Special Forces Doctrine for

A Monograph by

Major James P. Realini

Special Forces

First Term AY 90-91

~~~~~~~d for public Release; Dislribuilon is Unlimited

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED M I L I T A R Y STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPilOVAI.

MAIOR IAMES P. REALINI

Title of Monograph: S~ec ia l Forces Doctrine for

Counternarcotics Operations

Approved by:

- Acting Director. , C ~ L School of Advanced hrdon Atcheson ./-' Military Studies

c.J(:[ ; I : ; L L L ..-L J ;,"rc.,/-I Director, Graduate

Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D. Degree Program

.7, !!.,. .~4day of '. L " ; : L L & : ,,y 199 1Accepted this b

SPEClAL FORCES DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS b y Major James P. Realini. Special Forces, 4 0 pages

This monograph addresses the su i tab i l i t y of Special Forces doctrine

fo r t he i r p r i m a r y wart ime missions o f Special Reconnaissance. D i rec t

Action, and Foreign Internal Defense when considered fo r application i n

counternarcotics operations. This study i s motivated by the continuing

threat to national secur i ty presented by i l legal drug t ra f f i ck ing and the

increased r o l e of the United States m i l i t a r y requested by the people of the

United States through the i r congressional representatives. A signif icant

pa r t of the m i l i t a r y contr ibut ion to the so-called 'war on drugs' i s being

provided b y U. S. Army Special Forces.

This study begins w i t h an analysis of the National Drug Control

Strategy to derive what the tactical counternarcotics missions fo r Special

Forces could be. The missions are related i n terms of the p r i m a r y wart ime

mission described by cur ren t U. S. Army doctrine fo r Special Forces

Operations. The Army Counternarcotics Plan i s analyzed to determine the

constraints and res t ra in ts imposed on the mission by pub l ic laws and DoD

resowces. The capabi l i t ies fo r each mission are analyzed and then

compared to an application i n counternarcotics operations. The analysis of

each mission evaluates how each mission recognizes pol i t ica l and

diplomatic sensit iv i t ies, faci l i tates interagency act iv i t ies i n an affected

country, and balances 'security of operations' w i t h the operational tenet

of synchronization.

The study concludes that the doctrine fo r each mission i s suitable

when applied to counternarcotics operations only i f law enforcement i s not

the purpose fo r interdiction. The study f inds that each mission can

accomplishes the tasks required fo r counternarcotics operations, except

when called upon to per form law enforcement duties. The study finds the

application of Special Forces i n a Foreign Internal Defense mission to be

most suitable fo r defeating drug t ra f f i ck ing when i t i s viewed as an

insurgency.

TABLEOF CONTENTS

Page

ii. PART ONE: REQUIREMENTS OF THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL ------ 4 STRATEGY

iii. PART TWO: ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTERNARCOTICS RELATED TASKS WITH THE PRIMARY MISSIONS FOR SPECIAL FORCES:

APPENDICES

1 . SPECIAL FORCESOPERATIONAL DETACHMENT ORGANIZATION -- 50

2. DOD ORGANIZATION FOR COIINTERNARCOTICS----------------------- 5 1

3. MISSION TRAINING PLAN OUTLINE: SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE 52

4, SPECIAL FORCES MISSION BRIEFBACK FORMAT -----.­ ..­ --------..53

5. MISSION TRAINING PLAN OUTLINE: DIRECT ACTION ------­ --.----55

6, SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE ORGANIZATION ---------.---*-------- 56

7, COUNTERNARCOTICS MISSION ANALYSIS .-----------.--------------.-57

INTRODUCTION

'Traff ic i n i l l i c i t drugs imposes exceptional costs on the economy of the United States, undermines our national values and inst i tut ions, and i s d l rec t ly responslble fo r the destruction and loss of many American lives. The internat ional t r a f f i c in i l l i c i t drugs constitutes a major threat to our national secur i ty and to the secur i ty of other nations.'l

Drug t ra f f i ck ing threatens national security. Accordingly, the

President and the Congress of the United States of America have given a

clear mandate to the Department of Defense to counter the flow of i l l i c i t

drugs in to the United States. The National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS)

describes how the United States of America w i l l defend against i t s epidemic

of i l legal drug use. Specif ic departmental and agency guidelines fo r

executing the strategy have evolved progressively. The National Command

Author i ty (NCA) directed the Specified and Unif ied Commanders to prepare

plans supporting the President's National Drug Control ~ t ra tegy2. Several

elements of these plans have reached the implementation stage. The Army

Counternarcotics Plan3 art iculates the Army's support f o r the National

Drug Control Strategy.

Numerous Commanders-in-Chief (CiNCs) have designated US Army

Special Forces Operational Detachments (see Appendix 1, SFOD

Organizational Chart) to f u l f i l l important tasks supporting the

interdict ion of drugs f lowing in to the United States. The most signif icant

plans fo r employment of Special Forces cu r ren t l y appear w i t h i n the United

States Southern Command (SOUTHCON). Specif ically, the Andean Ridge

region i s a focal point f o r combatting cocaine production and smuggling.'

I n compliance w i t h the Army Plan, United States Army Special Forces must

now organize to conduct counternarcotics operations.

There are three cr i t ica l premises for this study of Special Forces

Operational Detachments conducting counternarcotics operations. The f i r s t

premise asserts that we w i l l use Special Forces Detachments as long as the

NCKs assessment of drug traff icking determines that a threat exists to the

national security of the United States. This could change for several

reasons. For example, future domestic pol i t ical decisions could shift the

United States' policy towards tolerance. A greater, more immediate

mi l i ta ry threat could present i tself requir ing a diversion of m i l i ta ry

resources from counterdrug operations. Optimally, drug traff icking w i l l

no longer threaten national security because the NDCS has succeeded. The

second premise requires that employment of Special Forces Operational

Detachments be part of a combined, multi-agency (Department of Defense

and other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies) and conventional

force supporting the National Drug Control Strategy. Special Forces alone

are not capable of fu l f i l l i ng a l l the support roles required for the Army.

The th i rd and f inal premise declares that Special Forces Operational

Detachments must deploy outside the borders of the United States as

described by public law. Counternarcotics Operations are inextricably

woven into the business of law enforcement, so commanders must take

great care to prevent Army elements from acting as law enforcement

agents.

With these premises i n mind, this study w i l l examine the National

Drug Control Strategy to discern what are the tactical counternarcotics

missions for Special Forces units. The missions w i l l be matched with a

pr imary wartime mission of Special Forces which w i l l establish a basis

for comparing existing doctrine wi th requirements for counternarcotics

operations. Then this study w i l l examine whether current doctrine for

Special Forces operations i s suitable for executing the tasks required i n

counternarcotics operations. Specifically, i t w i l l analyze the Army

Special Operation Force's doctrine for the conduct of the Special

Reconaissance. the Foreign Internal Defense, and the Direct Action

missions. These Special Forces wartime missions appear to have the most

u t i l i t y i n counternarcotics operations for intelligence. interdiction and

security assistance.

SPEClRL OPERBTIONS IMPESltlTIPlES Fig 1-8, pi-22, FM 3i-20, Doclrine for Special Forces Operatiol

'Recounize Political lm~l icat ions *me . . .inters- A c t r v w

'Engage a Threat Discriminately 'Consider Long-Term Effects 'Ensure Legitimacy & Credibility of SO Activlties 'Anticipate & Control Psychological Effects 'Apply Capabilities Indirectly

1 *Develop tlultiple Options 'Ensure Long-Term Sustainment 'Provide Sufficient Intelligence 'Balance Security and Svnchronization -

Fig. 1

Cr i ter ia derived from three key Special Operations Imperatives w i l l

be used to evaluate the doctrines for each mission (See Figure 1 ). I w i l l

examine the following questions. Does the doctrine recognize the polit ical

implications for counternarcotics operations described by United States

Public Law (Posse Comitatus Act Tit le 18 United States Code 1385) and

host nation diplomatic and polit ical sensitivities? Does the doctrine

facil itate interagency activit ies directed by the Office of National Drug

Control Policy (The Drug Czar) and the Department of State activit ies i n

each affected country? Finally, does the doctrine balance 'security of

operations' with the operational tenet of synchronization? The

conclusions drawn from answering these three questions w i l l i l lustrate the

implications for Special Forces Operational Detachments preparing to

conduct counternarcotics operations both now and i n the future.

PART ONE: REQUIREMENTS OF THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

'-an issue of th is sort concerns the extent to which force should be used, either by the police o r by the Army.'5

President George Bush f i r s t articulated the National Drug Control

Strategy i n September 1989. This strategy mobilized a l l the departments

and agencies of the Executive Branch of the United States government to

combat the threat to national security imposed by il legal drug use and

trafficking. The task of coordinating the federal departments and agencies

wi th drug reduction missions i s the responsibil ity of the 'Drug Czar'or

Office of National Drug Control Policy.6

The implementation of the NDCS i s expensive. A budget authority of

$10.6 b i l l ion for Fiscal Year 199 1 represented an increase of 68% from

19897. I n an era of constrained resources for government programs, the

use of existing mi l i ta ry resources appears prudent. Congress has

carefully given permission to use mi l i ta ry resources. In th is regard.

intense and continuous Congressional investigation of the NDCS reveals a

national desire to balance two cr i t ica l factors, what potential exists for

usurpation by the mi l i ta ry of law enforcement duties and what are the

potential adverse effects on combat readiness?

Specific guidance on assistance given to c iv i l ian law enforcement

agencies prohibits the Army from directly participating i n law

enforcement activities. Army personnel o r equipment can only provide

operotional support to civi l ion law enforcement agencies upon approval

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Understanding the Public Laws

dorfved from the Posse Comitatus Act. Section 1385 of Tit le 18 (Crimes

and Criminal Procedure) United States Code, i s crucial for any Army

element's implementation of a counternarcotics program. The Act i s short

and concise:

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, w i l l f u l l y uses any part of the Army or the A i r Force as a possecumitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more thon two years, or both8.

Congress created this Act i n 1878 i n reaction to the sometimes

excessive use of m i l i ta ry force during the occupation of the South's f ive

mi l i ta ry distr icts after the Civ i l Warg. Recognition of the separation of

the United States A i r Force from the Army and extension of the law to

Alaska are the Acts' only two modifications. The United States Navy,

through SECWVINST 5820.7, recognizes that Posse Comitatus also applies

to i t s operations and those of the Marine Corps as well. SECNAVINST

5820.7 allows no Naval (or Marine Corps) involvement i n c iv i l ian law

enforcement actions whatsoever, without authorization from the Secretary

of the Navylo.

The Congress again clari f ied the mi l i tary 's relationship and

responsibilities wi th c i v i l law enforcement agencies i n Section 908 of

Public Law 97-86. Section 908 added a new chapter. Chapter 18

'R i l i tary Cooperation with Civi l ian Law Enforcement Officials,' to Part

One (Organization and General M i l i ta ry Powers) to Subtitle A (General

M i l i ta ry Law) to Tit le 10 United States Code. The law reaffirmed the

traditional prohibition against direct m i l i ta ry involvement i n law

enforcement (i.e., arrests. searches, seizures, etc.) and also provided the

Secretary of Defense with specific authority to use the armed forces for a

variety of indirect assistance roles.11

DoD Directive 5525.5 explains the requirements for employing DoD

resources i n support of any law enforcement activity. Enclosure 4 of DoD

Directive 5525.5 states that the following activit ies are not restr icted by

the Posse Comitatus Act.

Actions that are taken for the pr imary purpose of fur ther ing a m i l i t a r y o r foreign affairs function of the United States, regardless of incidental benefits to c iv i l ian authorities. This provision must be used wi th caution, and does not include actions taken for the pr imary purpose o f aiding c iv i l ian law enforcement off icials o r otherwise serving as a subterfuge to avoid the restr ict ions of reference (v) [Posse Comitatusl. Actions under th is provision may include the following, depending on the nature of the DoD interest and the authority governing the specific action i n question:

( 1) Investigations and other actions related to the enforcement of the Uniform Code of M i l i t a r y Justice (UCMJ)

........................................................................................ (5) Protection of DoD personnel. DoD equipment, and

off icial guests of the Department of Defense. (6) Such other actions that are undertaken p r imar i l y for a

m i l i t a r y o r foreign affair's purpose.12

in summary, both the DoD Directive and public laws serve to keep

the m i l i t a r y out of the law enforcement business inside the borders of the

United States.

Regardless, the question of m i l i t a r y involvement i n drug

enforcement operations outside the borders of the United States remains

unanswered. Nevertheless, a precedent of sorts has been established

during Operation JUST CAUSE when agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency

arrested Manuel Noriega. This provides a clear exnmple of cooperation

w i t h c i v i l i a n law enforcement act iv i t ies ( i n th is case the Drug

Enforcement Agency) operating outside the borders of the United States.

Clearly, u n t i l the laws or pol ic ies change, the m i l i t a r y can be applied

d i rec t ly outside the borders of the United States to support

counternarcotics operations as long as they do not attempt to enforce

c i v i l i a n laws. This w i l l occur only when a host nation requests our

assistance. No uni la tera l counternarcotics operations are authorized or

impl ied b y any U. S. policy.13

Secretary Richard B. Cheney announced in September 1989 the

Department of Defense pol icy fo r implementing support fo r the NDCS. The

Secretary described the ro le of the armed forces as follows:

We (The United States Armed Forces) w i l l work on the drug program at every phase-at the source, i n the del ivery pipel ine and to fu r ther support federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. I n countries where the plants are grown and the raw materials are converted in to drugs, we (The United States Armed Forces) can provide economic and secur i ty assistance. t ra in ing and operational support fo r host country forces and assistance to law enforcement agencies of those countries i n stopping the export of drugs.

Deploying appropriate elements of the armed forces w i t h the p r i m a r y mission to cut of f the f low of drugs, should, over t ime help reduce the flow o f drugs in to the country.

We need also to make clear that the Department of Defense i s not a law enforcement agency. We do not enforce domestic c r im ina l laws, nor can we solve society's demand problem. But there i s much we can do without usurping the police role.'l4

This statement provided the s ta r t point fo r DoD implementation of

counternarcotics programs. I n response, DoD aqencies and designated

Unif ied and Specified commanders (CINCs) prepared specif ic mechanisms

to support the NDCS. (See Appendix 2, Organization of DoD for

Counternarcotics Operations-Chart) The CltlCs took various cctions

including the formation of Joint Task Forces.

Joint Task Force (JTF) 4 (commanded by a Coast Guard Yice

Admiral) was formed i n Key West. Florida to coordinate counternarcotics

detection and monitoring operations for the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM).

Commanded by a Coast Guard Rear Admiral i n Alameda; California. JTF 5

performs similar functions for the Pacific Command (PACOH). JTF 6

(commanded by an Army t lajor General) i n E l Paso. Texas coordinates

Army and regional law enforcement agencies along the southwestern United

States border wi th Mexico. I n addition to the foundation of JTF's, several

of the CINCs increased the deployment of mobile training teams (HTTs) to

host countries including Peru. Bolivia. and Thailand. The Director of the

Defense Communications Agency (DCA) established the Counterdrug

Telecommunications Integration Office. The role of the DCA i s to lead DoD

i n coordinating the exchange of intelligence between the different operating

'cultures' found in law enforcement agencies and the mi l i tary. A l l of these

actions provided the foundation for a command and control infrastructure

wi th in the DoD to support counternarcotics operations.

In March 1990, Stephen M. Duncan, DoD coordinator for drug

enforcement policy and support, further clari f ied the role of DoD i n drug

reduction. Mr. Duncan described interdiction ooerations, ooerational

suooort, and Mobile Training Teams missions and capabilities.15 Although

lengthy, these descriptions are v i ta l to understanding the philosophy of the

U. S. Army Counternarcotics Plan.

In te rd ic t ion O~~erar ions ...'Interdict ion' involves several phases, including detection, sor t ing of probable drug t ra f f i ckers f rom a l l other a i r c ra f t o r surface vessels that have been detected, intercept ion (d i rect ing ships o r a i r c ra f t to the target f o r identif ication), t rack ing and monitor ing ( fo l lowing a target u n t i l i t can be 'handed off ' to a law enforcement agency); and apprehension, search, seizure and ar res t b y a law enforcement agency. Often these phases overlap.

Interdict ion can take place i n the a i r , at sea or on land. Thus, in terd ic t ion i s a multiphase, mult ienvironment and multiagency ac t i v i t y i n which the DoD has signif icant responsibi l i t ies. lb

Ooerational Supoort The DoD i s assisting i n the attack on the supply of drugs i n

source countries through assistance fo r nation building, operational support to host country forces and cooperation w i t h host country forces to prevent drug exports. ...U. S. m i l i t a r y personnel are authorized to accompany host nation forces dur ing authorized t ra in ing and administrat ive act iv i t ies w i th in areas which have been previously designated by the U. S. m i l i t a r y group commander in each country and approved by the CINC, but they do not accompany host government forces on actual f ie ld operations.

The operational support takes various forms, e.g., planning. communications, medical and logist ics support, but U. S. m i l i t a r y personnel do not serve as f ie ld advisors o r replace agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration on coca eradication operations.17

Mobi le Trainina Teams (MTTs) The MTTs have been sent to the region (Andean) to provide

t ra in ing in individual and smal l un i t tactics, leadership and a i rmobi le and r i v e r i n e operations. Advice i s being given on the procurement and architecture of command. control and communications and intell igence faci l i t ies. Medical and engineering support and c i v i c action are being provided along w i t h a i r mob i l i t y assets which enhance the capabi l i ty of the source countries to inser t the i r own counternarcotics forces to remote regions where cocaine i s grown, processed o r transported.

The DoD has not. and does not intend to. subst i tute U. S. programs fo r those which the host countries must implement fo r themselves. U. S. m i l i t a r y personnel w i l l not replace or augment host country m i l i t a r y personnel who are engaged i n counternarcotics operations.18

Having articulated these components of counternarcotics operations,

the United States Army i n A p r i l 1990 d is t r ibuted i t s Counternarcotics

p lan lq fo r supporting the ClNCs counternarcotics strategies. This

memorandum of instruction (M.0.i.) issued by the Secretory of the Army,

Michael P. W. Stone and Army Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Yuono.

charged the Army with two principal missions. First , the Army w i l l

provide forces to combatant commanders and assist them i n developing and

executing plans to effectively employ the unique capabilities of Army

forces. Second, the Army w i l l provide operational support, equipment

training, and personnel to other U. S. Government Agencies and (through

security assistance) selected foreign governments to counter drug

production, trafficking, and use. A l l specified and implied tasks w i l l be

derived from these pr imary missions.20

The concept of the operation in the H.O.I. also states three key

imperatives for providing Army forces. The f i r s t imperative requires that

their employment should be consistent wi th existing Army doctrine.

Second, Army forcss w i l l be placed under direct m i l i ta ry command.

Finally, the concept recognizes that units or individuals may face an armed

adversary. As a consequence, they should be prepared for actions related

to combat, even when conducting training, deterrence, surveillance or

other non-combat operations.

The last imperative leads directly to subsequent guidance about

development of rules of engagement (ROE) and rules on the use of force

(RUF). Ensuring protection of soldiers i s the key concern for

commanders. Army forces and personnel w i l l conduct counternarcotics

operations i n accordance with peacetime ROE and RUF as directed by

supported CINCs21. Ideally, the Army plan directs that thorough

fami l iar i ty with the ROE and RUF w i l l preclude a mission from being

hindered by uncertainty about permissible statutory actions and responses.

In addition to these concerns for employment, the Army

Counternarcotics Plan specif ical ly addresses un i t readiness and t ra in ing

fo r wart ime pr io r i t ies . Any degradation of readiness at t r ibuted to

counternarcotics taskings or operations w i l l be ident i f ied specif ical ly i n

the commander's comments o f Un i t Status Reports. Tra in ing i n uni ts

continues as prescribed i n FM 25- 100. Trainino the Force. Employment

of the 'battle focus' concept w i l l resolve conf l icts w i t h wart ime missions

that are unrelated to any requirements fo r counternarcotics operations.

Cancelling o f National Tra in ing Center o r Jo int Readiness Training Center

rotat ions and outside CONUS jo in t and combined exercises are to be avoided,

but are not prohibited.22

Using these concerns identif ied by the Army Counternarcotics Plan.

l e t us now examine haw the NDCS translates in to tactical operation fo r

Special Forces. When translat ing the NDCS into specif ic tactical missions,

the Army accepts the premise that counternarcotics i s low intensi ty

conflict.?3 This provides a doctr inal framework fo r developing how to

support the NDCS. The NDCS stipulates in terd ic t ion of drua t ra f f i ck ing as

the focus fo r counternarcotics operations fo r land forces. The

requirements fo r accomplishing th is are intell igence collection;

interdict ion at a source o f production, enroute to and at c r i t i c a l

d is t r ibu t ion points; and t ra in ing of host nation law enforcement and

m i l i t a r y personnel i n techniques, tactics and procedures that support

the i r own counternarcotics programs.

Army doctrine fo r low intensi ty conf l ict specifies that intell igence

operations are c r i t i c a l before organizing successful employment of

m i l i t a r y forces.jq Army leaders recognize that developing intell igence i s

the f i r s t task i n counternarcotics operations.?5 The tasks required for

intelligence collection i n the drug production and traff icking cycle range

from the employment of highly sophisticated intelligenco gathering

equipment to simple foot-mobile reconnaissance. These intelligence

collection tasks fa l l wi th in the description of 'Special Reconnaissance' for

Special ~orces.26 Using cocaine as an example, several places exist where

collection targets appear (see figure 2). Locating any of the 'low

technology' processing and

Cocaine: Production to Sales

Figure 2

manufacture sites i n the r u r a l areas of most undeveloped countries and the

routes connecting them would require human intelligence (HUHlNT) i n the

form of reconnaissance patrols. As the drug moves farther down the

pipeline, the smuggler's security measures for each site become more

technologically extensive and thus detectable by technological collection

means?:. By using the intel l igence preparat ion of the bat t le f ie ld process.

an intel l igence estimate and analysis o f the bat t le f ie ld area w i l l be

prepared to assist i n depicting the drug t ra f f i ck ing network.

Af ter ident i fy ing the drug t ra f f i ck ing network. there are two ways a

m i l i t a r y un i t can Interd ic t a drug t ra f f i ck ing system. It could destroy

c r i t i c a l fac i l i t i es o r i t could intercept shipments. Conventional m i l i t a r y

ra id ing techniques accomplish the destruction strategy. This study

recognizes that D i rec t Actlon of t h l s type I s not authorized for m l l t a r y un i ts

by any agency o f the United States. However. Drug Enforcement Agency

(DEA) agents and national police organizations trained and supported b y

Special Forces Detachments w i l l conduct th is mission. Special Forces

Detachinents can support drug intercept ion operations by acting as pa r t of a

'real time' reconnalssance and secur i ty force to ident i fy t imes and locations

o f drug shipment functions.

The fa r ther along a drug processing system you are able to penetrate

and then in terd ic t , the more substantial the loss to the t ra f f i cke r (see Fig.

2). The best 'payoff' for in terd ic t ion takes place when intercept ion of the

actual drug i n shipment occurs because the smuggler has committed a l l h i s

manufacturing resources and cannot recover them. H is shipping system i s

also disrupted and assets are removed f rom fu r the r use. This has been a

p r i m a r y focus of CONUS based forces, pa r t i cu la r l y the A i r Force and Navy

working together to vector the Coast Guard to make actual seizures and

arrests. Another luc ra t i ve target fo r intercept ion are the processing

chemicals produced at commercial chemical production faci l i t ies.

Hon i to r ing purchases of these 'legitimate' chemicals affords an oppor tuni ty

to ident i fy drug t ra f f i ckers and cut o f f t he i r 'controlled' chemical

purchases. I f nothing else, the drug traffickers must expmd more resources

to protect and reestablish faci l i t ies and smuggling systems.28

Additionally, unified commander's must consider rescue operations as

part of their counternarcotics plans. Drug Enforcement Agents, m i l i ta ry

personnel operating intelligence gathering equipment, and mobile training

teams threatened i n the performance of trainlng misslons are l lke ly targets

for capture by drug traffickers. A responsibil ity specified i n the Army

Counternarcotics Plan i s the protection of soldiers facing an armed

adversary.*9 This requirement implies the development of plans to recover

soldiers and sophisticated intelligence equipment.

Finally, the most extensive role for Special Forces units w i l l be their

cooperating with law enforcement agencies i n the conduct of security

assistance operations. I f the United States expects cooperation from foreign

nations i n the form of their own drug reduction programs, then the United

States must provide the training and equipment to assist these programs to

succeed. The training national police forces need to implement their own

counterdrug programs has been identified: individual and small unit tactics,

leadership, airmobile and r iver ine operations, advice on the architecture of

command, control and communications and intelligence facil it ies, medical

and engineering training and civ ic action. Keep i n mind that many countries

national police forces are organized as paramil i tary forces or m i l i ta ry

forces thus understanding of a host nation's polit ical sensitivities and

institutions w i l l be cri t ical. For the most part this training mission

appears to be satisfied by the 'Foreign Internal Defense' mission for Special

Forces.30

I n summary, Special Reconnaissance employing l1UHINT and

sophisticated intel l igence collection equipment; Di rect Action to in te rd ic t

drug t ra f f i ck ing systems, rescue and equipment recovery; and secur i ty

assistance are tactical missions ident i f ied fo r use i n counternarcotics

operations. None of these tasks appear to violate pub l i c law because they do

not requ i re the m i l i t a r y to act as a law enforcement agent. They also

specif ical ly direct the support of the NDCS to be directed outside the borders

of the United States of America. The question concerning the Army now is .

'Is the doctr ine fo r each Special Forces mission sui table fo r the

counternarcotics environment?'

PART TWO: ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTERNARCOTICS RELATED TASKS WITH THE PRIHARY MISSIONS FOR SPECIAL FORCES

1 'The function of the profession o f a rms i s the ordered application of / force i n the resolut ion of a social problem,' f rom a lecture t i t l ed 'The I Profession of Arms' given by LTG S i r John Winthrop Hackett. K.C.B.. i

The Special Forces operational detachment t r a ins to conduct Special

Reconnaissance (SR) as one of i t s p r i m a r y war t ime missions (See

Appendix 3, SR mission functional diagram). Under the fol lowing

circumstances theater commanders employ Special Forces to per form SR.

Special Reconnaissance i s conducted when 'normal' bat t le f ie ld

reconnaissance methods are impract ical . The reasons fo r th is are various.

The area of interest fo r a commander may be i n an inaccessible area.

There could be a requirement fo r rea l - t ime intel l igence i n a denied area.

Also, clandestine reconnaissance may be ordered which normal ly employs

assets (equipment and personnel) available to the U. S. intel l igence

community.j2 Special Forccs employed on clandestine reconnaissance may

be controlled directly by the U. S. intelligence community and require

Congressional oversight coordination. Any of these various situations can

provide a reason to conduct SR.

The simplif ied Special Reconnalssance mission execution cycle i s

preinf i l t rat ion activities, inf i l t rat ion, conduct of the reconnaissance.

exfi l trat ion, and debriefing. ARTEP 31-807-31-MTP. Mission Training

Plan for the Special Forces Detachment describes a l l of these tasks i n

detall. Preinf i l t rat ion activitfes are cr i t ica l to any Special Forces

mission. The crucial events during preinf i l t rat ion are: isolation,

preparation for the mission, debriefing an 'asset-33. and presenting a

b r iefback.

isolation occurs at the beginning of a l l Special Forces missions and

provides operations security for the team. In addition, i t serves to keep

the missions' employment status (covert or clandestine) plausible.

Mission preparation in isolation includes detailed planning to coordinate

a l l the participating support agencies wi th the identified mission tasks.

The coordinations of the specific methods for controll ing the deployed

detachment are also made. This preparation permits a precise mission

execution that i s normally restrained i n conventional operations because of

time. An 'asset' debriefed during isolation can be protected as a future

source. 'Assets' provide detailed information o r instructions required to

perform some cr i t ica l aspect of the mission. Examples include: l inking up

with a foreign agent, the location of a cache site, or a description of a

specific route to an objective. Regardless, preinf i l t rat ion activit ies

conclude i n isolation wi th the SF mission briefback.

The detcchment's brieiback i s a detailed presentation to the

immediate and other concerned commanders; i t may be given to the ClNC

himself. The la t ter i s normal ly represented by a deputy and responsible

staff action off icers. The purpose o f the briefback (See Appendix 4 - SF

Mission Briefback Format) i s to demonstrate a thorough understanding of

the assigned mission to include i t s impl icat ions and the intent. The

briefback details the required coordination and serves as a f ina l check fo r

everything that must occur to guarantee mission accomplishment.

After making an i n f i l t r a t i on , the Special Forces Detachment may

establish contact with an 'asset' who w i l l assist i n the reconnaissance

task. I f not, the detachment moves i n the denied area to the objective area

and establishes a mission support site. From th is s i te , the detachment

conducts i t s reconnaissance task. Reconnaissance act iv i t ies may involve

the deployment of sophisticated technological devices to assist i n the task.

For example, these devices may include comrnunlcations equipment designed

to re lay immediate intell igence data. Once the reconnaissance task i s

complete the detachment moves to another mission o r conducts ex f i l t r a t i on

operations.

Other c r i t i c a l tasks i n the mission t ra in ing and evaluation out l ine

are: employment of active countermeasures, maintenance of OPSEC, and

batt le d r i l l s fo r reacting to contact o r ambushes and breaking contact.

These tasks function p r i m a r i l y to protect the detachment members and

safeguard from compromise the deployment status (clandestine-covert-

overt) of the mission.

A detachment could conduct the Special Reconnaissance mission to

support the NDCS i n a variety of ways. Gathering intelligence data to

confirm or deny data gathered from another source to provide redundancy

of collection means i s just one example. Upon request of a host nation or

United States law enforcement agency, the detachment can also collect data

from a physically denied area. Perhaps the best payoff for the Special

Reconnaissance mission occurs when i t supports an interdiction operation

by providing 'real time' data on drug shipments.

The doctrine for SR recognizes the pollt lcal implications for

counternarcotics operations described by United States Public Law and host

nation diplomatic and polit ical sensitivities. I t does this by two methods.

one direct and one indirect.

Directly, i n preinf i l t rat ion isolation the detachment conducts a

mission analysis. Specified i n the Army Counternarcotics Plan i s the

requirement for '...a properly executed memorandum of understanding or

other agreement (that) w i l l specify the responsibil ity and authority of

both Army commanders and the civ i l ian agency personnel i n a supervisory

position over Army forces.34' ClNCs are also required to establish ROE or

RUF. DoD Directive 5525.5 combined with these specifications and the

detachment's mission statement ( i n the concerned Special Operations

Commander's mission tasking letter135, provides the detachment wi th the

necessary guidance to address any polit ical implications of the mission.

The briefback, p r io r to mission execution, verif ies the detachment's

understanding of responsibil ity and authority. A l l concerned commanders

can validate the detachment's understanding by placing specific questions

or topics i n the SF mission briefback sequcnce for each mission as stated

i n FM 31 -20 , Appendix E, SF Mission Briefback.

Because FM 100-20, f l i l i t a r v Ooerations i n Low lntensi tv Confl ict,

l i s t s counternarcotics operations as a peacetime contingency, the

detachment must consider the Imperatives of pol It lca l dominance and

legitimacy. The imperat ive of po l i t i ca l dominance requires adoption of

courses of action which are legal ly supportab1e.3~ Legitimacy, wh i le not

tanglble o r easi ly quantif iable. i s ve ry susceptible to misperception when

inappropriately applying force.3' These imperatives, when applied to the

SR mission, requ i re the detachment to adopt care fu l l y courses of action

which protect a l l concerned po l i t i ca l entit ies. For example. a host nation

may re luctant ly agree to allow a Special Reconnaissance mission w i t h i n i t s

borders only i f i t I s kept f rom the host notion's pub l i c knowledge.

Ind i rect ly , the detachment recognizes po l i t i ca l impl icat ions by the

tasks of employing countermeasures, safeguarding of 'assets', and OPSEC

techniques. Countermeasures can range f rom the employment of classif ied

technological devices to subtle cover and deception operations conducted

concurrent ly w i t h in-country secur i t y assistance act iv i t ies. Handling of

'assets' includes not only protect ing the ident i ty of the individual, but

prevent ing disclosure of who o r why the individual i s helping. OPSEC

measures are sound tactics fo r any m i l i t a r y uni t . P r i m a r i l y , OPSEC means

s te r i l i za t ion of any s i te a detachment occupied dur ing the mission that

could provide evidence that a reconnaissance took place. Special Forces

detachments rou t ine ly pract ice s i te-s ter i l izat ion techniques. This action

i s extremely valuable for re ta in ing the capabi l i ty to conduct fu tu re

reconnaissance.

The doctrine surrounding the Special Reconnaissance mission

faci l i tates interagency act iv i t ies directed by the Office of National Drug

Control Pol icy and the State Department ac t iv i t ies in each country

affected. B y i t s v e r y nature. counternarcotics operations w i l l requ i re

input f rom agencies directed b y the Office of National Drug Control Pol icy

(The Drug Czar) and support f rom Department o f State act iv i t ies i n an

affected country. Special Forces Detachments are fami l ia r w i t h procedures

fo r work ing i n support of non-mi l i tary agencies, predominantly the

Department o f State through the i r par t ic ipat ion i n 'country-teams.' The

Army Counternarcotics Plan specif ies that, '...forces w i l l always be under

d i rect m i l i t a r y command.'38 Once again. the detachment w i l l demonstrate

i n the SF Mission Briefback how we l l i t has coordinated required

supporting agencies.

Furthermore. the capabi l i ty fo r Special Forces Detachments to

operate i n a mult i tude of communications modes i s pa r t i cu la r l y useful to

law enforcement agencies. This i s c r i t i c a l f o r a Special Reconnaissance

mission because the data collected w i l l often be t ime sensitive. Time

sens i t i v i t y may in fact be the reason fo r d i rect ing a Special

Reconnaissance mission i n the first place. Once again, the b a s k SF

mission briefback b y the detachment operations sergeant w i l l demonstrate

just how the information requested t ransmits to the 'askfng' agency.

F inal ly . the problem o f balancing 'security of operations' w i t h the

operational tenet of synchronization w i l l always t rouble the Special Forces

commander. The commander must resolve the conf l ic t between who 'needs

to know' and OPSEC for mission execution.39 The doctrine addresses th i s

problem because i t also exists i n 'conventional' war t ime applications of

Special Rcconnoissance. Thc number and var ie ty of non-mi l i ta ry agencies

involved fu r the r complicates counterdrug efforts. The employment status

o f the mission now becomes a factor, pa r t i cu la r l y when attempting a covert

operation. However. the mission t ra in ing plan fo r Special Reconnaissance

treats secur i ty of the operation and data repor t ing as co-equal, c r i t i c a l

tasks. When issuing the Special Reconnaissance mission, the re la t i ve

importance of the data to be gathered versus the level of operational

secur i ty required must be c lear ly identified. This w i l l guide the

detachment dur ing the i r course of action development.

DIRECT ACTION

The Special Reconnaissance mission ve ry often leeds d i rec t ly to the

conduct of a Direct Action mission. The Special Forces Detachment

conducting the Direct Action mission provides the Theater Commander w i t h

the capabi l i ty to conduct combat operations beyond the range of tactical

weapon's systems o r the area of influence of conventional m i l i t a r y

forces.30 i n addition to attacking designated 'high payoff' targets and

c r i t i c a l nodes of a designated target system, the detachment performs

capture, rescue and recovery operations. Objectives fo r these operations

may encompass: selected hosti le personnel and equipment; U. S. o r Al l ied

prisoners, both m i l i t a r y and pol i t ica l ; downed aircrews; nuclear o r

chemical weapons; downed satell i tes; classif ied documents or equipment; o r

other sensit ive items of mater iel . The Direct Action mission i s a direct

application of m i l i t a r y power and does not r e l y on a foreign power."

Special Forces detachments conduct Di rect Action operations under

the direct ion and control of a Special Operations headquarters.

Detachments execute DA operations in four modes:

*Uni lateral ly, w i t h Special Forces qual i f ied personnel only. *Uni lateral ly. w i t h a m ix of SF, other SOF, and conventional forces.

*As a combined operation. w i t h SF-led foreign teams. *As a combined operation, w i t h SF-trained and directed foreign

teams.42

The theater commander controls Di rect Action operations b y

prov id ing the theater special operations commander a combination o f

mission-type orders, specif ic mission taskings, ru les o f engagement, and

other mission guidance. I n situations shor t o f war, the National Command

Author i ty (NCA) directs the appropriate regional uni f ied commander to

plan and execute contingency DA operations. I f the NCA desires more

posit ive control, i t may d i rect United States Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM) to plan and d i rec t the operation. The NCA may also d i rec t

USSOCOH to establish a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)

repor t ing d i rec t ly to the NCA or Chairman of the Jo in t Chiefs of Staff

(cJcs) .~~

The s impl i f ied Direct Action mission execution cycle includes:

p re in f i l t r a t i on act iv i t ies, i n f i l t r a t i on , in terd ic t ion o f a target system o r

recovery, ex f i l t ra t ion , and debriefing (See Appendix 5, Direct Action

mission functional diagram). The size o f a detachment conducting a Direct

Action mission can range f rom a two-man team conducting a clandestine

sabotage to a reinforced Special Forces company conducting an over t raid.

Examples o f U. S. Di rect Action missions are the recovery of 5 13

prisoners of war from Cabanatuan, Luzon by the 6 t h Ranger Dattalion i n

January 1915 and the attempt to recover American pr isoners from a

pr ison camp i n North Vietnam i n November 1970.

In the i r target selection process fo r Di rect Action missions, Special

Forces Detachments use the C A R Y E R ~ ~ The factors are c r i t i c a l i t y , factors.

accessibi l i ty, ~ e c u p e r a b i l i t y , vu lnerab i l i t y , effect-on-population. and

-recognizabil i ty. Special Forces detachments use the CARVER factors when

analyzing any target fo r any mission. The CARVER factors should aid i n

determining what the precise Direct Action mission tasking should be.

C r i t i ca l i t y describes the re la t i ve importance of a target system or

subsystem to an enemy's a b i l i t y to make o r sustain war or drug production

and shipment. Four ru les judge a target's c r i t i ca l i t y . The f i r s t i s

determining the location and number o f targets i n the system. When w i l l

the effects of the target's interdict ion be fe l t i s a second consideration.

The t h i r d is: what i s the reduction i n total output fo r the whole system

caused by the levels of possible target damage? F ina l ly , are the i r

substitutes o r al ternat ives available to continue output i n spi te of any

damage caused?

Accessibil i tv describes the re la t i ve ease an action element w i l l have

to strike a target. Elements involved i n sett ing the accessibi l i ty

calculation are i n f i l t r a t i on and ex f i l t r a t i on techniques; surv iva l and

evasion and escape potential i n the operational area: the secur i ty si tuat ion

enroute to and from the target; and whether the target i s w i th in range of

direct o r ind i rect weapons' f i re .

Recuoerabil i tv relates to c r i t i ca l i t y . I t measures the t ime required

to replace, repa i r o r by-pass the damage. The evaluation of recuperabi l i ty

includes an estimate o f economic capabi l i ty and technical resources

available to the enemy.

Vulnerabi l i tv i s d i f ferent f rom accessibi l i ty because i t considers

how to damage a target. The attack means and expertise of an action

element establish the calculation of damage possible. The calculation

considers the following. What are the nature and construction o f the

target? What i s the amount o f damage required and what systems w i l l

cause that amount? Who has the expertise to transport and employ each o f

the destruction systems.

Effect-on-the-oooulation re fe rs to pub l ic reaction i n the target

area and the domestic and internat ional reaction to the target's destruction.

Consideration o f pub l ic reaction must answer several key questions. W i l l

repr isa ls against f r iend ly forces occur? What effect w i l l target

destruction have on national PSYOP's themes? W i l l the ex f i l t r a t i on o r

evasion potential i n the area be helped o r h u r t ? W i l l target destruction

alienate o r re inforce the enemy population w i t h i t s government?

The f ina l CARVER factor i s recoanizabil i tv. This factor assesses the

physical effects o f weather, l ight , te r ra in , target size, and d is t inct ive

target signature. This assessment then compares the a b i l i t y of an action

element to ident i fy the target i n the operational area.

The targeting process employing the CARVER factors can easi ly

analyze a drug t ra f f i ck ing system l i k e cocaine (see Figure 2). Because the

design of the targeting process focuses at the theater level, i t na tura l l y

incorporates impl icat ions for not just m i l i t a r y power but a l l elements of

national power. As a resu l t i t does not matter i f a Special Forces

detachment o r some other agency (U. S. or host nation) provides the action

element fo r interdict ion. Most important ly , the target analysis process

serves to ident i fy the best place to s t r i ke .

As seen i n the analysis of the Special Reconnaissance mission, the

detachment briefback p r i o r to mission execution w i l l sat isfy many key

questions raised by the special operations imperatives. Those answers are

also t rue for the Di rect Action mission. The SF mission br iefback format

includes a section on target analysis using the CARVER factors which

demonstrates the detachment's understanding of the target's ro le i n the

drug t ra f f i ck ing system.

However, the D i rec t Action mission of in terd ic t ion doesnot

recognize the po l i t i ca l impl icat ions f o r counternarcotics operations. The

c ruc ia l po l i t i ca l impl icat ion not recognized concerns the provisions o f the

Posse Cornitatus Act. Whi le the doctr ine may have great potential fo r

aiding law enforcement agencies i n analyzing targets for interdict ion, the

doctrine does not contain any specif ications fo r ar rests , searches and

seizures. These a re act iv i t ies reserved speci f ica l ly to law enforcement

personnel and not authorized fo r m i l i t a r y personnel. M i l i t a r y personnel

can assist b y 'tracking' a target and then handing i t o f f to an authorized

agent fo r legal 'due process.'

The doctr ine i s also va l id i n recognizing host nation diplomatic and

po l i t i ca l sensit iv i t ies. I f the National Command Author i ty authorizes

interdiction45, w i th o r without host nation support. i t would f a l l w i t h i n

one of the four normal operating modes fo r a Direct Action mission.

Nevertheless, i t would only be va l id i n t h i s circumstance i f the detachment

personnel per form no legal 'due process' act iv i t ies.

The Direct Action mission o f rescue or recoverv doesrecognize the

po l i t i ca l impl icat ions fo r counternarcotics operations and host nation

pol i t ica l and diplomatic sensit ivit ies. There are two ingredients which

combine to allow th is recognition: the rescue or recovery operation and the

modes o f operation.

The f i r s t ingredient, the rescue o r recovery operation, does not

requ i re any law enforcement ac t iv i ty by m i l i t a r y personnel and the A rmy

Counternarcotics Plan specifies 'protection of soldiers' as p r i m a r y

concern fo r commanders. The capabi l i ty to per form rescue and recovery

operations w i l l be an essential element of any plan to provide protection to

m i l i t a r y personnel and other agency personnel. This i s pa r t i cu la r l y

important i n those areas where po l i t i ca l considerations fo r development of

ROE and RUF may requ i re acceptance of r i sk . For example, a detachment

deploys at the request of a host nation to provide operational support to a

drug eradication program. The host nation desires to downplay the

m i l i t a r y assistance given by the United States. Accordingly, the

detachment i s allowed to c a r r y only personal sidearms and remain inside

the remote base camp. I n response, the drug t ra f f i ckers arrange fo r a

local insurgent movement to attack the base camp.

The four operating modes fo r Di rect Action missions supply the

f ina l ingredient al lowing the recognit ion o f host nation po l i t i ca l and

diplomatic sensit iv i t ies. Upon NCA approval, w i t h o r without host nation

sanction, a rcgional CINC cen conduct recovery or rescue operations w i th

assigned Special Forces detachments. Each of the four modes can be adopted

to conform to the status of host nation part ic ipat ion.

The doctr ine fo r both Di rect Action missions faci l i tates interagency

ac t i v i t ies between the Drug Czar and the State Department ac t i v i t ies i n

each target country. By doctrine, a Di rect Action mission i s under the

control of the Theater Special Operations Command o r a JSOTF established

by USSOCOM by NCA direction. This places respons ib i l i t y for the mission

on a senior m i l i t a r y off icer. This of f icer coordinates d i rec t l y w i t h the

Department of State m i l i t a r y attach6 and the concerned law enforcement

agency. Under the provisions of the Army Counternarcotics Plan, th is

of f icer w i l l also ensure compliance w i th any memorandum of understantling

governing the employment of the m i l i t a r y personnel.46

The doctr ine f o r Di rect Action recognizes the balance between

'security of operations' and the tenet of synchronization. The employment

of D i rec t Action missions against specif ic targets fo r in terd ic t ion w i l l

have the best chance fo r opt imiz ing the balance. The isolated planning t ime

and preparat ion p r i o r to mission execution w i l l safeguard the mission's

deployment status and support OPSEC. The t ime i n isolation w i l l also allow

detailed information sharing and i t s incorporat ion in to the mission's

concept of execution.

A problem w i t h the doctr ine and t r y i n g to balance OPSEC w i t h

synchronization occurs when attempting a rescue o r recovery operation.

I n the counterdrug environment there w i l l exist a plethora of agents and

act iv i t ies operatlng both ove r t l y and clandestinely i n the area of

operations. By i t s ve ry nature. a rescue o r recovery mission i s a rap id

response operation. Because o f the many agencies that may operate in an

area and the short t ime available to conduct the recovery o r rescue, the

information available to the detachment may only come f rom the

organization requesting the mission. The level where law enforcement

agencies, the Department o f State, and the m i l i t a r y chain o f command l i n k

w i l l govern effective response to required information, simultaneously

effecting OPSEC and the cer ta inty o f successful mission execution.

The Foreign Internal Defense mission isnofexc lus ive ly a Special

Forces mission. I t i s a jo int and interagency ac t i v i t y o f the United States

government.r7 The p r i m a r y tasks fo r a Special Forces detachment on a

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission are to organize, t ra in , advise, and

assist host nation m i l i t a r y and parami l i ta ry forces. Ideally, by improving

the host nation tactical and technical proficiency, an insurgency can be

defeated without direct U.S. involvement.+^ According to the Army's

doctrine fo r FID, detachments conduct the fol lowing types of operations:

t ra in ing assistance, advisory assistance, intell igence operations, PSYOP,

CA operations, populace and resource control operations. and tactical

combat operationsq9. A b r i e f synopsis of operational doctrine follows.

Tra in ing assistance operations i n a host nation pe rm i t the rap id

development o f specif ic individual s k i l l s o r the preparation o f un i t s to

defeat an insurgent. The m i l i t a r y assistance e f fo r t begun fo r E l Salvador

in the ear ly 1980's w i t h i t s weapons, tactics, and jun io r leadership by

elements o f the 7 th Special Forces Group (Ai rborne) i s an example.

Training ass~stonce increases tho overa l l host nation force capabi l i ty by

making untapped host nation resources available fo r use against

insurgents. This supports the U. S. doctrine fo r In ternal Defense and

Development (IDAD) by focusing on bui lding viable host nation m i l i t a r y

inst i tu t ions that respond to the needs of society.50 Training assistanca

also reduces the requirement fo r U.S. resources.

Special Forces provides advisory assistance i n the form of

operational advice and assistance to specif ic host natlon and parami l i ta ry

organizations. The advisory assistance i s provided under the operational

contro l (OPCON) of the in-country U. S. defense representative, usuai ly

the Chief of Securi ty Assistance Operations. Act iv i t ies of the detachment

may intersect jur isd ic t ional boundaries or responsibi l i t ies of other

Country Team members (See f igure 3). The detachment anticipates

potential conf l icts and coordinates working agreements through i t s

m i l i t a r y chain of command and the m i l i t a r y organlzation working for the

ambassador i n the country. Addit ionally, the Special Forces advisers

coordinate thei r por t ion of the overa l l FID e f fo r t w i th each member of the

country team.

STATEDEPARTMENT

PLANS 6 OPERATIONS

AMERICAN EMBASSY

CL ANOESTINE OPERATIONS0

Mil i tary Forcer Ambassador C I A S 0 F C IA S 0 F Host Nation JUSHm6 Loca l Mil i tary Police/Military US AID and

US15 Constaeulary

INTELLI6ENCE COLLECTION SECURITY

C I A C I A Mil i tary Forcer Military Aslets 5 0 F press Poo l

Figure a. The Fignt Against Supply From HarCo?morilm: rhe ntw unconventional war MRJ MarR P. Hertlin!, Hili:~r~lh'!:m :larch 1 9 9 0

For a variety of reasons, host nations may refuse U. S. advisers. At

the same time, that host nation may request and receive U. S. mobil i ty and

f f r e support assets to combat a potent insurgent. Special Forces are

capable of coordinating a l l types of heliborne, tactical a i r l i f t , close a i r

support and gunship operations. Special Forces detachments, as liaison

teams, can coordinate this support to ensure i t s proper tactical

employment.

The Special Forces adviser must balance four cr i t ica l conditions of

the host nation environment. First, he must always act as a representative

of the United States. Problems must be resolved by means appropriate to

the host nation without violating U. S. laws and policies. A second

condition for successful advisory assistance i s understanding cross-

cultural communications while building close personal relationships. This

i s especially di f f icul t because host nation counterparts normally act

wi th in the context of their own sociopolitical experience. Host nation

leaders may tolerate advice only to obtain material and training assistance.

To safeguard both the U. S. interests and the adviser's, specific ROE exist

to keep the adviser an advizr. This i s the th i rd condition under which an

adviser operates. The fourth condition incorporates the f i r s t three.

Simply stated, i t i s that polit ical objectives and constraints, rather than

mi l i ta ry capabilities, often dictate the organization and force development

of host nation mi l i ta ry and paramil i tary forces.

Three pre-eminent resources: language qualification, the area

study51, and the SF mission briefback make the Special Forces adviser

especially suited for the FID mission. Special Forces headquarters orient

their teams to specific global regions. Accordingly, this orientation

focuses language prof ic iency requirements fc r t raining. Each team

prepares a specif ic area study incorporat ing i t s language prof ic iency.

This study i s kept cur ren t and continuously updated. I t i s f u r the r updated

w i t h additional, specif ic deployment area information p r i o r to deployment.

The briefback demonstrates tho adviser's understanding of the relat ionship

o f the RUF/ROE w i t h the area of operations.

The Special Forces detachment conducts comprehensive and detailed

intel l igence operations as pa r t of FID to assist the host nation i n using i t s

own super ior ( re la t i ve to the insurgents) resources to perforate an

insurgent secur i t y system. The detachment concentrates not only on

m i l i t a r y signi f icant information, but on assisting the host nation i n

conducting operations designed to destroy o r neutral ize the insurgent's

po l i t i ca l and intel l igence in f rast ructure.

Closely related to intel l igence operations are PSYOP operations.

Psychological operations target the host nation populace's perceptions

about t he i r government's interests and goals i n order to gain the i r support

o r at least deny i t to an insurgent. The Special Forces detachment assists

host nation forces to accomplish the fol lowing objectives w i t h support

f rom PSYOP elements:

*Assisting the host nation i n gaining o r reta in ing the support of i t s people. .Assisting the host nation i n defeating the insurgents. .Establishing a favorable U. S. image in the host nation. *Favorably presenting U. S. actions and intent ions to neutral groups and the internat ional community. *Assisting the host nation i n support ing defector rehabi l i ta t ion programs. *Providing close and continuous support to increase the effect of C i v i l A f fa i rs operations.

The ul t imate goal of the U. S. m i l i t a r y i s to help the host nation i n

developing i t s own PSYOP p r o g r a d 2 .

When the Special Forces detachment conducts c i v i l a f fa i rs (CAI

operations i n FID, i t s p r i m a r y mission i s to help host nation forces to

effect ively use i t s resources to mobi l ize the people to support the host

nation government against an insurgent. C i v i l A f fa i rs elements work

closely w i t h the detachment to coordinate the detachment operations w i t h

host nation, U. S. Mission, and internat ional agencies. This coordination

aims at providlng host nation c i v i l assistance programs to the people.

C i v i l assistance programs improve the capabi l i t ies o f host nation

authori t ies to deal w i t h the pol i t ica l , economic, and social aspects of IDAD.

Special Forces detachments part ic ipate i n m i l i t a r y c i v i c action projects

that enhance host nation economic and social development. These programs

function to gain the active support o f the population by emphasizing the

host nation's role.

PSYOP and C i v i l A f fa i rs operations are c r i t i c a l to the Special Forces

detachment when assisting a host nation i n population and resources

control operations (PRC). The detachment normal ly l i m i t s t he i r

par t ic ipat ion to advice, t ra in ing, and indi rect support of PRC.

Nevertheless, they must convey to the people that they are supporting a

host nation program, not implementing a U. S.-directed program. I n that

regard, the host nation must persuade the people of the fol lowing essential

*The insurgents, not the host nation government. are to blame fo r the inconvenience of the PRC measures. *The government acts fo r the long range benefit of the people. *The insurgents ac t iv i t ies are harmfu l to the people and requ i re the imposit ion of the PRC measures.

elnsurgents arc? tilt? eneny of the ~~~!t:;)le and must III! dcnicd suj~!)orl and supplies. *Loyal c i t izens must declare the i r support of the government w i t h f u l l and voluntary compliance w i t h the PRC programs. =The government w i l l reduce and el iminate the PRC programs as the insurgent threat decreases.

When the United States decldes to par t ic ipate i n a host natlon IDAD

strategy that includes combat operations, a detachment may conduct f i ve

types o f tactical combat operations described for FID: consolidatfon,

s t r i ke , remote area, border, and urban. Tactical operations are not

Independent actlons to destroy Insurgent forces and bases. Each operation

should be synchronized to gain a broader regional o r national objective. I t

i s the detachment commander's task to convince h i s counterpart to

integrate intel l igence, CA,and PSYOP into every tactical operation along

w i t h the minimum use of violence. The IDAD p r i nc ip le of minimum use of

violence54 i s v i t a l to success and the u l t imate e l iminat ion of an

insurgency.

The f i r s t type of combat operation i n FID i s Consolidation.

Consolidation operations are long-term population secur i ty operations

conducted i n areas generally under government control. They aim at

prov id ing secur i t y to free the people f rom fear of insurgent repr isa ls .

This i s accomplished by isolat ing the insurgent, protect ing the populace

and neutra l iz ing the insurgent in f rast ructure. Some techniques to

accomplish th i s are population resett lement o r 'strategic hamlet'

programs l i k e those used i n Malaysia and the Republic of Vietnam.

Second are s t r i k e ooerations. S t r i ke operations are short-durat ion

operations conducted in contested o r insurgent control led areas. They are

designed to destroy, isolate, and in terd ic t insurgent forces. the i r bases,

and the i r l ines of support. They are offensive operations that are

decisive bv themselves. They can support consolidation operations by

preventing insurgents from contesting host nation pacif ication efforts.

Special Forces advisers must advise against s t r i k e operations that

overshadow and dominate the nonmi l i ta ry aspects of counterinsurgency.

Another type of F ID combat operation are remote area ooerations.

Remote area operations are undertaken i n insurgent controlled or contested

areas to establish 'islands o f popular support' for the host nation

government and deny support to the insurgents. PSYOP and C i v i l A f fa i rs

programs can best assist i n obtaining local support fo r remote area

operations when signif icant segments already support the host nation

programs and the host nation rec ru i t s local personnel for service i n the

parami l i ta ry o r i r regu lar force for that remote area. Special Forces

detachments support remote area operations to interdict , destroy base

areas, collect and repor t intelligence, and demonstrate host nation support

fo r the remote area.

The f ina l types of tactical combat operations i n FID are border

ooerations and urban onerations. Both are the responsib i l i ty of host

nation police. customs or parami l i ta ry secur i ty forces. They also involve

extensive application o f population and resource control measures. The

goal of border operations i s to in te rd ic t insurgent forces and support.

Urban area operations are concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h combatting

te r ro r i sm, sabotage, and destruction of the insurgent in f rast ructure.

PSYOP and C i v i l A f fa i rs support are again c ruc ia l fo r gaining and

maintaining popular support during these operations.

The doctrine for executing the FID mission hy Special Forces ca l l s '

fo r the creation of a secur i ty assistance force (See Appendix 6). The

secur i ty assistance force (SAF) i s s im i l a r to a conventional, combined

arms task force. A Special Forces detachment can be the nucleus of a SAF.

The Special Forces led SAF i s normal ly augmented w i t h C i v i l Af fa i rs .

PSYOP, medical, engineer, m i l i t a r y police. m i l i t a r y intel l igence,

communications and other combat, combat support and combat service

support elements as required. The SAF must be capable of support ing a l l

potential FID operations. When an area coordination center (ACC) i s

established, the SAF has the capabi l i ty to integrate and coordinate a l l of i t s

ac t i v i t ies w i t h combined (U. S./host nation) c i v i l - m i l i t a r y headquarters

w i t h i n the ju r i sd ic t ion of the appropriate area commander.

The doctr ine fo r the Special Forces mission of Foreign in ternal

Defense recognizes the po l i t i ca l impl icat ions fo r counternarcotics

operations described by United States Publ ic Law. The FID doctr ine

st ipulates that the Special Forces adviser must solve problems without

v io la t ing U. S. laws and policies. The Special Forces mission briefback i s a

fundamental device for ve r i f y i ng that deploying detachments understand

the i r duties and the res t r i c t ions imposed under these laws. Dur ing the i r

br iefback, the detachment describes the Rules of Engagement (and o r Rules

on the Use of Force) for t he i r FID mlssion. The ROE o r RUF serve as the

ClNCs means to keep the detachment from breaking any law o r policy.

The doctrine c lear ly recognizes host nation diplomatic and po l i t i ca l

sensit iv i t ies. The doctr ine actual ly describes the specif ic employment of

m i l i t a r y personnel i n an in ternal defense and development ro le as

described i n FM 100-20. M i l i t a r y Ooerations i n Low Intensi ty Conflict.

The Army recognizes the close linkage between drug traf f icki .ng and

insurgency.55 The doctr ine f o r the FID mission describes how to w i n

against an insurgency. By s imp ly subst i tu t ing the word 'drug-traf f icker '

f o r 'insurgent' you can apply the doctrine. For example, t h i s can be

p a r t i c u l a r l y useful when contending w i t h the problem of how to convince

the local populace to cease ra is ing drug crops ( o r support an insurgent).

The doctr ine faci l i tates the interagency act iv i t ies directed by the

Office o f National Drug Control Pol icy and the Department o f State

ac t i v i t ies I n each affected country. The employment of a SAF work ing

under a memorandum of agreement w i t h the Drug Enforcement Agency

automatically puts the secur i t y assistance off ice of an embassy, the Drug

Enforcement Agency representative, and the detachment commander i n a

coordination group. The establishment of an area coordination center

o f fe rs a way to include the host nation i n the counternarcotics effort .

F ina l l y , the doctr ine balances secur i t y of operations w i t h the tenet

of synchronization. Imp l i c i t i n a l l FID missions i s the requirement to

protect the populace f rom the insurgent ( o r i n t h i s case the drug

t ra f f i cke r ) and to provide a safe environment f o r national development.

Combining t h i s w i t h the emphasis i n every FID operation to integrate

intelligence, PSYOP, and C i v i l A f f a i r s to w i n government support b y the

people, produces a sp i ra l ing effect where the drug t ra f f i cke r becomes less

secure as the populace becomes more secure. This i s a resu l t o f the host

nation support ing those who oppose the drug trade.

'it i s the business of armed services to fu rn ish a constituted I authori ty. a government, i n si tuat ions where force is, o r might be. used the greatest possible number of options.' f rom a lecture t i t l ed 'The Profession of Arms' given by LTG S i r John Winthrop Hackett. I

[K.c.B.; C.B.E., D.S.O., M.c:E.~~ . 1

I f the threat to the national secur i ty of the United States presented

by drug t ra f f i ck ing i s viewed as an External insuraencv, then the cur ren t

doctr ine fo r the Special Forces missions of Special Reconnaissance, Di rect

Action, and Foreign In te rna l Defense i s sui table fo r conducting

counternarcotics operations outside the borders of the United States. When

the drug t ra f f i ck ing threat i s viewed as a problem of domestic law

enforcement, then the doctr ine fo r the Special Forces missions isnot

suitable fo r counternarcotics operations.

There are three fundamental components which cause the doctr ine to

be sui table for application i n counternarcotics operations. Each of these

components sat isf ies the c r i t e r i a fo r t h i s study established by the

imperat ives for special operations. Consequently, Special Forces i s a

p r i m a r y tool available fo r in terd ic t ing drug t ra f f i ck ing outside the

borders o f the United States.

The f i r s t component that demonstrates su i t ab i l i t y i s the pre-

mission isolation process that culminates i n a formal briefback f rom the

executing detachment to the commander d i rect ing the mission. This

b r i e f i ng c la r i f i es exactly what i s to be done and the conditions under which

the mission w i l l occur. This i s c r i t i c a l fo r protect ing the m i l i t a r y f rom

committ ing to an operation that could violate the provisions imposed by

Posse Comitatus. The b r i e f i ng also c la r i f i es what safeguards and

provisions are being made to prevent any undue o r unwarranted acts of

force. This c lear ly provides recognit ion of the po l i t i ca l impl icat ions fo r

counternarcotics operations described b y United States Pub l ic Law (Posse

Comitatus Act T i t l e 18 United States Code 1385) and host nation diplomatic

and po l i t i ca l sensit iv i t ies.

The second component i s the inherent capabi l i ty of Special Forces to

coordinate any of these missions as p a r t o f a combined, multi-agency

(Department o f Defense and other U.S. and host nation governmental

agencies) and conventional force. This w i l l be indispensable to any

counternarcotics e f f o r t coordinated b y the ONDCP that involves United

States and host nation law enforcement agencies, the State Department, and

the Department of Defense. The key factor i n making th is work i s the

experience and t ra in ing that Special Forces commanders have i n work ing i n

combined, multi-agency environments. This is p l a i n l y the c r i t e r i a o f

fac i l i ta t ing interagency ac t i v i t ies directed b y the Office of National Drug

Control Pol icy (The Drug Czar) and the Department of State ac t i v i t ies i n

each affected country.

The t h i r d component i s the application o f the tenets of Low Intensi ty

Confl ict and in te rna l Defense and Development. The concept of a m i l i t a r y

force concentrating on the winning of popular support ( t o stop the f low o f

drugs) ra the r than the physical destruction o f an enemy force, w i l l be

essential to assisting host nations i n implementing last ing counterdrug

programs. Essential to t h i s concept are the requirements f o r intel l igence

and secur i t y as described i n FM 100-20, M i l i t a r v Operations i n Low

intensi tv Confl ict. Synchronizing the secur i t y of the force, the secur i t y of

the host nation populace we w i l l be attempting to dissuade f rom drug

t ra f f ick ing, and intelligence cc t i v i t y leoding to in tcrd ic t ion ef for ts i s

pa r t i cu la r l y inherent i n the doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense. Thus

the last c r i t e r i a , balancing 'security of operations' w i t h the operational

tenet o f synchronization, i s met.

On the other hand, a single c r i t e r i o n renders a l l the doctr ine

unsuitable when applying the doctrine to conduct counternarcotics

operations w i th the objective of domes!ic law enforcement. None of the

doctr ine i s able to comply w i t h the prov is ions i n the pub l i c laws and

regulations which are derived from Posse Comitatus. Whi le i t i s i m p l i c i t

in the doctr ine that the detachment w i l l not v iolate any law i n the

execution of i t s mission, there are no provisions for the detachment to act

as law enforcement agents. No t ra in ing plan exists for the missions to

enable the detachment to become capable of affecting searches, seizures, o r

ar rests fo r the purposes of br ing ing individuals to just ice i n a c i v i l i a n

c r im ina l court. If b r ina ino c r im ina l s t r a f f i ck ing drugs outside the United

States to iust ice i s the focus of U. S. s t r a t e w , then the Special Forces

detachment isnofan appropriate tool.

If the Office of National Drug Control Pol icy pursues a strategy fo r

in terd ic t ing drugs in to the United States that doesnof require Special

Forces detachments to act i n a law enforcement manner; i n other words,

just stoo the f low, then detachments canbe employed as an effective tool to

stop that flow. I f the United States of America wants to pursue a strategy

where host nations assume the greater par t of the respons ib i l i t y fo r

stopping the flow of drugs w i t h last ing host nation counterdrug programs;

then Special Forces deployed on a Foreign ln ternal Defense Mission as par t

of a combined, multi-agency (Department of Defense and other U.S. and

host nation governmental agencies) and conventional force tha! supports

the host nations' economic and political development of those lasting

counterdrug programs, i s the most suitable aml icat ion of Special Forces

Doctrine.

-ENDNOTES-

I. U. S. I'rcsidcnt, National S e c u r ~ t v Slrateav of the United Statcs, The White House. March 1990, page 7.

2. U. S. Department of Defense. Deoartm-ent of Defense Guidance for lmolementation of the President's National Drua Control S t ra tew. Richard 6. Cheney, Secretary of Defense. September 18, 1989. page 4.

3. U. S. Department of Defense. Department of the Army Memorandum, Armv Counternarcotics Plan, A p r i l 17, 1990. (Hereinafter re fe r red to as Armv Counternarcotics Plan.)

4. U. S. Department of Defense, Dapartrnent of the Army, h m Counternarcotics Symnosium, Report of Conference Proceedings, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, February 15- 16, 1990. (Hereinafter re fe r red to as Armv Svmoosium.)

5. Kitson, Frank, Low Intensi tv Ooerations: Subversion. I n s u r a e m Peacekeeoina. Faber & Faber Limited. London, 197 1 . page 70.

6. U. S. President. National Drua Control Strateqy. The White House, January 1990, page 3.

7. m.,page 100.

8. Posse Comitatus Act, United States Code. Section 1 3 8 5 of T i t le 18 (Crimes and Cr imina l Procedure)

9. T r i t ch le r , W i l l i am K. 'Employment o f the U.S. Armed Forces and the War on Drugs.' (Unpublished Research Report for the United States Mar ine Corps Command and Staff College. Nay 6 , 1987.) page 32.

10. Adams, Michael R. 'Navy Narcs', Proceedings, United States Naval Inst i tu te, September 1984. page 35.

1 1. T r i t ch le r . W i l l i am K. 'Employment of the U.S. Armed Forces and the War on Drugs.' page 37.

12. U. S. Department of Defense, DoD Direct ive 5525.5 , 'DoD Cooperation w i th C iv i l ian Law Enforcement Officials'. January 15. 1986. page 4- 1.

13. U. S. Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service. 'DoD Steps Up the Counternarcotics Fight." Defense Issues, Vol. 5. No. 2 2 , March 22, 1990. page 6.

14. U. S. Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service, 'DoD Role i n Drug Control.' Defense Issues, Vol 4 . No. 3 0 , September 18, 1989. page 1 .

15. U. S, Department of Defense, 'DoD Steps Up the Counternarcotics Fight." Defense Issues, Vol. 5 , No. 2 2 , March 2 2 , 1990. page 5-8.

ENDNOTES

16. LIJJ., p q e 3.

I7. bid.. page 6.

18. m.,page 7.

19. Armv Counternarcotics Plan. D i s t r i bu l:ion was made to a l l major commands o f the Army (MACOM)

20. w..page 3.

2 1. m..page 2 1.

22. u.,page 17.

23. Armv Svmoosium., pages I,4, and 23. Page 2 3 contains notes f rom a b r i e f i ng given b y COL Thomas E. Swain, Commander, A rmy /A i r Force Center f o r Low Intensi ty Conflict. The b r i e f i ng described the re lat ionship o f counternarcotics to Low Intensi ty Conflict.

24. United States Army Fie ld Manual 100-20/United States A i r Force Pamphlet 3 -20 , M i l i t a r v Ooerations i n Low lntensi tv Confl ict (Approved Final Dra f t ) United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fo r t Leavenworth. Kansas. December I. 1989. page 1- 12. (Hereinafter re fe r red to as F i l 100-20.)

25. A rmv Svmoosium., pages 4 and 29. Page 2 9 contains notes f rom a seminar on Intell igence Support to Counternarcotics led by BG John F. Stewart. Jr., Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff fo r Intelligence.

26. United States Army Field Manual 3 1-20, Doctr ine f o r Soecial Forces Ooerations, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. For t Bragg. Nor th Carolina, February 1. 1990. page 12- 1. (Hereinafter re fe r red to as FN 31-20.)

27. Reuter, Peter, Gordon Crawford and Jonathan Cave. Sealina the Borders: The Effects of increased M i l i t a r v Par t ic ioat ion i n D rug Interdict ion, The RAND Corporation, January 1988. page 14.

28. w.,pages v -v i i .

29. Armv Counternarcotics Plan. pages 4 and 2 1.

30. F M 3 1 - 2 0 , p a g e l O - I .

31. HacketI, Lieutenant General S i r John Winthrop, K.C.B.. C.B.E., D.S.O., N.C., The Profession of Arms, (The 1 9 6 2 Lees Knowles lectures given at T r i n i t y College, Cambridge, United Kingdom). Center for M i l i t a r y History, United States Army, Washington D.C. 1988. page 3. (Hereinafter re fe r red to as The Profession of Arms.)

32. F f l 3 1-20., page 12- 1.

ENDNOTES

33. Qi11, p q i : 5. -1Yi31:ls" i1;(11~ 1tiUdI:j. !]Iw:{K,~ \ I J % X I ' ~ i I V f > c::l!nt::l of individuals, or organizations i n place or which can be placed i n posit ion to accomplish specif ic tasks. These assets may be covert o r over t depending on the nature of the i r act iv i ty. The must be responsible to U. S. control and committable i n support of U. S. objectives.

34. &mv Counternarcotics Plan. page 17.

35. FM 3 1 -20 , appendix E provides an example of a Special Operations Command Mission Letter.

FM 100-20. page 1-8.

m.,page 1-9.

Armv Counternarcotics Plan. page 4.

FM 3 1-23, page 1-9.

-Ibid., page

m.,page

m.,page

m.,page 11-3.

United States Army Special Operations Command, Deputy Chief of Staff f o r Intelligence, Student Handbook on Special Omrat ions Taraetinq, 5 t h Edition. Strategic Industr ia l Target Analysis Tra in ing Course. For t Bragg, North Carolina. pages 2 & 3.

45. FM 3 1-20, paragraph 1 1 -2a.

46. Armv Counternarcotics Plan. page 17.

47. FM 31-20, page 10- 1.

49. w.,pages 10 -2 through 10-7.

50. F f l 100-20, page 2- 13.

5 1 . F f l 3 1-20., annex I contains a recommended general out l ine format fo r systematically organizing information i n an area of operations.

52. m.,page 10-3.

53. U.,page 10-4.

51. F f l 100-20. page 2 - 17.

ENDNOTES

55. t lorr is . James A . NAJ. USA. 'OCONUS Coun tcrnilrcot ic Campaign Planning.' (Unpublished Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1990.) describes i n detail the direct relation o f counter narcotics with insurgency. Also see Armv Svmoosium., pages 4 and 23.

56. Jhe Profession O f Arms.. page 29.

US GOVERNMEN1 AND AGENCY PUBLICATIONS

U. S., Congress, House. Committee on Government Operations, In i t ia t i ves on D r u ~ lnterdict ior: (Pa r t 1) . Hearinas, before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. 3 6 t h Congress, F i r s t Session, March 15- 16. J u l y 18. and October 24 . 1985.

U. S.. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. In i t ia t i ves on Drua Interd ic t ion (Pa r t 2 ) . Hearinas, before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. 3 6 t h Congress, F i r s t Session. February 6-7. A p r i l 16. May 14. and September 9, 1985.

U. S. Department of Defense. American Forces lnformation Service. 'DoD Role i n Drug Control,' Defense Issues, Vol 4, No. 3 0 , September 18, 1989.

U. S. Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service, 'Defense Against Ba l l i s t i c Missi les and Drug Traff ickers. ' Defense Iss-UB. Vol 4. No. 30 , October 12, 1989.

U. S. Department of Defense, American Forces lnformation Service, 'DoD Implementation of the President's Drug Control Strategy.' Defense Issrles, Yo1 4, No. 38 , October 17, 1989.

U. S. Department of Defensz, American Forces lnformation Service. 'DoD Steps Up the Counternarcotics Fight,' Defense Issues, Vol. 5. No. 22 . March 22 . 1990.

U. S. Department of Defense, Deoartment of Defense Guidance fo r lmolementation of the President's National Drua Control S t ra tew, Richard B. Cheney. Secretary of Defense, September 18, 1989.

U. S. Department of Defense. Department of the Army Memorandum. A m Counternarcotics Plan, A p r i l 17, 1390.

U. S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, A m Counternarcotics Svmoosium . Report of Conference Proceedings, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. February 15- 16, 1930.

U. S. Department of Defense, DoD Di rec t i ve 5525.5, 'DoD Cooperation w i t h C iv i l ian Law Enforcement Officials'. January 15, 1986.

U. S. Department of Defense. JCS PUB 3 - 0 7 . Doctr ine for Jo int O~era t i ons i n Low-lntensi tv Conflict. (For Comment Draf t ) The Jo in t Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.. 12 September 1988.

U. S. President. National Drua Control S t ra tew . The White House, January 1990

U. S. President. National Drua Control S t ra tew . The White House. September 1989

BIBLIOGRAPHY

US GOVFI?!!M:NT AND AGCNCY PUBLICfiTIONS-continue11

U. S. President. National Secur i ty S t r a t e w of the United States, The White House. March 1990.

United States Army ARTEP 3 1-807-3 1 -MTP, Mission Tra in ina Plan f o r the Soecial Forces Comoanv: S ~ e c i a l Reconnaissance. United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, F o r t Bragg, Nor th Carolina, January 1990.

United States Army ARTEP 31-807-32-MTP, Mission Tra in ina Plan f o r the Soecial Forces Comoanv: Di rect Action. United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. For t Bragg, Nor th Carolina, August 1989.

United States Army Field Manual 3 1-20, Doctr ine fo r Soecial Forces Ooerations, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Fo r t Bragg. Nor th Carolina, February 1, 1990.

United States Army Fie ld Manual 34- 1, lntel l inence and Electronic Warfare Ooerations. United States Army Intell igence Center and School, Fo r t Huachuca, Arizona. J u l y 1987.

United States Army Field Manual 100-5, Ooerations. United States Army Command and 6;neral Staff College, Fo r t Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1986.

United States Army Fie ld Manual 1 0 0 - 2 0 N n i t e d States A i r Force Pamphlet 3 -20 , M i l i t a r y Ooerations i n Low lntensi tv Cosf l ic t (Approved Final Draf t ) United States Army Command and General Staff College, For t Leavenworth. Kansas. December 1, 1989.

United States Army Field Manual 100-25 , Doctr ine fo r Armv Succial Ooeratina Forces (F inal Draft). United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fo r t Bragg, Nor th Carolina, June 1990.

United States A rmy Regulation 3 8 0 - 10, Disclosure of Information and Vis i ts and Accreditation of Foreian Nationals, HQDA. Washington D.C.. J u l y 29, 1988.

United States Army Special Operations Command, Deputy Chief of Staff f o r Intel l igence. Student Handbook on Soecial Ooerations Taraetinq, 5 t h Edition, Strategic Industr ia l Target Analysis Tra in ing Course, Fo r t Bragg. Nor th Carolina.

BOOKS

Hackett, Lieutenant General S i r John Winthrop, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.. M.C.. The Profession of Arms, (The 1962 Lees Knowles lectures given at T r i n i t y College, Cambridge, United Kingdom). Center fo r M i l i t a r y His tory, United States Army, Washington D.C. 1988.

Kitson, Frank. Low lntensi tv Ooerat ions: Subversiun. Insuraency. P e a c e k e e u Faber & Faber Limited, London. 1 9 7 1.

Reuter, Peter, Gordon Crawford and Jonathan Cave, Sealina the Borders: The Effects of Increased M i l i t p r v Par t ic ioat ion i n Druo Interdict ion, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. January 1 9 8 8

Stanton. Shelby L.. Green Berets at War: U.S. Armv Soeclal Forces i n Southeast Asia 1956- 1975, Presidio Press, Novato. Cal i fornia. 1985.

PERIODICALS

Adams, Michael R. 'Navy Narcs'. Proceedinas. United States Naval Inst i tute. September 1984, page 35.

Cromortie, Eugene R. Major General. ' Improving M i l i t a r y -C iv i l i an Cooperation i n Drug Investigations.' The Police Chief: October 1987.

Hsr t l ing, N a r k P. MAJ. 'Narcoterrorism: The New Unconventional War.' M i l i t a r v Review: March 1990.

Holt, J immie F. LTC(P). 'LIC i n Central America: Tra in ing Impl icat ions for the U. S. Army.' M i l i t a r y Review: March 1990.

Kolton, Randy J. MAJ. 'Combatting the Colombian Drug Cartels.' M i l i t a r v Review: March 1990.

Lockett. Carl L. 'Department of Defense Cooperation w i t h C i v i l Law Enforcement Officials.' The Police Chief: March 1987.

Mabry. Donald. 'Andean Drug Traf f ick ing and the M i l i t a r y Option.' M i l i t a r v Review: March 1990.

Meyer. Dan C. CPT(P) 'The Myth of Narcoterror ism i n La t in America.' M i l i t a r v Review: March 1990.

Moore, Richter H., Jr. 'Posses Comitatus Revisited: the Use of the M i l i t a r y i n C i v i l Law Enforcement.' Journal of Cr im ina l Justice, Volume 15: 1987.

Temple, Herbert R. Jr., LTG(Ret1 and LTC Walter L. Stewart. 'The National Guard i n the War on Drugs.' M i l i t a r v Review: March 1990.

UNPUBLISHED PAPER/BRIEFINGS

Abbott, Michael H. 'U. S. Army Involvement i n Counterdrug Operations--A Matter of Po l i t i cs o r National Securi ty?' (Unpublished USAWC M i l i t a r y Studies Program Paper. US Army War College, Car l is le Barracks, Pennsylvania. March 30, 1988.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Clements, Theodore S. 'The Role of the Army i n the War on Drugs.' (Unpublished USAWC M i l i t a r y Studies Program Paper, US Army War College. Car l i s le Barracks, Pennsylvania, March 28, 1988.)

Cooper, Norman G and others. 'The Pros and Cons o f M i l i t a r y Intervent ion i n to Drug Trafficking.' ( Unpublished Indus t r ia l College o f the Armed Forces - Research Report, Harch 1986.)

Dehoust, Walter F. 'The Use of Conventional M i l i t a r y Forces fo r Drug Interdiction.' (Unpublished Research Report fo r the Naval War College. Newport. Rhode Island. June 17. 1988.)

F r i e r s , T.R. 'DOD Involvement i n the ln terd ic t ion of I l legal Drugs.' (Unpublished Research Report fo r the A i r Command and Staff College. 1986.)

Gerlach. Stephen R. ' H i l l t a r y Forces and lntel l lgence In the Drug War.' (Unpublished USAWC M i l i t a r y Program Paper, US Army War College. Car l i s le Barracks, Pennsylvania. March 23, 1987.)

Har r is , W i l l i am H. Jr., HAJ. USA. 'Are Counternarcotics Operations a Viable Mission fo r U.S. Army Special Operations Forces?' (Unpublished MMAS Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fo r t Leavenworth, Kansas. 1989.)

Haselton, Mark A.. HAJ, USA. 'The Role of Special Operations Forces i n Counter-Narcotic Operations' (Unpublished MHAS Thesis. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Fo r t Leavenworth. Kansas. 1990.)

Hor r is , James A.. MAJ. USA. 'OCONUS Counternarcotic Campaign Planning.' (Unpublished Monograph. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, For t Leavenworth, Kansas, 1990.)

Mahaffey, Pat r i ck D. 'What i s the U.S. Navy's Role i n Drug Interdict ion?' (Unpublished Research Report for the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. November 10, 1 988.)

Moseley, Michael S. 'The M i l i t a r y Jo ins the War on Drugs.' (Unpublished USAWC M i l i t a r y Program Paper, USArmy War College, Car l is le Barracks. Pennsylvania, A p r i l 14, 1987.)

Mudd. Joseph F. 'Assigning DoD a Narcotics In terd ic t ion Mission.' (Unpublished individual study pro ject National War College, Washington, D.C.. February 1986)

Shur t le f f , Richard Ward, Major, USAF. 'The A i r Force Involvement i n Drug Interdiction--An Analysis.' (Unpublished individual study pro ject A i r Command and Staff College, Maxwel l A i r Force Base, Alabama, A p r i l 1986)

Smith. Matthew L.. MAJ. USA. 'The War on Drugs - - Can an Operational A r t i s t Help W in I t? ' (Unpublished Monograph, U.S. Army Commantf and General Staff College. For t Leavenworth, Kansas. 1989.)

Squier, Michael J. 'The Role of U.S. M i l i t a r y i n the 'Druy War'.' (Unpublished USAWC M i l i t a r y Program Paper, US Army War College. Car l is le Barracks, Pennsylvania, March 19. 1987.)

T r i t ch le r . W i l l i am K. 'Employment of the U.S. Armed Forces and the War on Drugs.' (Unpublished Research Report fo r the United States Mar ine Corps Command and Staff Collegc. f lay 6, 1987.)

Walker. Lynn 0. 'M i l i t a r y Use i n the Druy War." (Unpublished USAWC M i l i t a r y Program Paper, US Army War College, Car i is le Barracks, Pennsylvania, March 17. 1987.)

n~~pen t l~x i:i~,lriI .Sl~ec in iF o r c e s i:onr!)nn~l i ~ r ( l ~ r l l Z . , ! l ~ : l

iA R I L P 31-807-32 hCP Specml Forces Company, D i r e c t AC~WII page rnj

Special Forces Company Airborne Special Forces Group

TOE 31 -8Oi'LOOO

.<-.?!.-. . .

Company Commander MHJ Executive 0f f i r .er C PT OperationsiRdmin~strat iueOfficer WO Detachment NCO SGM Operations NCO MSG Communications NCO SFC Assistant Operations and Intel l igence NCO SFC Medical NCO SFC Supply NCO S F C Communicat~ons NLO S S G NBC NCO S G T

Company Headquarters (B Detachment) &$-> ...

4 ODR 1 ODR M i l i t a ry Free-Fall Qunlif ied 1 ODR Scuba Quaiifled

Commander CPT 18R00 Detachment Technician U I O 180FIO Operations NCO M S G 18250 Communications NCO SFC 18E4U Engineer NCO SFC 18C40 Medical NCO SFC 18D40 Weapons NCO SFC 18840 Rssistant Operations and Intel l igence NCO 5 F C 18F40 Communications NCO S S G 18E30 Engineer NCO S S G 18C30 Medical NCO S S G 18030 Weapons t i c0 S S G 18830

1 Chairman 1 J o i n t Chiefs (Command, Cont ro l , for D r u g Enforcement

o f S t a f f Colnnbunications. and I I . - .

I n t e ~ e n c e )-.....---. -Vic e C t ~ i k i r l n ~ n 1)i~puttl Ass t SECDEF ,1 I I J o i n t Ch ie fs

o f S t a f f ~ ( l ~ ; t e l l i q e n c e )

D i r e c t o r (I)r-u(j Enforcement P lans Defense ans Support) J 3 0per.al ions

In te l l igence VICE D ~ r e o t o r

...-Deputg 711

D i r e c t w Plans 8 Suppor t

I)eputy Asst SEC (Druq Enforcement P o l i c y )

Cr; D i r e c t o r d JC!; SP r Counte rna rcc~ i i cs

VICE Deputy Suppor t Of l i c e D i r e c t -..-..---

D I A LMO Nat iona l

DEA Ill ---.. -- ..- ... DE A

-. Offbci. o f M i l i t a r y s u y p o r t l

(CtIIF) .Joint Plans ~ r a n c l d

r 7--

C o u ~ ~ t e r n a r c o t i c s

CItICCLNT I r c t r J% D i r e c t o r -13

D i r e c t o r J 2 D i r e c t o r J%

Deputy D i r .IS

1 D i r e c t o r .J2I 1 D i r e c t o r .I3

Dep D i r Marcot ic .~.

Elranch - .J26 Dep D i r J:Z

Work ing Group J3

Counternarcot I.:,.

Counter.narcot i cs Hranch - J31 .. ....-

-- -..-.-.-.--. --

CDR J T F . 5 D i r e c t o r J 2 D i r e c t o r ,J3

(:otmter n a r c o t ICS 01-I- ICC V a t c l r - J 2 DCA I.NO

Dl:r' 1) IU

THE OPERATIONAL AREA HOVE I N A

WATERBORNE: 2 1 - 5 - 0 1

CONDUCT AREA INTELLIGENCE-COLLECTION

RECONN AISSANCE AUD SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

S E N D INFORHATIOH BY RADIO 2 1 - 5 - 0 1 1 2

THE OPERATlnNAL AREA

2 1 - 5 - 0 1 0 3

3 1 - 5 - 0 1 0 7 1 5 ) I N F I L T R A T E B Y COVERED H E A H S (U)

3 1 - 5 - 0 0 ' 1 8 IESTABLISH CONTACT WITH AN A S S E T

3 1 - 5 - 0 1 0 4

3 1 - 5 - 0 0 1 0

ACTIY ITIES (ISOLATE)

P R E S E N T BRIEFBACK

I i 2 1 - 5 - 0 0 0 4 iPREPF)RE THE ISOLRTIOH n R E R '

3 1 - 5 - 0 0 0 1 !-

5 2

1

Appendix 4 - Special Forces Miss ion Br ie fback Fo rmat (FH 31- 2 0 , Doctrine fo r Special Forces O i ~ e r a t i u r ~ s . App H , page H- 1 t h r o u g h t i - 2 )

SF n155!CN D R i E F D A t X r O R n A T

This appendix provides an outline format for an SF mission briefback. It can also be used by a group or battalion staff to prepare an init ial mission briefing. The formal provides a systematic means for presenting information concerning a specific SF mission. Although the basic outline is general, it i s flexible enough to be used for any doctrinal SF mission. The user must modify the outline by deleting those portions that do not apply.

COHnnnDCn [a. Purpose of briefing I

Ib. nission a s s tated in the OPORD i a, primary I c. Higher Commander% Intent b) Alternate Id. Detachment Commander's Intent C) Contingency !IIle. Organization of Detachment Chain of 8. Movement Plans I IComrnand and Hssigned Responsibility a ) From points of entry to contact site I if. Attachments and Detachments (If needed) I

b) From contact site to operations area. i 3. Security Plans 52 o r INTELLI6ENCE SER6ERNT lo. spec i f~cduties of contact team, bundle ,

la. oescr i~t ion of the JSOA I recovery team, and ther specialized teams. ;~ b .IPB ' i e. Training Plan I

1. Threat Evaluation 1. Tentative Dlan t o train indiaenous force. I-a) Threat identification I 2. Program o> Instruction I b ) naditions t o tne initial threa t a a t a I a1 Individual I

b) Collectivei io Determination of current order o i c) Leader [ba t t le (overlay) i f. Combat operations (only if preplanned I I 4) Disposltion, composition, and strength ! targets are included) i jof committed forces and reinforcements 1. Concept of the operation. :(identify each unit by category) ! 2. Routes t o and from the target.

e l Hostile force capabilities, intentions, / a. Securitu Plan. land activities tair, ground, uater, M a c ) 4. Rctions-at the objective toverall

f0 Hostile populace and resource concept). If a aemolition target, ?be icontrol measures aemohtion sergeant briefs; if a ra#d/ambush, I 2. Civilian population the weaoons seraeant briefs. .,I a. capabilities, vulnerabilities, intentions, 5. uithdrawal land activities of supported indigenous force. g. Link-up o r exfiltration plan I +. The effects of terrain and weather on 1. Primarylboth hiendlq and hostile forces in the J 5 0 A . I 2. Alternate ( U s e terrainbverlays as appropriate.) a. Contingency

5. Threat integration and probable course n. Demobilization Plan of hostile action. 1. PSYOP Ic. PIR and I R 2. DeceptionId. EEFI I a. OPSEC Ie. Detachment Intelligence Rctivities in the j j JSOR (Include defenswe C I Activities1 I

51 or DETACHMENT TECHHICIRH ia. Personnel status. S~OrOPERATIOHSSER6ERNT 1. Assigned strength I

a. Command and support relationships in the 2. Shortage by nos ii*Son. a. cross-trained personnel i b. concept of the operation. I b. Discipline, Law and order IIc. mules of engagement/Rules on the use of I 1. Court-martial and Article 1s jurisaiction ;IPorce lit an exception t o SOP Id. Infiltration Plan 2. Knom inaigenous force policy

1. Route /concerning discipline and la- and order 2. Point of no return (PONR) a. L e g a l s tatus of the team in the Jsoa !a. Contingency Plan (c.Dispasition of PIS in JSOA

a ) In-flight abort plan (include reca l l lo. s raves registration procedures) I I. US personnel !

b) Crash and lo r forced landing I 2. Indigenous personnel (s tate local I 1) Before PONR 'customs) ie) A f t e r POHR le. nora le ana personnel services crt other !4. Primary and a l ternate points of entry, , than SOP)

5. Contingency plan at entry points. / i . ~ e r s o n n e lrecords checx ! 6. Assembly plan. j 2. Mail handling

a) an prlmary and a l ternate points of I a. Promotions !entru- I 4. Comfort items b) Disposition of excess items <SCUBA o r i 1 5. Replocements and augmentations

:AIR ITEMS) i 6. Pay and a l lorances .f. Operational nrnd

Appendix 4 - Special Forces Mission Briefback Format (FM 31-20, 9octr ine i c r Special Forces Opuri~tions, App H )

S l or OET&C+IliENT TECHHICInN COPiWIJHICATIOHS 5ER6.EnnN_T_ --.----lg. Indigenous force strength 11 5- Security I Ih. Proccssina o f , ~ ~ .----- the indiacnous farce I I a> Site sccuritu -.. . .. I~~~ = -~ ~-~ --I 1. Oath o f alleaiance I i b> ~ransmissiog securitu i e Records to b; kept I i c ) Cryptographic equip&nt i1 a) pay I I 6. Internal detacnment communications III b3 Training c. Communications training p lan

c > Miscellaneous d. Existing communications in the JSOA I a. Identification photographs

UEDICRL SER6ERNT S t o r SUPPLY S E R 6 E m (a. Health status of detachment I

fa. Supplies and equipment Ib. Medical supplies and equipment to I 1. n i s p o s i t laccompany detachment I

litems not accompanying team I I 1. Icross-load planI Z. Special mission equipment issued to the 1 I P. Individual medical equipment and I ldetachment I lsupplies I I 3. Cross-load plan I Ic. Estimate o f the medical situation in the ! I b. Resupply plans I IJSOA I I 1. Automatic resupply I I 1. Indigenous force health I a) Schedule I I P. Preventitive mcdiciene I I b) Drop zone data/or delivery means I I a. Health hazards in the JSOA I I o Recovery plan I I +. Food and nutrition in the JSOA II n. on-call resupply I 1 5. Indigenous medical personnel and I I a ) Schedule I Ifacilities I I b3 Drop zone data/or delivery means I Id. Medical logistical plan I I C) Recavery plan I le. Medical training plan II 3. Emergency resupply and conditions for I I 1. Indigenous individual soldiers I limplementetion I I 2. Indigenous medics I 1 4. Existing logistical nets in the JSOA 1 I a. Clandestine treatment center personnel I[ 5. Indigenous 10gisticai plan I

ENGINEER SER6EANT SS or CIVIL AFFAIRS NCO la. Enclinecr eauioment and suoolies to . .

[a. politico-military implications or the mision , iaccoihpany d6tachment Ib. Status of local government in the JSOA I 1. Status of equipment IC. Status o f the snaaor resistance 1 I P. Cross-load plan lgovernment in the JSOA i ib. Estimate o f area potential to support j& Requi

le.

rements for inreragency coordination j ldemolitions and engineer requirements i:n the JSOA c. Mission planning folder (CARVER overlay) 1 IPlans to minimize civilian interference with d. CARVER Analysis of potential targets l the mission I le. muailability o f supplies in the JSOA <. Plans toprotect cultural properties in the i I f . Engineer training plan i,-. -- 1. Individual 19. Plans to develop the Auxiliary in the JSOFI 2. CollectiveIIn. Plans to aevelop Civ:l Defense 6roups in a. Leader lthe JSOA. Iii: Humanitarian and civil assistance plans. I UEAPONSSER6ERNTLJ. Military Civic action plans

la. weapons and t a c t ~ ~ & ~ m e n t to laccomoanu detachment i

5YOP OFFICER o m 1. siatu; of weapons and t a c t i ~ a l equipment;'a. Target audience I P. Basic load of ammunition i1 1. Uncommitted I a. cross-load plan ii 5L Hostile sympathizer+ b. Estimate of area potential to provide !iI a. Hostile mllitary forFes additional weapons, ammunition, and tactical iI 4. Resistance sympathizers equipment i 10. Approved themes and messages for each c. security i itaraet audience I 1. Assembly area !if not SOP1 ic. ~iaemesand messages to be avoided i P. contact areas o f not SOP) iid. Media production and dissemination means I a. Tentative base camp security plans I!availabule in the JSOA. I d. weapon5 and tactics training plan I ~h.PSYOP materiel to accompany detachment 1. IndividualI IP. Collective

j a. Leader I COMMANDER

la. CLOSIN6 STATEMENT I C~MMUNICATIONSSER6ERNT ! i.READINESS POSTURE OF DETACHHENT

la. Signal equipment and supplies to i I 2. UNRESOLVED ISSUES OR CONCERNS (IF I iaccompanu detachment I INONE. 50 STATE) i

1. siatu; o f equipment j lb. L!u&stions I( 2.. Crass-load plans I !b. Communicatians plan and procedures i I 1. Scheduled contacts i 1 S. Mandatory reports to SFOB or FOB ii a. Alternate encryption system I

4. Emergency communicallons system and i ~ r o c e d u r e s I

CONDUCT POST f l ISS lOH ACTIVIT IES

TASK NO. 21-5-012+

4

EXFILTRATE THE OPERATIONAL AREA

DENIED AREA/ 2 1- S - ~ ~ - O ~ I

LHNV: 3 1 - 5 - 0 1 2 1 Ii u a r L H a o R n E . 3 1 - ~ - - o L L ' La

IidTERDICT A TARGET EY APPROPRIATE CCHOUCT KECOYERY Of SCLEC TED OR DIRECTED ME ASS PERSOXaEL AidD EQUIPMEHT I

I N T E R D I C T I C T A TRRGETI 'COHOUCT RECOVERY OPERHTIOH~al-5-oeoa --_I 2 1 - 5 - 0 2 0 4 ,

CONFIRM O P E R X T ~ O H ~ T ~ CONFIRM OPERRT-NPLHH r--31-5-oeoe a i - 5 - r 7 ~ 0 2 J R SURVEILLANCE

21-5-0110 3 1 - 5 - 0 s IESTABLISHA SURVEILLFZGCE~~~W VBLISHZITS,- -.-- -

5-F T A B L I S H A M I S S I O N 5UPPOR.r - >ESTABL ISH A MISSIOH SUPP0n 1. 51.1 l', 31-5-0105 - _ a l - 5 - . 9 . L 0 0

L I 5 H CONTHCT WITH RH AS 31-5-01 0 2

iCONDUCT A 5 ? ~ ~ Y i -I-5-0010-

!INFILTRATE nv AIR OPERA TI^^^+^

(FM 31--20, Do,,;trll~-:: j,)r Sp(~";'i...}~ ro,c'l.~s OIJ~r.atJ\)I.~, PdY(.~ 10-B)

SAF SF

I II

I

/Tl ~ i I

MP! I I

CA 4I, II

I I

I - -L......

! lVl1 ,,

I I

=:L~ ~II 'I II I! ­II t:tJ :I II @ Ii SPT II SVC

I L __ J L -.JL __ JL __ JL __ J

I I

I I

56

--- -

AI'I'CNDIX 7 - COUNTERNARCOTICS MISSION ANAI YSlS FOR SI'ECIAI. FORCES MISSIONS ( P K ~ FROM ANALYSIS OF TIII: ARHY COIJNIERNAI~COTICSPLAN)PAREIL BY Alll l lOR

---.-------- -----..---NDCS

OINTFRDICT DRIJG INTO UNITED STATES *(:IN(:' IWi'PARE: COlJNTIIRNARCOl~ICS P1.ANS rONOCP COORDINA7-EZi IJ. S. EFFORTS r M l l ITAIIY PR0VII)IiS OPERATIONAL. SUPPORT

ONLY WI TH 0.S.I). APPROVAL *COI.l.ITC~T INTEI-LI GFNCE *IN l t-RDIO r AT TI-IE SOURCE, ENROUTC, AND

IJl!; ISRI 13U'I-ION POI N-rS *I I IA I N 1IOS'T NA-TIONS TO ENAF31.E THEM TO

I S 1-Atll.lSt1 TIIEIR OWN COUNTERDRUG

-----------. -"- -----ARMY CO1JN -- .- .- I..FRNAIKOTICS PLAN -.- - --. DOI)- -- --- --- -. -

rCOM13I NED/ IN 1-ERAGENCY EFFORT (PREMISE

NDCS.-.... (POSSES COMITATUS)

*NO AIIRESTS, SEIZURES, SEARCHES *NO MI1.I TARY USE INSIDr! U. S. BORDERS .NO OI)IXATIONAL. suPPoI>-r TO LAW

ENI-ORCEMENT AGENCIES WITHOUT O.S.D. APPIIOVAL

-AllMY COlJN~lERNARCO~l~ ..-. -.- ICS PLAN - DOD .NO (:IVII..IAN LAW ENFORCEMENT DUTIES *DO NO-T AC-T TO ENFORCE DOMESTIC LAWS .DO NO T SIJHSTITUTE U.S. IWOGRAMS/ ACT ION'

1-01?HOST NATION PRO(;RAMS/ACTIONS .AVOID CANCELLING ROTAl- IONS TO NTC mAVOll) CANCEI-LING JOIN-T TRAINING

CXI'IIC ISES mAVOIO CANCELLING COMIII NFD TRAINING

I_XITIlCISES