; 32,161 were admitted in 1995; and 32,573 in 1996 (Table 1). The percentage of inmates listed as having committed violent crimes was 27.8 percent in 1994, 25.5 percent in 1995, and 25.5 percent in 1996. The ratio of inmates admitted for a violent crime to those admitted for a property crime changed only slightly and in the direction of a more violent offender


population from 1994 (2.04) to 1996 (2.08). But violence inside the prison fell by half between 1995 and 1996.

Over two-thirds (68 percent) of the inmates in the New York State Department of Cor- rectional Services had been sent to state prison from New York City (NYS, DCS 2002). Thus, if New York City inmates were becoming less violence prone after 1995, this should be reflected in decreased violence in New York State prisons as well. Yet in 1995- 1996, inmate assaults per 1,000 inmates in the state prisons, shown at the bottom of Table 1, was the highest of the decade; moreover this rate in 1998-1999 was nearly iden- tical to the level in 1990-1991. If we compare the inmate assault rates in NYCDOC prisons with New York state prisons over this decade, we see that the violence rate declined substantially only in NYCDOC; it had been much higher than that in New York state prisons at the start of the decade but had decreased considerably by the end.

Additionally, if New York City was send- ing the state increasingly less dangerous offenders, we would anticipate that fewer state inmates would be classified as maximum security. In fact, the reverse is true: Table 3 shows that, in 1998-1999, the percentage of maximum-security prisoners in the New York state prison system was slightly higher than in 1996-1997, though rates of inmate violence in NYCDOC were substantially lower in the later period.

For New Mexico, Table 2 shows that prison population and overcrowding increased dramatically in the 1990s. However, these figures are for the state system as a whole-and riots occurred only in all the privatized state facilities. Crowding was becoming severe in the late 1990s, which is why the private facilities were rushed into operation. Yet despite the fact that crowding subsided in 1999 because of the opening of those facilities, it was only then that multiple riots occurred. And as with crowding, the ratio of inmates to staff escalated rapidly from 1993 to 1997. Yet it was when the ratio of inmates to staff dropped back to the levels of the mid-1990s (again mainly because of bringing the new private prisons into operation) that the riots broke out. Looking at Hobbs and Santa Rosa, we find no relation- ship between staffing levels and riots. Both

private prisons had riots in 1999, yet Santa Rosa had the fourth lowest ratio of inmates to custody staff of any private prison in the country at 2.1, much lower than the New Mexico state average of 3.2; Hobbs had a ratio closer to the average for state prisons at 5.5 and rather worse than the state norm (Camp and Gaes 2000:45-46).

Moreover, despite the growth in prison population, expenditures per prisoner dropped mainly in the first half of the decade, and during that drop there were no riots. Later in the decade, from 1995 to 1999, the period leading up to the riots, expenditures per prisoner were stable. Interestingly, turnover in New Mexico's prisons was mov- ing in the direction of greater stability in the years before the 1999 riots: Rates of new admissions fell and the average stay of prisoners increased. But none of this prevented the 1999 riots.

It is particularly interesting to view the security status of prisoners in New Mexico. There was systematic underclassification of prisoners in New Mexico involved with the placing of some in private institutions. The Duran decree as well may have led to underclassification. The decree covered only medium- and maximum-security prisoners; thus minimum-security inmates could be housed more cheaply under non-Duran conditions. Still, Duran did not give the state an incentive to classify prisoners as medium versus maximum security. The evidence in Table 3 suggests that New Mexico had an unusually low percentage of maximum-security prisoners in its prisons compared with New York State or the Federal Bureau of Prisons. In 1999, the year of the riots in New Mexico, only 6.2 percent of its inmates were classified as maximum- or high-security prisoners; compare this with 28.1 percent in that classification in New York State, and 41.4 percent in that classification in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Nationally, for all state and federal prisons, 25.5 percent of prisoners were classified as high- or maximum-security inmates. (The two prisons we examined, Hobbs and Santa Rosa, formally had all of their prisoners classified as medium security; none was classed as maximum or high security [O'Brien 2000:128,179]). Even allowing for considerable underclassification (and the percentage of maximum-security


Table 3. Percentage Distributions of Inmates Classified by Custody Level, 1990, 1991, and 1995 to 1999: New Mexico, New York State, Federal Prisons, and National Average

Percentage of the Inmates Classified Classification a 1990 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

New Mexico Department of Corrections Maximum security 11.0 17.0 3.8

Medium security 47.6 54.6 60.8

Minimum security 32.8 12.7 25.3

Other 8.6 15.7 10.2

Number of cases 3,004 3,195 3,868

New York State Department of Correctional Services Maximum security Medium security Minimum security Other

Number of cases

Federal Bureau of Prisons Maximum security Medium security Minimum security Other

Number of cases 54,644

National Average Maximum security Medium security Minimum security Other

Number of cases (1,000s) 674

40.0 36.8 31.6 26.8 26.6 30.8 28.1

49.0 49.5 53.8 51.5 53.0 57.6 53.9

11.0 7.7 14.6 14.5 19.6 11.6 17.5

0 6.0 0 7.1 .8 0 .5

51,227 54,895 66,758 68,489 69,709 69,384 70,001

40.2 32.3 32.7 31.1

24.2 24.3

23.9 26.1

11.8 17.3

60,734 85,573 100,250

26.5

24.4

16.4

105,544

29.0

23.4

16.4

112,973

41.4

19.7

22.6

16.4

123,041

21.4 24.5 25.6 25.0 25.5

41.4 34.4 34.7 34.6 33.7

26.7 31.9 31.6 30.6 30.2

10.5 9.3 7.9 9.8 10.5

732 981 1,104 1,150 1,228 1,293

Source: The Corrections Yearbook (CJI various years). a "Maximum security" includes maximum security and high/close security classifications. "Other" in-

cludes inmates in community (not secure) facilities and unclassified inmates.

prisoners in New Mexico dropped from 17 percent in 1991 to 6 percent in 1999, so it may be that the actual percentage that should have been classified as maximum security was closer to 15 percent), it would seem difficult to argue that the extraordinary amount of riot activity in the New Mexico prisons reflected an unusually violent or high-risk population of inmates compared with other prison systems.1

1 This conclusion is supported by a 1997 survey of inmates entering prisons in New Mexico, New York, and Arizona (Piehl, Useem, and

In short, whether we look at total prison population, prisoner turnover, crowding, ex- penditure per prisoner, or security classifications of inmates, there seems to be nothing in the basic demographic data that can explain either the enormous and rapid drop in violence in the New York City prisons, or

Dilulio 1999), which asked inmates about the crimes they committed just prior to their imprisonment. The costs of the crimes of the top one- fifth of offenders were considerably higher in New York ($240,000) and Arizona ($220,000) than in New Mexico ($163,000).

5.2

47.6

22.8

24.3

4,805

4.7

51.1

34.8

9.5

4,658

3.6

60.0

21.4

15.1

4,682

6.2

62.0

17.6

14.2

5,045


the eruption of multiple riots in the New Mexico private prisons.

INMATE-BALANCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE-

CONTROL THEORIES

Both inmate-balance and administrative- control theories appear strongly supported when applied to certain elements of the two cases. In New Mexico, the leading role taken by Native American inmates in the Hobbs riot was a reaction to a crackdown on their religious activities. In New York City, the pacification of Rikers Island followed an administrative tightening by the new leadership. Each theory accounts for elements of each case.

The problem is whether these theories can be applied more broadly to cover important elements across all cases of riots and their absence. The riot in Santa Rosa was unre- lated to administrative crackdowns and is better explained by the lax control of violence and weak response to inmate provocations and actions, as pointed to by administrative-control theory. Moreover, in New York City, the crackdown on violence among inmates, and particularly on gang-identifiers such as jewelry, would be predicted by inmate-balance theory to increase disorder and generate riots, yet it had the opposite result. In these cases, inmate-imbalance theory pre- dicts the opposite of what occurred.

Administrative-control theory, for its part, cannot account for the broad sense of injustice over deprivation of amenities expressed by the inmates at the New Mexico private facilities, as these deprivations were part of a deliberate policy of the state government and not the result of lax or arbitrary administration. Similarly, the impositions on Native Americans at Hobbs were part of a deliberate attempt to combat violence by imposing uni- form rules for behavior; their impact on inmates was highly provocative but again was not a result of lax or weak administration.

Violence is a clear symptom of deteriorat- ing order and is cited as evidence of failure by administrative-control theory. High levels of violence against inmates and staff, if not suppressed, generally set the stage for further assaults and riots. Yet a prevailing climate of inmate violence is not a general cause of prison riots. Of the 13 riots we ex-

amined in our prior study (Goldstone and Useem 1999), only two cases were marked by a "Hobbesian" ideology in which prisoners complained of a war of all against all and generalized insecurity. The majority of the riots were generated not by concerns about inmate violence, but by external demands or administrative shifts that produced new and poorly implemented policies, staff conflicts over new rules and routines, inmate grievances over arbitrary or illegal reduction of services or privileges by the administration, and failures of physical plant or security routines to control inmates.

More directly, simply connecting general inmate violence to riots does not make sense of the details of the New Mexico and New York City riots. The Native Americans who led the Hobbs riot had been, until the riot, nonviolent members of the prison community. It was attacks on their religious possessions and activities by prison staff-not violence by or against their persons-that led to their key role in initiating the riot. In the New York City riot of 1990, the leading role was played by corrections officers who bar- ricaded the prison to protest an externally imposed court order (the use-of-force directive) that they believed placed them in grave danger.

In short, inmate-imbalance and administrative-control theories point to factors that are important in causing particular riots, or to specific elements of riotous situations. But neither theory can account for the full range of elements leading to the breakdown and restoration of social order in these two cases. Both are accurate in some respects, but by themselves are too simple to account for the complexities of these cases and our data. The state-centered theory-which points to a combination of external administrative demands on prison administration, conflicts with staff, inmate grievances, ideologies of resistance, and ineffective response to inmate actions-comprehends the most valuable points of each theory and accounts for more elements of these two cases. The theory is also more general, capable of explaining a phenomenon that neither inmate-imbalance nor administrative-control theory lead us to expect, namely the strains that private firms face in maintaining social order in high-security prisons.


PRIVATE PRISONS: LESSONS FROM NEW MEXICO AND STATE- CENTERED THEORY

Over the last quarter century, U.S. policy- makers have increasingly embraced privatization as the solution to public problems, in spheres ranging from healthcare to low- income housing, from electric power to refuse collection. Government came to be seen as ineffective, while private enterprise gained credibility as an engine of innovation and efficiency. The failures of privatization in New Mexico's prison system suggest some problems with the presumption that private enterprises are always more effective than public institutions.

In fact, although the experience of New Mexico's private prisons was extreme, it was by no means unique. Surveys of private prison performance have found that "[p]rivately operated prisons appear to have systemic problems in maintaining secure facilities" (Camp and Gaes 2002:444).

PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATE VERSUS

PUBLIC PRISONS IN MAINTAINING

ORDER

Private prisons have experienced unusually high rates of riots and prisoner escapes (Greene 2001). In 1999 alone, riots occurred in private prisons in Oklahoma (in two different facilities), Tennessee, Montana, and Colorado, as well as those in New Mexico. That makes eight riots during that year within the nation's 49 private maximum- and medium-security prisons. These prisons held 35,860 prisoners, for an average riot incidence of 1 riot for every 6 prisons and for every 4,482 inmates (Camp and Gaes 2000, table 1; McDonald and Patten 2000:110).2 Comparing this with national data, between 1990 and 1998, an average of 6.1 prison riots occurred in the United States, ranging from a peak of 12 in 1995 to a low of 2 in 1998 (authors' tally from New York Times

2 There was also one riot in a private prison with predominantly low- and minimum-security prisoners-at Taft Correctional Institution in California. This riot was over food services and resulted in no injuries but caused approximately $50,000 in damages (Camp and Gaes 2000, table 1).

and Lexus-Nexus searches). This was in a national prison system that in 1995 held 606,252 inmates in 494 state and federal maximum- and medium-security prisons, for an average incidence of 1 riot per 81 prisons and per 99,386 inmates (CJI 1996:53; McDonald and Patten 2000:100). Even in the peak year of the decade for riots in U.S. prisons (1995), riot incidence was only 1 riot per 41 prisons and per 50,500 inmates. Com- paring these rates of riot incidence, we find that in 1999 private prisons experienced approximately seven times as many riots per prison, and over 10 times as many riots per inmate, as occurred in the peak riot year in the previous decade for all U.S. prisons.

This is a remarkable rate of disorder-especially considering that in the United States maximum-security prisoners are one-third of the medium-security plus maximum-security inmate population, while maximum-security prisoners are still rare in the private prisons, at under 10 percent of this group. In addition, most private facilities are newly built, and thus out-of-date architecture or run- down conditions cannot be blamed.

This pattern is confirmed by looking at prison escapes. In 1999, 23 prisoners (out of a total inmate population of 69,188 in all classifications) escaped from private prisons. By comparison, only 1 prisoner escaped from the secure facilities of the Federal Bu- reau of Prisons (and that was the first escape since 1996), out of a secured inmate population of 80,800 with many more medium- and maximum-security inmates (Camp and Gaes 2002:442).

The Federal Bureau of Prisons is particularly good at preventing escapes, and so it may not provide a fair comparison. Focus- ing on escapes of prisoners in all state and federal medium- and maximum-security prisons, there were 114 such escapes in 1999 (the latest year for which we have data) out of 764,784 inmates in 499 institutions (Criminal Justice Institute 1999; Criminal Justice Institute 2000).3 This yields an es-

3 These figures do not include Maine's 820 high security inmates and one prison because Maine did not report its escapes in 1999 (if any) to the Corrections Yearbook. If Federal inmates are excluded from the denominator, the escapes to inmates ratio is 1 per 6,102.


cape rate of 1 per 6,709 inmates and per 4.4 institutions. In the private-prison sector, 20 of the 23 escapes were from 49 maximum- and medium-security facilities, which housed 35,860 inmates, including five escapes of inmates during transport to or from such facilities. This is an escape rate of 1 per 1,793 inmates, or almost four times higher than all comparable federal and state prisons. The escape rate per institution of 1 per 2.45 is almost twice as high as in the comparable public sector.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to compare assault and homicide rates among prison systems because assaults are recorded differ- ently in different jurisdictions, and homicides are rare events. Moreover, most homicides occur among maximum-security prisoners, of which there are over 200,000 in all state and federal prisons and only 2,772 in private prisons (McDonald and Patten 2000:110). Camp and Gaes (2002:443) con- clude that results comparing homicides and assaults in public and private facilities are ambiguous. Based on a survey conducted in 1997, Austin and Coventry (2001) found higher rates of inmate-on-inmate assaults in private prisons (35 per 100,000) than in public prisons (25 per 100,000).

Finally, these problems in private prisons cannot be blamed on a concentration of faults at facilities run by a single jurisdic- tion or contractor. In 1999, escapes, riots, or inmate deaths spanned 23 separate incidents at 19 different facilities in 11 different states, run by 5 different contractors. The two larg- est contractors-Corrections Corporation of American and Wackenhut Corrections Cor- poration-reported 10 and 8 incidents re- spectively (Camp and Gaes 2000:39-43).

EXPLAINING THE PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATE PRISONS

Private prisons face external pressures to meet financial goals, and this differs from the primary mission of prisons generally. The imperative to keep costs down to win contracts and make profits may conflict with the key mission of prisons, which is to provide for the safe and secure confinement of inmates. Keeping costs down creates new problems for the administration, particularly with regard to staff compensation and

amenities for inmates. The result is often a less well-paid, less experienced work force, with a higher turnover rate (Camp and Gaes 2000, 2002). For inmates facing disamenities-whether in the form of deliberate pri- vations or arbitrary exercise of authority (as in the suppression of Native American activities at Hobbs)-these disamenities are easily regarded as imposed for the sake of the private contractor's gains, and thus as unjust. This ideology is further exacerbated by a vocal public debate criticizing the operations of private penal institutions. Com- bining the several elements above is exactly what the state-centered theory argues will lead to a breakdown of social order-and the data bear out this expectation for the operation of private prisons in the United States in the last several years.

The poor performance of private prisons under a variety of contractors and in a large number of jurisdictions further suggests the limits of the administrative-control theory of prison order. Private prisons should excel in efficient management because of the discipline of the market and the bringing in of private sector experience. Yet efficient administration is evidently not sufficient to create good order in prisons; such institutions present complex dynamics that require attention.

In particular, these complexities have to do with the operation of prisons as hierarchical societies. Many analysts treat prisons as "societies" (Sykes 1958) and view their effectiveness in terms of how well they operate as organizations (Dilulio 1987). We argue, however, that prisons must be understood as having the characteristics of both societies and organizations, and that their effectiveness depends on succeeding in both respects. Prison management must gain the loyalty of a professional staff and the compliance of a base population that is involuntarily placed in their care, while also coping with external demands and con- straints. This dilemma is familiar to heads of authoritarian states. Thus, we are not sur- prised that theories of social order obtained from the political sociology of revolutions do so well in explaining order and disorder in prisons.

Although privatization increases the com- plexity and intensity of external demands


on prison management, we do not believe that private prisons as such are doomed to fail. The privatization in New Mexico failed because the governor and legislature imposed a combination of conditions that im- pacted those prisons-a mandated deprivation of prisoners and cost savings, along with a high level of criticism and controversy that undercut the private facilities' legitimacy. When combined with an inexperienced, poorly trained, and poorly compen- sated staff, abuses of inmates' perceived rights, and weak or inept responses to inmate actions, the combination of riot conditions was essentially complete. Private facilities that are managed with an awareness of the conditions that lead to riots and are given full public support and reasonable mandates for the treatment of inmates could fare far better.

It is necessary to point out, however, that if private prisons see as their main goals simply the housing of inmates at lower cost and earning the maximum return for sharehold- ers while delivering cost-savings to the state, problems may arise. The administrators are then likely to neglect those aspects of prison management that require seeing the prison as a society, and may fail to realize that a key component of effective prison management is providing good social order for that society. We believe that such neglect most likely accounts for the relatively poor performance of private prison facilities to date.

CONCLUSION: CREATING ORDER IN PRISONS AND BEYOND

Prisons should be seen as small-scale societies, and as a particular type of society-a hierarchical authoritarian system, analogous to a monarchical or dictatorial state (Goldstone and Useem 1999). We have drawn on theories of revolution to identify structural conditions that lead to social order or breakdown in prisons. We have shown that (1) the structural conditions are not static, but react in a relatively short time to policy decisions made by state authorities and prison administrations that affect those conditions; (2) the state-centered theory provides a more accurate and comprehensive explanation for change over time than to competing expla- nations that look to changes in inmate popu-

lations, administrative expenditures, or reac- tions to administrative crackdowns; and (3) the state-centered theory accounts for the high rates of disorder in private prisons that have been documented in recent data.

Two sets of policy conclusions can be drawn. One set comes primarily from the Rikers case study and speaks to issues in prison management. The other set arises from the New Mexico case study and ad- dresses issues in the privatization of public institutions.

BRINGING ORDER TO PRISONS

The analysis presented here bears on the fu- ture of prisons and jails in the United States, which are now home to more than 2 million people. Blomberg and Lucken (2000) recently argued that prisons will continue to deteriorate: "Prison riots, hostage taking, gang warfare, and inmate to inmate, inmate to staff, and staff to inmate violence are all increasingly routine aspects of everyday prison operations" (p. 132). But we suggest the possibility of a different path. Indeed, the evidence from Rikers Island-a prison system that was considered hopelessly violence-wracked and unmanageable-suggests that prisons can be quickly turned into a model of stability despite no change in inmate population or public control. Our case studies show that this remains true whether prisoner turnover is high or low, and regard- less of whether prisons are old or new, crowded or not crowded.

The actions that reduce riot risks are as follows:

(1) Maintain cohesion and clarity of purpose among state authorities, prison administrations, and corrections staff. Do not un- dertake changes in policy without clear support and the financial and political resources to carry out the policy.

(2) Train and protect staff, to maintain high morale and loyalty to the prison administration among corrections officers.

(3) Do not impose arbitrary or poorly explained or understood disamenities or penalties on inmates. Levels of inmate safety, medical care, amenities, and punishment for infractions of rules should be clear and consistent across the prison system and should be consistent with state (and where man-


dated, federal) standards for treatment of inmates.

(4) Treatment of inmates by staff and administration should strive to maintain legitimacy in terms of public and legal standards for treatment of prison inmates. Prisoners should not have a reason to develop an ideology that unites inmates in the belief that prison conditions or staff actions are illegitimate and would be rectified if people "knew what was happening inside."

(5) Respond quickly, firmly, and consistently to inmate actions that infringe rules or challenge prison authorities.

PRIVATIZATION, CLIENT-INCLUSIVE

INSTITULTIONS, AND SOCIAL ORDER

Given the common practice of privatizing the delivery of all kinds of services, including services such as food provision in prisons, it may seem odd that privatization of prison management has been riddled with difficulties. However, the logic of market competition that is supposed to provide for more efficient delivery of services is not fully applicable to an institution that includes and has extensive responsibility for the welfare of its clients.

To operate effectively, prisons must reconcile a dual responsibility: (1) to provide secure confinement of inmates for the state, and (2) to provide a stable social order within the prison. In this dual character, they are not alone. Bidwell and Vreeland (1963a, 1963b) point out that schools face a similar challenge that is also rooted in the relationships among school administration, professional staff, and the population placed in their care. They argue that schools have a technical aspect-delivery of pedagogical services-and a communal aspect- socializing students to norms of good order. Both aspects are important, as learning takes place within a community of students who are subject to the authority of professional staff and administrators. Rejection of that authority is inimical to learning. This dual character is a general feature of organizations that include their clients and subjects them to the authority of the organization's administration. The preceding case studies have implications for privatization in other institutional settings.

The debate on school privatization is extensive, with some claiming that privatization has been shown to fail (Ascher, Fruchter, and Berne 1996), and others argu- ing that it has been proven to succeed (Hoxby 1994). Many public schools are wracked by violence and poor learning; thus building new private facilities, or giving control of an entire school system to a private provider may appear to be a solution. Yet the contrasting experiences of New Mexico and New York City should give pause to accepting that solution. We believe that many apparently unmanageable schools or school systems could be greatly improved by explicit attention to the five conditions central to maintaining effective order in hierarchical social systems.

In fact, several studies of schooling have stressed the importance of precisely the factors we have noted above as key to maintaining social order in hierarchical societies as important for the success of schools. Meyer (1970) has argued that certain colleges succeed because there is an exceptional degree of consensus and support from the outside community for the goals of the school.

Chubb and Moe (1990) have shown that effective school organization improves student learning. Controlling for other factors, a student gains at least one year in school attainment by attending an "effectively organized" school that stresses leadership, goals, personnel, and administrative practices. Soundness on these factors, rather than particular pedagogical or disciplinary routines, promoted school success.

S0renson and Morgan (2000) point out, however, that Chubb and Moe ". . . were unable to cast much light on what schools with effective organization actually do to produce more learning. They found no effect of the amount of homework required, graduation requirements, administrative routines in the classroom, or discipline" (p. 147). In other words, education researchers who focused on the delivery of learning services, and not on the degree of social order in the school as an hierarchical organization, were puzzled by Chubb and Moe's findings. These results, however, are exactly what we would expect from our theory of social order in hierarchical organizations. Schools have a social character, and a sound social order is neces-


sary for schools to perform well. Without good social order in the organization, including respected leadership, good administrative coordination, and acceptance of teach- ers' authority by students, other factors-the amount of homework assigned, graduation requirements, or disciplinary routines-will not produce good results. These conclusions parallel our findings for prisons: We have shown that neither demographic factors, nor reform policies, nor a lax or harsh style of management, have any particular advan- tages; what matters for good order are sound and coherent relationships among administrators, staff, base population, and the external community. To the extent that learning depends on good order in the school community, we expect that attention to the key conditions for social order-including staff/ administration/external consensus on goals and procedures and student acceptance of the legitimacy of staff and administration authority-would be crucial for good results.

Bryk, Lee, and Holland (1993) explain the superior performance of Catholic schools compared with public schools as mainly the result of success in building the communal aspects of schooling. In Catholic schools, "[s]hared understandings about what students should learn and how adults and students should behave grounds a communal school organization.... [S]chool principals described their top goal as 'building community among faculty, students, and parents'" (Bryk et al. 1993:139).

Prisons are not exactly like schools, but neither are they exactly like states. For example, prisons do not collect taxes from inmates as states do from their subjects. Rather, we argue that authoritarian states, prisons, and schools are all in varying de- grees client-inclusive organizations in which the baseline population is involuntarily subjected to the authority of state administration and professional elites. Thus, a similar logic applies to the operation of these organizations and to the conditions for their effectiveness. These conditions must balance the technical mission of the organization with the need to provide good internal social order among the administration, staff, base population, and external actors.

The debate about privatization of schools -and of other client-inclusive organiza-

tions, such as hospitals and medical facilities-may turn on the wrong issues. If privatization "works," it is not because of market-driven superiority in the delivery of pedagogical (or medical, or other) services. Rather, private organizations are effective only if the conditions of privatization-such as a clear charter from the community or strong communal values from the Church or other source-favor the conditions for good social order within the organization. Public institutions that pay attention to, and are able to achieve, the conditions for good social order are likely to be just as effective. By contrast, private institutions that focus on the cost-efficient delivery of services to the ex- clusion of concern for the social order of their organization are likely to provoke disorder and poor performance.

Enthusiasm for treating all institutions as "firms" whose efficiency can be improved by privatization has led to privatization of many public services. Yet privatization does not carry the same implications for all organizations, nor does it always assure effective management, as recent studies of the pitfalls of privatization reveal (Markusen forthcoming; Sclar 2000). Many institutions and complex organizations are far more than just firms; viewed internally, they have the characteristics of societies. In these circumstances, which prevail in prisons and may exist in other institutions, economic analysis is not sufficient for understanding the complex dynamics of internal order. Sociologi- cal analysis, based on theories of state order and disorder, is essential in understanding those dynamics.

Prison riots are extremely costly in injuries and lost lives, property damage, and perhaps most important, damage to the in- tegrity of the criminal justice system. We believe the basic causes of riots do not lie mainly in the inherently violent or irratio- nal nature of inmates, but in more general principles regarding the dynamics of social order in prisons. Order can be created and maintained by improving the relationships among prison management, staff, inmates, and outside authorities. We hope that understanding this will bring on a time when riots, instead of being a regular feature of our penal system, become increasingly rare.


Bert Useem is Professor of Sociology at the Uni- versity of New Mexico. He has written widely about social movements and prison riots, and is currently completing a study of the effects of rates of imprisonment on the crime rate.

Jack A. Goldstone is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Davis. A specialist in the analysis of revolutions and contentious politics, he is editor of the Encyclopedia of Po- litical Revolutions (Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998), coauthor, with others, of Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2001), and editor of States, Parties, and Social Movements (Cam- bridge University Press, forthcoming).

APPENDIX A

Sources of Data

The data for this study are from original ethno- graphic research and secondary analysis of official government reports and from journalists' accounts. The field work consisted of the following:

NEW MEXICO

The New Mexico Department of Correction made available files from its investigation of the two riots, which included dozens of memorandums, 40 inmate interviews, and 24 staff interviews. In addition, the first author interviewed six inmates involved in the Hobbs riot on January 9, 2002 and January 23, 2002. At the time of the research, most of the Santa Rosa inmates remained unavailable for interviews in an out-of-state prison.

NEW YORK CITY

The first author made two trips to Rikers Island. During these site visits, he was permitted to travel freely through four facilities, observing and talking to inmates and staff. In addition, he interviewed the entire senior executive staff of the agency and much of the middle management (both individually and in focus groups). He also attended a TEAMS meet- ing and observed the operation of the Training Academy. The site visit and interviews were conducted October 26-28, 1999 and November 18-20, 1999.

REFERENCES

Ascher, Carol, Norm Fruchter, and Robert Berne. 1996. Hard Lessons: Public Schools and Privatization. Washington, DC: Brookings In- stitution.

Austin, James and Garry Coventry. 2001. Emerg- ing Issues on Privatized Prisons. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. De-

partment of Justice. Retrieved March 18, 2002 (http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfilesl/bja/ 181249.txt).

Bidwell, Charles E. and Rebecca S. Vreeland. 1963a. "Authority and Control in Client-Serv- ing Organizations." Sociological Quarterly 4:231-42.

. 1963b. "College Education and Moral Orientations: An Organizational Approach." Administrative Science Quarterly 8:166-91.

Blomberg, Thomas G. and Karol Lucken. 2000. American Penology: A History of Control. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.

Bright, Charles. 1996. The Powers that Punish: Prison and the Politics in the Era of the "Big House," 1920-1955. Ann Arbor, MI: Univer- sity of Michigan Press.

Bryk, Anthony S., Valerie E. Lee, and Peter B. Holland. 1993. Catholic Schools and the Com- mon Good. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer- sity Press.

Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 1999. "New Mexico Had Highest State Unemployment Rate at End of 1998." Retrieved October 10, 2001 (http://stats.bls.gov/opub/ted/1999/Jan/ wk4/art02.htm).

Camp, Scott D. and Gerald G. Gaes. 2000. Pri- vate Prisons in the United States, 1999: An As- sessment of Growth, Performance, Custody Standards, and Training Requirements. Wash- ington, DC: Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of Research and Evaluation.

. 2002. "Growth and Quality of U.S. Pri- vate Prisons: Evidence from a National Sur- vey." Criminology and Public Policy 1:427- 50.

Chubb, John E. and Terry M. Moe. 1990. Poli- tics, Markets, and America's Schools. Wash- ington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Citizens Budget Commission (CBC). 1993. "The Performance of the New York City Depart- ment of Correction: Recommendations for Im- provement." Report, Citizens Budget Commis- sion, New York.

.2001. "CBC Financial and Service Indi- cators, City of New York, Department of Cor- rection, Fiscal Year 1990-2000." Retrieved March 18, 2002 (http://www.cbcny.org/DOC1. pdf).

Cloward, Richard A., Donald R. Cressey, George H. Grosser, Richard H. McCleery, Lloyd E. Ohlin, Gresham M. Sykes, and Sheldon L. Messinger. 1960. Theoretical Studies in the Social Organization of the Prison. New York: Social Science Research Council.

Crane, Richard. 2000. "Monitoring of Guadalupe and Lea County Correctional Facilities." Pp. 49-82 in The Consultants' Report on Prison Operations in New Mexico Correctional Insti- tutions: Submitted to Members of the Special


Advisory Group, edited by J. Austin, R. Crane, B. Griego, J. O'Brien, and G. A. Vose. Middle- town, CT: Criminal Justice Solutions.

Criminal Justice Institute (CJI). 1991-1997. The Corrections Yearbook. South Salem, NY: Criminal Justice Institute.

. 1998-2000. The Corrections Yearbook. Middletown, CT: Criminal Justice Institute.

Department of Investigation, City of New York (DOI, CNY). 1991. "Report to the Mayor: The Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, August 14, 1990: Its Causes and the Department of Correction Re- sponse." New York: Department of Investiga- tion.

Dilulio, John J., Jr. 1987. Governing Prisons: A Comparative Study of Correctional Manage- ment. New York: Free Press.

Emirbayer, Mustafa E. and Jeff Goodwin. 1996. "Symbols, Positions, Objects: Toward a New Theory of Revolutions and Collective Action." History and Theory 35:358-74.

Finn, Peter. 1996. "No Frills Prisons and Jails: A Movement in Flux." Federal Probation 60:35- 44.

Foran, John. 1997. "Discourses and Social Forces: The Role of Culture and Cultural Stud- ies in Understanding Revolutions." Pp. 203-26 in Theorizing Revolutions, edited by J. Foran. London, England: Routledge.

Foster, Len. 1998. "Religious Intolerance against Indian Religion: Native American Prisoners' Religious Freedom." National Native Ameri- can Prisoners Rights Advocacy Coalition. Retrieved October 10, 2001 (http://www. theofficenet.com/-redorman/lfoster2.htm).

Fresquez, Eli. 2000. "Memo to Eloy Mondragon, Warden." Memo dated September 1. App. F, pp. 1-7 in The Consultants' Report on Prison Operations in New Mexico Correctional Insti- tutions: Submitted to Members of the Special Advisory Group, edited by J. Austin, R. Crane, B. Griego, J. O'Brien, and G. A. Vose. Middletown, CT: Criminal Justice Solutions.

Goldstone, Jack A. 2001. "Toward a Fourth Gen- eration of Revolutionary Theory." Annual Re- view of Political Science 4:139-87.

Goldstone, Jack A. and Bert Useem. 1999. "Prison Riots as Microrevolutions: An Exten- sion of State-Centered Theories of Revolu- tion." American Journal of Sociology 104: 985-1029.

Goodwin, Jeff. 1997. "State-Centered Ap- proaches to Social Revolutions: Strengths and Limitations of a Theoretical Tradition." Pp. 11-37 in Theorizing Revolutions, edited by J. Foran. New York: Routledge.

Greene, Judith. 2001. "Bailing Out Private Jails." The American Prospect 12:23-7.

Griego, Ben. 2000. "Security Threat Groups and

Activation and Monitoring." Pp. 83-114 in The Consultants' Report on Prison Operations in New Mexico Correctional Institutions: Sub- mitted to Members of the Special Advisory Group, edited by J. Austin, R. Crane, B. Griego, J. O'Brien, and G.A. Vose. Middle- town, CT: Criminal Justice Solutions.

Horowitz, Alan. 1994. "Is Rikers about to Ex- plode?" New York Magazine, October 10, pp. 29-33.

Hoxby, Caroline Minter. 1994. Do Private Schools Provide Competition for Public Schools? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Kelling, George L. and William H. Sousa Jr. 2001. "Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the Impact of New York City's Police Reforms." Civic Report 22, Manhattan Institute, New York.

Kerik, Bernard B. 2000. "Accountability: The Key to Staff Safety." Corrections Today 62: 124-28.

Markusen, Ann. Forthcoming. "The Case against Privatizing National Security." Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Admin- istration.

McDonald, Douglas C. and Carl W. Patten Jr. 2000. "Growth and Development of the Private Prisons Industry." Pp 93-112 in Private Pris- ons In the United States, 1999: An Assessment of Growth, Performance, Custody Standards, and Training Requirements, edited by S. D. Camp and G. G. Gaes. Washington, DC: Of- fice of Research and Evaluation, Federal Bu- reau of Prisons.

McGinnis, Kenneth L. 2000. "Make 'Em Break Rocks." Pp. 34-38 in Building Violence: How America's Rush to Incarcerate Creates More Violence, edited by J. P. May. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Mead, Dean Michael. 1997. "Report on the New York City Department of Correction" (June 20). Retrieved March 18, 2002 (http://www. cbcny.org/0624.html).

Meyer, John. 1970. "The Charter: Conditions of Diffuse Socialization in Schools." Pp. 564-78 in Social Processes and Social Structures: An Introduction to Sociology, edited by W. R. Scott. New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston.

New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD). 1996. New Mexico Corrections Plan, the Fis- cal Year 2000. Santa Fe, NM: New Mexico Corrections Department.

. 1998. Annual Report for Ninety-Eight Fiscal Year, July 1, 1997 to June 30, 1998. Santa Fe, NM: New Mexico Corrections De- partment.

. 1999. Report on the Riots at the Guadalupe and Lea County Correctional Fa- cilities. Santa Fe, NM: New Mexico Correc-


tions Department. . 2001. "Summary Inmate Population Sta-

tistics, FY72-FY99." Retrieved March 18, 2002 (http://www.state.nm.us/corrections/ sumstats.pdf).

New York City Department of City Planning (NYCDCP). 1999. 1998 Annual Report on So- cial Indicators. New York: New York City Department of City Planning.

New York City Department of Correction (NYCDOC). 2000. Department-Wide Violence Statistics, Fiscal Years '95, '96, '97, '98, '99. Portfolio. New York: Department of Correction.

New York State Commission of Correction (NYSCC). 1991. Investigation of Disturbance at Otis Bantum Correctional Center. August 14, 1990). Albany, NY: New York State Com- mission of Correction.

New York State, Division of Criminal Services (NYS, DCS). 2000. "Criminal Justice Data for New York State." Retrieved March 18, 2002 (http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ data.htm).

. 2002. "1998 Crime and Justice Annual Report." Retrieved March 18, 2002 (http:// criminaljustice. state.ny.us/crimnet/oj sa/ cja_98/docsl.pdf).

O'Brien, Jerry. 2000. "Summary of Correctional Facility Security Review." Pp. 115-265 in The Consultants' Report on Prison Operations in New Mexico Correctional Institutions: Submit- ted to Members of the Special Advisory Group, edited by J. Austin, R. Crane, B. Griego, J. O'Brien, and G.A. Vose. Middletown, CT: Criminal Justice Solutions.

O'Bryant, JoAnne. 1996. "Inmate Privileges in State and Federal Prisons." CRS Report for Congress (October 30). Washington, DC: Li- brary of Congress, Congressional Research Service.

Piehl, Anne M., Bert Useem, and John J. DiIulio Jr. 1999. "Right-Sizing Justice: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Imprisonment in Three States." Report of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research Center for Civic Innovation, Manhat- tan Institute, New York.

Sandler, Ross. 1995. "The City Seeks to Regain Control over Its Jails, and Receives Help from the Federal Court and Congress." City Law (June/July):49-54.

Sclar, Elliott. 2000. You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Selbin, Eric. 1993. Modern Latin American Revolutions. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Sewell, William H., Jr. 1992. "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transforma-

tion." American Journal of Sociology 98:1-29. Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolu-

tion: A Comparative Analysis of France, Rus- sia, and China. New York: Cambridge Univer- sity Press.

. 1994. Social Revolutions in the Modern World. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni- versity Press.

S0renson, Aage B. and Stephen L. Morgan. 2000. "School Effects: Theoretical and Methodologi- cal Issues." Pp. 137-60 in Handbook of the Sociology of Education, edited by M. Hallinan. New York: Kluwer.

Stinchcombe, Arthur L. 1978. Theoretical Meth- ods in Social History. New York: Academic.

Sykes, Gresham M. 1958. The Society of Cap- tives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2000a. "Persons below Pov- erty Level." Statistical Abstract of the United States. Retrieved October 10, 2001 (http:// www.census.gov/statab/ranks/rankl9.txt).

. 2000b. "Personal Income per Person in Constant (1992) Dollars" Statistical Abstract of the United States. Retrieved October 10, 2001 (http://www.census.gov/statab/ranks/ rankl7.txt).

Useem, Bert and Peter A. Kimball. 1989. States of Siege: U.S. Prison Riots, 1971-1996. New York: Oxford University Press.

Vose, George A. 2000. "Guadalupe County Cor- rectional Facility Riot: Analysis and Prelimi- nary Review of New Mexico Corrections De- partment, Systemic Issues." Pp. 266-344 in The Consultants' Report on Prison Operations in New Mexico Correctional Institutions: Sub- mitted to Members of the Special Advisory Group, edited by J. Austin, R. Crane, B. Griego, J. O'Brien, and G. A. Vose. Middle- town, CT: Criminal Justice Solutions.

Weber, Lewis J. 2000. "Guadalupe County Cor- rectional Facility." Memo dated September 14, 1999. App. D, pp. 1-13 in The Consultants' Report on Prison Operations in New Mexico Correctional Institutions: Submitted to Mem- bers of the Special Advisory Group, edited by J. Austin, R. Crane, B. Griego, J. O'Brien, and G. A. Vose. Middletown, CT: Criminal Justice Solutions.

Zoley, George C. 1999. "Letter to Mr. Robert Perry, with Attachment." July 19. App. I, pp. 1-2 in The Consultants' Report on Prison Op- erations in New Mexico Correctional Institu- tions: Submitted to Members of the Special Advisory Group, edited by J. Austin, R. Crane, B. G., J. O'Brien, and G.A. Vose. Middle- town, CT: Criminal Justice Solutions.

forging social order and its breakdown: riot and reform in

Documents