1 J NI VERSITY OF NATAL

I ( . hlh l .I ll*;HDE LIBRARY

DIIRBAN

I

FOlRCED REMOVAL The Division, Segregation and Control

of the People of South Africa.

ELAINE UNTERHALTER

International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa Canon Collins House, 64 Essex Road, London N 1 8LR

1987

The International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa is a humanitarian organisation which has worked consistently for peaceful and constructive solutions to the problems created by racial oppression in Southern Africa.

It sprang from Christian and humanist opposition to the evils and injustices of apartheid in South Africa. It is dedicated to the achievement of free, democratic, non-racial societies throughout Southern Africa.

The objects of the Fund are:- (i) to aid, defend and rehabilitate the victims of unjust legislation and

oppressive and arbitrary procedures, (ii) to support their families and dependents,

(iii) to keep the conscience of the world alive to the issues at stake.

In accordance with these three objects, the Fund distributes its humanitarian aid to the victims of racial injustice without any discrimination on grounds of race, colour, religious or political affiliation. The only criterion is that of genuine need.

The Fund runs a comprehensive information service on affairs in Southern Africa. This includes visual documentation. It produces a regular news bulletin 'FOCUS' on Political Repression in Southern Africa, and publishes pamphlets and books on all aspects of life in Southern Africa.

The Fund prides itself on the strict accuracy of all its information.

Contents

I

. . .-- .. a INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE AND AID FUND

This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. All rights are reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers.

b Introduction 1 All photographs are from the photo library of IDAF Research Information and I .i~crature on forced removals 1

Publications Department. I'lle scale of forced removals 3

Chapter 1 History 4 . I;oundations, 190M8 4 1

liarly National Party policy, 1948-60 10 thntustan policy, 1959-73 I(antustan 'Independence' and the restructuring of apartheid, 1973-86 ( :onclusion

:; [ 26

Chapter 2 Forced removals through the pass system 27 1 listory of the pass system 28 'l'he first phase of National Party rule 29 I'ass laws and the bantustan strategy 31 The Riekert strategy 34 Objectives of the influx-control system 43 How the pass system works 47 Some effects of influx controls 5 5 1)cfiance and resistance 5 6 Conclusion 59

Chapter 3 Urban policy and forced removals Group Area removals <:oloured Labour Preference policy The establishment of African townships The establishment of bantustan towns Squatters Conclusion

i

First published in 1987 by IDAF Publications Ltd, Chapter 4 Rural removals

Canon Collins House, 64 Essex Road, London N1 8LR. r The end of labour tenancy and eviction of farm workers ,- Betterment schemes and bantustan land policy

ISBN No. 0 904759 79 2 (Paperback), 0 904759 81 4 (Hardback) Black-spot removals and bantustan consolidation Methods of black-spot removal

Phototypeset in lOpt Plantin and (:anditions after removal

printed in England by A.G. Bishop & Sons Ltd, Orpington, Kent. Resistance by black-spot communities I

1

I

Chapter 5 Popular resistance and new state strategies 122 Maps Reformulation of urban policy 124 1. I'laces affected by forced removal mentioned in the text: Transvaal and Housing policy 124 Northern Cape vi New strategies on squatters 127 2. l'laces affected by forced removal mentioned in the text: Eastern Cape, Decentralisation policy 128 Orange Free State and Natal vii

135 ...

Khayelitsha: a focus for new strategies 3. Provinces, major towns and bantustans vlll 137

. . . Group Areas Act 4. Administration Boards and bantustans v111 Rural policy 138 5. The growth of bantustan towns: Bophuthatswana, 1970-80 45 Conclusion 139 6. Segregated residential areas: Group Areas and African townships on the

West Rand 61 7. Coloured Labour Preference Area: The Eiselen Line 69

Tables 142 8. Squatter townships around Durban, 1985 86 1. Estimated number of people forced to move by type of removal, 196G82 9. Kwandebele: the making of a bantustan 106 2. African population by sex in major towns, 193G51 10. llecentralisation strategy 131

3. Economic sectors as a percentage of national income, 191 1-2 1 I 1 . Khayelitsha and the Cape Town townships 135

1. Workers employed in manufacturing, 1910-28 5. Aid Centres' administration of the pass laws, 1971-81 Illustrations facing page 88 6. Urban African population, 195k80 7. Recruitment of workers by bantustan in two Natal Administration Board

areas, 1979-81 8. Arrests, prosecutions and convictions under the pass laws, 1955-84 9. Numbers of Africans endorsed out of the major urban areas through the

operation of influx control, 195G80 10. Families moved through Group Areas Act removals, 1950-84 11. Funds spent on building houses in bantustans, 1967-83 (in R1,000) 12. Estimated number of commuters by bantustan of origin, 1977-82 13. Employment in agriculture, 195G85 Abbreviations 14. Farmers' total expenditure on machinery and implements, 1965-80, AFRA Association for Rural Advancement

at constant 1970 value of the rand (in R1,000) 15. Capital invested per person in South African agriculture, 1948-77

ANC African National Congress

at constant 1970 prices (in rand) CAYCO Cape Youth Congress COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions CUSA Council of Unions of South Africa ECAB Eastern Cape Administration Board

APPENDIX 1 Glossary of terms associated with forced removals 148 GG Government Garage - see Appendix 1 GST General sales tax ISCOR (South African) Iron and Steel Corporation

APPENDIX 2 Chronological summary of legislation related to 151

NCAR National Committee against Removals forced removals PFP Progressive Federal Party

PWV Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging

Bibliography 156 SABRA South African Bureau of Racial Affairs

162 Newspapers, periodicals and serials SABT South African Bantu Trust-see Appendix 1

Books and articles 163 SACTU South African Congress of Trade Unions SADT South African Development Trust-see Appendix I SANT South African Native Trust-see Appendix 1

Notes and References 168 SPP Surplus People Project TBVC Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei TRAC Transvaal Rural Action Committee

Index 172 UDF United Democratic Front

vii

- lu + lu z -0 C crr

CAPE PROVINCE

Map 3: Provinces, Major Towns and Bantustans.

Map 4: Administration Boards and Bantustans.

I

I I

Introduction 1 11lrr.gral to the political repression and economic exploitation of apartheid are

~nechanisms for population control. The process of control, division and wgrcgation of the people of South Africa has come to be termed 'forced removal', because it has been achieved only by force and has involved the physical uprooting of millions of the black people of South Africa over the last forty years. The enforced divisions and controls have sometimes created class divisions, and sometimes ignored them. Forced removals have sometimes assisted capitalist development in South Africa and sometimes hindered it. This book is an attempt to show the historical dynamic of the process of forced removal and population control and the sometimes contradictory forces that have promoted and retarded the policy.

I Forced removals have brought immense hardship to the mass of South African people. The removals, which have probably affected at Least 4 million people since 1948, have left few black South Africans untouched by the harassment, domestic upheaval, confusion and poverty which are the consequences of the policy. Forced removals have taken a number of forms in

1 the different periods of apartheid. The regime has constantly attempted to distort and disguise the nature of what it is doing, claiming it is abolishing pass laws when it imposes new identity documents on all Africans as in 1952

I

and 1986, or that it is ending forced removals, when new, more arbitrary I I

forms of removal are at hand as in 1985. But the propaganda of the regime is

I contradicted by the experience of the people of South Africa. It is the harsh conditions they know as a consequence of removal, attempted division, and control, that have fuelled resistance and strengthened the organisation of opposition over the decades.

LITERATURE O N FORCED REMOVALS

Forced removals were first exposed in a number of studies in the early 1970s. They detailed the hardships suffered by the people who were moved and t he dramatic reversal in their fortunes when they were uprooted from settled communities and dumped by government trucks on barren land with only tents for shelter.' These exposees made the names of resettlement areas, like Limehill, Dimbaza and Sada, symbols of gross deprivation, the death of children, and the abandonment of people to a bleak fate of poverty and unemployment.

A second group of writings on forced removals, appearing mainly in the 1980s, sought to point out the relation between forced removals and the general trend of apartheid policy and to categorise the various types of forccd removaL2 This line of analysis focused on a typology of the forms of Sorccd removal which was to be vividly illustrated in a five-volume report o l I IIC.

2 Forced Kemovul

Surplus People Project (SPP). The report illustrated and updated the analysis with a wealth of detail, province by province The information there was condensed into one book which also looked at explanations for forced removal and its history since the beginning of colonial conquest in the mid-seventeenth ~ e n t u r y . ~ Both groups of studies succeeded in focusing public attention on the 'discarded' people and provided a mass of information on little-known communities and on the gross injustices they suffered. But neither approach could fully explain why forced removals had been carried out in general. The first approach did not go beyond the reasons for a particular community's removal, and although the second approach pre- sented forced removals as integral to apartheid policy, apartheid itself was assumed to be a self-explanatory, consistent and unchanging set of policies.

In the most recent and the most systematic inquiry into the relation between removals and apartheid the authors reject simple analyses and conclude:

Relocation/forced removal is . . . too broad an issue to be explained by single causal theories: it reaches into virtually all areas of life in apartheid South Africa . . . The massive scale of the removals and the suffering that has been imposed on millions of people have not been incidental or accidental to the system of white domination that operates in South Africa. They have been essential to it-essential to the system of control over the black population that has been entrenched under apartheid.5

This book is a development of some of the ideas of this line of writing. It attempts to analyse forced removals in the context of apartheid, but does not take apartheid itself to be a simple unchanging practice. There are distinct phases within the history of apartheid. Major political and economic changes have occurred and there have been shifts in the balance of forces supporting the maintenance of the system. Under the guise of a single policy, different policies have been developed to meet changing demands. Apparent continuities often mask the fact that the same policy is being implemented for different ends. For example, the pass laws have led to thousands of forced removals over a long period. However, the context in which the pass laws have been applied has been dramatically different and although the form of the legislation appears the same, its substance and intention has altered considerably (see Chapter 2). Throughout the book the various forms of forced removal are considered within the context of the changing political and economic nature of apartheid.

In order to provide a background to this analysis, Chapter 1 gives an overview of South Africa before 1948 and the various phases of apartheid since, attempting to summarise the key economic and political developments of each period. Subsequent chapters situate the various forms of forced removal within the phases of apartheid and attempt to assess why removals which developed in one period of apartheid were maintained in another.

Chapter 2 looks at the changing nature of the pass system and the forced

~ c ~ ~ l o v a l s effected through attempts to regulate the supply of labour to d~llbrent sectors of the economy. Chapter 3 examines the forced removals I I I ; I I have resulted from the different approaches to urban policy under ;~l>artheid, and Chapter 4 discusses forced removals in the countryside within 111c context of the land question in South Africa. Chapter 5 outlines the ~lclx~res and new strategies that have emerged in the present period. New ;ipproaches by the regime to population control in urban and rural contexts ;Ire analysed, and counterposed against the militant and organised resistance ol the period.

1, 'THE SCALE OF FORCED REMOVALS

'l'licre has been much debate about the number of people forcibly moved.6 'l 'l~c most recent and most exhaustive analysis by the SPP estimated that 3.5 million people had been moved between 1960 and 1983 (see Table I ) , and that ~learly 2 million were still under threat of removal. But these were ~~nderestimates. They did not include the large numbers of people forced to Illovc from one area to another through the operation of the pass laws, some dimension of which can be gleaned from Tables 5 and 8. The SPP total did no1 include, and there is virtually no way of knowing this, the number of people living in informal settlements around the large towns of the country,

t lorced to move not once, but many times, as their homes are destroyed by olfcials and police. Lastly the SPP figures did not encompass all people ~iioved within bantustans through the operation of schemes to restructure land use, to divide the African majority of South Africa and to build up the hantustans as separate regional political structures. It must also be stressed rhat many removals pre-date 1960 and in all the categories of removal for which the SPP compiled statistics there were huge numbers of people moved hcfore the date their quantification begins. An attempt in 1986 (by a group of researchers at Stellenbosch University) to quantify forced removals con- cluded that 4 million people had been removed between 195 1 and 1986.' This figure was arrived at on the basis of categories similar to those of the SPP study. Four million is clearly the minimum number of forced removals since 1948, and the true figure may be almost double this. In qualitative terms the social upheaval of so many millions of people moved in so short a time is i~nalogous to that of the industrial revolution in Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, or the mass migrations of people displaced ;~nd made refugees by World War 11, and subsequent conflicts in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. It is unclear if the totals include children.

The international community has rightly been outraged by instances of forced removal at Limehill, Dimbaza, Crossroads, and Mogopa, seeing them as examples of the brutal callousness of the apartheid regime. This book shows how these well-known cases are not isolated examples, but part of a continuing process of dispossession of black South Africans. Forced removals have changed the geography of the country, both physical and political- it is clear too that the experience of removal has politicised a whole generation ol South Africans.

7- -

4 Forced Removul

CHAPTER 1

History The apartheid system represents a particular form of state action to secure and maintain white domination and to further particular economic interests. But the relation between white supremacy and economic forces has not always been a simple one. The policies pursued to maintain apartheid have changed over the decades as the balance of forces sustaining political power has shifted. Given the shifting nature of the relations involved, and changing policies, it is important to discuss apartheid in distinct historical phases. The picture is sometimes confusing because some of the instruments of white domination, including forced removals, occur in different historical periods, with different functions.

The term 'forced removals' is also an elastic one. In its most general sense it can cover the whole process of dispossession which lies at the heart of the history of South Africa. Indentured labourers, slaves and migrant workers were forced, through the poverty which resulted from their loss of access to land, to leave their homes and work under the harsh conditions dictated by the development of capitalism in South Africa. Although this forced removal is the backdrop to much of the discussion that follows, the book concentrates more narrowly on certain forms of removal: these are the removals carried out to maintain some of the essential structures of apartheid: migrant labour; division and segregation of the population; and political subordination of the black majority. Given the shifting nature of apartheid, the forced removals that underpin the system also have phases.

FOUNDATIONS, 1900-48

In 1910 the period of British colonial administration of South Africa came to an end and a Union was created out of the four areas that had been under British rule: the Cape, Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. The period of British imperial expansion in South Africa in the nineteenth century had completed a process begun in the seventeenth century when the first European settlers came to the country. Initially piecemeal, but as part of a co-ordinated policy by the end of the nineteenth century, the African people had been dispossessed of their land. Many thousands were crammed together in 'reserves' set aside for them, areas which comprised what remained of the former centres of the kingdoms of the leaders who had opposed European conquest.

The late nineteenth century witnessed the establishment of large-scale mining in South Africa, at the diamond diggings of Kimberley and the gold reef of the Witwatersrand. This industry relied chiefly on black migrant labour and workers were partly forced into mining through a number of

History 5

administrative measures implemented in the 'reserves' by colonial author- ities. In the same period the slow transformation of settler farming from small to large-scale commercial enterprise began. As an alternative to African workers who could generally not be induced to work on the plantations, sugar plantation owners in Natal brought indentured workers from India, the majority of whom settled permanently in South Africa, while the fruitgrow- ers of the Cape used the labour of the landless descendants of slaves.

Under the Union government, the territorial segregation which had arisen out of the pattern of colonial conquest was sharpened and entrenched by the 1913 Land Act. This law delimited the area of the African 'reserves' termed the 'scheduled land', and amounting to approximately 9 million hectares or 7 per cent of the total land surface-and stipulated that no African could in iuture purchase or occupy land outside them. At the same time whites were barred from buying land in the scheduled areas. African sharecroppers had undertaken much of the agricultural production outside the 'reserves' in partnership with white landowners. They were evicted en masse as a result of this legislation. Share cropping usually involved a farming arrangement between white landowners (who would provide land and seed, for example) and African tenants (who did the farming). The returns were shared. Despite rhe evictions and the major dislocation this brought for peasant families, share cropping did not disappear overnight and many former sharecroppers remained on white-owned farms as labour tenants having lost their right to a share of the crop and any security of tenure.'

The significance of' the 1913 Land Act was twofold. The eviction of sharecroppers provided farmers with labour and, by halting the process of whites acquiring reserve land the act maintained the 'reserves' and the liinction they then played in subsidising migrant labour for mining capital.*

In 1910 political power was centralised in a Union government, elected by a small minority of those who lived in South Africa. Three franchise systems operated in the country at the time. Firstly in the provinces of Natal, 'l'ransvaal and the Orange Free State only white men were entitled to vote for ~neinbers of parliament. In the Cape province all men who met a property qualification had the vote. The third system operated in the 'reserves'. It ;illowed certain African men to participate in the traditional councils which Ily then had lost a large measure of their political power and ruled subject to [he jurisdiction of local magistrates. In an attempt to secure the perpetuation o i white power in parliament, during the period 1930-36 Africans were dcprived of their franchise rights in the Cape while white women, throughout r he Union, gained the vote. A Native Representative Council was established In 1936 but it had no legislative power. Thus for white South Africans the forms of a Westminster-style parliament and political structures similar to [hose in Britain were maintained, while for all black people, other than the unall number of men classified as Coloured who retained the vote in the ( :ape, there was no democracy. By this date the traditional African structures 0 1 authority had been truncated and transformed. They were filled with llcople who, whether they were hereditary rulers or appointed, wcrc :III

6 Forced licrnovul

salaried officials answerable to central government departments, liable to demotion and banishment if they opposed government policy.

While the central government of the Union distanced itself from the needs and aspirations of the black majority, municipal government was more open to pressure. In part this was because industrialisation in South Africa had resulted in significant black urban populations developing in industrial centres, creating political and economic problems for local government.

As Table 2 shows, the African urban population was not made up entirely of male migrant labourers. Towns and areas like Johannesburg, Kimberley, Cape Town, Pietermaritzburg, Durban and the East and West Rand, with industries reliant on migrant labour, show an imbalance in the proportion of men to women in this period. This was directly attributable to labour policies that concentrated on recruiting men, leaving women to maintain some form of subsistence agriculture in the 'reserves'. The other major towns of South Africa, however, had populations with a roughly equal balance of African men and women, and this profile was maintained throughout the period.

As the conditions for subsistence production in the 'reserves' deteriorated- through overcrowding, inadequate investment and capital resources, lack of access to markets and the heavy tax burdens placed on rural households- more and more Africans, both men and women, moved to the cities, where the growth of secondary industry and the service sector provided full-time waged employment. In the 'reserves' Africans were allocated land by chiefs and the Native Affairs Department had jurisdiction over the areas. In the towns, however, considerable political authority as well as an obligation to provide for the infrastructural needs of Africans, fell to the municipal authorities. Not all municipalities provided land or housing for Africans, and for much of this period all black people lived together with poorer whites in the centres of the cities. However, legislation did provide for the proclama- tion of areas for African-only townships and in many of these, freehold land was sold to African householders. For example, Africans had freehold rights in the townships of Alexandra and Sophiatown in Johannesburg, in Evaton near Vereeniging, in Fingo Village near Grahamstown, and in Edendale near Pietermaritzburg, amongst others.

White South Africans had mixed views about the growth of an urban black population depending on their interests. Some factory owners and shopkeep- ers welcomed the labour they provided and the market for commodities. White artisans, however, feared competition for their jobs. Mine-owners and other employers who relied on migrant labour viewed a permanent black urban population with trepidation- they believed it would undermine the migrant labour system and force up wages. Strong views on the need to limit the African urban population were expressed, and the Stallard Commission which investigated the matter in 1922 concluded:

The native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to m i n i ~ t e r . ~

History 7

'l'hc Stallard 'doctrine' was endorsed by legislation in 1923. The Native t llrban Areas) Act of that year stipulated that all African men living in a ~jroclaimed (urban) area, were to report their arrival in the area, register their \crvice contracts, and record any loss of job. Any African who could not find work in an urban area could be compelled to leave by police and native ~~ommissioners. This Act was the first attempt to apply throughout the ~.ountry the form of population control that came to be known as 'influx control', by regulating the urban rather than the rural African population. f Iowever, the legislation was opposed by influential sectors of white opinion. 'l'hc Act vested the local authorities with power to impose urban segregation :~nd influx control. It therefore was not immediately enforceable by central ~ovcrnment. Although Johannesburg and Bloemfontein accepted the terms 01' the Act before the end of 1924, other municipalities were slower to ompl ply: Port Elizabeth, for example, did not implement the legislation until 1937. In 1935 an investigating committee for the Native Affairs Department cluestioned a cross-section of municipalities and found the majority strongly opposed to the Stallard doctrine and the measures they had to carry out to 111;1ke it practicab1e.J

'l'he main opponents to the Stallard doctrine were spokesmen for ~l~anufacturing industry. Unlike miners, the workers they employed in \ccondary industry were not recruited by labour agents in the 'reserves' and tlld not work fixed time contracts. Industrialists needed to draw on a pool of I;~llourers already resident in the towns. They also needed an African ~w)pulation surplus to their immediate labour requirements living in the [owns, who could fill the posts of any dismissed workers, and through c-ornpetition for jobs assist in keeping down wages5 The perspective of 1111ning capital and other employers of migrant labour derived from an opposite need. Their labour policies required a reserve army of labour in the I lira1 areas, where labour agents recruited contract workers. The existence of ;I rural reserve of labour enabled them to keep wages down in their particular cx.onomic sector. The Stallard doctrine, and subsequent legislation of similar I l~ilracter in this period, represented action by the state to secure a labour 1)c)licy favourable to the mining and agricultural sectors of capital, in I~I-clcrcnce to the industrial sector.

I lowever the attempt to implement influx control along the lines suggested Iw ~ h c Stallard Commission failed. The numbers of Africans in towns ~~)I.reased throughout the first half of the century (see Table 2). The Stallard ~~~olx lsa l s were loosely enforced by municipalities and massively defied by the ;\l~-ic,an people. The defiance succeeded for economic reasons.

Iiconomic development in South Africa was confined, in the nineteenth c c.lirury, to mining and agriculture. However after World War I manufactur- 1 1 1 1 : industry developed as a significant sector of the economy (see Table 3 ) . 1'111. growth of secondary industry took place in two phases. The first resulted

I I O I I I the disruption of international trade by World War I. As European I or~ntries oriented their economies to war production a world-wide shortage 01 manufactured goods ensued, particularly household and indusrri;~l

8 Forced Removal

commodities. In South Africa this shortage stimulated local production, protected from post-war European competition by the Customs Tariff and Excise Duty Amendment Act of 1925 which enforced a range of protective tariffs against imported manufactures. An additional protection was provided by the establishment of ISCOR, the state-owned iron and steel corporation. This greatly facilitated local industrial manufacture by supplying some of its essential material^.^

The second phase of industrial growth came in the 1930s. South Africa went off the gold standard in 1931: the result was a rise in the price of gold and attendant increases in state revenue. The additional revenue was used on irrigation and subsidies to agriculture on the one hand, and on a massive expansion of the economic infrastructure on, the other. Major new work in the provision of electricity, port and railway facilities and industrial finance was undertaken. There followed a large inflow of foreign investment, in particular for enterprises in manufacturing production. There was a huge growth in the number of workers employed in manufacturing (see Table 4).

Black workers formed a majority of employees in manufacturing, although poor whites, forced off their land in the rural areas, were a significant component of the industrial working class. The development of manufactur- ing industry in the inter-war years is thus an important backdrop to the growth of a permanently settled urban African population, and an explanation for the patchy application of the Stallard doctrine. Industrial entrepreneurs needed labour in this period, and were prepared to defy the Urban Areas Act to secure it. But the process of large-scale African urbanisation was by no means welcome to all whites. Farmers and mine-owners believed their supplies of labour were under threat and many white workers believed that African factory workers, who were paid lower wages, were jeopardising white jobs. T p allay some of these fears legislation was enacted in the 1930s which led to forced removals in the countryside on the same scale as those that resulted from the 1913 Land Act.

The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act stipulated that additional land- the released areas (6.2 million hectares)-was to be added to the 'reserves' as defined in 1913 and that this total, approximately 13 per cent of the area of the country, was all the land available in South Afiica for permanent African occupation. The released areas were to be apportioned between the provinces on a quota basis, and land purchased by the state for inclusion in the released areas was to be administered by the South African Native Trust (later the South African Bantu Trust). Like the 1913 Act this piece of legislation sought to provide labour for white farmers. It contained clauses prohibiting African peasants from living on land in while areas unless they were registered squatters or labour tenants. It also gavc lirrn owners control over the registration of squatters and tenanls and gavc rhcm rhe means, through the Bantu Commissioners, of evicting Alrica~is from (heir One result of this legislation was to prevent ASricans Gom easily leaving whitc-owned farms to work in the cities. In simultaneous Icgislarion mining capital, too, gained increased access to Africa11 labour. Amendinents to the Immigration

;\(.I hrbade contract workers from outside South Africa leaving employmenl O I I the mines for other employment, and a ban on labour recruitment north of .'2 degrees latitude was lifted.

'l'he legislation of this period was contradictory in its effects. At one level it .~l)l>cared to be an attempt by the state to provide labour for white farmers : r ~ r t l mine-owners, while prejudicing the access of urban-based industrialists 10 labour s ~ p p l i e s . ~ At another level it also contributed to the creation of a 11;11ional economy: it involved the collaboration of rival sectors which saw 111cir collective interests satisfied through mechanisms that inhibited the 1:lowth of an African peasantry and forced Africans into migrant l a b ~ u r . ~ It is I lc;tr that the 1936 Land Act, by limiting African access to land did ( or~~ribute , in the long term, to African entry into wage labour, but it was not : I I I immediate consequence of the act.

'l'hc 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act placed severe limits on the ~liovement of African urban workers. The Act stipulated that workseekers I orlld only remain in an urban area for 14 days looking for work. Thereafter lllcy were to leave. The wife of a worker had to have a permit before she could settle in town. There was to be a biennial census, and if its returns \I~owed an excess of labour in the areas permission for any African to enter I llc urban areas could be rescinded. People already in the area but surplus to I llc labour requirement could be removed. The minister was given the power I O ililervene if a local authority did not carry out its duties in observing influx t o ~ ~ t r o l . The act also prohibited Africans from acquiring land from IIOII-Africans in the urban areas, and effectively prevented any further ;\lrican acquisition of freehold rights.1°

'l'his regulatory influx control legislation could have done little to provide 111c labour which urban-based industrial capital needed. During a period \vllcii the state was actively encouraging mechanisation of a kind which I ccluired more low-paid semi-skilled African labour the legislation appeared 10 Iilnit its supply.ll On the other hand it may well be that in the context of . I I I expanding manufacturing sector the 1937 Act served to direct labour to \ ~ l ~ c r e it was required. Its exclusionary and restrictive aspects can be ~lvcr-stressed, and they did not apply on the ground. Certainly, the biennial c cnsus of labour and removals of surplus workers never took place. However I l l C Van Eck Commission of 1941 pointed to the low proportion of black workers in secondary industry. The black-white ratio in industry was 2:1, t ompared with 4: 1 in farming and 8: 1 in mining. According to Van Eck this I . r~io was the primary reason for the uneconomic position of the manufactur- 111): sector, which was overburdened with highly paid white workers.12 ( :Icarly to a certain extent the interests of industrial capital were subordinated io (lie interests of mining and farming capital partly as a result of legislation : I I I J the operation of influx control contributed to the relatively small number I ) I Africans employed in industry.

1)uring World War 11, as during World War I, the lack of manufactured l:oods from Europe, stimulated an expansion of local manufactur i~l~ ~ll~lustry. The value of manufacturing output increased by 116 per cent ill I l ~ c

10 Forced K emoval

war years and the industrial labour force expanded by 53 per cent.13 The Stallard doctrine, on which influx control had been based, began to be questioned in ruling circles. The Fagan Commission, which undertook an investigation into what policy the state should adopt toward urban Africans, concluded in 1946:

In estimating labour requirements one has to remember that where there is great industrial activity, it is also necessary that there should be a substantial reserve of labour-people who are ready to step in when others fall or when there is increased activity in some industry; and there are so many industries that are constantly contracting and expanding for seasonal reasons.14

The Fagan Commission therefore rejected the Stallard doctrine with its stress on influx control and the removal of Africans from the urban areas. It argued for consolidating the position of urban Africans in the interests of securing an adequate labour force for expanding manufacturing industry. It was this conclusion that was to be subsequently challenged by the National Party.

In the period before the mid-1940s; then, there were two main forms of forced removal. Firstly there was the removal of sharecroppers and squatters from white-owned land through the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts respectively. Secondly there was the introduction of influx control and the attempt to prevent the growth of large urban African communities and limit the numbers of Africans legally allowed to work in towns. Both measures served to support the interests of agriculture and mining capital, but because of external factors such as patterns of international trade and state investment, they did not seriously limit the expansion of secondary industry. However, the accelerated development of manufacturing industry during the 1940s posed questions about the validity of the forced removals policy of the period. These questions in themselves partly elicited new policies which for decades embodied doctrines quite at odds with the views of those, like Fagan, who had sought to reformulate policy to enhance industrial capital's expansion.

EARLY NATIONAL PARTY POLICY, 1948-60

The National Party came to power in the election of 1948, after a period of crisis in all sectors of the South African economy which had had a detrimental effect on the white working class. The 1940s had seen the beginnings of black mass mobilisation against discrimination and segregation. By 1945 a significant proportion of Africans working in mining, commerce and industry were unionised and their unions used strikes as weapons in the fight for minimum wages and for an end to migrant labour. The largest strike occurred in 1946 when 700,000 mineworkers went on strike over wages. Shortages of housing and transport for Africans contributed to mass defiance of restrictive regulations in the form of squatter movements and bus boycotts. The African National Congress and the Indian Congresses of the Transvaal and Natal were building mass-based organisations with precise

r History I 1

. I b I I 1 . 1 I l ( l s l lor political participation in a common legislature. , \ , ' . I I 1 1 ~ ~ 1 I l~ is backdrop of heightened opposition can be set the problems of

1 1 1 , 1 1 1 ( ( . I ( V I I economic sectors. Mining was losing labour to manufacturing I I I , I I I . I I v Workers could no longer rely on declining rural incomes in the

1 t I \ I . \ ' ro supplement their wage and the mine owners were unwilling to I s I \ I I \ I I I X wages. White farmers found that the sections of the 1936 Land Act , I , . I , . I I ( . I ~ 1 0 LOrce squatters into wage labour on white-owned farms were not

111): ( .~~lorced. The state did not wish for repeats of the uprisings in the I ; < ) I I I I ( . I I I 'l'ransvaal in 1941 when this had been attempted: there had been 1 1 1 . 1 :. ~lcli;lnce, a march of 10,000 people on the courts, and protracted I , I ~ I . I I I O I I li)r four years.ls With no binding labour contracts farm workers \ I I I I . I(.;~ving the land for better-paid jobs in industry. The Smuts government !I . I . . 1111wil1ing to apply the influx control machinery to prevent this, believing I 1 1 . 1 1 .~g~.iculture should be restructured with fewer, more efficient farms, and I 1 1 . 1 1 I;~I>our should be diverted to industry. Manufacturing industry benefited I I I , 1 1 1 I Ilc plentiful supplies of labour it attracted from mining and agriculture. \\ 1 1 1 1 \rate support industrial development took place on the basis of a policy

1 1 1 ,5~~l>stituting low-paid African labourers minding machines in place of ~ll~~~~c.c.hanised production. The National Party drew the support it required 1 0 will the election of 1948 mainly from white farmers and the white working e I . [ \ \ . They had deserted, respectively, the United Party and the Labour I ' . I I IV-their traditional political parties which had failed to secure the

t o~~(lit ions for the advancement of their supporters.16 I'hc new government had two major aims. Firstly, it intended to suppress

I IN. mobilisation of black opposition that was placing white political power at I I + . Secondly, they proposed to meet the demands of white farmers and wllitc workers for an effective administration of influx control that would

event Africans leaving the countryside to settle permanently in the city and 111ldcrmine the jobs of white workers: In 1948 the National Party adopted a \lr.atcgy reversing the trends marking the last years of the previous government. According to the new policy migrant labour was to be used for \ccondary industry as well as mining. Industry's needs for a labour force were lo be met without establishing a permanent African urban community. The presence of Africans in urban areas was to be regarded as temporary: their \ratus that of foreigners who could have neither a political role nor equal \()cia1 and other rights with whites.17

The second limb of the National Party's policy in this period was the repression of opposition by armed force and legislation aimed at strangling I he emergence of a unified opposition based on the principles of national liberation and trade union organisation. The attempt to undermine black opposition was partly assisted by the destruction of old-established black urban communities, on which some of the networks of resistance were based (see below).

Three forms of removal were envisaged by the legislative programme of the 1950s. First there were removals and attempted removals from the urban areas, through influx control, of a reserve army of labour that comprised malt

12 Forced K emoval

unemployed workers and some women. Influx control was intended both to prevent farm labour leaving the rural areas and to provide white farmers with a pool of workers who had been removed from the cities. The second form of removal resulted from the destruction of the mixed inner city communities and the establishment of segregated townships, partly as a measure to inhibit the growth of a national liberation movement that crossed the lines drawn by apartheid. The third form of removal forced peasants out of subsistence production as squatters on white-owned farms into agricultural wage labour, the only form of livelihood open to them once they had been forced off the land. Each type of removal satisfied the demands of a section of National Party supporters at the time and together the removals contributed to the fulfilment of the early projects of apartheid.

The whole system of influx control was rationalised in 1952 by the nation-wide introduction of 'reference books', which replaced the array of passes that Africans had previously been required to carry. Africans who were not in possession of a reference book could not be legally employed. Pension payments, housing and schooling, as well as the ability to move around the streets of a town, all became dependent on having a reference book with the correct stamp in it. Under the new measures passes were issued to African women for the first time- however the resistance was so fierce that it was only at the end of the decade, after savage repression, that passes for women could be said to be operative. The influx control measures of the pre-1948 period were strengthened to limit the number of Africans in cities. An amendment in 1952 to the 1945 Urban Areas Act introduced the 'Section 10' clause. This specified that only certain Africans had the right to remain in urban areas: people classified as Section 10(l)(a), that is those who were born there and had lived there continuously; those classified as Section 10(l)(b) who had worked continuously for one employer for ten years or had lived lawfully and continuously in the area for fifteen years; dependants of people in both these categories, classified as Section 10(l)(c); and other workers who had permission, usually through short term labour contracts, to be in the area for their jobs-they were classified as Section 10(l)(d). All other Africans could not stay legally in the urban areas for more than 72 hours.

The second form of removal in this period intensified the process of segregating the urban population. It was carried out mainly through the application of the Group Areas Act of 1950. This was not the first piece of legislation that had attempted residential segregation, but it was the most systematically applied. Africans in urban areas had been segregated from the rest of the population under the terms of the Urban Areas Act of 1923, and Indian occupation of land had been limited by legislation in the 1940s. These measures were extended by the the Group Areas Act. It gave the government control over all property transactions between the groups into which it divided the population and control over the occupation of land, thus ensuring its complete power to decree where the different groups could live. ls A group area was proclaimed for the ownership and occupation of a particular 'population group'. After the proclamation had been made, property owners

, ,I I . I I I I ( - I c.111 group would continue to own property for the rest of their lives, 1 I I , ) I I 1 1 l riot occupy it. On their death their heirs had one year to dispose of I 1 8 , I . f i r 1 1 l r c ~ a buyer of the appropriate group for the Group Area.

' , I 1 1 , . Ijower in this area was extended in 1955 with the Bantu (Urban \ I 1 . I . . ;I~ncndment Act which enabled the government to abolish African

r 1 a a 1 1 , , l ( l rights to their property. The legislation enabling this form of 1 1 1 1 1 1 \ , : 1 1 1 0 take place was designed both to concentrate the areas where black .! 1 1 1 I 1 . 1 \ lived, and to insulate these areas geographically and politically from :I 1 1 I I ( . ' South Africa. Urban segregation, however, was not achieved simply.

I I I L ~ I . I I I ~~r.opcrty owners used the courts in long drawn out battles to delay I 1 1 , 1 1 I c.~~lc)val under the Group Areas Act. Some African freeholders also took 1 1 1:.1l .l{.lion. The Johannesburg City Council refused to cooperate in moving . \ 1 I I ( ,111s Irom freehold land in Sophiatown, Martindale, Newclare and I'.~~:(.\,ic.w to the new township of Soweto. The central government responded I ) \ ~-ll;~cting new legislation, the Bantu Resettlement Act of 1954, to force 1 1 I, . I I ; I ~ I thorities to carry out these removals.

l I I C third form of removal in the 1950s was the expulsion of peasant I~o~~\ ( . l~o lds from white-owned farm land. In 1954 an amendment to the : \ I : I I I V L ' 'l'rust and Land Act obiiged white farmers to register all households I t . 1 1 1 lng land from them. Under the amendment all those who had rented land . I ~ I ( . I - 1936 were deemed illegal occupants under threat of eviction. The I I Illoval of all safeguards to the position of these households meant that they ( ~ l ~ l t l he forced into arrangements of labour tenancy or wage labour with ~ ; I I I I I C ~ . ~ . Controls over labour tenancy were also tightened. In 1956 legislation I,~ovidcd for the registration of all labour tenant contracts and prohibited 1 . 1 1 Incrs from taking on any more rent-paying tenants. From 1954 Chapter IV

0 1 111c 1936 Land Act was implemented. It specified that no African could , A . I I I ~ on white-owned farm land unless he or she was a farm worker, a I (.gistcred labour tenant or a dependant of workers in these two categories. 1 Il~lawful residence entailed removal and imprisonment and farmers who did 1101 rcmove the surplus population on their farms were guilty of an offence.

'l'he 'betterment' policies of this period can also be seen in the context of I l ~ c overall government concern to make more labour available to farmers. I'llc schemes involved the demarcation of areas in the 'reserves' of ~csidential, agricultural and grazing land for each community. People were 111oved from their homesteads into the residential areas, many losing their 1-1ght to land in the process. Although the original idea behind betterment ~~chemes was the creation of a class of competitive commercial farmers, in its ~~nplementation there was never enough land available to fulfil this aim and the policy came increasingly to be used as a form of political control.19 I'casants in the bantustans who lost land through betterment schemes formed a pool of labour from which white farmers in adjacent areas could recruit workers.

The 1950s saw a drive towards mechanisation in agriculture. It was not initially accompanied by a decrease in the demand for labour, but rather thc reverse. Much mechanisation amounted to capital substitution rathcr th;tn

14 Forced Rt~rnovul

labour saving.1° Farmers continued to complain of labour shortages. Given the extremely low wages they paid they had to rely on influx control to prevent potential labourers going to the urban areas, and on the dispossession of squatters and greater exploitation of labour tenants for cheap labour power.

In mining, new gold fields were established in the Orange Free State and the far West Rand. The new mines were more mechanised than the older workings and the mining companies' needs for semi-skilled African workers were enormous. The length of labour contracts was extended and in-service training was provided for unskilled workers. The Chamber of Mines continued to depend on a migrant labour force, and the peasants displaced through betterment schemes in the bantustans provided them with new sources of workers. Their success in securing adequate supplies of labour saw an expansion of gold mining production: between 195 1 and 1961 gold output increased by 99 per cent from 358,202 kg to 713,562 kg.ll

Industrial developmcnt in this period was more complex. While manufac- turing contributed 20 per cent to gross domestic product most manufacturing was in the hands of small concerns employing a handful of workers in labour intensive processes. Import controls protected them from foreign competi- tion and ensured that they supplied the major part of the domestic market with food, textiles and paper. At the beginning of the decade there was no domestic mechanised capital goods sector. Mining companies opened the way for investment in this area to provide for their own needs.12

At one level the removals policy of the 1950s benefited mining and agriculture at the expense of industry. However, the controls imposed by the

*

pass laws were an attempt to ensure that a large proportion of industrial workers remained as migrants on fixed term contracts. At the same time white workers in skilled artisan positions were protected from the competi- tion of skilled black workers. Influx control enabled small entrepreneurs to pay low wages to Africans without jeopardising their access to labour, although the more mechanised industrial sector encountered problems as semi-skilled African workers with permanent urban residence rights were in short supply. The structures of apartheid buttressed by the removals policy of this period were entrenched as the National Party consolidated its parliamentary strength in the election of 1953. It was clear that the white working class and many white farmers continued to view it as the party that best served their interests.

The second period of removals policy saw state intervention to provide the conditions of cheap labour for mining, agriculture and industry. The principal spheres of action were influx control and land dispossession albeit with some opposition from local government and the judiciary. Through residential segregation attempts had been made to control the urban working class politically and to make this working class available for industrial employment. The range of informal sector activities that had kept some black people out of the labour market was considerably undermined as old communities were destroyed. However, the attempt to carry out the various

lorms of the removals policy generated countrywide resistance. The llnposition of passes on women, the destruction of urban residential areas, ,ind the forced betterment schemes all fuelled mass defiance that was given coherence through the demands of the organisations of the Congress Alliance: the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, I he South African Coloured People's Congress, the South African Congress 01 Democrats, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions. Because of 1)opular opposition much of the removals policy could not be implemented.

Despite the boom in mining and agriculture, industrial production showed . I relative decline from its position in the 1940s. The next phase of apartheid was marked by an attempt to repress decisively all opposition to white \upremacy and to ensure continued profitable expansion in every economic \cctor.

BANTUSTAN POLICY, 1959-73

l'his phase of apartheid begins with the introduction of a range of repressive Ic~islation which went far beyond that of the 1950s. The new laws were used I I I ;I sustained attempt to crush the political opposition that had grown up in tllc previous decade. The shootings at Sharpeville in March 1960 and the \r~hsequent State of Emergency heralded a new form of the coercive state. 'I'housands of people were detained without trial, the main mass political 01-ganisations opposed to apartheid were banned, meetings were outlawed ; I I I ~ individuals were silenced through banning orders.-At the same time the Ix~ntustan programme was enforced, providing an additional mechanism for control and an ideological justification for apartheid, euphemistically termed 'separate development'.

This period saw two major forms of removal. On the one hand the t.\tablishment of bantustans entailed a further division of South Africa and a tlivision of the population into separate groups. Africans owning land that fell o r~~s ide the bantustans came under threat of removal. However, the large \tale removals of this period were mainly the result of economic boom. The 1060s witnessed a huge expansion in manufacturing and agriculture, largely tllc result of mechanisation and rises in productivity. Both sectors were I rtnded significantly by foreign investors, who took advantage of the political ,\~;tbility imposed by repression. Mechanisation aroused fears among whites ;~hout the size of the labour force in these two sectors of the economy, as the I~oom produced what was deemed a surplus population, particularly in .~gr.iculture. From the mid-1960s legislation was implemented to control this ~)opulation, frequently through removals. The bantustans, initially estab- lished as a form of political control, became crucial as areas where removed 1,cople were sent. A key aspect of National Party strategy became the attempt to reverse the flow of Africans to the urban areas, and to establish the Ivrntustans as the major African population centres.

The bantustan programme was initiated in 1959 with the Promotion 01. I h t u Self-Government Act. rt ttdrew oii the earlier colonial systcm 01'

1 6 Forced Kemovul

government through chiefs which had been resurrected in the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act. This act had placed local government in the 'reserves' in the hands of chiefs, village headmen and councillors, all of whom were salaried officials, accountable to the Bantu Affairs Department. These local officials were in charge of the maintenance of roads, schools, law and order, pension and welfare applications and land allocation. The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 incorporated these features of 'reserve' administration and devolved greater executive powers to eight regional bantustan administrations (the number was later to be increased to ten). Simultaneously the parliamentary representation of Africans through white representatives, introduced in 1936, was abolished. The rationale for the final act of political segregation was expressed by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development at the time, who stated that if the principle of African parliamentary representation was retained:

. . . then the Bantu would have to accept this parliament as his parliament, and he would then become involved in a struggle in which he would demand representation in this house on at least the same basis as the white man. That is the trouble which awaits South Africa . . .z3

The struggle for African parliamentary representation and full political participation had in fact been taking place throughout the 1950s. The government's response in the 1959 legislation was to reject the demands for full political rights, abolish the small representation that still existed, and institute the bantustans, where it was intended that all African political aspirations would be channelled and contained. Throughout the decade the various bantustan administrations were given greater executive powers and ushered through the stages of being bantu authorities, territorial authorities and legislative assemblies. However, ultimate direction and control, as well as finance, continued to be provided by Pretoria. For example a Venda Territorial Authority was created in the Transvaal in 1962. In 1969 this body was given executive powers with control over various aspects of internal administration of the geographical area designated Venda, and in 1973 Venda was decreed self governing with a legislative assembly of 18 elected members and 42 appointed chiefs. In 1979 Venda was declared 'independent' and joined the Transkei, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana as bantustans which had accepted this status. All the bantustans, whether 'independent' or not, are now designated 'national states'.

The demarcation of the larid for each bantustan was begun in 1959 and plans were mooted for consolidation 0 1 their widely scattered areas. Many of the areas of freehold land held by Africans throughout (he Republic since 1913 came under threat when they lay in arcas design;~tcd as part of 'white' South Africa. They were termed 'black spots'. A long-term plan for the eradication of black spots in pursuit of bantustan consolidation was drawn up. In some areas of Natal, particularly in the Dundee-Ilannhauser area, and also in the Eastern Cape, peopIe began to be forcibly moved from black spots,

1 History 17

I I I . . I I . I I I ~ to land owned by the South African Native Trust (SANT, later the ' , t 11 1 1 l r African Development Trust (SADT)), designated for inclusion in a I~.~l l I~~xtan.

I llcxc removals were first brought to world attention in Cosmas I ) ( . \~~lond 's account The Discarded People.24 Reasonably affluent peasant 1 . 1 1 lllcrs, who were moved, suddenly experienced a terrible transformation I I I I ( ) iandless, stockless communities on the margins of society. Their ~~ l l .~ r ion did not improve with time, as Desmond discovered when he

I ( I 11l.11ed a decade later to one of the resettlement camDs he had written about . I I I .1lnehi11.25 As plans for bantustan consolidation were further elaborated I 1 1 c . 1 c were continued removals from black spots and areas considered 'badly , . I I 11.11cd' for African occupation. But these removals were piecemeal, as final I ~ . l ~ ~ ~ r ~ s t a n land settlements awaited bantustan 'independence'. The black- . . ~ I ( I I ~.cmovals were facilitated by the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1973, a I I I ~ . ( L. o i enabling legislation which allowed removals from black spots to take 1 1 1 . 1 ( L. without the period of consultation stipulated in earlier legislation. The I I ~ . L ~ law also provided mechanisms for removal in the face of local t llq~)sition.26

1 ' 1 1 ~ bantustan policy was being imposed at a time when the state faced the I I I ( 15r iar-reaching challenge yet to its apartheid policies. Mass political ~llolulisation of the black population made much legislation unworkable, 1 b . 1 1 ~icularly influx control. Many urban areas and some rural districts in 1'1~11doland. Zululand and the Bafurutse area of the Transvaal were virtuallv I I I governa able. In urban areas there were widespread protests at the extension

( 1 1 Ixlsses to women and the issuing of reference books. In rural areas similar 111 orests were coupled with uprisings against imposed bantustan authorities, rll(. removal of black spots, and restrictions on cattle ownership. The I1.111rustan policy was part of an attempt to suppress this opposition, linked to I I I C repressive legislation of the period. The bantustan strategy enabled the * \ I : I I C to increase long-term political control in the 'reserves' through the ~lcwly established organs of bantustan rule. When appointed, the bantustan Ic.;l~icrs were given promises of self-rule and ultimate independence, in .~tldition to preferential access for their supporters to highly paid bureaucratic jtllls. There were manifold opportunities to acquire personal wealth through I IIL. economic opportunities offered in Pretoria's plans for the development of I llc bantustans. South Africa's rulers believed that once bantustan leaders I I ; ~ been co-o~ted thev would be able to act as a more effective brake on African political aspirations than any show of white armed force.

If the bantustan strategy was initially political in its formulation, its \ubsequent evolution was primarily affected by economic develop~nents in lie 1960s. Hard on the heels of the repression of the black political ~~lovernents in 1959-64 there followed an industrial boom. Between 1957 and 1962 gross domestic product at current prices increased by 5.2 per cent, while between 1963 and 1968 GDP increase nearly doubled, at 9.3 per cent.2; 'l'he boom was primarily evident in the manufacturing and construction :,ectors. Over the period 1960-70 the manufacturing sector increased lrs

18 Forced Removal

workforce by 63 per cent, drawing some of its new workers away from employment on the mines and the farms. However, the boom was primarily capital-intensive and increases in productivity were largely the result of considerable investment by the manufacturing sector in capital equipment.28 Between 1965 and 1975 the ratio of capital stock per worker increased by 5 per cent per annum, representing one of the highest rates in the capitalist world.29 While the expansion in the manufacturing sector led to an increase in black employment the government wished to direct and control labour supplies. It was concerned that the growing black working class should not form a permanent urban population, which might challenge white political supremacy and could pose a threat to the state in a period of economic recession and high unemployment.

Dr Verwoerd, the prime minister, stated in 1965:

With mechanisation and automation it was expected that by 1978 a decreasing number of Bantu would be required in the industries situated in and around white urban areas. If the number of Bantu in White areas continued to increase in the meantime it is not in conflict with the National Party's ultimate goal of turning the flow back to the Bantu homelands.30

Such confident statements, however, obscured an inability to achieve their aims. National Party attempts to work against the urbanisation of the black population were greatly frustrated by the economic growth of the 1 9 6 0 ~ . ~ l

The new approach to influx control centred on the bantustans. The strategy was both to remove unemployed people from the urban areas and to prevent a mass uncontrolled migration of workers from the bantustans to the boom areas.

At the urban end new regulations extended control over the movement of African women, whose presence was deemed to perpetuate the African population that was to be limited. In the words of F S Steyn, MP for Kempton Park: 'We do not want the Bantu women here simply as an adjunct to the procreative capacity of the Bantu population.'32 Act 42 of 1964 repealed the section of the 1945 Urban Areas Act which had given wives and children automatic rights to live with men who qualified as urban residents under Section 10-in order to remain they now had to prove that their original entry into the urban areas had been lawful. The same legislation stipulated that a woman, even though a Section 10 qualifier, could be endorsed out of the urban areas if she was unemployed. In future all women were to be refused entry into the urban areas unless they qualified for Section 10 rights independently of their husbands.33

Other aspects of urban control were tightened. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964 widened the definition of people who were 'idle and undesirable' and thus liable to be 'endorsed' out of the urban area. Under Section 29 of the 1945 Urban Areas Act people believed to be idle and undesirable could be arrested without warrant. They were required to give a 'satisfactory account' of themselves, and if they failed to do so a Bantu Affairs

History 19

Commissioner could impose various forms of detention including two years labour in a farm colony. People convicted of being 'idle and undesirable' forfeited Section 10 rights and any claim they might have had to accommodation in the townships. In the words of Mr Justice Didcott in 1979:

Once you are officially 'idle', all sorts of things can be done to you. Your removal to a host of places, and your detention in a variety of institutions can be ordered. You can be banned forever from returning to the area where you were found, or from going anywhere else for that matter, although you may have lived there all your life. Whatever right to remain outside a special 'Bantu' area you gained by birth, lawful residence or erstwhile employ- ment is automatically lost.34

In 1971 the Bantu Affairs Administration Act removed responsibility for the operation of influx control and other municipal functions from the white local authorities. Twenty two Administration Boards (consolidated into 14 boards in 1971 and renamed Development Boards in 1984) were created to oversee influx control and all local administration in African townships outside the bantustans. The Administration Boards were directly responsible to the Department of Bantu Affairs, and the space for individual municipalities to act with some leniency towards African urban dwellers was removed. The Administration Boards, which operated in conjunction with bantustan representatives, had the power to fence African residential areas, set rent and service charges, erect housing and hostels, determine who might live in an area, and resettle inhabitants elsewhere.35 The 1971 legislation, according to a subsequent government commission, was 'designed to bring about a more effective and uniform administration over larger areas and to achieve a greater mobility in Black labour'.36 The Administration Boards were designed to increase the mobility of 'necessary' labour within their area and of what was deemed 'unnecessary' labour out of their area.

The bantustans became crucial as the catchment areas for people 'endorsed out' of the cities. The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (later the National States Citizenship Act) of 1970 decreed that each African was the citizen of a Oantustan, whether or not he or she lived in that bantustan. Once a bantustan I~ccame 'independent' those whom the government deemed to be its 'citizens' lost all right to South African citizenship. This provided the legal framework lor a much harsher practice of influx control. In terms of the Admission of I'crsons to the Republic Regulation Act of 1972 all non-South African

L ~rizens, such as people deemed 'citizens' of 'independent' bantustans, if round to be illegally resident in a city would be subject of summary 'Llcportation' or imprisonment for six months without option of a

'fhe rural end of influx control hinged on the bantustans. The political >11'1tcgy for the bantustans had included an economic component, as the ~lolicy makers in the early 1960s believed the bantustans could only be ~lolitically viable if they included areas of economic development in or near

20 Forced Removal

which people might find work. In 1960 a Border Area Development Programme was inaugurated, designed to encourage industrialists to establish plants adjacent to bantustans. New industrial estates at Rosslyn and Hammanskraal in the Transvaal were developed, but throughout the decade there was very little growth in the border areas. Few industrialists availed themselves of the concessions for establishing plants in these areas. They considered the advantages of low wage rates and tax deductions could not compensate for the lack of infrastructure and the distances from major markets. Despite the projections of government planners the development of border industries did not prevent the migration of workers to the cities.

The failure of the economic 'development' in the bantustans to reverse labour migration led the regime to adopt a coercive strategy in the bantustans in which influx control played a central part. In 1968 a proclamation entitled Bantu Labour Regulations (Bantu Areas) transferred the locus of operation of the pass laws to Tribal Labour Bureaux established in the bantustans. All African males over 15 who were resident in the bantustans had to register with such a bureau before they could be recruited for work in the cities. At registration workers were classified for a particular category of work. No man could leave his area to look for work without the permission of the labour bureau. To do so remained an offence until the repeal of this legislation in 1986. Labour recruited through these labour bureaux was mainly fixed term contract labour. Men taking this route to wage employment were to find it impossible to acquire Section 10 rights, or to change their jobs. Indeed the Bantu Labour Regulations (Bantu Areas) Act expressly forbade this, stipulating that it was illegal to leave a bantustan for work without a registered contract, and that no contract could run for more than a year. No women were permitted to register with a Tribal Labour Bureau.38

Up until 1986 it was illegal, without the rarely given permission of the Director of Black Labour, for women from bantustans to enter into a contract of employment to work in a 'prescribed area'. A woman from the bantustans (who was deemed a perpetual minor in terms of the law) could work with the consent of her 'guardian', but not in the higher wage sectors of the industrial areas. She was confined to low wage work in bantustan-based industries, resettlement areas or farms.3y

The repressive labour legislation of the 1960s failed to put a further limit on the urban African population or to prevent large numbers of bantustan residents moving to the cities. The controls were constantly undermined by the poverty of the bantustans and the boom conditions in the cities. In addition better health facilities and nutrition in urban areas led to considerable growth in the urban population as infant and maternal mortality declined, and life expectancy for all age groups increased. Thousands of people risked arrest to seek work in the cities, and such was the demand for labour in this period of expansion that employers tended to overlook passbook irregularities or would personally intervene with officials to secure the requisite endorsements.

Increased mechanisation in manufacture was followed later in the decade

I History 2 I

I)y increased mechanisation in agriculture. Harvesting, in particular, saw the ~~rlroduction of new machines which drastically reduced farmers' needs for a 1.1r.g~ pool of labour. The size of individual farms increased through .l~nalgamation of smaller farms. Large farms could meet the cost of ~lrcchanisation and reduce their dependence on large numbers of farm ivorkers. The farmers who in the 1940s and 1950s had been desperate for ,.(.ciningly unlimited supplies of unskilled labour now changed their (lc~nands. They no longer required a large residential black labour force. I'llcy considered that labour tenancy tied them to a backward economic ,\\,srcrn, and meant that they subsidised African peasant production. The I 1 1 dominant view was that labour tenancy could not continue if agriculture \ v : ~ h to be 'modernised'. The Minister of Agriculture summed up these views 1 1 1 I974 saying that success in rationalising farm labour through increased ~l~ccllanisation and higher productivity

will be determined by how much hired farm labour can be decreased. Following this should be an unloading off the white platteland, not only of Bantu farm labourers, but also of the much larger and continually increasing number of Bantu who live on white farms without contributing anything to agricultural productivity .40

I,.~l.mers, a key element in the National Party constituency, had no difficulty 1 1 1 wcuring the legislation they needed to bring about an end to labour 1 1 1l:lncy. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964 enabled the minister to 1~111hibit labour tenancy within any area. Throughout the decade proclama- I I O I I \ outlawed labour tenancy in each region. Farmers and Department of I ! . I I I I U Administration officials evicted large numbers of families, many of 11 110111 were removed to rural slums, called 'closer settlements', on SADT I . I I I ( I within the bantustans. In 1970 a blanket ban was placed on any further 1 . 1 I ) ( )llr tenant contracts being established anywhere in the country, although 1 1 1 ,>olne regions labour tenancy did continue illegally. In this period white 1 1 1 Illcrs also called for the abolition of black spots, some of which comprised 1 i t (.llcnt agricultural land. With increasing mechanisation, white farmers no I 1 1llr:cr needed the areas to function as pools of additional farm labour and 1 1 1 , \ wanted the land to be available to them on the open market.41

I I I C conditions of the evicted tenants were appalling. They were housed in 1ll.ll~c.ahi~t buildings in barren parts of the bantustans, with no access to

I I I I ( . , a lack of clean water, and scant chance of finding work. But from the I '1 1 1 I I I 01' view of the bantustan authorities the evicted tenants in resettlement

I I I I I ) \ provided an expanded constituency from whom rent, tax and other , 1 1 1 1 . could be raised.

I II(. bantustans were a key element in the removals of this period. They r ~ l ~ ~ \ l(1c.d not only the space where people removed through black spot

I I .I l\acssion, farm evictions and influx control were located, but also the I ~ . ~ ~ I I I I C ~ to control these 'surplus people'. A general circular by the

,, I t-1:ll.y of the Bantu Affairs Department specified in 1967 that bantustans

22 Forced Removul

were to provide four types of settlement for people who had been forcibly removed: (1) Self-contained towns to rehouse inhabitants of 'deproclaimed' muni-

cipal townships, and to provide accommodation for workers in border industries.

(2) Towns deeper in bantustans established mainly for the families of migrant workers.

(3) Residential areas with rudimentary layout where people must build their own houses, for evicted tenants on farms and black spots.

(4) Areas of 'controlled squatting' with no facilities provided on Trust Land for evicted tenants and black spot residents.42

The bantustans were clearly envisaged as the place where people no longer needed by employers in agriculture or industry would be settled to form a labour pool of men and women with no option but to work on the most exploited terms when required. M C Botha, Minister of Bantu Affairs, said in 1969 that the resettlement areas were not meant to be areas of employment, but areas from which migrant workers could be drawn.43

The boom of the 1960s had a number of structural economic weaknesses. Industry and agriculture had relied heavily on increased mechanisation to increase producti;ity and profits. This required capital goods which were largely imported, amounting to 45 per cent of all imports in 1973.44 The increase in demand for imports was not matched by an increase in exports and a substantial balance-of-payments deficit built up. It amounted to R48 million in 1964 and R1,003 million in 1971.j5 The state, alarmed at the deficit, began to put a brake on industrial expansion. This policy, combined with the world recession which began in 1974, kept the South African economy in a depressed condition throughout the 1970s, despite the rises in the price of gold. These were anyway largely neutralised by the steep rises in the price of oil, which hit South Africa particularly because of its lack of a domestic oil supply and the embargo imposed by some of the maior oil suppliers.

The economic depression coincided with, and contributed to, renewed black militancy. In the early 1970s economic crisis and political challenge forced the apartheid regime and its supporters to a re-evaluate the strategy of the 1960s.

BANTUSTAN 'INDEPENDENCE' AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF APARTHEID, 1973-86

In 1973 textile and metal workers in Durban came out on strike for higher wages, precipitating a wave of industrial action throughout the country. They were reacting to steep increases in the price of food, clothing and transport which far outstripped wage rises.46 This new expression of black workers' militancy was followed in 1976 by a country-wide uprising against apartheid, sparked off by the events of June 1976 when armed police attacked schoolchildren in Soweto who were demonstrating against the apartheid

I Histoty 23

< I I C . ; I ~ ion system. Throughout the country for more than a year there were , I,.llronstrations, attacks on government buildings, strikes, school boycotts, . I I I ( I sustained protest.47 The uprising was the most serious threat the ,sl,vcr-nment had faced since the early 1960s. It exposed some of the economic \\(,;~kncsses of apartheid and forced a political realignment in an attempt to ~ ~ - . ~ ~ - ~ l c t u r e apartheid and salvage the basis of white supremacy and of the , i I 111omic system.

I'llc economic crisis of the early 1970s had three major aspects: a growing I I.II:IIIC~-of-payments deficit with a shortfall in investment capital; shortage of . I I l lcci workers to further the rate of mechanisation; and growing unemploy-

I I I ( . I I I . Hecause the manufacturing sector had concentrated chiefly on , t~~l\lrlner goods, to the virtual exclusion of capital goods, it was heavily 8 1 1 - 1 5~.11dent on foreign-exchange earnings from the export of primary products I I I I rllc import of equipment and technology needed for continued I I I , . ~ 11;lnisation and expansion. However, the market for South African

1 1 . 1 I ( 11ltura1 products was an extremely competitive one. Furthermore, the I I I I , 111:11ions in the price of gold that followed the breakdown in 1971 of the I ! I , . I I O I I Woods system of a fixed international price for gold meant that 1 1 1 1 I . I K I I exchange could no longer be guaranteed to the South African , I 11 I ( ,my. Manufacturing suffered a number of crises with severe shortfalls of I I I \ I . \ I I mcnt capital. The volume of manufacturing output fell by 6 per cent 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 I974 to 1975, and again during 1976-77. Private-sector investment in I 1 1 ~ l ~ ~ ~ l i ~ c t u r i n g began to drop in 1974 and total investment declined by 13 per , 1 1 1 1 I~crween 1975 and 1977. Foreign investment shrank in the wake of the a I , I I I \ oCJune 1976. In the first three months of 1977 there was an outflow of 1: i 1 ' ) million in short-term capital and a fall of R106 million in the official

I . I I I , I ; ~ n d foreign-exchange reserves in spite of extensive government I 11 I All these trends were exacerbated by a fall in the price of gold in 1 ' ' ' ' ) resulting in a loss of 25 per cent of foreign exchange reserves.j9

I I I C , investment and foreign exchange crises both exposed and increased I 1 \ 1 1 ~cndencies within the economy which the boom of the 1960s had I I I ~..I\cci. Firstly, as mechanisation proceeded there was a shortage of

s I I I 1 \killed workers and of skilled supervisory and technical workers. Given 1, ,I I c.scrvation, a small white population and limited immigration, these

s a ~ ~ l (.rs could not be found. Secondly, there was growing long-term I 1 I 1 1 I I ~ldoyrnent particularly amongst unskilled workers. It was estimated that 1 1 1 1 ~lil'loyment in 1977 was 2.3 million, and it was estimated that the rate of

% 1~~~~ 1111,1oyment would not decline unless the economy grew at a rate of 6.7 I , ' I c m r per annum, which it has since failed to do.50

'~lll l~.~ages of investment capital and skilled workers, and the problem of 1 1 1 1 1 ~l~l'loyrnent at a time of increasing popular unrest, led to the beginning of

1 1 1 1 1 111~1s to restructure apartheid to help shore up white supremacy. The I V I I I I L . ;ilso attempted to paper over the cracks in apartheid and convince

I 1 1 1 1 1 I ~ . I I ~ ial political and financial opinion overseas of its continued command , , I 1 1 1 ~ . hituation by means of a secretly funded propaganda campaign. The

I 11 I . . I I ~ - ~ of this campaign and in particular its undeclared use of government

24 Forced Removal

funds led to a power struggle within the ruling party. P W Botha, Minister of Defence in Vorster's cabinet, became prime minister in 1978. With much publicity about forthcoming 'reforms' it was claimed that a new era had been inaugurated. The strategy of the new rulers, set within a 'National Security Strategy' was formulated by a number of government commissions. Two became particularly well known. The Wiehahn Commission investigated labour law and recommended the recognition and registration of African trade unions, and the Riekert Commission dealt with labour recruitment, influx control and the means by which industry could improve its access to semi-skilled workers.

The Riekert report was premised on a particular view of the labour market:

It is a prerequisite for sound economic growth in South Africa for employers to be able to satisfy their full labour requirements and for adequate job opportunities to be created for the country's fast-growing labour force. But the employment of labour must take place within the statutory framework created and the necessary machinery must be used to ensure that the supply and demand for Black labour are brought into e q ~ i l i b r i u m . ~ ~

The report suggested that people with Section 10 rights, many of them skilled and semi-skilled, should have increased residential security, the right to buv the leaseholds on their houses in townshivs, increased mobilitv within

A ,

and between urban areas and an expansion of job opportunities. Some limited forms of these benefits, particularly in housing, had already been accorded to Section 10 aualifiers in the earlv 1 9 7 0 ~ . ~ ~ All other workers. who were in the main unskilled, would be forced into contract employment. They would thus be permanent migrants with no chance to acquire rights to remain outside the bantustans or the benefits that flowed from those rights. In addition Riekert

u

proposed removing the responsibility for implementing influx control from the police on the streets, and instead vesting it in employers and those who controlled housing. Heavy fines should be imposed on employers who employed workerswho had not been granted the right to work in terms of the pass laws.

Another aspect of this phase of apartheid was the granting of 'independ- ence' to the bantustans, beginning with the Transkei in 1976. While the bantustans continued to serve the polirical purpose of controlling the rural population and containing the unemployed and the relative surplus population, they acquired new roles with 'independence' and 'self-rule'. Thev featured centrallv in attemnts to decentralisethe economy and establish regional growth and new urban areas. Politically their 'independence' became the facade behind which the central governmcnt divested itself of responsibil- ity for the political aspirations of millions of its citizens, now deemed 'citizens' of 'independent' states. The government used this fiction to try to justify the denial of political rights, freedom of movement, and underde- velopment. The bantustans, whether 'self-governing' or 'independent' remained financially, administratively and militarily dependent on Pretoria.

History 25

I lowever, their new status opened up a new field of political struggle on \cvcral fronts, including that of forced removals.

'l'he apartheid policies of this period resulted in four main forms of I c.moval. Firstly, arising from the Riekert Commission report, a number of I~.;~rures of influx control were altered and then the whole system itself t(.li)rrnulated in 1986. Initially, after the Riekert report, people with Section I0 rights acquired the right to buy their houses on leasehold and to move

I lc.rween towns in an Administration Board Area, without losing their Section lo rights. However, it also became more difficult to acquire Section 10 rights. h\igrant workers were tied to short-term contracts, preventing them . I ( quiring the status of a Section 10 resident even though they might have \\.ol.ked in an urban area for a considerable period. In addition, recruitment I I I rhc bantustans virtually ceased and people in the bantustans were t olrrpclled to work in bantustan industries or border industries for L t~llhiderably less pay than in the main urban centres.

I l r 1986 major parts of the influx control legislation were repealed, 1 1 1 1 Iuding the laws which had defined the Section 10 categories and the Black I ..ll,~)tlr Regulations which had hindered people from leaving the bantustans I I I I I ( . ~ S [hey were on contracts. The regime asserted that the pass system was I I ~ \ V elcad and that it favoured a policy of 'orderly urbanisation'. In fact all ' 9 c ~ ~ ~ ~ I1 Africans now have to carry a similar identity document and landlords . 1 1 1 t l employers must provide details of their tenants and employees. Access to Iltl~l\lng and trespass laws rather than the widsly defied pass laws are to be 1 1 . . 1 . t 1 1 0 control workers' presence in urban areas outside the bantustans. ' ! I I I lcmcnts which the regime declares illegal are liable to be bulldozed and I 1 1 , 1,c.ople moved. While the wrong stamp in a pass will no longer bring

1 1 I < . \ ( , there is no sign that the forced removals related to the control and IIIO, ;~rion of labour will come to an end.

I Ilc. second form of removal in this era was in the Riekert mould and was ' 1 1 .~i:llcd to reduce the number of Section 10 qualifiers. The government I 1 1 1 1 ,.11c.d a policy of moving urban Africans who lived within 70 kilometres of I Il.~l~cnstan into that bantustan and of redrawing the borders of some I I I 1 I lr\r;rns to include metropolitan townships. For example, the Durban I 1 I \ \ I l\lrip of KwaMashu was made part of Kwazulu in April 1977. Whenever I I I 1 1 . 1 1 1 relocations took place the people lost their Section 10 rights. This I I I I I ~ 1 1 disputed policy was rescinded by the regime in 1985, although

I ~ I < I ( laimed' townships did not regain their status, and urban township 1 , I I ~ ~ . I I I S who moved into 'independent' bantustans lost their citizenship.

I 1 1 , 1 1 . were ,moves in 1986 to restore citizenship to certain people deemed 1 1 I : , - 1 1 , of' the 'independent' bantustans, but the numbers who will benefit

( ( , , I I I I Iris are extremely limited. 1 1 1 , . gcncral drift of policy until the early 1980s was to freeze the building

, I 1 . I I I I I ~ V liousing in urban areas outside bantustans and to make residence in I . I . I I ( Y I S conditional on the availability of accommodation. Parallel with 1 1 1 1 I . I I I . I policy o i establishing towns in the bantustans and encouraging 1 1 , . I I I I . ow11ership in these. The absence of housing in the older townships

26 Forced Kemovul

forced many people to move to the bantustan towns, placing them within the framework of bantustan administration. The state has attempted to demolish illegal squatter housing on the Rand and in the Cape as another way of forcing people into the bantustans. One major modification to earlier policy however has been the decision to establish a consolidated African township in Cape Town, Khayelitsha, where the people who acquired Section 10 rights while living in informal settlements like Crossroads will be moved. The devastation caused in Crossroads in 1986 by vigilantes backed by troops and police forced many who had previously refused to go to Khayelitsha to accept it as their only option.

The third form of removal is a continuation of the earlier policy of relocating people in bantustans. The clearance of black spots and the relocation of landlords and tenants from African freehold land to the bantustans has continued, as has the eviction of surplus farm workers. A decision to establish Kwandebele, an additional bantustan, has meant the forced removal of people from one area to another, because they have been reclassified in order to create a population for the new bantustan. The publication of the land consolidation plans for the Transvaal bantustans in 1985 pointed to further forced removals of rural people. Bantustan leaders themselves have carried out forced removals in their territory and expelled people from one bantustan to another on the basis of apartheid classifications. Removals through betterment schemes have continued and the well- advanced 'development' plans of some bantustans anticipate an acceleration of this land policy. Some squatter areas within bantustans have been demolished and the people forced to move.

The so-called reforming era of apartheid has not lessened the impetus of forced removal, population control, impoverishment and repression. What is different about this period is that the regime is now searching for allies in bantustans and their organised armed groups, private entrepreneurs and local councils who will carry out its policy. In this way, so the theorists argue, the state will become neutral, and popular struggles for political power will be deflected.

CONCLUSION

This introductory survey has sketched the various forms of forced removal carried out in the different phases of apartheid, and shown how they have sometimes continued beyond the phase in which they were originally conceived. The following chapters deal with the forms of removal in greater detail. The present profound economic and political crisis facing the rulers of South Africa has forced a re-evaluation even of the policy changes of the mid-1970s. Forced removal has become the focus of much popular resistance and of repeated condemnation of the regime. It is one of the policies over which much conflict has developed amongst South Africa's rulers as they search for new ways to maintain white rule in the face of continuing defiance and resistance.

Forced Removals through the Pass System 27

CHAPTER 2

Forced removals through the pass system

I'.I.,\ I;rws as a form of population control have been a feature of South African ,I I, I C I y for nearly two hundred years. They have been used to control the ~l l~~vcment , settlement and employment of the entire African population. It 1 1 . 1 . . Ijccn estimated that since the beginning of the twentieth century I ,' , . '~0 ,000 Africans have been arrested or prosecuted under the pass laws.'

I 111~ler National Party rule many pass law controls from former periods , \ ( . I (. consolidated, nationally enforced and used to promote a particular form , # I ,-( onomic development based on the coercive direction of labour. The

1 1 I ion of the pass laws brings about a slow piecemeal removal of people I I , 1 1 1 I he urban areas when their labour is no longer required. It also prevents \ I I 1, ; I I ~ people coming to towns to look for work. Pass-law removals do not

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 : 111e sudden horror of communities being destroyed, which is part of I $ 1 I , I. \pot removals or the evictions of farm labourers. They are, however, a

1 , ,-l)lng form of removal that has affected virtually every African. They I , I 1 1 1 1 : ~jrosecutions, police raids, control on housing and fears of losing a job

1 1 1 ~ 1 [;Icing removal or eviction from an area, away from friends, family and I I ~ B ~ N , I . ~ networks. The pass system has divided families and forced workers

I , t . I ( ,-cpl intolerable working conditions because of the insecurity of their 1 . 1 1 11.. 'l'he legislation of 1986, which abolished pass laws for many Africans,

I I I I I I, I.,(.cI strict controls on access to housing in a new version of influx control 1 1 1 ~ 1 llllposed new, harsh restrictions on the movement and employment of

I 1 1 0 , llizcns of the 'independent' bantustans. I ~ ~ l c r apartheid, pass laws became central to the development of the

8 . 4 D ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i c system and crucial to the maintenance of white political power. In I t . I I Iv 1950s;at the beginning of the period of National Party government, 1 1 I 1 1 1 , 1);lss law controls from former periods were consolidated and enforced 1 1 1 1 l D ~ ~ l : I ~ ~ ) ~ ~ l the country. In subsequent decades pass laws were used to I I 1 1 1 . I I C cconomic development. Indeed, so close has the identification of

1 1 I I I ~ . I ~ and the pass system become that, in 1985, when President P W I I , ~ I 1 1 . 1 $ 1 1 1 ~ 1 those around him spoke of abolishing the influx-control system, 1 1 1 . \ I I.~llned, simultaneously, that they were reforming apartheid. In 1986

1 1 , 1 1 I.Iw:, repealing sections of the pass laws went before parliament the I 1 , I ~ I ( . I I I asserted that apartheid was dead. But while pass laws have been

, 1 1 1 I . 1 1 1 0 (he maintenance of apartheid, they are only one part of its 1 , 1 ' 1 1 . . ~ v c slructure. In recent years it has been possible to change certain I ' 1 1 1 1 . . 0 1 I he pass system without abandoning apartheid.

I 1 1 I I ~ l ~ o u g h the implementation of influx control involved police, the , I I I I . . .111t l a massive administrative machine it did not succeed. Despite all

28 Forced Remo7)al

the forces against them hundreds of thousands of people defied the law and lived and worked illegally in the urban areas, because the alternative was starvation. In 1984 it was estimated that 42 per cent of the population of the Western Cape were 'illegal' residents living there in contravention of the pass laws and that throughout the country 2.5 million people had come to live on the fringes of urban areas in squatter settlements that flouted the entire system of control^.^ It is this massive popular defiance, underpinned by the present needs of industry for a large local labour pool, that has led to re-evaluation of the pass system from within the ruling circle.

This chapter looks at the history of the pass system and considers the objectives behind the control and direction of labour. There is a detailed analysis of how the system worked prior to the 1986 amendments and an outline of some of its drastic effects. The most recent legislation and changes in aspects of influx control are assessed. The final section of the chapter looks at forms of resistance to the pass system and at their influence on policy.

HISTORY OF THE PASS SYSTEM

The report of the Riekert Commission in 1979 provided a bald definition of the intentions behind the pass laws:

Constant changes had to be made to regulate the orderly movement, settlement, housing and employment of Black labour. This process has by no means come to an end.'

Historically the role of the pass laws has changed. In the nineteenth century they had the function of controlling slaves and preventing 'free' labourers changing jobs and deserting masters. In the twentieth century the approach to the contrcl of workers' movement by different governments has see-sawed between an 'exclusionary' approach, designed to limit strictly the number of urban Africans, and an 'inclusionary' strategy, premised on an acceptance of a permanent urban African population.Vt has been suggested that this divergence in policy arises from the fact that the pass laws are based on two contradictory premises: (1) 'The need to obtain political security by controlling the number of

Africans in 'white' areas and rigidly policing them (2) The need to ensure a plentiful supply of cheap labour to the

white-owned economy. As has been shown in Chapter 1, whether it was decided to stress inclusionary or exclusionary features of the pass system at any particular period depended on the nature of the economy and of the political party or group in power.

In the 1920s and 1930s problems of white unemployment, accentuated by the depression, led to the exclusionary Stallard doctrine being incorporated into the Urban Areas Act of 1923. This legislation introduced nationwide a system of controlling African urban residence. Simultaneously a policy of giving preference in employment to Coloured, rather than African, workers was mooted by the National Party, then in Oppo~i t ion .~ In this period

Forced Removals through the Pass System 29

I ~~licials in 'reserve' areas were instructed not to grant passes to Africans who \\.lnted to go to cities to seek work. Women, who were not obliged to carry ~):~sscs, were from 1930 made subject to legal provisions which empowered I I I I I nicipal officials to remove them from towns. Municipalities could

oclaim specific areas for African occupation, force people to live there and I lr:idly control and police their conditions of stay. In 1932 the Native Service 1 o~~rrac t Act introduced special provisions regulating the movement of \[I-tcans from farms, and Act 18 of 1936 gave labour-control boards the ~ ~ ~ ~ w e r to determine the maximum number of African workers permitted to I I \ ( . on any particular piece of land. As late as 1937 Prime Minister Smuts was \ I-l~cmently advocating vigorous action to prevent Africans coming to town. I I(. [old a conference of municipal representatives in Pretoria:

'l'he proper way to deal with this influx is to cut if off at its source and to say that our towns are full, the requirements met, we cannot accommodate more natives, and we are not going to accept any more except in limited number^.^

I 111. I)oom in manufacturing industry, and the attendant demand for African I 1 1 I , 1 1 1 1 during World War 11, changed political attitudes to urban Africans. In I ' J I ' pass laws were relaxed. The Smit Committee, established in 1942 to

I . t~ga te the health and economic conditions of urban Africans, denounced 1 1 , ~ 111igrant-labour system and pass laws. However, official thinking I I I I I I I I C ~ committed to the maintenance of segregation and to influx control

I I I I \ ~ ~ U I means of allocating labour. This was also the view of the Fagan I ~1l11111ssion of 1946-48 while rejecting the Stallard doctrine of a temporary 1 1 1 ( 1 . 1 1 1 Alrican presence, it called for centralised administration of the I I I ~ ~ ~ I I I I>ureau system and a streamlining of pass documentation:

\\;'llcre Native communities become settled in the vicinity of \vlltte ones, or Natives enter the service of Europeans (both in the I I I I ; I ~ areas and in the towns) a certain amount of regulation is Ilc.ccssary for the maintenance of the principle of residential ,t.li:~ration.7 *

I 1 1 , I 111o11ale of the pass laws had shifted from excluding African labour to 1 , , 8 1 1 1 I ~ : I I I ~ it on terms set by white political authorities.

I I I1 I:IItST PHASE OF NATIONAL PARTY RULE

I 1 , . ' J . I ~ I O I I ~ ~ Party, which came to power in 1948, rejected the Fagan I . , 1 , I < 11 re-enforced the influx-control laws that had lapsed, and 1 , I 1 1 1 , , I , i l l the interest of its white farming supporters, to prevent farm

. ( I , I . I<.;~ving white- owned farms for the cities. There was a rigid t t I 1 1 1 ~ . 1 1 1 01- the division of the country into 'reserves' (later bantustans), , , . . 8 1 1 ~ ~ 1 ; I I - C ~ S ' (that is, all cities, industrial and commercial areas), and

. . 8 t I . I ., I II,L.cI areas (that is, farms and mines). People could remain in t I 1 1 ,I . I I .~ . ;~ s only if they qualified under Section 10 of the Urban Areas

1

30 Forced Removal

Act, and could be in non-prescribed areas only if they had a job.* With the introduction in 1954 of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy in

the Western Cape, controls were more strictly implemented in that region than anywhere else in the country. Between 1954 and 1956, 4,928 African women were endorsed out of the Peninsula area, while the pass laws had barely begun to be applied to women anywhere else in the country. The Coloured Labour Preference Policy envisaged removal from the area of all Africans not born in South Africa, a freeze on the number of African families with residence rights, and restriction on the number of migrant workers recruited. The overall aim was a general replacement of African workers by Coloured worker^.^ But although the residence rights of urban Africans came under threat in his period, there was never any attempt at wholesale removal of the urban African communities. Moreover the recruitment of migrant labour was not abandoned, but rationalised, and it became easier for African contract workers to return ycar after year to the same job through renewal of fixed time contracts. l o

Some of the effects of the new pass laws were observed by Nelson Mandela in an article written in 1955. He pointed to the way 'people are destroyed':

Rachel Musi is fifty-three years of age. She and her husband had lived in Krugersdorp for thirty-two ycars. Throughou~ this period, he had worked for the Krugersdorp municipality for £7 10s a month. They had seven children ranging from nineteen to two years of age. One was doing the final year of the Junior Certificate at the Krugersdorp Bantu High School and threc wcrc in primary schools, also in Krugersdorp. She had several 1 convictions for brewing kaffir beer. Because of these convictions she was arrested as an undesirable person in terms of the provisions of the Native Urban Areas Act and brought before the Additional Native Commissioner of Krugersdorp. After the arrest but before the trial her husband collapsed suddenly and died. Thereafter the Commissioner judged her an undesirable person and ordered her deportation to Lichtenburg. Bereaved and broken-hearted, and with the responsibility of maintaining seven children weighing heavily on her shoulders, an aged woman was exiled from her home and forcibly separated from her children to fend for herself among strangers in a strange environrnent.ll

Mandela called for united and organised resistance against such brutalities. Frances Baard, a trade union activist in the 1950s, recallcd how pass laws

were used to hamper her activities. She had gone to East London to organise a union branch among food canning workers:

When I got to East London, I thought well, the best thing to do,

Forced Kemozlals through the Pass System 3 1

.~l\out the police. Early the next morning I was still sleeping at the Il~rcl. I hear-shoo! loud!-'The police! the police! the police!' I'l~cy were checking the hotel. I thought, well there's no worry

I 111s time; I've got a permit now. They were going from room to I oorn checking the permits of the other people and leaving them. : \ I 1 that time they wanted me! When they came to me at last I look out my permit, and I thought no, it's all right, I've got a [,crrnit. They look at my permit. Then they look at me. Then the 011c says, 'Kom aan [come on]. We want you.' 'Ag what for now? I'vc got a permit mos.' Well, I was taken to the charge office and I \v;ls charged there, I don't know what for because they didn't ,;llch me at the factory or anything, they just caught me at the 110tcl where I was sleeping. I didn't even address any meetings vcr. The magistrate gave me one hour to leave East London.I2

I 1 , ) I I I I l~csc activists clearly saw how the pass laws were being used to expel I , t l ~ r : ..c.r~lcd urban families, to maintain a cheap labour force made up chiefly #I I 1 1 I , : I . : I ~ ~ workers and to exercise control over the increasingly militant and

I 1 1 I , ;lily active urban African ~opulation. In attempting to limit the size of I I 1 1 . I~ol,ulation, the government hoped to limit the extent of mobilisation by I I I , .\ 1 I-ican National Congress.

lb . \ \s LAWS AND THE BANTUSTAN STRATEGY

1 1 1 , I I C . ~ ~ phase of apartheid, the 1960s and early 1970s, was marked by a I . ( , 1 1 1 111 all sectors of the economy. However the boom was strictly managed

1 , , ~ ~ ( l i l ~ p to apartheid principles, and in part facilitated by the extreme I .< , 1 1 1 1 ( ; 1 1 repression of the time. Influx control continued to help provide a 1 I I I 1 . I . I I I I labour force and to maintain a high level of insecurity in the lives of I I I t . 111 ,\lricans. But it also came to be perceived like the Stallard doctrine of I I ) , Ii)?Ox as a mechanisg that could actually prevent any workers, whether 11111:1.1111 or not, coming to the cities.

I I I ( . lact that the boom was based on-capital intensive investment, which rn . , , I l,rclductivity, meant that the proportion of workers employed in 1 1 , ~ 111.,1r.y would fall. T o facilitate this process the state considered it necessary I , , I I \ . ~ I I ; I ~ C labour allocation and prevent the establishment of communities

I ( 1 1 111xh unemployment in the prescribed areas. A large unemployed urban \ I I I, ; I I I population was considered ~otentially politically disruptive and a

1 1 ) 1 $ . \ t lo the maintenance of white supremacy. I 1 1 I llc mid-1960s the Bantu Laws Amendment Act instituted the centrally

1 1 1 c I ( . c I labour-bureau system, and made it virtually impossible for a worker I , , 1 1 1 1 ~ 1 work in a prescribed or non- res scribed area without registering at a 1 1 1 l l 8 1 1 1 bureau, Employers could not recruit labour without registering

I, I I I ~ I C S with the labour bureau and could not lawfully employ someone since there is this permit thing, I must go to the commissioner's office and get a permit. So I was given a permit so I could stay for the weekend, or for a few days maybe, without I must worry

a

1 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 registering the employment. Workers could not register with a I 5 $ t ~ ~ ~ I,\lrcau unless their pass documents were in order. New restrictions

I I I)l;~ccd on women exercising their rights under Section 10 of the Urban

r

32 Forced Removal Forced Removals through the l'ass System 33

Areas Act to live with their husbands or fathers who had urban residence rights. From 1964 wives and unmarried daughters could only live in towns if Many families have come for advice because they have not been

they 'ordinarily resided' with qualified men. Thus no woman could get a accepted on the waiting list because the male head of the family is

Section 10 stamp in her pass unless she produced her husband's lodger's registered in terms of Section 10(l)(d) of the Act, and so does not

permit bearing her name, and no housing official would issue such a permit qualify for housing. Added to this there are the people who go to

until he had seen a Section 10 stamp in the woman's pass.13 The intention of apply for a house and are then endorsed out when their position is

these regulations was to limit the number of women in urban areas. The same investigated. This happens to many wives who are deemed to be

intention underlay Circular 25 of the Bantu Affairs Department of 1967, in the area illegally. Many men find themselves in difficulties

which made it official policy that all 'non-productive' Africans- the aged, the because the application is refused on the ground that they do not

ill, widows and the like-were to be removed from towns in the prescribed qualify for family housing. They are convinced that they do

areas to towns in the bantustans.I4 qualify under Section 10(l)(a) or (b), but they are shown in the

The effects of these policies were felt most bitterly in the bantustans. records as being 10(l)(d). It can be a very long and involved

Living conditions there, which had been deteriorating over decades, became process proving that they are indeed qualified under (a) or (b) and lrequently they fail because they are unable to produce the utterly desolate as women, unable to make a living from the land, found necessary proofs. l6 themselves prohibited from taking up migrant labour contracts or joining

their menfolk. The elderly were abandoned to an old age of destitution. A 4 ,111 . 70-year old woman who visited the Advice Office in 1968 epitomised the study carried out by the University of Cape Town in March 1974 among 757 1 1 . 1 1 ( l\l~ips which the law brought: households in 10 areas in the Transkei found that 67 per cent of the households in their sample were headed by women. There was a correlation She was born in Umtata, but came to the Reef more years ago

between very poor households and households headed by women and the lhan she can remember. Here she has lived and worked. Now she

elderly. Six per cent of the sample, comprising widows, women abandoned is old and widowed. Since 1963 she has been living with her

by their husbands, and the elderly who had no relatives and who had not divorced daughter, who is a registered tenant of a house in

been able to negotiate a pension, were utterly destitute. One widow, who had Soweto. She has been living there legally. Her name is on the

last seen her son ten years before, told the interviewers, 'I cannot mention my htrusing permit. She confidently and reasonably expected to see

diet. I think I eat only once in three or four days.'15 out her days there, cared for by her daughter and her

Evictions of women from townships when their husbands died became grandchildren, enjoying the peace of her old age. But this was not

commonplace and homelessness jeopardised people's right to remain in lo be. One day, like a bolt out of the blue, she was informed by

urban areas. Advice workers in the Black Sash Johannesburg office reported I he Superintendent of the a r e h h e r e she lives that she is not

in 1971: lrcrmitted to remain in Johannesburg and must leave the area within 72 hours. She was told to return to Evaton where she had

Women are very rarely allowed to take over a house from a male ~rrcviously been living with another daughter, yet it is highly tenant who has died or deserted them and women on their own rlnlikely that Evaton will readmit her, because she has been are not accepted on the waiting list for houses. It does not make t~lrsent from there for so long that she has lost her domiciliary any difference if they can pay the rent or how many children they I lghts there. It is far more probable that this poor, lonely old have. Several women have come in to the office saying they have \\.oman will be resettled in her homeland, which she left years ago nowhere to live with their children because their husbands have . I I I ~ where she will now be unknown and bereft.17 gone to the Superintendent's office to say that thev wish to divorce this woman and marry another. They have been ordered I I I I I I~cr effort to limit the size of the urban African population was made in to vacate their houses. Men have come in who have been ordered 1 1 ~ ' 1'107 Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act which gave the to vacate their houses because their wives have died or deserted ', 1 ) I I I .I ( .I . of Planning power to restrict the use of African labour by employers them. The parents of disabled children have great difficulty in c 8 I I 1 1 I I ry, trade, commerce, and on farms. The aim of the legislation was to finding accommodation even if they have been accepted on to the 1 8 1 , I 1 . I , > ( . the proportion of whites to blacks in industry from about a third, waiting list for a house, because while they must find lodgers' 1 t 1 , 1 1 1 1 was in 1967, to over a half. It was planned that there would be a 5 per accommodation and people are unwilling to have mentally 1 1 1 ~c.(luction in the African labour force each year. The government disturbed, crippled or chronically ill children in the house. This I l l l l ~ , ~ l ~ c . c i Aid Centres in 1966 to streamline the huge bureaucratic also applies to families with more than two children and to the I I ,I ' I I .I I I I \ administering the pass laws. These centres processed a range of very old. I 8 I . I \ \ . ol'iences which had previously been dealt with in Bantu Commis-

34 Forced Removal

sioners' Courts. With the institution of Aid Centres the figures for pass-law prosecutions declined from 1969 (see Table 8). This did not mean that fewer people were controlled by pass laws, but rather that more cases were dealt with in Aid Centres than in the courts (see Table 5).

THE RIEKERT STRATEGY

After 1973 the stresses in the South African economy become apparent. The high rate of mechanisation in mining, agriculture and industry increased the rate of unemployment. With no welfare system, and few people able to claim unemployment benefit, families had to resort to desperate strategies to survive. Government policies to rectify the balance-of-payments deficit had deflationary consequences within South Africa and there were periods of decline in manufacturing output. Rising prices for locally manufactured products occurred just when wages were being depressed. Some of the economic stresses associated with the end of the long boom contributed to the strikes of 1973 and the uprising of 1976-7. The re-emergence of mass popular resistance signalled by these events, coupled with the decline in foreign investment, led to a reappraisal of policy by the government. The Riekert Commission, one instrument of this reappraisal, was briefed to inquire into the laws affecting the 'utilisation of manpower', in other words the pass system.

The commission reported in 1979. It recommended that in formulating policy it should be recognised that South Africa had a settled African urban population, which could not be relocated in its entirety in the bantustans. The system of influx control should be rationalised. Control should be tied not only to the availability of work, but also to housing: that is, people without approved housing could be refused entry into a prescribed area. While entry into prescribed areas was thus to be made more difficult, those who already had Section 10 rights should have the right to have their families join them, if approved housing was available, and should be able to transfer their Section 10 rights of permanent urban residence from one prescribed area to another. According to the report the goal of the commission was that of:

... identifying the various market failures and points of friction arising from the existing statutory framework and of eliminating them within the framework of certain political parameters, which were taken as given.I8

In Riekert's recommendations there is much stress on 'streamlining', 'modernisation', 'elimination of friction' and the avoidance of all provision that may be regarded as 'discriminatory on the grounds of population group'. The strategy can thus be seen to be an attempt to adapt the apparatus of influx control inherited from a previous era to a time of demand for skilled African workers and high unemployment for unskilled workers.

While the pass laws have often served to disorganise African workers,

Forced Removals through the Passsystem 35

11;tving been used as an instrument to undermine the establishment of an or.ganized urban African working class, the Riekert proposals went further. I'hcy envisaged a strongly maintained division between a relatively better- 1):lid African urban population with property rights, reasonably high living ,landards and job mobility, and an impoverished bantustan population ,r~rviving through low-paid contract labour, living on the margins of ~rrhsistence as a reserve army of labour with no free access to work.19

The Riekert report caused much debate and dissension in ruling circles. I xgislation was drafted to incorporate its proposals. It was presented to I,;~rliament in 1980 within a cluster of legislation that came to be known as the I<oornhof bills. The three bills dealt with urban African local government, 111c provision of housing and services, and influx control. The first two bills (vcre initially considered relatively uncontroversial and became law: they were the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 and the Black Communities I )cvelopment Act of 1984. However, legislation on influx control was more I,~.oblematic. Koornhof s 1980 bill was named the Laws on Co-operation and I )cvelopment Bill. It exempted certain African people from general I,~ohibitions on urban residence, but gave no positive rights of urban I c,,idence as Section 10 had done. It shifted the administration of influx I 1111rro1 away from supervising the presence of Africans in town, and instead , . I I cssed the need for administrative control of residence and housing. The 1 , 1 1 1 allowed greater mobility for Africans exempted from urban residence ~ l ~ ~ h i b i t i o n s but linked employment contracts with accommodation.

['he bill elicited widespread opposition'from black community groups, I I . ~ l c unions, academics, liberal pressure groups, some opposition Members

I'arliament, and representatives of industrial capital. The attitude of the 1.111cl- was determined by the effects of the temporary boom resulting from I ~ I L . high price of gold and the balance of payments surplus. Employers in 111tlustry were primarily frustrated at the shortage of labour and at that time t ~ I I I I C unconcerned with the prospect of urban ~ n e m p l o y m e n t . ~ ~ Confronted it I I 11 this level of criticism the government referred the bill to a parliamentary 1.1c.c~ committee which was instructed to redraft the legislation in accordance

it 1111 the content and spirit of the Riekert report. The select committee, ~ ~ l t t l ~ r the chairmanship of E M Groskopf, never made its report public, but < l , -~ ;~ i l s of its recommendations were leaked to journalists. These included a , e ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ of full property ownership to urban Africans, the right to urban I ( - ,l(lcnce for Africans who had both employment and accommodation, and I 1 1 , . ;tholition of the 72-hour limit on the continued presence in towns of

\ I I lians without correct pass endorsements. It recommended a shift in the 1 1 1, 11s of the administration of the pass laws from the streets to the place of , \ ,I I < and residence; employers or householders were to be strictly penalised 1 \ 1 1 j:iving work or employment illegally.21

I I I C Groskopf Committee's recommendations were not adopted when the 1 1 , \I l~lflux control legislation was drafted in 1982. The Orderly Movement

1 1 1 1 1 Settlement of Black Persons Bill was formulated against a backdrop of I I I , I t.;lscci unpopularity for the government's policies amongst its own

36 Forced Removal

supporters, as illustrated by the declining vote for the National Party in the 1981 election. Economic recession provoked fears of growing une rnp l~ymen t .~~ The new bill distinguished between 'authorised' and 'unauthorised' people in urban areas. '14uthorised' people might remain in urban areas if they qualified under a number of categories, one of which was that of permanent urban residence in terms of section 10. 'Authorisation' did not provide a right but merely conferred an administrative designation, which could be denied to anyone who was not deemed a citizen of South Africa, including people who had been assigned to bantustans which had become 'independent'. 'Unauthorised' people could remain in urban areas for only 17 hours. No 'unauthorised' person could seek or take employment in an urban area and fines of R5,000 for employers of illegal workers and of RSOO for people who gave accommodation to 'unauthorised' people were laid down.

The Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, like its predecessor in 1980, elicited widespread criticism. Its major critics were trade unions and community organisations. Big business also opposed the bill. They considered it too weak an instrument to control unemployment and provide them at the same time with enough labour when expansion was needed. On the other hand, the rural-based supporters of the National Party were angered at the bill's reversal of key elements of influx control. Bowing to pressure the government once again withdrew the bill in May 1984 and promised a weaker form of legislation, an Urbanisation Bill, to be introduced in the first session of the new segregated parliament.

While political and economic forces made it difficult in the period after 1979 for the government to implement legislation on the lines of the Riekert proposals, some of them were incorporated into existing legislation or administratively implemented as regulations. The attempt to graft Riekert's strategy on to the existing influx control system has had two phases. Controls were relaxed during the economic boom and upsurge of confidence in P W Botha's strategy. A restrictive period followed as the recession developed and Botha's political support diminished. A subsidiary aspect was an overall attempt to rationalise the pass system. The liberal phase began in November 1979 when a moratorium was placed on prosecutions of illegal urban residents. They were urged to register with the labour bureau without fear of penalty for illegal entry. The economic boom of this time brought an enormous demand for African labour. A key Riekert proposal was formulated in regulations gazetted in June 1980. People with Section 10 rights became able to move from one prescribed area under the control of a particular Administration Board to another, provided accommodation was available. This was an attempt to provide greater flexibility of movement to skilled workers at a time when demand for manufactured products was high.

In this relatively liberal economic and political climate two key judgements by the Appeal Court extended rights of urban residence that had previously been denied by officials enforcing influx control. The judgement in the Komani case of 1979 concerned Section 10(l)(c) rights, that is, the rights of families of workers who had rights of permanent residence. The judgement

Forced Removals through the Pass Svstem 37

I - . I \ ,c a worker who qualified under Section 10(l)(a) or (b) the right to have his 1.111lily join him in town whether or not the family wcre grantcd permission to

( 1 1 ) so by Administration Board officials and irrespective of their possession of Ilor~sing permits. In the Rikhoto judgement of 1983 the judges ruled that G 111rrract workers who had worked for one employer for more than ten years 1 I I I olie year contracts, with a short return to the bantustans at the end of each , l ~ ~ ~ r r a c t , should have the benefit of Section 10(l)(b) rights of urban residence

I I I ; I I is, the rights of those with ten years' continuous employment by one I llll,loyer). The court declared that it was an administrative fiction to 111.111irain that there had been no continuous spell of employment with a single 1 1111,loyer. It was estimated that 143,000 out of 800,000 migrant workers i t I ~ I I I J benefit immediately .23

ll~iplementation of the more liberal aspects of the Riekert proposals came I ( ! . I lralt as the price of gold fell, a balance-of-payments deficit developed and 1 1 l . 1 1 kcrs for manufactured goods contracted. Strong dissatisfaction with the ~.~l \~c~~-nrnrnt 's strategy began to be expressed by some within the National I ' . I I I V and by the parties further to the right-the Conservative Party and the I lt.1-srigte' (Reformed) National Party. The National Party faced a serious

1 1 1 oral challenge from these more right-wing parties in the 1981 election ' ~l~ll,;~ign and in the 1983 referendum on the new constitution. Against a l l . l ( IL~:round of mounting political and economic crisis the more repressive

I I X . L I S of the Riekert proposals were enforced. In 1983 the Laws on 1 1 1 ~~licr.ation and Development Act abolished the rights conceded by the 1 . ~ l ~ l l ; l ~ i i judgement. The new law made it impossible for contract workers \ \ 1 1 1 , .icquired Section 10(l)(b) to have their families live with them unless I I I I - \ , were the legal, registered owners or tenants of approved accommoda- I 1 0 1 1 ,Most contract workers could not meet these conditions, as they lived in 1 1 1 1 .lt.ls and were not entitled to occupy family accommodation except as 1, *, I , : ~ . I s. For some time, despite the ruling in the Rikhoto case, officials of the ( ( 1 ~ll)~.ration and Development Department had refused to implement the ~ ~ ~ ' l ~ : t . ~ l ~ c n t and continued to deny rights to people who qualified. Despite the 1 8 1 ~ ~ . 1 ~ 1 intention of the Rikhoto judgement during 1982 workers in Durban ,, 1 I 1 I Section 10(l)(d) urban residence rights (usually the case for contract ,\ 1 1 1 I - t.l.si, but no legal accommodation, were being forbidden workseekers' 1 8 t I I I I I I \ : ' ~ A study in 1983-5 in the Western Cape of more than 10,000 1 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 1 ~ ions made by migrant workers for permanent urban rights under the

I : 1 1 I I , 1 1 , ) ruling showed that 69 per cent had been rejected and only 21 per , I I I . ~~ ,~ j rovcd , while the remainder had been pending for many months.25

I I I , . I C were widespread pass raids in 1982-3, particularly on squatter , 1 1 1 1 I I I L . I I I S and mass arrests for pass law offences (see Table 8). Women

1 . 1 1 I I , I I I ; I I - I V became targets of pass raids, as official thinking still held that 1 1 1 , , I \llc\cnce in an urban area facilitated the establishment of a long-term 1 I I 1 1 I I ~~~)u l a t i on . In the period 1980-83 many more women than men were

1 1 1 ' 1 1 - 1 1 I I I the areas of the Cape where there were large squatter ' , I I 1 1 I 1 \ 1 1 ics. For example 9,7 15 women were arrested for pass offences in

I I I ) \ V I I in 1982, compared with 6,297 men.26 The cumulative effect ol

38 Forced Removal

the legislation from the 1960s had been to reduce the proportion of African women living in towns. In the 1980s 43 per cent of African women lived outside bantustan areas, while in the 1950s 54 per cent had done so.27

Sara Sibisi recounted the story of her life in 1984. She told of the increasingly harsh application of the pass laws. She was born on a white-owned farm in the Northern Transvaal:

As soon as I could I decided to go and work and help my family with food and other necessities. So in 1963 I went to Jo'burg and found a job. I was very lucky at that time. It was before the passes were so heavy. . . I had piece jobs for some time. Then I had my firstborn. I went home at that time. Since then I have never found a job, not a proper job. When I ask at the commissioner's they say only farm work. City jobs are only available from a commission- er's office. The work on the farms it is heavy, and the money is little. It can kill people. I tried to go back to Soweto without a contract and work. But it is harder than ever before. Many madams are scared now. They say they'll get caught if they have a 'girl' without a pass. I tried at the pass office. But they just say I must go home. There is no work for the 'girls' from the homelands. I was arrested too. That was bad. So I came home. Maybe I will work on the farms. But only for a while. It's bad.28

Legislation which stressed the repressive side of the Riekert recommenda- tions continued to be enacted. In April 1984, the Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act was passed. It further controlled movement from bantustans and increased the penalties to R5,000 and two years' imprison- ment for employing, accommodating or trading with 'aliens', the definition of which included people from 'independent' bantustans. All aliens required permits to enter or work in South Africa and an alien without the necessary permit could be deported by passport officials, police and agents of the Development Boards, without reference to the courts.29 In 1985 a memorandum by a firm of Nelspruit attorneys drew attention to South African citizens held as suspected illegal immigrants for months without access to a lawyer. Many had been assaulted to extract statement^.^^

The linking of bantustan 'independence' and certain of the Riekert proposals was expressed clearly by the Minister of Plural Relations in 1976:

The identification of the black man with his own nation will put the so-called privileges of Section 10 in the shade. Section 10 . . . will possibly not need to be repealed because the nations concept will overshadow it . . . No black person will eventually qualify in terms of Section 10 because they will all be aliens and, as such, will only be able to occupy the houses bequeathed to them by their fathers (under 99 year leasehold) by special permission of the Min i ~ t e r .~ '

From 1978 the bantustan 'independence' programme had provided a means

Forced Removals through the Pass System 39

I , , limit access to Section 10. In that year an amendment to Section 12 of the I ' I Ijan Areas Act stipulated that any child born after the independence of the I j.111rustan to which his or her parents were deemed to belong, could not enter 1 1 1 I crnain in an urban area without permission from the Secretary for Plural I<t,l;lrions.32 No such child could qualify for Section 10(l)(a) rights unless his

# ) I Ilcr parents qualified. The impact of this ruling is evident in the case of a \ I I I I ~ ~ man who was born in Cape Town where his mother was working ~llt.,cally as a domestic servant, although his father had residence rights. He \ \ . I \ sent to school in the Transkei. In 1984 his widowed mother had her work 1 1 1 ( :ape Town legalised. Her son wanted to claim his right to live and work in

,11?c Town, but he was 'endorsed out' to the Transkei. His mother was told 1 1 ~ l l e boy did not go she would lose her permit.33

1:urther repressive aspects of the piecemeal adoption of the Riekert . I I ;Iregy became apparent in the early 1980s. Many people who had jobs were

1 \ 1~.1ed from the urban areas when they tried to register their employment, I~~.( . ;~use they did not have Section 10 rights.34 In 1981 the Admission of 1 ' 1 I wns to the Republic Regulation Act of 1972, which had been drawn up to I ~ .~ : l~ la te immigration into South Africa, was used to summarily remove 3,666 Il~.ol~le from Cape Town to the Transkei bantustan on the grounds that they \I I 1.c. illegal i m r n i g r a n t ~ . ~ ~

A2ore rights for Section 10 qualifiers meant fewer employment prospects 1 0 1 hose who did not qualify. In Johannesburg many employers began to ~ l l ' r t \ t that workers had Section 10 rights before they employed them. Section 1 1 ) pcople in most areas of the country could now take work without going 1111ouph a labour bureau, making them more attractive to employers by ~~. , l~lc . ing the bureaucratic administration related to their employment. In I 1 1 . ~ i ~ i c e , therefore, employment in the cities became more difficult for people

I I l~out Section This part of the Riekert strategy tended to close the 1 1 1 Iun labour market in a way that influx control had never before achieved. I I ~~~ccve r , in both the more liberal and more repressive phases, many of the I: 1c.kert proposals on the streamlining of influx control were adopted through ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ n i s t r a t i v e reorganisation. Within the urban areas 'employment and i ,~~~cIance ' centres were established to function as labour exchanges for ~~~l ) \cekers with urban residence rights. Here people with Section 10 rights

8 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 1 be recruited to work in other towns. A two tier system began to e Illt.l-ge, with urban labour bureaux continuing to administer influx control

1 1 1 ~ 1 1 0 act as a labour exchange for contract workers. In the rural areas the V . I C , I ~ of recruitment and registration at labour bureaux began to be ~l~t(.t.scded by assembly centres run directly by the Administration Boards.

I I I , - W registered both workseekers and employment contracts, selected men 1 ~ ~ 1 jobs, and provided 'passports' and any necessary influx control

c ~l,lo~.sements. In some areas assembly points moved about as mobile units, ,1111~ others continued to be located far away from where unemployed

, \ Itcrs live.37 I I~cse new methods of rural influx control amounted to a system of labour

8 I I I I ~ , with workers from one area being recruited chiefly for particular

40 Forced Removal

farms or mines. Rigid allocation took place as all economic sectors cut back their labour demands and unemployment reached record levels.38 Increasingly, jobs in urban areas were being reserved for urban people, and urban recruitment from bantustans was being reduced. Employers co- operated because it had become much easier to employ someone with Section 10 qualifications.3' Observers have described how huge crowds gathered at assembly points when labour recruiters were due to arrive and how farmers, looking for labour, were surrounded by men holding up their passes and asking for work as soon as they stepped out of their vehicles.40

In 1985 there appeared to be a return in form to some of the more liberal aspects of Riekert. In February three amendments to the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 were announced. Firstly Africans with permanent urban residence rights outside the bantustans under Section 10 could retain these rights if they moved to another urban area. This formalised in law regulations of 1980 which had already given these rights. Secondly, workers might qualify for Section 10(l)(b) rights by working either for 10 years with one employer or for 15 years with several employers in different areas. This was designed partly to meet the needs of the construction industry, which suffered acute labour shortages because the nature of the work prevented employees working in one job in one place for 15 years. The amendment would also help to meet a general demand for a more mobile skilled labour force. The third amendment stipulated that Africans who had Section 10 rights would retain them if for instance they went to live in the bantustans because of lack of accommodation in the prescribed areas.41

Section 3 of the Physical Planning Act of 1967 was repealed in June 1985. This law had required industrialists to seek permits to employ additional African workers, but had in fact been barely observed for some years. Most industrialists had been granted special concessions, and the law had largely been ignored. The new legislation did little more than formalise existing practice.

Both these pieces of legislation were the outcome of intense lobbying by the corporate sector, and signalled the extent to which the ideas of financiers like H F Oppenheimer of the Anglo-American Corporation had come to coincide with the views of go~ernment .~2 In 1986 the regime went still further in the direction demanded by the corporate sector and began to reformulate the entire influx control system. A White Paper released in that year accepted recommendations made by the President's Council that the present influx control measures must be abolished and replaced by an urbanisation strategy'.43 This strategy is linked explicitly in the White Paper to 'the maintenance and advancement of the free enterprise system' and to an 'alliance between the state and private enterprise with regard to the provision of community welfare services.'" The strategy involves new approaches to the housing of urban dwellers, with tight official control of housing, but with more and cheaper housing units. Housing is seen as the key to promoting 'orderly urbanisation' and 'new arrivals in urban areas must possess approved acc~mmodat ion ' .~~ Access to housing is seen as a better form of population

Forced Removals through the Pass System 4 1

control than the widely defied pass laws. The legislation of June 1986 which contained the promised Urbanisation

hill, embodied the spirit of the White Paper. The Abolition of Influx Control Act repealed the whole of the 1945 Urban Areas Act and the whole of the I'roclamation on Black Labour Regulations of 1968. Under the new Icgislation it is no longer necessary for Africans to qualify under Section 10 to remain in urban areas. Theoretically, anyone may leave a bantustan or a rural area to look for work in urban and metropolitan centres, although other Icgislation seriously limits this option. The bantustans themselves have not vct repealed their legislation which compels all their 'citizens' to register with labour bureaux and forbids people to leave a bantustan except under a rontract attested at a labour bureau. People from the 'independent' I~antustans (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC)) must be recruited through a labour bureau within the bantustan, and attest a contract [here. They must have a permit endorsed in their 'passport' by an 'immigration officer' giving them permission to enter and remain in the rest ' O K South Africa only for a specified period with a specified employer in a ,,pecified place. They are not permitted to change employers without prior .il,proval of the Department of Home affair^.^^

The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act and the Slums Act were amended IO make control of access to housing the a form of population control and instrument of forced removal in the urban areas. According to the new provisions any person deemed to be living illegally in township accommoda- (Ion, whether squatting or renting a room, faces summary eviction, the (lcmolition of buildings, arrest and a fine of R1,000 and six months' gaol. A I:~ndlord providing land or housing for what is considered illegal occupation Iilces a R2,000 fine or a year's imprisonment. Charges of trespass, which is a ( riminal and not a civil offence in South African law, and which carries heavy ocnalties (R2,000 fine and two years' imprisonment) are also to be used g gain st squatters and 'illegal' tenants. Moreover, the Housing Regulations for on-bantustan townships have not been repealed. These require that every I'crson living in a township must be listed on a lodger's permit. Superinten- tlcnts have wide discretion as to whether they grant lodgers' permits. They , ;ln refuse permits on the grounds that a house is overcrowded. Providing I~ousing for a tenant without a permit carries a heavy penalty for the landlord. I'hc locus of operation of controls on the urban population has thus shifted ~ i o m the workplace to the township, and the policing of the controls has 111oved out of the hands of employers into those of landlords. The passbooks I I I ; I [ all Africans had to carry on pain of arrest have been replaced by a new ~ll(.ntity document which is to be the same for all South Africans. The new tl~)cument is to contain details of name and address and fingerprints. A new ~q)ulat ion register has been established which will register details of I, ,,tdence. All landlords are obliged to inform the population registrar of their I ( il:lnrs. Despite the changes in the law, officials in the Department of Home \Il;iirs in Johannesburg were refusing in 1986 to issue identity documents ~ l ~ ~ l c s s a person could produce a house permit.47

42 Forced Removal

The new identity documents are to be issued to all people designated as South African citizens. This means that millions who are living or have lived in the bantustans deemed 'independent' have no right to the identity documents and will pobably only be able to find work in metropolitan and urban areas in terms of exploitative contracts. Despite promises made by P W Botha that citizenship would be restored to citizens of the TBVC bantustans the Restoration of South African Citizenship Act passed in July 1986 restored South African citizenship only to those deemed citizens of the TBVC bantustans who had always lived outside the bantustans, those who had lived outside the bantustans after their so-called independence for five years before the 1986 legislation, and those who might work outside the bantustans on legal contracts for five years after the legislation. The severe limitations even on these limited concessions became apparent by the end of 1986. TBVC people who had acquired Section 10(l)(b) rights found they were being refused identity documents and the restoration of South African citizenship if their families remained in the bantustans. Because of the enormous housing shortage many long-term workers outside the bantustans could not have their families join them. They are therefore disqualified from holding the new identity document because they cannot answer a question which requires them to state the date their family left the b a n t u ~ t a n . ~ ~

It has been estimated that only 1.75 million of the 9 million 'citizens' of the TBVC bantustans will qualify for a return of their South African citizenship." People coming from the TBVC bantustans to work must comply with the provisions of the Aliens Act on residence and work permits. Employers in urban centres will find it easier to employ people who have access to identity books, and for whom there are no bureaucratic difficulties in obtaining work permits. Employers of TBVC people have to fill in a monthly return of all 'aliens' in their employ, giving a host of details on each person. Those who take on TBVC workers without authorisation will be liable to prosecution under the Aliens Act which carries a fine of R5,000 and two years' gaol, while 'alien' workers can be fined R600 with six months' gaol. TBVC workers' work permits can be withdrawn at any time. Black Sash advice offices in the Cape reported in 1986 that women workers from the Transkei, who had had six month permits to work in Cape Town, suddenly found that their permits were withdrawn and they were instructed to return to agricultural work in the b a n t u ~ t a n . ~ ~ TBVC inhabitants are therefore to become foreign workers in the country of their birth with all the insecurity, threat of removal as aliens, discrimination and exploitative work conditions that status implies. Within months of the new pass laws being adopted Sheena Duncan of the Black Sash concluded that the new system was a harsher version of the old. In January 1987 she wrote:

In September 1985 when the State President announced that the pass laws were to be repealed I burst into tears in front of the television cameras. We believed it was true. We thought that maybe our advice offices would not be needed any more, or at

Forced Removals ~hrough he Puss Syslern 43

least that they would not be needed to deal with the same kind of problems. We were not cynical. We did rejoice and welcome the announcement.

Now we sit with the same long queues, the same heartbreaking stories of divided families, homeless people, people who need their pass to be fixed up because they cannot find work without it. It is all new law, a completely different system, but the problems and anxieties, the divisions and despair are the same.51

I'he new legislation fulfils the needs specified by a number of projects that l~ave been developed in the present phase of apartheid. It opens up the urban I,lbour market to employers, who had for years complained bitterly of the \killed and semi-skilled labour shortage created by dependence on a largely ~nigrant, unskilled workforce. The freeing of the labour market will enable employers to drive down wages for skilled and semi-skilled workers because o f the large pool of labour available in the urban areas. They will still have recourse to migrant labourers in the bantustans, especially the TBVC. But I he opening of the labour market does not entail any freedom of movement: workers are controlled by the availability of accommodation and the manipulation of their citizenship status.

The history of influx control legislation has shown how the laws limiting African access to the urban area have varied in intention, although often ,~ppearing the same. They have been used to protect whites' access to jobs, to maintain a migrant labour system, to undermine urban African political activism, both to prevent and to create the establishment of an unemployed ,lrmy of labour in the cities outside the bantustans, and to meet the needs of manufacturing industry for more flexible access to labour. Although newly perceived needs lead to new formulations of the law, older objectives remain. While influx-control legislation is a key to apartheid population control it also reveals how varied the strands of oppression that make up apartheid have heen.

OBJECTIVES OF THE INFLUX-CONTROL SYSTEM

Since 1948 the pass laws have had three main objectives. Firstly, as shown above, they have been used to limit the growth of the

urban African population and to perpetuate the widespread use of migrant labour in mining, manufacturing and farming. Migrant labour entails a I)crpetuation of low wages. Migrant labourers on one-year contracts were at one time attractive to employers as they were considered more malleable and ~ractable as workers. Their lack of job security made them less prone to h k e s and political activism. The insecure nature of the migrants' contracts ~ontinued to affect their working conditions even when employers devised \vstems to re-employ migrant workers each year to prevent a high labour I urnover.

Secondly, pass laws have been used to control the allocation of labour to tllfferent sectors of the economy. State regulation of recruitment through the

44 Forced Removal

labour bureaux therefore replaced competition between firms for labour. Competition played a minor part in determining wages of Africans, which have been mostly set through government wage boards. African wages have risen at a much slower rate than is usually the case with a growing industrial economy. 52

Thirdly pass laws have been used to control the physical location of unemployed Africans. Generally they have been removed from the urban industrial areas to rural areas and bantustans, where they form a reservoir of cheap labour and where the political threat they pose may be more easily controlled.

The pass laws have failed to achieve any of these three objectives. All the machinery of police, courts and bureaucrats have not prevented a mass defiance of the controls. People may go to prison, may be removed to bantustans, but they return illegally to the cities and attempt to evade arrest. In 1981 in reply to a parliamentary question the Minister of Co-operation and Development estimated that there were 85,500 Africans living and working illegally in Cape Town alone.53 Many researchers consider this estimate conservative. For many people there is no alternative to working illegally in an urban area. Families on farms or in the bantustans cannot survive without some wage remittance from the towns. Influx control has within it a contradictory dynamic. The laws have served to widen the differentials between urban and rural areas. The more poverty and unemployment are exported to the bantustans the greater the economic necessity for people to seek work in urban areas. In the words of one researcher, 'The more efficient the influx controls, the more necessary for people to violate them.'54

As a result of the 1986 legislation population control through influx control has acquired a new importance for the regime. These laws are intended to allow the state to appear neutral on the issue of housing, while landlords are forced to control access to housing and enforce prohibitions on urban residence. The regime believes this posture will enable it to depoliticise struggles around issues like housing and access to work and to relegate such conflicts to the workings of the 'market economy'. In the past every conflict over housing and jobs raised the issue of political power, because the state so clearly controlled access to both. By apparently removing state control the regime hopes to deflect the conflicts and prevent the question of political power being sharply and continually posed. Its strategy also remains to divide the black population. The pressures placed on African landlords to inform on their tenants are to be sweetened by financial inducements to encourage entrepreneurs in the townships. The preferential access to citizenship will deepen already existing divisions between urban and rural people, bantustan and non-bantustan residents. These new objectives do not supersede, but complement, the earlier intentions of influx-control legislation. However the prospects of the new legislation succeeding in its purpose are put into question by the heightened resistance of the mid-1980s and the way in which the issue of political power has been so sharply defined.

As Table 6 shows, the non-bantustan urban African population has

Forced Removals through the I'ass System 45

46 Forced H ernoaul

increased since 1950 in absolute terms far beyond the natural birth rate, even though influx control and other forms of urban removal have reduced the rate of growth of this population particularly in the 1970s. In the period 1946-5 1 the rate of increase of urban Africans was 6.6 per cent, while in the decade 1951-6 it was 4.5 per cent and in 1960-70 3.6 per cent; in the decade 1970-80 it was 2.2 per cent.55 Although influx control has reduced the rate of growth of this section of the African population, it has not prevented widespread urbanisation. In some respects the figures for 1970-80 are misleading. During this decade many millions of people came to work in the cities but, unable to find accommodation in the prescribed areas, they settled in huge squatter settlements in adjacent bantustans, and commuted to work in the industrial centres. Their presence is not reflected in the official figures cited above. The spectacular growth of bantustan towns in the last 20 years (see Tuble 6) contrasted with a relative decline in the growth of the non-bantustan urban population. Housing restrictions and influx control have forced a large population into bantustan towns who would otherwise have settled outside the bantustans.

Although migrant labour kept African wages down it also presented employers with problems of high labour turnover. These became particularly acute as mechanisation increased and the demand for semi-skilled workers grew. The welcome given to the Rikhoto judgement by industrialists reflected their need for a stable skilled workforce. Similarly the Riekert proposals to increase the mobility of urban workers between industrial centres gave factory owners access to a wider pool of skilled labour. But while a great deal of unemployment has been located in the bantustans, the pass laws were by no means successful in eliminating urban unemployment. In 1977 an estimate put South African unemployment at 2,313,000, that is, 22.4 per cent of the workforce. In that survey of the unemployed, carried out in the largest cities-researchers found between one quarter and two-thirds of young people living there were unemployed, confirming other research which estimated urban unemployment rates at the time as 19 per cent in Cape Town, 24 per cent in Pretoria and 29 per cent on the Witwatersrand.56 Nearly a decade later analysts considered that unemployment stood at between 4 and 6 million, about 48 per cent of the potentially economically active population. In Soweto in 1985 unemployment ranged between 60 per cent in the poorest areas and 44 per cent in the better-off zones. In Port Elizabeth it stood at 56 per cent. In most African townships 50 per cent of school-leavers were unable to find African wages have been depressed, but only partly as a result of influx control. Low wages are also the product of employers evading government measures like influx control. They admit that illegal workers 'work like hell. They're not under contract and they know you can fire them at the drop of a hat.'5x

The insecurity which influx control wa.s meant to induce failed to stem the militancy of workers or the emergence of African trade-union organization, first in the 1950s and again in the 1970s and 1980s. In both periods trade unions fought for and won some wage increases for African workers which

Forced Hernovuls through the Pass System 47

underpinned their popularity as workers' organisations. For example, in the 1980s in the textile industry, the metal industry, motorcar manufacture and the food-processing industry in certain regions rises in wages can clearly be attributed to trade union action.59 A survey of wage negotiations in the

I manufacturing sector in 1986 by a management consultancy firm concluded that trade unions had bolstered their members' pay by an average of 15 per cent in that year." However, these increases must be set in the context of

i around 16 per cent inflation and the low base from which African wages had to increase.

The new divisive legislation should be seen in the light of the unity created between urban and rural residents, both in and out of bantustans, particularly by the United Democratic Front. The strong demand, even from among African businessmen, for the unbanning of the African National Congress and for political participation for all illustrates the limits of the co-option strategy. Trade unions are working to minimise the victimisation of workers in the bantustans. For example, in response to a Department of Home Affairs letter in 1986 to all employers asking for particulars of 'alien' (i.e. TBVC employees), one union federation, the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) said, 'This is one area where employers can respond by not sending back the forms'. A spokesman for the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), representing 500,000 workers said:

I We will watch the whole thing closely. We know that some employers have sided with apartheid when it suited their interests. This is why we hold bosses responsible for the mess the country finds itself in.6'

The statement hints at union action to prevent workers being evicted to the TBVC bantustans. Attempts to sow disunity are clearly being resisted. However the failures of influx control should not obscure the horrors of its successes. Although it has not met and is unlikely to meet the objectives for which it was formulated, it has still blighted millions of lives, led to the impoverishment and exploitation of the African population and made the threat of removal as commonplace as the smoke in township air.

I HOW THE PASS SYSTEM WORKS

Before 1986 every African over 16 had to carry a reference book which contained an identity card, information on employment, population group, lamily details, and Section 10 qualifications. Failure or refusal to produce a reference book when demanded by police or Administration Board officials would result in a fine not exceeding R50 or imprisonment for up to three ~nonths. The pass laws meant that every African was under constant police mutiny. Nelson Mandela wrote in 1964:

I Pass laws, which to the Africans are among the most hated bits of legislation in South Africa, render any African liable to police surveillance at any time. I doubt whether there is a single African

48 Forced Removal Forced Removals through the PassSystem 49

male in South Africa who has not at some stage had a brush with the police over his pass.62

Since July 1986 all South Africans have had to carry an identity document which states their name and address and contains their fingerprints. To acquire this identity document those classified as White, Coloured or Indian need only produce their birth certificates, but Africans must produce, according to one official in the office issuing the books, 'birth certificate, marriage certificate, house permit and identity number so that the clerks can check if you qualify'.63

Before the 1968 legislation influx control, and the operation of the pass laws, hinged on rights of residence. It can be seen that people in urban areas outside the bantustans who had no rights in terms of birth or length of residence would, if they lost jobs or housing or had no passes, fall foul of the provisions of Section 10 and would be categorised as unemployed illegals. If arrested either they would be detained in police cells, from which they were referred to an Aid Centre or sent to the Commissioners' Court to face prosecution or they could be sent to Aid Centres for direct reference to the Labour Bureaux. Some of the people sent to an Aid Centre might have been referred to the Local Labour Bureau and placed in urban employment. Others might have been referred to the district labour bureaux for agricultural employment. Others might be sent to the Commissioners' Court and prosecuted. If found guilty by the court one of a number of things would happen. They might be referred back to the Aid Centre and Local Labour Bureau, or sent to prison for up to three months, or fined up to R100, or be removed to their place of birth in the rural areas, or be relocated in a resettlement site in the bantustans. From 1954 it was the practice that some African men arrested for technical offences were taken by police to district bureaux and 'offered' work in rural areas as farm labourers. If they refused this work they became liable for prosecution and imprisonment. Convicted prisoners, many serving sentences for pass offences, were hired out as labourers to farmowners for derisory pay in the 1950s. Similar schemes relating to prisoners on parole continued in subsequent decades.64

The risks of remaining illegally in town were high, but many people were prepared to take the risk because the urban areas are the only place they could make a living. They were prepared to calculate imprisonment and a fine as part of the cost of not starving. Having served a prison sentence the majority of people remained in the cities, even though they would have lost their Section 10 rights as a result of the pass offence. Mildred Mjekula, who since 1969 when she was 18 had worked in Johannesburg without the correct stamps and sometimes without a pass, told an interviewer in 1983:

I have had trouble with the police before. I have been arrested three times. The first and third times I went to court and the magistrate fined me R5. The second time I was discharged-I don't know why.

I am afraid to walk in the streets. When the police come, they

ask you for your pass and look for the stamp. Maybe you have a stamp for one year only and it is finished when the police look. They just put you in the van and take you to the police station.

. . . I was very scared when I first went there. And later. Most of my friends have also been in prison.65

But despite such experiences she has continued to work as a domestic servant: in the Transkei, from where she came 'you can look for work for one year and you won't find it'.

In the 'white' rural areas workers had two options: either to find work as farm labourers, or to register at a district labour bureau, wait until a requisition was received for labour, and then go to the towns as contract workers. When workers registered at a labour bureau they were placed in one of 17 categories of labour, for example farm worker, unskilled labourer, semi-skilled operative and so on. Once assigned to a category like farm worker it was almost impossible for a worker to change categories. Only when a vacancy in a particular category was registered with the district labour bureau would a contract worker in that category be allowed to take the job. Contract workers had permits to work in an urban area valid for work with

1 one employer for one year only. These permits could only be renewed in a bantustan or rural magistracy. In this way workers were forced to leave the urban area every year to renew their permits and to maintain the fiction that

I they were not permanent residents in the towns. Women could not register I for employment on contract at all. ! African women became migrant workers in three major waves. The first

wave began during the expansion of the industry in the 1940s and early 1950s before women had to carry passes. This wave continued even after women were coerced into the pass system and only came to an end with the

1 imposition of the Black Labour Regulations of 1968, which prohibited the I recruitment of bantustan women as migrant workers. The second wave of

{ ' women's migration was as illegal migrants. Many women, despite the prohibitions on their recruitment, risked fines and imprisonment rather than starvation and low wages and went to the main urban centres where many settled in squatter communities or to bantustan towns like Winterveld and Mdantsane where they could commute to work. The third wave of women's migration came with selective lifting of the Black Labour Regulations in response to shortages of labour in certain areas. For example, when new housing areas were proclaimed for Whites north of Johannesburg, women were recruited from the bantustans to meet the sudden expansion in demand for domestic servants.66

Generally Africans who grew up on white-owned farms were categorised as farm labourers and could not register for jobs in an urban area. During the 1979 moratorium on illegal employment, when people without permits were ~nvited to register their employment without jeopardy or prosecution, staff at Rlack Sash advice offices found that people born on farms were not allowed to &Ittest new contracts with urban employers because they were classified as

50 Forced Removal Forced Removals through the Pass System 5 1 I ' I ' 'farm labour'.67 From 1981 it became apparent that labour zoning was being applied quite strictly. Even people who found jobs and had accx~m~nodation were not automatically registered at a Local Labour Burcau unless rhcy had Section 10 rights. It is unclear whether labour zoning will still bc pr;lcriscd in the wake of the Abolition of Influx Control Act. but thc narurc of the decentralisation schemes makes this seem likely (see Chapter 5).

In the bantustans a worker might register with a bantustan labour bureau or assembly point, hoping to be recruited on contract, rather than face long-term unemployment as employment opportunities in the bantustans themselves were sparse. But, despite an attested contract, a municipal or district labour officer might refuse to sanction the employment of the worker recruited in the bantustan. The grounds for refusal might have been the lack of suitable accommodation, or the presence of unemployed Africans already in the area. The residents of manv bantustan towns are commuters rather than long-distance contract workers. They live in the bantustans, but commute, often as much as 100 kilometres away daily to their jobs. Some bantustan residents commute even longer distances as weekly commuters. The number of commuters grew from 420,000 in 1970 to 719,000 in 1980 on conservative estimates.68 By 1982 official statistics put the total at 773,000 (see Table 12).

For all people from rural areas, bantustan and non-bantustan alike, the alternative to registration and recruitment through the labour bureau was to travel to the industrial areas without an endorsement in a reference book. They then looked for work on their own initiative, but risked arrest, removal back to the rural areas and repetition of the whole process. It is this route that the Riekert Commission sought to outlaw by making it impossible to travel, take lodgings or work without an endorsement in a reference book.

The new influx control or controlled urbanisation system works in a different way. Workers in search of higher wages will leave white-owned farms or the bantustans for the urban areas of employment. If they come from the TBVC bantustans they will often be leaving as illegal 'aliens' in terms of South African law. Workers must attempt to find housing-either by renting a room or building a shack in a squatter camp. If this housing is declared illegal they move to another squatter camp or lodging house and so on, often via prison and the courts. In time the frustration of constant removal and lack of settled housing may force the worker into a bantustan town in which he or she falls subject to the political power of the bantustan authorities and must commute to the urban centres. For TBVC citizens, conviction as alien workers also takes them through the courts and prisons and entails eviction back to the bantustans.

Arrests under the pass laws were made by members of the South African Police and officials of the Administration Boards. Under the new legislation evictions and removals from housing deemed illegal are to carried out by commissioners with jurisdiction over African areas and by officers of the local authorities. Under the Aliens Act 'aliens' are arrested, charged and removed by the police. The tendency has been for officers of the local authorities to

play a greater role in enforcing pass laws, almost superseding the South African Police in this respect. In 1982 out of the 206,022 pass arrests throughout the country over half, a total of 112,646, were made by officers of the Administration Boards rather than by police.

The form of local government in African areas has undergone a number of changes. Some of the powers of Administration Boards were ceded to local councils in 1983 when a form of African municipal government was established. The Administration Boards themselves, renamed Development Boards in 1982, are due to be dissolved into Regional Service Councils which will centralise regional administration for all the people in a particular area. Officials of the boards and councils have extensive powers of search and inspection, which they can use if they believe a breach of influx control laws has been committed.69 The many attacks on councillors and officers of boards in 1984-86 brought to light the contempt in which their communities held them. Court cases arising from these events highlighted many instances of fraud and bribes involving councillors and board employees in the granting of land and employment permits.70

The Bantu Commissioners' Courts where, until September 1984, offences ( under the influx control laws were tried, handled one third of all people sent to trial in South Africa each year. They were described by a professor of law as conveyor belts, which travestied notions of legal justice. 71 In the Johannesburg courts an average of one case was heard every two minutes.

f Where there was no legal representation cases lasted on average one case per minute. The commissioners who heard the cases were appointed by the Minister of Co-operation and Development. They were assisted by prosecu- tors, appointed by the Attorney-General, who had little legal training and were generally promoted from clerks or interpreters. Lawyers commented on the prosecutors' lack of experience of the laws of evidence and criminal procedure, which resulted in numerous procedural irregularities, underlining the fact that justice was manifestly not being seen to be done.72

People charged under the pass laws rarely had legal representation. In 1983, for example, 1 per cent of the 284,000 people who had appeared in Commissioners' Courts in the major urban area were legally r e p r e ~ e n t e d . ~ ~ A study in 1983 of the Johannesburg Commissioners' Court revealed that the presence of a lawyer dramatically altered a commissioner's attitude to a case ; ~ n d exposed the weakness in many cases brought against people charged as (dfenders. The majority of commissioners had no command of African languages. They were entirely dependent on interpreters for information and had 'no way of knowing the accuracy of the interpretation nor of whether the ~.l~arges have been fairly put to an accused'.74 In prosecutions under Section 14 of the Urban Areas Act, which provided for the removal of illegal residents

0 1 an urban prescribed area, the accused were presumed to be guilty and lllllawfully in the urban area until they could prove the contrary:

Y This relieves the state of the common law burden of proving the case against the accused beyond a reasonable

52 Forced Removal Forced Removals through the Pass System 53

The study concluded that 'all too often justice is sacrificed in the interests of haste'76 The Hoexter Commission on Legal Reform, reporting in 1983, found that Commissioners' Courts trying pass offences were an anomaly. The commission found:

That inhabitants of the same country should purely on the grounds of race be criminally prosecuted in separate courts for any offence whatever, is . . . by any civilised standard unneces- sary, humiliating and repugnant.'77

On the recommendations of the commission the Commisioners' Courts were removed from the jurisdiction of the Department of Co-operation and Development and placed under the Department of Justice from September 1984. From that date on pass law offences were tried in magistrates' courts, and the procedures began to change. In the Johannesburg courts an average of 30 cases a day were being heard, in contrast to 200 a day previously. Many cases were dismissed by the magistrate because a basic tenet of the particular law had not been applied, or if people were not brought before the court within 48 hours of arrest. Around 60 per cent of people arrested daily in Johannesburg were being released before their cases came to court, because there were no sworn statements made by the arresting In Cape Town bail conditions were being imposed, many cases were being thrown out because witnesses were not available, and the average sentence had fallen from R70 or 70 days to R50 or 25 days.79

Even in the new system legal representation was inadequate. There were no proper consulting facilities for lawyers, who found that their clients were not informed of their rights to bail, to defend themselves, or to call witnesses.s0 In spite of certain reforms in court procedure, thousands of South Africans are still being arrested daily merely for trying to live and work. The legislation using housing as an instrument of influx control will lead to many thousands of prosecutions for trespass and illegal squatting coming before magistrates' and Commissioners' Courts.PThe Aid Centres, like the courts exhibited many features of harsh bureaucratic control. They date from 1964, and were conceived as an attempt to take the burden of prosecutions off the Commissioners' Courts, or in Riekert's words,

to limit criminal proceedings against, and the detention of, persons contravening the control measures to the offender who is guilty of repeated offences and to afford the circumstantial or 'technical' offender the opportunity to get his affairs in order.*'

Before the 1986 legislation there were 17 Aid Centres throughout the country. Table 5 analyses how Aid Centres processed cases referred to them. It is evident that they never fulfilled either of their intended roles. They did not significantly assist people either to avoid prosecution or to find jobs. Only in the last two years for which data is available, 1979 and 1981, did the number of prosecutions fall below the number not prosecuted, and even in these years the gap between the two figures is small. The number of people

assigned jobs by the Aid Centres remained a small proportion of the total number of referrals. According to Riekert between 1975 and 1977 Aid Centres throughout the country removed 50,000 Africans each year to the bantustan^.^^ Table 5 gives slightly lower figures than Riekert for 1976, but higher figures for 1975. The table also shows that removals to the bantustans through Aid Centres continued to 1979. Given the increase in unemployment after this date it is likely that removals of this type continued at an even higher rate until the 1986 legislation abolished Aid Centres.

People who were arrested were taken to the Commissioners' Courts in police or Administration Board vans and then bundled into Aid Centre cells. There they were interviewed by officials of the Department of Co-operation and Development, working through interpreters, who inquired in detail into the arrested person's history and took his or her fingerprints. The Aid Centre's primary task was to check on all the information provided. Thus all Africans arrested under the pass laws were first interviewed at an Aid Centre, although people who referred themsleves to Aid Centres were not prose- cuted. If the person was to be prosecuted the Aid Centre made a written recommendation to the magistrate. A study made in 1982 of the Langa Aid

i Centre in Cape Town, concluded that Aid Centres primarily aided the magistrate in undertaking his work of investigation, but that aid to the accused was minimal.83 The study pointed out that, despite the official claims to the contrary, people were not encouraged to come to Aid Centres of their own accord. The Abolition of Influx Control Act of 1986 abolished Aid Centres.

Conviction under the influx-control laws entail heavv fines or months in prison for low-paid workers. In a study of the Langa Commissioners' Court, it was estimated that 45 per cent of all people convicted of pass offences paid

! their fines, while the rest served prison sentence^.^^ In 1979 R351,028 was collectcd in the Cape Peninsula in fines for influx-control offences: R245,648 was paid by individual offenders, while R105,380 was paid by employers who had employed workers illegally.85 It is likely that similar large amounts in fines will be collected through prosecutions for housing offences and the persecution of 'alien' labourers under the 1986 legislation.

In the present period of economic recession strict controls on labour zoning are being applied. Some rural areas, remote from labour bureaux and towns, I have been declared unofficially 'closed' to all recruiters, bar farmers who, with this huge pool of labour to draw on, can pay derisory wages and impose extremelv harsh work conditions without fear of losing workers.x6 In urban

II -

areas certain job categories in the service sector and the construction industry were closed to contract workers. Section 10 qualifiers were being forced to

I take work they would previously have avoided because of low pay. This was termed the local labour preference There is evidence of this trend extending into manufacturing. For example in 1982 residents of the neri-urban areas of Inanda and Ndwedwe, on the outskirts of Durban. found ;hey could no longer take work in the ~ t r b a n urban area unless thdy were requisitioned through their local Labour Bureau at V e r ~ l a m . ~ g Work in

54 Forced Removal

Durban appeared to be closed to all except those registered as living within it. Similarly, commuter workers from Bophuthatswana, working in Rosslyn adjacent to the bantustan, found in 1985 when they had to have their annual contracts renewed that they were dismissed and frequently replaced by workers from the non-bantustan townships in the area like Mamelodi and ~ t t e r i d ~ e v i l l e . ~ ~ These practices meant that bantustan residents found it increasingly difficult to find work in manufacturing, and were being forced into contract work on farms and mines, or long-distance commuting. The abolition of Section 10 in 1986 may have removed the legal underpinning to these but the trend towards recruiting local rather than bantustan labou; continues.

There has also been a trend to zoning labour in accordance with apartheid's divisions of the population. Table 7 shows, on the basis of figures from two ~dminis t ra t ion Boards in Natal, that over a three-year period there has been a marked tendency to reduce the employment of people from all bantustans other than Kwazulu. These figures are borne out by evidence from elsewhere in the country. In 1978 men removed to Ilinge in the Transkei found it impossible to get permits to work on a road-construction project at Cathcart in the Eastern Cape because they were from the Transkei bantustan. The Chief Director of the Eastern Cape Administration Board said that it was government pol!y that priority should be given to workseekers in the immediate area. Only when suitable labour is not available in the immediate district are people from other districts considered,' he said.90

This trend towards labour zoning has the effect of underpinning government plans for a federal South Africa based on a regulated demographic distribution of workers in decentralised industrial areas.91 However, labour zoning was first practised in the early 1 9 7 0 ~ ~ before these plans were formulated, when certain Administration Boards encouraged employers to recruit workers from adjacent bantustans. But Riekert found that this was not happening on any large scale, and in his report advised against legislation on labour zoning. H e considered that each Administration Board could implement appropriate policies.92 The trend for certain boards to zone labour rigidly accelerated with the recession: they aimed to keep down unemployment in their areas by refusing employment to people from further afield. The effect of labour zoning is similar to that of influx control as used in the 1950s and 1960s to secure adequate supplies of labour to specific sectors of the economy. Moreover labour zoning appears to be used in conjunction with control on housing to limit the access of bantustan residents to non-bantustan towns. The Black Sash advice offices reported the case of a woman from Gazankulu, who when she heard of the abolition of the pass laws came to Johannesburg. Her husband had lived for many years in a hostel as a migrant worker. She applied to the Soweto Mayor for a house site but was told that sites were not for people from outside so wet^.^^ As housing is now the prerequisite for employment labour zoning continues despite the changes in the law.

The immediate effect of these policies has been and will continue to be that

i Forced Removals through the Pass System 55

workers will tend to be recruited on lines dictated by the bantustan policy. (krtain workers in certain bantustans will be denied access to better-paid i-~ty-based jobs. They are kept administratively in the bantustans as a huge I;~bour reservoir. Their wages can therefore be sharply depressed, an ~,~nployer can impose long hours of work, and the harshest of work conditions ;Ire perpetuated. Workers permitted to leave bantustans to settle in urban and ~netropolitan areas will be little better off, competing for scarce jobs and inadequate housing.

SOME EFFECTS OF INFLUX CONTROLS.

'fable 8 shows the number of arrests, prosecutions and convictions under the pass laws over nearly thirty years. It can be seen that the number of prosecutions rose dramatically in the early 1960s as the regime tried vigorously to prevent the bantustan population settling in non-bantustan Lowns. Although the number of prosecutions declined from 1972, the number of cases dealt with by Aid Centres increased from that date although i t fell after 1976 (see Table 5).

Table 9 shows the numbers of Africans endorsed out of urban areas as a result of conviction under the pass laws. While it has been argued that many such people remain in the prescribed area because they would rather risk a Surther arrest and continue to have access to work, the declining non- bantustan urban population growth rate since 1970 (see Table 6) also shows that an equally large number of people do return to the bantustans, and hope LO gain work through the labour bureau system. Some of the life histories quoted below show the oscillation of families between the bantustans and the prescribed areas, as they try to evade the web of official restrictions, arrest and imprisonment.

Probably every African in South Africa has a tale to tell of the restrictions and hardships influx control brought into their lives. Perhaps the most heart rending cases are those of young people, separated indefinitely from their parents and relatives because of these laws. The Black Sash offices in Cape Town publicised the case of one such young child. He was born in Cape 'rown. His parents died when he was very young. Brought up by relatives he had no birth certificate and no death certificates for his parents. He was endorsed out of the area away from the only family he knew because he could not produce this documentation, and his application for a late registration of his birth was refused because he had no permit to be in the area. This is one of many thousands of such stories.

In 1982 Marcus Motaung, sentenced to death for his part in ANC armed actions against police stations and railway lines, told the court in his plea in mitigation of some of the circumstances in his life that had led him to join Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC:

I would start off by mentioning the raids, being raided for permits. We stay in small houses. We are crowded in these houses. If one has a visitor in these houses the police come and

56 Forced Remoual Forced Removals t/~rouyh he l'uss Sys~em 57

arrest him solely because he has no permit to be in that house. One would ask himself the question why would this person be arrested, because he is South African? Why should he be arrested for not having a permit in so wet^?^^

The effects of the pass laws were summed up by a Cape Town worker:

When you are out of a job, you realise that the boss and the government have the power to condemn you to death. If they send you back home (and back home now there's a drought) and you realise you can't get any new job, it's a death sentence. The countryside is pushing you into the cities to survive, and the cities are pushing you into the countryside to d i ~ . ~ ~

DEFIANCE AND RESISTANCE

The pass laws have awakened two forms of resistance in the people they are designed to repress. Firstly there has been mass defiance, which merely ignores the law. Hundreds of thousands have come to non-bantustan towns in search of work even though they are termed illegals, and are liable to arrest. This defiance is mainly the act of individuals, individually compelled through poverty to risk imprisonment. The spirit of such people, up against enormous odds, was captured in a scene in the Langa pass courts. A man told the court he had a valid contract and was not guilty of a pass offence. He was referred to an Aid Centre, which established he had no contract. When he reappeared in court he was asked why he had lied. 'What can a man do?' he replied. 'He must surely take a chance.'96

Families and people from the same area in the country often provide a network of support for illegals, helping people to find jobs and accommoda- tion, providing fines after a pass raid, and caring for children if their parents have to serve prison sentences. It is these relations of mutual support in the face of shared hardship and a common enemy that the Riekert strategy, the 1984 legislation on aliens and the 1986 legislation on housing were designed to fragment.

The second form of resistance to pass laws has formed part of the mass campaigns of the political movements that have organised and led the opposition to apartheid. In the 1950s when pass laws were extended to African women the ANC organised a nationwide campaign against passes. There were demonstrations in hundreds of towns and a mass rally in Pretoria in 1956 when 20,000 women gathered from all over the country to bring petitions stating their opposition to passes. In Zeerust the protest against the extension of passes to women intersected with a campaign against black-spot removal and thc establishment of Bantu Authorities. Militant defiance of the authorities was met with repression and mass arrests. It was only by tying pensions and work opportunities to the possession of passes that the authorities could force passes on to African women. But opposition to passes, coupled with pass-burning campaigns, was intense throughout the late 1950s.

A pass-burning demonstration in Sharpcville in 1960 called by the Pan Africanist Congress was met by policc firing on the crowd, killing 69 people. A week later a State of Emergency was declared and the mass-based anti-a~artheid organisations outlawed.

FO; nearly two dccadcs there was no organised resistance to the pass laws. But rejection of the Riekert strategy andtits legislative expression in the Koornhof bills was a powerful factor in the emergence of a new level of organisation of popular resistance. The UDF was formed to unite all forms of popular organisation-civic associations, youth organisations, women's groups, religious bodies, sports clubs, and self-help circles-against legisla- tion designed to undermine the unity forged in suffering.

In the words of the UDF Declaration:

We say no to the Koornhof Bills, which will deprive more and more African people of their birthright. We say yes to the birth of the UDF on this historic day. We know that the government is determined to break the unity of our people, that our people will face greater hardships, that our people living in racially segre- gated and relocated areas will be cut off from the wealth they produce in the cities, that rents and other basic charges will increase and that our living standards will fall, that working people will be divided race from race, urban from rural, employed from unemployed, men from women . . . Mindful of the fact that the new constitutional proposals and Koornhof measures will further entrench apartheid and white domination, we commit ourselves to uniting all our people, wherever they may be, in the cities and countryside, the factories and mines, schools, colleges, and universities, houses and sports fields, churches, mosques and temples, to fight fur our freedom. We therefore resolve to stand shoulder to shoulder in our common struggle . . .97

This form of organised popular resistance to the Koornhof bills, and subsequent legislation in the Riekert mould, continued after the establish- ment of the UDF in 1983. In May 1985 when the Laws on Co-operation and 1)evelopment Amendment Bill was published, extending Section 10 rights, I)r Ntatho Motlana of the Soweto Civic Association responded:

It is too late in the day for the Government to tamper with the influx control laws. This is the kind of action that will satisfy nobody. We urge the government to move bodly forward to abolish forthwith the pass laws and the Group Areas Act so as to give blacks the kind of freedom of movement that is given to other citizens whose colour is not black.

. \ Johannesburg UDF spokesman pointed out:

The Bill is nothing new. It is an old divide and rule tactic of the

58 Forced Remuvul Forced Removals through the PassSystem 59

Government. We insist that black people are one and that there is no urban or rural black person and that no one should be limited in his or her movements in the c o ~ n t r y . ' ~

The organised resistance of the U D F and their campaigns, demonstrations, and ability to mobilise large sections of the population, and inspire others, has been an important limiting factor on the implementation of the Riekert strategy. Influx control has also become a major issue taken up by trade unions and workers in an organised fashion. In 1984, according to a labour lawyer:

A substantial proportion of strikes is related to job security issues such as dismissals and retrenchments because of consequences that flow from influx control.yy

Recently trade unions have been forthright in their condemnation of pass arrests. Mass pass raids in the Transvaal in August 1984 led to protests from several unions. In March 1986 after a meeting between the executive of the newly formed Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the ANC and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in Lusaka, a communique was issued which affirmed:

It has become imperative that the workers of our country, together with all the democratic forces, work together to destroy the pass laws-the badge of slavery-and the whole system of influx control and prevent the Botha regime from re-introducing the hated system in any guise w h a t s o e ~ e r . ' ~ ~

In response to the change in the pass laws in 1986 COSATU reported that its branches were

outraged . . . because it divided the rural comrades from those in the urban areas. It has turned people into aliens thus making it even more difficult for them to have access to jobs and facilities. lo '

COSATU reaffirmed its commitment to resolutions passed at its launch in 1985 where workers had committed themselves to:

Fight for the right of workers to seek work wherever they wish and to reside with their families wherever they wish and that proper housing be provided as a right for all workers and their families near their place of work; [and to]

Call for a national strike should the apartheid regime carry out its threats to repatriate any migrant workers.lOl

announcement in 1986 the ANC declared through Radio Freedom:

We must prevent the regime from dragging us into their control network by refusing to carry the documents which help them in their work. This is part of our growing struggle to exercise popular control over our own land . . . when we burn the dompas, we have to move to break down the fences of locations, ghettos and bantustan borders.lo4

This signals a movement beyond the politics of protest at influx control. In seeking to establish centres of people's power where pass laws and controls on movement are ignored, the ANC is envisaging a fusion of the long-standing defiance of influx control with organised resistance.

CONCLUSION

Government planners and strategists see the future of influx control in the depoliticisation of the conflicts the pass laws create. They envisage a shift from control by [he police to greater use of administrative controls on housing, recruitment and employment. None of the contemporary strategists of apartheid envisage abandoning population control. They are concerned to rationalise it and use it to serve a co-ordinated set of policy objectives, relating to decentralisation of industry and ease of movement for skilled workers. Influx control, however varied, will continue to be used to keep down African wages, provide adequate labour for all sectors of the economy, move the unemployed from towns and cities and maximise the use of skilled African workers. In no way are the removals associated with influx control likely to cease as a result of any strategy designed to change the instrument of control from a document to a house. Moreover this new strategy has reawakened organised resistance on a scale not seen since the 1950s. This resistance will not be halted by a change in the form of influx control.

CUSA also reiterated its commitment to eradicate all aspects of control on workers' mobility. lo3

The ANC, operating underground, has constantly stressed the need for opposition to the pass laws. In response to the new identity document

60 Forced Kemovul

CHAPTER 3

Urban policy and forced removals Two of the most important trends in South Africa since 1950 have been the forced removal of the black urban population into segregated conglomerate townships adjacent to 'white' cities and the further removal of thousands of African urban residents from the towns of 'white' South Africa to bantustan towns. Up to the mid-1960s virtually every major South African town saw the uprooting of the people from mixed areas and their segregation into Coloured, Indian and African townships. In the period 1960-70 197 'white' towns experienced a decrease in their African population despite the overall increase of the urban African population.' By 1980 the total urban African population of South Africa was at least 7 million, of whom between 5 and 6 million lived in areas outside the bantustans and 2 million lived in bantustan t0wns.l

Control of the population by means of urban removals has appeared in a number of guises. Behind these removals lies a strategy for securing access to black urban labour, while minimising the political challenge to white supremacy such labour might pose. Enforcing residential segregation was an important part of this strategy at an early stage. In later periods different means have been used: chiefly removing existing African townships into bantustans and developing bantustan towns whose residents commute to work outside the bantustans. This policy served both the initial political rationale for the establishment of bantustans (that is, providing bantustan leaders with a constituency and a population of the kind from whom civil servants could be recruited), and the later role as reserves of labour and catchment areas for the unemployed.

The three decades since the National Party came to power can be categorised as follows: 1950-60 was a period of substantial African migration to urban areas; 1960-70 was a period of massive state efforts to reverse this process by means of the pass laws, housing policy and forced removals of African townships into the bantustans; 1970-80 was a period of a slower movement to the bantustans, the elimination of locations in small towns, and an attempt to replace settled urban workers with migrant^.^

The crisis, evident since the late 1970s, has prompted many debates about urban policy in ruling circles. The debates have focused on four aspects of urbanisation: housing policy, control of squatters, the question of urban Africans in the Western Cape, and decentralisation strategy. An intensive struggle over policy has emerged, whose outcome is still to be decided (for a full discussion see Chapter 5) .

JOHANNESBURG

CITY CENTRE

Urban Policy and Forced Removals 61 I

'fhis chapter focuses on various forms of urban removal in the different I,criods, some of which are still being carried out today. It deals with urban I cinovals that have resulted from early apartheid policies- Group Areas I-cmovals, removals to consolidate African townships and removals as a result OI the Coloured Labour Preference Policy -as well as the process initiated in ; I subsequent phase of apartheid of relocating townships in bantustans. It also 1 \rlrveys the beginnings of the growth of large squatter communities around I he major metropolitan areas and highlights the constant removals suffered I,y squatters, particularly in the Western Cape.

GROUP AREA REMOVALS

I'he Asiatic Land Tenure Laws Amendment Committee, established by the lirst National Party government in one of its first actions, recommended in 1950 that a total separation of the various 'population groups' should be carried out and that people should be removed to areas assigned to thei; xroup. These recommendations were enacted in the Group Areas Act of 1950, which stipulated that certain areas would be proclaimed as Group Areas in which only members of a particular group might live, own property, and conduct business. This Act was facilitated by, and was indeed the corollary to, two earlier laws which had institutionalised the division and

I

I

Il

I

;il

I

M a p 6: Segregated Residential Areas: Group Areas and African Townships on the West Rand.

62 Forced Removal

classification of the population into separate groups on the basis of a combination of language, descent, skin colour and so on. These were the Population Registration Act of 1950, which provided for the issuing of identity cards indicating the group to which a person had been assigned, and the Prohibition on Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, which made intermarriage between groups illegal. The Group Areas Act meant that Indian and Coloured residents who had been long settled in city centres close to and intermingled with whites, began to be removed to outlying townships. The Group Areas Act was not used to enforce the segregation of the urban African population as this was already provided for in the 1945 Urban Areas Act, but African families living in an area proclaimed as a Coloured, White or Indian Group Area had to move. The act gave the government control over all property transactions between the different groups and over occupation of land. Thereafter it could decide where the different groups could live. Local authorities were obliged to plan Group Areas and to suggest their location to a Group Areas Board.

Planning Group Areas, buying out property owners who found themselves living in the wrong Group Area, compensating traders and establishing new segregated Indian and Coloured townships, has been a long drawn-out process. The establishment of Group Areas was considerably assisted in 1966 by additional legislation which froze all Indian and Coloured rights of land ownership and occupation in areas that had not yet been proclaimed as Group Areas. Nevertheless the total residential segregation of the population envisaged in the 1950 legislation is not yet complete. The Group Areas policy has however been consistently sustained, and only now is some of the legislation being revised.

A number of adjustments in Group Area legislation were conceded after 1973. New legislation was gazetted in 1977 in response to recommendations of the Theron Committee which examined the conditions of the Coloured population and its position within the apartheid system. The regulations stipulated firstly that industrial areas outside the Group Areas would not be reserved for white-owned factories exclusively. Indian and Coloured entrep- reneurs would be free, with the State President's permission, to establish factories in those industrial estates if they wished. Secondly, some Coloured and Indian retailers were permitted to open shops in areas outside the allocated group area.4 In 1984 the Group Areas Amendment Act repealed certain sections of the original legislation and made it possible for the State President to deproclaim group areas and open them for trading, commerce, professional practice and education by all groups. But residence was still to be limited to the population group for whom a Group Area was originally declared.

The present trend in Group Areas proclamations is to declare regional Group Areas close to growth points outlined in the decentralisation strategy (see Chapter 5). Growth points with preferential access to development funds for industrial investment promise lucrative employment for skilled Coloured

Urbun Policy und Forced Kemoz~uls 63

~uild Indian workers. These adjustments and amendments, while in no way undercutting the fundamental principle of segregation., concede certain privileges to members of the Coloured and Indian middle class and skilled xtisans. These sections of the population have been key targets in the rcgime's attempts to co-opt sectors of the black population. The inauguration o f the new segregated tricameral parliament in January 1985, with separate White, Indian and Coloured chambers and cabinets has been the most striking political demonstration of this.

Group Areas legislation has had several objectives. It has been a means to cnforce a system of residential segregation in urban areas which supports the population classification system refined by the apartheid p ~ l i c y . ~ It became a way of splitting up and keeping the black urban population in separate areas which facilitated control and hampered organisation.' At one stage the Group Areas legislation had a specific part in government policy concerning the Indian population. The National Party election manifesto in 1948 called for the 'repatriation' of South Africans of Indian descent:

The party holds the view that the Indians are an alien, foreign element which can never be assimilated. They can never become natives of this country and must be treated as an immigrant community .8

The intermediate step before the realisation of this goal was the removal of Indians to separate group areas with prohibitions placed on their ability to live, trade or own property in 'white areas'. This immediate separation became an election promise which was carried out in the legislation of 1950. The new law also served to meet the demands of commercially precarious ~ Afrikaner traders for legislation limiting their competition from more solidly established Indian retailers.' As the decade progressed Indian repatriation proved impossible and the manifold delays in implementing the 1950 legislation became apparent. However, the widespread popular militancy of Ji

the 1950s gave the Group Areas Act a new political rationale. In the I repressive period of the 1960s it was used to break up the mixed communities i

of the inner cities in an attempt to undermine the unity between Indian, i Coloured and African, which had been given concrete expression with the formation of the Congress Alliance and at the Congress of the People in 1955. What could no1 be achieved in terms of maintaining white political i

supremacy through the banning of political organisations, the use of trials and long prison sentences, might be facilitated if the communities which

i sustained the opposition were dispersed.

In the most recent period Indian and Coloured communities removed in I I

terms of the Group Areas Act have generally experienced better conditions in the new townships, compared to those in African areas. In Indian and Coloured townships better housing, better roads, a wider range of facilities and greater proximity to industrial areas have all served the government's

~ i

attempt to widen the gulf between the various groups. However the rejection of this co-option process was underlined by the boycott of elections to the I

i

64 Forced Removal Urban Policy and Forced Removals 65

new segregated parliament in 1984. Only 18 per cent of Coloured voters registered actually voted in 1984, while according to the government figures only 20 per cent of registered Indian voters voted. Many did not even register to vote, and it is believed that the actual number of Indian voters was closer to 12 per cent of the voting age p~pulat ion.~()

Implementation of the Group Areas legislation involved gross disposses- sion. Although Group Areas Boards were meant to value the property lost and award compensation, the awards rarely compensated at the market value and could not make up for the loss of long-term investments. Once a Group Area was proclaimed, a property owner of the wrong group for the area could continue to hold property in the area for the rest of his or her life without occupying it. After their death their heirs had one year to sell the holdings: whatever the market conditions, they were obliged to sell.

Government spokesmen talked of the forced removal of Coloured and Indian communities as 'slum clearance', pointing to the new housing that was provided. Improvement in conditions, however, was not the predominant impression formed by other observers who noted, for example, the bleak housing estates on exposed parts of the Cape coast to which Coloured communities of the Peninsula were moved and the lack of transport and high rents experienced as major probleins in Phoenix, an Indian township in Durban to which people were removed under the Group Areas Act." In Johannesburg, Western Native Township was designated a Coloured Group Area after Africans had been removed in the 1950s. So many people were crowded into the township, as the Transvaal Coloured population grew, that, far from the removals securing 'slum clearance', they in fact resulted in the area becoming a slum.12

People were removed from well-established integrated environments to tightly controlled and barren landscapes. Removals usually meant large numbers of people crowded into areas with little or no facilities. For example, in Elsies River people who moved from their homes into flats faced bleak conditions. One woman complained to the newspaper in 1977:

I am sick and tired of living in Clarke's Estate [flats]. I was better off in my shack in Elsies River, but here I have to pay a high rent for mouldy walls and a blocked toilet.13

There were no play facilities for children. Extended families had been broken up by forced removals. This left children with neither facilities nor family care, as the majority of parents were at work.14 Removal could mean loss of access to jobs. Thousands of families, for example, who had for decades worked fishing boats in the bay suburbs of the Cape Peninsula were moved to Coloured townships many miles from a harbour.

The number of families forced to move through the operation of this legislation is shown in Table 10. Very few Whites have been affected compared with the large numbers of Coloured and Indian families. A large number of Africans have also been dispossessed, although there are no

statistics that illustrate the full extent. In 1961 it was estimated that in Durban alone 80,000 Africans had been affected by Group Area removals.15 'l'hese probably represent a fraction of Africans moved under this act ~hroughout the country since 1950.

Litigation has been one of the main instruments used by Indian and (loloured communities in resisting Group Areas removal. Long-drawn-out cases have been fought contesting eviction notices, property valuations and [lie quality of accommodation provided in new townships. On the whole it is mainly the wealthy members of the communities who have been able to ;ifford the legal cost involved in contesting removal notices, but their actions have often held up the removal of a whole community for many years. I'ageview in Johannesburg, for example, was declared a White Group Area in 1956. Protracted legal battles were fought and nearly 30 years later in 1982 67 Indian families remained and had sought an interdict restraining the Department of Community Development from carrying out further cvictions.16 An action was brought by a Pageview family in 1984 challenging [heir eviction on the grounds that it ran counter to the intention of the new constitution. The family maintained that matters pertaining to the Indian community could now only be dealt with by Indian 'own affairs' authorities, and they could not be evicted by white 'own affairs' officials. This was dismissed by the courts in 1986. However, in a separate action by t l ~ e community through the Save Pageview Association, the Department of Community Development had been forced to withdraw eviction orders against 60 families because of mistakes in the notices.''

Yet however long-drawn-out the legal battles on points of detail and interpretation, the law provides no ultimate protection for people fighting Group Area removals. Once all the inconsistencies in removal notices have been ironed out communities are obliged to leave their homes for assigned Group Areas. Often the removals evoke vehement anger: some of the people removed from Pageview in 1982 ignored the Group Areas Act and returned to their former homes. This happened persistently in District Six, the centre of the Coloured community of Cape Town, between 1966 and 1976 when the last Coloured and Indian families were removed and the area was totally given over to white occupation. But until the houses of District Six were actually bulldozed or bought up by white property developers many evicted families clung tenaciously to the shreds of their past amongst the ruins of their community.

In recent years, because of the housing shortage in Coloured and Indian townships large numbers of Indian and Coloured people, mainly employed in central Johannesburg, have moved into housing in 'White' areas in defiance of the Group Areas Act. Actstop, a pressure group which supported the move and which has campaigned for the repeal of the Group Areas legislation, cstimated in 1983 that they numbered close on 12,000, many in the Hillbrow and Joubert Park areas of the city, mainly in flats.lx In 1986 it was estimated that 66 per cent of the population of Mayfair, an inner-city area of Johannesburg once occupied by white workers, were black.19 Despite

66 Forced Removal Urban Policy and Forced Removals 67

extreme hostility and abuse from many of their neighbours and frequent harassment by the police the new tenants have remained. Their chances of continued occupation were considerably enhanced by a judgement in a test case brought by Actstop in 1982. The Pretoria Supreme Court ruled in the Govender case that eviction should not follow convictions for Group Areas contraventions unless alternative accommodation was available. So although it is illegal (in terms of the Group Areas Act) for Indian and Coloured people to live in Central Johannesburg, the law is unenforceable because there is no alternative accommodation and they cannot be evicted. However, even though defiance of the law has won an important area of concession, the judgement itself does not offer total protection: landlords can now be prosecuted and fined, discouraging them from defying the law by renting flats to Coloured and Indian families.20

Despite the intention of the Group Areas legislation to create barriers between communities and to co-opt sectors of the Indian and Coloured communities through preferential treatment in comparison to Africans, this policy has largely failed. The joint action between the political organisations of the Coloured and Indian communities in forming the Congress Alliance in the mid-1950s was an explicit rejection of the divisions implicit in Group Areas legislation. S Chetty, a Natal Indian Congress activist in the 1950s who worked as a volunteer collecting demands for the Freedom Charter, recalls that though in many Indian households there was suspicion of co-operation with the ANC, in equally many there was a wish to talk about political grievances and the material lack of housing. Despite residential segregation African people were particularly open and welcoming:

When we Indians go into an African area there was no question, you know, that the guy's going to assault you. The moment you give them the sign, you're a comrade. You say 'Afrika!' and they return it 'Mayibuye!'. Straight away you're a comrade. Open, come into the house and

Although the repression of the 1960s had driven organised opposition underground and apparently destroyed the unity built up during the 1950s, the emergence of the black consciousness movement in schools and universities drew together Coloured, Indian and African students in opposition to apartheid in the early 1970s. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 gave open expression to the widespread rejection of apartheid in all its manifestations, even amongst those who had been given superior resources.

Concrete expression of the spirit of the UDF and some indication of the nature of the popular feeling that had led to its formation was seen in Indian attitudes to the proposed forced removal of Africans from the black spot of St Wendolin's, near Durban. Although the area was zoned for Indian occupation after the planned removal of the African community, the Indian community refused to take the land from the people of St Wendolin's. They

..lid they would not move into the area if Africans were forced out. This I)c.came an important factor in the struggle of the St Wendolin's community I O retain their land, and a key element leading to a reversal of the removal ~l~.cision: the government decided in 1984 to allow the black spot to remain.22

Although it has taken many years to rebuild this solidarity among o~nmunities, it is testimony to the contradictions of apartheid that the very

%,cnse of popular unity which the Group Areas legislation was created to ~lcstroy should itself be re-created in opposition to that legislation and the \vliole panoply of apartheid laws.

(;OLOURED LABOUR PREFERENCE POLICY

111 September 1984 President Botha announced to the Cape National Party congress that the Coloured Labour Preference Policy, for 20 years a central clement in apartheid strategy in the Western Cape, was to be abandoned. The Inove was welcomed by businessmen, who, for an equally long period, had ~lcnounced the The removals associated with Coloured Labour I'rcference are now a matter of history, a history of hardship and suffering [hat the new policy adjustments do not attempt to redress.

Coloured Labour Preference in the Western Cape had been discussed by the National Party for decades before it took office in 1948, but a coherent \tatement on how it was to be implemented only came in 1954. In that year, I3 F Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, told the Federated Chamber o l Industries that 'Native families would be discouraged from settling in the Cape where migrant labour would be considered most suitable'. He later announced in Parliament that 'the Western Cape is to be the preserve of (;oloureds and all further family housing for Africans is to cease'.24

In 1955 the details of the policy were announced by the Secretary of Native ASfairs, Eiselen, at a conference of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA):

Briefly and concisely put, our Native Policy regarding the Western Province aims at ultimately eliminating natives from this region.

He explained that Coloured Labour Preference would entail that all non-South African Africans leave the Western Province and no more be allowed in; that influx control would be very strictly applied and all Africans coming to work in the area would be screened; that African people who already had permission to work in the Western Cape would have to have suitable accommodation; and that if there was a need for additional African workers they should be recruited as migrant workers on short contracts.25

The government aimed to decrease the number of Africans working in the Western Cape by 5 per cent per annum through strict influx control and a freeze on accommodation, and to give Coloured people preferential access to jobs and housing. Coloured Labour Preference was formulated at a time when the Separate Representation of Voters Act removed Coloured voters

68 Forced Removal Urban I'olicy and Forced Removuls 69

from the common electoral roll with whites and destroyed the last vestiges ol parliamentary representation which the Coloured population had retain4 since 1910. Evidently Eiselen and Verwoerd, through promises of protectio~~ from African competition for jobs and preferential access to housing, hopctl to deflect opposition from the issue of removal of political rights.

In the late 1950s the Coloured Labour Preference Policy was implementctl mainly through strict application of influx control in the Western Cape. Ry 1957 chief magistrates in the Peninsula could report a decline in the Africa11 population over two years.26 But no regulations existed as yet to compel thc. employment of Coloured rather than African workers. The spur to a morc effective application of the policy was provided by the upsurge of popul;~~. protest in the late 1950s, culminating in a huge protest rally and stay-at-homc in Cape Town in 1960 after the killings at the Sharpeville anti-pass protests. Donges, Minister of Finance, declared in Parliament in 1960:

The disturbances have taught us another lesson to which the Government has also directed attention previously. This lesson is that in those areas where the Coloured community form a natural source of labour, it is wrong to import Bantu in large numbers and eventually create two unprosperous communities- the Gov- ernment will therefore apply more strictly its policy that Coloured labour should be put to the best possible use.27

A standing Cabinet committee and a permanent interdepartmental commit- tee were established. Their brief was to implement all aspects of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy. The Bantu Labour Act of 1964 contained measures to enforce the policy. All employers in the Western Cape were compelled to employ Coloured labour unless they obtained authorisation through the Department of Labour and the local magistrates' office to do otherwise. The cumbersome method for recruiting African workers was spelled out in the 1965 Bantu Labour Regulations:

If no unemployed Coloureds are registered and the office concerned is satisfied that the employer's wages etc. are attractive enough to draw Coloureds, but that no Coloureds can be recruited, the employer is issued a certificate indicating that suitable Coloured labour is not available for the specific vacancies. On the submission of this certificate to the Bantu Labour Officer concerned supplementary Bantu labour from the Xhosa-speaking homelands is allowed on a single contract basis through the labour bureaux system provided that Bantu labour is not available locally and that there is suitable h o ~ s i n g . ~ g

i t is evident that features of influx control, adopted in the rest of the country in the 1980s as part of the Riekert proposals were introduced earlier to the Western Cape as part of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy: for example, regional labour zoning and making access to jobs dependent on the availability of housing.

1 1 1 , .tlca covered by Coloured Labour Preference was considerably I I ( I 1 1 1 ~ ~ 1 in the mid-1960s. Originally the so-called Eiselen line had , I , Ill.ll, ~ r c d the Coloured Labour Preference Area as that to the west of the 1 . . \ \ I I . . t 11 Kimberley, Colesburg and Humansdorp. With the new regulations I I , , I l,,(.lcn line was moved eastward to run between Aliwal North and the I I 1 1 I(1vc.r. In the entire area no new African family housing was to be , , I , ! \ ltlcd. From 1966 the African labour component in all industry and . , I I I I I I I ( . I . C C in this area was frozen and each enterprise was to be forced to I e I I I , (. ASrican labour by 5 per cent in future years. Ministerial approval was I f q I I I I I ( . ~ i Sor the employment of African contract workers, and no contract

,III,I c.xceed 12 months. The Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources \ , I 0 1 1967 stipulated that industrial expansion in certain parts of the \\ .I(.I-n Cape could only take place using Coloured and White labour unless I l l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c r i a l permission had been granted for the employment of Africans.

I I I C Coloured Labour Preference policy resulted in three types of forced I I I I I ) V ; I ~ . Firstly the pass laws were used to evict many Africans from the \\ , ,)[crn Cape. The policy failed entirely to reduce the African population. In ( . I I , I . 'l'own for example the legal African population was 65,025 in 1960 and 100.000 in 1970. But the nature of the population changed. The pass laws , \ , - I< . used to try to remove women, many of them wives of workers, and

\ \ \ \ \ \

\ Colcsburg: w Altwal Nurrh

EAST

I

Map 7: Coloured Labor Preference Area: The Eiselen Line.

70 Forced Removul Urban Policy and Forced Removuls 71

sub-tenants of people with Section 10 rights. It was hoped that the only Africans remaining would be the migrant male w0rkers.2~

Secondly the lack of provision of family housing led to the establishment of squatter camps, which have been repeatedly destroyed by the authorities. One study estimated that the percentage of Africans in family accommoda- tion in Cape Town decreased from 70 per cent in 1960 to 50 per cent in 1970.30 The lack of municipal family housing forced people to establish squatter communities like Crossroads and Nyanga. Some employers pro- vided temporary accommodation for their workers, but there was a general shift away from this and from hostel accommodation to the shacks of the squatter settlements. By the late 1970s the Cape Flats were densely populated with squatter communities. Several had been bulldozed, the homes destroyed, and many residents, mainly women, forced to go to the bantustans because they did not have the necessary endorsements in their pass to remain (for u fuller discussion see below).

The third type of removal associated with the Coloured Labour Preference policy has been the destruction of African townships in the small towns which fell within the area west of the Aliwal North-Fish River line. The townships were deproclaimed as areas for African settlement. The residents lost their Section 10 rights and were forced to move into the new towns being established in the bantustans. The notorious settlements of Sada and Dimbaza in the Ciskei were two such towns. Here the gross deprivation of forced removal was first noticed by the press when epidemics broke out, lines of children's graves appeared, and people were forced to live in flimsy tents and prefabricated housing with no work a~ai lable .~ '

The Coloured Labour Preference Policy caused vast upheavals in the lives of many thousands of Africans who suffered removal and a consequent decline in living standards. But the policy did not work. Although Coloured workers were increasingly employed in skilled and semi-skilled jobs the wages of the Coloured community as a whole fell dramatically relative to whites. In 1945 Coloured earnings were 41 per cent of white earnings, but in the late 1970s they were 24 per cent.32 The higher wages which Coloured workers could demand and the ease with which they could move between jobs made them an unpopular labour force with employers. The majority of Cape industrial and commercial employers preferred illegal African workers to Coloured workers. When they did employ Coloured workers they paid low wages, which many were forced to accept because of a high rate of unemployment. By 1984 there was proportionately more Coloured unem- ployment in the Western Cape than elsewhere in the country.33

Despite the high-level policy commitment to Coloured Labour Preference the programme was unworkable. It made labour costs high and labour recruitment cumbersome for Cape employers at the very time when manufacturing industry in the area was expanding and demand for service industries was growing. As early as 1954 when the policy was first discussed the Cape Chamber of Industries had protested, declaring that 'certain industries in the Western Cape had need of settled urbanised native labour'.

1 1 1{.111red assurances from the government that stricter application of 1 1 I I 1 1 1 ( 1 1 ) rro1 would still ens~lre a reasonable pool of locally available labour,

1 1 1 $ 1 I 1 1 . 1 1 once a worker returned to the bantustans at the end of a contract his I ' , I I 1 1 1 I (.nlployer would be able to re-employ him.34 But as the policy was

I I ~ I ~ I I , ( I rhcse conditions were not met, and Cape industrialists complained 1 1 1 1 1 I l l f i l l wages paid to Coloured workers would hamper industrial

% 1 ) I l l -1011. I I I I Irc mid- 1960s the government recognised that it was impossible to have

I ,q ,I 1 1 ~~ldustrial growth and a 5 per cent reduction of African labour in every 1 1 1 l l r I'hcy therefore conceded that while there should be a 5 per cent I 1 1 I I , I Ion for the area overall, the reduction in individual firms need not be so 1 . 1 . I I Rut employers continued to resent the policy, criticising it in public

I I I ~ I cvdding it in private. The Cape Chamber of Industries commented in its , \ l~lcnce to the Wiehahn Commission in 1977:

This submission should not be construed as requesting that the inflow of Bantu should in any way be increased; it merely seeks for a review of policy in relation to those who are permanently in the Western Cape and are entitled to remain here. Their education and general process of urbanisation has reached a level which is already causing them to be intensely frustrated by the limitations imposed on their employment. Dissatisfaction on that account is already reaching disturbing proportions and is bound to erupt if this relatively small segment of our Western Cape population is not provided with more satisfactory job ~pportunities.~'

In subsequent years the Chamber of Industries pointed out that the Coloured Labour Preference Policy had retarded the economic performance of the Western Cape by reducing the productivity of African workers, inefficiently using skills, and limiting access to training.36

The decision to abandon Coloured Labour Preference in 1984 was partly a concession to Western Cape industrialists. This was consistent with the attempt to gain political support from the private sector, a central element in the regime's current strategy (see Chapter 1). It was also an inducement to them to bring the resources of the private sector to the development of African housing in the Western Cape, an area that has become the focus of an intense debate about urban policy3' The abandonment of Coloured Labour Preference may also be interpreted as a concession to the Coloured Labour Party, the largest Coloured party participating in the segregated parliament. The Labour Party had opposed the policy because it priced Coloured workers out of jobs, inducing employers to undercut them by employing illegal African workers. The official announcement of the end of the policy came in May 1985 when, after lengthy negotiations with the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, the director of the Cape Employment Bureau announced that applications by employers for addi- tional African workers would be granted without exception and no lengthy

72 Forced Removal Urban Poltcy and Forced Removals 73

process of ministerial endorsement would be neces~ary. '~ While the opposition of the Cape employers was clearly a critical factor in

inducing the government to abandon the Coloured Labour Preference Policy, the popular resistance to it was a precondition for this decision. Had hundreds of thousands of people not defied influx control and been prepared to work illegally for low wages in Cape Town rather than starve in the bantustans, there would have been no expansion of Cape industries, and no vociferous industrialists to demand greater growth.

The courage of the people who daily defied Coloured Labour Preference and the pass laws, and made their homes out of plastic sheeting on the Cape Flats when the state decreed they would build no houses for them, is illustrated by the story of a group of women arrested at Nyanga squatter camp for being in Cape Town illegally. The women were transported by bus to Komgha, a small town on the edge of the Transkei bantustan, but refused to leave the bus. One of them later told a newspaper reporter that the police

brought dogs on to the bus and forced us to the station. Once off the bus we did not get on the train, but started walking towards Stutterheim.

By foot and by train the women made their way back to Cape Town. Living once again as illegals, they said:

We want our rights here in Cape Town. There is nothing for us in the Transkei. We belong here with our husbands . . . We want our rights here in Cape Town. We are not happy here but we are not frightened. They can arrest us but we are going to stay.39

The demise of Coloured Labour Preference is also an index of its failure to win Coloured support for the regime. In its original form it had failed to undermine the alliance of the 1950s which demanded the rights enshrined in the Freedom Charter. In the 1980s the formation of the UDF and the high level of resistance in Coloured areas of the Western Cape during the States of Emergency in 1985 and 1986 show that even the new constitutional proposals, Coloured preference in a new guise, have been no more successful.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AFRICAN TOWNSHIPS

In the first decade of National Party rule the government set about destroying the areas of freehold urban land owned by Africans. New townships were established some distance from the city centres. The next phase saw a streamlining of the administration of African townships with the Bantu Affairs Department taking over control from municipalities which had sometimes run townships on more liberal lines than the central government wished. In the present phase the trend has been increasingly to devolve authority to locally elected councils. Those who suffered the removals of the 1960s are at present being courted with promises of full powers of local government and property rights. The new local councils of the 1980s were

1 1 . 1 1 I 01 an attempt to divide township residents from migrants and to coax I I I ~ 111, by conceding some form of local authority powers, into supporting 111 .11 theid in its present guise. But in the uprisings which began in the Vaal I I ~ ,~ngle in late 1984 the local councils elected by a minority of the I ~ ~ l u ~ l a t i o n , came under concerted attack, leading many councillors to resign. I Ilc wbsequent moves to by-pass the official local authorities, by building up

. I I cet committees' as alternative forms of local administration, show how far I I l l \ policy has failed.

Africans had been forced to live in segregated urban townships even before 111c Nationalist Party came to power in 1948. The Native (Urban Areas) Act 0 1 1923 had initiated urban segregation, preventing Africans from acquiring I . I I ~ in urban areas deemed for whites only. Local authorities were obliged to ~uovide housing for Africans in separate areas and to supervise African wttlement in these areas. However, not all urban Africans lived in these ~liunicipal townships. There were some areas like Alexandra and Sophiatown 111 Johannesburg, Edendale in Pietermaritzburg and Fingo Village in (irahamstown where Africans had freehold land titles. The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937 had halted the expansion of these areas by prohibiting the sale to Africans by non-Africans of any freehold land around urban areas. The essential outlines of segregated townships for Africans thus predated the 1948 election. However, the post-1948 administration was committed to completing this segregation and eliminating all anomalies. This policy entailed the first phase of forced removal of urban Africans.

Most removals were from the areas of African freehold land in the centre of cities whoe there had been considerable population increase. Sophiatown's population, for example, grew from 9,500 in 1933 to 61,700 in 1951." After 1948 the government was determined to resite African townships on the outer edges of cities. The new housing was to be financed by a levy on local employers. The implementation of these removals was by no means straightforward. The Johannesburg City Council opposed them and the government was forced to pass specific legislation in 1954 to compel the council to destroy the freehold townships of Sophiatown, Martindale, Newclare and Pageview. Popular local campaigns publicised the removals and politicised sectors of the community. But the removals went ahead. In many cities people were evicted and their houses were pulled down. The removals from Sophiatown were described in this way by an eyewitness:

On the broad belt of grass between the European suburb of Westdene and Sophiatown a whole fleet of army lorries was drawn up: a grim sight against the grey, watery sky. Lining the whole street were thousands of police, both white and black: the former armed with rifles and revolvers, the latter with the usual assegai. A few sten guns were in position at various points. . . In the yard military lorries were drawn up. Already they were piled high with the pathetic possessions which had come from the row of rooms in the background. A rusty kitchen stove, a few blackened pots and

74 Forced Removal Urban Policy and Forced Removals 75

pans, bundles of heaven-knows-what, and people soaked, all soaked to the skin by the drenching rain.41

In Johannesburg new housing was provided for the evicted people in Soweto, a huge new township to the south west of the city. In the area that had been Sophiatown houses for whites were built and the area was renamed Triomf (Triumph). In Pretoria 60,000 people were removed from the townships of Lady Selborne, Eastwood and highland^.^^ In Durban removals on a similar scale took place in 1958. Cato Manor was proclaimed a white area and 82,000 Africans were removed to the municipal townships of Umlazi and Kwa- Mashu. In the Cape the Simonstown township of Luyola was disestablished in the mid-1960s and 2,000 residents removed to Guguletu.

The rationale for the destruction of the urban African freehold areas lay in the stricter enforcement of influx control in the 1950s. It was plainly impossible to confer the status of 'temporary sojourner' on people who owned land and houses. According to official thinking the urban African population had to be made as temporary as possible to deter long-term African settlement in towns. Hence people were forced to rent scarce housing, rather than buy it, and land ownership rights were abolished. The municipalities, and afterwards the Administration Boards, had control of all housing in the new townships.! The new townships allowed for better police and military control as they had straight roads with easy access to each dwelling.43 The strategic advantage this gave police and army was seen in the uprisings of 1976 and 1984-6 when armoured vehicles could move through the streets of townships like Soweto, Sharpeville and Sebokeng gunning down people who found scant protection in the buildings or streets of the township. The distance between African townships and white suburbs enables opposition to be contained without undue disturbance to the white electorate. In 1976-7 and 1984-6 buildings were burning and children were being killed in the streets of the townships while daily life proceeded as normal a few miles away in the centres of the cities.(

The new townships also served to divide Africans. Housing was zoned in accordance with the divisions of the bantustan policy. Particular areas were assigned to people who were Zulu-speaking, Xhosa-speaking, Sotho- speaking and so on. Schooling and other amenities were provided on the same segregated basis. From the mid-1950s, once the African urban population had been relocated in the new townships in rented accommoda- tion, and freehold property rights had been abolished, the way was open for housing to be used as an instrument of influx control. Lack of housing became the reason given for removing people from the urban areas. As early as 1958 the government decided to withhold funds from local authorities for building new African housing. The grounds given were that it was not the state's task to provide subsidies for African housing in white areas. As a result the new townships were built by levies on local employers, but this severely limited the finance available to buy land and build houses.$4

From the beginning, then, the new townships were characterised by

housing shortages. Shortages became acute from the mid-1960s, when, as part of the stringent attempt to curtail African urban population growth, a limit was placed on the extension of African townships outside the bantustans. From 1967 family housing provision was frozen. Widows, divorced women, and unmarried mothers were struck off the housing waiting lists.45 It was commonplace during Soweto funerals for the Administration Board to move in to repossess a house from a newly widowed woman while the mourners were still gathered around the ~ o f f i n . ~ T r o m 1968 access to township housing was strictly regulated. People could only occupy township houses if they had a permit, and permits for family housing were only granted to men with Section 10(l)(a) or (b) rights who had both work and dependants. All other people settled in the townships had to find accommodation in the single-sex hostels, or as lodgers. Until 1979 if a man had a spell of 30 days' unemployment his permit for family housing could be cancelled. Only a limited number of houses could be built by Africans who employed private labour on local authorities' sites, and homes could not be inherited on the death of a father.47 A man who qualified under Section 10(l)(a) or (b) could not bring his wife into an urban township unless he had what the pass officials deemed to be suitable accommodation.

These housing regulations, together with the Black Labour Regulations of the same period, were used in an attempt both to curtail the settlement of workers in the cities, and to turn the African workforce into a largely migrant workforce based in the bantustans. ;But despite the harsh housing regulations people still came illegally to the cities, risking arrest and eviction, because it was the only chance of a reasonable job and wages above the poverty level. The 1968 regulations forced a greater proportion of Africans to live in the bantustans, but they also caused gross overcrowding in the African townships, and a housing shortage of critical proportions developed.

After the uprisings in the townships of 1976-7 government commissions were appointed to investigate living conditions of Africans. The Riekert Commission estimated in 1977 that there was a shortage of 141,000 family houses outside the bantustans and 126,000 hostel beds for Africans. Inside the bantustans it was estimated that the housing shortage was 170,000.48 One year later the Urban Foundation estimated that in South Africa as a whole 400,000 houses needed to be built for rural and urban Africans to reduce the backlog, let alone provide lor future population The Viljoen Committee of 1981 calculated that the shortage of African housing in urban areas outside the bantustans was 168,000 while in Soweto alone a backlog of 35,000 houses needed to be built. The committee estimated that houses in Soweto should be provided at a rate of 4,000 per a n n ~ m . ~ O In 1986 a study by the officially sponsored Building Research Institute concluded that the housing shortage outside the bantustans amounted to 634,000 houses even before the pressing needs of the bantustan population were taken into account. (The total shortage included: African 538,000; Coloured 52,000; and Indian 44,000.)5'

76 Forced Kemoval Urban Policy and Forced Removals 77

The very existence of the current huge housing shortage shows that even in the post-Riekert era it has not been government policy to provide the much needed accommodation. In the past seven years only 7,700 houses in African urban areas outside the bantustans have been built, and in 1982 government funds for African housing were reduced.52 In Cape Town the first houses for a decade were provided in 198 1 when 1,359 family houses were converted from single quarter^.^' The building of Khayelitsha (see below) represents an acknowledgement by the regime that it is impossible to remove the African population from the Western Cape. Instead of meeting the problem of the housing shortage in African townships by building more houses, the government has adopted a range of other strategies that accorded with the thinking on apartheid at any particular moment. In the mid-1960s when family housing in townships was frozen, local authorities were instructed to build houses in nearby bantustans and have workers commute into urban areas. Table 11 shows the increasing proportion of funds spent over the decade 1967-77 on building houses in bantustans. The severe housing shortage means that people must choose to live in conditions of gross overcrowding, or move into a house in the bantustans. Someone who moves to a bantustan will have a house, but will also have to commute up to a hundred and fifty kilometres or more each day to work. Children born in the bantustans will lose any residence rights their parents acquired. However unpalatable this option, many people have been forced to accept a self-imposed removal: they wake, for example, as commuters from ~ w a ~ w a to Bloemfontein do, at 3 a.m. and return from work at 9 p.m., paying a substantial portion of their wages in fares. They are forced to accept the unacceptable because, through government policy, they have been denied the basic human need of shelter. As Ignatius Makodi of the Huhudi Civic Association said of people who moved from Huhudi to Pudimong in Bophuthatswana 55 kilometres from their work at Vryburg: 'They were glad, because there was housing at P ~ d i m o n g . ' ~ ~

The overcrowding and insecurity of the new townships bred a fierce spirit of resistance in the children who grew up in them. ~ l t h o u ~ h the townships might have been designed to break down local unity, the conditions there bred a fellowship amongst the people. Local associations began to develop in the mid-1970s. They constantly raised the issues of the appalling conditions within townships, and became powerful mobilising organisations able to raise broader political demands on behalf of the community. For example, in Cradock, in the Eastern Cape, the Cradock Residents Association (Cradora), was organised from 1983 on the basis of street committees and mass participation. After the assassination of Cradora leaders in July 1985 the community successfully conducted a consumer boycott of white-owned businesses and was able to force the local Chamber of Commerce to raise at Cabinet level issues about detentions, poor lighting facilities, and school boycotts in Cradock. Although the disorganisation of African urban communities that followed their removal in the mid-1950s was effective for a decade or so, the intense hardship in the new townships and the

re-emergence of organised protest led to these very townships producing the most sustained opposition the regime had yet encountered.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BANTUSTAN TOWNS

The development and gradual implementation of the bantustan policy from the mid-1960s was an attempt to exercise political control over subsistence farmers, and economic control over the supply of cheap labour. Integral to this attempt was the policy of 'solving the problem' of the permanent African population in the towns. The influx control regulations of the 1950s failed to reduce the population in the face of pressures caused by the collapse of the subsistence agriculture in the bantustan areas and the expansion of manufacturing industry.

The reghi developed its attempted solution in two phases. Firstly there was the establishment of towns in the bantustans, adjacent to border industries. It was believed that for the residents of these new towns the possibility of work in border industries would act against the push to migrate to 'white' urban areas. However, the development of border industries was initiated on a very small scale, and later in the decade a second more drastic policy was devised. This was an attempt not only to halt African migration to urban areas, but to reverse that which had already taken place. The bantustan towns of the earlier phase became central to a policy of large-scale forcible relocation of urban people, through the deproclamation of existing non-bantustan townships.

This policy had distinct advantages for the regime over the cumbersome influx control reeulations. There was no loss of labour to industrv as workers " were merely changed from short distance to long-distance commuters. Because people removed to bantustan towns lost those rights, there was no chance of their accumulating rights under Section 10, and thus posing a threat of permanent urbanisation. The intractable problems of urban administration could be relegated to the bantustan administrations, which became responsible for containing unrest and dissent. The policy of urban relocation appeared as the solution to a number of problems of housing, local administration and the threat of large-scale unemployment facing the administration. In particular it provided a chance to transform long established urban workers, essential to industry, into rightless migrants. In the words of demographers sympathetic to current government strategy: 'For the first time attempts were made to take the urban problems from the central area to the veri~herv ' .~ '

L X 2

In the early stages of bantustan development the stress was primarily on developing towns in the bantustans to attract workers who would otherwise have migrated to 'White' cities. In 1961-6 the first five-year plan for the bantustans envisaged that R75.9 million, 66 per cent of the total development budget for all bantustans, would be spent on creating towns. The first towns were adjacent to border industries like Garankuwa in the Transvaal and Zwelitsha in the Eastern Cape, and it was envisaged that they would house

78 Forced Removul Urban Policy and Forced Removals 79

border-industry workers, as well as squatters evicted from urban areas and rural black spots. In 1960 the urban population of all the bantustans was a mere 33,486, but a decade later this had increased to 594,420.56 In 1960 there were only three towns in the bantustans excluding the towns of the Transkei; by 1970 there were 66 and by 1980 there were 88.57 By the end of 1985 38,500 houses had been built in 37 new bantustan towns (see Table 11). Between 1961 and 1978 more than R520 million was spent on establishing bantustan towns.5x

The new towns failed to sidetrack African migration to the major urban areas. In the period 1960-70 the African urban population outside the bantustans increased from by between 22 and 30 per cent, according to various estimates.5"See also Table 6). Drastic measures were required from the administration to fulfil its aims of 'reversing the tide'. In part these measures were enacted in the Bantu Labour Regulations Act of 1968, but the other side of influx control was the actual physical removal of people to bantustan towns. In the middle of the decade official thinking began to consider the possibility that bantustan towns could act not only as catchment areas for the rural surplus population that might have migrated to the cities, but also as a residential area for people working in 'White' towns adjacent to bantustans.'jO A strategy of turning settled workers into commuters, of disestablishing existing townships and forcing people to move into bantus- tans was formulated. This went hand-in-hand with a use of the housing shortage in the metropolitan areas to force people into bantustan towns where the housing was being built.

The Department of Bantu Administration and Development's Circular 27 of 1967, which halted the expansion of existing African townships, initiated the policy. The circular instructed local authorities that before any new housing developinents in townships were undertaken local authorities must obtain permission from the department. This would only be granted if new developments, like family housing, were imperative, and it was not possible to provide accommodation in an adjacent bantustan. In addition Africans in townships henceforth could only rent their houses; anyone wishing to build a house could do so only in the bantustan 'of their own national unit where they could also acquire freehold'. Local authorities were encouraged to build houses in adjacent bantustan township^.^' New townships began to develop. Mdantsane in the Ciskei was for commuters into the East London area and Mabopane was for workers in Pretoria. Some local authorities began building hostels and houses for workers in bantustans considerable distances away. For example by 1976 the East and West Rand Administration Boards had built 80,000 houses in the bantustans of the Northern Transvaal, 380 kilometres from the Witwatersrand, and the Administration Boards for the Orange Free State had built 10,000 houses in the Qwaqwa bantustan, 240 kilometres from B l o e m f ~ n t e i n . ~ ~

In towns next to bantustans entire townships were deproclaimed and the whole African population forced to move into the bantustan: workers became commuters and their Section 10 rights disappeared. For example, in 1963 the

decision was taken to move people from the East London township of Duncan Village to Mdantsane in the Ciskei; by 1977 82,000 people had been moved. In the Cape, Oudtshoorn's township was deproclaimed in 1968 and the one in Noupoort in 1971. In Natal, by 1981 thirteen townships had been moved into the Kwazulu bantustan: parts of the Durban townships and the townships of the northern Natal towns of Utrecht, Ladysmith, Dannhauser, Estcourt and Newcastle, and that of the coastal town, Margate. In the Transvaal among the townships moved have been those from Nylstroom, Naboomspruit, Ellisras, Vaalwater and Louis Trichardt (relocated in Venda); those from Pietersburg and Potgietersrus (relocated in Lebowa); and from Rustenburg (relocated in Bophuthatswana). Many more townships are under threat. It was calculated in 1983 that throughout the Republic 730,000 people had been forced to move through the policy of deproclaiming townships, and that a further 184,000 people were under threat of removal.63 In some cases of deproclamation people have not been physically removed. The boundaries of bantustans have been redrawn so that they include existing African townships. In Durban the township of KwaMashu was decreed part of the Kwazulu bantustan in 1977. Without actually moving the people of these townships lost their Section 10 rights. Thus none of the benefits of the amendments to the Urban Areas Act applied to them. They could not move from one urban area to another, or work without registration.'j4

To encourage movement out of existing townships the administration initially gave assurances that people with Section 10 rights could live in bantustan towns without sacrificing their South African citizenship or rights to live outside the b a n t ~ s t a n s . ~ ~ But children born in a bantustan town lost residence rights their parents may have preserved. Indeed, after the 'independence' of a bantustan residence rights may not confer any status. For example many people who moved from the locations of Pretoria to Garankuwa, 30 kilometres away in Bophuthatswana, preserved their Section 10 rights and were given houses on the basis of this. However after the 'independence' of Bophuthatswana in 1977 the bantustan authorities decreed that only those declared 'citizens' of the bantustan had rights to land and housing. Many who did not fulfil this condition had settled in Garankuwa and Winterveld, and they were forced to move. They were finally relocated in a new town 50 kilometres away from Pretoria at Soshanguve, which was placed under the direct jurisdiction of the Department of Co-operation and D e ~ e l o p m e n t . ~ ~

The 1986 legislation on influx control, which replaced Section 10 as control on entry to the urban labour market with access to accommodation and a narrow definition of citizenship, will limit the type of work available to people who have accepted housing in the so-called 'independent' bantustans (see Chapter 2). They are likely to be deemed aliens and severely restricted in terms of the jobs and working conditions they can secure. They are subject to harassment and eviction, similar to that carried out under the pass laws. In February 1987 it was reported that 500 workers had been sent back to the

80 Forced Kemoval Urban Policy and Forced Removals 81

Transkei bantustan after raids on workplaces by officials looking for 'alien' workers in the Cape. 67

The result of the policy of urban deproclamation was that by 1970, 197 'white' towns reported a decrease in African population, and 15 of the largest urban African communities were in the bantustans. By 1976, 86 bantustan towns had been proclaimed. In the period 1966-71, R12 1.5 million was spent on urban development in the bantustans (74.7 per cent of the total bantustan development budget). The plan was to build 93,380 houses in 61 new towns.6x The population growth in the new towns was phenomenal. For example in Umlazi, where some of Durban's township residents were moved, the population increased from 12 1,600 in 1970 to 172,550 in 1979, a growth of 42 per cent. In Garankuwa, where people from Pretoria's locations were moved, the population grew by 96 per cent during 1970-79, from 42,554 to 83,196. In Mabopane over the same period there was a 488 per cent population increase from 15,000 in 1970 to 88,190 in 1976.69 In 1981 it was estimated that the population of these bantustan towns, including squatters who had no formal accommodation, was in excess of 2 million.70 A recent study of Botshabelo, a town established in the area designated for the Qwaqwa bantustan in the last decade, estimates that the population grew from 64,000 in 1979 to 200,000 in 1983 to 420,000 in 1986.71 It must be remembered that these huge concentrations of people have been fostered in areas where there is little or no infrastructural development, where water and sewerage are minimal, shops scarce, entertainment and public facilities non-existent.

The removal of people to bantustan towns has led to a huge increase in the numbers of people who commute very long distances to work daily. In 1970 an estimated 290,000 Africans commuted from bantustans and this had increased to 638,000 by 1979.72 Table 12 shows the number of commuters from each bantustan. It can be seen that the largest number of commuters come from the bantustans adjacent to major industrial areas, like Bophuthatswana and Kwazulu. However even bantustans far from any major industrial centre, like Lebowa and Kangwane, have many thousands of commuters.

The state has given huge subsidies to the bus companies which transport commuters to and from the bantustans. The local Administration Boards also contributed a portion of the revenues they raised from selling liquor to township residents. In 1973 buses run by the Corporation for Economic Development (an arm of the Bantu Affairs Department) were costing R34 million. By 1976 this had risen to Rl10 million and by 1982 to R230 million. In 1971 official planners believed it was feasible to transport people daily between points 113 kilometres apart, and weekly between points 650 kilometres apart.73 While this may indeed be feasible, the human cost is enormous. Workers rise before dawn and return towards midnight. They sleep on the buses. They hardly see their families and even with state subsidies they pay a significant proportion of their wages in fares. In 1982 it was estimated that an average commuter spent R3 per week to get LO work

from a bantustan, and some workers spent as much as R5 per week, because of the longer distances they travelled.74 The average African wage in 1982 was calculated by the Afrikaanse Handels-Instituut, a semi-official research body, as R241 per month.75 This meant that on average commuters from the bantustans were spending between 5 per cent and 8 per cent of their weekly wages on fares.

The alternative to these punishing journeys is to look for work in the bantustans. The intense competition for jobs means that employers can pay lower wages than those paid elsewhere in South Africa. It is these wage rates that the South African authorities hope will tempt foreign investors to set up plants in the bantustans, thus further entrenching and justifying the urban removals. For example, in the Ciskei bantustan in the years 1981-2 industrial investment nearly doubled from R32 million to R63 million, although the total number of jobs available was only 7,700. Dimbaza, where one of the first films of the horrors of the relocation camps was made in 1972, was ten years later an industrial town with 37 factories, many with foreign owners. The attraction for many investors is not only the interest-free loans and cash rebates provided by Pretoria, but also the fact that the labour legislation protecting workers does not apply in the bantustans, there is no minimum wage, and trade unions face considerable barriers in attempting to establish collective bargaining machinery. The wages at Dimbaza, for example, are about half of those paid in East London, not many miles away, but outside the bantustan. People are prepared to work for such low pay because there is no alternative employment. The population of the Ciskei was 666,000 in 1982, and the 7,700 industrial jobs available meant there would be no labour shortage, even when wages and work conditions were most e ~ p l o i t a t i v e . ~ ~

Living conditions in bantustan towns are bleak. For example the people of the Kenton-on-Sea location in the Eastern Province were given eleven days notice of their removal to Glenmore in the Ciskei. They had lived in Kenton-on-Sea for 25 years. 77 By contrast with the community they had built up there, Glenmore has been described as 'row upon row of identical wooden houses stretching into the distance'. Gungutu Zakhe outlined the despair of life in the settlement which was portrayed in 1979 as a new model township:

We are being dumped here very much against our will-only to die. People are starving. Only last week a young Gqalotha Seto died in his initiation school. It was found he had not eaten for days. We had to bury him . . . You only find five people at a service because they are hungry and do not have enough energy to go to church.78

The stories of great hardship in Glenmore are repeated for many of the newly established bantustan towns to which people have been removed. Bot- shabelo, due to be incorporated into the Qwaqwa bantustan and 55 kilometres east of Bloemfontein, was established when people were evicted from squatter settlements in the area designated part of the Bophuthatswana

82 Forced Removal Urban Policy and Forced Removals 83

bantustan. It is intensely overcrowded because of its huge growth in population. Lack of land for housing was so critical in 1985 that 30,000 people moved to the outskirks of the town and claimed their own stands. Sewage disposal is by bucket; water is piped to a handful of communal taps. There are no health facilities other than mobile clinics manned by army doctors. One man, driven out of Bophuthatswana into Botshabelo, told reporters: 'We were being hounded and our cattle were impounded by Bop cops. But conditions aren't better here. We are ~tarving.'~'

As people became aware of some of the political consequences of removal to bantustan towns, resistance developed. The most successful campaign of this type was carried out by the people of the Ekangala township on the East Rand, set up next to an industrial 'deconcentration' point at Ekindustria. It was scheduled for incorporation into the Kwandebele bantustan in spite of earlier promises to the contrary. When Kwandebele was scheduled for 'independence' in 1986, the prospect of incorporation was even more vehemently opposed. The Ekangala Action Committee organised protest meetings, and a memorandum signed by over one thousand households was sent to the government stating that as urban people they rejected the bantustan system and feared they would be persecuted for this. Despite state-vigilante action and terrorisation of members of the Action Committee, their opposition continued. It contributed to the decision in 1986 by the Kwandebele authorities to shelve their plans to accept independence.80

Another long-sustained campaign by a community against incorporation into a bantustan was waged by the people of Lamontville, near Durban, when it was re-zoned as part of the Kwazulu bantustan. For months there were attacks by the community on police stations and police vehicles. Children boycotted schools; meetings and demonstrations were held in which people vehemently expressed their opposition to incorporation into Kwazulu. The police responded with great brutality, killing demonstrators and detaining activists, but opposition to incorporation has not been broken. To date Lamontville remains outside the bantustan structure. In other areas protest on a smaller scale people has won significant gains. In 1964 the people of Fingo Village, the Grahamstown location, rejected plans to move them to Committees Drift in the Ciskei. In 1970 when Fingo Village was declared a Coloured area a resollltion of all freeholders was submitted to M C Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, rejecting this. A referendum voted by 647 to 65 against the move. Further deputations to various government officials finally resulted in a partial reprieve. Freeholders could remain near Grahamstown in the township of Makana Kop, although tenants had to move.81

In many areas resistance has been strengthened by the stand of other black communities. The refusal of the Indian community to move into St Wrndolin's, where they would have gained housing once the township was dcproclaimed, has already been described. Coloured residents of East laondon, who were due to settle in Duncan Village after the African ~'opulation had been moved into the Ciskei town of Mdantsane, stated:

We are entirely against the removal. The blacks are our brothers. We have lived with them. We played with them. We grew up with them and now the Government wants to separate us. We won't move into their houses if they are moved.82

In Huhudi the community's civic association also worked against divisions amongst residents in order to ensure maximum unity in the face of the threatened move to Bophuthatswana. The Huhudi Civic Association worried that residents without Section 10 rights would be labelled 'illegal', and be evicted and forced to move to ~ u d i m o n ~ in the bantustan: it therefore worked to get all residents registered as part of a community-wide struggle against deproclamation and rem0val.~3 The organisation of the 14,000 residents and their persistent resistance led to a significant victory in October 1984, when the original removal orders were c a n ~ e l l e d . ~ ~

Communities have learned to be constantly vigilant about Administration Board changes, aware that slight shifts in policy might signal the beginning of a move towards deproclamation and removal to a bantustan. In 1985 in Sibongile township, outside Dundee in northern Natal, on the borders of the ~ w a z u l u bantustan, residents launched a campaign against the increase in rents. They pointed out that rent increases would bring evictions which would force people into the townships of Kwazulu. The protest was successful and both the rent increases and the removal were delayed.85

In sum, then, the policy of urbanisation in the bantustans had two aspects. The first was to establish towns close to the development centres of 'White' South Africa, where industrial workers would be available for wage employment, but still contained within bantustans, and therefore because of high unemployment willing to accept low wages. The second aspect was to establish a trading, administrative, and professional class, essential if bantustans were to attempt to live up to the fiction of 'self-g0vernment'.~6 In both aspects the regime has had some successes, but they must be seen in conjunction with its failures: continued large-scale evasion of influx control and the very small number of people willing to co-operate in maintaining the facade of bantustan 'independence'.

State demographers doubted in 1981 whether the process of decreasing the African urban population was proving worth the cost to the government. They pointed out that in an age of high fuel costs the mass transport programmes involved might not appear attractive. In subsequent years such doubts seem to have affected policy. The new leasehold rights and house buying policy has meant that house-building in older townships is now unfrozen, and to some extent there is less incentive to move to bantustan t0wns.~7 In addition the threat of removal has proved a potent focus for community organisation and resistance within townships like Oukasie near Brits, Huhudi in the Northern Cape and Sibongile in Northern Natal, to name only a few. These are probably some of the factors behind the Cabinet's decision in May 1985 to abandon some of the programme of forced removal to bantustan towns. The Department of Co-operation and Development

84 Forced Removul

issued a list of 52 townships which were no longer threatened with removal. These included Atteridgeville and Mamelodi in Pretoria and the Bloemfon- tein townships.88.

However, the reprieves for these townships in no way indicate that removals from urban townships are at an end, or that the strategy of developing large urban areas in the bantustans for commuter labour has been abandoned. From 1980 the residents of the Old Location at Brits were forced by a variety of direct and indirect pressures to move to a new township in a resettlement area bordering Bophuthatswana, Lethlabile. The pressures intensified from 1985. No new houses were built in the Brits location; if a landlord moved to Lethlabile, in return for a lump sum in compensation, all his tenants' homes were demolished and the site frozen for new development; from 1980 to 1986 people from the Brits location could not bury their dead in the local cemetery, but had to go to Lethlabile. People active in the Brits Action Committee which is organising the popular resistance to the removal had their homes attacked, and many members of the Action Committee were detained when the State of Emergency was declared in June 1986.89 In October 1986 the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning deproclaimed the Old Location, transforming the 10,000 remaining residents into illegal squatters. Despite petitions and delegations from community groups, trade union and employer representatives, the Minister refused to reverse his decision. At the end of 1986 officials and police visited the township checking documents; the people believed this to be a prelude to forced removal.

Although the destruction of old-established African townships was a feature of the 1950s, it reappeared in the mid-1980s. In Langa township, near Uitenhage, houses bordering the suburb of the town designated for whites were bulldozed in 1986, some at dead of night with troops working with council officials by floodlight. The people were forced at gunpoint to take their possessions to tents erected for them in the township of K~aNobuhle.~O In the African township near the Eastern Cape town of Despatch residents were given 24 hours' notice in September 1986 to move to KwaNobhule. Eight hours later trucks arrived accompanied by armed municipal police and the people were forced to pack up their possessions. The removal took place at a time when the leaders of the civic association were in detention. In July 1986 the George Municipality notified the 3,000 residents of the old settlement at Lawaaikamp that they had to move to a new township at Sandkraal by 3 1 December. The new area is a 'site and service' scheme where residents must build their own houses. A squatter settlement next to Lawaaikamp was bulldozed in April and police raided the township repeatedly during 1986, harassing and intimidating the residents. All these new urban removals appear linked to local white fears of black militancy and the regime's strategy to throw a military cordon sanitaire around the townships.

The rationale for these new forced removals interlocks with the changes in influx control and the industrial decentralisation programme. It envisages

Urban Policy and Forced Removals 85

major population growth in the bantustan towns, because they are the areas where housing will be made available to Africans. Towns like Ekangala and Botshabelo, not yet incorporated into any bantustan, may be granted autonomous status as city states. For the regime, the pressures forcing people into townships excised from 'White' South Africa are an attempt both to curb the political militancy of the townships, to create large labour pools for decentralised industrial concerns and to curb the growth of black trade unions.91

Although the limited reprieve concerning township deproclamations represented a victory in the battle against urban deproclamations and removals of this type for some, the many people affected by these removals still face a long struggle. Those who have been forced into the bantustans have to face the often brutal actions of the local administrations: these include continuing attempts to marginalise them in relation to the major areas of economic growth, to undermine their political organisations and to deprive them of rights of residence and free movement outside the bantustans and access to full South African citizenship. They have to confront daily the appalling living conditions, the long journeys to work and the lower wages paid in local jobs. Although the regime partially halted one form of forced removal because the cost to it was too high, the legislation that allowed for these removals was not repealed and no compensation was contemplated to redress the consequences of the removals that have been inflicted on hundreds of thousands. Moreover, the strategy of urban forced removal continues to be used to attempt to enforce military control over uprisings or threatened resistance in urban areas, as seems the case in Brits, and to maintain its regional development programme, on which rests its hope of economic revival and re-established political authority.

SQUATTERS

One result of government urban policy has been that housing shortages have become endemic in cities. In the face of the complete lack of municipal or Administration Board housing thousands of urban people built their own homes on waste land or on land rented from local landowners. The squatter movements of the 1940s succeeded in persuading local authorities to provide squatters with housing and as the township consolidation of the 1950s and early 1960s took place squatters were allocated homes in the new conglomerate townships. But the restrictions on township house-building programmes, initiated in the late 1960s, coupled with the enormous pressures on people from the rural areas seeking work in the cities, led to a resurgence of squatting in the 1970s. By the end of the decade virtually every South African city had its satellite squatter settlement, and here some of the most vicious removals have taken place. The regime has sought time and again to evict the communities, destroy the housing they had constructed themselves, and hound people back to bantustans.

The squatter settlements of the Western Cape have become internationally

86 Forced Removal Urban Policy and Forced Removals 87

Ik~~own. Here the housing shortage was acute because the enforcement of the (:oloured Labour Preference Policy had meant that no new municipal Ilousing for Africans was built at all between 1966 and 1981. From 1972 to 1980, despite the lack of formal accommodation, the African population of the region increased by 62.9 per cent from 108,827 to 183,360; the African l>opulation in 1984 was estimated as 229,000.92

Before the attacks on squatters of mid-1986 there were four main squatter settlements around Cape Town. Crossroads, with an estimated population of 40,000, grew up in 1975 as an emergency site for people evicted by inspectors l'rom makeshift accommodation in several sites around the peninsula. Originally established with the consent of the local authorities, it began to attract residents from the townships who were tired of overcrowded lodgings and many women who came to try to work in the cities but could not find hostel accommodation. When the squatter settlements at Modderdam, Unibel, and Werkgenot were destroyed in police raids, the people living there moved to Crossroads. The other settlements of the Peninsula were KTC with approximately 1,000 residents, where followers of one of the Crossroads community leaders moved after disputes about rights to remain in the area; Nyanga Bush, with 2,000 people living on sand dunes after they were evicted from the township of Langa; and Nyanga Extension with about 300 families who were forced to move by evictions from a township at Hout B ~ v . ' ~

Although international attention has focused on the squatter communities of Cape Town, those around Durban are far more extensive. A study in 1983 estimated that the numbers of squatters in the region grew at a rate of 10 per cent per annum from 1966 to 1979. In 1984 the head of the Natal-Kwazulu planning council estimated there were 1 million people living in informal settlements around Durban, and that their numbers would grow to 3 million by the year 2000.Y4 A year later estimates of this population ranged around the level of 1.25 million in 35 informal settlement^.^^ The majority of these squatter settlements are in the areas around Durban that are officially designated part of the Kwazulu bantustan. The workers, without Section 10 rights, form a huge pool of labour for local employers who can exploit the workers' legal status by paying low wages without jeopardising their readv access to labour.

In the Natal towns of Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle, Richards Bay and Port Shepstone, and along the coast, squatters have also established a precarious 1 existence.

In the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area there are two types of squatter settlements. Some, like Winterveld, lie within a bantustan from which people commute to work. Others are adjacent to existing townships, such as are found near Alexandra Township, Katlehong, Evaton, Soweto and Grasmere, where the majority of people have Section 10 rights. At Katlehong squatters have been living in the backyards of legal tenants under constant threat of removal, and in Munsieville 2,000 to 3,000 squatters are in a similar situation. In 1980 the population of Winterveld was estimated to be

88 Forced Removal

300,000-400,000, but later studies have suggested figures of 1 million and that the population may well exceed this.96

In the Orange Free State town of Thaba Nchu a squatter community of several thousand, with numbers swelled by evicted farm workers, put up housing in the area called Kromdraai. After negotiations between central government and bantustan leaders of Qwaqwa and Bophuthatswana the entire commumnity was relocated at Onverwacht in the Qwaqwa bantustan. Around Bloemfontein on white-owned smallholdings, squatter communities have also mushroomed.

The regime's response to the development of the squatter communities has been c ~ & ~ l e x . In non-bantustan areas there seem to have been three phases: first, turning a blind eye, then eradication, and finally removal to new townships. But the end of one phase in one area does not automatically mean that a general end of that phase has come in the whole country. It appears that, as in much urban policy and in currently planned urban removals, there is still considerable debate and no uniform position on squatters has been evolved. In the Western Cape, for ten years from the mid 1960s the squatter settlements were left relatively unmolested, save for occasional pass raids, or evictions by landowners. But in 1976, mass evictions took place at Unibel and Modderdam as part of the regime's response to the uprising of that year in which the Cape Town townships participated. The Minister of Community Development announced that local authorities had been given powers to clear the squatter areas. These powers derived from orders for removal by the Minister which, once published in the Government Gazette, meant that people could be moved to any place and that no court could prevent the removal.97 From that date the Cape local authorities began a campaign against squatters, bulldozing houses, moving families and scouring the peninsula by helicopter to spot camps.98 In 1980 local authorities were given the right to destroy squatter settlements outside their own municipal borders, although only authorities in the C a ~ e and Transvaal had used these bv 1986.99 ~ -

2

Terrible attacks took place against the people of the large squatter communities first at Modderdam and Unibel and then at Crossroads, Nyanga and KTC. In 1978 the Cape National Party congress debated the squatter settlements and the government announced tha; Crossroads could not be tolerated, and that it would move to eradicate the settlement.100 From that date the level of attack, eviction, and demolition of homes rose markedly. Special riot squads were sent into the area as popular resistance grew. In July 1981 an attempt was made to demolish Nyanga. Nine hundred and two cases were brought against people arrested during the evictions; 2,452 children were taken to gaol with their parents; 3,600 squatters were evicted from the Western Cape, although 41 per cent had been in Cape Town more than ten years and 95 per cent of the men and 84 per cent of the women were in waged employment. lo'

The following year over 1,000 were arrested at Nyanga. Those who had been born in the Transkei were held incommunicado at Pollsmoor Prison and then deported as 'aliens' to the Transkei bantustan under the Admission of

l h e centre of Cape Town, after the dernolztton of Lhstrlct SII Photo: Caroltn Sch~rren

L)emonstration against the establishrnenr of segregated towndrlps, V e r ~ e n e i n ~ 1959. The leading banner reads ' W e want to 1iwe together with people of all races'.

ANC Meerrng !?I Soph~atou,n, 1956, rn protest at the destrlr~rrotr of the townslrrp and Jorcea renzovar ro Jozclero ---

Photo' Ell Wetnberg 1 5 1 , ~ rod , Johannesburg Photo ELI Weinberg

I

Qlrelrrng ro ~ I I , ' rent under the S U ~ C T L ' I S ~ O ~ ~ f t m n s h i p polri~' at district offices, SOQP~O '984. I-'horo: Natrg. l ) ~ ~ e l I - M ~ ~ K e n n c ~ Queurng outside a labour burearr for pass endorsements and work. Photo: Eli IVelnberg

Wuttz~lg fo buy wufer ar Bor~l~uhrlo, 1982. Plrofo: Nuncj~ 1)urrell-Jlsk'ennu

'We will nor go to Iihayelitsha'. Poster used in rhe Cape Torc'n campaign against forced removal ro Khayelirsha, 1 985-6.

Urban Polzcy und Forced Kemovuls 89

I,, 1 , I 8 I * I 1 1 1 I : ( . I I I I I ) I I L . Act. Koad blocks were set up along the Transkei I ... 1 1 1 1 ~ 1 1 1 1 , . 1 0 I I I ( . V C . I I I ~)eo~>Ic returning.lo2 These attacks were so ruthless I 1 , I 1 1 1 1 1 1 \ ) I . I I c . \ ~.ol1gressman who witnessed some of the Nyanga

I 1 1 I ! I I . I \ . ( . I I C . C I ; I [>OLII the world and I have never been so shaken 1 5 , ( , , I < l o !

I I . I ' 1 1 1 . 1 1 \ 1')s ( I Ilc N'csrern Cape Administration Board repeatedly tried to . I . I I I I l l ,., I I I C . ~ ~ l c ~ ~ t ar KTC. Although shacks were flattened and hundreds

t q , I , a I v t , ~ I I I ( . 1~.111rlicd ro the site and rebuilt their homes. The authorities . , D , 1 , t c 1 I I I ;~llow 1,500 families who qualified under the pass laws to

, . 1 1 1 1 l 1 I I I\ I ( .. 1 ° 1 I ~ L I ~ in 1984 as the population of KTC swelled, with I .. a ' 1 ' I 11' ' \ 1111: 1 0 I Ilc sire from Crossroads, further demolitions took place. In I I , , 1 1 1 . I . I \ I I I O I I I I I S 0 1 1984 more squatter houses were demolished in the ' \ I , I I ~ ( , 1 1 1 , . I ~ I ; I I I in the wholc of 1983. Houses were demolished at an , . 1 I , 1 1 1 ( 1 1 . I X . X pcr day,and the total number of demolitions by July

, , , , l 1 , , 1 :,, ,' 111 the space of four weeks, 28 May to 2 July, 1,024 homes , c 1 , 1 1 1 , b l ~ , . l ~ ~ . ~ l ;]I Nyanga, Crossroads and KTC.lo6 AS the camps were

I t x # I 1 1 1 , . . I , I ; , llic clderly, and small children were left exposed to the . 1 1 1 1 , I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I C I S lost their children in the confusion; possessions were

I , 1 I 1 I I 121 I hc height of the raids the people of KTC would rise before I 1 1 1 . 1 1 r ~ I O L V I ~ [heir own shelters, bury their possessions, and go off to

1 I , . 1 1 , 1 1 1 . 1 1 111g that it was the best strategy in the face of repeated raids. I : I 1 , 1 1 , I \~ Ic ILI , a member of the Nyanga Bush Committee told a Cape Times

, . l b e s l 1 , 1 . I ~ I I I I I I honlc of the effects of the constant raids:

I 1 1 1 . l~.,,l>lc don't want trouble. They just want to talk. When 1 9 , I I I I I ( . ;ll>l>cal to the board inspectors to stop raiding, they say the I , ~ , \ . ( . I 111licnr has sent them. Children are sleeping in the open. \ \ ' I I ( . I I ljcople return from work, they find their houses are gone.

I \ \ ( I c-l~~lclrcn aged two and four were lost for two weeks after a I I I t .111 r-;lid whilc their mother was at work.Io7

I 1 1 , ( , L V I ~ I ~ ; I , another committee member, said starkly: 'The raids are I I I I 1 1 1 1 Noljocly can live like this'.Io8

1 1 1 1 1 1 , . ' I ' ~ - ;~~~svaa l the initial 'blind eye' period ended in 1982. The East 1 ' 1 1 I , ! , .\tl~~~~lriatration Board evicted the squatters of Katlehong to the

1 , a I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c ~ ~ ~ 01 tear-gas, baton charges and arrests. At Grasmere, near l ~ t l ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ( . , . I ~ ~ ~ s g , LOO squatters were arrested in January 1984 in an early

1 1 1 . ' 1 11111,: I ;IICI, ~;iken to a specially convened court and sentenced to one 1 ~ 1 1 1 1 ~ 1 1 I ( 1 1 1 : 1 ~ \ ' imprisonment or RlOO for squatting illegally, although many . . I . I \ \ , 1 1 1 111): [lousing allocated to them in Sebokeng township and many

. I I 1 , I . \ L 1 . 1 (. Icg;~lly in the area, having been recruited as farm labourers. lov

, 8 1 ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ . . 111 bantustans fare no better. Usually the raids and attacks are 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 . I 1 ~ , 1 1 l , l ( . ~lccmcd to be in the wrong population group for the area. For

. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . I I I I I ~ . I < I . ; I S ~ U S settlement in Bophuthatswana, the police raided

90 Forced Kemoz~ul Urban Policy and Forced Removals 91

every two days, hounding those not deemed to belong to the bantustan, particularly people from the Transkei and the Ciskei. In the police attacks windows and doors were broken with steel bars, and those who could not bribe the police were arrested with their children and taken off to prison. They were only released after paying admission of guilt fines of R30. A man whose wife was raped during one such raid told a journalist:

We cannot afford the bribe. So most of us, including women, flee to the veld and sleep there. We go to our respective places of employment the next day without having washed. It's terrible. I feel like dying rather than living like this.Il0

Because of' the precarious nature of life in thc squatter camps unscrupulous entrepreneurs can mercilessly exploit the people's needs. Landowners charge extortionate rents. Even municipalities make high charges for minimal services. For example Crossrcads residents in 1984 were paying R7 per month in service fees for garbage and sewage collection and water provision although only 20 water taps served the population of close on 540,000."' In some settlements water is sold. For example cafe owners and entrepreneurs in the squatter settlements of GaRankuwa and Winterveld north of Pretoria have sold water to people at R2 a drum, roughly 200 litres.112 The diseases of poverty such as cholera, typhoid, fatal gastro-enteritis and pneumonia resulting from polluted water supplies and lack of protection from the cold are common in squatter settlements, while almost unknown amongst white South Africans and residents of established townships.113

Conditions at Winterveld in Bophuthatswana were described in a report by the Diocese of Pretoria:

Most dwellings are of corrugated iron, mud bricks or packing cases obtained from the factories . . . Houses vary in size from one to six rooms. Because of uncertainty of tenure these shacks are built in such a way that they can easily be dismantled and moved elsewhere. No running water, electricity or sewage system is provided. . . In some cases boreholes are contaminated from toilets. The incidence of deficiency diseases-kwashiorkor, sca- bies-and malnutrition is high. Infant mortality is around 10 per cent in the first year; something evident in the lines of small graves in the cemetery. Other common afflictions are TB, gastro-enteritis and alcoholism. "4

Resistance to removal in the squatter settlements takes a number of different forms. Firstly there is the open anger of the residents as their homes are destroyed. Angry women have shouted at the board employees, heavily protected by police, who tear down their houses. During the raids on KTC in July 1984 women danced and sang hymns in protest for hours on end as the officials backed by armed police tore down their ~helters."5 Police and Development Board vehicles have frequently been stoned as they raid the camps. Given the high level of harassment squatters are subjected to it is not

. . I I I Im\lnl: that it has been from Crossroads that some of the grenade attacks ,111t l gtl~llirc at police came during the State of Emergency of 1985-6.

' I ' l ~ c second form of squatters' protest is simply to refuse to move: to suffer I 1 1 , . clc\lruction of their homes time and time again, and then to rebuild and , ~ F I I I I I I ~ I ~ living in the area. This attitude was summed up by a resident of I i ' I ' ( : 111 August 1984 after suffering many demolitions throughout the cold \ V I I I I C I months:

I'cople are fed up. They all said they were going nowhere. They said they had already crossed the winter and the demolitions would not worry them. . . instead of getting tired the raids are giving the people more power to stay every day. People say they will die here instead of moving.U6

I o underpin their status as a settled community many of the Cape .( . I I lcmcnts had community organisations, schools built by local people and a .I I I )11g neighbourhood spirit.

I{ I I I the limits on both these forms of resistance were shown in late May I ' , X O whcn in three days of intense fighting the satellite settlements around

4 I-ohsroads-Portland Cement and Nyanga Bush-were destroyed by vigi- I . I I I I C S acting with police and military back-up. The divisions within the , I , ~ ~ ~ r n u n i t y were ruthlessly exploited by the authorities. On the one hand, , I I ; I I I I I y within Old Crossroads among long-established Section 10 qualifiers, 111c.l-c were supporters of Johnson Ngxobongwana who from 1979, as , I~;~~l-rnan of the Crossroads Committee, had raised considerable levies and I l . ~ ~ ~ s liom the community, while organising the communities into wards, , - . 1 c - I 1 with its own official. On the other hand, strongly based in the c ~ohsroads satellite communities were supporters of the Cape Youth ( .ollgr.ess (CAYCO) and the various women's organisations which had taken

he issue of illegal residents in the squatter settlements and resisted . I ~ ~ c . ~ l ~ p t ~ to divide Section 10 qualifiers from illegals. Although the two , : I I I [ I ~ S had had periods of intense and violent confrontation they had also , I F ol?crated, particularly in a campaign against rent increases in late 1985.Il7

I lowever, the unity was fragile and in an attempt to eliminate the , ~ t , ~ ~ ~ o c r a ~ i c organisations in Crossroads, Ngxobongwana, in co-operation , V I I 1 1 thc police and army, armed his henchmen and set them to attack the ~rc,llire camps. Forty eight people were killed, despite resistance organised

I ,\, I I I C youth and the women's organisations, and 30,000 made homeless. The 1 , 1 1 1 111-out ruins of homes were bulldozed and regulations issued under the , , I . I I C 01- Emergency powers prevented residents returning to their homes to , ( - I l.111n their possessions. People who for years had resisted removal to I.: I~.~vclitsha were forced to seek food and shelter at emergency camps there. I I I l1c.1.5 who sheltered in church halls and a Red Cross depot were raided by , l ~ ~ l ~ c c who arrested illegals to send them to bantustans. Only an emergency i I I I , . I - ~ I L . I prevented a similar destruction of the KTC community. According 1 , ) , 1 1 1 ; I I I I i-removals campaigner, the destruction of sections of Crossroads was

92 Forced Removul Rural Removals 93

the cheapest removal for the government both in political and economic costs. Politically the government has kept its hands clean. And thc disaster has been seen as an act of so-called black-on-black violence. In economic terms . . . the people of Cape Town and all others who have donated money and given support, have footed the bill for the devastation.I1x

The regime's present outlook on the squatters is confused, as is discussed in Chapter 5. On the one hand there is the desire to eradicate all the communities and move people either to bantustans or into official townships like Khayelitsha. On the other hand they see the potential of the low cost, self-built housing of the squatter communities being a possible solution to the housing shortages, hence the armed support for Ngxobongwana and the Old Crossroads community. However, as the debates on policy continue many squatters suffer intense harassment. According to Timo Bezuidenhout, the Cape Town local official of the Department of Co-operation and Develop- ment, 'The government will not allow its will to be defied by a group of people. . .'I1' For defying the will of the regime the squatters of Crossroads were brutally attacked and their community virtually destroyed. However Timo Bezuidenhout himself resigned in 1986, unable to continue with the ruthless destruction of homes. But in many areas the squatters' will to remain has worn down the policy of brutal force. Now the regime is desperately seeking to accommodate those squatters whom they perceive as tractable and conservative.

CONCLUSION

The four forms of removal that have resulted from the regime's urban policy represent attempts to enforce segregation and division in all phases of policy, to turn the workforce into a migrant one by expelling people long settled in townships to bantustans in the phases from 1960, and to prevent the growth of squatter communities in existing townships in the present phase. In all these areas of policy there is now doubt amongst influential sectors of the regime, a doubt nurtured by long decades of popular resistance in many forms.

CHAPTER 4

Rural removals I IN.IC. have been three main forms of forced removals from the land: the

1 \ 1, I ~ O I I of labour tenants and farm workers; the dispossession of peasants I ~ I I O I I ~ I I 'hetterment' and other land allocation schemes in the bantustans; . I I I ~ I lllc seizure of freehold land in 'black spots'. The first two categories 1 1 1 1 - t l ; ~ ~ c the first period of National Party rule during the 1950s although, (1 1 1 1 1 S O I T ~ C notable exceptions in the case of betterment, their most evident 1,10\c.c.111ion came at the end of the second period (the 1960s) and the I 3 ( ~ : I I I I I ~ I I ~ of the third period (the 1970s). Black-spot removals have been

1 . . , I ( 1;lrcd with the course of the bantustan programme in the second and 1 I l l 1 , I I ~ I I ~ S C S .

\V'l~ilc a comprehensive history of twentieth century South African farming I 1 I I I ~ I I I I S to be written it is clear from the initial studies that have been done 1 1 1 . 1 1 Iorccd removals in the countryside are largely the result of the

G 1 0 \ c.lol~ncnt of capitalist commercial agriculture. Increasing mechanisation I I I I \vl~ilc-owned farms from the mid-1950s and the reduction in the number 3 1 .11 111s has in the long term meant a smaller demand for African farm labour

I I 1 1 I I IIL. I-cmoval of farm workers through mass eviction. This trend has by no 1 1 1 0 . I I I \ Iwcn uniform, which accounts in part for the regional differences in I 1 1 1 1):lc.c and scale of forced removals from farms. The attempt to develop

% ' 5 ~ ~ 1 ~ oriented farming sectors through betterment schemes in the baritu- I . I I I , ? I I ~ I S had similar results. Long-established peasant subsistence communi-

1 1 1 . I I ; I V C bcen uprooted and forced to move to make way for highly I 1 1 l , .~,l~\cd commercial farmers with ready access to credit, marketing boards

1 1 1 ' 1 ~~~cchanical inputs through development plans. Although forced 1 I I 1 1 I \ ~ ; I I \ olworkers from white-owned farms and peasants from communally 1 1 ' 1 ~ 1 1,l;lc.k lirms have their origins in similar economic developments - the

1 1 Il,.lon ol'commercial farming throughout the South African countryside- ( 1 1 s \ I I ; I 1.c different political dimensions and will be discussed separately.

1 1 1 1 . I c~noval of 'surplus people' from the land has been a brutal chapter in 1 1 1, 1 , \,c.lol~ncnt of capitalist agriculture throughout the world. Resistance

& I , I . I I ', I I I O S I difficult for people who are already bound by a form of master . ( . I \ . ; I I I I c.ontract, as were Africans on white-owned farms in South Africa,

I I I I I I 1 4 \ ( I S tained when the people removed have legally recognised rights 1 1 1 1 1.11111 they are losing. Thus in South Africa fierce resistance to

I , , 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 c . 1 1 1 \chcmes from peasants in the bantustans has severely limited the ' I , I , I 1 1 . I ! 1 0 1 1 01 111c schemes and their efficacy. A resistance of equal intensity, 1 1 1 ~ I ~ ~ I I ~ : ~ I I 11 (Iil'Scrent form, has been mounted by the remaining African

, , . I 1 1 I . ( 1 1 I I cChold farms who find themselves in areas designated 'black 1 ~ ~ ~ 1 - . I I I ~ ~ ',( llccluled for removal into bantustans. This is the third group of

94 Forced Removal

rural people who have suffered removal or are under threat of removal. Their success in using the courts and in attracting international attention has already proved a stumbling block to the strategy of forced removals of this type.

According to the present apartheid apologists forced removals of rural communities are a thing of the past and nowadays communities only move voluntarily. But the whole world saw the massive police presence at Mogopa that was needed 10 'voluntarily' remove people from that 'black spot' and attention then focused on Driefontein and Kwangema, where the coercive tactics of 'voluntary removals' were exposed. The importan\victories won by these three Transvaal communities when they challenged their removal in the courts set a precedent for other black spots under threat and must surely have contributed to the shift in government policy on black-spot removals in 1985. (This change of policy, however, must be seen in the context of the debates, and new alignments and legislative initiatives discussed in Chapter 5.)

T H E END OF LABOUR TENANCY AND EVICTION O F FARM WORKERS Throughout the nineteenth century labour tenants were allowed to farm some small amounts of white-owned land and graze stock in return for three to six months virtually unpaid labour, for a white farmer. The terms of the agreement between farmer and tenant were specified in a contract which usually bound not only the tenant, but also his family, to work on the farm. For more than a century labour tenancy was the major form of labour relation on the farms of Natal and the Transvaal. These were both areas where white settlers acquired large tracts of land without long drawn-out wars, in contrast to the Cape and the Free State. There were large African populations settled on the land taken by the whites and the early settlers had neither the arms nor the legal coercive powers to expel them. Indeed they needed their labour and they were able to secure this through tenancy agreements.] The 1913 Land Act outlawed African tenant farmers who rented land from white freeholders, but labour tenancy was not affected by this legislation.

In 1956 labour tenancy, long criticised as backward, feudal and responsible for industry's labour shortages, came under threat with an amendment to the 1936 Trust and Land Act. The new legislation required the registration of all labour- tenant contracts and the establishment of Labour Tenant Control Boards in each district to administer this and to take responsibility for pegging the number of labour tenants allowed per farm in each district. In addition farmers were to be prohibited from taking on any additional rent-paying tenant^.^ While manufacturing industry and mining, both of which suffered a labour shortage in the 1950s, were influential in securing the 1956 legislation, a significant political impact was made by the findings of the Du Toit Commission. The commission, established in 1956, investigated the decline in the white rural population, and found that it comprised only 4 per cent of the population on the land. It concluded that the decline resulted

~ I I I I I I I tic existence of many small farms, unable to support their owners, who , o l r l t l not compete with large landowners when buying land and lacked the I I I ) : I I working capital required to provide for the necessary machines and 111 c.c.el~ng stock. The commission also pointed to the lack of a credit system I I B I ~ l l c agricultural industry. In addition the growth of manufacturing I I I C I I I \ I ~ ~ since 1945 had created a demand for white labour in the cities. ,\, { ~ ~ t l i n g to the commission it was necessary to halt this trend of I l , . l )~~ l> i~ l a~ ion because 'a numerically strong, yet economically sound rural I t, l l)~~l;~rion is a prerequisite to the maintenance of White civilisation in South <\I I I ( il'.

. \ I I I ( I ~ ~ schemes for encouraging white settlement in the countryside were I I I I I . . ( . lor social and educational programmes, electrification, control of land I 1 1 I , (.\ ; ~nd elimination of uneconomic farming. But the commission stressed 1 1 1 1 11t.cd for a policy

10 organise farm labour in such a way that only the absolutely c~scntial number of units are employed, and particularly to limit Iilrgc non-white families on farms to the absolute minimum."

\ [ I I I ~ I I I K ~ thc logical connection between a large black rural population and I I I I , 11rh;rn migration is tenuous, their relation was described in emotive

I I I 1 I , , 11 general scare about the 'beswarting v a n die platteland' (blackening of I 1 1 , ,111111rryside) was whipped up, and this century-old demographic feature %.I ,,I I I I I 11 Al'rica became equated with a threat to civilization and the survival a ' 1 I 111- \\ hitcs. The 1956 legislation was partly a response to these economic, I s 8 ~ I I 1 1 . I I and ideological conditions.

1 1 1 1 . I(.gislation, however, did not lead to an immediate eviction of labour I , 1 1 1 1 1 1 , . 'l'his was partly due to the expansion of South African agricultural

I 1 1 1 1 I 1011 after World War 11. The strong demand and high prices I I I I I I 1 . 1 I c ~ l production and a drive towards mechanisation, but mechanisation

f # I . I I I I I ( ~ which did not bring a decrease in the demand for farm labour. ( 8 q 1 1 , I . ~ l l v , I [ took the form of capital substitution, such as the use of a tractor I I I ~ ~ l . ~ ~ ,. I B I ;In ox-drawn plough, which did not entail a significant reduction in I 1 1 . 1 1 , I , I I I lorcc (see Table 15). The expansion of agricultural activity meant I 1 , 1 1 I 11(.1c was, in fact, an increased demand for casual labour, especially , I , # I 1 1 1 , I 1 1 . 1 1 vest time. There was a conflict of opinion among farmers about

1 I I ' J ' ) o Ic~islation. Many relied on labour tenants for adequate supplies of I 1 1 8 a l ~ ~ ~ , . I I I C I ;IS no alternative method of obtaining labour existed, they were I ' I I 1 1 I, I : . I I ~ I I I . C ~ the legi~lation.~ The presence of a majority of local farmers , , I I 1 , I ..llu~r~r Tenant Control Boards ensured that restrictions on labour

1 . I I 1 1 1 , \ , I l t I ]lot outstrip the needs of white landowners. 1 I I I 1 I , 1 l ~ ~ ~ ~ ) s ;~gricultural growth reached a plateau. The tendency towards

r I I I I 1 1 1 ~ , I I . I I I I W ~ production methods began to predominate. Many farmers , 8 1 1 . 1 1 I 1 1 , 1.1111>loy semi-skilled wage labourers, and considered the large

q t ) 1 I I I I I . ( 1 1 I.ll>our tenants and casual farm workers redundant. This trend 1 I . I I 1 1 1 1 I I I I IC. in the 1970s and 1980s (see Tables 13-15). However, there

, 1 . I 1 1 1 , . I I I I I C . li~rmers, particularly in Northern Natal and the Northern

96 Forced Removal Rural Removals 97

Transvaal, who were reluctant to expel labour tenants because they feared evictions would threaten their casual-labour supplies. The Natal Agricultural Union considered that the ideal of a full-time wage labour force was commendable, but that this should be achieved through 'evolutionary rather than revolutionary mean^'.^ Evictions began, but at different rates around the country. In each area labour tenancy was abolished by proclamation. By 1970 labour tenancy had been abolished everywhere except Natal. After 1970 no new labour tenants were registered in Natal and a concerted effort began to remove the existing 24,000 tenants in that province. The first removals were made by state agencies,ybecause once families were no longer covered by labour tenant contracts they were illegal occupants of white-owned land. GG (Government Garage) transport moved the mass of people to dumping grounds on South African Bantu Trust land. Later removals were under- taken by farmers, who evicted tenants without ensuring where they might find alternative land. Labour tenancy was formally abolished, for the whole country, in 1979.

While labour tenancy was the labour relation most common on farms in Natal and the Transvaal, farmers in the Cape employed full-time waged workers. However, the same forces that encouraged landowners to comply with the abolition of labour tenancy and the eviction of tenants led to the removal of farm workers and their families in the Cape. From the late 1960s thousands of farm workers were evicted. In 1976 a major drive against unregistered farm workers in the East Cape was mounted. The Eastern Cape Administration Board (ECAB) sent out labour inspectors to enforce long-neglected regulations. The registration fee charged for each African resident on a white-owned farm was a major incentive to farmers to evict workers whose labour was only required at certain time of the year. The expelled farm workers of the Eastern Cape swelled the population of the resettlement camps of the bantustans.

It has been calculated that evictions of labour tenants and workers from white-owned farms meant that, between 1960 and 1983, 1,129,000 people had been forced to move.7 As the settled African population in the rural areas of 'White' South Africa has been virtually stagnant for two decades, this means that a number of people equivalent to all natural increase in that period must have left, either through forced removals or evictions, or in search of better-paid work.8

The evictions have come in waves. At the end of the 1950s there was a big drive in Natal against surplus labour tenants and an estimated 40,000 people were evicted between 1957 and 1959. In the next decade the major thrust of policy was felt throughout South Africa. An estimated 656,000 labour tenants were removed between 1960 and 1970, although the Department of Bantu Administration acknowledged only 175,074 people removed in this period. Of the total number moved during that period, an estimated 400,000 people were removed in Natal alone. In the 1970s far fewer evictions took place, estimated at around 400,000. Once again the greatest number of removals were in Natal. The Kwazulu bantustan's Department of the Interior reported

I l l ; lr in one year, 1978, 10,306 Africans had been evicted from white-owned I ;II-ms in Natal.9 The period of evictions is by no means over. An estimated 1 i~~illion farm workers are still threatened with removal in the next decade.I0

'l'he evicted people were moved to 'closer settlements' on South African I i ;~n~u Trust (now South African Development Trust) land in the bantustans. 'l'hcy could keep no livestock and were restricted to one-quarter acre plots. Sometimes the regime provided rudimentary dwellings, which the people wcrc obliged to buy." The conditions in the closer settlements were and are .~ppalling. In 1976 an official handbook gave the bland reassurance:

The resettlement of families is undertaken by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. An estimated objective is to ensure the least possible discomfort and disruption to the families and to meet their individual requirements as far as possible. Facilities should at least be on a par with those existing before the move . . .

Resettlement only takes place when a particular area has been carefully planned and the necessary conveniences like schools, clinics and infrastructure have been provided for by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, or its agents.12

'l'his picture should be compared with the first-hand observations of Cosmas I)esmond, who visited many of the closer settlements in Natal in the late 1960s. At Mpungamhlope, a closer settlement near Babanango, Desmond saw:

The whole place had a general air of shabbiness with a number of overgrown, empty plots. Many very poor, dilapidated houses, some half-built houses and no proper roads. Ragged, hungry- looking children surrounded the few taps that were installed in the 'streets' in 1965. There was no sign of any form of sanitation . . . There was little sign of any development. There was a primary school with 620 pupils, including some from the farm. There were two shops, but the food was very expensive because of transport; a bag of Mealie Meal cost R4.75 (the usual cost is R4 to R4.25). A doctor visited once a week but there was no permanent clinic. The scrub bush, of which there was plenty, did not make good firewood so they had to buy wood from people on the farms. l3

The bleak picture was repeated in all the areas Desmond visited throughout the country. At Mnxesha, in the Eastern Cape, he commented:

There were the familiar, tiny one or two-room houses. Many with a number of ragged hungry-looking children or a bent old woman sitting outside. It was not quite true that I could no longer be shocked or disturbed. I was, in particular, by the sight of one tiny

98 Forced Removal

baby, a virtual skeleton. Unable to move or even to cry and covered with flies. I have been through the children's ward in African hospitals throughout the country and over the past ten years have seen thousands of starving, dying children. But I doubt whether I have ever seen anything worse than this. I cut short my tour to take the child to hospital.I4

Desmond's observations were repeated by many others. Mare reported from Weenen district that 17 families moved off farms, remained after a year in tents or wattle and daub huts with no facilities.15

Nondweni in Nqutu district is a notorious closer settlement. It was started around 1970 to house labour tenants evicted from Vryheid and Louwsburg. Initially it was intended to have 4000 sites and house 30,000 people. But in July 1979 the number of sites planned was reduced to 1,000, because it was discovered there was insufficient water. Conditions for the 4,000 inhabitants were atrocious. The nearest water source was a polluted donga (ditch) and the pump for water was frequently broken. Thousands of tin shacks on bleak veld comprised the closer settlement. Overcrowding was rife, often with 10 people per room. The nature of the ground meant that the pit toilets often flooded and typhoid together with malnutrition was common. Fuel was scarce and it had taken many months for the Nqutu magistrate to give permission for firewood to be cut. Pensions and disability grants took more than a year before being transferred to Nondweni. The poverty of the people was desperate. The nearest stores were 10 kilometres away although unlicensed stores charging high prices did operate in the settlement.16

The bantustan of Kwandebele, created in the mid-1970s out of land in the Central Transvaal, has a majority of its population living in forms of closer settlement as a result of forced removal. Water is scarce. The boreholes drilled under government contract have dried up and now people have to buy expensive water brought in by truck. Families spend many months under canvas waiting to be allocated a small plot where they can put up a house. The land is parched and arid and it is virtually impossible to grow vegetables or sustain any livestock. Commuters from Kwandebele, who work in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area, must often leave home at 2 a.m. to get to work at 6 a.m."

It seems that conditions in closer settlements do not improve over time. Desmond visited Limehill in Natal in the late 1970s having first seen it as a new resettlement camp in 1967. He wrote:

Facilities at 1,imehill remain rudimentary. There is a Bantu Affairs Department office, a water supply (with one tap for every 35 families), corrugated iron privies served by a bucket system, two overcrowded primary schools (shared with other settle- ments), a clinic (without a telephone) two general dealers and one cafeistore where prices are higher than in town. . . About 20 of the children born at Limehill have not survived to the dace of the survey. In addition, it appears that the birth rate has dropped and

I Rural Removals 99

the rate of population growth is about half the average rate among Africans. . . Unemployment rates are high even by contemporary South African standards. In particular, very few adult women are in wage employment. . . There is a general feeling of hopelessness amongst the residents of Limehill.18

! In Sada, in the Eastern Cape, first established in 1964, the same general conclusion can be drawn. This is evident from a report made in 1983

I

I Sada, in 1982, is badly underhoused, lacks proper facilities, cannot support itself locally, and shares a dwindling migrant labour market with all the other thousands in Hewu [district of Ciskei]. The place has never developed in morale either. It was always too degraded to get run down. All you can say is that the misery of 1964 has multiplied without reducing the sense of isolation. l9

A detailed household survey was carried out at Sada in the early 1980s. Forty ! \even per cent of the people were evicted farm workers. Although conditions

I ;I\ farm workers had been severely exploitative and wages were minimal, ~ l ~ c r e had been certain benefits. The diet on farms was more varied, for

I csample. One worker said:

Starvation in this place is abundant because you stick to one type of food, but on the farm you could enjoy milk every day.20

On farms people could often build reasonable houses for themselves with l i t ) rcnt to pay and had access to clean water, while at Sada the houses were \~nall and clean water scarce. On the farm people could keep stock, while this \ource of income and food was banned at Sada. The majority of men could only support families in Sada if they became migrant workers, going as far 1 .~licld as Johannesburg and Cape Town. Fifty-seven per cent of the women in I Iic survey sample worked in and around Sada in handicraft manufacture and ,~griculture, both with very bad pay. People spoke of their hardship:

I

Starvation is our problem due to scarcity of work. We have to buy things on credit or borrow them in order to survive.21

I ( was estimated that half the households were on or just below the breadline, with no spare money for clothes and only able to afford the most basic foods. Such poverty is physically and psychologically debilitating. As one man put

I 11:

I We are trying by all ways and means to make ends meet only for

! survival. We live in bad conditions and see ourselves destroyed bit by bit.22

I I I addition to the problems of remaining alive there are additional problems 0 1 . expensive transport, dusty roads and inadequate medical fa~ilities.~-i

100 Forced Removal

After the 1971 television film Last Grave at Dimbaza exposed some of the horrors of closer settlements, Dimbaza became the focus for concerted development efforts by the Ciskei bantustan administration to change conditions in response to international pressure. It upgraded the resettlement area by building factories, providing amenities like shops and churches and improving services. But despite this an investigation of the area in the early 1980s pointed to a 35 per cent unemployment rate; one-third of the households surveyed reported a child death since their arrival in Dimbaza; and there were serious protein deficiencies in their diet. The residents of Dimbaza complained of shortage of money and inadequate accommodation, unemployment, lack of hospitals and the high cost of e d ~ c a t i o n . ~ T l o s e r settlements under apartheid are, even at their best, places of extreme deprivation, hardship and exploitation.

Because farm tenants and workers have been evicted in small groups over a long period of time, it has been difficult to build up any co-ordinated resistance. The strongest protest the labourers have made is their refusal to go to the closer settlements. Evicted tenants moved from farm to farm in the Transvaal and Natal in the 1970s, offering their labour and trying to stave off the day when there would be no more farmers willing to take them. Often people who were moved to a bantustan by government officials returned to their former land.25 Many people designated for removal to closer settlements went instead to a squatter settlement like Winterveld, where less

i close control on employment meant better work o p p ~ r t u n i t i e s . ~ ~ At the moment of eviction many tenants are too shocked by its suddenness to mount any organised campaign. However, disobedience of orders and passive resistance are common strategies used by farm workers. At Weenen in 1970 large numbers of labourers refused to obey eviction notices and they were only forced out by hut burnings, bulldozers, arrests and prosecutions. Another tactic of the Weenen workers was to load the GG trucks with stones, disguised as bundles of possessions. They were transported to Madadeni, off-loaded the phoney 'luggage', and then made their way back to the

I Weenen farms.27 In the Transvaal and elsewhere in Natal similar passive resistance occurred.2x

Although from the outside the closer settlements appear places of abject despair, ruled by the compulsion for survival, they were born in conditions of fierce resentment and the passage of years, in multiplying the hardships, intensifies the anger. At Elukhanyweni resettlement camp in the Eastern Cape a woman told white interviewers:

I don't know what you people think of us. You lie to us, you cheat us, you make promises which you never fulfil, you take away our land, you murder our husbands and children, yes murder. I say murder because that is what you do and you treat us the same way you treat your animals. You put eleven people in two rooms, you put grown-up men with their grown-up sisters and then what do you expect? I can understand why my husband couldn't work

Rural K emovals 101

here, and he was ill. My sons found jobs but they got so little Ilioncy. And that is another thing. You people told us that it will Ijc- easier for the children here in Elukhanyweni. You said that the vollng people wouldn't suffer here because there are many opportunities and jobs for them. Well, they suffer, they suffer. 'l'hcrc are no jobs, the children die.2y

ItIl'l''l'1:RMENT SCHEMES AND BANTUSTAN LAND POLICY

I I I ( . \~.c.ond form of forced removal in the countryside is the uprooting of /j~..~,r.llll I~~useholds from land they occupy in the bantustans. The first phase

{ I I I I I I S policy was initiated in 1939 as a scheme for improved land use or 1 1 1 . 1 1(.1.11icnt' in the 'reserves', as they were then termed. Betterment schemes

$ I 1 1 1 1 I I I I I ~ lo the present day, but their emphasis has changed as has the scale % ! I 1-~11lovals. As the reserves have been transformed into bantustans, the I . I I 11 t11.11~ behind betterment evictions has changed: initially conceived in I c - I I I I \ 01 dumping grounds for surplus people, the betterment evictions are I I O \ \ . li~lkcd to the regime's commitment to foster the development of a I , I I \ . . I I C. landowning class in the bantustans.

I I I ~ . lil-sr betterment schemes, initiated in 1939, divided land in a particular 1 , t t . I I I I V illlo three strictly defined areas: one for livestock, one for agriculture,

I I I (Or residence. The original planners considered such rural policy ~ \ ( I I I I C I i~~c,l.case productivity in the subsistence sector. Within the Native \ I I . I I I \ I kpartment at the time there was a belief that improved agricultural

I 1 1 t I I ion by the subsistence sector would halt migration to the ~i t ies .~O In 1 ' 1 1 , l I IIC. Secretary of Native Affairs proclaimed 'a new era for reclamation' I. 8 1 I I . , . c . I vc land and plans were made for an ambitious policy that involved , I I , . I \ L. demarcation of the land along the lines of betterment planning. A I . I I . I I I I ; I I ion in 1934 had made betterment planning automatic and

8 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ o l - y on all trust farms. However by 1952 only 9.4 per cent of reserve I 1 1 1 ~ 1 1 1 , 1 < 1 h~.cn reallocated in terms of betterment schemes.31

I 1 1 , Il~;~k)dobsta~lejto the full implementation of the schemes and the mass 1 . I I i t n ( . t i .\ .;i of,Ja_ni~n. the reserves was the resistance of the people. Whatever I 1 1 , I ~~.~~c. \ ,olcnC intentions of some of the early planners, betterment quickly 1 ,, , . I I I N . .~\\ociated with high-handed actions by local commissioners. In 1949 . . I , I a IUI \ \ .< , I -S were given to Native Commissioners to implement betterment

1 1 , I ~ I I . , , .111ci fine or imprison people who opposed them. Attempts to move I , $ ' 1 1 1 , I I oln the land they had worked for centuries elicited some of the I I . I , , . I I I I I - ; I ~ resistance of the 1950s. For example, in Sekhukhuneland in

I , I 1 1 ( 1 1 1 ( . l Moroamoche and some of his councillors refused to accept the 1 : ~ ~ I I I I : \ l~~l~ori t ies Act and the attendant betterment schemes. They were

1 . 1 1 1 ~ I I I . I I .111ci [he people refused to pay taxes or obey the successors ( 1 , I - 1 1 I l l r . , l . I )emonstrations of resistance were brutally suppressed by a

t I ! . .I I I C I I I ( . C unit, but defiance persisted. In Natal in 1957 women protested, . I I . I I 1 t v l 1 . 1 1 1 Iv, and refused to obey legislation on dipping tanks and cattle

1 I I I I 1 1 , 1 1 1 10 lczognise Bantu A ~ t h o r i t i e s . ~ ~ In Pondoland a rebellion against

102 Forced Removal

Bantu Authorities and betterment measures led to one of the most sustained rebellions in rural South Africa, organised over a wide area for nearly two years.33

As noted in Chapter 1, one response to the popular rebellions in the countryside, many of which were directed against betterment, was the inauguration of the bantustan programme and the attempt to impose new structures of political authority in 1959-60. In the mid-1960s the bantustans acquired a new economic importance for the regime and they came to be conceived as areas for the location of reserve supplies of labour, the unemployed and women workers not required in periods of contraction of industrial growth, and in addition, dumping grounds for the old and the sick. In the context of this new role for the bantustans, betterment schemes lost almost entirely any aspect of improvement or rationalisation of land use and became instead principally instruments of coercion. A study of two betterment areas, Bothashoek and Sephaku, in this period concluded:

[The] betterment has not fulfilled its stated purposes of rehabili- tating the bantustan areas or rationalising agriculture to become viable economical units. Betterment became a way of planning these two areas so as to accommodate and control as many as possible of the people uprooted and settled in the bantustans. Betterment also provides accommodation for families of evicted labour tenants while men work wage contracts on farms.34

A study of betterment schemes in the Nqutu district in the Kwazulu bantustan observed:

. . . many families cannot afford to relocate their homes and spend anxious months awaiting eviction and often the plans are changed without notification. Often while the families are being relocated, grazing and agricultural areas have not been finalised, and the people may spend the growing seasons waiting for decisions from chiefs, Agricultural Advisers and Kwazulu Government Officials. Families are not compensated for their moves under the betterment s~hemes .3~

In the current phase of apartheid there have been shifts in bantustan land policy as the role of the bantustans themselves has been reformulated. The bantustans are no longer conceived of merely as labour reservoirs, protected from economic development. They are seen as areas where economic development should be encouraged both to support the political power of the present ruling groups and as a means of decreasing the mass urbanisation of the African population. Part of the 'development strategy' for the bantustans has involved decentralisation and the attempt to relocate industry in the bantustans (see Chapter 5).

I Rural Removals 103

. \ I I I ) I ~ I C ~ aspect of the 'development' policy has been the attempt to utilise 1 3 1 I I , I I I I C I I I schemes to foster the development of a class of commercial I . I I I I I , . I \ with substantial landholdings in the bantustans. Subsistence I . I I 1 1 l c . 1 \, dispossessed through these plans, are relocated in closer settlements I 1 1 I I I I I I X ;I pool from which contract labour and labour for decentralised I I I I ~ I I . . I I v is drawn. In the Transkei bantustan, for example, people were I , # I I I , I 1 0 move from communally held land to make way for a tea plantation I I I I ' , ~lltloland, an irrigation project and intensive agriculture development in I ) . I I I I . I I ; I ;111d an asparagus farm owned by the bantustan leader Matan~ima.3~ 1 1 1 J 2 1 \ ~ ~ ~ g ; ~ in the Kwazulu bantustan commercial farmers have been given Y I O I I C X [arcs of land on Tugela Estates displacing many peasant producers in I 1 1 1 . . I I \ , ~ . I . c , L . o w ~ ~ ~ district. All these schemes have been established by the I ' I I I , 11 I;I-l'unded development corporations. The new emphasis on land use is

q 1 1 1 . 1 \ 1 1 crops for an export market and the destruction of subsistence I J . ~ I , I I ~ I I I ~ C . This development strategy has been incorporated into the

# I ( \ I Ioiu~~cnt plans of a number of bantustans. For example the development 1 1 1 . 1 I I 1 ( ) I Kwazulu published in 1978 and redrafted into a White Paper in 1979 J ' I I 1 1 11 I\CCI 3 reform of the entire land-tenure system in the bantustan. The

1 I w;~s to increase agricultural production through 'managed farming G I 1 1 I I 1t.s combining individual operation with high level technical and

I l ~ ~ t c ~ . ~ l ~ ~ o n a l input', co-operative planting, harvesting and marketing involv- 1 1 1 1 . / :I 01113s of peasants with individual land tenure, assistance to individual I 3 4 . I . . . I I I I larmers involved in production for the market, and company- , $ ) I I I I I 11 led and operated agricultural schemes. An agricultural development I ) 1 1 1 1 I \ ( O help acquire land 'for more able farmers'. According to the White I ' I I V . I I ; I I I ~ tenure reform was to be undertaken to enable land to be used as ., , I I I I I v to raise development loans. The present estimated 2 million people

1 1 \ 1 1 1 , : ,111 [he land should be reduced to 750,000 who could farm the land , ) I I I I I ~t.l-c.ially .3' Development plans in the Ciskei bantustan embody similar I I I ~ I I I I I O I I S 10 move people from the rural areas to the urban centres and

I I I I I 1 1 I I ; I I ~ subsistence a g r i c ~ l t u r e . ~ ~ ( , I \ ( . I I [he long history of resistance associated with attempts to move

I I 1 1 11,- I [.om the land in the name of betterment planning it is not surprising I 1 1 . 1 1 . I I present these schemes are still a long way from implementation. In I \ , I I I ~ : . I , Kwazulu, where evictions for development corporation farming

1 1 I \ I . l.1kcn place, intense land struggles have followed and the district has I b t I 1 1 I 1vc.11 by bitter battles for nearly a decade. It is unlikely that schemes $ 1 I 1 1 I I , I I I ; IVC any different result in any other district. Bantustan leaders are 1 1 1 a I \ I ( I rrcad carefully in putting into effect so explosive a policy which

I I I I I , : ~ I I ~cop;lrdise their own political standing. None the less the plans cannot I ) ( t l ~ , . ~ ~ ~ ~ s s c d entirely and as long as they stand the threat of eviction hangs

I I ~l~or~sands of subsistence farmers in the bantustans.

1 III A ( :K SPOT REMOVALS AND BANTUSTAN CONSOLIDATION

I I 1 1 , 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 11!,1;111 policy envisaged the establishment of 'self-governing states' in

104 Forced Removal

the areas which the 1913 Land Act had designated for African occupation. The areas were widely scattered and some of the criticisms of the bantustan policy focused on the fragmented character of the land that would make up each bantustan, the problems of administration and the difficulty of gaining credence for an 'independent' state comprising so many little pieces of land. To overcome some of these problems various proclamations were made providing for consolidation of bantustan land. An overall consolidation plan was laid out in 1973, only to be superseded by a new plan in 1975. The Van der Walt Commission, charged with reporting on the proposals for the country as a whole, was then appointed and is still to report. However in advance of the full report plans were finalised in September 1985 for the boundaries of the Transvaal bantustans of Gazankulu, Lebowa and Kwandebele as well as plans for the consolidation of Kwazul~l. The revised proposals for Kwazulu entailed an increase of the number of areas of the bantustan from 10, as advocated in 1975, to 15, the clearing of all black spots and the removal of most Africans living on white-owned farms.39 The Transvaal plans involved the reallocation of districts, like Moutse, deemed part of one bantustan in 1975 and now reallocated to another.40

The 1973 consolidation plans would have reduced the number of bantustan blocks of land to 82, but would also have involved moving 575,000 pe0ple.~1 The 1975 schemes involved moving 1 million people.42 The 1985 plans for the Transvaal and Kwazulu entail moving 42,000 people in Natal, according to the regime's Commission on Co-operation and Development, and rescinding removal notices in the Transvaal." However the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) considered that the Natal plans would lead to the removal of 242,000 people, as only eight out of a total of 189 black spots were exempted from the proposals. 44 The Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC) pointed out that the Transvaal consolidation schemes affected approximately 143,000 people, who, although they would not be moved, would be assigned to different bantustans often in violation of their wishes45

In 1986 new legislation was enacted to enforce incorporation of communi- ties into bantustans: the Borders of Particular States Extension Amendment Act. This provided for the incorporation of certain additional areas of land into the bantustans deemed 'independent'-Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC). Some of the people in these areas are already deemed 'citizens' of the bantustans. The new legislation means they will lose their rights to have South African citizenship restored to them in terms of the Restoration of South African Citizenship Act 1986. As alien workers they will face harassment and insecurity at work. Others who retain the right to South African citizenship will find that, if they attempt to take out South African identification documents, they run the risk of expulsion from the bantustan in which they are now considered to live.46 The legislation means that no physical removal has taken place but communities have been incorporated into bantustans, without consultation, and have been subjected to laws that considerably worsen their conditions.

The majority of removals due to bantustan consolidation have been from

~ Rural Removals 105

I ; I I I ~ known as 'black spots', or 'badly situated' areas. Black spots are farms in . I I V ; I S designated 'White', held in freehold by Africans. Before the 1913 Land /\(.I Ilalted all African land acquisition there had been a concerted move by ~~lclividuals and groups of Africans to buy back from White settlers the land 1 1 1 ~ Africans had lost through conquest. Land acquired in this way was j:c.~lcrally of high quality in the centre of white farming communities. The I)l;~ck spots have long been the focus of white farmers' antagonism and a I ~ l l l ~ y for the dispossession of African freehold farms has existed for many ~lcc;ldes. After their election victory in 1948 the Nationalist Party intended to 4 . 1 ;~tlicatc all black spots as soon as possible, but their schemes were hampered I I I I I I C 1950s by a shortage of land for relocation. Only in the 1960s, with the ~~lcc.l~;lnisation of agriculture, was there a slight lessening of white farmers' ~ ) ~ ) ~ ) o s i ~ i o n to selling some poor-quality land to the SANT (the South African N ; I I I V ~ Trust, later renamed the South African Bantu Trust (SABT), now the \ O I I ~ h ASrican Development Trust (SADT)) on which black-spot inhabitants , I , 1 1 1 ~ 1 be accommodated.

Arcas termed 'badly situated' have been viewed in the same light. These . I I ( . ; IS are not freehold farms, as are black spots, but fragments of reserve I . I I I (~ , often under communal tenure and with bantustan appointed chiefs, in

midst of extensive white-owned land. In this section black spots and ' l l.ltlly situated areas' are discussed together because conditions and the form 0 1 1c.mova1 are similar, although usually only the term black spot is used.

111 I I K 1960s the government started moving African farming communities ..,.I I lc~l on black spots into bantustans and white farmers acquired their land . I I kl~ock-down prices.

I{;~ntustan consolidation entails various forms of removal. The case of the ( ~dtci bantustan illustrates this. In 1972 Pretoria proposed to rationalise the 1 ' 1 ;II-C;IS dcemed to comprise the Ciskei. The bantustan was to consist of five

. I I , . . I \ . 'l'his consolidation process entailed the removal of 14 black spots, Iloac pcople were moved to resettlement camps in the Keiskammahoek

o l I icr . Further consolidation proposals undertaken in 1977 meant the I ( - I I I I ) V ; I ~ of all black spots in the area. Two districts, formerly designated as I L I I I 01 thc Ciskei, Glen Grey and Herschel, were ceded to the Transkei 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 I I S ~ ; I I I and the Ciskei was compensated with new land in the south of the I , . J : I O I I . When the Transkei was made 'independent' in 1976, 40,000 people I 1 1 4 IV( . ( I Il.om Herschel and Glen Grey to the Thornhill and Zweledinga areas 1 ) I I (Iiskci, hoping for less repressive conditions. At the resettlement camp I 1 1 I ' I , I S ~ ; I I I I a transit camp was established for evicted farm workers who were $ \ l , ( . l l ~ t l Irom white-owned farms which had been purchased by the SABT in I ' ~ i l ) 101- ~ h c establishment of the bantustan town of Mdant~ane .~ ' In 1987 it

s , 1 1 1 Ire. \cell that bantustan consolidation entails the removal of people from 1 1 1 . 1 , 1; \ I IOIS, the removal of tenants from white-owned farms bought for

I I I ~ . I O I I jnto bantustans, and the removal of people from one area to another 1 . . t O ( . 1101-ders of bantustans are drawn and redrawn.

I I I 1 % ) 1') ( ireyling Wentzel, Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Develop- 1 1 1 ~ 1 1 1 , \ ; I I C I that, although the Van der Walt Commission had not yet

106 Forced Remoz~al

reported, the government would nevertheless go ahead with the removal of black spots outlined in the 1975 consolidation proposals.48 In the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape the majority of people living in black spots have already been removed. A few opposed the removals on legal grounds and two communities in the Transvaal won reprieves (see below). However, in Natal, it was estimated in 1983 that over half the freehold areas had not been eradicated.49 Kwazulu presents an enormous problem for schemes of bantustan consolidation as it comprises so many fragments. The large number of black spots and the need to find compensatory land complicate the problem. The most recent schemes have been strongly criticised both by Kwazulu bantustan officials and the communities scheduled for removal. The forcible removal of people from one bantustan to another has occurred throughout the country. When Kwandebele was created as the tenth bantustan in 1977 it had scant land (only 55,000 hectares), and a tiny population of 25,000. In order to give some substance to the regime's claim

BOPHUTHATSWNA

ludlng 1975 consollddrlon

Kwandebele 1984 proposals for Incorvoratlon 169.000 hd already f ransfer~d

Moutse and Nebo farms ILebowa)

Map 9: Kwandebele: The making of a Bantustan.

Rural Removals 107

that it is a 'nation state' it has had considerable areas and a growing ~>opulation assigned to it. By 1986 it consisted of 300,000 hectares of land and I I ; I ~ a population of 465,000.50 People from Bophuthatswana assigned to lcwandebele were forced to move as they no longer fitted the official criteria lor residence in Bophuthatswana. The Moutse district was excised from I .cbowa and despite organised resistance and a long court battle its residents \vcrc assigned to Kwandebele. In the Free State the residents of Thornhill \ v ~ r c moved from land under the administration of the Bophuthatswana I,;~rllustan at Thaba Nchu to Botshabelo, due to be consolidated into ()\vaqwa. In the squatter area of Winterveld, once the area had been ,l(.\ignated part of Bophuthatswana thousands of those deemed to belong to O I ~ I C I - bantustans were terrorised and forced to move.

I<ilntustan administrations view with some ambivalence the eradication of 1 1 1 . 1 ~ k spots which has forced large farming communities into their territories.

I 11c.v have also had mixed feelings about the plans for consolidation. I lo\vcvcr most of their statements about forced removal are rhetorical ,:,.,>I III-cs which mask the financial and political benefits they reap from the I . I , I \ V I ~ in the population they administer. The public stance of most 11.11111rsran leaders is one of staunch opposition to all removals. Thus in 1973

1 1 . I conlbrence held at Umtata amongst bantustan leaders a resolution was I ~ I O ~ I I ( . C I to resist the continuation of mass removals." This resolution has

1 1 ~ 1 - ~ ~ ~-c,pcated in many public statements since. The Transkei bantustan has I . I l l . , c . t l lo accept any people forcibly removed en r n a ~ s e . ~ ~ This is one factor ,! 1 1 1 , 1 1 1,;unpered the destruction of the squatter camps of the Cape Peninsula

I I I C \ 1 t ~ l to the devising of the Khayelitsha strategy (see Chapter 5). In the ( I . I . ( - I tj;rntustan in 1978 'Chief Minister' Sebe pledged his support for the 1 p s 3 , 1 1 1 , . 01 the black spots around Mooiplaas in the Eastern Cape, who were ! I 1 b l v t . t l in a struggle against eviction and forced removal. He told reporters:

l t l 1 1 whatever that Government does will not include the removal our people from their land. Their removal will never be

. 1 1 l ( , ~ led during our lifetime . . . That area is dear to us. It is our I I I C which we will never ever give up, no matter what the

% I 11 1\c.cltlcnces.~3

1 1 1 I . I I I I I I ; I I vein a Bophuthatswana official protested in 1978:

I 1 1 , . sorr:h African government is going ahead with the removal of t ! I I I I ~ c ~ ~ ~ l > l c in spite of our protest that they should not be removed 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,111,cnities are provided for them 54

I . ,I 1 1 I I ! I I I I~c.lczi, the Kwazulu bantustan leader, has made emotive attacks ( f I . . I . , , I r t-~rlot,;~ls. In 1973 he commented on the bantustan consolidation

, I , . , l l l l t l l l

'\\ I I . I \ ~ - ~ i c l bdore that we are not prepared to co-operate with 1 1 ~ . l I I I I ) \ . ; I ~ olpcople. We don't want to be party to the misery of . a 1 1 1 I , , 1 1 1 1 1 c . "

108 Forced Removal

In 1978 officials of the Kwazulu authority started a campaign fund for people evicted from Natal farms, and in 1981 a speaker in the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly compared Pretoria's methods of removing people to 'the cattle trucks of Nazi Germany'.s6 However, behind this public posture bantustan authorities have co-operated with the policy. Sometimes their participation in removals is grudging, the result of the lack of other alternatives. For example, although the Kwazulu authorities accept no responsibility for the closer settlement at Nondweni, which is on SADT land, they must make some attempt to provide medical and other welfare services. In a similar way they participated in negotiations with the central government over the removal of black spots in the Ladysmith area, until it was revealed that Pretoria considered the negotiations to be about the administration of relocation and not about whether the removals would take place at a11.57

Yet the Kwazulu government also clearly benefits from the forced removal of people into the bantustan. The large number forced into the bantustan have increased the bureaucracy's fiscal base. The local dues which officially authorised chiefs and headmen are allowed to collect cement their alliance to the ruling group around Buthelezi. The increasing population of the Kwazulu bantustan bolsters Buthelezi's claim to represent a large constituency.

In other bantustans, too, leaders have on occasion actively encouraged removals. The Gazankulu administration welcomed removals arising from bantustan con~olidation.~' Bophuthatswana too has collaborated in the division of people in the territory and sanctioned removal on these grounds. In 1977 the Chief Minister, Mangope, signed an agreement with the Ministry of Bantu Administration that those who did not take out Bophuthatswana 'citizenship' could be expelled from the squatter camp at Winterveld and any landowner who refused 'citizenship' would be e ~ p r o p r i a t e d . ~ ~ In 1986 the Borders of Particular States Extension Amendment Act designated the farm Bloedfontein as one of the areas to be included in Bophuthatswana. Because the majority of the population of Bloedfontein are not Tswana speaking they will not be allowed to take up Bophuthatswana citizenship, but will be moved from their farm to land still to be added to K ~ a n d e b e l e . ~ ~

The malign reasoning behind this policy in Bophuthatswana was articu- lated during the second reading of the Bophuthatswana Citizenship bill in 1978 by a spokesman for the administration. He said:

Citizenship rights will not be granted automatically after five years. Bophuthatswana will not be a dumping ground for the scum and outcasts of other countries.62

A Bophuthatswana, in pursuit of this policy, provided the vehicles and the officials to remove the huge Sotho speaking population from the squatter settlement at Kromdraai near Thaba Nchu in the Free State.

Other bantustan leaders have terrorised people opposing incorporation into their bantustan. As the date set for the 'independence' of Kwandebclc

Rural Removals 109

, I I t Io\c ilnd the people of Moutse continued to express their opposition to 1 1 1 1 1 1 lll~.lr~sion in that bantustan the chief minister of Kwandebele, Simon . . I ( 1 . . I I I ; I , organised an armed group to round up old and young men in 1\~,111..(. ; I I I ~ subject them to brutal beatings and vile abuse in an attempt to I * I I . I I . I I I C c,ommunity's resistance. When a State of Emergency was declared 1 1 1 )1111(. I086 hundreds of people, many of them young students, were .Ic I . I I I I ( X ~ by police and military in Moutse and stringent regulations , I I I I I C I I I < . C I movements and the right to hold meetings in the area.63

' b q , I 1 1 , . 01' rhe ambiguity of the bantustan leaders' position was summed up I , , . I I . I I I I I I X Sebe speaking in the Ciskei Legislative Assembly in 1979. He

1 1 1 1

\V(. tlo not support resettlement but if resettlement is to take place 111,-11 the Republican Government is responsible to see that its 1~1 ,11 t . v is carried out, but once those people are settled in the ( 15,lici, they are not stones, they are people and for humanitarian I I . . I \ I , I I S we have to give assistance to them, not that as some say, \ I I . cllcourage r e ~ e t t l e m e n t . ~ ~

I 1 8 , I , I \ . ~ / ( ~ l u official responsible for education, also the Secretary-General of 1 1 1 I I 1 1 . 1 , 1 ) I - Oscar Dhlomo had a strikingly similar formulation:

\\'I CIO not formally participate in receiving or accepting I I ,.(.I I lc~nent people in territories under our jurisdiction. The I 8 , )I I l ; ~ t ion removals in Natal involve persons displaced or I I I I I O V ~ ~ lrom so-called 'black spots' and a variety of other areas, \ I I I ~ I ; I I C rhen more oftei~ than not settlers on land purchased by ' , . \ I ) I ' within the proposed boundaries of Kwazulu but which has 1 1 1 1 1 VC.I been handed over to Kwazulu for administration. I - . I / I I ~ I I government is neither consulted nor informed about

I I , I I I t.11iovals . . . Where areas in which people are resettled have 1 1 1 . l t lv hcen handed over to Kwazulu, central government has I 14 , I \ ' , I \ which override ours and we have no option but to , ~ 3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ; ~ ~ i c c the resettlement . . . on humanitarian grounds. We ' t l ~ ~ I , I I I O ~ turn people away who would otherwise be homeless or I ., I I I(.tI under even less favourable circumstances on SADT I l l l t l

I I , , I I ,.l),tfiliant the bantustan leaders may claim the short-term effects of , t t t , 1 1 . I I , . 1 1 ) [hem, the policy does provide them with a constituency, a I ( 1 I 1 1 1 , I I 0111 whom revenue can be raised, and who might constitute I 1 . 1 1 1 I I . I l ~ ~ ~ ) o I - ~ c r s . The resistance of bantustan leaders to removals has + 8 I m 1 I I I . I I I I I C . level of rhetoric, because the division of the country which

1 , o , I I I ( 1 1 . . I c.111 cscnt is fundamentally in their interest and constitutes their I I . . ~ \ I I I <.over they themselves have not been averse to carrying out

, . I ' 1 0 1 1 1 I'\wana-speaking people were hounded out of Winterveld by 1 ; I I I I I I , , I , I \ , 1 1 1 . 1 ~~ol ice. When the farm of Doornkop in Natal was . I ,, $ 1 I I ~ ( 1 1 1 1 1 0 Kwazulu in 1986 it was sold to a black farmer. With the

110 Forced Removal

approval of the Kwazulu authorities he served eviction notices on the 100 families living on the farm.66 In August 1986, 40 families who had lived in the village of Rala in the Ciskei were evicted by the authorities and dumped at the roadside beyond the Ciskei boundary. The authorities said the forced removal was carried out because children of the villagers had burnt a hut and killed some livestock of a local landowner. One of the villagers said a more likely reason was that the villagers did not support the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party .67

Since 1960 some 614,000 people have been moved through the expropria- tion of black spots and the implementation of plans for bantustan consolidation. Over 1 million were still threatened with removal in 1984. These figures do not include people reassigned to different bantustans after their areas have been reallocated in terms of new consolidation schemes.

The pace of black-spot removals has varied. In the decade from 1960 to 1970 the estimates of the number of people removed from black spots range between 68,000 and 97,000. In the early 1970s in just three years, from 1970 to 1973,88,000 people were forced to move and in the next three years 73,000 people were

The majority of black spots in the Cape and Orange Free State have been expropriated. Many removals have taken place in the Transvaal, although a few communities fought protracted legal battles against removal that significantly delayed the process. Although in some areas in Natal black-spot removals have been thoroughly implemented, particularly in the areas of mining and industrial developments, most black-spot removals are still to take place.69 The government's Bureau for Economic and Statistical Research commented in the mid-1970s that even after final consolidation recommendations had been drawn up for Natal, there would still be 43,000 hectares of land to be purchased in order to eradicate the remaining black spots.70 In 1984 more people were due for removal from black spots than have yet been moved. The success of black spot communities like KwaNgema and Mogopa in conveying their plight to international audiences when threatened with removal and their ability to use the courts to delay removal notices, may well be a form of protection for the 1 million people still living under threat of dispossession. However, costly legal battles and the vagaries of press attention are no substitute for secure rights in the land.

METHODS OF BLACK SPOT REMOVAL

In 1969, M C Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration, claimed that removals from black spots did not entail force:

We get their co-operation in all cases voluntarily. As a matter of fact sometimes it is necessary to do quite a lot of persuasion, but we do get them anyway.71

The forms of 'persuasion' range from the curt official instruction to move, through intimidation, selective use of violence, fostering of widespread

Rural Removals 1 11

1115c.curity, the division of communities and an outright show of force. The Millister of Co-operation and Development claimed, in a 1983 parliamentary tl(.lx~te on forced removals, that in black-spot removals:

Everything possible is also being done to ensure that it [removal] is carried out with consideration and compassion and that all people of South Africa will eventually benefit from it.72

I lrcse words do not bear serious scrutiny. The huge police operation used to l(.lnove people from the black spot of Mogopa in 1984 indicates the I~ollowness of the claim. George Rampou described the removal to journalists I r om the Washington Post:

They did not discuss with us. They just come. They come in the middle of the night all armed with revolvers. They come and surround your house as though you killed somebody. Then they corce you to leave your house without you knowing why, now you must go. They decide how much to pay you without talking to you about it.

But you must accept because they already break your house. Then they tell you you must go to Pachsdraai although you tell them you would rather go to Bethanie. They tell you if you want to go to Bethanie you must fetch your own transport. They must be great cowards to come and surround people when they are fast asleep. . .73

1 1 1 , story has been repeated thousands of times throughout South Africa. It r t hoes this account of the removal in 1982 of the Fingo people from the I \~t\ikama area:

We were moved by guns at 3 a.m. No knock at the door. They just came in and pushed the door open. They don't care. The children started to cry. There were GG lorries. They bulldozed the houses. They took the man of the house first to the land rovers. Then they surrounded the houses with guns and soldiers. Cattle and fowls-some were lost and some died. Some managed to take them to Ke i~kammahoek .~~

( .olnmunities are undermined by uncertainty about when the move will take ~ j l . ~ . c and what it will entail. At Steinkoolspruit people were not told what 111zil- properties were worth in advance, and were informed they would I t~ civc their compensation only when their household effects had already I , ~ x . I I loaded on the trucks for removal.75 Land is commonly grossly 1111(l~r.valued.76 No consideration is given to the violation of people's history . I I I ~ I culture. As Sam Mathopi of Mathopestad says:

What really concerns me mostly is the graves. You know I honour those graves more than I honour myself and my father, because

1 12 Forced Removal

those people bought us a very fruitful farm. On that farm we have never suffered. 77

When communities oppose removal they may find the popular leadership overruled, as happened at KwaNgema; or killed, as happened when Saul Mkize was shot by a policeman at Driefontein, while addressing a meeting about the proposed removal. Water supplies have been poisoned and schools closed, as other tactics of ' p e r~uas ion ' .~~

A newly emerging tactic by the regime in the face of black-spot communities' resistance to removal is not to carry out a physical removal but without consultation or negotiation to declare the area part of a bantustan as happened in the case of the black-spot farms of Braklaagte and Boschfontein in the Transvaal, which have been declared part of Boph~ tha t swana .~~ Although only legal documents have changed their status, the force behind the law is clear. This tactic appears to be a punitive executive response to the legal victory against such measures won by the people of Mgwali in the Eastern Cape. Mgwali, a black spot, was decreed to be under Ciskei bantustan administration following an agreement between the Ciskei authorities and the central government in 1981. The Mgwali Residents Association organised resistance to the agreement and challenged its legal status in 1985. They won an out-of-court settlement declaring the 1981 agreement null and void and ordering that the administration of Mgwali and similar black spots in the area known as the Border Corridor should return to the central government. However, the experience of a period of Ciskei administration of the Border Corridor black spots created and exacerbated many divisions within the communities. Those who supported the Ciskei ruling group were divided from those who opposed it. The resulting conflicts led to some people leaving voluntarily and some being forced into the Ci~kei.~OFrom 1981 onwards, members of the Residents Association were detained without trial on several occasions, by both bantustan authorities and central government.

A review of removals published in 1984 stressed that the residents of black spots are never moved of their own volition, and that varying degrees of legal manipulation and force are used. It concluded:

So here we are, back in the era of forced removals. But we must realize that we never left it. Force underlies every step of the process of persuasion. To talk about 'Voluntary Removal' is a contradiction in terms. Dr Koornhof s own words indicate the contradiction . . . There are laws remaining on our Statute Books which make talk of reform and voluntary removals utterly ridiculous. g 1

CONDITIONS AFTER REMOVAL

The forced removal of the black-spot communities are not merely gross acts of dispossession, they are also determined attempts to divide people. On

Rural Removals 1 1 3

1t1.1, li spots there are two groups: landowners and tenants. In some cases I 111.1 c. ;~r-c large landowners with many poorly off tenants and in other black . I , , , I \ I he distinctions are blurred. For example at Driefontein the plot owners

4 , I I I 11c whole own very small plots of less than 10 morgen (about 5 acres) and I 1 1 , . lc~iants pay a very low rent of R24 per a n n ~ m . ~ ~ In KwaNgema the area I . owned by members of the Ngema family, the descendant of Stuurman N,:c.lna, who had originally acquired the farm. However the tenants are ~,.j:;~l.dcd as an integral part of the community. They participate with the I 111.111hcrs of the family council, or Umdeni, in overseeing the actions of the 111 .111 appointed to administer the farmeg3

Wlien black spot communities are moved to bantustans loyalties and II)II~-established relations between people are not respected. Landlords with 111o1.c than 20 morgen and stock are allowed to keep their stock and have 1,t.l liiission to buy land in the relocation area. Alternatively, they may take 8 . I ~ I in compensation. Small landowners, in contrast, are allocated half-acre I I I I I I \ and forbidden to keep more than one cow and a few chickens. Tenants . I I I . signed to quarter-acre plots in closer settlements and forbidden to keep I I \ , ( . \ I ock or engage in agricultural production. The only compensation they . I I ~ . i~llowed is for the value of improvements made. Since 1968 state policy l1.15 envisaged that former tenant farmers on black spots should be channelled I l~lorrgh labour bureaux to places where white farmers are short of labour.84 I(l:l~.k-spot removals are both an exercise in the division of the land and ~ c . ~ p l c on apartheid lines and an attempt to make labour available to white 1.11 ~iicrs on easy terms.

'l'he hardships of moving into the bantustans have been acute for 1l1.1ck-spot communities. All suffer from the shortage of land. Even ~l~c.viously wealthy landowners find they cannot buy adequate new land with I IN. compensation money they receive.85. Communities with some autonomy I I I I lie administration of their daily lives find themselves subject to arbitrary ,1111liority. For example, the Fingo community who were moved from

I \~~s ikama to the Ciskei bantustan found that if they spoke out about their R 11;11iged conditions they were liable to arrest and beating by local headmen I I I I I ~ L - ~ Proclamation 252, which also provided for ninety days' detention for . I I I vonc considered a threat to the peace.86 The Mogopa community, moved I O Ikthanie in Bophuthatswana, were split into three by the Paramount c . l ~ ~ c l , who forbade them to hold meetings except in his presence. People \vc.~.c constantly harassed by police and taken for q ~ e s t i o n i n g . ~ ~

'I'llc housing provided by the regime is frequently inadequate. In 1977- 1c.r)orters from the World newspaper visited the private farm of Chief j\\;~~itshiwa near Mafeking where people had been moved from a black spot at ,Ui~chabestad seven years before. They had been left with tents, which had 1vo1.11 out, and iron shacks, which had rusted. People had put up huts which <l l \~~~tegrated when it rained.88 The impoverished community could provide I I O ;~lrernative housing. For the elderly, housing is a particular problem as I .c.vv 'l'hagane told reporters after he had been moved from a black spot into

114 Forced Removal

I was born in 1894. Where do you think I am going to get strength from to build another house like the one I built at R i e t k ~ i l . ~ ~

The Mogopa community were moved to Pachsdraai in 1984. Their treatment was much the same as the Machabestad community 14 years before. They were allocated tents and tiny huts which could not hold all their possessions. The metal huts became blazing hot in the sun. There was no shade and the barely cleared area was covered with thorn bushes, which stuck in the children's feet.90 Other people from Mogopa, who settled at Bethanie, had no local water supply, and had to walk a great distance for water.91 One year later they were still living in shacks made from the corrugated iron roofs of their old homes at Mogopa. The old people had not had their pensions transferred to Bophuthatswana and work seekers could not get jobs because their passes registered them in another area.92. Glenmore, a relocation site in the Eastern Cape, established in 1979 with temporary housing, bucket toilets and one water tap per house, was a horrifying place to move to. Rations were only provided for people moved into the area for the first few days. When these ran out the people faced starvation. Eleven people, nine of them children, died in the first weeks after the removal from gastro-enteritis, kidney inflammation, kwashiorkor and bronchial pneumonia, all of them diseases of poverty and poor ho~s ing .~3

Black spots should not be romanticised as oases of prosperity and co-operation before forced removal: poverty, hardship and exploitation of tenants were also features of the areas.94 But the uprooting of communities, the destruction of farms, and the compulsion placed on the people to live in crowded hovels on arid land with uncertain employment remain acts of great cruelty and the naked exercise of might.

RESISTANCE BY BLACK-SPOT COMMUNITIES

The forced removal of black-spot communities became a focus of interna- tional attention during the 1980s. In 1984, after the people of Mogopa were removed to Bethanie and Pachsdraai in a blaze of publicity there was a world-wide outcry and the United States State Department delivered a high level protest to the South African Ambassador in Washington. Before P W Botha visited Britain in June 1984 a demonstration was held outside Downing Street about the proposed removal of the KwaNgema community and a letter from the community, pointing out that their land rights had been sanctioned by King Edward VII in 1904, was handed to the Prime Minister, who raised the matter spechcally with Botha. These international dimen- sions of resistance to forced removals indicated the growth of organisation in opposition to removals amongst black-spot communities. For many years members of communities faced with removal have made strong statements of protest. For example Mr Makodi, leader of the Machabestad community which was moved to Rooigrond in Bophuthatswana, told a meeting called by the community:

Rural Removals 1 15

We have been thrown away. We feel very much grieved. When I talk of our land I mean the land of our forefathers, the land where our forefathers' graves are. I would like to pose the question: who are the foreigners? I can say that my people were there to accept the foreigners when they came. It is so painful that those people are the ones who are now telling us to go. We grieve for our corefathers' graves which have been ploughed over.95

I I I .I similar spirit in 1978 the Batlokwa community, threatened with removal 10 I<ochum in the Lebowa bantustan, jeered and barracked officials of the I )rpartment of Plural Relations who informed them that the decision to move 11.1cl heen made by parliament and was irrevocable.% Parliament has been one l o c t ~ h of protest. Isaac Ternbani, a delegate from the Fingo community, went I , ) Ix~rliament in 1982 to hear the debate on the sale of the Fingo land to white 1.11 lllcrs, and said:

I came to see Minister Dr Koornhofs face so that our children should one day kiiow that we were not afraid to go to the highest authority to put our case.97

1 . l ~ statements of protest at meetings and to the press are courageous, strong I lc.l~~onstrations of the depth of popular feeling, but they are poignant because 1 l ~ v counterpose these feelings against a powerful and unresponsive state. As

1) Twala, chairman of the Daggaskraal Landowners' Executive said, in 10x3:

Mr Van Niekerk was told, as his predecessors have been told, that the people of Daggaskraal have no wish to be moved. To be frank the people of Daggaskraal shall not move. The government can move us by bringing the bulldozers and having us all bulldozed. We are not a militant lot.

My statement must not be misconstrued that perhaps our objection may have a militant support. But for our sole rights we are willing to stand at our rightful ground. Let God, or perhaps whoever has power, decide over us.ys

I l r key to moving beyond verbal protest to concrete resistance lay in the t,,-ganisation of communities and their ability to make links with other ~)~.ganisations, the media and international public opinion.99 At Driefontein, hlogopa and KwaNgema this was done with concrete results. The I:ovcrnment's attempt to project a human face to apartheid was shown to be I . \ l~c and in the cases of KwaNgema and Driefontein it ensured that the 1c.111ovals did not take place. In Mgwali and the other black spots .lillninistered by the Ciskei bantustan authorities since 1981, the formation of ~ c . \ ~ d e n t ~ ' associations was an important factor in focusing resistance and ,.(.curing the end of Ciskei administration through court action.

lu all three communities a representative group was elected by both I.\lrdlords and tenants. This group was strongly opposed by these whom the

11 6 Forced Removal

government recognised as community leaders. At KwaNgema the democratic group was forced to use the courts to establish its legitimacy, once it was clear that officials of the Department of Co-operation and Development were refusing to consult or inform its representatives.loO At Mogopa, although the community had proof that the headman Jacob More, who favoured their removal, was corrupt and although they wished to depose him, their decision was not accepted by the local commissioner.

At Mogopa and Driefontein bitter divisions emerged between people who were prepared to move and those who were not. Jacob More held secret meetings at Mogopa with officials from Pretoria and Bophuthatswana. He agreed to move with 10 families to good accommodation in Pachsdraai. This paved the way for the terrorisation of the community in an attempt to force them to follow the headman: bulldozers smashed down the local schools and churches, the bus service was stopped and the water pumps were taken out. But the people who stayed behind refused to be intimidated. They bought a new pump, began to rebuild the school, organised older children to teach the younger ones, and initiated legal action to have the bulldozer removed from the village.lol In the face of these threats the mass of the community stood together, and they turned their back on the headman More who had been prepared to abandon their interests for his own. The threat of removal heightened the extent of local organisation. When the order to move from Mogopa was received the community decided not to co-operate but to wait and rather be moved by force. Their commitment led to political groups, church representatives, students and members of the Black Sash going to Mogopa to stand in solidarity while people waited for the police and trucks to arrive. This attracted considerable press attention. As no police or officials came for the first few weeks, rebuilding of the school continued. Women fixed the roads and the local committee went to the commissioner, demanding that he pay the pensions owed and stamp workers' passes, which he had been refusing to do. He was forced to accede. Although the removal finally took place in February 1984, the stand of the organised community focused so much national and international attention on forced removals that the regime was pressed to rethink its whole strategy on the eradication of black spots.

The action of the Driefontein community against forced removal began with letters to the Prime Minister by its representative, Saul Mkhize, writing on the instruction of the community:

I write to you for only one reason- your help on the behalf of the people of Daggaskraal, Driefontein and Ngema. Your help is needed because we are being forced to move from our properties by the Department of Co-operation and Development. Dr Koornhof has been known to say 'there will be no forced removal of black people from black areas', and yet here we are, without any real discussion, being told by his department that we will move, like it or not.

Rural Removals 117

This is not humanitarian, or in God's name, proper. I ask you l o arrange, with due notice to myself and my Council of Directors of Driefontein, duly elected by landowners of Driefontein on I)ecember 26, 1982 at a meeting specially convened to elect representatives to negotiate about the removal, for a meeting with 1)r Koornhof to discuss this whole matter.

The Committees of Daggaskraal and Ngema, which are in \imilar predicament, would like to join us at such a meeting. May I cay that we do not wish to discuss our removal, which seems to he a fait accompli by the Department of Co-operation and I )evelopment, but: ( 1 ) Why we should consider leaving our homeland at all? 12) Why we should give up our legally owned property? i 3) What reasons has the department for even thinking that we are prepared to allow them to intimidate us into such a move? (4) In view of lack of co-operation from the department, why jhould they expect our co-operation?

These are only a few of the items we must discuss but, to do so, we need a fully representative team from the Department of Co-operation and Development, including Dr Koornhof, in order to sort out the entire matter of what we consider a completely iinnecessary upheaval of these well-settled, well-adjusted and happy communities.

Your Honour, we have suffered for many years due to the uncertainty of our position. We have heard rumours, we have been told to obey, but we have never been properly informed or had proper discussions regarding the 'whys' and 'wherefores' of our situation. In God's merciful name, is this merciful? Are these the actions of a man of God as I know you are.

At present our people are hungry and short of water. Our boreholes are dry and we wish to arrange to have new boreholes, hut how can we do this in the present circumstances? We are, as all South Africans are, proud people and all we ask is to remain so. We do not wish to be rebellious in any way, but only to continue to live our lives out in our own environment.

All we ask is that we have a reasonable and full discussion with a duly appointed body, by someone such as yourself. We know we must listen, but we must also have every opportunity to talk and to explain our position.

Your Honour, I beseech you to help us in this matter and to act on our behalf. We need your help and we ask for it now.lo2

I , I ILY-S and meetings of protest have been a feature of the resistance in all I 1 1 I (.c 'Transvaal communities. It was at one such meeting that Saul Mkhize 1, .I,, shot dead by a policeman at Driefontein, in 1983. At the time of his death

1 18 Forced Removal

Mkhize was addressing a meeting of the Driefontein community in the grounds of a local school. Two policemen arrived and tried to stop the meeting, threw tear-gas at the crowd and then shot Mkhize. Mkhize's funeral was attended by 3,000 mourners and many representatives of organisations. The funeral became a demonstration against the forced removals at Driefontein in particular and throughout the country in general.J03

A further tactic has been the use of the courts to delay the removals and alert a wider public to the situation. Although the court action to hait the removals at Mogopa failed, it brought the removals to national and then international attention. The removal in fact took place while the community's challenge to the legality of their removal was still pending before the Appellate Division. In November 1983 their application for an interdict to stop their removal was refused by the Transvaal Supreme Court. The community applied for leave to appeal. This was refused. They then petitioned the Appellate Division and while the petition was before the court their removal took place in February 1984.

In May 1985 the regime introduced a bill containing a retroactive clause which sought to amend the law so that the approval of Parliament was not necessary before a removal order could be served on a community which refused to move. The Mogopa community was arguing in the Appellate Division that, contrary to the law as it stood, Parliament had not approved their removal.104 The bill provoked a storm of protest both within South Africa and abroad. A professor of law at the University of the Witwatersrand, John Dugard, telegraphed the British Minister of State at the Foreign Office asking him to raise the matter in his meeting with the Minister of Co-operation and D e v e l ~ p m e n t . ' ~ ~ The regime was forced to withdraw the legislation and the Appellate Division ruled in favour of the Mogopa community. The community then continued their litigation. Their leader John More said when he heard of the court's decision: 'This is the beginning of our struggle to get back our land."06 The struggle involved more litigation. The people wrote to the Minister of Co-operation and Develop- ment stating that they wished to return to their original farms, that they wanted reinstatement and damages for forced removal, and for the expropriation of their land.

The court action by the Ngema community also resulted in a significant victory. In March 1985 the Pretoria Supreme Court dismissed the Ngema community's application to stop Cuthbert Ngema, who favoured removal, acting as chief. However, it also granted an interdict preventing the state filling the Heyshope dam, which would flood parts of KwaNgema, pending the outcome of an action to determine the lawfulness of the construction of the dam on the community's land. The legal action gave the people of KwaNgema a breathing space in a critical moment of negotiations. The political atmosphere in which removals took place was changing. It was no longer possible for isolated communities to be treated as helpless victims and their land taken without the whole world paying attention. The regime had been forced to reconsider the removal at Kwangema. In August 1985 the

I

I Rural Removals 1 19

I ),.lur~y Minister of Development and Land Affairs met representatives of I 1 1 , . KwaNgema and Driefontein communities. He agreed that the communi- I I, .. would not be removed and that they would be compensated for land they I , ~ , . I when the new dam was built.'07

1 . l ~ tenacity and courage of the three Transvaal communities in taking a I . I I I ~ ~ against their forced removal has inspired others. When the new

$ ,111so1idation plans for the Transvaal bantustans and Kwazulu were 1 1 ~~lounced in September 1985, communities affected immediately began to 41~l: ;~~l ise their opposition and held meetings of protest. People living at l!lt~c.dContein and Geweerfontein who would be forced under the plans to

c i (I(. their land to the Bophuthatswana bantustan held a meeting in October .I I I , I declared unanimously they were not prepared to move. In Kwazulu 500

ople threatened with removal from Reserve Four attended a meeting and 0 11tlorsed the words of the local Chief Matiyane: 'They must shoot us and kill 1 1 . . rather than make us leave.''Os In Moutse, scheduled for incorporation into I\ \v;~ndebele, people attacked and killed the policemen who tried to break up 111,1lcst meetings. Despite the presence of armed police vehicles, tear-gas . I I I .leks, bans on meetings, detentions and intimidation by armed semi-official , : I ~ I I I ~ S the community continued to oppose their incorporation into I., wandebele and the 'independence' plans for that bantustan. So high was I I I ~ . lcvel of resistance that it helped cement the alliance against Kwandebele

I I I , lcpendence' and helped force the reversal of this decision. The experience 1 1 1 I 11;s successful opposition has fostered a fierce and organised opposition to . I I I Iuntustan structures in the area. lo9

'I'he people of black spots who are threatened with removal are working to t l\,c.l-come their isolation. Church organisations and anti-apartheid groups 111side South Africa too have helped to build up support against removal. At a 111c.cring organised by the Witwatersrand Council of Churches in June 1984 ~ I I , I I ~ than 300 people pledged to resist removals and support those who did I I O I wish to be forcibly relocated. The rally demanded that the government t .111cc1 all further removals and appoint an independent commission to plan 1 0 1 a rapid rate of urbanisation, a termination of influx control and . I ( cluisition of land outside the bantustans for black people who are homeless . I I I < \ landless. This meeting was addressed by the Rev Frank Chikane of the I I I )I: and Moses Ngema, chairman of the Kwangema community committee. I I was a significant illustration of the links being established between rural . I I I < \ urban struggles.

1 1 1 1985 leaders of 95 communities threatened with removal issued a joint % o~l~mcnt on the President's assertion that forced removals would cease:

The former minister promised there would be no more forced removals and yet the people of Mogopa were loaded up by police and moved by force one year ago. It is not enough that the government says it will reconsider some of the areas. Ourselves, ;IS well as other communities threatened, have the right to stay where we are. We will fight for our future, whatever reprieves and

120 Forced Removal

threats the government issues. We believe that it is our struggle which has shown the government that to continue with removals will cause bloodshed. The government fears the bad publicity which this brings to South Africa, but this is caused entirely by their own acts.l10

The communities' representatives demanded a list of the areas from whic Dr Viljoen proposed to suspend removals, and extensive relief measures I help re-establish all the communities that had been moved. This form of joi~ action illustrates the links communities are building and the commo strategies they are devising. In 1984 a National Committee against Remova (NCAR) was formed. It incorporated four of the organisations that ha worked to help publicise the stand of people against removals: Transva; Rural Action Committee, Association for Rural Advancement, Grahamstow Rural Committee and the Surplus People Project. Under the auspices of th NCAR leaders from communities threatened with removal have met togethc and planned common and co-ordinated strategies, transforming the loci threats into national and international issues. As a result of all of the: developments the regime's ability to implement its plans for the countrysid has been challenged.

The ANC has explicitly condemned forced removals of black-spc communities and supported opposition to bantustan incorporation.ll1 I January 1980 an armed unit of Umkhonto we Sizwe attacked the polic station at Soekmekaar in the Northern Transvaal at the height of th community's struggle against forced removal. According to Petrus Mashig who was convicted in 1980 for his part in the action, the attack was carrie out because of the assistance the police had given the authorities in carryin out the forced removals of the people from the area. 112 The assassination i July 1986 of Piet Ntuli, the KwaNdebele bantustan administration 'Minister of Internal Affairs' and leader of the semi-official armed forc Mbokodo, in Kwandebele, was an event which triggered the rejection (

bantustan 'independence' and gave some reprieve in status to the peopl forcibly removed into the area. Chris Hani, a senior ANC army commandel confirmed in December 1986 that the assassination was the work (

Umkhonto we Sizwe, which had acted 'to eliminate a notorious collaboratc and to assist the popular mobilisation against Kwandebele independence'.'' The ANC's view on the bantustans and the condition of removed people wz outlined in a statement on 8 January 1987 by the National Executik Committee:

At the founding conference of our movement 75 years ago, [the rural masses] were represented by those traditional rulers who enjoyed their confidence because they had not yet been cor- rupted, as some are, by the monthly salaries that the apartheid regime now hands out to administrators of the bantustan system. Today, these masses are representing themselves in the common struggle through their own activity. We must reinforce this

Rural Removals 12 1

development to ensure that the rural areas are organised and further activised, as in Kwandebele and Lebowa, to enable them to clear the countryside of all apartheid institutions of power, including the bantustans, to join the armed struggle and to repossess the land as part of our nationwide advance towards victory. 114

122 Forced Kemozlal

CHAPTER 5

Popular resistance and new state strategies

The 1980s, marked by a growing mobilisation of resistance, have been a time of crisis and realignment for the regime. A range of new strategies have been discussed, and policy formulations once abandoned have been resurrected. This chapter highlights major strands in the new formulations of policy on forced removals and assesses the extent to which popular opposition may undermine these initiatives.

In February 1985 the Minister of Co-operation, Development and Education, Dr G Viljoen announced a suspension of the removals programme pending a review of up to 30 black spots and 30 townships due for incorporation into bantustans. He attached two conditions to this statement: where leaders agreed to move communities would be relocated; and squatters would not be tolerated.' The statement should be seen partly as a response to the criticisms of the removals policy that had been appearing in the Afrikaans press, in addition to those coming from religious figures and the business community. Cabinet Ministers themselves also appeared concerned about the policy. On his retirement as Minister of Co-operation and Development in 1984 Dr Koornhof gave an interview to the Johannesburg Sunday Times, saying that the greatest trauma of his political career was the implementation of forced removals and the destruction of squatter shacks. He had personally stopped 20 major removals, he said, and he hoped that his successor could reduce them to a minimum.2

Clearly there is a smack of the public relations exercise about both Koornhofs statement and Viljoen's announcement. As the leaders of many communities under threat of removal pointed out in February 1985, the review of removals policy did not deal with the cases of 245,000 people due for removal, nor did it cover removals other than those affecting black spots and townships due for incorporation into bantustan^.^ TRAC also criticised the policy changes:

The government's current policy on removals is at best confused and inconsistent, and at worst, devious. Even in black spots and urban relocation incoherence and contradictory government action has caused severe strain and uncertainty for affected communities, while giving the government a breathing space in the face of criticism."

Indeed throughout 1985 and 1986 removals continued to take place and new removals were planned despite the miniscerial assurances. In 1986 an

Popular Kesistunce and the Ncu Stare Strutegies 123

I 1 1 1 1.11txi 1 10,000 people were forcibly moved through the destruction of the I I . . I cuds and Langa communities. Fifteen thousand people in Oukasie and

11 11 11 1 111 1,awaaikamp were threatened with removal.' I la~rvcvcr, the duplicitous nature of government statements should not

, . I t I 1 1 (, the extent to which pressures have mounted on the regime to rethink I I I t , I ( L . C ~ removals policy. In the fields of influx control and urban and rural I 1 1 I I I I 11g a number of initiatives have been set in motion that alter the course

, I I 1 1 , . Iorced removals policy of the last few decades. In the post-1976 period I 1 1 , .ll);ll.lheid philosophy of earlier periods was discussed and analysed by a I 1 1 I I I 1 1 or prominent white academics and high-level civil servants. They I # I I 1111I;ltcd a critical view of why the system was not working, what had led to 1 1 1 , I I I ; I \ \ country-wide protests, and what the future stress points were likely I 'I'his group became known as the 'technocrats', partly because of their I , I 1,:111;1lic approach to apartheid, which stressed that if some aspect of the 1 , ' s I ~ g \ was not working that part should be abandoned, and partly because of I 1 1 , 1 1 t ommitment to streamline, rationalise and modernise the political and ( 1 1 , I - , ocmnic systems, making South Africa a more efficient capitalist

, 1 1 1 1 1 I v . Their outlook has led them to advocate a change in certain features - I .10;11-111eid as part of a strategy for preserving the conditions of white

, ~ I I I < ;11 domination and for safeguarding those economic interests which 1 ,. 1 1 1 I I I C , ~ from apartheid. It must be stressed however that any liberalisation 1 , \ 1 1 l l i 1 1 the context of maintaining both capitalism and white political I3 ,~1~~~~; l l l ce .

I \ \ I , new considerations appear to have been important in shaping the I , , I ~ . c l I-cmovals policy changes. Firstly, in a time of recession, there are . 1 1 1 1 . I lolls about the fiscal cost of the removals and queries about whether the ! c I I I O , , ; I I S help or hinder the economic growth of the country. As a Cape Times

. I I I O I I : I I put it:

l~lllux control and removals are economic nonsense. There is a link between urbanisation and economic growth, as business Ic;lders such as Mr Gavin Relly of Anglo-American have noted. I'hroughout the world the fast-growing economies are those \vhich have a rural population which can be rapidly absorbed into ~ ~ l ~ l u s t r y without restrictions on movement and e m p l ~ y m e n t . ~

. ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ( l l y there has been the tendency amongst analysts associated with the 8 I V I I I I ( . 1 0 see a highly dangerous source of opposition to the regime in the

1 , 1 1 1 01. the state's responsibility for the administration of the black ~ , ~ ~ l ~ l l l ; ~ ~ i o n . The strategy advocated by a number of advisers has been to

I, I l , , l ~ t icise' the administration of the black population- to minimise the I ' \ I-olc as landlord, controller of the labour market, and administrator of

I.,' . I I ;~llairs-and to allow these matters to be regulated by 'market forces' 1 I 1, I I I(.c-~cd black representative^.^ Much of the attempt to reorient removals

1 , . ~ I I ~ v ( . ; I I ~ be read in the light of concerns to promote economic growth and 1 ' I 1,111licise' conflict, in the hope that this will help maintain the basis of the

1 , I ~ I I I I ( . ' S power.

124 Forced Kemovul

REFORMULATION OF URBAN POLICY

Thc regime's planners have been preoccupied with urban policy since 1976-7 when the predominantly urban uprising of that period highlighted many of the problems of existing strategies of urban population control. Attention has focused on projections of the rapid growth of the urban African population outside the bantustans. The growth has not been prevented either by the establishment of bantustan towns, or by the lack of township housing, and even less by the Coloured Labour Preference Policy. Demographers, using estimates from the 1980 census, concluded that before the end of the century there wo'uld be 20 million urban Africans concentrated in the metropolitan areas of Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging, Durban, Port Elizabeth- Uitenhage, and the Western Cape.x In another projection it was estimated in 1979 that South Africa's population would have doubled by the turn of the century. Out of a total of 50 million people, 74 pcr cent would be African, and 80 per cent of the total population would be urbanised.' Official statisticians project a total population of 45 million in the year 2000 with 77 per cent African and between 75-79 per cent of the population urbanised.1°

The 'technocrats' ' advice to the regime, in the face of these statistics, has been to swim with the tide of increasing urbanisation. They have advocated a number of new strategies which differ from the policies on removals of previous eras. Firstly they outlined, and the regime largely accepted, a new housing policy for people with Section 10 rights, grounding their presence in urban townships in property rights and making the threat of phvsical removal for these people less potent. The 1986 laws which abolished Section 10 rights embody the same approach. African entrepreneurs and better-paid workers are to have access to privately owned housing, while other Africans, who cannot afford this type of housing, are to be marginalised and possibly removed into bantustans to limit and control the political opposition they might advocate. Secondly, the 'technocrats' suggested a new policy on squatters, some of which was soon tried at a local level. Thirdly, and this is perhaps the major element in their strategy, they advocated a decentralisation policy which is perceived as the solution to a whole range of problems facing the regime.

HOUSING POLICY

Following on the Riekert report the 'technocrats' and those influenced by their approach, accepted that a certain core of urban Africans with permanent residence rights could not be moved from the townships of 'White' cities. From that premise it was suggested that such people, far from posing a problem for the maintenance of apartheid, might in fact provide a solution to apartheid's problems. It was agreed that families, long-settled in towns, with more education, with the potential to earn high wages and to purchase consumer goods on an increasing scale, could provide the pool of skilled and supervisory labour needed for economic growth and a new market for locally produced manufactured goods. This section of the working class,

i 1 1 1 1 - ~hcory ran, relatively better paid with a Ilifillc~ \ I . I I I ~ I . I I I I 1 1 1 I I ~ 1 1 1 1 .

, . I I I S I

Is, 1llclined to support the regime which had nl;~dc 1 1 1 , - 1 1 1 I I I I ~ I I I I I ~ 1 1 , a ,

I I

1 1 , B > \ l I > l ~ .

1 1 1 1978 an- act of Parliament made possible the ~ I I I ( I I . I , . I ~~1 I - \ T 1 1 . I 1 1 1 1

I ol)crty on the terms of 99-year leasehold rights and 1.t.1111 I O ~ I I I ~ 1 1 1 11-111(.

Ib~~~ltling as an option for township residents. A huge salc 01 Icn . c l . I I I I ~ U I I 11s I c~ l~ l \ i~~g began, building societies were set to make enorlrlollh 1 \ 1 0 1 1 1 . . 111

c r l , 11 [gages on the new leases, and the construction indusrry : I I I I I ( I \ ~ . I I ~ . C I , ,,ll.inded demand for home building. Initially the Western (:apt, W I I I I rl~c ( loured Labour Preference policy still in force, was exempted Srom ~ l l c ~lcw ~ l ~ ~ . ~ ~ c ~ i s a t i o n on leasehold. But in 1984 99-year leasehold rights were gra~lrcd I , , hlrican township residents in the Western Cape.

I'lle new mode of thinking about township housing clearly influenced the I~~~ l~c . i a ry . In the Yapi judgement of 1982 township residence rights were I I I I lllcr extended beyond those established by the 1979 Komani judgemcnt .,., (,'hapter 2). In the later case the judge ruled that people with Section 10

I ~~: l l rs would be deemed lawfully in an urban area, even though they were not I .~\vl~~l ly occupying housing.ll Thus important aspects of the housing 1 1 . ,[1-ictions constructed between 1960 and 1973 wereabandoned. Section 10 I l):l~[s could not be withdrawn if housing was not available, and one of the % 1.111ral elements in the forcing of urban residents into the bantustans, lack of .I, I css to urban housing, lost its force.

I lowever, the ground gained by urban Africans in this judgement was lost 11 Ir~.n the influx control legislation was amended in 1986. Section 10 and I I I lun-residence rights no longer secured access to urban hou.;ing, but urban I~otlsing now secured access to urban-residence rights. Analysis of official . . l .~~cments on urban housing policy have led to a conclusion that the regime h~i~cncis to use housing as a means of imposing stratification on the urban \ I~ic;m population. The official view is that the housing in the older African ~o\vnships, many of them adjacent to white residential areas should be sold to 1101nc-owners and people holding long leases. In these areas will live the .\lr-ican middle class and better-paid members of the working class who are .~ l ) lc to afford high rents and mortgage repayments. The intention is that they .I~ould act as a buffer between the supposedly more politically volatile poorer ..c.~tions of the working class and the ullemployed who, with no housing, \vould be forced into squatter camps or bantustan towns. Rent boycotts, \ \ l~crc township residents are refusing to pay the higher rents or accept c.\,~ctions, are a crucial line of popular defence against this strategy.12 The . .~lc of township housing was welcomed by the corporate sector. Jan Steyn,

< Iriel. executive of the Urban Foundation, said in 1984 at the time of the c.h~cnsion of leasehold to Western Cape Africans:

I The advantage of private sector participation is obvious. It relieves the state of a massive burden in a time of extreme financial stringency. It will also stabilize the situation of blacks in this part of the world. In the same way the government's mass

126 Forced Removal

housing sale and its new housing policy could well create new stability and a sense of belonging for black people elsewhere in the country."

Steyn's statements echo the policy formulations of the 'technocrats' of some years earlier. According to Professor Simon Brand, chair of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister and later the President:

If someone wants to buy a house and this transaction falls within the private sector, it is a transaction between a seller and a buyer. But as soon as a government takes responsibility for supplying houses it becomes a political matter and then people who are not in the political process, who haven't got representation in Parliament for example, say it is because they don't have representation in Parliament that they have to stand at the back of the queue for houses. That is why they definitely want one-man-one-vote for this country. But if you can take these things out of the political sphere as much as possible then Parliament and the government plays a much less important role and it becomes a less important matter for people to necessarily have a certain form of representation in the central Parliament.'''

The private sector has been quick to take advantage of the new market in African housing and the state has assisted this development by providing infrastructural investment in electricity and sewerage. In the Witwatersrand private and state investment in township housing increased by 40 per cent between 1981 and 1985, representing a total 1985 investment of R172.2 million.15 But the policy masks increased burdens for the mass of the people. Buying a house is beyond the means of all but a fraction of African township residents. In 1985 the monthly instalment on a loan to buy a simple house was R267, while the building societies would not lend money to anyone earning less than R1,068 per month. This meant that 99.4 per cent of all wage-earners could not qualify for the loans, even had they been able to afford the monthly loan repayments.16 Yet despite the high costs of buying a house people began to be compelled to buy their houses. In 1983 35,000 houses were offered for sale to tenants. Those who did not buy by July 1984 would face increased rent." Simultaneously the new township authorities, created under the Koornhof legislation of 1982, were given powers to set rents and service charges as funding for services from central government was withdrawn.

Without any financial reserves the new local authorities passed all their overheads on to the residents. For example in the townships of the Vaal Triangle in 1984 rents were raised first by R3 a month; then R25 was levied on all tenants to create a fund against bad debts; and a new ground tax was introduced, as well as permit charges for subletting. These heavy increases in the cost of living came just as economic recession was making thousands of industrial workers redundant, and as the central government itself began to

Popular Resistance and the Nezu Slale Slrareg~es 127

I I \, 1 0 raise revenue by indirect taxation. (In particular the general sales tax ( , \ ' 1 ' ) rose in 1984 from 6 per cent to 10 per cent of the value of goods bought

1 1 111 in 1985 to 12 per cent of the value of goods bought.) In the townships of I 1 1 , . Vaal Triangle between 1980 and 1984 African wages increased by 17 per t I I I I while. rent increased by 56 per cent.IR

lic.sistance to the new housing policy has been sustained and effective. The a l11c1 tactic has been the rent boycott. Rent boycotts begun in September ~ ~ j s l in the townships of the Vaal Triangle had spread by mid-1986 to 48 r~ \ \ l~ sh ip s in different areas of the country. Rent boycotts became the main I , , I 1 1 1 oC popular resistance during the second half of 1986. The authorities' I I I ( . I I I ~ ~ to win the co-operation of employers and induce them to deduct rent

1 1 1 , 1 1 1 wages did not meet with much success, as employers were wary that , 1 1 1 11 action would lead to strikes. A number of community councils were

I O I I c d to resign because of the boycotts and popular opposition to their role I I I ,!l;lnding in for Pretoria. By October 1986 local councils' rent arrears were

q . . I 1111;1ted at R250 million and there was scant possibility of their recouping 1 1 1 t - Illoney. Meanwhile the conduct of the boycott had contributed to the ,:lt,w~h of street committees and township civic associations. These , , I ,:;l~~isations began to take on some of the functions of the disrupted local

I I I I l~c~rities - for example, organising refuse collection and establishing I ) I t blilc's parks on waste ground. When evictions of people not paying rent

, I (. ~hreatened activists set up barricades to prevent police access or broke I I I I O Ilouses to readmit evicted tenants.19 Despite the widespread terrorisation % 1 1 I I I C townships by the presence of troops, the boycott remains a potent \ I , .1,io11 in the hands of urban tenants and an effective instrument to help 1 8 1 t - v c ~ ~ t the implementation of the new and divisive housing policy.

N I :W STRATEGIES ON SQUATTERS

I I I ,\(lgust 1984 Hermann Giliomee, an influential academic close to leading I I I . I I I ~ . \ in the administration, wrote an article in the Cape Times reviewing the

a 1 1 1 . 1 1 Icr situation in the Western Cape. He quoted extensively from research a , I I I { I a i l ' s favelas and asserted:

Iktensive research established that squatters are system-suppor- I ivc, non-revolutionary and unwilling to take political risks- they arc people who have the aspirations of the bourgeoisie and the perseverance of pioneers.*O

1 \ 1 1 . .!I-ticle was published at a time when the regime's policy on squatters q I . I I I C C ~ most contradictory. On the one hand demolition raids had been

I ' . I I I I I C ~ at Crossroads and KTC only a month before. On the other hand, in I * I ~ I I \ o l the so-called Koornhof Deal permission was given for 1,000

I I 1 1 1 111rcs to be constructed at the Nyanga Bush site. The Director of the \\ ~.,.lcl-n Cape Administration Board told the Nyanga Bush and the Cathedral , . I t t 1 1 1 i of squatters that to alleviate overcrowding within their communities I I I , \. tvould be allowed to erect more shelters on sites allocated by the Western

128 Forced Removal

Cape Development Board, but only if they did not allow any newcomers access to the sites.

By 1986 the policy on squatters had been clarified. Some squatters in informal housing developments were to be tolerated, particularly if these developments were located in sites specifically designated for this, as at Khayelitsha and Botshabelo, or if the people in these areas had developed a relation of accord with the government, as had Johnson Ngxobongwana at Crossroads. Such squatters, presumably, are seen as potential supporters of the apartheid system, as Giliomee had predicted and as events demonstrated at Crossroads in August 1986. However, all other squatters are to live under constant harassment, threat of eviction and prosecution for trespass and illegal immigration. The attempt to marginaliw and disperse these people is an attempt to break their political militancy and to turn discontent into competition between residents, rather than opposition to apartheid policies. The attacks on the Crossroads residents, evictions of squatters around Soweto, and fierce fighting between squatter groups being differentially exploited by landlords which developed at Christmas 1985 near Durban are all examples of this strategy. However, the ruthless attacks and the attempts to control settlement havc not extinguished resistance. In Botshabelo, in defiance of official rulings, people have claimed land and demanded the right to settle there. Township residents havc rcfused to turn their backs on squatters without rights. For example, in Soweto in August 1984 the Meadowlands and Diepkloof People's Party sent a deputation to the mayor and held a meeting with the town clerk to protest at the council's decision to evict 1,000 illegal residents squatting around the Meadowlands hostel.21 Households within the Cape Town townships took in the refugees from Cros~roads.~z Further, it seems unlikely that the resistance of Crossroads residents, who undertook several armed attacks on police and military forces during 1985-6 has been totally extinguished despite the brutalities they have suffered.

DECENTRALISATION POLICY

Decentralisation, although a key notion for the 'technocrats', and a policy which has received much government support of late, is not a new notion in discussions about facilitating the implementation of apartheid. Perhaps its long history accounts for the small degree of political opposition the policy encountered in the late 1970s. But although the current decentralisation strategies have much in common with earlier plans of this nature, they also contain essential differences- the stamp of the 'technocrats' ' desire to manage a political economy that threatens to fall apart. Decentralisation is no longer seen as a way to put apartheid into practice, but rather as a way to ensure that that practice does not destroy itself.

In the 1940s, in the light of discussions about whether it was necessary to control African urbanisation, decentralisation schemes were first mooted by the Board of Trade and Industry, which recommended that in order to lessen

I

Popular Resistance and the New State Strategies 129

I I ~ , . threat of a concentrated African workforce, there should be:

... a policy of regional planning and development in order to bring about a greater measure of decentralisation of industry, the transfer and development of some of the industries making cheap standard wares for native consumption in reserves, as well as for a policy of separation and racial parting in factories and even for a large measure of territorial segregation.23

I 1 1 ~ s even before the National Party's accession to power, influential civil ..(.I vants considered industrial decentralisation as a component of territorial ..,.~rcgation. However, any large-scale policy of industrial decentralisation W;IS impossible in the immediate post-war years. Economic conditions were I I O ( yet considered sufficiently prosperous to generate the revenue to support ,,ttih a scheme.14 In addition the recommendations for the establishment of ~~~tlustries within the 'reserves' were rejected by the government on the ):l-ounds that they would pose a threat to white labour. However, the .tr~ractions of decentralisation were obvious, as H F Verwocrd told the I:cderated Chamber of Industries:

A long-term policy must exist for the development of completely suitable industrial areas, situated in such a way that native labourers in the towns can live in their own areasz5

I'he development of the bantustan programme, initiated as a means of ~jolitical control in the 1960s, was closely linked to decentralisation policy. In 1960 the prime minister released a statement on the 'Establishment of Industries in Border Areas', and a Permanent Commission for the Location 01' Industry and Development of Border Areas was established. Border Areas were defined according to the Permanent Commission as:

... those locations or regions near the Bantu areas, in which industrial development takes place through European initiative and control, but which are so situated that the Bantu workers can maintain their residences and family lives in the Bantu areas and move readily to their places of employment.26

It can be seen that this first stage of decentralisation policy envisaged the bantustans remaining as labour reservoirs with industry sited outside the bantustans under the direction of white entrepreneurs.

The border-industry plans were dogged by problems of inadequate funds and lack of infrastructure in the designated areas. Despite new incentive schemes for businesses offered in 1964 and 1968, the only successful border-industry area was Rosslyn in the Northern Transvaal, close to the already established markets of Pretoria.

In the mid 1960s as discussed above (see Chaprer I ) there was a major reassessment of the purposes of the bantustan programme. Policy was reoriented towards maintaining the bantustans not only as areas of more effective political control of the African people, but also as labour reserves

130 Forced Removal

where the unemployed workers could be minimally maintained, and available to undercut wages and replace people already in work. The Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act of 1967 provided for the zoning of all industrial development. It enabled the Minister of Planning to refuse increasing African migration to urban areas on the grounds that a fixed ratio of black to white workers had to be maintained. New plants could not be opened without discussion and permission from the Planning Department.27 Decentralisation and the border-industry programme came to have two objectives. It remained a means to encourage African workers to remain in the 'reserves', but it also became an instrument to curb metropolitan industrial development and ensure that industrialisation would take place where labour surpluses existed and where government zoning decreed.28 Behind the decentralisation schemes lay the belief that relocation of industry would act as a form of influx control, retarding African migration to the urban areas. According to the 1971 White Paper on Decentralisation of Industry:

Without purposeful decentralisation policy the major expansion of economical activities and . . . the creation of employment opportunities will take place in the existing development centres. For economic, social and political reasons however, it is necessary that economic development should also take place within or near the areas with large non-white population concentrations, parti- cularly Bantu.29

The White Paper on Decentralisation of 1971 outlined the mechanics of the new approach in detail. There were to be restrictions on the establishment of non-essential industries in the PWV area and the ratio of white to African workers in the area was to be maintained at 1:2 (i.e at least one-third of employees had to be white) Industries which relocated in the bantustans were given generous tax concessions, long-term interest-free loans and rebates on rail transport.

But despite these attractive offers, the promised rewards were not enough to induce entrepeneurs to relocate in the bantustans or the border areas. The Industrial Development Corporation aimed to create 23,500 new jobs a year in border- industry areas in the early 1970s, but it succeeded in creating only 8,000 jobs per year.31 A 1974 study of the decentralisation of firms from Johannesburg found that 68 per cent of relocations were merely moves to other districts of the Witwatersrand and that most of the rest were transfers to other metropolitan areas.32 Substantial relocation was minimal. The costs of decentralisation for firms in the late 1960s were high and these offset government inducements. The low direct cost to the taxpayer concealed higher costs in the loss of productive efficiency, and the overall effect was considered a limitation on

In the post-1976 climate of reassessment the decentralisation policies received particular attention. Strict cost-benefit calculations were introduced. The new and current decentralisation plan was first aired at a meeting

Popular Resistance and the New State Strategies 131

132 Forced Removal

between the prime minister and leading businessmen at the Good Hope Hotel in 1981. It envisaged the division of South Africa, including all bantustans whether 'independent' or not, into eight development regions demarcated according to development needs, development potential, functional rela- tionships and physical characteristics. Within each of the eight regions eleven deconcentration points were envisaged, i.e. development areas close to existing large metropolitan areas. I n addition 49 industrial development points were planned: 21 outside the bantustans, and 28 in bantustans. They were intended as alternative growth points to the metropolitan areas. A Rl00 million per year incentive package was designed to attract labour-intensive industrial developments to the development points. The scheme offered improved rebates and subsidies on rail and road transport, harbour services, electricity, housing and training. The major change from the 1973 subsidies was the shift away from tax concessions to direct payments to firms according to the number of workers they employed. Thus, for example in the East London-Ciskei development area a monthly payment of R110 per worker was to be paid to each industry for seven years. Firms qualified for a 60 per cent rail rebate, a 50 per cent discount on harbour charges and 60 per cent subsidy on in te re~t . '~ The main instrument for financing the new plan was a development bank which was to make R650 million per year available for development projects from the mid-1980s, increasing to R1,000 million per year by the end of the decade. The bank is financed by debentures issued on South African and overseas capital markets. The new decentralisation strategy differs from the formula of a decade before in that the regional development areas are demarcated more in terms of economic function than purely political purpose. But the overall aim of the policy is a revised method of achieving the demographic distribution needed for the success of the territorial and constitutional entrenchment of segregation.

In the words of the influential economic adviser to the Cabinet, Dr Jan Lombard:

If this [federal] balance is not maintained by market forces in the economy, it will have to become the objective of an effective special programme of concerted intervention. . . Unless the government of Mr Botha does undertake such. a major decentra- lisation programme the entire tradition of political pluralism in South Africa must be mortally endangered within a short time, and with the disappearance of the present geographic distribution of ethnic pluralism, will also disappear the chances of a peaceful transition to normal participation by blacks in the political processes of the Southern African region within a confederal or a federal constitutional d i s p e n ~ a t i o n . ~ ~

This constitutional language and the phrases of economic planning cannot obscure the fact that what is envisaged are schemes to maintain white political domination and economic control.

The constitutional goals of the strategy observers believe are connected

Popular Kcsistance and the N c w State Strutegzer 1 3

$1 1 1 1 1 rtlcas about the transformation of South Africa into a confederation, in , \ i 1 1 c 11 the bantustan governments and 'white' South Africa would co-operate I I I I ~ I I I ~ ~ ~ consultative constitutional structures. Subsequent events seem to i s , . I I ( ~ u t this analysis. The Buthelezi Commission advocated a joint ~ , l ~ ~ \ ~ ~ l i s t r a t i o n for Natal and Kwazulu, and a federal solution to conflicts in

, . O I I I ~ I Africa has been supported by leading technocrats, the Progressive I I ,l~.r-al Party (PFP) and Inkatha. In April 1986 a Natal-Kwazulu indaba was 1 1 , 1 ~ 1 to discuss the implemention of some of the joint regional structures I I I , I 11111cnded by the commission and the National Party sent observers to 1 1 1 , . cliscussion. A similar strategy for the Cape, the so-called 'Cape option' I, . I . . I~cing discussed in January 1986 by some of the 'technocrats' associated \ \ 1 1 1 1 rhc regime. While regional co-operation across bantustan borders poses

I 111111lber of constitutional problems, the regime's own political strategy , I . I I I S geared to incorporate it. Current planning envisages regional economic

, IL . I t.rlrralisation, interlocking with regional service councils that will replace I 1 1 ~~v~ricial administration and allow all groups representation on a single 1 1 , I I I ~ , although direct elections will be ab~l i shed .~"

I:zonomic and political goals underpin the decentralisation strategy, but I 1 1 , - clis~inctive mark of the 'technocrats' is their attempt to salvage apartheid, 1 1 , ,I 1)" more political control, but by a modification of that political control [I~e.;iciy in existence. The attempt is being made to 'depoliticise' conflict, to

I . I I , L . the government out of the front line and substitute 'market forces'. Thus 1 ' 1 (~lcssor Brand, who played an important role in devising the decentralisa- I I O I I plan, has argued:

Economic decentralisation will play a pivotal role in influx control. Control of movement will come to rest less on coercion and more on economic incentive^.^'

I:t.~wcen April 1982 and March 1983 777 applications by investors, including \rom overseas companies, wishing to establish themselves in the

,I~.vcloprnent regions were approved by the government. The aggregate ~~rvcstrnent was R2,459 million and a potential 65,342 jobs were to be c rc;ltod. However, the overall economic and political contribution of this ~lc~vclopment, measured in its own terms has been questioned by a group of ~~.\carchers in business studies from the University of the Witwatersrand. On \ \ I < basis of a survey of 290 companies in the bantustans they concluded that ,)i per cent of the businesses were subsidiaries and would have been I \lablished anyway. They relocated to the bantustans because of government ~~~ccnt ives , but they did not represent totally new investments. In addition ~ l l c present policy has not succeeded in generating local enterprises among .\lr.ican entrepreneurs nor in generating development in the regions. They I~c,licved that, as short-term financial incentives are the main reason for Il~~sinesses relocating in or near bantustans, decentralisation policy is likely to ,lr-;lin resources and threaten economic growth.'* This interpretation is to be t.xl,ccted from researchers who do not share the government strategists' Ilc~litical and ideological goals. However, the point remains that the policy

; I ~ ~ K . ; I I \ 1 0 I'c economically questionable and as such not equal to the g~.;~~icliosc claims made for it. Nevertheless, the weaknesses in policy do not mean that it will not be implemented, or attempted.

In some areas decentralisation plans are far advanced. For example Ekangala, a township established 20 kilometres north of Bronkhorstpruit to the east of the Witwatersrand, represents a microcosm of the decentralisation policy in practice. Bronkhorstpruit is one of the new deconcentration points and Ekangala, adjacent both to the Kwandebele bantustan and the Ekindustria industrial site, points to the way the regime sees decentralisation working. Ekangala was established in 1983. Housing was made available only to people from the East Rand who had Section 10 rights but no housing. By March 1984 1,000 families had moved there despite the fact that they faced a 200 kilometres return journey to work. By Marih 1985 the population was 5,500 with accommodation being provided for an intended 750,000.39

It was common knowledge that the regime intended to incorporate Ekangala into Kwandebele. The East Rand Development Board assured those not deemed to belong to Kwandebele that they would not lose their Section 10 rights if they movrd, although this implied that those who were assigned to the bantustan would lose their residence rights and the right to claim from the unemployment insurance fund.40 The changes in the form of influx control of 1986 mean that after 'independcncc' many residents and their children will lose their citizenship rights and thus lose access to better-paid and more secure work. As the date for incorporation grew nearer opposition mounted among the residents of Ekangala. Despite harassment by supporters of 'independence' the community began to organise opposition. In 1985 they threatened to stop paying rent and return to the shacks of the Vaal Triangle if the incorporation went ahead. A young man was shot dead when police used rubber bullets against 3,000 residents protesting at incorporation. The demonstrators attacked the Administration Board offices and stoned ~ehicles .~ ' .

The Ekangala Action Committee drew up a memorandum to submit to the government laying out the reasons for the community's opposition to incorporation into a bantustan - 1,000 householders signed the document. Despite terrorisation of Action Committee members by the police, who often organised local armed groups, the resistance to incorporation remained strong. Complementing the Action Committee's political resistance was another form of opposition: rather than suffer incorporation into Kwan- debele people moved back to the backyard shacks and crowded rooms of the East Rand townships." By mid-1986 the community had taken a decision to return en masse to the East Rand.43 This resistance, combined with that of the Moutse and other communities already designated part of the bantustan, contributed to the decision by the Kwandebele legislature in August 1986 to shelve 'independence' plans. The move placed doubts over the ultimate fate of the residents of Ekangala. It also indicated how popular militancy and organisation could frustrate the regime's attempt to tie decentralisation policy to its bantustan strategy.

Popular Resistance and the New State Strategiczs I 35

I, 1 IAYELITSHA: A FOCUS FOR NEW STRATEGIES

, I c two strategies of change in urban policy and forced removals outlined :l)ovc can be seen intertwined as events have unfolded around the plans for a I I , .W African township in Cape Town at Khayelitsha. In an important ,\~.llunge in Parliament in March 1983 a major reversal of policy on the I ~ I I : I I ~ C ~ S of the Cape Peninsula was announced by Dr Koornhof. In answer I , , ;I question about housing in the Cape Peninsula, he told parliament:

It is necessary for the orderly development of the Cape Peninsula that provision be made for the consolidated housing needs of the Black people in the Metropolitan Area of the Cape. For this purpose the development of the Drift SandsiSwartklip area to the east of Mitchell's Plain should be undertaken without delay and funds will be made available to ensure that the development of the residential area can be started as soon as possible on an + imaginative scale . . . with the development of the new Black residential area not only will the provision of housing be concentrated on but the emphasis will also be placed on community development to stimulate the orderly and voluntary settlement of the Black community of the Cape Peninsula in that area. 44

I-his represents an important shift in government thinking. Instead of

Map 11 : Khayelitsha and the Cape Town Townships.

136 Forced Removal Popular Kesis[arrce and rhe New Srare Srraregies 137

attempting to clear all the Cape squatter settlements and remove all Africans, , ~ , , . l , ~ ~ in Khayelitsha because they were completely destitute. But the earlier bar contract workers, from the Western Cape to the distant bantustans ol. , of Ngxobongwana were echoed by Simon Menzina of the NYanga Bush Transkei and Ciskei, Koornhof conceded that what the Cape needed was its ( ,,lnmittee, representing some of the people who were most vulnerable lo own bantustan. Here in one giant township all Africans from the

\ 1,:lIante and police attack: old-established townships and the squatter settlement were to be rehoused. A site for the new deve~opment, to be called Khayelitsha, had already been we don't know where to stay in this country. The government found on the Cape Flats, 40 kilometres from Cape Town, and the planners moves black people every minute. NOW they want to move us to

that by the turn of the century 300,000 Africans would be housed Khayelitsha and then they will want US to move again. . . we are there. The first phase of the Khayelitsha project comprising 5,000 houses, not animals, we are people. If they want to move us they must schools, street lighting and pavements was estimated to cost R63 millions and come and discuss it with us. For many years we have had no was completed by March 1985.45 rights, no work and no houses.4y

The first families were moved into Khayelitiha squatter sites in october ( ) , , r of the meetings at the end of 1984 only one group of squatters decided

1984.46 A major modification of the plan was then announced by the new , l l C y would go to Khaye]itsha and that was on condition that all squatters in Minister of Co-operation and Development, Gerrit Viljoen, in early october , I,,. Peninsula were given permanent rights to live and work in the Western 1984 when he told a press conference that all squatters in the Cape Peninsula The other three major squatter communities all rejected the (whether they were legally settled under Section 10, or illegals) were to be l<hayelitsha solution o~tright.5° Despite the wishes of the residents, rehoused in Khayelitsha in 1985.47 Khayelitsha is to have its own adjacent I,ruparations to move people went ahead. In February 1985 Development industrial and retail site, and will provide houses on leasehold for the Iioard guards were brought in from the Transvaal to begin forcibly moving better-off and 'site and service' schemes for squatters (that is land on which ,,Cop]e and Viljoen announced that in future uncontrolled squatting in people may build their own housing and which is serviced with some water, :rossroads would not be tolerated.51 The community was convulsed with sewerage and refuse-collection facilities). It is an example of the new housing ,-age and in a series of demonstrations 18 were killed and 230 injured. In April policy, the attempt to co-opt squatters, and the decentralisation policy all in ;, deal was offered to illegal squatters that they would be spared deportation to One. It is also an e~ample of how these policies work and the resistance that is ,he bantustans if they moved into site-and-service schemes at KhaYelitsha. growing towards them. ~h~ brutal attack on thousands of Crossroads residents in June 1986 left

From the first announcement of the establishment of Khayelitsha the Inany destitute and forced many more to go to Khayelitsha as there was residents of the Xpatter communities refused to move. Throughout 1984 nowhere else for them to live. Khayelitsha seems an example of how the new people signed petitions and held meetings protesting at the proposed move. strategies will be put into practice. Here the regime's ho~s ing policy and In August 1984, 12,000 residents of Crossroads signed a petition saying they tolerance of squatters in site and service schemes are evident, The would not move. In October the UDF established an anti removals way in which the opposition to the removal to Khayelitsha was subverted, committee which included representatives of the western cape civic using both internal political struggles within the Crossroads communities and Association and the United Women's Organisation. They held meetings in military and police action, is a grim reminder of the brutality that may be Crossroads to Protest at the move to Khayelitsha. People pointed out the used to implement such a strategy. distance they would have to travel from Khayelitsha to work in Cape Town, the lack of consultation on the move, the way Khayelitsha housing was being offered to those with Permanent residence rights and not others, and the way GROUP AREAS ACT township living conditions would expose them to harassment under influx ~h~ new urban strategies that are being devised entail a measure of forced Control regulations. According to the Crossroads community leader Johnson and co-option in order to try to preserve the political life of the Ngxobongwana: current regime. A different question confronts the policy-makers in

The government ~hould first give people full rights here [in connection with the they consider they have already co-opted

Crossroads] and not say they must move before they get rights. through the segregated parliament: the Coloured and Indian communities. If

The people can then decide themselves whether they want to go they hold equal political power with the whites, as the regime claims, why to Khayelitsha or not.48 they be forced to live in segregated group areas? Why should they be

forcibly moved from their homes? This question has been asked by lawyers It is salutary to reflect on this statement by Ngxobongwana with hindsight. arguing cases challenging forced removal under the Group Areas Act. It has 1986 he himself directed the vigilantes who, with police cover, violently been raised in parliamentary debates by the Coloured and Indian political attacked many of the rightless people of Crossroads, forcing them to take parties which participate in the segregated parhment. It is a question

I

138 Forced Kemovul

which the regime has no coherent answer, and it may well be that segregation under the Group Areas Act will cease to be enforced.

Already large numbers of Indian, Coloured and African white-collar workers rent flats in Hillbrow and Mayfair in central Johannesburg in defiance of the Group Areas legislation. A Supreme Court judgement of 1984 gave them security from eviction when the court ruled that a landlord could not evict a tenant or because of contravention of the Group Areas legislation. The pressure group Actstop brought this test case to court and has continued to campaign for the repeal of the legislation. The defiance of the law, coupled with the regime's desire to court the Coloured and Indian population, has led to very few prosecutions under the Group Areas Act taking place in recent years. The Strydom Commission investigating the legislation, which reported in 1984, recommended that business districts should be desegregated. This became law in 1985. By September 1986 21 so-called 'central business districts', in which segregation no longer applied, had been established in 16 towns and cities and 60 other applications were being considercd.52 Officials and ministers still stressed that this desegregation was limited to commercial, professional, religious and educational undertakings and no residential desegregation was contemplated. However the central business districts and the unofficial desegregation of inner city suburbs might well be the thin end of the wedge that undermines strict residential segregation, although clearly, given the present distribution of wealth in South Africa, it would only be the richest fraction of the black community who could afford to live in the suburbs decreed white.

RURAL POLICY

While concessions on certain types of forced removal are being contemplated for residents of urban areas, most often hand in hand with coercion, no concessions and no end to removal have been discussed or debated in connection with the poorest people: farm workers and landless peasants in the bantustans. The regime has given no signs of any intention of halting or preventing the evictions of farm workers or people living on communally owned land in the bantustans. They may hide behind the defence that these removals are the result of 'market forces' and are necessary for more advanced economic development to overtake backward peasant production. Even if this is believed the regime has no plans to allocate alternative land to evicted workers or peasants. The dispossessed must further swell the reserve army of labour, helping to force down wages, and destroy workers' organisations.

The only changes being contemplated in rural policy relate to black-spot removals. Section 9 of the Laws on Development Aid Amendment Bill presented to Parliament in March 1986, attempts to circumvent the opposition of black-spot communities to forced removal and the victory won by the Mogopa community in the courts. The bill states that by agreement with a bantustan Pretoria may authorise a bantustan to administer a black

Popular Resistunce and the New Start! Strutegies 139

. . 1 )01 .53 In other words a community would become part of a bantustan ~ c ~ ~ h o u t physically moving, although all the disadvantages of bantustan I t d e n c e such as possible loss of citizenship, loss of benefits and difficulty in l : ; ~ i ~ ~ i n g access to urban labour markets would apply. The Borders of I';~rticular States Extension Amendment Act (discussed in Chapter 4) ~~~corporates the principle of this legislation and applies it specifically to black )l)ots, which are to be made part of already 'independent' bantustans, railing the severe disabilities of a change of status for the inhabitants, a forced removal by means of statute.

On 31 December 1986 the control and administration of 4.5 million I~~.c.tares of land were transferred to the six non-'independent' bantustans. I'llc transfer (affected an area of South Africa equal to one-half of what was

..<.I aside as 'reserves' under the 1913 Land Act), was the result of a series of I~~-oclamations by the State President. The proclamations were published in 111c Government Gazette, without discussion in parliament and almost ~~nnoticed by the press. The move had been preceded by the devolution to I 11c bantustan authorities of more powers of repression and of control over the .~llocation and utilization of land. All the consequences and implications of ~ l lc changes are still to emerge, but they have clearly heightened the security of millions of people who occupy the affected land. Much of it was I'rust Land on which many people had been forcibly settled after previous

t,victions or forced removal. Bantustan leaders now have powers of removal without the legal check which had been exploited by the Mogopa community 1 0 delay their forced removal. The changes have also meant the lifting of ~c.srrictions which previously prevented much of the land being sold on the 111arket to private concerns.54

Ncw strategies on forced removal and population control emerged in the tlccade after the uprising of 1976. These were devised around the notions of i~clvisers to the government who believed that the basic apartheid structures 0 1 white rule and economic exploitation could be maintained without c.ocrcion. The key would be the division of the black community on lines of tlifferential access to political and economic power together with economic KI-owth untrammelled by the brakes on its development inherited from lormer administrations. The ideological presentation of this strategy stressed 'free play to market forces', 'depoliticising conflicts', 'orderly urbanisation' i~nd 'desegregating certain facilities'.

When P W Botha declared in 1986 that 'apartheid was dead' he was i~ligning himself clearly with that section of his party and the electorate which ~liaintained that the changes in form of some of the apartheid structures tailed an end of the system which had earned international condemnation. Ilut parallel with the ideological formulations about 'reform' ran increasing ; ~ n d escalating repression. The changes were not accompanied by economic KI-owth and rising wages, as had been envisaged, but by deepening recession.

140 Forced Kt*tnovul Popular Kc.s~stuncc' urrd the NCZU State Strafe~res 141 i

I llcl.e was little beyond hopelessness there is now a growing anger that The recession made it difficult for the government to find the economic 1 , ,, i.cd removals as intrinsic to apartheid and calls not only for an end to the means to pay off the allies it had hoped to create. It also pushed many more I l l ,vcr ty and the humiliation, but also for full political rights to effect that people into active participation in anti-apartheid organisations, which grew I - 1 1 ~ 1 .

and developed enormously in the decade. These organisations increasingly called for the unbanning of the ANC and identified themselves with the demands of the Freedom Charter. Popular mobilisation led to non- compliance with many apartheid bodies like Community Councils and bantustan offices. In these circumstances a state of deepening political and economic crisis developed for the government, a crisis which increasingly they felt only able to control by severe repression.

In the field of forced removals, where in January 1985 the Minister of Co-operation and Development promised all removals would be suspended, there were midnight actions by the military in places like Uitenhage forcing squatters off their land; there were the brutal killings and arson attacks under police and military supervision at Crossroads that forced large sections of the community to go to Khayelitsha; there was the callous eviction for trespass of families living at Brown's Farm near Cape Town; there was the detention and torture of activists who opposed removals like Piet Kose, chairman of the Ekangala Action Committee, and leading members of the Brits Action Committee. There was no apartheid without coercion, despite what government planners would have had the world believe.

The crisis for apartheid was deepened by the growing strength, organisa- tion and co-ordination of resistance. Increasingly communities facing forced removal formed associations to fight the removal and affiliated their groups to national anti-apartheid groups. Further, the opposition to forced removals became increasingly linked to demands for full political rights for the majority of the population and for national liberation. Throughout 1986, 'We will only pay rent when Mandela tells us' became the catchphrase of rent boycotters in Soweto opposing the new housing p ~ l i c y . ~ V o u r women refugees forced to flee from Crossroads undertook a seven-day fast for justice in August 1986 in a church in an affluent white suburban area of Cape Town. After the fast they told the press that on behalf of their communities they wished for a lifting of the State of Emergency, the withdrawal of troops from schools and townships, the release of detainees and gaoled political leaders, the unbanning of popular organisations and the ability to return to the land on which their houses had stood.55 The Natal Conference against Relocations held in August 1985 and attended by representatives of more than 20 communities, mostly living in black spots, 'badly situated' areas, and South African Development Trust land, adopted resolutions rejecting all removals and calling for them to halt. The conference resolutions also affirmed 'there is one South Africa' and demanded 'that the wealth of this country is shared equally and that there be no taxation without repre~entation'.~

Through huge police and military effort the new strategies for removal and population control have been enforced, but the organisation of those affected and their determination to resist has increased and deepened. Where once

Tables

TABLE 1 Estimated number of people forced to move by type of removal, 1960-82'

T y ~ e o f removal N u m b u moved

Removals under Group Areas Act 834,400 Township relocations in bantustans 730,000 Eviction of squatters in informal urban settlements 1 12,000 Eviction of farm workers and labour tenants 1,129,000 Black-spot and other evictions for bantustan consolidation 687,500 Removals within and between bantustans 30,000

'Total 3,522,900

1 Rcmovals under rhr pass law,, u,hich are difficulr ru quantily, arc nor included. I'hc figures for hlack~spor and other evicrions fur cun,ulldauun ~ncludr eviill,ms lor ~nlrasrructural and \rmrcjili pruircls.

Source: Surplus Peuplr Prulecr 1983. VoI I. p 6

TABLE 2 African population by sex in major towns, 1936-51

Cape Kimber- East Port Durban Pieter- Town ley London Elizabeth maritzburg

-

1936 Males 10,701 7,738 12,740 15,636 57,296 12,155 Females 4,302 7,418 12,711 13,999 15,961 4,442

1946 Males 26,927 15,313 17,754 26,433 92,112 16.1 19 Females 1 1,555 1 1,702 17,471 24,843 32,368 6,329

1951 Males 36,983 15,393 21,866 37.116 117,175 17,566 Females 18,369 13,866 21,950 34,666 50,560 7,807

Pretoria Johannes- East Rand West Rand Bloem- burg fontein

1936 Males 31,178 182,914 223,811 83,631 15,733 Females 16,825 62,405 3 1,597 12,395 17,624

1946 Males 69,875 274,022 264,566 106,260 22,417 Females 43,703 147,516 58,63 1 2 1,256 23,593

1951 Males 77,485 311,328 284,236 116,261 30,751 Females 57,571 202,398 92,312 28,614 31,155

Source: Sirnkins 1983, p . 9

TAB1.E 5 Aid Centres' administration of the pass laws, 1971-81

Tables 143

'TABLE 3 Economic sectors as a percentage of national income, 1911-21 -

Munujuc-turtng Mining Agriculrurc,

191 1-12 7.0 28.0 16.0

1918 9.6 20.3 21.6

1920-2 1 12.3 15.7 18.2

.Souni.: Inner 1984, pp. I l b 2 3

TABLE 4 Workers employed in manufacturing, 1910-28 --

1910 1917 1920 1924 1928

Workers 55,000 121,000 180,000 115,000 141,000

Sourcr- I r i n c ~ I984 pace riunlher m~s\ ing .

7 b ~ u l I'eople I'cuple nor People I'eople smr ro referrals prosecured prosec urrzd asstgned lohs hunru~tlrtis

.Sourcr:.Sun~~?~1]K11~.~Ki./li1io,i~, l Y 7 1 L X 2 .

TABLE 6 Urban African population, 1950-80

Urbun Urhun non- Turul urhantsed Toral burrri~stun hunrusrun populurton Afrtcun

populartorr

144 Tables

TABLE 7 Recruitment of workers by bantustan in two Natal Administration Board areas, 1979-81 --

L)rake?rsberg Port Nalal Admintstrution Board AdmtntstrucUln Board

-- --- 1979 1980 1981 -- 1979 1980 1981

-- Bophuthatswana 24 388 50 1 84 59 I2 Ciskei 379 1,752 1,526 573 460 16 Gazankulu - - - 642 625 4 I Kangwane 703 366 302 1,020 1,144 96 Kwandebele 419 114 165 68 47 16 Kwazulu 172,154 225,372 255,120 282,220 303,297 348,285 Lebowa - - - 712 766 18 Qwaqwa 1,168 283 503 2,518 2,904 113 Transkei 14,310 20,026 25,807 47.980 34,358 21,731 Venda 34 18 79 24 2n 2 - - v - - Total 189,191 248,319 284,003 335,841 343,680 370,336

TABLE 8 Arrests, prosecutions and convictions under the pass laws, 1955-84' ppp

Year Arrests l'ros~cutlon Convicliorls - 1955 324,9002 337,604

1956 379,900 356,8 11 1957 - - 365,911

1958 - - 396,836

1959 - - 413,639

1960 - 370,300 340,958 1961 - 370,700' 375,417 1962 - - 384,497

1963 - 395,660 -

1964 - - - 1965 - 62 1,0002 -

1966 - 61 1,012 -

1967 - 670,296 -

1968 633,140 1969 - 643.897 - 1970 - 63 1,300 -

1971 -. 616,595 -

1972 - 530,444 - 1973 - 509.31 1 1974 274,641 349,345 -

1975 268,985 381,858 -

1976 250,030 287,374 -

1977 224,308 279,957 -

1978 272,887 306,850 /

1979 119,869 239,400 -

1980 108,499 171,435 - 1981 160,000 215,535 75,176 1982 206,022 - 98,708

1983 262,904 - 142.067

1984 183,000

1 I'rtrsccorlon\dtiring ~ h e pcrlod 1967-74 covcr oil'enccs agarnrl ~ u r i c ~ rcyularion\, lurrign ASricanr lllegall? in ~ h c urhan arcas, Lallulc to product do~.ummts and orhcr oifcnccs s p c ~ i t ~ c d in rhc llrhan Arras Act. Oiicnccs alirr lqhR against thc Black L.ahour Kegularions Act arc ~nc'ludcd.

L l i s [~n~arc \ of annual averapcs oiprosecurlons (derived hy Savapc 19x4. ' l a h k 2 '

S v u n e Arrcr~,: Hot~rr o f ~ l , ~ ~ ~ ~ m h l ~ ~ e b a ~ e s ( H ~ ~ ~ i u r ~ I l . 1975-80. Cilv;lge 1981,Sumq u(RaceKrialtr1nr. 1981; FOI u.\, No. 58, p. 12. L'r~~sccu~ions. .\irurh~l/ni~~t~~'oit,e,l,,nuiz/Rep~~r~, 1V67-74; Sa\agi. 1984; Savage 1986, p 190. Convlcrioos: Sun,n , o/RarcKeloizo,r i . 1955-84; I.(xu.. Nu. 52, p 7

146 Tables Tables 147

TABLE 9 Numbers of Africans endorsed out of the major urban areas through the operation of influx control, 1956-80

195663 464,726 1972 30.000' 1964 98,241 1965 86,186 1966 70.0001 1967 60,0001 1968 61,658 1969 40,095 1970 33,851 1971 30,000'

1 Estimates. Where ncl figurcs were available the cstimatc has

.Source: Survq, a! Race IKrieoorcr, 14btL80

2 - -

1973 92,886 1974 18,467 1975 61,242 1976 38,544 1977 32,525 1978 36,325 1979 30,0001 1980 30,0001

heen mdde hdscd on the wquencc o i l~gurcr plvcn

TABLE 10 Families moved through Group Areas Act removals, 1950-84

Coloured Indiun White Afncan' ---

Cape 65,657 3,05 1 840 Natal 3,845 25,288 817 Orange Free State 2,335 no residents -

~~ -

Transvaal 11,854 1 1,728 76 1 Total

- - 83,691

- 40,067 2,418

I Figurer unknown.

Sfnrrci: Surilry of Race Ridarzo,rr, 1985. p. 348.

TABLE 11 Funds spent on building houses in bantustans, 1967-83 (in R1,OOO)l --

1967-68 5,656 1975-76 67,215 1968-69 9,515 197677 - 1969-70 18,299 1977-78 - 197C-71 24,030 1978-79 46,330 1971-72 35,662 197%80 48,742 1972-73 25,790 198C-81 59,645 1973-74 30,504 198 1-82 71,941 1974-75 45,985 1982-83 81,014

1 F1gun5 alter 1978 L X L ~ U ~ C the bdnrubtdn\ o l I rdnskel, Rophuthdtrwana and Lmda. and h p r e s alter 19Kl cxc lud~ the (

TABLE 12 Estimated number of commuters by bantustan of origin, 1977-82

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Bophuthatswana Ciskei Gazankulu Kangwane Kwandebele Kwazulu Lebowa Qwaqwa Transkei Venda

Total

Source: Sourh Alrica 1983a, ~ r . 404

TABLE 13 Employment in agriculture, 1950-85

1951 1960 1970 1980 1985

Black 1,363,218 1,568,999 2,384,539 1,204,017 1,090,934 White 145,424 118,487 97,913 102,425 88,656

----- - Source: South Alrica 1986a, p. 7.5.

TXRI-E 14 Farmers' total expenditure on machinery and implements, 1965-80 at - . - - - - - constant 1970 value of the rand (in R1,000)

1965 1970 1975 1980

35,932 59,400 191,406 565,501

Source: Calculated lrom Sourh A l r u 1986a, p. 9.25, dnd Nattrass 1981, p. 253.

TABLE 15 Capital invested per person in South African agriculture, 1946-77, at constant 1970 prices (in rand) - 1946 1951 1960 1971 1977

515 470 656 660 747

Source: Nartrara 1981, p. 102.

148 Appendix

APPENDIX 1

Glossary of terms associated with - -

forced removals Administration Boards Appointed executive authorities, directly responsi-

ble to the Minister of Bantu Affairs (later Minister of Plural Relations, then Minister of Co-operation and Development), which administered and controlled the movement, employment and housing of Africans outside the bantustans. Established in 1971. In 1979 the number of boards was reduced from 22 to 14. Renamed Development Boards in 1982. Some powers of urban administration delegated to community councils in 1982-4. Administration Boards replaced in 1986 by the Regional Service Councils.

Aid Centres Created in 1971 to help streamline the operation of the pass laws. Abolished 1986 when influx control legislation reformulated.

Bantu Affairs Department Principal section of the civil service dealing with the administrative control of Africans outside the bantustans. Headed by a Minister from the Cabinet elected only by Whites. In 1978 renamed the Department of Plural Relations. In 1980 renamed the Department of Co-operation and Development. Reorganised in 1986: functions divided between the Department of Constitutional Development, the Department of Education and Development Aid and the Provincial Executives.

Bantu Commissioners' Courts Courts presided over by local officials in charge of the administration of Africans. They handled only offences under the jurisdiction of the Bantu Affairs Department for which only Africans were prosecuted. Chiefly used for prosecutions under the pass laws. In 1984 placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice.

Bantustans Ten areas designated by the regime as the 'national states' to on< of which all Africans were deemed to belong, irrespective of where they live. Each bantustan is made up of widely scattered pieces of land and is nominally self-governing, although overall military and foreign policy is decided by Pretoria. The ten bantustans are Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Venda, Gazankulu, Kangwane, Kwandebele, Kwazulu, Lebowa, Qwa- qwa, Transkei and I'enda. Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei have been designated 'independent' and most of their inhabitants stripped of their South African citizenship.

Betterment Schemes for restructuring the tenure of agricultural land in the bantustans, first introduced in the 1930s, which entail the division of an area into residential, agricultural and grazing sections.

Black spots Freehold land owned by Africans, lying outside the scheduled areas and the released land, and not subject to bantustan administration.

Appendix l 149

Closer settlements Areas within bantustans, or on trust land, set aside for the rudimentary housing of people removed from black spots and white-owned farms.

Coloured Labour Preference Policy Initiated in 1955 to give preferential access to work and housing in the Cape to people classified as Coloured and used to expel large numbers of African workers from houses and to restrict their access to most jobs, except under migrant labour contracts. Abolished 1984.

Community Councils Elected councils established in 1977 as part of the system of administration of non-bantustan Africans. In 1982 legislation extended their functions from being chiefly consultative, to municipal administration, which includes setting and collecting rents, levying service charges, allocating housing and business sites.

Commuters African workers who live in a bantustan and work outside the bantustan, often considerable distances away. They may travel daily or weekly to work.

Development Boards See Administration Boards. Endorse out To place a stamp in a passbook to indicate that the holder has

been illegally in a prescribed area (see Prescribed areas), or to cancel stamps which allow the holder to remain in a prescribed area. A term used generally to refer to eviction from urban areas under the pass laws.

GG 'Government Garage.' The letters on the number plates of official vehicles. Used to refer to the regime's trucks which transport people forced to move.

Group areas Segregated zones in towns and cities set aside for residence, commercial and professional activity, industry and education for members of White, Coloured and Indian groups.

Influx control System to control and direct labour, particuiarly used to prevent Africans living in the bantustans from living and working in the non-bantustan urban areas except under highly restrictive conditions.

Labour bureaux Offices at which African work-seekers must register and be assigned a job category before they can officially be recruited for work in towns, white-owned farm areas, or outside bantustans.

Labour tenant Tenant farmer compelled to work a fixed period of the year unpaid for the farm-owner, in return for the right to live on the farm-owner's land.

Non-prescribed areas See Prescribed areas. Passes Documents issued to Africans recording details of identity, which

are stamped with permits to live in certain areas and work for a named employer. Includes documents officially named 'Reference Books'.

Prescribed areas The whole of the country outside the bantustans was divided for the purposes of influx control into prescribed areas (which included all cities and commercial areas) and non-prescribed areas (which consisted largely of farmland and mines). Controls over the presence and employment of Africans differed in the two kinds of areas.

Reference Books See Passes

150 Appendix l Appendix 2 15 1

Released land Land set aside in terms of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 to be added to the areas designated African reserves in the 1913 Land Act (the scheduled land). Released land in 1936 amounted to 6.2 million hectares which was to be acquired for African occupation by the SANT (see below). By 1974 20 per cent of land designated released land had been acquired for African occupation. The scheduled and released land together amounted to just under 13 per cent of the total land area of South ~ f r i c a .

SABT See SANT SADT South African Development Trust. See SANT SANT South African Native Trust. Established as the South African

Native Trust in 1936 to acquire and administer land released for African occupation in terms of the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act. Later renamed the South African Bantu Trust and renamed again the South African Development Trust.

Scheduled land Land set aside in terms of the Native Land Act of 1913 as the only land available for African occupation and ownership. Comprised 8.98 million hectares.

Section 10 Section of Urban Areas Act which designated categories of Africans allowed to remain more than 72 hours in non-bantustan towns. (See Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 1945 in Appendix 2.)

Squatters People living illegally on land without the permission of the landowner and the relevant state authorities.

Trust land Land acquired by the SADT for African ownership and occupation.

APPENDIX 2

Chronological summary of legislation related to forced removals

Legislation referring to Africans was initially prefixed with the term 'Native'. In 1951 the term was replaced by 'Bantu', which was itself replaced by 'Black' in 1978. In this appendix the names of laws are given as they were when first enacted. In the text the laws are referred to by the names they had during the period described. The current names of laws employ the term 'Black' where once 'Native' or 'Bantu' was used.

Native Land Act, 1913 Prevented Africans owning or acquiring land outside the scheduled areas and halted white acquisition of land held by African farmers.

Native (Urban Areas) Act, 1923 Prevented Africans settling in urban areas except in segregated locations or townships.

Native Administration Act, 1927 (later Black Affairs Administration Act) Laid down the structures for administration of Africans including Commissioners' Courts where pass-law offences were heard. Section 5 allowed the State President to define the boundaries of land allocated to any particular group of people and to order the removal of people from one area to another without prior notice. Police were empowered to ensure compliance. Africans living on scheduled or trust land could only be moved if the Minister obtained parliamentary approval for the removal.

Native Service Contract Act, 1932 Forced farm workers into labour contract agreements. An African family could be evicted from a white-owned farm if a member of the family did not provide the required labour services.

Slums Clearance Act, 1934 Laid down minimum standards of housing and gave powers to officials and police to expropriate property and evict tenants from areas deemed to be slums.

Native Trust and Land Act, 1936 (later renamed Development Trust and Land Act) Specified further areas allowed for African occupation in addition to those demarcated in the 1913 Land Act. The additional 'released' land was to be acquired by the South African Development Trust. Chapter IV regulated the presence of Africans in white farm areas. Only registered farm owners, farm workers, registered squatters or tenants and their dependants were allowed in the areas. A farmer who allows on his land Africans, other than those listed, is guilty of an offence. Africans illegally resident in a white farming area can be prosecuted and evicted and their houses demolished. Evicted Africans are to be settled in scheduled or

152 Appendix 2 Appendix 2 1 5 3

released areas under the direction of the Bantu Affairs Department (later the Department of Co-operation and Development).

Native Laws Amendment Act, 1937 Prohibited Africans acquiring land in urban areas from non-Africans and limited churches, schools and other institutions attended by Africans to African townships.

Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 1945 (later Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act) Consolidated the laws controlling Africans' presence in urban areas, strictly specifying the conditions under which Africans might live and work in urban areas; defined and limited the sections of urban areas in which Africans could live; and provided for the Minister to remove or abolish African townships. Section lO(1) defined which African people could remain in urban areas for more than 72 hours: (a) people born there and who had lived there continuously since birth; (b) people who had worked lawfully and continuously for one employer for 10 years or for several employers for 15 years; (c) the wives or children under 18 of people in categories (a) and (b); (d) people granted permits by labour bureaux to work for a fixed time contract. Section 29 empowered the local authority to remove from the urban areas Africans deemed 'redundant' or 'idle and undesirable'.

Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, 1949 Prohibited marriages between people classified as White and people classified as members of other population groups.

Population Registration Act, 1950 Imposed a rigid system classifying people according to a combination of skin colour, descent and language. Compelled each individual to be classified according to these categories in a population register. Every person had to carry an identity card indicating his or her classification.

Group Areas Act, 1950 Proclaimed separate Group Areas for people classified as White, Coloured or Indian. Property ownership, residence, industry, commerce and education in each Group Area to be limited only to the members of the specified group.

Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 Placed the administration of certain aspects of the lives of rural Africans in the hands of Bantu Tribal, Regional and Territorial authorities to whom certain advisory, executive and administra- tive powers were to be gradually devolved.

Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, 1951 Made it an offence for a person to enter or settle on land without the permission of the owner or the lawful occupier. Penalties for conviction under this law were £25 or three months in prison or both. These penalties were increased when the act was amended in 1976 to R500 or 12 months in prison or both. The amended act gave the landowners or the Department of Community Development and the Bantu Administration Boards power to demolish buildings erected. It became a punishable offence to obstruct these demolitions.

Bantu (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act, 1952 Forced all Africans, men and women, to carry reference books

which contained their identity card and population classification, stamps registering their residence and employment in a particular area, and certificates of taxes paid.

Immigration Regulation Amendment Act, 1953 Forbade people classified as Indian who married non-South African women overseas to bring their wives and children to settle in South Africa.

Bantu Resettlement Act. 1954 Provided for the removal of Africans from Johannesburg. Enacted primarily to effect the destruction of Sophiatown.

Bantu (Urban Areas) Amendment Act, 1955 Abolished African freehold rights in the prescribed areas and gave the Bantu Affairs minister power to abolish a township.

Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959 Abolished the limited parliamentary representation of Africans and defined eight bantustans. Increased the powers of Tribal, Regional and Territorial Authorities and brought urban Africans under their aegis.

Aliens Control Act, 1963 Made it an offence for an African to enter South Africa without a travel document issued by his or her home country and recognised by the South African government. Failure to comply was an offence punishable by six months' imprisonment and deportation.

Bantu Labour Act, 1964 Consolidated the regulations controlling African workers. Made it a criminal offence for an African employed on any mines or works to infringe his or her contract of service and refuse to obey an emp!oyer7s command. This section was repealed in 1974. The law was amended in 1970 to allow the Minister to prohibit the employment of Africans in certain areas and in certain job categories.

Bantu Laws Amendment Act, 1964 Transferred powers over influx control (particularly regarding visits to town and women wanting to join husbands) from municipal officers to labour bureaux, and limited the right of women to settle in towns. They might only do so if they 'ordinarily resided' with husbands and if they had initially lawfully entered the area. It widened the definition 'idle and undesirable' Africans to include those who qualified under Section 10, and established Aid Centres for the processing of pass

- -

offenders. Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act, 1967 Imposed

controls on the establishment and extension of factories. In terms of a proclamation under this Act issued in 1968 no factory employing Africans could be established in the main metropolitan centres without the permission of the Minister of Planning.

Bantu Labour Regulations (Bantu Areas) Act, 1968 Established labour bureaux in bantustans and urban townships where African workers were to be placed in specific job categories. Compelled all Africans living in a bantustan to register with a Tribal Labour Bureau and made it an offence - ~ -

to seek work without going through the labour bureau. Empowered the Director of Bantu Labour to zone areas in which specified Africans might work.

Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, 1970 Decreed every African a citizen

154 Appendix 2 Appendix 2 155

of one of the bantustans, whether or not he or she lived in a bantustan. Bantu Affairs Administration Act, 1971 Removed responsibility for

municipal government in African townships and influx control from white local authorities. Established the Administration Boards, directly under the Bantu Affairs Department to carry out these functions.

Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act, 1972 Incorporated the Immigration Regulation Amendment Act of 1953. In 1978 the Minister of the Interior allowed those wives married before 1977 to join their husbands with their children.

Bantu Laws Amendment Act, 1973 Expanded the powers of bantustan legislative assemblies. Set up the procedure for the consolidation of bantustan land. Allowed that if the Minister of Bantu Affairs ordered the removal of an African community and the community refused to move the removal order would have to be confirmed by both houses of the whites-only parliament.

Bophuthatswana Citizenship Act, 1978 Repealed the Bantu Homeland Citizenship Act of 1970 in Bophuthatswana and required all people who had acquired Bophuthatswana citizenship to reapply. Laid down condi- tions for the granting of Bophuthatswana citizenship.

I Laws on Co-operation and Development Act, 1979 Increased the fine for

an employer found guilty of employing an African who did not have the necessary permit from R50 to R500.

Proclamation 2089, 1979 Abolished labour tenancy, as defined in the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, throughout South Africa.

Black Local Authorities Act, 1982 Established elected local authorities for non-bantustan urban Africans.

Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, 1982 Never made law in its original form. Envisaged making African urban residence rights conditional on the availability of housing in a particular area and restricting access to Section 10 rights.

Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act, 1984 Tightened restric- tions on the employment of permitless 'aliens'. (Since the 'independence' of four bantustans the term now applied to their citizens.) Required employers to furnish a return of alien workers. Prohibited the provision of accommodation to aliens.

Black Communities Development Act, 1984 Reconstituted Administra- tion Boards as Development Boards to act in conjunction with elected local authorities. Development Boards were empowered to register 99-year leasehold rights for township residents.

Abolition of Influx Control Act, 1986 Repealed the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 and the Bantu Labour Regulations of 1968. Established common identity documents for all South Africans. Gave freedom of movement to all South African citizens, but excluded the citizens of 'independent' bantustans. Made permission to remain in urban areas conditional on occupation of approved housing.

Borders of Particular States Extension Amendment Act, 1986 Incor-

porated certain black spots into the territory of 'independent' bantustans. Restoration of South African Citizenship Act, 1986 Restored South

African citizenship to limited numbers of citizens of 'independent' bantustans, previously deemed aliens.

156 Bibliogruphy Bibliography 157

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166 Bibliography Bibliography 167

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168 Notes and R eferences Notes and References I 69

Notes and References Introduction

I Dcsmund 1971; Nash 1980 5 l'larzkv & Walker 1985, pp. 66-7 2 Baldwln 1975; Marc 1980; Walt 1982; Surplus 6 Baldwin 1975; Surplus People l'rolect 1983,

I'conlc I'rolec~ 1983. I'lat~kv & Walker 1985 Vol. I , pp. 3-8

4 I'l;~uky & Walker 1985

CHAPTER 1: History

1 Plaatje 1916; Kecg.1~ 1986 2 Wilson 1971, pp. 130-31; Wolpe 1972, pp.

436-7 7 Quoted in Davenport 1969, p 95

Davenport 1969, pp. 98-101 5 Mare 1980, pp. 4-5 6 lnnes 1984, pp. 118-23 7 Surplus People Project 1983 Yo1. I . pp. 87-90 8 lnnes 1984, p. 129 9 1.acey 1981 pp. 181-206

10 Patun 1957 n.5; Union Statutes 01 South Alrlca. No. 46 of i937

I I O'Meara 1983, p. 227 12 Legassick 1974, p. l 1 13 Savage 1984, pp. 26 7 14 Pagan Commission 1948. p. I8 15 Yaw~tch 1982, pp. 14-16 16 O'Meara 1983. Ch. 15 17 1.egasslck 1974, p. 16 I8 iC1:lasdorp & Plllay 1977, p. 95 19 Yawl~ch 1982. pp. 94-5 20 Surnlus l'conle I'ro~ect 1983. Vol. 2. pp. 17-20 21 111n;a 1984,' pp. 150-54 22 Innes 1984, Ch. 7 23 Ouoted In Molreno 1977, p. 19 24 Ccsmond 1971 25 Dcsmond 1978 26 Surplus I'eople Projec~ 1983. Vol. 5. p. 39 27 Innes 1984, p. 188

CHAPTER I Savage 1984, p. 1 I 2 Sunday Timcy [Jhb], 9.12.54 3 Riekerr Report 1979, p. 41 4 Savage 1984, pp. 24-31 5 Goldin 1984, p. 7 6 Quoted 111 Lrgdsslck 1974. p. 7 7 Quoted in Legas\~ck 1974. p. 15 8 Chaskalson & Duncan 1984. p. 4 9 Goldin 1984, p. 10-11

10 Legasslck 1974, p. 24 11 Mandela 1978, p. 58 I2 Baard 1986. D. 30 13 ~ a w l t c h 1984 pp. 6-7 14 Mare 1980, p.25; Smit & Bouvsen 1981, p 27 15 Centre for Intergroup Studies 1974, p. 6 16 Slnclalr 1971, pp. 30-31 17 Harris 1%8, p. 20 18 Riekert Renort 1979, P. 246 I9 Savage 19G, p. 30

28 Innes 1984, n. 191 29 Williams 19f7, p. 8 30 Quoted In Lcgilssick 1974, p 28 31 Smit & Hnny>en 1981, p. 48 32 Quoted In Simon> 1968, p. 282 73 Simons 1968, pp. 281-2. Surplus People I'roject

1983. Vol. 2. p. 105: Baldwln 1975, p. 226 34 Quoted in Monama 1980 , p.146 35 Riekert Report 1979. p. 58; Brooks & Rrickhlll

1980, pp. 170-77 36 Riekcrt Report 1979, p. 64 37 Surplus People I'roject 1983, Vol. 3, p. 13 38 Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. 2, p. 105 39 Chaskalson & Duncan 1984, p. 9 40 Quoted in Mare 1980, p. 110 41 Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. 2, p. 96 42 Surplus People Proiect 1983, Vol. 1, p. 13 43 Mare 1980, p. 3 U Cachalla 1983, p. 15 45 Innes 1984. p. 190 46 Luckhardt & Wall 1980, p. 448-9 47 Brooks & Brickhlll 1980; H~rson 1979 48 Brooks & Brickhill 1980, pp. 300~301 49 Saul & Gelb 1981, p. 23 50 Slmklns & Desmond 1978: Davles 1979; Cacha-

Ila 1983. p. 1 51 Rlekert Report 1979. pp. 155-6 52 Baldwln 1975;11'

2: Pass laws Hlndson & Lacev 1983, pp. 104-5 IL).iF B r ~ ~ f i ~ r f i I'up~r. No. 13, 1984, p. 2 Hlndsun & Lace? 1983, p. 108 I;,lius. NO. 5 1, p. 10 Black Sash 1982. p. I2 ('ape Hrruld. 8.6.85 Savage 1984, p. 48 Yawitch 1984, p. I1 Quoted in Barrett, Dawber t>r al. 1985, pp. 9-10 Foctcs, No. 59. p. 7 Sourh Alrliur~ Jounral o ] Humurl Klghrs. Vol. I , l't. 1, 1985, p. 89 Quoted in Mare 19SO. p. 17 Duncan 1980. p. I2 Cape I'imcs, 25.9.84 Black Sash 1981 Savage 1984, p. I4 nu^!\' .Vcnrs, 3.8.84 Hlndson & Lacry 1983, p. I I I

i S I ..~ccy 1984 {') Iil,~ck Sash 1982, p. 16 I l l I..ccey 1984, p. 9 I I 1.0, uc, No. 58, p. 12 I ' Oppcnhelmer 1985, p. 294 l \Yhlte Paper 1986, p. 2 1.1 Whltc Paper 1986,.p. 3 I . Whlcc I'aper 1986, p. 9 lo 1)rlncan 1987, p. 4 I1 I )\Incan 1987, p. 5 IS Ihncan 1987, p. 13 1'1 \[or, 25.7.86 . ( I I)t~rlcan 1987, p. 4 - I I)rlncan 1987, p. 6 t ' \~chcrt & Guelke 1973, p. 18 ' i t~nldin 1984, p. 53 ,I \,l\,age 1984, p. 49 >'. \1111t & Booysen 1981, p. 48; Surplus People

I ' n ~ ) e c ~ 1983, Val. 2, p. 8 \~mkins and Desmond 1987, pp. 114.16

t i \;lraklnsky and Keenan 1986, pp. 20b21, 25 ,S ()uoted in (;oldin 1984. p. 25 ,'I I\t~dlcnder, Hendrie B. Young 1984

I ~ I I \!or, 1.10.86 0 1 I . ' M;~~ldela \ororrun, 8.8.86 1978, p. 181

1 , i \rindu~' Srur, 6.7.86 0 1 1 oak 1982, pp. 31-5 0 , I'csold i d . ) 1985, p. 79 1 8 1 , \ ' . ~ w ~ ~ c h 1984, p. 6

73 Capr Trmes, 6.1 1.1984 74 Monama 1983, p. 17 75 Monama 1983, p. 5 76 hlonama 1983, p. 17 77 Hoexter 1983, p. 409 78 Sunday Express, 14.10.84 79 (:ape Times, 7.9.84 80 .Sunday Express, 14.10.84 81 Rlekert Reoort 1979. n. 54 82 Rlekert Reporr 1979, p. 55 83 Bishop 1982. p. 9 84 Blshon 1982. D. 11 85 Black' Sash i9k2a. p . 9 86 Lacey 1984, p. 9 87 Laccy 1984, p. I2 88 Black Sash 1982a, p. I2 89 Saraklnsky and Keenan 1986, p. 25 90 L)atly Illspulrh, 4.8.78 91 Lacey 1984, pp. 12-13 92 Smit & Booysen 1981, p. 77 93 Duncan 1986. p. 33 94 Quoted in Anti Apartheld Movement press

release, 6 June 1983 95 Quoted In Savage 1984. p. 50 96 B~shop 1982, p. I0 97 Unlted l>emocratic Fronr 1983 08 So~neran, 21.5.85 99 So~nelan, 20.7.84

100 ANC, SACTU and (:OSATU 1986 101 Congress of Sourh African Trade Uniona 1986,

I , Il1.1,k Sash lg8l p. 19 1 . i \ I I ~ I I & Booysen 1981, p. 95 102 Congress of South Afr~can Twde Unlons 1986, ( . ' I \1011~rna 1983, p. 46 p. 20

I I I l ' lm~s, 21.9.84; So~oerarl, 5.9.85, 3.10.85; 103 Council of the Unlons of South Afrlca 1986, p \ O I I I I I h i r ~ c a ?'he Impr~soncd Society 1986, p. 3 2 1

I I )\lfi;~rd 1983, p. IX 104 Summary q / World Broad~usrs, 1 1 .8.86P to l l :~ma 1983, p. 17

CHAPTER 3: Urban removals I 1 I U ~ ~ I I ( I U / Mall, 17.2.78 32 (illdin 1984, pp. 4 3 ~ 4 ' '111111 KI Booysen 1981, p. 1 33 Cape I'lmes, 13.8.84 ! ',11111\111\ 1983, Ch. 2 34 Goldin 1984, p. 17 I 1:1<Ccr1 1979, p. 37 35 Quoted In Goldin 1984, p. ??

\I,,,,PY 01 Kuce Relul~ons 1984, p. 474 36 l:rrra~li~al Marl, 28.9.84 r . ' . ~ , , ~ d u \ I'eople Project 1983, Vol. 4, p. 4 37 See Ch. 5

l l t l l , . \ 1075, p. 7 38 nully Illspalch, 23.5.85 I ) / i~ lc t l ~n O'Meara 1983, p. 170 39 Grucsruors, 1981, June

' 1 I ) ,\lc:lr;l 1983, pp. 170-71, 218 40 Smir & Rooysen 1981, p. 21 1 1 1 1 , W ~ \ , I ~ I ; I 1984 41 Huddlesron 1956, pp. 134-5 I I III,,,., 1975, pp. 19-32; Surplus People Prolecr 42 S m ~ r & Booysen 1981, p. 25

I"h { , Yo1 4, pp. 217-33 43 Mare 1980, p. 28 I ' I ! r~~~, l lcv 1976, p. 79 44 Chaskalson & Duncan 1984, p. 12 1 ' I ' I I I I L O C k 1980. p. 10 45 Flnaririal Marl, 17.2.78 1 1 I ' I I I I I I , I h 1980. pp. 58~80 46 S I ~ I S I 1978 I . # I , I ~ I ~ ~ \ I1cople Prolecr 1983, Vol. 4, p. 217 47 Chaskal\on & Duncan 1984, pp. 12-13 1'. . M ) . r (11 Ku'r. Relarrons 1984, p. 454 48 Smlt & Booy\en 1981, p. 91 1 .,,,. , i ,,I Kurc Relairons 1985, p. 357 49 Mare 1980, p. 38 1 !,I, l l I 83 50 Savage 1984, p. 37-8 1 ~ r r , t r , , r r \ < I / World Broadcasls, 15.9.86 51 Slur, 12.8.86 . i , I / N u ~ c Kclallons 1984, p. 481 52 Savage 1984, p. 37-8

1 1 , I , 1 1 1 j ~ l t t n c r & Cronln 1986, pp. 47-8 53 Black Sa\h IYX2a. p. 8 , , I S i , , , / l z ~ , , \ [Jhh], 15.4.84 54 Sush 1983, V111. 26. No 2 , p. 15

1 , s t , t n $ , ! , I / \I,r11. 28.9.84 55 Smit & B~v)v\cn 1981, p. 28 I 1 l h t , , ~ ~ ,I ( 1 1 ( , , ~ I ~ I I I 1984, p. 10 56 S m ~ t & Boovscn 1981, p. 26

l . , , l , l t t t I < I X I , I> . 10 57 Srnlt. 011vlcr & Boouscn 1982, p. 95 , ' . 1 1 1 1 , , , I ' J S I ~ I > l l 58 Male 1980. p. 26

c 8 . . ( , , ~ (,01~1111 1984, p. 11 59 Slrnkln\ 1983. pp. 5 4 ~ 5 ' , , . I . 1 1 1 (,o1~1111 10x4, 11. 13 60 Slnlt K. Hwyscn 1981, p. 26

1 1 , .. I .A I \ I I , C l l l l l 1080, p. 68 61 Smlt K. Ho<~y\cn 1981, p. 28, Surplus People ' , I I , , I , I , , ~ , I I#I:,' P ~ I ) J ~ L . I 1983, Vol. 2, p. 97; Mare 1980, p. 25

I , , 1 1 , ~ , , I ~ , , ~ ~ ~ I ~ I ' I , , ~ c L I 1983, Vo1. 2, pp 1 9 7 62 Smlt & Booysen 1981, p. 28 / e 6 7 Marc 1980, p. 26; Surplus People Project 1983,

170 Notes and References

VoI 4. nn. 56-61: Vol. 2. n. 65: Vol. 1, no. 6-7 92 Flnancral Mall, 3.8.84 ; I ( ) u , ~ ~ e d In Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. I, . . 64 ~ i a s k 's 'Gh~l982; p. 11' '

'

65 Smit & Booysen 1981, p. 90 66 Smit & Booysen 1981, p. 76 67 Summoq of World Broadcasrs, 11.2.87 68 Smlt & Booysen 1981, pp. 20, 48 69 Smith & Boovsen 1981. n. 87

93 Argus, 17.7.84 94 Flnanctal Mall, 7.12.84 95 Daily News, 10.9.85 96 Smit & Booysen 1981, p.92; Srar, 24.8.84 97 Black Sash, Annual Kepurl 1981, p. 10 98 Surplus People Project 1983, Vo1.3, p. 60

70 S m ~ t & ~ o o y i e n 1981, p: 41 71 Clry Press, 31.8.86; Cobbett 1985 72 Mare 1980, p. 26 73 Ftnanclal Matl, 27.1.78; Srur, 10.11.82 74 Slur, 10.11.82 75 Survey of Kace Rcla~rons 1983. p. I25 76 f;lnanclal Ttmes, 12.11.82 77 Daily Dtspaich, 3.4.79 78 Citv Press. 20.5.84 79 CI& Press, 31.8.86 80 Obery 1986, pp.8-10 81 Dally Dzsparch, 16.6.78: 24.11.78 82 Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. 2, p. 137 83 Transvaal Rural Action Committee 1985, p. 67 84 Focus, No. 58, p. I2 85 Transvaal Rural Action Committee 1985, p. 66 86 Mare 1980, p. 25 87 Smit & Booysen 1981, p. 68 88 Transvaal Rural Act~on Committee 1985, pp.

65-6 89 Tranavaal Rural Act~on Committee 1986a 90 CIQ l'ress, 27.7.86 91 Bell 1986, pp.290-92

CHAPTER 4:

I Trapldo 1980, pp. 350-68; Marks 1971, pp 132-4 Surplus People Project 1983, Vo1.4, p. 45 Du T o ~ t Comrnlsslon 1959, p. 3 Du Toil Cornm~ssion 1959, p. 51 Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. 2, pp. 17-18 Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. 4, p. 45 Surplus People Project 1983, Val. I , p. 6 Surplus PeopLe Project 1983, VoI. 2, p. 9 Mare 1980, pp. 9-13 Transvaal Rural Action Cornrnlttee 1985, p. 68 Mare 1980, p. 13 Quoted in Mare 1980, p. 41 Desmond 1971, pp. 50-51 Desmond 1971, p. 81 Mare 1980, p. 10 Mare 1980, p. 14 Kwandebele 1986, p. 3 Desmond 1978, pp: 25-6 Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. 2, p. 207 Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. 2, p. 212 Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. 2, p. 225 Surplus People Project 1983, vol. 2, p. 229 Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. 2, pp. 206-46 Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. 2, pp. 197- ?ns

99 Smit & Booysen 1981, p. 92 100 Financtal Mail, 3.8.84 101 Black Sash 1982a. no. 7-8: Goldine 1984. n. 15 102 Black Sash 1982;: b. 6 103 Anrt-Aparrhetd News, November 198 1 104 Focus. No. 51. n. 10 105 Cape '~tmes, 12.7.84 106 Ctr~zen, 5.7.84 107 Cape Tlmes, 12.7.84 108 Cape Ttmes, 12.7.84 109 Sher 1984, p. 16 110 Soweran. 14.8.84 l l l Srar, 20.8.84 112 Rand /)ally Mall, 8.8.77; Commlss~on for Jus-

tice and Peace 1983, p. 4 113 DeBeer 1984, pp. 47-64 114 Commission tbr lusr~ce and Peace 1983, nn. 4-5 115 Srar, 30.7.84 116 Kand Dallv Marl, 1.8.84 117 Cole 1986. nn.36-43 118 Weekly n-luri.' 5.6.86 1 19 Cape 7'1mt~. 30.8.84

Rural removals 36 Surplus I'cople Project 1983, VoI. 2, p. 116;

c. 9 3 , -- >>" ,,, >ournail I Y ~ L , pp. L L O ~ ~ U

Kand Dally Mull, 10.4.79 Surnlus Peonle Proiecr 1983. Vol. ~ r a ; . 23.9.85 Star, 25.9.85 BalJw~n 1975, p. 216 Mare 1980, p. 41 Slur, 23.9.85; Slar, 25.9.85 Buslnesl Day, 25.9.85 Transvaal Rural Act~on Commlttee Transvaal Rural Act~on Committec Surplus People l'rolecr 1983, Vol. 2, p. 69 Mare 1980, p. 41 Surplus People Project 1983, Val. 4, p. 3 Transvaal Rural Actlon (:ommittee 1986c, p. 3 Baldwln 1975, p. 227 Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. 2, p. 112 Dally Despalch, 1.6.78 Ftnanclal Mail, 27.1.78 Natal Mrrcuq, 30.4.73 Posi, 4.8.78; Surplus People Project 1983, VoI. 4, P. 7 Surplus People Project 1985, Vol. 4, pp. 11-12 Glaser 1986, p. 14 Surplus People Project 1983, Vol. 5. p. 34

~ --

I' I ,' ' Ilorc<e o/ Assemhlv Llehares, 11.2.81, (:ol. 844 ; 4 IL;t,hlnglon Posf, 4.11.84 ,.I c)uored In Melunsky 1982, p. 15 '' l~r~runc~al Mall. 27.1.78

. ' I > Mclrln\ky 1982, p. 16

.'.' \tr!h, 1983; Vol. 26, No. 2

. ' \ KwdNgema 1985, Mare 1983, Wentzel 1983, I r:~n\vaal Rural Action Comm~ttee 1985

'1 'I r.lllsvaal Rural Acrion Committee 1986b, p. 2 Sll (;rahawrrrown Rural Cummllree Newslerrrr, 1986,

1711 18-21 \ I ( I:l;~\\cns 1984. p. 8 \ ' bt:~rc 1980, p. 26 h Krv.iNgema 1984, pp. 23-5 h l hl.lre 1980, p. 10 5' . I l:~vsom 1983, p. 44 vi , Mclunsky 1982, p. 16 4 ; It';t\hrnplon t'osl. 4.5.84 i s IY~rld, "19.4.77 \'I I:<III~ Llatly htuil, 19.10.77 ')I) l:,t~rd Ilatlv Mull. 24.2.84

~ - , . ' 1 I .\'o?u<~ran, 28.3.8.1 ' 1 ' I'l-,~~~svaal Rural Action Commlrtcc 1985, p. 31

CHAPTER 5: Debates and strategy

I I , , ,o~s, No. 58, p. 12; Transvaal Rural Action ( ottlmlttee 1985, p. 57

' \ll~rday Tlmes [Jhh], 12.8.84 i I .ott t~, No. 58, p. I2 I I ~.ln\vaal Rural Action Comm~ttee 1985, p. 57

11). 1 1 Briefing Paper, No. 22, 1987, p. 4 8 , i ,rpc I'lmes, 25.7.84

/111c 1983, pp. 158-82 7 \ I I I I I & Boovsen 1981. n. 68

, I , ..~\sc,n 19i9; pp. 117-18 1 1 1 h ~ ~ h 1982. pp. 1, 13 I I I ~ I . , L h S A ~ 1982. n. 10 I , Ilft~,l\on 1986, pp: 9-11 I ' I , I /#, . ' I ' I~IYs, 31.8.84 I 1 I I ~ I ~ I I C ~ In Zille 1983, pp. 169-70 I I I, 11,llcr & Parnell 1986, p. 201 1 1 , I l t ~ ~ d l c r 1986, p. 9 1 1 o o t \ 3 X I > . 51 p. I0 I 1 1 , l\on 1986, p. 17 1 ' 9 \ , t i i Ipurrhetd .Vews, November 1986

1 1 I ,I/'# I'tmei, 4.8.84 I /:,,,rJ /)ally Mall, 28.8.84 \ ~ , I I 1986, p. 11

' 1 )hct,~cO 111 Ixgassick 1974, p. 16 I I t , I 1 l<J70

I ) I U > I ~ - ~ III 1.egasslck 1974, p. 17 ' I . l : . ~ ~ ~ ~ r - t ~ l > . ~ c h 1974, p. 201~2

I: I I I I ~ . I I ~ ~ . I C ~ 1974, p. 206 I. I , ( I I'J74, p. 128

29 Quoted In Kleu 1974, p. 132 30 Kleu 1974, pp. 133-5 31 Kleu 1974. n. 14 32 Gasson 1979: p. 126 33 Bell 1970 34 Zille 1983. nn. 148-9 35 Quoted ~ n ' z i l e 1983, pp. 173-4 36 Cobbett et al 1985, pp. 96-100 37 Quoted 111 Zillc 1983. p. 175 38 Flnanclul Mail. 28.9.84 39 Ftnancial Mail, 15.3.85 40 Transvaal Rural Action (:omrn~ttee 1985. p. 67 41 Focus. No. 58, p. I2 42 Obery 1986, pp. 9-10 43 Yawltch 1986, p. 25 44 House o/ .qssemhly I)ehare.i, 30.3.83, Cols. 891-2 45 I'lnanclul Marl, 26.10.84 46 Cape Ilmes, 5.10.84 47 Cape l'tmes, 3.10.84 48 Kand Dally Mall, 4.10.84 49 Kand Dally Mall, 4.10.84 50 (,'apz T~mes, 15.1.84 51 Transvaal Rural Action (:ommittce 1985, p. 73 52 Frnmctal Mall. 26.10.86 53 Siar. 7.3.86 54 FoC.is, No. 70, p. I2 55 .-lnrt-Aparrhe~d News, October 1986 56 Cupr I'lmes, 18.8.86 57 AFRA Reporr Sheer, No. 27, 1986

Noles und References 17 1

93 I'lat~ky & Walker 1985, pp 348-9 94 Surplua I'eoplc I'rolect 1983, VoI. 2, p. 12 95 Sher & Wdlt 1982, p. 22 96 .Slur, 16.1 1.78 97 .Sunda~ E.pn.ss, 13.6.82 98 Sash, 1983. VoI. 26, No. 2 99 Walker 1982, p. 20

100 KwaNgema 1984, pp. 18-83 101 Transvaal Rural Act~on Cornrnlttee 1985, p.

29-30 I02 .4.Vf' WeekLy Nrzus Briefing, 7.17.83 103 Focus, No. 47, 1983, p. 2 104 Transvaal Rural Action Commlttee 1985, p. 20 105 'l'ransvaal Rural Actlon (;ommittee 1985, p. 33 106 Transvaal Rural Action Cornmitree 1985, p. 21 107 Srar, 28.8.85 108 Dally Nems, 7.10.84 109 Obery 1986, pp. 10-1 1 110 Soweran, 5.2.85 11 1 ANC 1986, p. 11 112 Focus, No. 33, p. 12 113 Sechaha, December 1986 p. 11 114 AN(: 1987. n. 7

25 Mare 1980. D. I5 60 Cape Ttwres, 8.12.77 ,_ , ~ -

172 Index Index 173

~lcccnlralisation policy/strategy 62, 103, 124, 12%34 Aid Centres 3 3 4 , 48, 52-3, 148 1:cderation policies 133 arrests/contraventionslprosecutions 27,28, 34. 37-

I kpartment of Banru Affairs 19, 148 8 , 51-3, 55, 58 (:lrcular 25 32 Assembly Centres 39 1 :irculrr 27 78 Bantu Commissioners' Courts 51-2, 148

I)cs~nond, Cosmas 17, 97, 98 banrustan policy and 18, 19-20 I ) I I 'foit Comniission (1956) 9 6 5 defiancelresistance 17, 28, 44, 5 6 9

denounced by Smit Committee 29

Index economy 9, I0 and economic system 27

Iialance of payments deficit 22, 23, 37 effect of 27, 3G1, 38, 42-3, 47-9, 55-6 I~oom 15, 17-18, 22. 31, 35, 36 'employment and guidance centres' 35

The index is in two parts. The first is a subject index and the secwd lists Lvrr of living increasrs 22, 1 2 6 7 Fagan Commission 10, 29

Iorcign investment 8, 15, 23, 34, 133 Groskopf Committee recommendations 35 places mentioned in the book which have been affected by forced remc-?ls (;I)I ' 1 7 history 27, 2 a 3 1 , 47-8

xold prices 8, 22, 23, 35, 37 housing policy and 25, 27, 34, 37, 40-1, 50, 52, policies. xold standard 8 74, 125 O I I prices 22 Labour Bureaux 20, 149

SUBJECT INDEX [>:IS\ laws and 27 labour bureau system 29,31-2, 39.4 1,44,48,49, ~rrnovals policy and 123 50

\lurrip 22-3, 34, 36, 37, 1 3 9 4 0 and labour supply 9, 11, 12, 11, 19-2 1.29, 30, 31, Arrr of parliamenl, hill. and proclamurions art. ull housing as an ~ncentive to move to 26, 76, 78 ~:~ril'fs 8, 1 1 43 indexed under legtslur~on population size 60, 80 '~cchnocrats' policy formulations 128, 133 legislation 8-9, 19-20,25,29,36,38,4@1,43,44,

removals to 60, 70, 72, 7kL9. 83-4 \<.<. illso agriculture; industry; mining industry 79, 125 Administration Boards (lulcr Development Boards) betterment schcmes 14, 26, 93, 101-3, 148 objectives 14, 18, 28, 31, 35, 4 S 7 , 59

19, 39, 5G1, 54, 148 removals 26, 93 passes (reference books) 12, 15, 17, 29, 47, 149 African National Congress (ANC! 1 6 11, 15, 58-9, Black consciousness movement 66 I . .Ic.II~ (:ommission (1948) 10, 29 see also identity documents

I2G1 black spots lh-17, 93, 105, 113, 148 1.11111 I:lb~)ur 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 29, 48, 49-50, removals 11-12, 25, 27, 53, 59, 69-70 Umkhonto we Sizwe I20 removals 1 6 1 7 , 21, 26, 6 6 7 , 9S4,~ ,104, 105-6, ',.I, 95 'repealed' 25, 27, 41-2

agriculture 5, 11 11G14 ] <.vlt ~ionslremovals 5, 8, 12, 13, 21, 26, 93, 95-7, resistance 44, 5h-9 'development strategy' and 103 resistance 98, 1 1 6 1 2 1 100, 104. 105, 110, 138, 140 Riekert Commissionlstrategy 24, 25, 28, 3 4 4 0 expansion 15, 95-6 suspension of 122. 138-9 ~~~cclianisation and 15, 21, 34, 93, 95 Stallard 'doctrine' 6 7 foreign investment 15 Bophuthatswana bantustan 16,80,88, 104, 107, 108, I c cl<.r;~tion policies 133 urbanisation strategy 25, 41-3, 44, 50, 60, 12&7, labou~ tenants 5, 8. 13, 2 1, 93, 9 6 6 , 149 112, 119 1 h . 1 L < < I removals (defined) 4 137-8 share-croppers 5, 10 Border Area development programme 20 workings of 47-54 squatters 8, 10, 11, I2 border arras 20, 77, 129 t;.c~~hulu bantustan 108 see also Coloured Labour Preference Policy; dcccn~ white settlement schemes 95 boycotts 76 I ,r~t.~Ccy~l' (:ommittee recommendations 35 trallsation strategy see also farm labour bus 10 1 ~ I I N I I I I Arcas Act ser under legislation Iscor (Iron & Steel Corporat~on) 8

Aid Centres 33, 48, 52-3, 148 consumer 76 1 .I ~ ' I I I I ,Arcas policy 149 Asiatic Land Tenure Laws Amendment Committce elections to tri-camera1 parliament 6 3 4 I . I I I I I IC 0 1 66

61 rent 125, 127, 140 ~ ' I . I I I I I I I I ~ 2nd implementation 62, 64 Kangwane bantustan 80 Khayelitsha 26, 76, 91, 107, 128, 135-7 # ( rr~i~v;~l\ 12, 61-7

Baard, Frances 3 G 1 Koornhof Bills 35, 57

rr+lalice to 13, 65-7 Bantu Affairs, Department of 19, 148 Chtkane, Rev Frank 119

Rwandebele bantustan 26, 82, 98, 1 0 6 7 , 108-9. ~ u l l , . a ~ ~ ~ \ a ~ i o n strategy and 137-8

Circular 25 32 children: 119, 120, 134

cffect of removals 64, 89. 114 Kwazulu bantustan 25, 79, 80, 82, 102, 103, 104, Circular 27 78

Bantu Commissioners Courts 51-2, 148 section 10 rights 39, 55. 76, 79 I I , , I<.! ( :ommission on Legal Reform 52 106, 108, 109-10, 119

Hoexter Commission recommendations 52 Ciskei bantustan 16, 81, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, I ~ , , ~ ~ . I I I I . 11o1icy 25-6, 32-3, 40, 44, 54, 1 2 6 7 Bantustan system 15-17, 19-20, 22, 24, 32, 60, 77, 110, 112 . n ~ b c l .c,Lc\s to work 34, 68 labour:

102, 1 0 3 4 , 129 citizensh~p 19, 26, 42. 104, 108, 134 l l l i l I I I I I U X ~unt ro l 25.27, 34, 37,4&1, 50, 52, 71, allocation strategy 18, 31, 40, 43-4, 60 bantustans 148 closer settlements 21, 97-101, 103, 149 127

1 , . ILIC. I I I I~I I hcgregation 12, 60, 62 Coloured Labour Preference Policy 30, 67-70 administration I6 Coloured Labour Preference Policy 30, 67-~72, 87,

lt(811.11:c 7 6 6 , 85, 87 collrract 9, 20, 24, 25, 30, 35, 43, 49, 50, 53, 68, betterment schemes 14, 26, 93, 101-3, 148 149 . , , i l s , ~ ~ o w n s h ~ p s

103 citizenship 19, 26. 42. 104, 108, 134 removals 69-70 Section 10 rights 37 closer settlements 21, 97-101, 103, 149 Coloured population: 'rrnploymen~ and guidancc' centres 39 communitiesltownships incorporated into 25, 60, attempts to co-opt into Apartheid regime 62, 64. 8 1 . ~ ~ ~ I I ~ < l o ~ t ~ ~ i i e n t s 25, 41, 47-8 farm 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 29,48,49-50, 54, 95

79, 81-2, 104, 111, 134, 13%9 72 l < ~ , l ~ , , I l u ~ l > ~ ~ l i ~ ~ i o n : evictions/remo\~als 5, 8, 12, 13, 21, 26.93, 95-7, 'development strategy' 102-3 C E P also Coloured Labour Preference Policy I B ~ ~ I , ~ . o ~ o p t into Apartheid regime 63 100, 104, 105, 110, 138, I40 'independence' 24, 119, 120, 131 Group Area removals 62, 6 3 4 , 65 l . ~ , t s ~ ~ , \ I C . I removals 62, 64, 65 mechan~sat~on and 15, 2 1 . 34. 93. 95 industrial investment 81 resistance to 65-7 8 5 I . I . I I I C C 10 13, 65-7 indentured 4, 5

S E E also border industries urbanisation strategy and 137-8 I ~ ~ > . I I I I \ ; I I I O I ~ \trategy and 137-8 industrial 6 7 , 8, 9-10, 11, 14, 111, 3 3 , 46, 53 decentralisation policy and 103, 128-34 legislation affecting 62 1. 1 . 1 I . ~ I I ~ ~ I I . ~ l lec~ing 62 jobs, dependenr on h o ~ ~ s i n g 34, 15, 37, 43, 68 as alabour pool 20,21,22, 24, 35,43, 55, 60, 103, Community Councils 72-3, 127, 149 I , III I . I I I < , I I ~ x ) l ~ c y 63 local labour prclcrencc policy 51

129 commuters 50, 54, 76, 78, 8&1, 98, 149 , , I , , . ~ , , migrant 6 5 . 6, 9, 1 1 . 14, 22, 24. 25, 30, 43, 49 land consolidation 1 6 1 7 , 26, 1 0 6 7 , 119, 139 Congress Alliance 15, 63, 66 ~ r ~ . l I L U ,It-I Area development programme 20 supply and dcnidud 7, 1 1 . 14, 21. 23, 29. 36, 40, leaders: and removals 107-~9, 139 Congress of the People (1955) 63 r f f 1 1 ~ * I G ) I I I I X I I.ahour I'reference Policy 7 G 1 43, 46, 7 0 I liv~ng conditions 33, 84, 97-100, 1 1 3 4 Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSA'I'I I I I I 1 . III<I I I C C . I I I ~ C IS, 23, 34 - I I I I ~ I X cc1111roI :111d 11, 12, 14, 19-21> 30, 31, movement to and from 20, 55, 60, 78 47, 58 1 , . rn 1 ~ 1 1 . 1 I 1 ~ ; 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 sIr;ltegy and 129 4 3 squatter settlements 46, 89, 100 contract labour 9, 20, 24, 25, 30, 35, 43,19, 50, 5 i . l . 8 1 ~ I I ~ I I I I V < - I I I I I C I I I IS. 23 I C ~ I S ~ : I I ~ O I I : I I ~ 9 , 43 towns: commuters 50, 54, 76, 78, 8&1, 98, 149 68, 103 1 I , , ~ \ I I ) ' h . $1 10, 11, 15, 17-18 Kickcrt proposals and 24. 39

conditions 70, 80, 81-2 Section 10 rights 37 I I 1 ' S ' I I , 4 8 3 3 46, 7 /.oning 39, 50, 54, 68, 130 establ~shment of 22, 60, 77-83 Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) 47. 5 X , U , I I ~ , \ c C ~ ~ L I ~ ~ I I II.~,, 1 . 1 ~ 5 27, 59. I49 ~ 6 , ols~r w:lges growth of 46, 80 Crossmads 26, 87,88,90,91-2, 123, 128. 1 3 6 7 . 1.10 \ , I I ~ ~ ~ O D C , I I , I I I ~ > ~ I I%o.~rd I9 1.ahorlr I{t~rcaux 20, 149

174 Index Index 175

labour bureau system 29, 31-2,39,41,44,48,49, 50 Physical Planningand Util~satlon of Resources Act labour tenants 5, 8, 13, 21, 93, 94-6, 149 (1967) 33, 40, 69, 130, 153 land: Population Registration Act (1950) 62, 152

apportionment 5, 6, 8 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (1951) 152 'development strategy' 103 Amendment 41, 152 dispossession 4, 13, 14, 17, 64, 93 Proclamation 2089 (1979) 154

see also black soots Proclamation on Black Labour Renulations (1968) freehold rights 6,'9, 13, 16, 26, 73

Lebowa bantustan 79, 80, 104, 107, 115 41

Prohihition on Mixed Marriages Act (1949) 62, legislation:

Abolition of Influx Control Act (1986) 41, 53, 154 Act I8 119361 29 Act 42 (1964) i 8 Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation

Act (1972) 19, 39, 8&9, 154 Aliens Control Act (1963) 153

152 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959)

15-16, 153 Restoration of South African Citizenship Act

(1986) 42, 104, I55 Separate Representation of Voters Act 67-8 Slums Clearance Act (1934) 151

Aliens

Bantu

Bantu Bantu Bantu

Bantu Bantu

Bantu

Bantu Bantu

and Immigration Laws Amendment Act (1984) 38, 42, 50, 56, 154 (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act (1952) 152 Affairs Administration Act (1971) 19, 154 Authorities Act (1951) 16, 152 Homelands Citizenship Act (1970) (laler National States Citizenship Act) 19, 1 5 S 4 Labour Act (1964) 68, 153 Labour Reeulations (Bantu Areas) Act

(1965) 20, fi, 68; (1968) 78, 153 Laws Amendment Act (1964) 18, 21, 31, 153: 11973) 17. 154 ~es>ttlement Act (1954) 13, 153 (Urban Areas) Amendment Act (1955) 13,

Amendment 41 Urban Areas Act (1923) 28; (19.15) 1&19, 41, 51,

62 ~ m e n d m e n t (1952) 12; (1978) 39

Urbanisation Bill 36 local authorities set7 Community Councils

Makodi, Mr 1 1 4 1 5 Makodi, Ignatius 76 manufacturing industry see industry mining industry 4, 14

labour 4 5 , 7, &9, 10, 14 strikes 10

migrant labour 4 5 , 6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 22, 24, 25, 30, 43. 49

153 -. S m t committee and 29

Black Commun~t~es Development Act (19841 35, Section 10 25 . - . 134

Black Local Authorities Act (1982) 35, 154 Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (1945):

Amendments (1985) 40 Bophuthatswana Citizenship Act (1978) 108, 154 Borders of Particular States Extension Amend-

ment Act (1986) 104, 108, 139, 154 Customs Tariff and Excise Duty Amendment Act

(1925) 8 Group Areas Act i1950) 12, 61-2, 63, 152

Amendment (1984) 62 in general 62 objectives 63, 66

Immigration Act: Amendments 8-9 Immigration Regulation Amendment Act (1953)

152 &..- Laws on Co-operation and Development Act

(1979) 154; (1983) 37 ~ m e n t m e n t (1985) 57'

Laws on Co-oneration and Develonment Bill (1980) 3;

Laws on Development Aid Amendment Bill 11986) 138

Native '~dministration Act (later Black Affairs Administration Act) 151

Native Land Act (19131 5, 8, 10, 94, 151 Native Laws Amendment Act (1937) 9, 73, 152 Native Service Contract Act (1932) 29, 151 Native Trust and Land Act (1936) (later Develop-

ment Trust and Land Act) 8, 10, 11, 13,

see also contract labour; influx control Mkhize, Saul 112, 1 1 6 1 8 More, John 118 Moroamoche, Ch~ef 101 Motaung, Marcus 55-6

Natal Conference against Relocations 140 Natal Indian Congress 10 National Committee Against Removals (NCAR) 120 National Party 1 6 1 1 , 14, 15, 18, 2 3 4 , 29, 37 National Security Strategy 24 Native Affairs Department 6 Native Representative Council 5 Ngema family 113, 118 Ngema, Moses 119 Ngxobongwana, Johnson 91, 128, 136 non-prescribed areas see Prescribed Areas

parliamentary representation: African 16 Coloured 67-8 franchise system 5-6 segregated tri-camera1 parliament 63, 64

pass lawslsystem see influx controllpass laws passes (reference books) 12, 15, 17, 29, 47, 149

see also iderrtity documents population reglster 41 Prescribed Areas 29-30, 149

151 Amendment (1954) 13 Qwaqwa bantustan 76, 78, 80, 81, 88, 107 Amendment (1956) 94

Native (Urban Areas) Act (1923) 7 , 12, 73, 151 reference books see passes Native (Urban Areas) Consol~dat~on Act (1945) Regional Service Councils 51

(later Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Released land 150, 151 Act) 152 see also black spots

Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Per- repression 11, 15. 17, 5 6 7 , 66, 74, 89-90, 101, 109, sons Bill (1982) 35-6, 154 11611, 117-18, 134, 137, 140

'reserves' ( lam bantustans) 4, 5, 29 'betterment' schemes 14, 26, 101 rranchise system 5 land allocation 5, 6, 8 migration to urban areas 6

Residents Associations: Brits Action Committee 84, 140 Cradock Residents Association (Cradora) 76 Daggaskraal Landowners Executive 115 Ekangala Action Committee 82, 134, 140 Huhudi Clvic Association 83 Mgwali Residents Association 112 Nyanga Bush Committee 89, 137

resistance: boycotts 10, 6 3 4 , 76, 125, 127, 140 to decentralisation strategy 134

in general 1 6 1 1 , 15, 17, 34, 1 4 6 1 to influx controllpass laws 44, 5 6 9 to removals 13,65-7, 72,82-3,961,9311, 1 0 6 1 ,

101-2, 103, 106, 107, 112, 11421, 128, 1 3 6 7 , 140

Soweto uprising (19767) 22-3, 74 strikeslstay-at-homes 10, 22. 34. 58. 68

in townships 76 ways of neutralising: attacks on squatters 128

bantustan system 17, 24, 60, 85, 102 housing policy 44, 124 labour strategy 18, 31, 60 residential segregation 14, 44, 60,62, 74, 125

Bafurutse 17 Pondoland 17, 101-2, 103 Sekhukhuneland 101 st7e also squatters; Uni~ed Democratic Front

Riekert Commission (1979) 24, 25, 28, 34. 52, 75 recummendations 24, 3 4 5 , 3&40, 46, 50, 54

Riekert strategy 25-6, 3 4 4 3 passim, 56 rejected 57, 58 removals 25

SANT see South African Native Trust Scheduled land 5, 150

see also black spots Section 10 see under urban Africans share-cropper 5, 10 Sharpeville massacre (1 960) 15 Smit committee (1942) 29 South African Coloured People's Congress 15 South African Congress of Democrats 15 South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU)

I F FP --, 2" South African Indian Congress 15 South African Native Trust (SANT) (later South

African Bantu Trust (SABT); South African Development Trust (SADT) 8, 17, 105, 150

Soweto 74 Soweto uprising (19767) 22-3, 74 squatter settlements 25, 28, 46, 70, 72, 85, 87-92,

~ n n ."" arrestsievictlonsiremovals 26, 41, 70, 88, 89-90,

137, 140 condltlons 89, 90 demulition 26, 70, 84, 8&9, 91-2, 123, 127 pass raids 37 policy revision 127-8, 135-7

squatters 150 de-politicisation strategy 128 see also under agriculture

Stallard Commission (1922) 6 Stallard 'doctrine' 7, 8, 10, 28 State of Emergency (1960) 15, 57 street committees 73, 76, 127 strikesistay-at-homes 10, 22, 34, 58, 68

'technocrats' policy formulations 123, 124, 126, 128, I I I -22

Tembani, Isaac 115 Theron Committee recommendations 62 townships 6 , 12, 19, 72-6

disestablishment of 70, 77, 79, 84 evictions from 32-3, 41, 87 housing: building controls 78, 85

control of access to 41. 75. 78 rent increases 1 2 6 sale of 125-6 shortaee 75. 85 tenure-6, 32

incorporated into bantustans 25,60,79, 81-2. 134 local councils 72-3 new: conditions 63, 64 removals totfrom 12, 60, 70, 7&9, 84

suspension of 8 3 4 , 122 resistance in 7 6 7 street committees 73, 76, 127

see also Residents Associations trade unions 10, 47, 58 Transkei bantustan 16, 24, 103, 104, 105. 107 Transvaal Indian Congress 10 Tribal Labour Bureaux see Labour Bureaux Trust Land 150

unemploymentluncmployed people 23, 34, 39, 46, 70 endorsed out 18 removal of 44, 60

United Democratic Front (UDF) 57-8, 66, 119, 136 urban Africans (outsidc bantustans) 7

'aliens' 38, 50, 52, 80 'authorised'i'unauthorised' 36 de-politicisation strategy 123 endorsed out 18, 33, 39, 42, 55, 149 Fagan Commission recommendations re 10, 29 Groskopf Commi~tce recommendations and 35 housing policy 25-6, 32-3, 40, 44, 1 2 4 7 'illegals' 28, 44. 48-~9, 50, 56, 72, 75 land and property tenure 6, 9, 12-13, 35, 73, 74, . q r

1 LJ

numbers: increase in 6, 8, 20, 44, 46, 60, 87, 124 decline of 55, 80 se'e also influx control; pass laws; Urban Areas

Act policy revision 124-6 proportion 01 mcn to women 6 removals 12, 25, 27, 39, 6 6 1 , 70, 73, 77, 8 6 5

see also tindm (;ruup Areas policy Rickcrt (:ommislon recommenda~iot~\ and 34-5,

3 6 7

see* also Group Arcas poli~y; bquattcr sc~rlcrnenrs; townships

Urban Areas Act see utldrr lcg~sl:rrion urbanisa~iorr \Iralcgy 25, 4(L-3, 44, 50, 60, 1 2 6 7 ,

137-8

Van dcr Wall (;ornmiss~otr 111.4 Van 1:ck (:ornmission ( 1941 ) 9 Vcrrda halr~ustarr 16, 104 vigilantes, state 82. 91. 137

wages 7, 10, 14, 43, 46, 70, XG1, 126 see also slrikcs

Wichahn (;ommissiotr 24

176 Index

women: In bantustans, living conditions 32 Influx controllpass laws and 9, 12, 14, 20

arrests 37 campaign against 17, 56 effect of 30, 38 removals 69-70, 72

migrant workers 20, 49 resistance 90, 91, 101, 140 Secrion 10 rights 18, 31-2 in urban areas 6, 18, 20, 29, 31-2, 37

endorsed out 18, 30, 32, 33, 42 property tenure 32. 75

INDEX OF PLACES AFFECTED BY FORCED REMOVAL

Places in the index are categorised according to the following key:

B Black Spot (includes Badly Situated Area) BD Bantustan District C Closer Settlement D Deconcentration Point G Group Area S Squatter Township T Official Township W 'White' farming area

Alexandra T 6. 73. 87 Fineo Villaee 7' 6. 73. 82. 11 1. 113. 115

Mahopane T 78, 80 Mdchahestad B 114 Madadeni T 100 hidirklng 1' 113 Makana Kop 7' 82 Mamelodi 7' 54, 84 Margare 7' 79 Martindale 7' 13. 73 Mathopestad B I 11 MayCair (; 65, 138 Mdantsane 7' 49, 78, 79 Meadowlands T 128 Mewall B 112. 115 ~ g x e s h a C 9 7 Modderdam S 87, 88 MogopaB 3 ,94 , 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 118, 119,

1 XR . A -

Mooiplaas B 107 Moutse BD 104, 107, 109. 119. 134 Mpungamhlope (: 97 Munsieville T 87

Nahoomspruir 7. 79 Ndwedwe T 53 Nelspruit T 38 Newclare T 13, 73 Nondweni C 98. 108 Noupoort 7' 79 Nyanga S 70, 72, 87, 88-9, 91, 127, 137 Nvlatroom 7' 79

Onverwacht TIS 88 Oudrshoorn T 79 Oukasie 7' 83. 123

Pageview ti 13, 65, 73 Pietersburg T 79 Potgietersrus 7' 79 Pudimong CIS 76, 83

Roolgrond C 114 Rosslyn D 20. 54, I29 Rustenhurg 1' 79

Sada C: 1, 70, 99 Sandkraal 7' 84 Sehokeng T 74, 89 Sephaku 6'0 102 Sharpev~lle 1' 15, 57, 68, 74 Sibonglle T 83 Sophiarown 1' 6, 13, 73 Soshanguve 7' 79 St Wendolins B 66, 82 Steinkoolspruit B 11 1 Stutterheim 1' 72

Thaba Nchu S 88, 107, 108 Thornhill (; 105, 107 Tsitaikama R 111, 113

Vaalwatcr 7' 79 Verulam 1' 53 Vrvhurg 7' 76

Weer~cn W' 9X, 100 Werkgcnot S 87 Winterveld S 40, 79, 87, 90, 100, 107, I O X . 1011

Zeeru5r 1' 56 Zwelitsha 7' 77