for land & justice

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HE HACIENDA LUISIA NAIONAL FACFINDING MISSION (NFFM)spearheaded by the Unyon ng Manggagawa saAgrikultura (UMA, Federation of Agricultural Workers), its loca l affiliate Alyansa n g mga Manggagawang-Bukid sa Asyenda Luisita (AMBALA, Hacienda Luisita Farmworkers Alliance) an d the Of-fice of Anakpawis Party-list Representative Fernando Hicap, was launched to verifyreports of fraud, militarization and new cases of landgrabbing before, during andafter the Department of Agrarian Reform’s (DAR) land distribution activiti es inHacienda Luisita, a vast sugar estate in arlac province controlled by the family ofPresident Benigno Simeon “Noynoy” Cojuangco Aquino III.

Te NFFM, held fromSeptember 16-17, 2013 wasparticipated in by over 50individuals from Manila andCentral Luzon representingSentro para sa unay na Re-pormang Agraryo (SENRA,Legal Center for Genuine

Agrarian Reform), KilusangMagbubukid ng Pilipinas(KMP, Peasant Movementof the Philippines), Amihan(National Peasant Women’sOrganization), Pamalakaya(National Fisherfolk Organi-zation), National Network of

Agrarian Reform Advocates- Youth (NNARA-Youth),the national chapter of thehuman rights group KARA-PAAN; anggol Magsasaka(Farmers Support Group),Promotion of Church Peo-ple’s Response (PCPR), Aly-ansa ng mga Magbubukidsa Gitnang Luzon (AMGL,Central Luzon Peasant Al-liance), Bagong AlyansangMakabayan-Gitnang Luzon(BAYAN-GL, New Patri-otic Alliance-Central Lu-zon) and alternative media

groups Bulatlat.com andPinoy Weekly. he NFFM

was precede d by a 3-day i m-mersion program by studentorganizations of the De LaSalle University College ofSt. Benilde from September13-15. All activities wereheld within the villages ofCutcut (Sta. Catalina), Ma-palacsiao and Balete in ar-lac City.

Te mission was cappedby the violent and unlawfularrest of 11 of its delegates:

Anakpawis Rep. FernandoHicap and his Congressand National Headquartersstaff members Karl Mae San

Juan, Rene Blasan, Kerima Acosta and Danilo Ramos, Anakpawis spokesperson andformer secretary-general ofKMP; anggol Magsasakavolunteer Sister Patricia Fox,cultural worker Ericson Acos-ta, KARAPAAN volunteerRonald Matthew Gustilo,and Luisita residents Ange-lina Nunag, Luz Versola oflocal youth group SAKDAL,and Florida “Pong” Sibayan,

acting chairperson of AM-BALA. Te arrest was un-dertaken by elements of thearlac City police on ordersof the Cojuangco-Aquinofirm arlac DevelopmentCorporation (ADECO).

Several individual inter-views and surveys were alsoconducted to complementthis report. Tese were ac-complished in five villages– Balete, Cutcut, Mapalac-siao, Bantog and Asturiasall in arlac City – throughthe efforts and support ofthe Hacienda Luisita Peas-ant Support Network,Rural Missionaries of TePhilippines (RMP), Stu-dent Alliance for the Ad-vancement of DemocraticRights in the University ofthe Philippines, Diliman(SAND-UP) and thePhilippine Collegian.

UMA releases this com-prehensive report on Haci-enda Luisita as contributionto the people’s struggle forsocial justice and genuineagrarian reform.

For Land & Justice:Te Continuing Agrarian Struggle

in Hacienda Luisita

REPOR OF HE 2013 HACIENDA LUISIA FAC-FINDING MISSION

UNYON NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA AGRIKULURA

Abbreviations

AMBALA Hacienda Luisita Farmworkers AllianceAFP Armed Forces of the PhilippinesAMGL Central Luzon Peasant Alliance

AMT Tarlac Peasant AllianceAPC armored personnel carrier

APECO Aurora Pacic Economic Zone and FreeportFU Application to Purchase and Farmers’ Undertaking

AFP Armed Forces of the PhilippinesBCDA Bases Conversion Development Authority

BIN Barangay Intelligence NetworkBrgy barangay, village

BSP Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Central BankCAFGU Civilian Auxiliary Forces Geographical Unit

CARP/ER Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program/ Extension with Reforms

CAT Central Azucarera de TarlacCATLU Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union

CBA Collective Bargaining AgreementCHI Centennary Holdings, Inc.

CLOA Certicate of Land Ownership AwardCPP Communist Party of the Philippines

CSI Crime Scene InvestigationDAR Department of Agrarian Reform

DOL E Department of Labor and EmploymentEO

Executie Order FWB farmworer-beneciaryGARB Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill

GSIS Government Systems Insurance ServiceGSW gunshot wound

HLI Hacienda Luisita, IncorporatedIB /IBPA Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army

ID Infantry DivisionIFI Filipino Independent Church

LBP Land Bank of the PhilippinesLEM Luisita Estate Management

LIP Luisita Industrial ParkLIPCO Luisita Industrial Park Corporation

LRC Luisita Realty CorporationKMP Peasant Moement of the Philippines

MOA Memorandum of AgreementMRTC Manila Regional Trial Court

MTC Municipal Trial CourtNDFP National Democratic Front of the Philippines

NFFM National Fact-Finding MissionNOL COM Northern Luzon Command of the AFP

NPA New People’s ArmyPARC Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

PARO Proincial Agrarian Reform OfcePhp Philippine Peso

PNP Philippine National PolicePP Presidential Proclamation

Pres. President

Rep. Representative

RCBC Rizal Commercial Banking CorporationRTC Regional Trial Court

Sec. Secretary

SAKDAL Luisita Democratic Youth AssociationSC Supreme CourtSCTEX Subic-Clar-Tarlac Expressway

SDO Stoc Distribution OptionSENTRA Center for Genuine Agrarian Reform,

legal counsel of AMBALA

SWAT – Special Weapons and TacticsTADECO Tarlac Development Corporation

TPLEX Tarlac-Parangasinan-La Union ExpresswayTRO temporary restraining order

ULWU United Luisita Workers UnionUMA Unyon ng mga Manggagawa sa Agriultura

(Federation of Agricultural Workers)

UN United Nations

* d a r k g r e y a r e as a r e a g r i cu lt u r a l L A N D


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for LAND & JUSICI 2013 HACIENDA LUISIA NAIONAL FACFINDING REPOR

oday, portions of Hacienda Luisita have

en converted to commercial, residentiald industrial use. Aside from the 11 lo-village propers, other residential ar-

s include a subdivision phase called theomesite” near Barangay Cutcut; the Lasaciendas Subdivision, which used to beacetrack that housed Jose “Peping” Co-angco Jr.’s hundreds of horses; and theulent 50-hectare Alto village residencesthe Cojuangco-Aquinos. Te so-called

entral echno Park area of the Luisita In-strial Park, Co. (LIPCO) houses a hoteld a few factories and is near the Aquinoenter museum building. Te Plaza Luisita

commercial area adjacent to McArthu r

Highway is now operated by the mall-con-glomerate Robinsons Land Corporation ofthe Gokongwei family.

Tese converted or non-agricultural areashowever comprise only about 8% of the es-tate, a very small section compared to vastareas planted to sugarcane, and to the bur-geoning ricefields and foodcrop plantationsof organized farmers under the Bungkalan(tillage) initiative of AMBALA.

Hacienda Luisita is one of the most con-troversial landholdings in the history ofPhilippine agrarian reform. It is the eco-nomic base of the immense political power

T C-A

H L

Hacienda Luisita was originally owned bya Spanish hacendero, Don Antonio Lopezy Lopez who named the estate after his wife, Luisa Bru y Lassus. Te estate wasonce partly a tobacco plantation owing tothe nature of Don Antonio’s company, theCompania General de abacos de Filipinasor ABACALERA which also controlledvast landholdings in Cagayan and Isabelaprovinces.

Te earliest labor union in Hacienda Lu-isita was the Hacienda Luisita Labor Union(HLLU) whose first president was Come-des Romero. Eventually, Comedes sided with management and went against ordi-nary farmworkers.

Even before the Cojuangco-Aquino take-over, the United Luisita Workers Union

(ULWU) was founded in 1956. By thenthe ULWU won over the HLLU as officialunion. Te management refused to recog-nize the ULWU, prompting the new unionto wage a 4-day strike where the ULWUemerged victorious. Eventually, Luisitamanagement employed various devices tosubvert the militant nature of this union.Te Central Azucarera de arlac Labor Un-ion (CALU) is another prominent laborunion established in Hacienda Luisita. When the lease contract of the Span-

iards neared its expiration, farmworkersstarted asking government to acquire Lu-isita through public funds so that the estatecould be distributed to them.

In 1957, Jose Cojuangco Sr. took controlof the Central Azucarera de arlac (CA)and the 6,453-hectare Hacienda Luisitathrough loans from the New York-basedManufacturer’s rust Co. endorsed by theBangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) or Cen-tral Bank, and the Government SystemsInsurance Service (GSIS).

Te BSP approved Cojuangco’s loanthrough its Monetary Board ResolutionNo. 1240 dated August 27, 1957 on twoconditions, one of which states that:

“Tere will be a simultaneous purchase ofHacienda Luisita with the purchase of theshares (of the CA –Ed.) with the view todistributing this hacienda to small farmersin line with the Administration’s social jus-tice program.”

GSIS likewise approved a 5.9 million-peso loan through Resolution No. 3202on November 27, 1957, on conditionsthat Cojuangco himself suggested to GSIS.Quoting from Jose Cojuangco, Sr’s letter toGSIS:

“It will pave the way for the sale tobona fide planters on a long term basis portions of the hacienda. Tis woul d provide an opportunity for deserving planters to own choice agriculturallands.”

“It will pave the way for the Fili- pino groups to subdivide the presentbarrio sites into small lots to be soldon long-term basis to bona-fide bar-rio residents. Te purchase thereforewould provide an opportunity to forthe long-time residents within the ha-cienda to acquire their homesites.”

Since then, sugar production in HaciendaLuisita has always been a Cojuangco-Aqui-no enterprise. Te Cojuangcos acquired theestate through the prodding of PresidentRamon Magsaysay, with whom BenignoSimeon “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. worked for as

personal assistant. Hacienda Luisita wouldbe distributed to farmers after ten years un-der Magsaysay’s social justice program.

Magsaysay was principal sponsor in Ni-noy Aquino’s wedding to Jose Sr.’s daughterCorazon or “Cory.” When Hacienda Lu-isita and the CA went under the controlof Jose Cojuangco Sr.’s arlac DevelopmentCorporation (ADECO) in May 11, 1958,Ninoy Aquino became Luisita’s first admin-istrator. After his death in a plane crash, Magsay-

say was succeeded by President Carlos P.Garcia. Elderly Luisita residents claim thatthousands of farmworkers started to peti-tion for land distribution during PresidentGarcia’s administration.

Ninoy Aquino facilitated the surrenderin 1954 of rebel leader Luis aruc whosearmed group Huk or Hukbong Mapagpa-laya ng Bayan (HMB, People’s Liberation Army) had at that time resorted to banditryand opportunism under his flawed leader-ship. Elderly farmworkers still recall howNinoy, as farm administrator, coddled andutilized bandit elements as his private armyto quell dissent within Luisita. After ser ving two years as union leader,

former ULWU president Domingo Viadan was killed in 1960. Viadan led co-workersin petitioning government for land distri-bution to Luisita’s small farmers.

R C S:

M A

Under the conditions of Cojuangco’sloans from BSP and the GSIS, HaciendaLuisita would have been distributed tofarmers in 1967.

ACIENDA LUISIA is a 6,453-hectare sugar estate covering 11 villages in three towns of arlac province. Most of the originalrmworkers reside in 10 villages – Barangays Balete, Cutcut (or Sta. Catalina), Lourdes (formerly exas), Mapalacsiao (formerlyuisita), Asturias, and Bantog in arlac City; Barangay Motrico in La Paz town; and Barangays Parang (formerly San Sebastian),abilog (formerly Pasajes) and Pando in Concepcion town. Te original estate includes the Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT)gar mill and a golf course. Te eleventh village is Barangay Central in arlac City which houses the CA sugar mill, the St.artin de Porres Hospital and the Our Lady of Lourdes Church.

Hacienda Luisita : A Brief HISORICAL LANDSCAPE

enjoyed today by the Cojuangco-Aquino

clan. Tis landlord family – whose mainfigures are ironically touted icons of democ-racy in popular history books – has un-leashed every possible devious scheme andmachination to supress worker and peas-ant unrest in Hacienda Luisita. Tey haveused political influence, underhanded legalmaneuvers, bureaucratic corruption, fascistviolence and murder to maintain control ofthis sugar estate.

Te saga of the toiling masses in HaciendaLuisita and their brave resistance against thisvicious landlord clan is an intricate study inclass relations and contradictions.

In 1967, Conrado Estrella of ththority inquired in writing with if they had complied with theGSIS conditions of land distribCojuangco, Sr. replied that whenover Luisita, there were no tenanthey only had to hire farmworke

During this time, President Marcos was early into his first tNinoy Aquino, who later emergcos’ most bitter critic and poli won a seat as the youngest SenRepublic.

But it was also a time of rejfor the progressive mass movemthe emergence of several peoplzations and formations champidemocratic rights of workers, peoppressed sectors of society. InLuisita, farmworkers also organselves to assert their rights.

In arlac, the peasant war wa when the discredited HMB was rthe New People’s Army (NPA). was founded March 1969 in Capadjacent to Hacienda Luisita.

Te Cojuangco-Aquino clan to repress farmworkers with the infiltration of pro-managementin the ULWU. Even before Mpeasant leader Cecilio Sumat wpeared. Sumat led workers in ato push an agreement between and the government for the hacidistributed to tillers 10 years aft juangcos acquired the estate in 1

But when Marcos declared Min 1972, Ninoy Aquino was amoto be arrested.

Treatened by renewed peasnationwide, Marcos explicitly reform as one of his justificatiotatorial rule. Marcos signed his flreform law, Presidential Decree N27) exactly a month after on O1972. PD 27 decreed the distrvast rice and corn landholdingsand farmers.

In 1977, the Marcos governman investigation on land distrHacienda Luisita. Te Cojuangccried harassment. Jose, Sr.’s widotria, who was at that time ADEpresident, insisted that it was impdistribute Luisita to so many be– farmworkers who are technical“tenants.” Besides, the sugar estacovered by Marcos’ PD 27 whionly rice and corn landholdings22, 1978 letter to Ministry of Agform (MAR) Deputy Minister E


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Valdez, Demetria Cojuangco said:

“(it is) extremely unwarranted tomake us account for the fulfillment ofa condition that cannot be enforced…there are no tenants in Hacienda Lu-isita; ..the Central Bank resolutiondoes not indicate “small farmers;”..the hacienda is outside the scope ofany land reform program of the gov-ernment; there is no agrarian unrestin Hacienda Luisita.”

On May 7, 1980, the Marcos govern-ent filed Civil Case No. 13164 againstADECO before the Manila Regionalial Court (MRC). Te case compels

ADECO and the heirs of the late Jose Co-angco, Sr. to turn over Hacienda Luisitathe MAR for subdivision and sale at costsmall farmers or tenants.

Te bitter rivalry between Marcos andquino led to the assassination of Ninoyquino on August 21, 1983 at the Manilaternational Airport, as Aquino returnedm a three-year exile in the United States.

Te Cojuangcos lost in the case filed bye Marcos government when the MRCndered its decision on December 2,85. According to the seven-page decisionJudge Bernardo P. Pardo of the MRC:

“defendants (ADECO and theCojuangcos) shall execute the neces-sary documents to convey the entirehacienda to the Ministry of Agrar-

ian Reform, which shall take posses-sion of the hacienda to be subdividedinto small lots and conveyed at cost toqualified citizens ‘small farmers’ …upon payment to defendants of justcompensation fixed at 3,988,000.00 pesos, Philippine currency, with inter-est at legal rate from the finality of thedecision, and costs.”

A day after this court decision, Cory Aquino fielded her candidacy to the 1986Snap Elections on a land reform platform.Te snap elections in February 1987 wasbeset with widespread fraud instigated bythe Marcos camp.

But only a few months after the MRCdecision on Hacienda Luisita, Cory Aquino was swept into power t hrough the historicEDSA People Power Uprising also in Feb-

ruary.Te AMBALA petition in 2003 sharplyanalyzes Hacienda Luisita’s place in the rul-ing class squabble between two of the mostpowerful families in Philippine history:

It is true that Marcos, political en-emy of the Cojuangco-Aquino clan,utilized the issue of the hacienda’sownership to pressure them. But noamount of political squabble betweenthese two ruling class factions can everdiscount the historic and legitimaterights of farmworkers to the lands ofthe hacienda.

ized themselves into a local alliance calledthe Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang-Bukidsa Hacienda Luisita or AMBALUS, the pre-decessor of the present day AMBALA.

However, it was Cory’s land reform law,Republic Act No. 6657 or the CARP, which would prove to dash the hopes of peasantsfor genuine land reform, not just in Haci-enda Luisita but throughout the rest of thePhilippine countryside where feudal andsemi-feudal exploitation persists. Underthe CARP, the Aquino administration con-cocted the Stock Distribution Option orSDO, a shady pro-landlord scheme whichallowed landowners to distribute to farmersshares of stock in a corporation instead ofland. Essentially, the SDO provided land-lords the legal excuse to evade equitableland distribution.

CONFUSING CORPORATIVE SCHEME

On August 23, 1988, the Hacienda Lu-isita, Incorporated (HLI) was establishedas a spin-off corporation of ADECO toimplement the SDO scheme. Te estab-lishment of the HLI ahead of a scheduledreferendum to supposedly “consult” farmworkers of their preferred mode of landreform, speaks of the Cojuangco-Aquinoclan’s certainty that the SDO scheme willnot face opposition from the farmworkers.HLI’s incorporators were Pedro Cojuang-co, Josephine C. Reyes, eresita C. Lopa, Jose Cojuangco, Jr., and Paz C. eopaco.

Farmworkers now recall these “consulta-tions” as a reign of terror within the hacien-

da. Te choice was between stocks or land– Cojuangco-Aquino supervisors mocking-ly referred to this as “prinsipyo o kaldero:”if one picks the principled choice of theirright to land, the ADECO managementthreatened to automatically dismiss theperson from work and evict them fromtheir residence. As stockholders and part-owners of the hacienda, ADECO prom-ised farmworkers that they would never gohungry again under the SDO.

Toughout the 1980’s, the Cojuangco- Aquino clan maintained the “Yellow Army,”a private army composed of 300 Israeli andBritish-trained paramilitary forces. At onepoint, 90 percent of ADECO’s 106 su-pervisors were armed and doubled as rabidminions of the Cojuangco-Aquinos. Te“Yellow Army” and the armed ADECOsupervisors were widely utilized to “con-vince” farmworkers to choose the SDO

scheme.On May 9, 1989, the Cojuangco-Aqui-no clan along with DAR Secretary Philip Juico, the arlac governor and mayors ofarlac City, Concepcion, and La Paz, helda referendum among Luisita farmworkersto present the SDO. After the referendum,the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)on the SDO was signed.

In the MOA of May 11, 1989, HLI wasdesignated as the second party to whichADECO transferred control of agricul-tural portions of Hacienda Luisita andother farm-related property in exchange forshares of stock of farmworkers.

C C P

After the People Power Uprising toppledthe fascist Marcos dictatorship, Ninoy andCory were hyped as “democracy icons.”However, “Cory Magic” quickly dissipatedfor the Philippine peasantry after 13 pro-testing farmers were killed by state forces inthe infamous Mendiola Massacre in Janu-ary 23, 1987.

Like Marcos, Cory declared agrarian re-form as the centerpiece program of herrule. Cory issued Presidential Proclamation131 and Executive Order No. 229 in July1987. Tese issuances were the basis forthe Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Pro-gram (CARP), now infamous as the long-est-running, most expensive bogus landreform program in Philippine history.

Cory Aquino’s rise to power was instru-mental in the Cojuangco-Aquino clan’s

maneuvers to maintain control of Haci-enda Luisita. On March 17, 1988, theCojuangcos elevated their lost Luisita caseto the Court of Appeals docketed as CAG.R. 08634. o support the Cojuangcos,the Solicitor General, the BSP governorand the Department of Agrarian Reform(DAR) filed a motion to dismiss the civilcase against the Cojuangcos, arguing thatHacienda Luisita would be covered by the Aquino administration’s agrarian reformprogram anyway.

On May 18, 1988, the Court dismissedthe case against the Cojuangcos. Aroundthis time, farmworkers have already organ-

Agricultural land covered by consisted of 4,915.75 hectares original 6,453 hectares of HacienTe said agricultural land had anvalue of P196.63 million in 19proximately Php 40, 000 per hecording to an article by SolicitoFrank Chavez published by the Mletin in 1989, other tracts of L were classified as roads and creehas.), farmworkers’ homelots (12and an agro-forest (158.85 hadential area of 652.43 has. was rADECO, but was also announdistributed to farmworkers if thlots were inadequate. However, 3tares of land acquired by ADEthe ABACALERA are unaccouhis report.

Based on the MOA, farmwoposedly owned 33.3% of the

ing capital stock of HLI, which355, 531,462.00 (Php 355.53 m355,531,462 shares at Php 1.00before May 10, 1989. In the stbution plan, 33.3% of capital sto118,391,976.85 (Php 118.4 m118,391,976.85 shares will be dto farmworker-beneficiaries (FW30 years. Tis meant that the Pmillion worth of shares of stocksdistributed to the FWBs over athirty years at 1/30 of the Php 1per year.

800s 1900s

1 8 9 8 - 1 9 4 0s

882on Antonio Lopez of Spain, founder of the Com-

ñía General de Tabacos de Filipinas or TABACALERA

quires a vast estate in Tarlac province. He names it “Ha-

nda Luisita” after his wife, Luisa.

1907-1909Melecio Cojuangco, ex-president

of Paniqui, Tarlac and only son of

patriarch Jose I Cojuangco orKo Guiok Huang of Fukien China,

sits as Representative of the 1st District

of Tarlac in the Philippine Legislature.

During the American colonial period, Hacienda Luisita supplies almost 20% of sugar in the US.

1916-1928Benigno Q. Aquino, Sr.

of Concepcion town, owner of Haciendas

Lawang, Murcia & Tinang,

sits as Representative of the 2nd district of Tarlac.

1928Melecio Cojuangco’s

four sons establish the

Paniqui Sugar Mills

with Ysidra Cojuangco,

Melecio’s sister. The

Cojuangco clan becomes

the biggest landowner in

Central Luzon.

1928-1934Benigno Q. Aquino, Sr.

sits as Senator.

1934-1946One of Melecio’s

four sons,

Jose Cojuangco, Sr.

sits as Representative

of the 1st district

of Tarlac in the

Philippine Assembly.

Hacienda Luisita continues to operate during

the World War II Japanese imperialist invasion

of the Philippines.

1930s 1940s

1942-1945Benigno Aquino, Sr. sits as Speaker

of the House of Representatives

during the Japanese puppet government

of José P. Laurel.

Benigno Simeon “Ninoy” Aqu

wors as assistant to Pres. Ramon Ma

Ninoy negotiates the surrender of reb

Luis Taruc of the Hubong Mapagp

Bayan (People’s Liberation Army

1950s


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Aside from the enticing presentation of

illions of shares of stocks, the Cojuangco-quinos proudly announced that FWBsere also to receive 240-square meter resi-ntial lots each under the SDO. In 1991,any farmworkers received Certificate ofward documents from the HLI for theomelots, but the original titles were neverstributed to them. Until now, many claimat not all farmworkers were allocated

omelots during the SDO period.According to the MOA, qualified benefi-aries of the stock distribution plan shall

farmworkers who appear in the HLI’snual payroll. Tese included both per-anent and seasonal employees who weregularly or periodically employed by theADECO.If a farmworker was dismissed for anyuse, his name ceases to appear in the an-

ual payroll and he will then be disquali-d from receiving any shares of stock frome year he was dismissed onwards. On theher hand, a newly-employed worker, al-ough he is not a resident of the haciendad should not be a beneficiary of the SDOheme, will technically receive shares ofock on the basis of his mandays just be-use his name appears on the payroll.Te distribution of the farmworkers’ares of stock was actually based on the

umber of hours of work or mandays ine hacienda. Te mandays in turn, weresed on the system of guaranteed workys wherein HLI management allocatede number of days available for manualork to each farmworker.Farmworkers did not receive their fullnual shares because these were allocatedcording to these management-controlledandays. Even before the SDO scheme

was implemented, wide-ranging land use

conversion and mechanization of sugar-cane production were already implement-ed in the hacienda, which by 2003 limitedthe guaranteed mandays to only 80 days ayear for each farmworker, or around 1-2days of work per week. Joblessness in the hacienda was then

used by the Cojuangco-Aquino clan toaggressively push for land use conversioneven while Hacienda Luisita was techni-cally under a land reform program. Teconversion and sale of the hacienda’s ag-ricultural assets were justified by the fam-ily by saying that commercial centers andindustrial parks would generate jobs forLuisita residents.

L U C

Cory Aquino was succeeded in 1992 byGeneral Fidel Ramos, whose presidency Aquino annointed. President Ramos ag-gressively pushed for the implementationof neoliberal policies in favor of imperial-ist globalization – liberalization, privatiza-tion, denationalization, and deregulation,anticipating that the Philippines wouldreach newly-industrialized country (NIC)status by the year 2000. Land use conver-sion and development plans favoring for-eign private corporations ushered in unjustexemptions from Cory’s land reform lawCARP.

Even under a land reform scheme, part ofHacienda Luisita was mortgaged by HLIto Prudential Bank for Php 550 million inas early as 1991, without the knowledge ofits “co-owners,” the farmworkers.

In September 1995, the ProvincialBoard of arlac under Governor Marga-rita “ingting” Cojuangco, wife of Peping

in San Francisco, California claims to haveprovided land planning services for LRC inconsultation with the SWA.

Te Hacienda Luisita master plan is stillshowcased as an existing project in theNMA website up to the present. Te plancontains the comprehensive land conver-sion of the entire Hacienda Luisita prop-erty into a commercial and industrial com-plex leaving nothing for agricultural use.Te conversion plan is complemented bya superhighway project which now appearsto be former President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo’s pet project, the Subic-Clark-ar-lac Expressway (SCEX).

Te Luisita master plan envisions Haci-enda Luisita as “the next important com-mercial and industrial hub in Central Lu-zon.” In line with his neoliberal policies,

President Ramos by then had formed apresidential commission for the imple-mentation of a master development planand “growth corridor” for the whole of theregion. Hacienda Luisita is at the heart ofthis “W Growth Corridor” -- a W-shapednetwork of existing and future commercialhubs and eco-zones in Central Luzon start-ing from the Clark Ecozone to the contro-versial APECO in Aurora. AMBALA observed that the Cojuang-

co-Aquino clan used the HLI as a laun-dering conduit to hide its earnings fromfarmworkers. At a given point, more than

11,000 individuals were under the payrollof the HLI, even when farmworkers in theiremploy numbered only to around 5,300.Tis meant that the HLI was shouldering wages and benefits of numerous supervi-sors, “confidential employees” and evenmember of their private army, or individu-als in other Cojuangco corporations whichhad nothing to do with agricultural pro-duction.

Te HLI and other spin-off corporationsof the original ADECO of the Jose Co- juangco, Sr. and Sons such as the CHI,LRC, LIPCO and possibly others havebeen used by the Cojuangco-Aquino clanlike dubious ghost corporations to fraudu-lently sidestep their obligation to distributeagricultural land to farmworkers.

T H L S

Te Cojuangco-Aquino clan maintainedtheir popularity and visibility in nationalaffairs, regaining prominence when Cory Aquino supported another popular upris-ing against a corrupt president. In 2001,President Joseph Estrada was ousted byanother EDSA People Power Uprising. Es-trada was replaced by a former President’sdaughter, vice-president Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo.

But by 2003, unrest was brewing amongstfarmworkers of Hacienda Luisita. Joblessness, low wages and deceitful ben-

Cojuangco passed Resolution No. 28 that

reclassified 3,290 hectares of Hacienda Lu-isita from agricultural to commercial, in-dustrial, and residential land.

On August 1996, the DAR, throughSec. Ernesto Garilao issued Order No.030601074-764-(95), Series of 1996, which approved 500 hectares of Luisitaland for conversion. Te approval was subject to payment of 3% of the gross sellingprice to FWBs, among other conditions.

HLI then ceded 300 hectares of theland approved for conversion to Centen-nary Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a subsidiaryof HLI, in exchange for subscription ofshares of stock. CHI then sold the entire300 hectares to the Japanese-dominatedLIPCO, of which the Cojuangcos and thebanking magnate Yuchengcos were alsostockholders and incorporators, for Php750 million. Te LIPCO was etablished inNovember 1996 by the Yuchengco-ownedRizal Commercial Banking Corporation(RCBC) Agila Holdings, Itochu and HLIto develop the 300-hectare industrial parkfor Japanese investors.

Te Cojuangco-Aquino clan acquiredhefty profits from the conversion projectsbut farmworkers never benefitted fromthese transactions. HLI absorbed the earn-ings from the sale of landholdings as ad-ditional capital of the corporation.

By 1998, a master land use plan wascommissioned by the Luisita Realty Cor-poration (LRC) from the SWA Group, which according to its website is an inter-national landscape architecture, planningand urban design firm with offices in theUnited States, China, and the Middle East. Another architectural design firm, theNoni Mendoza Associates (NMA) based

efits plagued farmworkers. By 2lar farmworkers received only Pday while seasonal or casual farmonly P194.50. What they actuais a minimum of P9.50 a day, oothers only P9.50 a week becausment only allowed one to twodays a week. Since the implemthe SDO in 1989, ULWU recthat 1,009 farmworker-benefictheir jobs. o fastrack retrenchmeven resorted to offering early plans to its workers.

On September 28, 2003, 95% workers boycotted the elections workers’ and supervisors’ represethe HLI Board of Directors in the SDO scheme. Farmworkersthat four board seats were usele

seven management seats. A month after, on October 14Supervisory Group filed a petitthe DAR to revoke the SDO schgroup complained that HLI waing them their dividends – the 1%gross sales and 33% share in thfrom the conversion and sale otares of land. Te group also cMOA violations by the HLI, thsic of which is the false promiselives would improve because ofscheme. When the milling season open

1954Pres. Magsaysay serves as wedding sponsor

to Ninoy Aquino and Cory Cojuangco

at the Our Lady of Sorrows Church.

The Cojuangcos and the Aquinos, the two most

powerful political clans in Tarlac and the whole

of Central Luzon, merge

1955Ninoy Aquino is elected mayor of Concepcion.

1957Jose Cojuangco, Sr.

takes control of Hacien-

da Luisita through loans

from the New York-based

Manufacturer’s Trust Co.

endorsed by the

Central Bank, &

GSIS under condition

of land distribution to

farmers after 10 years.

1963Ninoy Aquino is

elected governor of

Tarlac.

1956The United Luisita Workers Union

(ULWU) is established.

50s

1958TADECO

(Tarlac Dev’t Corp.)

takes control of

Hacienda Luisita & the

Central Azucarera de

Tarlac sugar mill.

Ninoy Aquino

becomes Luisita’s

1st administrator.

1960ULWU President Domingo

Viadan is murdered.

Ninoy A

is elected

1959Ninoy Aquino is elected

vice-governor of Tarlac.Jose “Peping”

Cojungco, Jr. is

elected mayor

of Paniqui.

1961Ninoy Aquino assumes the

governorship of Tarlac.

Peping Cojuangco is elect-

ed Representative of the

1st District of Tarlac.

1965Ferdinand Marcos starts

his 1st term as President.

After 10 years,

the Cojuangco-Aquino c

refuses to distribute

Hacienda Luisita.

Farmers assert their righ

The Marcos go’t presse

the Cojuangco-Aquino c

on the distribution ofHacienda Luisita.

1960s

Cojuangco-Aquino take-over


6/23


ober 2003, more than a thousand farm-orkers gathered to protest against theDO scheme, land-use conversion and job-sness at the hacienda.By December 4, 2003, AMBALA gath-ed signatures from around 80% of thetal 5,339 Hacienda Luisita farmworkersd filed through its counsel SENRA astoric petition to the DAR to nullify andcind the SDO scheme and to stop land-e conversion at the hacienda.Te next year, a deadlock in the negotia-ns for a collective bargaining agreementBA) between the Central Azucarera derlac Labor Union (CALU) transpiredJuly when HLI refused to increase work-’ wages to P225 per day. Workers also

bbied for work days to be increased fromce a week to 2-3 days per week. Onctober 1, 2004, HLI ordered the illegalsmissal of 327 farm workers belonging to

nited Luisita Workers' Union (ULWU),cluding its President Rene Galang andher leaders.Tese incidents sparked the farmworkers’trage.

Te Hacienda Luisita Strike was initiatedNovember 6, 2004. Te ULWUstart-the strike at 11 a.m. Almost all of the

000-strong farmworkers’ union member-ip joined. About 700 sugar mill workersthe CALU stopped working and joinede strike at 3 p.m. the same day.On November 10, Department of Labord Employment (DOLE) Secretary Patri-

a Sto. omas issued an “assumption of ju-diction” (AJ) order citing that Hacienda

uisita and the CA sugar mill were “vitalthe national interest.” After failing to

sperse the protesters, Sec. Sto. omas onovember 15 deputized not only the police

but also the military to enforce her order.In one Senate inquiry, Sto. omas had

inadvertently implicated the Cojuangco- Aquino clan with her own revelation thatshe sent military troops after she received acall from then Rep. Noynoy Aquino of theSecond District of arlac. Rep. Aquinoinformed her that “tension was mountingin Hacienda Luisita since 50 busloads ofsympathizers from neighboring provinceshad arrived to beef up the picket line.”

On November 16, around 700 police-men, 17 truckloads of soldiers in full battlegear, two tanks equipped with heavy weap-ons, a pay loader and four fire trucks with water cannons were assembled to confrontthe picketline. According to a fact-finding report by

BAYAN:

Water cannons blasted the strikers

and their supporters with chemi-cal-laced water and initially forcedthem back from the front lines facingGate1...

but the strikers returned. Hundredsof tear gas canisters were then hurledat them. In due time, however, a fewstrikers learned to smother the tear gas by either dowsing the canisterswith water or burying these in sandysoil... Te pay loader and tanks werethen used to smash open Gate 1, thesame gate management had earlier padlocked. After the third attempt,the tank succeeded but the strik-ers threw stones at it and forced thetank to pull back… Scores of strikersrushed through Gate 1 towards the fire trucks throwing everything theycould get their hands on at the as-

In November 21, the funeral march ofthe Massacre victims was joined by morethan 6,000 people. Te marchers’ stream-ers proclaimed: “uloy ang laban! uloyang welga!” (Te fight continues! Te strikegoes on!) AMBALA’s December 2003 petition sud-

denly started to move forward after themassacre.

Te strike continued. During its peak,more than 10,000 farmworkers, theirfamilies, and sympathizers gathered in 10picketlines established all around the sugarestate. State repression and killings contin-ued. Te first victim of post-massacre kill-ings in Luisita was Marcelino Beltran, anarmyman turned peasant leader of the pro-vincial chapter of AMGL and KMP, Alyan-sa ng mga Magbubukid sa arlac (AM).Beltran was scheduled to attend a Senatehearing on the massacre to serve as witness

on gunshot trajectories. Aside from localfarmworkers and peasant leaders, othersubsequent victims were a barangay chair-man, a Catholic priest, a city councilorand a bishop of the Filipino IndependentChurch.

On November 22, 2004, the DAR issuedSpecial Order No. 789 which called for thestrengthening of the ask Force Stock Dis-tribution Option through the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) Secretar-iat. Te DAR ask Force Stock Distribution was then renamed ask Force Luisita and was

convened on November 25, 2004 to discussfor the first time the petitions by Luisita su-pervisors and AMBALA.

But only a few days after the massacre inNovember 25, LIPCO transferred 184 hec-tares of Luisita land approved in the 1996conversion order to the Rizal CommercialBanking Corporation (RCBC) owned bythe Yuchengco family, who are also LIPCOstockholders. Te land was transferred inpayment of LIPCO’s loan obligations. Amid the tension of the strike, AMBALA’s

clarion call was for farmworkers to occupyand cultivate the land for their very survival.Tis was the start of the bungkalan (tillage).Strikers started by planting crops near thepicketlines. By 2005, AMBALA members went on to distribute .7 hectare-parcels ofland to each farmworker willing to till andcultivate farmlots for food production.

T F L

In March 2005, the DAR’s ask ForceLuisita deployed 10 teams to 10 barangays within the hacienda to investigate and con-duct focus group discussions with farmworkers on the SDO and its supposed bene-fits and provisions. Te Armed Forces of thePhilippines’ (AFP) Northern Luzon Com-mand (NOLCOM) also pursued heavy de-ployment of soldiers to facilitate “peace andorder” during the DAR investigation. At that time, farmworkers were still on

strike. Tree companies from the 69th In-

saulting tank. Ten a vo lley of gunfire rained down on the protesters. Itlasted for a minute, followed by moresporadic shooting. Everyone scamp-ered away from where the gunfire wascoming from, away from where the police a nd military were positioned,behind Gate 1, inside the compoundof the sugar mill.

Seven people were killed and 121 others were seriously injured, 32 from gunshot wounds. Tis was the “Hacienda LuisitaMassacre.” After the massacre, more than a hundred

farmworkers were arrested and detainedat the PNP Provinicial Headquarters inCamp Macabulos, arlac City. Only 20 ofthose arrested were ULWU members.

Rep. Noynoy Aquino tried to downplaythe horrifying incident by saying that most

of the victims, and even possible perpetra-tors of the violence which police and mili-tary elements purportedly responded to, were most likely “outsiders.”

Indeed hundreds of those arrested weremigratory seasonal cane cutters employedby HLI management. Most of those arrest-ed and hauled to Camp Macabulos werethese “sakadas” – 48 from Negros island, 14from Isabela, and four from Bataan. Out ofthe hundreds of victims of physical assaultand injuries, almost half were not fromLuisita: 45 from Negros, and the rest fromBataan, Nueva Ecija, and Isabela, accordingto KARAPAAN.

fantry Battalion and 703rd Infgade patrolled the fields and elages at night. Residents, farmwtheir leaders engaged the soldiertussles and confrontations in mLuisita villlages.

ask Force Luisita submitteings and recommendations on thDAR Secretary Nasser C. Pangan July 2005. By August, Pangandaed a special legal team to review in the task force’s report. Te DAlegal team submitted its terminathe two petitions in September 2mending the revocation of the 1SDO scheme in Hacienda Luisit

Te PARC’s actions were obthe HLI management as politic which resulted from President Aing out with the Cojuangco-Aquis clear however that the two rul

were solidly against farmworkersstrike, and while anomalous dethe overpriced valuation and comfor the right of way in Hacienand construction of a “private” terchange in the SCEX were un Arroyo’s most trusted fascist h

now fugitive Brig. Gen. Jovitopersonally facilitated extra-judicand the reign of terror withinLuisita during his stint as commficer of the 7th Infantry DivisioCentral Luzon starting in 2005.

980arcos go’ts case s

DECO 1985December: The court orders TADECO

to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the

Ministry of Agrarian Reform.

The Cojuangcos eleate the case

to the Court of Appeals.

Cory Aquino les her candidacy

for President on a land reform platform

and ows to subject Hacienda Luisita

to agrarian reform.

1987-1998Peping Cojuangco

gets reelected as Rep-

resentative.

1969e CPP-led peasant army NPA

is founded in Capas, Tarlac.

1970 A series of mass

demonstrations

leads to the First

Quarter Storm

1972Marcos declares

Martial Law.

Ninoy Aquino is arrested.

Marcos decrees hisland reform law PD 27

1983Ninoy Aquino is

assassinated at the

Manila International

Airport .

1986The People Power uprising topples the Mar -

cos dictatorship and catapults Cory Aquino

to the presidency in February.

Militarization in Hacienda Luisitaintensies. The Cojuangco-Aquino clan

establishes a “Yellow Army”of armed agents & superisors.

1987January 22: Farmers march to Malacañang to demand genu-

ine land reform. State forces kill 13 farmers in the violent disper-

sal now known as the “Mendiola Massacre."

Cory issues PP 131 and EO 229, the basis for her land

reform program, CARP. The Stoc Distribution Option or SDO

is among its provisions.

AMBALUS -- the precursor of

the farmworkers’ alliance AMBALA

is established.

1988Under the Aquino gov’t, the Solicito

General, BSP goernor & the DAR le

motion to dismiss the c ase s TADECO

The Court of Appeals junks th

Marcos case vs TADECO

The Cojuangco-Aquinos cone

parts of Hacienda Luisita int

commercial and industrial areas

June: RA 6657 or CARP is signe

into law by Pres.Cory Aquino

August :TADECO establishes th

Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) t

implement the SDO scheme


7/23


After Arroyo grew increasingly unpopularrough allegations of massive corruptiond electoral fraud, Cory Aquino called foresident Arroyo’s resignation.On November 17, 2005, HLI signed aOA with Hazama Corporation for quar-ng in connection with the construction

the SCEX over a period of one year.azama Corp. is a partner of Hazama-aisei-Nippon Steel Joint Venture (HN-

V), which won the SCEX contract fromses Conversion Development Author-(BCDA) to construct the Clark-arlac

gment which passes through Luisita.azama Corp. is also contractor for thenstruction of the Luisita Industrial Parkthe 300-hectare portion of the DAR-ap-

oved conversion in 1996, a project whichmains idle to this day.Te HLI’s 1991 Prudential Bank loanas reportedly settled through govern-ent compensation for the 80.5 hectareght of way, which pegged land valuationan overpriced Php 1 million per hectare.rmworkers fought land conversion ande SCEX project by building humanrricades and engaging government insti-tions like the DENR to declare the quar-ng illegal.

On December 23, 2005, the PARC, un-r President Arroyo issued Resolution No.05-32-01, which revoked the SDO planADECO and HLI and placed the landsbject SDO plan under the compulsoryverage scheme of the CARP.Te Hacienda Luisita Strike officially end-after more than a year in December 2005,er the HLI management forged agree-ents with the CALU and ULWU. Teikers declared it a “historic victory.” Teost striking achievement of their strug-

by this time is the thriving bungkalantiative which by then had covered around

000 hectares, and improved the daily livesfarmworkers. Te DAR decision may beder the RO, but farmworkers continuedoccupy and cultivate the land.

After the PARC decision, the DAR ap-peared ready to undertake land distribu-tion, even pronouncing to media thatthe DAR preferred to issue a collective or“mother” Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to all FWBs of HaciendaLuisita.

On the first working day of the new year,the HLI was quick to file a motion for re-consideration of the PARC resolution be-fore the DAR. In February 2006, despitethe pendency of their DAR motion, HLIfiled a petition for certiorari and prohibi-tion against the PARC before the SupremeCourt (SC).

Te PARC denied the HLI’s motion forreconsideration in May but by June, theSC issued a emporary Restraining Order(RO) preventing the PARC and DAR toimplement land distribution.

Ordinary ROs are valid only for a spe-cific number of days, but the RO thatprohibited DAR from Hacienda Luisitaland distribution had no expiry date. TisRO went down in Philippine judicial his-tory as the longest restraining order everimplemented.

Te Cojuangco-Aquino clan answered with more political killings and a perpetualreign of terror.

In 2009, Cory Aquino died of coloncancer. Because of death, her son, Noynoy Aquino, who was elected Senator two yearsearlier despite a dismal legislative record,suddenly became a frontrunner in the 2010Presidential Race.

A C-A

President Noynoy Aquino, now a fifthgeneration Cojuangco scion, was sworn intooffice in June 2010, under the banner of the“daang matuwid” (righteous path) anti-cor-ruption crusade. A few months after, howev-er, the Cojuangco-Aquino clan maneuveredyet again to maintain control of HaciendaLuisita through their political influence.

For the first time since the land dispute was brought to its doors four years earlier,the SC scheduled oral arguments on theHacienda Luisita case.

Te first of these oral arguments werescheduled in August 2010.

HLI quickly maneuvered to tap unau-

thorized representatives of AMBALA andULWU to sign a compromise agreement torevive the SDO scheme.

Te HLI asked the SC to approve thecompromise deal. Within Hacienda Luisita, increased mili-

tary presence was once again felt, as the AFP established more permanent detach-ments around the estate.

error and militarization was once againutilized by the Cojuangco-Aquino clan asa way of “consultation” with farmworkers. AMBALA showed fierce opposition andurged the SC to junk the compromise deal.

In July 5, 2011, the SC promulgated a deci-sion upholding the earlier PARC resolutions,but with the option for FWBs to remainstockholders of HLI.

Clarification to this earlier decision waspromulgated in November 11, 2011 and re-solved several motions filed by HLI, PARCand DAR, the HLI Supervisory Group,FARM, AMBALA and Rene Galang.

Te SC ruling ordered the total land dis-tribution of Luisita’s agricultural lands, therevocation of the SDO, and the audit ofHLI and CHI “to determine if the PhP1,330,511,500 (Php 1.33 billion) pro-ceeds of sale of three (3) lots were actu-ally used or spent for legitimate corporatepurposes. Any unspent or unused balance and any

disallowed expenditures as determined bythe audit shall be distributed to the 6,296original FWBs,”

In April 24, 2012, the SC affirmed itsNovember 22, 2011 ruling in a final andexecutory decision which ordered the DARto facilitate the total land distribution ofHacienda Luisita to farmworkers.

1989The Cojuangco-Aquinos, DAR and Tarlac LGUs

compel Luisita farmworkers to choose between stocks or land

in a referendum. The SDO wins ia militarization & coercion.

The Memorandum of Agreement

on the SDO is signed.

ON APRIL 24, 2012, ALL EN VILLAGES HA MAKE UP HE LUISIA ESAE Sdenly broke into euphoria. Te Supreme Court had, on that same day, affirmed its decision to effectdistribution in the country’s most controversial and dispute-ridden hacienda . In the face of a very imtant, even historic legal victory, thousands of Luisita farmworkers — all toughened by decades of str— could not have helped feeling as if social justice had at long last been won as well.

HE FINAL AND EXECUORY RESOlution of the SC on the HLI case, in themain, instructs the DAR to facilitate thetransfer of land ownership of agriculturallands in Hacienda Luisita to qualifiedfarmworkers all within a period of one year.

Te landmark resolution furtherorders the following:

1. Te revocation of the 1989 SDOscheme;

2. Te distribution by the DAR of4,335 hectares, including other tracts thatit would find to be agricultural in use, to6,296 FWBs. Each should supposedlyreceive no less than a 6,886 sq. meteragricultural lot;

3. Te issuance, for free, by theHLI of 18,804 shares of stocks to 4,206non-qualified FWBs who will remain asstockholders of HLI;

4. Te accounting by HLI ofthe proceeds of sale of the 500-hectareproperty to RCBC and LIPCO, and 80.5hectares used for the SCEX amountingto Php 1.33 billion;

5. Te payment by the DAR of justcompensation to HLI for agricultural landat the price prevailing in 1989.

Whereas it is the DAR that isprincipally tasked by law to carry outland distribution in Hacienda Luisita, theorganized rank of the farmworkers hasdeemed itself likewise duty-bound andto have all the right in fact not to remainpassive at this juncture of the agrarianstruggle.

First of all, the farmworkers, espe-cially through AMBALA, have remainedfirm on their stand for free land distribu-tion. While the SC ruling prescribes that

Distributing LuFROM LANDMARK SC DECISI

O BOGUS DAR IMPLEMENA

the state pays the HLI for every hagricultural land, it has been thetion of AMBALA that no singletavo shall in the process come frofarmworkers’ pockets. Tis for threason, AMBALA has long arguseveral times over, the cost of lanhas already been paid for by the

decades of toil and misery.Second, the farmworkers,

opportunity, have also been keenreminding the DAR of their pardesire to own and till the distriblands on a collective basis. Such at any rate has long been establisa social and economic fact throupractice of bungkalan, a mass cumovement which the farmers thand AMBALA have ingeniously during the height of the Haciend


8/23


rike in 2005.Tird, as direct and active party to

e social enterprise of land reform, theganized farmworkers have requestedat, in the spirit of democratic consulta-

on, the DAR provide them with cor-sponding documents, including copiesthe all-important Luisita land surveyd subdivision plan. Likewise, in theterest of transparency, AMBALA hasany times asserted that the f armwork-s themselves have the right to appointauditing firm that would review their

are of the Php 1.33 billion total sale ofLI assets.

DAR meanwhile, sometime in thecond half of 2012, confidently declaredat land reform in Hacienda Luisita shall

ush through especially as it has theneady become basically the department’s

rawing up the Masterlist

QUALIFIED FWB IS DEFINED BYe SC decision as one who was a worker ine hacienda in 1989 when the SDO wasopted. An FWB therefore was supposedhave been eligible to own land had actu-land distribution been implemented ine said year instead of the SDO. A non-

ualified FWB, meanwhile, is someoneho became a worker in the hacienda onlyer the SDO scheme had been in effect.e or she therefore is not entitled to landstribution but to shares of stock of HLI.

Te 1989 MOA masterlist is theost reliable documented reference toeck for original farmworker beneficiar-. It must be recalled, however, that this

me list had been used by HLI to gainverage over the opponents of its poli-es among the farmworkers. Tose whoaunchly asserted their right to land in89 were automatically stricken off thist. In a 2003 petition,meanwhile, AM-ALA accused the HLI management ofoating the number of workers under theyroll. Tis masterlist thus is a veritable

anscript of the Cojuangco-Aquino brandintimidation and fraud.

In 2010, the HLI management sub-itted to the SC 10,502 names whiche former identified as Hacienda Luisita

WBs.Te DAR released an initial master-

t of FWBs in October 30, 2012 com-

flagship endeavor. Such declaration mayhave effectively served to further dispelany popular doubt at that time as toMalacanang’s willingness to abide by theSC and truly subject the vast land of thePresidential family and clan to distribu-tion. It may be recalled particularly thatthe actions of President Aquino in Mayof the same year which led rather speed-ily to the impeachment of Chief JusticeRenato Corona have largely been readas the chief executive’s way of gettingback at the latter, who was said to havebeen instrumental in the SC decision onHacienda Luisita.

By the middle of 2013, it seemedby all indication that the DAR wasenjoying maximum logistical supportand media mileage in projecting the linethat the current Aquino president, given

his rectitude and impartiality, shall notin any way intervene with land reformin his erstwhile 6,453 has. backyard,Te pressure furthermore in beating thedeadline in 2014 for the completion ofCARPER’s land reform targets, accordingto DAR, can only make land distribu-tion in Hacienda Luisita more inevitablyexpeditious.

Te findings of the September2013 Hacienda Luisita NFFM which arehere comprehensively presented gener-ally confirm that land distribution in allof the ten villages of Hacienda Luisitahas indeed been quite expeditious. Expe-ditiously bogus, that is -- a very unfortu-nate narrative no doubt which howeverspeaks as well of the continuing life anddeath struggle for land and justice of thegallant Luisita farmworkers.

prised of 5,365 farmworkers, and an ac-companying provisional list containingnames of 1,221 individuals purportedlylacking in requisite documents to provetheir qualifications as FWBs. Te DARpompously announced their elaborate veri-fication process which mobilized hundredsof its personnel for rounds of interviewsand collection of documentary evidencefrom nearly 10,000 FWB applicants.

Te KMP criticized the DAR forsowing confusion, disunity, and chaos

when it padded the original number of6,296 FWBs to 8,482. Increasing thenumber of beneficiaries by consideringCojuangco-Aquino dummies could onlyreduce the size of land for individual dis-tribution down to a pitiful garden plot,and thus justify once more the age-old Co-

juangco-Aquino alibi of the impracticabil-ity of subdividing an extremely vast estatelike Hacienda Luisita.

Te unfortunate prospect of landdistribution based on a deliberately flawed

“WALA PANG MASYADONG MGA TAO SA

asyendang ito nang mapadpad dito ang mga

ninuno namin galing sa Isabela. Dito na ipi-

nanganak ang lolo’t lola ko. Dito na rin ako

ipinanganak, nagkaasawa at nabiyayaan nganim anak. Gaya ng aming mga lolo’t lola,

kami ay naging manggagawang-bukid sa

asyenda ng mga Cojuangco-Aquino. Hirap

ang buhay namin bilang mga manggaga-

wang-bukid.

“Nang malulo si Cory, natuwa ami. Magig-

ing marangya na raw ang buhay namin dahil

magiging stockholders na kami sa progra-

mang SDO. Lumipas ang ilang taon, wala na-

man kaming natikmang magandang buhay.

Mas lumiit pa nga ang ita namin . Marami

sa amin ang tumatanggap na lang ng hindi

hihigit sa P9.50 bawat araw. Pagpapahirap,pagsasamantala ang araw-araw naming

nilulunok hanggang sa hindi na namin ito

natiis.

“Nobyembre 6, 2004, sumiklab ang welga.

Kasama kami lahat. Tumindi nang tumindi

ang karahasan laban sa amin at humantong

ito sa madugong masaker nong Nobyembre

Mga Lista sa Tubig

Ang mag-asawang Norma at Edilberto Mabuti ay mga manggagawang-bukid saBrgy. Bantog, Hacienda Luisita. Ito ang salaysay ni Norma:

Mga Lista… >> p. 5

and divisive list has given AMBALA rea-son to finally opt for collective land owner-ship instead of individual titling. A highlyorganized, democratic and independentcommunity can resolve problems far morerationally that any bureaucratic techni-calities. Farmers’ organizations can bettermaximize the land’s productivity throughplanned cooperation and the systematicpooling of labor power and other produc-tive resources, and the prompt considera-tion of each household’s day-to-day needsbased on the full recognition of their col-lective history and struggle.

AMBALA’s fears however wouldbe realized in February 2013 when theDAR finally released its official masterlistof 6,212 beneficiaries. Some of the oldestfarmworker families, most prominent un-

ion and farmworkers’ leaders and activists,and kins of victims of the Hacienda Luisitamassacre and subsequent killings were no-

where to be found in the list. Meanwhile,nearly a thousand questionable names wereincluded, some belonging to the Cojuang-co-Aquino’s most rabid agents, supervisorsand so-called “yellow army.”

Anomalous Land Survey IN JULY OF 2013, HE DAR ANnounced that FF Cruz & Co., Inc., thesurvey firm that the department has hiredby, found only 4,099.92 hectares of ag-ricultural land for distribution from theoriginal 6,453-hectare property. Each ofthe 6,212 FWBs could thus expect to re-ceive a 6,600-sq.meter farm lot (.66 hec-tares) or more than half a hectare of land.

Te DAR-FF Cruz survey based itssummary on a mysterious figure of 5,149hectares which supposedly covers threeland titles found in arlac City, La Paz andConcepcion towns that ADECO cededto HLI in 1989 and placed under theSDO scheme. According to public records,the total agricultural land covered in theSDO is equal to 4,915.75 hectares, whichshould make only around 234 hectares inthese three towns to be non-agricultural innature. With this formula, the survey hasglaringly left more than 1,300 hectaresof Hacienda Luisita property to be unac-counted for.

Tese dizzying figures show how theDAR came up with only 4,099.92 hectares

– out of 4,335 hectares decreed by theSC or out of the 6,453 original landarea of Hacienda Luisita – for distribu-tion to farmworkers. It also justifies therather unthinkable exclusion of nearly300 hectares of land as “new roads,creeks and irrigation, railroads, a cem-etery, firebreaks, buffer zones, lagoons,fishponds, and additional eroded areas.”

at pulis. Pero hindi kami sumuko. K

kami sa inilunsad na bungkalan lalo

lupang kinakamkam ng RCBC upa

ang karapatan namin sa lupa”.

“2005, nagsimula kami ng aking a

mga anak, na maglinang ng .7 ekt

erya dito sa barangay . Palay, gulay

papano, may nakakain kami. Hindi n

ito magkasya sa aming malaking

dahil umuutang lang ako sa mga pin

na nagpapa-usura. Mga ana o na

tumulong na rin para kumita. Sum

sila sa konstruksyon sa kung saan-

labas ng asyenda.”

“Dumating ang araw nang ilabas n

ang pinal na listahan ng mga benip

Gaya nina Norma at Edil, hindi am

ma sa listahan.

“Ano ba ang basehan ng DAR para

kami samantalang matagal na kam

Benipisyaryo na nga kami ng ho

e bakit sa farm lot wala kami? G

napagkaisahan sa organisasyon, a

na rin sa batas, dapat kung saan na

ay dun na kami italaga. Kaya di ko

itong .7 ektarya na ito. Hahantong

kapag may dumating para angki

Ano’ng karapatan nila? Bakit kasi

ginawang paraan ng DAR na kami a

away-awayin. Ito ba ang reporma

na sinasabi ng ating gobyerno?”

“Mahigit sa 25 pamilya pa rito sa ba

ang kagaya naming ganito.

“Lupa at hustisya pa rin ang aming

ing. Umaasa ako kasama ang aking

na gaya ng pagkakaisa na ginawa

sa welga noong 2004, andyan pa

lakas ng organisasyon na titindig

karapatan ng mga manggagawang-b

16, 2004. Ang manugang ko, winasak ng

bala ang baliat. Mabuti nabuhay pa siya.

“2005 nagsimula kaming maglinang ng saril-

ing lupa. Tinamnan namin ito ng palay. Mga

.7 ektarya batay sa sabi ng organisasyon.

Ganito rin ang magiging bahagi namin sa

lupa kapag ipinamahagi na.

“Dahil kasama kami sa masterlist ng DAR

nong 1989, nabigyan kami ng home lot.

Kampante kami na makakasama sa pinal

na listahan ng mga benepisyaryo. Laking

gulat na lang namin nang ilabas na nila ang

listahan – wala kami rito. Pinagsabihan kami

na umalis sa lupang nililinang. Ang tagal na

namin dito. Kasama kami sa hirap at paki-

kibaka pero wala kaming napala sa DAR. Ayaw sana naming umalis pero baka pagod

at gastos lang ang aabutin namin. Baka ang

nakakuha ng aming lote sa tambyolo ng

DAR ang sumunod na magpalayas sa amin.

Gulo lang yun.

Ngayon heto kami at nakikiani, nagtratra-

baho muli bilang manggagawang-bukid sa

tubuhan. Ang mga anak ko, naglalabada,

sumasama sa konstruksyon, para lang

mairaos ang araw-araw.

“Sa kaibuturan ng aming puso, lupa at hus-

tisya pa rin ang aming hinahanap!”

Sa asyenda na pinanganak angmag-asawang Marcela at LeopoldoDatu Sr. 1901 pa dumating rito angkanilang mga ninuno. Ito ang kuwentoni “Nong Poldo:

“BILANG MANGGAGAWANG-BUkID DINA-

nas namin ang matinding hirap sa kamay

ng panginoong maylupa. Kaya gaya ng

karamihan, sumama rin kami sa welg. Naka-tikim kami ng karahasan mula sa mga militar

p. 13


9/23


Chavez noted that the large portiondescribed as residential land in the 1989data is a reserve that will also be distributedto farmworkers if the allocated home lots

were inadequate. Ahead of Cory Aquino’s land re-

form program, the Cojuangco-Aquinos,through the LRC, converted certain por-tions of Luisita for commercial, residen-tial and industrial use. Based on 1989and 2013 information, it is still unclearhowever, if these famous Hacienda Luisitalandmarks belong to the “residential” or tothe “unaccounted” section.

500-hectare “converted land”

FURHERMORE, HE DAR HAS EXcluded the 500 hectares of “convertedarea” from the arlac City title (-236741)

which the department has claimed to beentirely situated in Brgy. Balete, contraryto the 1996 order which clearly states thatonly 341.45 hectares from this land titlehad been approved for conversion. Howev-er, there are also discrepancies between thetotal number of hectares declared in 1996(1,594.2 has) and 2013 (1,783.8 has.) forthis arlac land title, making declarations

TABLE 2 --L L B / Source: Manila Bulletin & DAR

based on these purported orighighly questionable unless directto public scrutiny.

HLI’s conversion applicatitober 1995 stated that 300 hecto be used for an industrial estatetares for medium-cost housing, aer 100 for low-cost housing. AcDAR’s conversion order, the 5property is found in Sitios (suSan Miguel, Luisita and BantugUngot in arlac City, the origindeclared in the 1907 ABAowned land titles.

Te 500-hectare “converhas been a bone of contention beCojuangco-Aquinos and the fain the villages of arlac City, esBarangay Balete where, accordinthe entire 500-hectare area is fouthe approval of the conversion, H300 hectares to another CojuanCentennary Holdings, Inc. whisold the property to LIPCO. A feter the Hacienda Luisita MassacrLIPCO sold 184 hectares of thto RCBC.

Tese “converted areas” undergo any kind of developmemain agricultural up to the pregate of the Luisita Industrial Parplex leads to a vast expanse of However, at the height of the Luisita Strike and AMBALA’slan campaign in 2005 – or 10 ythe HLI applied for land use c– farmworkers took it upon tto cultivate part of the contestproperty for food crops.

AMBALA and Balete resisince engaged RCBC in a bitt

war even as this private corporunflinchingly utilized violence, even in partnership with state

suppress the farmworkers’ claimber of incidents involving violesals and arrests of farmers, chcounter-charges ensued. In 201and the Cojuangco-Aquino cla“Oplan April Spring”– a stratega military plan which aimed tfarmers’ opposition to the RCBTis local strategy complemente

Aquino’s national counter-insuricy “Oplan Bayanihan” and utisive propaganda and mass decep


10/23


violence, underhanded legal maneuvers,and even corruption and bribery ofcommunity leaders.

AMBALA through its counselSENRA has challenged RCBC incourt. AMBALA contends that withinthe bounds of law, an area approved forconversion should undergo develop-ment within five years. Failure to do soforfeits the conversion order. Section 65of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended(CARPER) stipulates the following:

“Failure to implement the con-version plan within five (5) years fromthe approval of such conversion plan orany violation of the conditions of theconversion order due to the fault of theapplicant shall cause the land to auto-matically be covered by CARP.”

Tat these areas were never cov-ered by any kind of development afternearly two decades uncovers the truththat the Cojuangco-Aquinos had allalong been using spin-off corporationsto perpetually dodge land reform andto benefit financially through deceptionand landgrabbing. Te DAR has beenissuing several technical and bureau-cratic excuses for its ineptitude – prac-tically favoring the Cojuangco-Aquinosand the RCBC – on the land conver-sion issue.

By the time DAR started itsland allocation activities in July 2013,RCBC had installed several watchtow-ers manned by armed personnel, exten-sive concrete fences and layers of forti-fication around the contested property.

Furthermore, upon scrutiny ofthe DAR reports, the NFFM foundout that the 500-hectare “convertedarea” could not have possibly beenchopped off from Brgy. Balete giventhat the declared area of the said ba-

rangay in the arlac City title is onlyaround 101 hectares. Yet just as ques-tionable are DAR’s figures for the landareas of populous villages Balete andMapalacsiao which are unusually smallcompared to how these villages appearin HLI’s own maps.

Instead, according to its records,the DAR has excluded from distri-bution a whopping 526 hectares inBrgy. Lourdes, a village adjacent toBalete. It could be assumed this time

N OCTOBER 2007, THE RCBC, FAMILIAR TO MOST AS A COMMERCIAL BANk FOUND eery major urban center in the country, interened in the Hacienda Luisita SC case by ling a

otion. After the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council resolved that Hacienda Luisita must be dis-

buted to its farmworkers, RCBC claimed that their 184-hectare property within Luisita must be

empted, for they were but “innocent purchasers” that had nothing to do with the agrarian dispute..

Before the RCBC installed layers of con-

ete fences and fortications around its pur -

rted property earlier this year, part of the lot

as cultiated by AMBALA for the bungalan

ce 2005.

RCBC acquired the contested 184 has. from

isita Industrial Par Corp. (LIPCO) in Noem -

r 25, 2004, as payment of LIPCO’s Php 431.7

lion loan obligations. But how did agricultural

nd supposedly seized by government for land

orm become property of an industrial rm in

e rst place?

In 1995, HLI applied for a land conversion

der from the DAR. Hacienda Luisita was then

der a corporative land reform scheme, the

ory-implemented SDO which allowed land-

ds to evade physical land distribution by hav-

g the farmers as “co-owners.” The scheme

parently also allowed agricultural land to be

nverted into other uses when. on August 14,

96, the DAR approved the said HLI applica-

n allowing 500 has. to be converted for com-

erial use.

Of the total 500 has., HLI ceded 300 to Cen -

nnary Holdings, Inc. (CHI) in exchange for

bscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks on

ecember 13, 1996. CHI is wholly-owned by

LI and the Cojuangcos, Teopacos and Lopas.

e remaining 200 has. was transferred to Lu-

a Realty Corporation (LRC), a company cre-

ed by the Cojuangco-Aquinos to facilitate its

velopment plans for Hacienda Luisita.

Subsequently, CHI sold the 300-has. prop-

y to LIPCO for P750 million. LIPCO acquirede property to build an industrial complex. Is

PCO then another company wholly-owned by

e Cojuangco-Aquinos?

In Noember 1996, RCBC joined Agila Hold -

gs, Itochu and HLI in putting up the Luisita

dustrial Park Corp., a 300-has. industrial park

Japanese investors.

During the SC oral arguments on Hacienda

isita in 2010, it was reported that RCBC

ld 524,997 shares in LIPCO while HLI had

4,999 or 9% ownership.

According to AMB ALA counsel, Atty. Jobert

Pahilga, CHI, LRC, and een LIPCO and RCBC

are the successors-in-interest of HLI on the

500-has. property and, as such, are bound by

the terms of the conersion order. On January

5, 2012 AMBALA led a motion for the DAR to

revoke the conversion order and include the

500 has. for land reform coverage. The conver-

sion can be revoked by the DAR on the follow-

ing grounds:

Non-compliance with the conditions of the

conversion order;

● Failure to commence any deelopment

work on the property within a year from issu-

ance of order (14 August 1996)

● Non-completion of the deelopment plan

on the property within 5 years from order;

● Failure to submit written request for ex-

tension within 6 months before the lapse of the

5-year period;

● Failure to submit quarterly reports on the

status of the deelopment to the MARO, PARO

and Regional DAR as required by the rules;

● Non-obserance of the conditions for the

use of the land as authorized in the Conversion

Order by HLI and its successor-in-interest;

● Unauthorized change of use of the land

from the development plan as approved in the

Conersion Order without the prior consent and

approval by the DAR;

● Unauthorized sale, transfer or dispositionof the land without the prior consent and ap-

proval by the DAR.

Is RCBC an “innocent purchaser?” Legal

gobbledygook may say yes even if RCBC

acquired the property only a few days after

the gruesome Hacienda Luisita Massacre.

Meanwhile, the DAR taes its sweet time

“studying” and “considering” the farmers’ ap-

peals and petitions as the RCBC unleashes

the wrath of its “Oplan April Spring” upon

defiant farmers.

S RCBC AN “INNOCENT PURCHASER?”

that the 500-hectare “converted area” hadbeen slashed off from Lourdes. Whenthe NFFM however compared the HLImap of Lourdes with the DAR’s subdivi-sion plan displayed on a tarpaulin dur-ing the tambiolo draw in the barangayhall, it revealed that the slashed portionsin question are different from the “con-verted area” fenced by RCBC and LIPII. A portion adjacent to the RCBC andnear Barangay Balete is among agricul-tural lands found by the NFFM to beguarded by ADECO/LRC personnel. Afull-sized detachment of the paramilitarygroup CAFGU is also found in one areaexcluded by DAR from distribution nearthe SCEX access road.

581


11/23


by ADECO and should vacate the lots within 15 days upon receipt of notice orface legal action. ADECO, as stated inthe SC decision has no longer any legalclaims to lands covered by Hacienda Lu-isita:

“Te stock distribution scheme ap- peared to be ADECO’s preferred option incomplying with the CARP when it organ-ized HLI as its spin-off corporation in orderto facilitate stock acquisition by the FWBs.For this purpose, ADECO assigned andconveyed to HLI the agricultural lands ofHacienda Luisita, set at 4,915.75 hectares,among others. Tese agricultural lands con-stituted as the capital contribution of theFWBs in HLI. In effect, ADECO depriveditself of the ownership over these lands whenit transferred the same to HLI.”

When the NFFM inspected theseareas in September, ADECO had erect-ed six (6) watchtowers in agricultural lotsnear the village proper of Balete, three (3)of which surround AMBALA’s bungka-lan pilot area; and two (2) in BarangayCutcut, with one overlooking AMBALA’s

local “kubol” (hut serving as headquar-ters) and directly beside the ricefield cul-tivated by its members. Each of the out-posts is manned by at least two (2) armedguards.

A detachment of the 3rd Mecha-nized Battalion of the AFP which wasthen under construction is situated di-rectly beside ricefields cultivated by AM-BALA leaders Rene Galang and FloridaSibayan. Despite Anakpawis Rep. Hicap’sinsistence, soldiers refused to properlyidentify themselves. Tey told the NFFMthat they were in the area because they

were to vacate their previous post at the Aqua Farm near Barangay Cutcut, andthat the Cojuangco-firm LRC offered thesaid area to their unit.

Te NFFM observed that the tractsof land aggressively claimed by ADECOare considered prime lots – those in Baleteand Mapalacsiao are very near the SC-EX, while the Cutcut area is also adja-cent to th e newly-opened arlac-Pangasi-nan-La Union Expressway (PLEX)operated by San Miguel Corporation, a

company owned by another Cojuangcolandlord and business magnate, Eduar-do “Danding” Cojuangco, Jr., cousin ofCory Aquino.

Trough several formal correspond-ences, documented dialogues, personalfollow-ups and an omnibus motion beforethe SC, AMBALA has repeatedly request-ed the DAR and its local offices to furnishthem a copy of the new Luisita subdivi-sion plan based on the survey conductedby FF Cruz. Maps or simple visual guidesthat farmworkers can better understandand scrutinize than the DAR’s confusingtables and survey summary can help clearor verify the observed anomalies. Portionsof the whole subdivision plan were viewedby residents during the tambiolo activi-ties, but still the DAR must not ignore

AMBALA’s request to furnish the group with complete maps and other documentspertaining to the most recent land survey.Trough its July 23 omnibus motion,

AMBALA has urged the SC to appoint ageodetic engineer, or an independent sur-vey to validate the survey conducted by

ADECO Strikes Back

HE DAR L AND ALLO CAIONtivities from July to August 2013, resi-nts began to notice from DAR tarpau-

n maps on display that certain portionsBarangays Balete, Cutcut and Mapalac-o have been excluded from distribu-

on. DAR personnel told residents thatrtain areas were yet to be surveyed.

Around this time, the Cojuangco-quinos suddenly revived the Luisitaaim of their firm ADECO. Vast tractsagricultural land – more than 200 hec-

res in Balete and 100 hectares in Cut-t were declared “ADECO privateoperty” and were cordoned off fromrmers through aggressive installationwatchtowers, guardhouses and armed

rsonnel. ADECO also sent evictionters to hundreds of residents and farm-s who are supposed to be beneficiariesland reform in these two villages. Teter signed by ADECO lawyer Eu-

ocinio dela Merced asserted that farm-orkers have encroached on lands owned

TWENTY NINE (29) FARMERS IN BARANGAY BALETE, TARLAC CITY HAvE BEEN

receiing erbal threats from TADECO security guards. “You must leae or else, we’ll eict

you!” they warned. Farmers hae tilled and cultiated the land here since AMBALA initiated the

bungkalan in 2005.

cion town. TADECO says the lots are priate

property. The DAR bacs the Cojuangcos’

claims and says these farmlands were con-

sidered “residential” and not agricultural, and

were not covered by the SC decision.

Dennis de la Cruz, believed by residents to

be murdered by TADECO guards last No-

vember 1, had this to say a few days before

his death: “Typhoon Santi was terrible, itcompletely destroyed the bungkalan kubol

(farm hut) where I stay. But after only a few

days, our bungkalan work teams managed to

rebuild it. But the next day it was dismantled.

Not by any typhoon but by these TADECO

guards!”

Hacienda Luisita farmers can be very out-

spoken. After all, they have been exposed

to the most oppressive circumstances in this

Cojuangco-Aquino controlled estate.

“TYPHOON TADECO,” WORSE THAN SANTI

Several residents of the 16 houses spread

out in the area where the farmers work and

reside have received written notices to leave

their homes within 15 days or face legal ac-tion from TADECO. Recently, after the Ty-phoon Santi (international name: Nari) rav-

aged Tarlac in mid-October, six (6) of these

houses were totally devastated. When farm-

ers tried to rebuild their homes, they were

barred from doing so by TADECO securityguards.

These agricultural lots are part of more than

200 has. mysteriously excluded by DAR

from distribution to FWBs. In Balete, only

117 residents were awarded lots near the vil-

lage proper. The rest, 618 FWBs and their

families, will be dislocated, or heavily incon-

venienced if they chose to tend to the lots

awarded them in distant villages Pando and

Mabilog, 10-15 ilometers away in Concep-

In a very low voice, ‘Nong Isko* said, “It’s not

just the farm hut that they’e destroyed; this

time it’s Dennis himself whom they’ve killed.

Couple Carding and Marsing* share the

same story: “Immediately after the typhoon,

we tried very hard to repair our little hut. At

least our kids would have a safe place to stay.

We were ready to transfer our belongings

from our cousins’ house which became our

temporary shelter. To our dismay, we found

our hut dismantled, a “NO TRESSPASSING”

sign was even placed atop the wreckage.”

“One of our relaties confronted the TADECOguards and tried to stop them: ‘What righthas TADECO to destroy that house? Why

stop farmers from rebuilding their homes?’The guard could only answer that it was or-

dered by their boss.”

It is different with couple Dodo and Lorna.*

This is what they have to say: “We rebuilt our

house immediately. Nobody can stop us be-

cause we have been here a very long time.

That TADECO, I’e neer heard about them

but now they claim this land is theirs. The SC

yphoon adeco... >> p. 17

the DAR.By withholding the survey from

AMBALA and by consistently and openlydefending the ADECO’s claims to theseagricultural lands in its recent media pro-nouncements, the DAR is in effect beingcomplicit to any attempts by any party togo against the SC decision. Te DAR ispractically aiding the Cojuangco-Aquinoclan in the latter’s aggressive bid to retainownership of choice prime lots, particu-larly in arlac City.

Te DAR must show the publica complete survey of Hacienda Luisitato ensure that ALL agricultural land inLuisita is covered by land distribution.Granting the exclusion of the 500-hec-tare “converted area” and another 500plus hectares of Hacienda Luisita land-marks such as the golf course and exist-ing residential and industrial areas, thereis still a discrepancy of nearly a thousandhectares that the Cojuangco-Aquino clanand the DAR should clearly and truthfullyaccount for. Still, owing to its agriculturalnature and potential, it is but just that the

500-hectare area which the RLIPCO failed to develop for indmust also be distributed to farm

Te DAR should stop SC decision as a shameless excunically, the SC ordered the DAmediately distribute to FWBs agland put under the SDO schemDAR is also mandated, not onspecific SC ruling but by its veas an agrarian reform unit, to all land that it may find to be ag

Furthermore, the DAR-survey is anomalous not only btant exclusion of vast agricultuthat the Cojuangco-Aquino clanretain. Concerned DAR emplpointed out that the FF Cruz su

was overpriced by as much as Plion. Based on DAR records, thtion survey for lands planted to is pegged at Php 2,516 per hetotal of around Php 12.9 millio5,149 hectares that the FF Cruzveyed in Hacienda Luisita. Tefirm was paid Php 19 million funds for this dubious survey.

Tambiolo Land Reform

HE DAR CARRIED OU tribution of Lot Allocation C(LAC) to listed FWBs in all barangays of Hacienda Luisita rather unorthodox mode: “tambtery drum) raffle.

Farmworkers reported irregularities and cases of intand harassment in the conduDAR’s “tambiolo” land allocaprompted AMBALA, throughcounsel SENRA to file an motion before the Supreme

July 23, questioni ng the anoma

distribution scheme being impby the DAR.

In all barangays covereNFFM, residents reported the pDAR personnel months before uled “tambiolo” raffles. Tese pe

welcomed by barangay officialshouse-to-house information cregarding the DAR’s land dscheme.

Tese employees explaine workers that the DAR land d

says that the land will be returned to us now.

Why would we lose this land now? ”

Based on a 1998 Luisita master land use

design commissioned by the Cojuangcos,

the 200-hectare plus area in Balete will be

the site of the Luisita Industrial Park III. If the

landlord family is securing these prime lots

near the SCTEX for deelopment plans in

the near future, then Cutcut and Mapalac-

siao, the two other villages where the DAR

shamelessly excluded vast agricultural lands

for distribution, will have to brace for the

same “TADECO storm.”

However, this master plan leaves nothing

for agricultural use. There are only industrial

parks and business districts, shopping cent-

ers and town centers for exclusive residents.

It will leave nothing for farmworkers. After

sham land distribution, the ght for Luisita

remains a life and death struggle for thou-

sands of oppressed farmworkers.

*names altered to protect their identities

p.16


12/23


State forces open re on striers, illing 7

farmworers & injuring hundreds in the Ha -

cienda Luisita Massacre. Mauling and illegal

arrests ensue.

A few days after the massacre, RCBC buys

184-has. of land from LIPCO.

Strikers set up 10 picket lines around the ha-

enda. At their peak, picketlines gather m ore

than 20,000 striers & their families.

The DAR’s Task Force Luisita is formed to

inestigate the implementation of SDO.

December 8: Marcelino Beltran, 53,

Luisita massacre witness & Tarlac peasant

leader, is assassinated.

CONTEND and poets from the UP faculty

ublish Paiiramay: Alay ng mga Maata sa

mga Magsasaa ng Hacienda Luisita (Poets’

Tribute to Hacienda Luisita Farmers). The

kM64 Poetry Collectie publishes a simi -

lar collection titled Kabyawan (Sugarcane

Harvest).

2005

AMBALA starts land occupation & cultiation

of Hacienda Luisita with the bungkalan.

January: Tudla Productions & Eiler premiere

Sa Ngalan ng Tubo (Prot/Sugarcane), a

documentary on the struggle of Hacienda

isita sugar worers. The lm includes actual

footage of the Hacienda Luisita massacre.

1992Gen. Fidel Ramos eldshis candidacy via an en-dorsement from Cory. Heis elected President with a

minority vote.

1994Poet Gelacio Guillermo(b. 1940 in HaciendaLuisita) publishes Azucarera, a bookof poems on Luisita

farmworkers.

1995The Provincial Board

of Tarlac under Tingting

Cojuangco reclassies

3,290 has. of Hacienda

Luisita into commercial,

industrial & residential use.

1996DAR approves 500 has. of Luisita land

for conversion. HLI cedes 300 has. to

its subsidiary, Centennary Holdings, Inc.

(CHI).

RCBC & HLI establish LIPCO to deelop

a 300-hectare industrial park for Japa-

nese investors. CHI sells the 300 has. toLIPCO.

Pres. Ramos issues EO 321 creating aPresidential Commission for the Central

Luzon Growth Corridor.

1998Joseph Estrada is

elected President.

A Luisita master land use

plan is commissioned

by the Luisita Realty

Corp. (LRC) from int’l

land planning rm SWA

Group.

1998-2007Benigno Simeon “Noynoy” Aquino III sits as Representative of the 2nd District of Tarlac.

2001Pres. Estrada is ousted by

a People Power uprising

supported by the Aquinos.

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

assumes Presidency.

2003Farmworkers launch protests vs

SDO, land conersion & jobless-

ness.

The HLI Superisory Group les

a petition to reoe the SDO

The 5,000-strong AMBALA

les a petition s SDO &

land conversion

2004

October: HLI retrenches

327 workers, including

ULWU-AMBALA leader Rene

Galang & other union ofcers.

November 6: 5,000 ULWU

members & 700 members of

CATLU launch the historic

Hacienda Luisita Strike.

January: Noynoy Aquino’s bodyguards

are implicated in a shooting incident

wounding 2 Luisita strikers.

The AFP NOLCOM conjures up a hitlist

of presumed state enemies in Hacienda

Luisit

for land & justice

Documents