fokker 50 continuation training revision cycle: 2 years author: m.dekker continued airworthiness...

Fokker 50 Continuation TrainingRevision cycle: 2 years

Author: M.DekkerContinued Airworthiness DepartmentSAMCO

Fokker 50 Continuation Training April 2013 Rev.1

DISCLAIMERDISCLAIMER

This document is intended for training purposes only. This document is intended for training purposes only.

All data, figures and other information contained in this document All data, figures and other information contained in this document may not be used as a reference for maintenance practicesmay not be used as a reference for maintenance practices

This document will This document will NOTNOT be kept up-to-date be kept up-to-date

Fokker 50 Continuation Training April 2013 Rev.1

General informationGeneral information

During presentation click on During presentation click on highlighted items, to open the items, to open the

respective itemsrespective items

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVESAIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

AD IndexAD IndexAD2011-0043

AD2011-0064

AD2011-0083

AD2011-0098

AD2012-0050

AD2012-0065

AD2013-0027

AD2013-0125

AD2013-0126

AD2013-0139AD2013-0139

AD No.: 2011-0043Effective Date: 30 March 2011

A report has been received of loss of ATC transponder transmission, due to a loose connection of an installed resistor. The occurrence was related to the Gables ATC/TCAS control panel installed in the affected aeroplane.

Gables Engineering has contacted operators that are known to have the affected type G7490, G7492 or G7493 series control panels, to advise them to return the control panels for modification.

Navigation Systems – Mode-S Transponder Control Panels – Modification

This condition, if not corrected, could lead to further cases of loss of ATC transponder transmission, likely resulting in disruptions in the Air Traffic Management process and potentially compromising aircraft safety.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires the replacement of the affected control panels with modified units.

Gables Engineering Service Bulletin (SB) G7490 ( )-34-01, SB G7492 ( )-34-01 Revision 01, or SB G7493 ( )-34-01, as applicable.

Navigation Systems – Mode-S Transponder Control Panels – Modification

AD No.: 2011-0064Effective Date: 21 April 2011

One operator reported a clearly visible crack in a fuselage lap joint, just forward of the ice protection plate in the forward fuselage. During a subsequent review of fatigue lives of lap joints in general, a critical location was found at a skin cut-out for a water service panel in the rear fuselage. Analysis by Fokker Services shows that at this specific location, due to the high local loads, cracks can occur from about 47K Flight Cycle in the inner skin. The outer skin will cover a crack in the inner skin and a crack will therefore not be visible.

Fuselage – Rear Fuselage Lap Joint – Inspection / Repair

This condition, if not detected and corrected, can result in an exponential crack growth rate, possibly leading to failure of the lap joint over a certain length and consequent in-flight decompression of the airplane.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-time low-frequency eddy current inspection of the lap joint for cracks and, depending on findings, repair of the lap-joint. This AD also requires sending an inspection report (even when no cracks are found) to the TC holder to confirm the selected inspection threshold for aeroplanes that have not yet accumulated 45K FC, as well as the inspection interval. . .


The repetitive inspection task will be introduced in a future revision of the Fokker 50/60 Maintenance Review Board (MRB) Document.Repair of the lap joint constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections.

In addition, the terminating action can also be applied before the initial inspection is required, thereby preventing the need for inspection altogether.

Fokker Services SBF50-53-061 dated 13 January 2011. .

Fokker Services SBF50-53-062 dated 13 January 2011. .


AD No.: 2011-0098Effective Date: 01 August 2011

The Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) have informed EASA that a review of the safety of passenger seats manufactured by Koito industries has disclosed discrepancies which include falsification of static, dynamic and flammability testing, as well as uncontrolled changes to production data (material and dimensional).

In addition, JCAB confirmed that Koito records, showing evidence of falsification, could not be deemed complete.

Equipment & Furnishings – Passenger Seat – Replacement

The exact level of airworthiness risk for each seat model can only be determined through further dynamic or static testing (as per the applicable certification basis) and flammability testing.

This AD requires the affected seats to be replaced no later than 2 years after the effective date of this AD if no test is performed.

However, completion of testing in accordance with the requirements of this AD may allow the seats to remain in service for a longer duration.

Equipment & Furnishings – Passenger Seat – Replacement

AD No.: 2012-0050Effective Date: 10 April 2012

In December 1989, Fokker issued Service Bulletin (SB) SBF50-24-A013 and SBF100-24-A011 (both Alert Bulletins) to instruct operators to inspect and adjust several torque values of bus bars and contactors in the EPC. The Civil Aviation Authority of The Netherlands (CAA-NL, formerly RLD) issued AD (BLA) 89-159 and BLA 89-157 respectively (both now at issue 2), to require operators of the affected aeroplanes to comply with the instructions of these SB’s.

Electrical Power – Electrical Power Center (EPC) and Battery Relay Panel – Inspection / Adjustment

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to arcing and, in combination with other factors, to an on-board fire, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane and injury to occupants or maintenance personnel.EASA issued AD 2011-0083 to address this unsafe condition.This AD retains the requirements of EASAAD 2011-0083, which is superseded, and for F28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes, adds required action for the missing terminal block TB4906A by making reference to SBF100-24-043 Revision 1.Fokker Services SBF50-24-031 dated 29 January 2008. Fokker Services SBF50-24-032 dated 10 February 2011.

Electrical Power – Electrical Power Center (EPC) and Battery Relay Panel – Inspection / Adjustment

AD No.: 2012-0065Effective Date: 24 June 2012

The SFAR 88 requirements to manufacturers, prompted Fokker Services to review their design on the Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 and revealed that the absence of electrical insulation material between a wing main tank Fuel Quantity Indication System (FQIS) probe and the bottom of the tank structure could, under certain conditions, result in an ignition source in the tank vapour space.

Fuel – Wing Main Tanks – Modification [Fuel Tank Safety]

This condition, if not corrected, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane.

To address this unsafe condition, EASA issued AD 2011-0228 to require the application of sealant below the FQIS probes in the wing main tanks and after modification, repetitive inspections to verify that the sealant remains undamaged and, if damage is detected, repair or reapplication of sealant.

Since that AD was issued, EASA decided to amend the compliance time, to require modification at the next scheduled fuel tank opening.


For that reason, this AD retains the requirements of EASA AD 2011-0228, which is superseded, amending the compliance time, at the same time delaying the effective date to compensate for reducing compliance time.

Fokker Services SBF50-28-034 dated 02 September 2011.


AD No.: 2013-0027Effective Date: 22 February 2013

The SFAR88 review conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker 50/60 design in response to these regulations revealed that under certain failure conditions of the maximum fuel level (max level) sensor, or in the wiring to the max level sensor in the inboard fuel tanks, a short circuit may develop in an inboard fuel tank.This condition, if not corrected, could create an ignition source in an inboard fuel tank vapour space, possibly resulting in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane.

Fuel – Inboard Fuel Tank Wiring – Modification [Fuel Tank Safety]

For the reasons described above, this AD requires installation of fuses in the wiring of the max level sensor in the inboard fuel tanks and subsequently, the implementation of the associated Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL).

Fokker Services SBF50-28-036 dated 01 November 2012. .

Fokker Services AOF50.050#03 dated 01 November 2012. Fokker Services AOF50.050#03 dated 01 November 2012.

Fuel – Inboard Fuel Tank Wiring – Modification [Fuel Tank Safety]


For the reasons described previously regarding SFAR88, this AD requires installation of additional bonding provisions inside the fuel tank and to the fuel tank wall and installation of an anti-spray cover on the fuelling shut-off valve in the LH wing and, subsequently, implementation of the associated Fuel Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI) and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL).

Fokker Services SBF50-28-033 dated 01 November 2012, and Revision 1 dated 25 April 2013

.

Fuel – Fuel Tanks – Modification [Fuel Tank Safety]


For the reasons described previously regarding SFAR88, this AD requires installation of additional electrical bonding provisions in the fuel system outside the fuel tanks and, subsequently, implementation of the associated Fuel Airworthiness Limitation Item (ALI) and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL).

Fokker Services SBF50-28-039 dated 01 November 2012, dated 01 November 2012, and Revision 1 dated 25 April 2013.

Fuel – Fuel Tanks – Modification [Fuel Tank Safety]

SERVICE LETTERS SERVICE LETTERS

(SL)(SL)

INDEX

SL 190 Dated: 10 Jul 2012 Rev.5

Introduction:

Several operators have requested Fokker Services’ approval for the use of alternative sealants in case the sealant required in a procedure is not available.

Specifications and Materials – Alternative Sealants for Sealants Specified in the Consumable Material List (CML)

SL 228 Dated: 16 Jun 2011

Introduction:

It was brought to Fokker's attention that some operators prefer the use of Mobil Grease 28 specification MIL-G-81322 instead of Aeroshell Grease 7 specification MIL-G-23827B.

In the current issue of the Consumable Material List (CML) only Castrol grease A1 is referred to as an alternative for Aeroshell Grease 7.

Approved use of Mobil grease 28

Conclusion

Fokker approves the use of Mobil Grease 28 as an alternative to Aeroshell Grease 7 for all applications. It is however not approved to mix both greases for a single application. The CML will be changed to reflect this situation.


SL 232 Dated: 01 Jun 2012

Introduction:

This Service Letter is issued to inform you that the use of Mobilgrease 33, manufactured by ExxonMobil Aviation Lubricants, can be used on the Fokker 50 and the Fokker 60.

Mobilgrease 33 is a high-performance general purpose grease, which provides excellent lubrication performance over a wide temperature range and operating conditions. It has excellent

structural stability and resistance to water wash-out. The grease complies with specification MILPRF- 23827, Type I.


Fokker Services has added Mobilgrease 33 in the Consumable Material List (CML) under material number Fk04-016A. Consequently this grease can be used wherever in the AMM or other Fokker Maintenance Documentation Fk04-016 is required.

In case Mobilgrease 33 is used as an alternative grease i.a.w. the CML, the following must be taken into account:

• Mixing up or use together of alternative types (Type I and Type II) of greases to a single application is not allowed.

• In case an alternative type is to be used, the old grease must be completely removed, followed by a period of high frequency lubrication.


Record must be made of those parts that are lubricated with an alternative type of the specified grease.


SERVICE EXPERIENCE DIGEST SERVICE EXPERIENCE DIGEST

(SED)(SED)

INDEX

SED INDEXSED INDEX

SED PW125B

SED Dowty Propeller

SED Fokker 50 Interior

SED APU

SED: 20-35-001EN00-51-002Effective Date: Sep 2011

Subject information:

The last few months Fokker Services received a significant increase in the number of question concerning our policy on the painting of antennas.

Policy and Approval for the Painting of Antennas

SED: 76-12-006Effective Date: Aug 2012

Subject information:

As more and more operators are incorporating SBF50-76-017, the first service experience data on the modified Automatic Flight Idle Stop System with the Flight Idle Stop System Control Unit becomes available:

Pls open hyperlink above for additional info.

Automatic Flight Idle Stop System – In Service Experience

SED: 24-20-006Effective Date: Sep 2011

Subject information:On the Fokker 50/60 aircraft the GCU is capable of storing

fault codes in its memory. In order to reveal the stored fault codes, the GCU had to be send to an authorized workshop.

To overcome this situation, Fokker Services developed a tool, the GCU Fault Code Downloader, to perform this job in situ.

Information on New Fault Code Downloader Tool for the Generator Control Unit (GCU)

SED: 24-22-002Effective Date: Sep 2011

Subject information:Operators reported loose contactor studs during the

accomplishment of the service bulletin for the one-time inspection and adjustment of the torque value on the contactors and terminal blocks in the EPC of Fokker 70 and Fokker 100 aircraft.

In the Fokker 50/60 the same inspection and adjustment has to be done according to Service Bulletin SBF50-24-032.

Loose Contactor Studs


Subject information:Several operators reported engine anti-icing faults which had been caused by failed bleed air shut-off valve of the intake flange heating system. The valves had been found stuck in the closed position.

Investigation of failed valves at the manufacturer showed that the seat of the poppet valve had come loose, and that this seat had blocked the valve.

Bleed Air Shut-off Valve of Engine Air Intake Flange Heating


Subject information:As more and more operators are incorporating SBF50-76-017, the first service experience data on the modified Automatic Flight Idle Stop System with the Flight Idle Stop System Control Unit becomes available.

Automatic Flight Idle Stop System – In Service Experience

SED: 80-10-003Effective Date: May 2011

Subject information:The starter motor MTBUR is showing a decreasing reliability since 1998.

Fokker Services Component Maintenance shops have seen an increased number of starter motor removals for high brush wear and brush box and /or clutch damage.

Starter Motor - Reliability

SED: 80-10-004Effective Date: May 2011

Subject information:Service Experience Digest (SED) article 80-10/003 informs operators of decreasing starter motor reliability. Goodrich Power Systems and Fokker Services have re-opened the issue for further investigation after operators’ comments during a Technical Focus Group Meeting in April 2006.

This SED article addresses the findings of the investigation.

Starter Motor - Reliability

ENGINEERING NOTICES

(EN)

EN IndexEN Index50-52-004 REAR CARGO COMPARTMENT DOOR STOPS MISSING

IN IPC PARTS LIST

50-31-003 INCORRECT REFERENCE IN AMM

50-34-004 TCAS OPS/FUC – EFFECTIVITY CHANGE

50-51-003 USE OF ALTERNATE EXTERIOR PAINT

50-28-005 INCORRECT FUEL QUANTITY PROBE ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE IN AMM

50-31-002 INCORRECT REFERENCE IN WM 31-13-04

50-31-001 INCORRECT RESULT ACCORDING TO AMM AFTER SELECTION OF LH AND RH PACK

50-52-003 INCORRECT JIC MANUAL AND CAP MODIFICATION

50-28-004 REFUEL DEFUEL ADAPTER ATTACHMENT

50-51-002 CANCELLATION OF HSH INTERPLAN 1065 B ONE-COMPONENTS COATING FOR USE IN THE AIRCRAFT

INTERIOR

EN IndexEN Index50-28-003 LEAKING FUEL FROM NACELLE

50-32-007 LANDING GEAR SELECTOR REMOVALS

50-34-003 INCORRECT PROCEDURE FOR ADJUSTMENT OF THE ROLL TRIM AND 400 HZ REFERENCE OF THE WX RADAR

50-32-006 MAIN WHEEL ASSY REPLACEMENT – PRESENCE OF AXLE SPACER

50-00-003 IPC PART INTERCHANGEABILITY

50-21-003 INCORRECT PN REFERENCE IN THE INSTALLATION PROCEDURE OF THE CONDENSER AND MIXER

50-21-002 INCORRECT PN REFERENCE IN THE INSTALLATION PROCEDURE OF THE CABIN AIR FILTER

50-28-002 SRM PICTURE TO BE USED IN LIEU OF CURRENT PICTURE IN AMM TASK 28-11-00-200-846A

50-34-002 UNCLEAR PROCEDURE IN SB F50-34-055

EN IndexEN Index50-00-002 STANDARDS & PROCESS MANUAL

50-76-001 MODIFICATION TO THE AUTOMATIC FLIGHT-IDLE STOP SYSTEM

50-71-004 A ONE-TIME INSPECTION OF THE ELECTRICAL WIRING HARNESS OF THE ENGINE AIR INTAKE DUCT

50-20-002 SEALANT Fk09-051 DATA INACCURACY

50-52-002 MISSING INFORMATION OF DETAILED VIEWS IN IPC

50-27-002 RADIAL PLAY LIMITATIONS ON FLAP DRIVE NUTS

50-30-001 REPAIR OF DE-ICING BOOTS

50-12-003 CLEANING SOLVENT INTERCHANGEABILITY

50-61-004 PROPELLER BOLTS AND WASHERS

50-27-001 FOUND GREASE NIPPLE ON THE JACK SCREW ACTUATOR OPEN

EN IndexEN Index50-32-004 INTRODUCTION OF INSPECTION FOR PRESENCE

OF LOCKWIRING ON LOCKBOLTS WHICH HOLD THE MLG SLIDING MEMBER END STOP

50-53-001 FUSELAGE SKIN CRACK UNDER WING/ FUSELAGE FAIRING, TOP COVER OR DORSAL FIN

50-33-001 WINGTIP NAVIGATION LIGHTS

50-32-003 ADJUSTMENT OF MAIN LANDING GEAR No.1 UPLOCK SWITCHES

50-12-002 WATER RESIDUE AFTER AIRCRAFT WASHING

50-32-002 ANTI SKID SYSTEM TEST AFTER MAINTENANCE

50-80-002 STARTER MOTOR RELIABILITY

50-12-001 PREFERRED USE OF AEROSHELL GREASE 33 INSTEAD OF AEROSHELL GREASE 7

50-51-001 CORRECT INSTALLATION OF THE NOSE GEAR STONE DEFLECTOR ASSEMBLY AS PER SBF50-51-003

EN IndexEN Index50-61-002 DE-ICER BOOT ADHESIVES

50-34-001 SYMBOL GENERATOR REVERSED TAWS IMAGE GENERATION

50-32-001 INCORRECT INSTALLATION OF MAIN WHEEL BRAKE UNITS

50-21-001 ACM & HEAT EXCHANGER MAINTENANCE PRACTICES

50-80-001 STARTER MOTOR PREMATURE FAILURE

50-71-002 ENGINE MOUNT ATTACHMENT BOLTS AT STA. 1930

50-20-001 TORQUE VALUES

50-71-001 INCORRECT ELECTRICAL HARNESS INSTALLATION

50-25-004 BEVERAGE MAKER USER INSTRUCTIONS

50-61-001 FEATHERING PUMP OIL LEAKAGE

50-55-001 LOOSE LEADING EDGE

50-74-001 INSTALLATION OF HT LEAD

ENGINEERING ORDERS

(EO)

EO IndexEO Index50-61-20R1 PROPELLER EROSION PROTECTION

MAINTENANCE PRACTICES

05-12-04 EXTERIOR CLEANING

05-61-01 ALTERNATE PROCEDURE FOR REPLACEMENT OF PITCH CONTROL UNIT

05-32-11 GROUND / FLIGHT SIMULATOR SWITCHES

ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE

MI.50.006 ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE FOR RAI OF NLG STEERING BOX ASSY

50.12.66 OXYGEN SERVICING

UNSATISFACTORY REPORTS

(UR)

UR IndexUR IndexAir BalticAir Baltic

BluebirdBluebird

Denim Air ACMIDenim Air ACMI

Panta HoldingsPanta Holdings

Air AstanaAir Astana

COMMENTS

The EndThe End

Please do not forget to fill in your ‘Course Please do not forget to fill in your ‘Course evaluation form’ and send this together evaluation form’ and send this together

with your ‘questionair sheet’ to with your ‘questionair sheet’ to [email protected] [email protected]

fokker 50 continuation training revision cycle: 2 years author: m.dekker continued airworthiness...

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