fo b3 public hearing 1-26-04 2 of 3 fdr- tab 9-18 mfr- 10-21-03 jane garvey interview 689

8/14/2019 FO B3 Public Hearing 1-26-04 2 of 3 Fdr- Tab 9-18 MFR- 10-21-03 Jane Garvey Interview 689

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M E M O R A N D U M F O R THE RECO RDEvent: Jane GarveyType of Event: InterviewDate: October 21, 2003Special Access Issues: Non ePrepared by: Bill JohnstoneTeam N umber: 7Locat ion: Co mm ission Offices: GSA Conference RoomParticipants - Non-Commission: Jane GarveyParticipants - Commiss ion: SamBrinkley, Bill Johnstone, John Raidt, Lisa SullivanBackground and Mission[U ] Ms. Garvey was FAA Administrator from 1997-2002.[U ] M s. Garvey indicated that during her tenure at the FA A, the agency's top prioritieswere always safety, security and system efficiency. In backing up that statement, shepointed out that three of the main members of the FAA "management board" were theassociate directors fo r security (Irish Flynn, later Mike Canavan), safety (Guy Gardner,later Nick Sabotini) and air traffic control (Steve Brown). She met with these managerstwice a week (usually M ondays and Fridays).Security Reporting[U ] W hen Ms. G arvey arrived at the FA A , she was aware of the good reputation thatFAA Secu rity chief Irish Flyn n had both inside and outside the agency. Con sequently,she didn't see a need to change the agen cy's security leadership. W hen sh e took over theagency had just gone through a difficult period, w ith the Pan A m 103, th e ValuJet crash,an d TW A 800, and Ms. Garvey looked to the recommendations of the Gore Commissionas the blueprint she needed to focus on for safety (which was a "huge" issue) andsecurity. She believed that Flyn n received good coo peration from the agency leadershipin implementing th e Gore security recommendations. She added that th e approach ofY2K was also a focal point for her, especially because of Congressional criticism ofF A A ' s preparedness to deal with th e problem.[U] W ith respect to security reporting, M s. Garvey indicated that Irish Flynn had a"pretty direct line" to both her and Deputy Administrator Belger whenever he needed todiscuss anything. She did not receive daily reports, but relied on Flynn to keep herinformed and anytime he needed her attention he got it. M s. Garvey believed F lynn did agood job in keeping her informe d on security matters. If there w as a problem, she kept


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Commiss ion Sensitiveon top of these, but she relied on Flynn's judgment , as well as that of DeputyAdministrator Belger.[U] Garvey valued DOT Inspector G eneral Ken Mead 's judgment and counsel. Forexample, they undertook a joint review of post-TWA 800 safety issues. She felt thatMead had cons tructive suggestions, but at the beginning of her tenure at the FAA hedidn' t focus much on security. Over time, there were a number of discussions betweenthe FAA and Mead on airport access issues, an d Garvey worked w ith him on these. Itseemed to her that the FAA Director of Operations spent "all of his time" on airportaccess. Garvey believed that progress w as made on this front, but not sustained. As aformer airport director, she personally talk ed a lot about access issues, and brought theairports into the discussion .[U] S-60 (DOT D irector of Intelligence and Secu rity) was Garvey's key link w ith theSecretary of Transportation. While sh e recalled doing briefings on follow-up to the GoreCommission recomm endations, she didn't think she had initiated specific briefings onsecurity with the S ecretary.Vulnerabilities[U] Lynne Osm us briefed Garvey on Red Team results. Flynn provided he r with moregeneric briefin gs on vulnerabilities. As to particular problems, she was aware of thetechnology challenges of Explosive Detection Systems (EDS), human factor problems inboth safety and security, and the slowness of rulemaking . On EDS , she knew thetechnology was flawed, bu t there was a Congressional deadline on deployment; sh e feltsuch emph asis on this one com ponent of the security system was "disturbing." On thewhole, though, sh e felt the FAA was a solid organization, which had done good work.[U ] Ms. Garvey stated, "On balance, there was a positive feeling about security...Youalways worry about it.. .It's the unknown, th e uncertainty, which keeps yo u awake."[U ] Garvey expressed the opinio n that the aviation system's strengths were based onredundancies, in all areas (safety, security an d efficiency). The security failures(documented by GAO , the IG and others) were a concern, but there were other w ays todeal with them (such as by enhanced training of the aircraft crew).Domestic Threat[U ] With the benefit of hindsight, Ms. Garvey indicated that the blindness to the threat todomestic civil aviation seem s "obvious." At the time, the emphasis w as on the overseasthreat, particularly in the Middle East (which was also a reflection of her own"suspicions" as to threat). There were also concern s raised by the A rab-A m ericancommunity about being targets of security m easures . She recalled a similar com plaint onbehalf of Arab-A mericans from at least one Member of Congress. In response, Garveywent to Detroit to meet with the Arab-American comm unity there.

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Com mission SensitiveShe observed that they, like other Americans, were (and are) schizophrenic with respectto such measures: w e wa nt to be secure, but we also don' t want to be inconvenienced.[U ] While Irish Flynn had raised general concerns, he had been unable to providespecifics about the threat. She was unaware of the frustrations felt by Irish Flynn in thistime period (which Flynn testified to the Commission about) that led him to g o to theCIA and FBI to seek better threat inform ation. In hindsight, she wishes she had beenasked to go to the intelligence com mu nity to push for such inform ation.[U ] After Pan Am 103, the FAA had developed a better working relationship with theFBI, according to Garvey. However, pre-9/11, she had no knowledge of any informationthe FBI may have possessed on Moussaoui, on terrorists training as pilots or of thePhoenix memo.[SSI] Ms. Garvey did not recall seeing a numbe r of documents that dealt with thepotential threat to dome stic civil aviation (some o f which raised but largely discountedthe possibility of su icide hijackings in the U.S.), including the 1995 National IntelligenceEstima te, a 1998 FAA assessm ent and a 1999 FAA Intelligence N ote. She was aware ofa 2000-1 CD -ROM briefing prepared by Pat McD onnell for the airlines and airportsabout the terrorist threat to civil a viation, but she learned m ore about its contents after9/11.[U ] While Garvey was aware of Bin Laden pre-9/11, she saw hijac king as a relativelylower risk.Com puter Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS)[U ] Ms. Garvey believes that CAPPS is an effective tool as part of a system ic approach tosecurity. It provides a way to narrow the field in terms of potential threats. Pre-9/11, he rmindset was focused on the explosives threat, and so was the CA PPS program. W henCAPPS was to be implem ented (after the Gore Co mm ission), it was controversial. Sheinformed the airlines that it was going to get done. The system's focus on checked bagsw as "sensible" in Garvey's view because: a) that was where th e threat was (i.e.bombing), and b) that was what could get done.[U ] According to Garvey, the airlines were "difficult" to deal with concerning CAPPSand their relationship with the FA A was alwa ys somewhat c onfrontational. She talkedwith Bob Baker (American Airlines) about CAPPS and other security issues, and hethought CA PPS w as a mistake from a resource allocation standpoint, given higherpriority safety needs.[U ] Ms. G arvey did not recall the 1997 expiration of a Security Directive which hadsubjected "selectees" under the manual, pre-CAPPS profiling system to securitymeasures which included searching their persons and carry-on baggage.



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Commission SensitiveCheckpoint Screening[U ] Garvey was frustrated with the human an d technological limitations with respect toscreening, problem s that she believes T SA still faces today. She indicated, "We knew weha d to be better," and cited the FAA 's efforts on screener training (Threat ImageProjection system ) and screening comp any certification. She also pointed to a certainschizophrenia with respect to the very expensive and somewhat flawed EDS machines:was this too muc h or too little in improv ing screening? Overall, she felt the systemneeded to focus m ore on redun dancies (i.e. other security layers, especially intelligence)an d on hum an factors. She was frustrated in watching Co ngress's post-9/11 deliberationson checkpoint screening. There needed to be recognition that it was virtually impo ssibleto get a "foolproof system.Aircraft Security[U ] Garvey first go t involved on this issue when she was Director at Logan A irport.After Desert Storm, sh e discussed the subject with Israeli authorities, who hadimplemented m ore secure cockpit doors in response to the terrorist threat. Ga rveyreported that, wh ile at the FAA , she struggled with the issue because of Flight Standards'safety concerns about decompression. For the Israelis, the terrorist threat clearlyoutweighed the decompression risk, but this was not clear in the U.S. prior to 9/11.[SSI] The Federal Air Marshal (FAM ) program was in place when Garvey arrived, but itsfocus was on flights outside of the U.S. Garvey did not recall an y instance in which sh edisapproved a request fo r security spending, including fo r FAM. However, the programstill faced budge t constraints (as did the rest of the FAA bu dget), and though the G oreCommission helped some by boosting overall aviation security spending by $100 million,Garvey and others (including in Congress) didn't think FAM was as high a priority asother FAA needs.[SSI] Ms. Garvey did not recall discussions about revisions in the "Common Strategy"for dealing with hijackings. She indicated that it was felt to be the right approach, pr e9/11. She recalled a post-9/11 incident at Dulles w here the pilots follow ed the old"comm on strategy" training an d climbed out of the plane, rather than defend the cockpit.She was briefed on FAA hijacking procedures, and, prior to 9/11 there ha d beenapproximately a half-dozen previous suspected hijacking incidents while she wasAdministrator, none of which turned out to be a hijacking. She did not recall discussionsduring 2001 about raising the AVSE C alert level above level III. She indicated that sucha decision w ould have been initiated by Flynn, or his successor C anavan, andsubsequently approved by her and the Secretary.Foreign Threat[SSI] Garvey didn 't think "hijacking was solved," or that anything else in aviation wasfinally solved, fo r that matter. She cited the extraordinary security m easures at specificoverseas airports (at one time, over 40 airports fell into this category) as the core of the



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Commission Sensitiveaviation security system's attempt to target heightened security where they were mostneeded. She was aware of the Security Directives an d Information Circulars issued bythe FAA during the spring an d summer of 2001 that emphasized the overseas threat, an dcalled on airlines an d airports to be on guard an d make sure their security measures weredeployed.Risk Management[U ] Risk management at the FAA was largely based on intelligence products, supplied bythe intelligence com mu nity. The FAA itself was better at data analysis fo r both safetyan d security, or as Ms. Garvey observed, the agency w as "data rich, but informationpoor." The Gore Comm ission ha d provided a blueprint fo r both safety an d security,which the FAA tried to follow.[U ] M s. Garvey indicated that FAA's security priorities were threat-driven, and she citedBrian Jenkins as making the point that security is often reactive. The key is how youidentify trends. Aviation had historically developed its agenda based on historical data,such as the number an d kind of safety incidents. Garvey stated that she was morefamiliar with safety issues, because these were very clearly entirely within FAA'spurview. The bottom line was that the FA A's risk assessment w as based primarily on theanalyses done by its Intelligence office.Fines[U ] Garvey reported that the FAA had sought Congressional approval to raise the finesfor safety or security violations from $1,000 to $10,000. The agency's goal in so doingwas no t to raise reven ue but to leverage improved co mpliance by the industry. She didnot recall the fines on airlines or screening companies being reduced by as much as 90%,as some have charged.[U] M s. Garvey objected to terming the fine process as a "negotiation." As described byM s. Garvey, the process would be initiated on site by a security inspector, who wouldrecommend the imposition of a fine first to the Regional Office an d then to Headquarters.The airlines wou ld have an opportunity to present a rebuttal to the charges, with theprocess on the FAA end being handled by the General Counsel's office. M s. Garveycould not recall an y instance in which she was involved in making decisions on fines.[U ] Under M s. Garvey, the FAA initiated a policy of publicizing fines, after a certainamount of t ime (one year) ha d passed. (The reason for the delay was to avoid publicizingcontempo rary vulnerability information, which could be exploited by those wishing to doharm.) She indicated that this new approach was effective enough to have drawncomplaints from the airlines.[U ] Ms. Garvey recomm ended that the whole system of fines and enforcem ent should bereviewed. She believes that the airlines did regard the fines as just a cost of doing



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Commission Sensitivebusiness. However, sh e candidly adm itted that changing the enforcem ent system was nothigh on her list of priorities as Administrator.9-11 Fam ilies' Question[U ] Ms. Garvey was not aware of any information that the Attorney General and otherhigh-ranking Cabinet officials ha d refrained from flying on comm ercial aircraft in theperiod prior to 9/11. Had there been such actions, sh e felt sure that sh e would have beenmad e aware of them.Rulemaking[U] Ms. Garvey stated that rulemaking presented the challenge of allowing publiccomm ent while being responsive to dealing with the problem at hand. She doesn'tbelieve that an y federal agency has achieved the perfect balance, an d that was especiallytrue of the FAA. Part of the problem was the enormous num ber of rules. WhileCongress legislated expedited rulema king procedures in 1996, in practice this providedlittle relief. Virtually everything still had to go through the regular process. One reactionto the cumbersome rulemaking process at the FAA was to use temporary measures(Security Directives for security, Ac tion Directives for safety) to bypass the system. Shebelieves that TSA's expedited rulemak ing authority m ight be more useful.[U] W hile the F A A ' s Challenge 2000 task force had developed recomm endations forimproving rulemaking, at that time the Office of the Secretary of Transportation only ha don e person (Nancy McFadden in the General Counsel's office) assigned to handle al lFAA rules, an d Garvey reported that the agency still hasn't "cracked the code" to enableexpedited handling even within the departmen t. Direct contact betwee n the FAA andOMB was not encouraged.[U ] She cited the screener ce rtification rule as one that had received severe criticism fromthe small business sector, which in turn caused the rule to be pulled back. On anotherfront, she had thought that Jim Hall of NTSB w ould be an ally in producing an alternativeto cost-benefit requiremen ts in rulema king and she tasked the FAA Policy office to workon this; however, nothing came of it.The Airlines[U ] M s. Garvey recalled discussions with Bob Baker of Am erican Airlines on therulemaking process, and she believed that B aker an d some other airline operations people(Ed Bohler, Crowley an d others) did understand the value of investments in safety andsecurity, but this wasn' t always reflected in their companies' positions on rulemaking.With respect to cost-benefit analysis, sh e indicated that this was where the FAA had tomake the case to the airlines about the value of safety an d security investm ents. Both theFAA and the airlines had far more experience with safety incidents, so such analysis wassomewhat easier in that field. With respect to security, Garvey felt there was a need for



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Commission Sensitivean alternative approach, such as a way to identify priority rules that must be doneregardless of the cost-benefit analysis.[U] Ms. Garvey indicated that the airline industry had proven its effectiveness on CapitolHill, and would go to Congress directly on contentious issues. She cited the rule onbackground checks, which preceded her tenure at the FA A, Congressional pressure onspecific technology deployments (such as L3 and Envision) and the post-9/11 "bail-out"as examples. How ever, she did not recall ever receiving a call from a Member ofCongress urging that a rule not be promulgated.[U] Garvey agreed that it was a fair characterization that airlines regarded security as an"externality" and this may be an even greater problem today wtyen airlines think they ca n"wash their hands of it." She also indicated that the airlines were more concerned withsafety than security because they had mo re recent and continuous experience with theformer.FAA Priorities[U] According to Garvey, all elements of the FAA , with the exception of the Air TrafficControllers, could ha ve u sed a dditional funding, with training ran king as perhaps thebiggest need. She and the agency spent more time on safety and efficiency (on issuessuch as traffic congestion and crew rest) because that was "what was eating our lunch."Furthermore, that was the feeling on Capitol Hill, of the Inspector General and ofindustry. However, sh e maintained that the FAA security leadership was able to get herattention w henever they needed to .[U ] M s. Garvey pointed to the public's aversion to delays, and the FAA's need to focuson keeping the country moving: "that was the mood of the t ime. Every day in 2001 waslike the day before Thanksgiving." She also worried about the impact of congestion onsafety. W hile Garvey herself did not view security as "disruptive," sh e believes others,including th e airlines, might h ave.Hijacking Response Preparation[U] Garvey noted that the last domestic hijacking ha d been in 1991. She felt that intraditional hijackings, the aviation security system had a greater sense of "control" (vianegotiations) than in the case of explosives, and the latter also generally produced greaterconsequences. She did not believe, pre-9/11, that suicide hijackings rose to the samelevel of potential threat as either a traditional hijacking or sabotage.[U ] In the half-dozen suspected hijackings which had occurred on her watch prior to9/11, M s. Garvey indicated that the Security division had the lead, and they wouldactivate the operations center and notify the Administrator who would overseeoperations. There was no operational checklist fo r her. She was prepared to notify theSecretary and his Chief of Staff, but none of these previous instances turned out to be abig deal , and none was in any way a "warm-up" for the 9/11 events.



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[U] While she did do preparatory exercises for Y2K , she didn 't recall participating inhijacking experiences. How ever, both Monte Belger and Lynne Osmus, who Garveyrelied on, had significant security experience. She was confid ent that key staff hadclearly defined roles in such emergen cies, and she recalls at managem ent meetings thatAdmiral Flynn stressed the need to know where everyone was so they could receiveemergency notifications, as w ell as the importance of following procedures.The Day of September 11, 2001[U ] M s. Garvey had just returned from Texas, and on the morning of 9/11 she was in Sec.Mineta's office for a breakfast meeting w ith th e European Union Transportation Minister(Madame Durant) and her aide (Michel Arrille) on environmental issues. The meetingwas in the Secretary's Conference Room at DOT headquarters, an d present, in addition tothe Europeans were Sec. Mineta, Adm inistrator Garvey, DOT's Chief Counsel, an d CarlBurleson. Mineta Chief of Staff John Flaherty "rushed into the room" an d notified theSecretary an d Adm inistrator that they were needed "right away." This was at the t ime ofthe first reports o f the first plane hitting the Wo rld Trade Center (WTC). CNN was on inthe Secretary's office.[U] The first reaction in the room was that it was a small plane, possibly the result of aheart attack of the pilot. Garvey imm ediately called the FAA Operations Center to askwhat w as going on and was told, "They were not sure; we've just got word of a potentialhijacking," but the two events were not necessarily connected.[U] Ms. Garvey then left immediately fo r FAA, which would have been between the firstand second W TC crashes (she did not make note of the t imes throughout the day), an donce there went through the 10 th Floor Operations Center, where Lee Longmire waslocated, on to the security operations area "vault" (SVTS), where she met up with MonteBelger, an d tried to reach FA A Security chief Cana van. Once there, she was incommunication with the Herndon Com mand Center (directed by Linda S chussler an dBen Sliney that day), which was handling most of the communications for FAAheadquarters that day. The initial feeling w as that this was an Air Traffic Control (ATC)matter, and the rest of the FAA would help and try to gather information. M s. Garveymaintained an open line fo r comm unications with the field and w as asking what washappe ning. Garvey called the Secretary, an d Belger may have called the New York an dBoston air traffic control offices at this time. She does not recall the arrival of the DOTDirector of Intelligence an d Security.[U ] After the second crash, she learned that FAA personnel at Logan were already testingthe screening machines and interviewing relevant people at the airport. As she waslistening in on the communications, it was clear that other agencies had been pulled in tothe call, and her assumption (though unconfirmed at the t ime) was that this included theFBI and NORA D.



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[U ] While after the second crash there was growing awareness that the events had likelybeen hijackings, after the Pentagon crash, they knew they were dealing with an"extraordinary" event. At that point, Don Car ty from Am erican called, and he couldn'tbelieve the Pentagon crash had been an Am erican plane. He asked what she knew, whichshe told him w as v ery little at that point, a nd she inquired what he knew about Americanflights. Shortly thereafter, there w as a report of a 4 l plane having gone down near theOhio River, and with numero us repetitions becam e almost a fact. At that point, she wentfor a brief visit to check on the FAA Day Care Center, and to m ake sure that FAAemployees weren't panicking, and those who w ere leaving were exiting safely. M s.Garvey recalled that the atmosphere that m orning throughout the building was intense,but calm and professional.[U ] Sometime between the Pentagon and Pennsylvania crashes, Garvey ca lled JimGoodwin (CEO of U nited Airlines) and Leo Mullin (CEO of Delta) to ask them whatthey knew about their planes (there was some concern at this time about a loss ofcommunication with certain Delta flights as well). M ullin was appar ently aware of theproblems at American a nd United and he was m ore concerned to learn about what wasgoing on those airlines.The Ground Stop[U ] After the fourth crash, the challenge was to determine what to do about the nationalairspace. Sec. Mineta and John Flaherty had left by this time to go to the W hite House,but were still in comm unication with the FAA. Belger told Ms. G arvey that Boston andNew York ATC had alrea dy instituted a ground stop, and Garvey indicated to theCommission that she felt that this was a case of the controllers themselves taking theproper action and that part of the response worked well. At that point, Garvey and Belgerfelt that they needed to get the Secretary m ore into the decision-m aking loop. Minetathen called, and Belger expressed the view that the FAA needed to bring all of the planesdown. After conferr ing with Vice President Cheney, Mineta ordered that action.[U ] W ith respect to the issue of "pilot discretion" in implementing the ground stop, M s.Garvey recalled that Belger had explained the standard protocol in groundings, whereb ythe pilot in charge had authority to implement in a way that d idn't com prom ise theplane's safety (for example, with respect to fuel supply). She believes that the Secretarymay have m isunderstood the degree and nature of this discretion, and that m ay have ledto the reports of him ordering the planes to land without any pilot discretion.[U ] Once the order wa s given to ground all planes in the national airspace, Ms. G arveywent back to the CV TS "vault" (which would have been around 11 AM ). The order wastreated as a matter for the ATC system to handle, and discretion was given to the flightcontrollers as to what to sa y to the pilots. M s. Gar vey cited a concern that the order toland be given to the pilots in very clear terms and not confused with other issues, and thusthere was no clear, system-wide order given to comm unicate to pilots to secure theircockpits.

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[U] As the planes were being grounded, screening the disembarking passengers was notconsidered. For one thing, given the many planes diverted to small airports in the U.S.an d Canada, it is not at all certain that the capacity to do this in any reasonable timeframe even existed.Immediate Response to 9/11[U ] Ms. Garvey indicated that in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, he r focus was to getthe system up and running again, and top determine what security counter-measureswould be need to be undertaken. Som etime in October, she asked the FBI for anintensive briefing on their recommendations as to what needed to be done, based on theirinvestigation of the hijackings. Th e FAA's liaison to the FBI (Jack Salata) was involvedin the briefing. Ms. Garvey recalled that the Bureau provided "evasive" and "imprecise"responses as to whether they had discovered other plots.[U ] W ith respect to reports of a gun having been used in the AAL Flight 11 hijacking,M s. Garvey did not recall receiving such a report at the time and n ever believed this hadoccurred, but she subsequently heard about the reports through med ia accounts and aGA O investigation. W hen she was presented with several versions of the "ExecutiveSumm ary" said to have been prepared for her (the first two versions of which cited thegu n report), Garvey did not recall seeing these on the 11 th an d possibly not on the 12 theither.[U ] M s. Garvey did recall that the Secretary ha d received a report, later determined tohave been "fabricated," of a shredded U.S. airline uniform (with ID stolen) having beenfound in France. W ith respect to cockpit ju m p seat usage, Ms. Garvey had no directknowledge of any 9/1 1-related prob lems, but indicated that the FA A Flight StandardsOffice was in charge of such access issues and that the airlines had their own po licieswith respect to obtaining authorization to use the seats.[U ] Garvey recalled much action growing out of the recomm endations of the Secretary'sRapid Response teams, input from the FBI and other sources, in the immediate aftermathof 9/11. M any, but not all, of these took the form of S ecurity Directives (SD's). Sheremem bered briefing s and discussions on such issues as disallowance of silverw are inFirst Class (on which she had "an interesting conversation w ith a CEO on knives"), thecurbside check-in ban, and cockpit door re-enforcement.[U ] M s. Garvey reported that Sec. M ineta had some tough conv ersations with airlineCEO s in this period. Garvey was "surprised" to learn of reports that she had "watereddown" the initial SD 's and believes that all of the items that had been determined to benecessary were included. She recalled that she "might" have questioned some of thedetails an d implementation of some of the SD's issued in the immediate aftermath of9/11 , she did not recall receiving an y input from the airlines in that regard. As t ime wenton, G arvey added, the airline and airport security directors did begin to question the need

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Commission Sensitivefo r certain counter-measures, such as the 300-foot rule (for parking in front of a terminal)at smaller airports.Lessons Learned[U ] Later, Ms. Garvey was made aware that there ha d been some confusion at theOperations Center at the outset, an d that they didn 't have the right training for such anemergency , which nothing in the recent past had prepared them to deal with. Belger did areview and focused on such issues as the com position of the Operations Center staffingan d the notification of NORAD (which sh e learned was initially don e at a "low level").As a result, certain FAA policies were changed very quickly. Garvey acknowledged thatthe FAA did not do a very good job of documenting the lessons learned, an d while on ecould see the results of what they learned in the ma ny actions taken in the immediateaftermath of 9/11, sh e wished they ha d done more in this regard .[U ] Re-opening the national airspace required an ongoing review of the lessons learned,especially with respect to Reagan National Airport, an d involved the input from otherfederal agencies as well as other interested parties.[U ] M s. Garvey stated that, with the benefit of hindsight, on e could lose sight of thecontext within which the aviation security system was operating on 9/11. She felt thatthey did a good job back then of doing what they knew to do: "we responded well to whatwe then understood the threat to be." She feels that she and others in the system shouldhave done a better job of com mun icating their actions back then, and the reason s forthem. M s. Garv ey believes that th e Comm ission faces a challenge in trying to put itsreport in the perspective and tenor of the pre-9/11 t imeframe.Garvey Recommendations

1) Not just with respect to aviation bu t also more generally, there is a critical need toinstitutionalize the collection an d sharing of relevant intelligence. Garvey thoughtthis fu nction probably needs to be centralized, with on e entity possessing all ofthe relevant information for dissemination.2) There is a continuing ne ed to clarify the roles and responsibilities for aviationsecurity. The airports should have a clear role carved ou t with respect toperim eter security. There should be federal control of checkpoint screening, butnot necessarily a federal wor kforce. (Ms. Garvey expressed a concern that th eairlines' overriding financial mission would always detract from security, if they

were given responsibility for screening again.)3) Security Boards for airlines is an "interesting idea" (in response to a suggestionfrom Commission staff).

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Com mission Sensitive4) W e need better security training for flight crews (including certification). Ms.Garvey felt that now that the airlines had been relieved of screeningresponsibilities they could focus m ore on this and other layers of security.5) The security system needs to retain an element of randomness to defeatdetermined adversaries.6) W e need more "robust" risk management. (She reported that FAA did this moreintuitively.)

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