flying planes, surgery and privacy (external version)

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Flying planes, surgery and privacy Ian Oliver Tomi Kulmala Security, Privacy and Continuity Team 9 April 2013

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Page 1: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Flying planes, surgery and privacy Ian Oliver

Tomi Kulmala

Security, Privacy and Continuity Team

9 April 2013

Page 2: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

30 October 1935

On 30 October 1935, Army Air Corps test-pilot Major Ployer Peter Hill and Boeing employee Les Tower took the Model 299 on a second evaluation flight; however, the crew forgot to disengage the airplane's "gust lock." Having taken off, the aircraft entered a steep climb, stalled, nosed over and crashed, killing Hill and Tower (other observers survived with injuries).

Page 3: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Solution

• No additional pilot training

• Creation of checks for – Startup

– Taxi (1)

– Take-off

– Climb

– Cruise

– Descent

– Approach

– Landing

– Taxi (2)

– Shutdown

– Exceptional circumstances

• Single Engine Failure

• Icing conditions

• Fire

• Etc...

Page 4: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Application to Privacy Audits

We developed:

• Epics, Use cases for Privacy

• ”Checklists”

• Software Development Process Integration

• Audit Procedures

– Non functional areas: privacy, secuity, performance, buisiness continuity

and the result was...

Page 5: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Application to Privacy Audits

Failure

Page 6: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Application to Privacy Audits

Failure

Maybe an extreme overstatement but: • Complex to apply • Tied to a specific software development processe

• Waterfall vs Agile almost irrelevant • Hard to map to variations

• Time consuming • Required an expert to audit • Required too much formality, documentation and time from the

development teams • Prone to missing details due to overall complexity • Hard to apply incrementally

Page 7: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Why didn’t that work?

• Despite highly trained personel – Cessna Single Engine Failure

• FLY THE AIRCRAFT – Air France AF447

• To much adherence to process – Processes tell everyone the order of what to do – Difficulty in handling exceptions and experts – Aviation Checklists are status checks used to ensure due dilligence in preparation for the

next and future phases of flight. • Checklist replaced responsibility and expertise

– For both the auditor and develoment teams

• Tick-box oriented – Ask questions, Accept answers, TICK! – Limited understanding and context of naswers

• Limited time-scale

– One-off review

Page 8: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Preventing Central Line Infections

• Peter Provonost, John Hopkins University Hospital, UK

Page 9: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Preventing Central Line Infections

• Peter Provonost, John Hopkins University Hospital, UK

1. Wash Hands • Soap with water or alcohol

2. Wear Sterile Clothing • Mask, gloves, gown, hair

covering • Cover patient with sterile drape • Minimise access hole

3. Clean Patient’s Skin • Chlorhexidine

4. Avoid Veins in arm and leg • Greater infection risk

5. Check line for infection • Minimum once per day • Remove when not needed

Page 10: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Preventing Central Line Infections

• Peter Provonost, John Hopkins University Hospital, UK

1. Wash Hands • Soap with water or alcohol

2. Wear Sterile Clothing • Mask, gloves, gown, hair

covering • Cover patient with sterile drape • Minimise access hole

3. Clean Patient’s Skin • Chlorhexidine

4. Avoid Veins in arm and leg • Greater infection risk

5. Check line for infection • Minimum once per day • Remove when not needed

• 10 day infection rate went from 11% to 0% in one month • 2 infections in 2000 patients in 15 months

Page 11: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Preventing Central Line Infections

• Peter Provonost, John Hopkins University Hospital, UK

1. Wash Hands • Soap with water or alcohol

2. Wear Sterile Clothing • Mask, gloves, gown, hair

covering • Cover patient with sterile drape • Minimise access hole

3. Clean Patient’s Skin • Chlorhexidine

4. Avoid Veins in arm and leg • Greater infection risk

5. Check line for infection • Minimum once per day • Remove when not needed

• 10 day infection rate went from 11% to 0% in one month • 2 infections in 2000 patients in 15 months

• Devolved responsibility: ALL given power to stop procedure in case of non-compliance, eg: nurses cross-check doctors

• No impact on process • Tool improvements:

• dedicated packs for central line equipment including sterile clothing, drapes, soaps etc

• Placement of equipment next to each patent (readiness)

Page 12: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Checklists in Surgery

• Atul Gawande et al.

• Simplicity

• Two kinds: – DO-CONFIRM

– READ-DO

• Independent of process – No tick-boxes

– Emphasis on communication

– Emphasis on shared and devolved responsibility

• Devolved responsibility

• Integrates other checklists and procedures

– Eg: anaethesia machine checkout

Page 13: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Surgery and Privacy?

• Most audits have some form of initial self-diagnosis of varying quality – We have/have not PII?

– Here’s are some links to an ”architecture”

– ”Our database schema is MySQL 5”

• Triage

• Diagnosis and Operation Planning

• Operating on the privacy patient – Diagnoses change, different parts operated upon

• Closing the wound, cleaning-up and release to intensive care

• Following-up with the privacy patient – diagnosis,

– Drugs

– prognosis

• What Has Privacy Got To Do With Surgery? – Surgey and Privacy operate in ”long timescale”, agile environments

– ( http://ijosblog.blogspot.fi/2013/03/what-has-surgery-got-to-do-with.html )

Page 14: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Privacy Audit Checklist

Inspired by the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist

Page 15: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Implementation and not a Process

Page 16: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Process Integration

R&D Team Checklist (before review)

R&D Team Checklist (post-review)

Audit Team Checklist (sign-in)

Audit Team Checklist

(time-out)

Audit Team Checklist (sign-out)

Project development & processes (time)

System under audit Review

Lead

Legal Expert

Additional members

Architecture Expert

Reivew Lead IS NEVER reponsible

for running the checklist!

”Su

rgic

al T

eam

Page 17: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Process Integration

R&D Team Checklist (before review)

R&D Team Checklist (post-review)

Audit Team Checklist (sign-in)

Audit Team Checklist

(time-out)

Audit Team Checklist (sign-out)

Project development & processes (time)

Page 18: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

System Rampdown

Another example is ramping down a system • Customer interaction • Complex interaction of

stakeholders • Complex legal requirements • Complex data handling

requirements • 3rd parties often involved

for data destruction • Etc...

Page 19: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

Experiences • It works!

– Takes time to ramp up and customised but much faster than detailed previously

– Accepted by auditors and development teams

• Exposing holes in our externalisation of knowledge

• Exposes holes in our knowledge of what privacy is (and demonstrates our naivety) – On The Naivety of Privacy ( http://ijosblog.blogspot.fi/2013/01/on-naivety-of-privacy.html )

• Customer Checklists are of the READ-DO type with short timescales – Vital Signs

– Pre diagnosis

– Structured follow-up

• Audit Team Checklist is a DO-CONFIRM type with longer time-scales

• Tooling weaknesses – Data extraction, documentation, auditing tools, formal reporting, ontologies, classification systems

– What is ”information”?

• Localisation for particular contexts (by design!)

• Implemention by mentoring, not teaching

• Single person teams – Discipline improvement in this situation.

– Avoid introducing yourself to the team however...

• Quality improvement – Due dilligence, coverage, depth, speed of review

• Confusion can happen with the process-obsessed, tick-box mentality

Page 20: Flying Planes, Surgery and Privacy (external version)

More Information

• Ian Oliver: [email protected]

• Twitter: @i_j_oliver

• Blog: http://ijosblog.blogspot.fi/