flooding taskforce report on the fermanagh flooding nov2009

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FLOODING TASKFORCE

Report of the Flooding Taskforce on the

Fermanagh Flooding of November 2009

OFMDFM July 2010



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Flooding Taskforce is grateful to the people of Fermanagh who gave

freely of their time and energies to detail to us the impact the November 2009

flooding had on them, as well as sharing their wider views and concerns about

flooding in the Fermanagh area. Without the input of the local community

obtained through the evidence gathering sessions and the many written

submissions made, this report would not have been possible.

The Taskforce would also like to express its gratitude to Fermanagh District

Council for all of their help and advice and in particular for facilitating the

evidence gathering sessions in Enniskillen and Lisnaskea.

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CONTENTS

Page

1. Executive Summary 5

2. Introduction 11

3. Background 13

4. Methodology 16

5. Review of the Fermanagh Flooding by the Rivers 18 Agency of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development

6. Taskforce Findings

(i) Impacts of the Flooding 21(ii) Issues Raised 30

7. Conclusions 58

8. Recommendations 61

List of Annexes

Annex 1 List of Taskforce members Annex 2 Data on levels of Lough Erne during 2009 Annex 3 Rivers Agency Report – Fermanagh Flooding of 2009

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Fermanagh Flooding of October 2009

1.1 During the course of late October and November 2009, County

Fermanagh experienced what for many was unprecedented levels of

rainfall. The result was that the area was subject to widespread

flooding, leading to significant disruption to life in the county at both

individual and community level.

The Flooding Taskforce

1.2 The impact of the floods was such that the Northern Ireland Executive

decided at their meeting on 3 December 2009 that a Flooding

Taskforce should be established to investigate the causes of the

flooding, identify lessons learned and consider measures required to

mitigate the impact of any future flooding.

1.3 This cross-departmental Taskforce gathered evidence from members

of the public in the affected areas, business people, local

representatives and stakeholder organisations. A number of evidence

sessions were held in Enniskillen and Lisnaskea so that the Taskforce

could hear at first hand about the impact of the flooding on local life in

Fermanagh. A significant number of written submissions detailing the

impact of the flooding and offering potential solutions to the problem

from a local perspective were also obtained from a wide range of

individuals, businesses and organisations. Furthermore the Taskforce

took full account of the issues identified by a Review of the Flood

Response conducted by the Rivers Agency, Department of Agriculture

& Rural Development. This report is attached at Annex 3.

Key Findings

1.4 The evidence received by the Taskforce confirmed that the flooding

had presented very considerable challenges to the local population – difficulties in accessing homes, shops, schools, farmland and

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businesses; problems in caring for the vulnerable; public health

concerns; animal welfare issues; and wider economic impacts were all

reported in detail to the Taskforce. Potential longer term damage to

the Fermanagh area in terms of its reputation as a tourist destination, a

good place to do business, and even as a good place to live and raise

families was also identified by a number of those giving evidence.

1.5 It became apparent to the Taskforce that the flooding events had also

brought a strong sense of community spirit to the fore, with residents

displaying resilience and a readiness to help themselves and their

neighbours to deal with the worst effects of the floods. Without this,

and despite the considerable assistance and support provided by the

responding agencies, it is generally recognised that the impacts,

particularly at an individual level, could have been much worse.

1.6 While the consequences of the flooding were extensive and varied, the

residents of Fermanagh felt strongly that the main contributory factor to

the flooding was associated with the way in which the Lough Erne

system was managed, from the Upper Lough to the hydroelectric

power generating station at Ballyshannon. Section 6 of this report sets

out in detail how the system is managed by the Rivers Agency in the

North and by the Electricity Supply Board (ESB) in the South, and in

particular how this is achieved in such a way as to meet drainage

needs within the lough basin as well as the power generating

requirements of ESB.

1.7 It was equally clear that those who submitted evidence believed there

to be two potential solutions to the alleviation of the risk of future

flooding and the mitigation of the impacts of such events – namely that

the level of Lough Erne should be lowered (by up to 600mm / 2 feet);

and/or that a number of key pieces of roads infrastructure should be

raised to mitigate the effect of flooding of the surrounding lands.

Detailed discussion of both of these issues may be found in Section 6,and the outcome reflected in the report recommendations at Section 8.

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Conclusions

1.8 The Taskforce undertook a detailed analysis of all of the evidence

provided, the main conclusions arising from this were:

• The extensive flooding in Fermanagh during November 2009 had a

profound impact on the lives of local people.

• In light of the substantial and potentially long lasting consequences

from the flooding it is important that more is done to alleviate the

impact of future serious flooding in Fermanagh.

• The flooding was as a direct result of very heavy and persistent

rainfall in Fermanagh during October and November 2009 which

exceeded the drainage capabilities of the Erne System.

• The Erne System complies with recognised drainage standards and

it would not be economically or environmentally feasible to increase

the capacity of the system to a level where flooding from extreme

events, such as the November 2009 flooding, could be prevented.

Neither would it be feasible to significantly reduce existing water

levels, given the detrimental impact this would have on the natural

environment and on water based tourism.

• During October and November 2009 the Erne System was

managed by Rivers Agency and the Electricity Supply Board in

accordance with the Erne System Operating Regime. This Regime

was first developed in the 1950s and should now be the subject of

an in depth review to ensure that it adequately meets modern day

needs. As part of this review consideration should be given to the

feasibility of bringing forward the winter drawdown of Lough levels

to maximise storage.

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• Subject to sufficient funding being made available, the level of

investment in flood mitigation works in Fermanagh should be

enhanced to include works to key roads infrastructure to protect key

transport and access routes. In addition the feasibility of options for

a flood alleviation scheme to protect Derrychara Link, Enniskillen,

from inundation from Lough Erne should be examined.

• Flooding risk in Fermanagh cannot be eliminated completely.

• All organisations engaged in flood response and recovery must

ensure that their emergency plans and networks are maintained

and further developed to deal with the consequences of future

serious flooding.

• In order to minimise the impact of any future flooding, steps must be

taken to protect the delivery of essential services to local people

during times of flood. This will include carrying out a programme of

works to the Killyhevlin Water Treatment Works to further protect

the supply of public drinking water in Enniskillen. In addition, all

organisations responsible for the provision of essential services to

the local community, especially emergency / health care, education

and refuse collection must ensure that robust contingency

arrangements are in place to protect the provision of these vital

services to areas affected by such flooding.

• It is vital that the local community is as prepared as possible to deal

with the consequences of any future flooding. The public must

have accurate information about flood risk in the area, know what to

do in a flood situation, and how to access help. An education and

public awareness programme should be developed to inform the

local community, including school children, about flooding in

Fermanagh and this should specifically include information on the

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Erne System.

Taskforce Recommendations

1.9 Following detailed examination of all the evidence adduced the

recommendations of the Flooding Taskforce are:

Management of the Erne System

• An in depth review of the Operating Regime for the Erne System

should be conducted to ensure that the arrangements and

parameters for the management of the Erne System are adequate

to meet modern day needs. The Lough Erne Management Co-

ordinating Committee and the Lough Erne Advisory Committee

represent all interests and activities associated with Lough Erne,

and so should be actively engaged in this review process.

Flood Mitigation

• Subject to sufficient funding being secured, a programme of road

improvement works should be undertaken to include all the roads

listed at Section 6 (paragraph 6.65) to reduce the likelihood of loss

of key transport and access routes.

• A feasibility study should be conducted to consider options for a

flood alleviation scheme to isolate Derrychara Link, Enniskillen,

from direct inundation by Lough Erne, so alleviating flood risk to the

area. In the interim, containment measures should be put in place

prior to the coming winter.

Essential Services

• A programme of work should be undertaken to improve the level of

protection from flood risk to the Killyhevlin Water Treatment Works.

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• All organisations involved in the response to and recovery from the

November 2009 flooding in Fermanagh should maintain and further

develop their emergency planning arrangements and networks to

ensure they are as prepared as possible to deal with any future

serious flooding which may occur.

• All organisations responsible for the provision of essential services

to the local community, especially emergency / health care,

education and refuse collection must ensure that robust

contingency arrangements are in place to protect the provision of

these vital services to areas affected by serious flooding.

Communication and Public Awareness

• An education and public awareness programme should be

developed to inform the local community, including school children,

about flooding in the Fermanagh area and how to deal with it. This

should specifically include information on the Erne System.

Way Forward

1.10 Taskforce Ministers will present this report and associated

recommendations at the earliest opportunity to the Northern Ireland

Executive for its consideration. Relevant Departments and agencies

will then be commissioned to take forward the recommendations

agreed by the Executive.

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2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 In late October 2009 and for most of November the Erne catchment

experienced unprecedented levels of rainfall, both in terms of quantity

and duration. As the rain persisted it fell on what was already

saturated ground, resulting in extensive flooding across Fermanagh.

2.2 In response to the impact which this flooding had on the people of

Fermanagh, the Northern Ireland Executive agreed at its meeting on 3

December 2009 to establish a Flooding Taskforce to investigate the

circumstances of the flooding. The Terms of Reference for the

Taskforce were subsequently agreed in the following terms:

“FLOODING TASKFORCE – TERMS OF REFERENCE

PURPOSE

The Flooding Taskforce, established at the request of the NI Executive,

will investigate the Fermanagh flooding of November 2009 and

consider what further action is required by the NI departments (and

their sponsor bodies) to deal with the aftermath of the flooding and to

minimise the impact of future flooding.

The Taskforce will report its findings and make recommendations to

the NI Executive.

FORMAT & MEMBERSHIP

The Taskforce will:

• be convened on a task and finish basis;

• produce an interim report by the end of February 2010;

• include Ministerial representation as well as officials drawn from the

relevant NI departments; and

• be led by the Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister.

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The secretariat for the Taskforce will be provided by Civil

Contingencies Policy Branch, OFMDFM.

ACTIONS

• To investigate the factors which contributed to the flooding, to

include those of cross-border significance.

• To arrange evidence gathering sessions involving a range of local

stakeholders.

• To consider how NI departments could assist in dealing with the

aftermath.

• To examine lessons learned in a cross-departmental context.

• To identify longer term planning issues, including the development

of a Flood Risk Management Plan for Fermanagh

• To consider preparations for possible measures to minimise the

impact of future flooding.”

2.3 The Taskforce is Chaired by the Office of the First Minister and deputy

First Minister, and membership comprises of the Executive Ministers

for Regional Development; Agriculture and Rural Development; the

Environment; and Enterprise, Trade & Investment, as well as senior

officials from key NI Departments and agencies. A full list of the

Taskforce membership may be found at Annex 1.

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3. BACKGROUND

3.1 The flooding in Fermanagh during November 2009 affected most of the

population of the county in some form or another. Some had to endure

only minor inconveniences, but for many others the social, economic

and environmental impacts were much more significant, both at

individual and community level. The level of impact experienced was a

consequence of an unprecedented level of rainfall during October and

November 2009, coupled with the particular topography and

demography of Fermanagh.

3.2 The bulk of the flooding occurred after 19 November 2009 owing to

inundation from Lough Erne. However, there was also flooding in the

Boho area from the 4 November 2009 which resulted from the

inundation of the natural floodplain of the Sillees River.

Fermanagh Profile

3.4 Fermanagh covers an area of 187,582 hectares, with a population of

some 57,600, 13,600 of whom live in the county town of Enniskillen.

The county has a population density of 31 persons per square

kilometre, compared to 119 persons per square kilometre for Northern

Ireland as a whole. Many of the residents therefore live in rural, often

remote, locations.

3.5 Agriculture represents a key sector in the economic profile of the

county, which also boasts a number of thriving businesses as well as a

healthy retail sector bolstered in recent times by an influx of trade from

across the border.

3.6 A major topographical feature of the region is that some 30% of

Fermanagh is covered with lakes and waterways. The River Erne and

associated loughs and channels are of particular significance in terms

of drainage in the area and consequently were a key focus for theTaskforce.

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The Erne System

3.7 The River Erne, which rises from Lough Gowna in County Cavan, flows

through County Fermanagh to the sea at Ballyshannon in County

Donegal. The river, which is some 100km long, drains an area of

around 4,350km2, of which 1,850km2 is in Counties Fermanagh and

Tyrone.

3.8 There are a large number of lakes in the catchment area upstream of

Enniskillen. The largest is Upper Lough Erne which has a surface area

of some 38km2. Water from the Upper Lough flows through the inter

lough channel to Lower Lough Erne, which has a surface area of

approximately 111km2. Sluice gates in the inter lough channel at

Portora are used to ensure that water levels do not fall too low in the

Upper Lough. The flow from the Lower Lough passes through the

Belleek Channel to Cliff where the first of two hydro-electric power

stations is located. This dam at Cliff controls the water levels in the

Lower Lough. A second hydro-electric power station is located

approximately 5km further downstream at Cathaleen’s Falls, more

commonly known as Ballyshannon.

3.9 Control of the water level in the Erne System is undertaken by the

Rivers Agency, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, in

conjunction with the Electricity Supply Board in Ireland under the terms

of an agreement made in 1950 when the River Erne was harnessed for

hydroelectric power generation.

3.10 Each October, in preparation for the higher levels of rainfall during the

autumn and winter periods, the responsible agencies attempt to draw

the water level in both loughs down in order to maximise the storage

capacity within the system. When the amount of water in the loughs is

too great, it can be spilled at Cliff and then at Cathaleen’s Falls.

However, where rain is persistent a situation can be reached where the

inflow of water from the catchment into the loughs substantially

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exceeds the amount that can be conveyed by the channels and passed

through to the sea.

Why the Flooding Occurred

3.11 Fermanagh experienced an unprecedented level of rainfall totalling

336.8mm over the period 17 October 2009 to 27 November 2009. To

put this in context, the total rainfall for the month of November for the

county was recorded at 280mm, against the previous record of 191mm

(in 1939)1 and the long term average for the month of 103.25mm. This

level of rainfall over 41 days is well in excess of a 1 in 100 year rainfall

event, which means that there is a 1% chance of such an event

happening in any given year. Prior to this heavy rainfall, the lough was

successfully drawn down to its minimum level in early October 2009 in

order to maximise winter storage capacity – see paragraph 6.32.

3.12 However the heavy rain in mid to late October 2009 caused the ground

in the catchment to become saturated by early November. This

effectively meant that from early November all rain falling in the

catchment area ran off into the rivers and loughs.

3.13 The persistent rainfall caused water levels in the Erne System to rise to

the point where the recorded levels at Belleisle, Portora and Rosscor

were the highest since the current regime was introduced in the 1950s.

As the water levels in Lough Erne rose above the prescribed upper

limits the volume of water exceeded that which could be conveyed by

the channels to the sea. Consequently, extensive flooding occurred,

particularly around the Upper Lough. The actions taken throughout this

period by the agencies charged with managing the Erne system were

in accordance with the legislation.

1 Data supplied by the Met Office

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4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 The approach taken by the Taskforce to this initiative was dictated

largely by the clear need to engage directly with the people of

Fermanagh to hear at first hand about the impacts the flooding had at

both individual and community levels. It was therefore agreed at the

first meeting of the Taskforce in Enniskillen on 17 December 2009 that

the process should be informed by a series of evidence gathering

sessions to take place in Fermanagh, and that those sessions should

be open to the widest possible range of local people, community

representatives and organisations from the affected areas.

4.2 Accordingly, a total of six evidence gathering sessions took place

during January 2010. In addition to two public sessions in Enniskillen

and Lisnaskea, the Taskforce heard from local Fermanagh district

councillors; the Ulster Farmers Union; the Northern Ireland Agriculture

Producers’ Association; and representatives from the business and

commercial sectors in the county, including the Fermanagh Economic

Development Organisation. The evidence thus gathered was

augmented by a substantial body of written evidence provided to the

Taskforce during January 2010.

4.3 In addition, the Taskforce sought and received information from the

Electricity Supply Board. To supplement this, OFMDFM officials visited

the ESB power station at Cathaleen’s Falls, Ballyshannon on 9

February 2010 to learn at first hand about the operation of the power

station and the impact of ESB’s operational requirements on the

drainage of the Erne catchment and the wider management of the Erne

system. The Taskforce also received evidence from Waterways

Ireland on their perspective on the causes and effects of the November

flooding.

4.4 The work of the Taskforce in considering the causes and impacts of theflooding was closely linked to and informed by the review conducted by

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the Rivers Agency of the Department of Agriculture and Rural

Development - ‘Fermanagh Flooding of November 2009’, a summary of

key outcomes of which is at Section 5. The full Rivers Agency report is

annexed to this report at Annex 3. This review examined the

effectiveness of the multi-agency response of stakeholder

organisations to the flooding, which was central to managing the

effects of the flooding and its impact on the community. In relation to

that response it concluded that co-ordination and co-operation between

the various responders had been sound.

4.5 The subsequent analysis of the evidence collated led to the

identification of the range of impacts the flooding had on the local

community. In addition, the Taskforce distilled a number of proposals

from those directly affected as to how the impact of future flooding in

the area might be lessened. These proposals, which fall into four main

themes, were analysed in detail by the relevant government

departments and agencies, to establish their viability and potential

effectiveness to meet identified need. Consideration of these impacts

and proposals is at Section 6, with Taskforce conclusions at Section 7.

4.6 The final stage in the process was the production of a Taskforce

Report and its presentation to the NI Executive for their consideration

of the Taskforce recommendations, as detailed at Section 8.

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5. REVIEW OF THE FERMANAGH FLOODING BY THE RIVERS

AGENCY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL

DEVELOPMENT

5.1 In addition to establishing a Flooding Taskforce, the Northern Ireland

Executive also decided at its meeting on 3 December 2009 that the

Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development should carry out a

review of the response provided by Rivers Agency (RA) and its

partners to the flooding in Fermanagh.

5.2 Section 4 of this report has already alluded to the importance and

relevance of the RA Review to the work of the Taskforce, not least as a

source of expert evidence on the management of the Erne System.

Specifically, the RA Review Report outlines how the water

management system for Lough Erne was applied during the course of

the November 2009 flooding. It examines the response made by the

various flood response agencies, identifies lessons learned and makes

recommendations on how the multi-agency response might be

improved in the future. It also contains detailed statistics on water

levels to illustrate the effect of the heavy rain and the response made

by the managing agents to mitigate its effects on water levels in Lough

Erne.

5.3 The recommendations of the Rivers Agency Review Report are as

follows:

Control of Water Levels

• The operating regime, applied within the current legislation should

be reviewed by Rivers Agency and ESB to investigate if there is

any scope for improvement.

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• The performance of the existing regime which has been in place

since the 1950s should be reviewed. This will inform the need for a

review of the current legislation.

• Any further review of levels must take account of the environmental

designation, particularly on the Upper Lough. The Upper Lough is

a Special Protection Area (SPA) and a Special Area of

Conservation (SAC). The Habitats Directive, which is European

legislation, applies to SPAs and SACs. The Upper Lough also has

nine Areas of Special Scientific Interest (ASSIs) of which Belleisle,

Trannish and Crom are arguably the three most important. The

Upper Lough is also a RAMSAR site (a wetland site of international

importance designated under the Ramsar Convention 1975).

• Any review of levels must also take account of the navigational

interests which involve Waterways Ireland, (the responsible

authority for navigation within the Erne system). Water based

recreation and tourism generates vital income in Fermanagh.

Emergency Response

• It is recommended that all organisations involved in the response to

and recovery from the flooding in Fermanagh use the lessons learnt

from the review to further develop their own emergency planning

arrangements. Opportunity should also be taken to further develop

contact arrangements.

• A structured process should be established to carry out ‘desk top’

exercises every two to three years to ensure that agencies maintain

contact and co-ordination arrangements between each other.

• Facilities to obtain rainfall information for the whole catchment

should be examined.

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Government Response

• Consideration should be given to establishing an agency to provide

a strategic overview to the management of flooding in Northern

Ireland, particularly in the medium to long term. This agency may

also be responsible for ensuring that all agencies and organisations

have adequate emergency arrangements and plans in place should

a similar flooding event occur in the future as will be required by the

Floods Directive within Flood Risk Management Plans.

• Planning Policies restricting developments in the floodplain should

be strictly applied to help eliminate the risk of property flooding

should a similar event occur in the future.

Improvement Works

• Consideration should be given to examining the viability of raising

critical roads.

• Rivers Agency and Roads Service should examine whether joint

improvements can be made to the Derrychara Link area.

Awareness

• Rivers Agency, in conjunction with ESB, should draw up a short

brochure explaining how the Erne system works and this should be

distributed to schools in Fermanagh. Rivers Agency should also

examine opportunities to add to previous presentations they have

given on the Erne system to improve public awareness.

The RA Review Report, the terms of which were agreed in February

2010, is reproduced in full at Annex 3 of this Taskforce Report.

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6. TASKFORCE FINDINGS

IMPACTS OF THE FLOODING

6.1 The November 2009 flooding in Fermanagh occurred against a

backdrop over the last two or three years of more frequent and more

severe flooding incidents both locally and across the region than had

previously been the norm. Flooding events in Belfast in 2007, and

more widely in August 2008, led to the evacuation of large numbers of

people from their homes, with significant damage to property, services

and infrastructure. While evacuation and property damage of this

magnitude was not a feature of the 2009 Fermanagh flooding, it

nonetheless had a profound and lasting impact on the people of the

county both at individual and community level. The true cost of the

floods may never be accurately determined, but it is clear that it was

significant.

6.2 It was also clear to the Taskforce that despite the co-ordinated

response by various agencies the impacts could have been very much

worse had it not been for the resilience of the local people, their

willingness to help themselves, help one another, and to make the best

of what was a very difficult situation for many.

6.3 For these reasons, it is important both to acknowledge and to record

the types of difficulties and concerns faced at this time, as well as the

impact that repeated flooding incidents of this nature might have on the

maintenance and future development of small rural, often isolated

communities in the county, the local economy, and the image and

viability of Fermanagh as a tourist destination. This section of the

report therefore records the evidence presented to the Taskforce

by local people about the problems they encountered, which

provided the information base to inform and help determine the

nature and extent of remedial work and arrangements required tohelp avoid or to mitigate the effects of future flooding in the area.

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6.4 The Taskforce heard from a broad spectrum of individuals and

community representatives, and it was clear from the evidence

provided that the flooding impacted on many aspects of life in the

county.

6.5 The main consequence of the November flooding however was the

loss of some key roads infrastructure which, given the topography of

the area, had a disproportionate effect on the community. This

resulted in a wide variety of impacts including isolation of families;

significant problems for people commuting to work and taking children

to school; problems for care and emergency workers accessing

vulnerable people; access difficulties for farmers in tending their

livestock; damage to agricultural land; and economic losses to the

business and commerce sectors arising from increased operating costs

and lost trade.

Figure 1. A number of key roads were flooded.

6.6 The prolonged duration of these impacts undoubtedly put an additional

strain on those directly affected. Many of those who gave evidence

mentioned the stress they had been under while dealing with the

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consequences of the flooding and the resultant hardship both in

economic and social terms that had been caused.

Social / Welfare Impacts

Access

6.7 A number of homes, mainly but not exclusively around the shores of

Upper Lough Erne, were entirely cut off by the flood water. Access to

these properties was possible only by tractor or boat, which carried its

own inherent dangers as it became increasingly difficult to determine

the path of lanes and roads when the flood waters rose. This caused

significant disruption to normal life for those involved.

Figure 2. Homes cut off by flood water.

6.8 It was reported that some entire families had to leave their homes for a

period of time, while others were separated with some family members

remaining behind in the home. There were other instances cited of

23



individuals with care responsibilities for elderly relatives living nearby

being unable to make the necessary journey due to the height of the

flood waters.

Figure 3. Significant areas of countryside flooded.

6.9 Some of those in the affected areas mentioned that they had to leave

their cars some distance from their homes at the edge of the flood

waters, and before going to work each morning had to wade through

the flood, change their clothes at the car before driving to work, and

then repeat the process on the journey home.

Schools

6.10 Families also detailed the difficulties faced in taking children to nursery

groups and schools. While geographically separated from Lough Erne,

the hazards of having to take young children through flood water were

mentioned in particular by parents of children from Killyhommon

Primary School in Boho. Other problems encountered in this area

concerned children being subjected to long detours before reaching the

24



school. In the case of the Moat Primary School, Lisnaskea, a

temporary school was established in the church hall in Teemore to

facilitate children who would otherwise have had to travel from

Teemore to Lisnaskea via a long detour considered too arduous for

such young children to make. The impact of this disruption to the

school system was all the more acute in light of the school transfer

tests taking place during November.

Care of the Vulnerable

6.11 There was real concern expressed about the difficulties experienced by

care workers accessing the homes of the vulnerable and the elderly

who relied on their assistance on a daily basis. Examples were given

of patients who, because of difficulties with the provision of their care,

had to be moved to alternative locations away from their familiar

surroundings. In one instance, this was achieved only with the most

extreme difficulty. In a similar vein, residents in rural locations

expressed concern about the ability of the emergency services to

access their homes had an emergency situation arisen during the

flooding.

Animal Welfare

6.12 Animal welfare concerns were raised by members of the farming

community who had experienced real and prolonged difficulties

providing feedstuffs and dealing with sick animals in areas cut off by

flood water. In one case, difficulties in accessing stock to provide

veterinary care were evident.

Public Health

6.13 The effects of the flooding and its duration raised some public health

concerns. Residents in some locations reported that no refusecollections were made by Fermanagh District Council during the

25



flooding period. Farmers were concerned about delays in the

collection of dead stock due to the difficulties in collection lorries

gaining access to farms. Those from more built-up areas were

concerned about contamination of the flood water with sewage, given

that local people had no option but to wade through this on a regular

basis.

6.14 In rural areas, some slurry tanks were reported to have become

flooded, resulting in slurry mixing with the flood water.

Rural Communities

6.15 It was contended that the flooding, while worse than usual in

November, was something that occurred in Fermanagh on a fairly

frequent basis. Residents of the village of Boho, some six miles from

Lough Erne, raised concerns with the Taskforce about the long term

impact this could have on the viability of this small rural community.

6.16 The Taskforce heard evidence that both the nursery facility and the

primary school in Boho were accessible only with extreme difficulty for

a large part of November. Functions in the community centre also had

to be cancelled, which represented a significant loss of revenue for the

centre. In all three cases, concerns were expressed that if their

facilities developed a reputation for being difficult to access, and were

therefore unreliable, for example in terms of being able to provide an

appropriate level of schooling in the case of the Killyhommon Primary

School, then the public might be tempted to look elsewhere for school

placements or community activities. If this were to happen, the

damage to the community would be severe and lasting. These

concerns are likely to be reflected in other parts of the county.

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Economic Impacts

6.17 The significant access and travel problems experienced inevitably had

an economic impact for those affected, and the evidence provided by

all sectors bore this assertion out.

Farming Sector

6.18 The Taskforce heard evidence from farmers that animals that would

normally have been grazing outside had had to be housed early, so

depleting winter feed stocks which then had to be replaced at extra

cost to the farmer. Loss of revenue was reported from the inability of

milk tankers to get through the flood waters to make collections from a

dairy farm, and consequently milk output was lost. There were also

concerns expressed about potentially reduced productivity of summer

grassland as a result of land being under water for a significant period

of time.

Figure 4. Access issues for farmers.

27



Commerce and Business Sectors

6.19 The commercial sector reported significant loss of trade due to reduced

footfall in Enniskillen and in surrounding towns such as Lisnaskea,

coupled with a concern that once customers had by necessity taken

their custom elsewhere they would not return. The reduction in the

number of shoppers was attributed to a variety of causes, including the

loss of key transport routes preventing people travelling to the usual

shopping destinations, the (associated) severe traffic congestion in

Enniskillen, and a widespread public perception that shops in the areas

worst affected by the flooding would not be open. It was felt by some

shop keepers that this perception may have been exacerbated by

media coverage that was considered by some to have overstated the

actual problems in the area. Traders at Derrychara Link Road reported

an average loss of turnover in the region of 60 - 90% as a

consequence of customers not being able to gain access to their

premises. They also held the view that ‘roads closed’ signage in the

vicinity of their retail premises gave the false impression to potential

customers that their businesses were closed due to the flooding.

Figure 5. Flooding at Derrychara Link

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6.20 There were significant concerns expressed about extra costs incurred

by the business sector due to increased travel to work time for staff –

some workers were forced to undertake detours of approximately

twenty miles. The taskforce heard that inward and outward deliveries

from business premises were similarly disrupted, with lengthy detours

adding significantly to fuel costs. On occasions, deliveries had had to

be aborted due to flood water levels. It was pointed out to the

Taskforce that the main route to Belfast and Larne via Lisnaskea

remained passable to large lorries, but had the situation worsened all

this heavy goods traffic would have had to pass through Enniskillen,

adding further to the already severe congestion and exacerbating

losses to this sector from missed delivery targets.

Figure 6. Challenges faced by local traffic.

6.21 It was estimated by representatives of the business and commerce

sector that on average the retail sector lost sales of around 15-20%;

29



the distribution sector some 30%; the hospitality sector (which was

particularly affected by reduced cross-border trade) 35-50%; and

wholesalers around 20-25%. It was reported that while most locally

manufactured product was successfully delivered the real issue for the

manufacturing sector was higher costs, with a notable increase in

labour and fuel costs in particular.

Reputational Damage

6.22 Evidence provided to the Taskforce also identified the reputational

damage that flooding events such as these can have on the

Fermanagh area especially if, as has been the case in the last two to

three years in the Boho area, they occur on a regular basis. It was also

asserted that local entrepreneurs and inward investment projects alike

could potentially be deterred from establishing in Fermanagh if it were

to become known as an area that can at times be difficult to access, or

that is a relatively expensive area from which to do business.

6.23 Reputational damage is also a potentially significant problem for the

thriving local tourism industry, a key element of the economy in

Fermanagh worth some £33million per annum (2008). Facilities such

as the Share Centre near Lisnaskea suffered considerably during the

floods, both in terms of access to the site and the damage to buildings

and equipment by the flood waters. Although the flooding did not take

place during the shoulder or peak tourism periods, the Taskforce was

informed that cancelled bookings and/or loss of facilities have the

potential to impact on business viability in the longer term.

ISSUES RAISED

6.24 In addition to providing a detailed insight into the impacts and

consequences of the flooding from the perspective of those directly

affected, the evidence sessions also gave local people the opportunityto make suggestions regarding their perceptions of the causes of the

30



flooding and potential improvement works which they felt would

mitigate the impact of future flooding.

6.25 The suggestions thus made centred around four main themes, namely:

¾ Management of the Erne System;

¾ Flood Mitigation;

¾ Essential Services; and

¾ Communication and Public Awareness

Each of these four themes is considered in detail below.


6.26 There was a general belief evident among many of those giving

evidence to the Taskforce that the management of the Lough Erne

system should be pursued more proactively by the relevant agencies,

and that the statutory provisions of the Erne Drainage and

Development Act (Northern Ireland) 1950 which, inter alia, governs the

levels of the Lough, should be reviewed to ensure that they remained

relevant and adequate for current needs. More specifically,

representatives of the farming community requested that consideration

be given to lowering the levels of the Lough by 600mm (2 feet).

6.27 The power generation activities of the Electricity Supply Board at the

Ballyshannon and Cliff hydroelectric power stations were widely

queried in terms of any detrimental impact they may have on the quick

and efficient drainage of the Erne System.

6.28 Queries were also raised about the silting up of the Lough and therivers flowing into it, including the Finn, Sillees and Colebrooke, and

31



there was a consensus that more dredging was required to improve

drainage and alleviate flood risk from Lough Erne. Coupled with this

however, there was a widely expressed perception that any such river

maintenance would be hampered by environmental considerations.

6.29 Given these concerns, it is important that there is a clear understanding

of the operating regime for Lough Erne, how it is implemented, and by

whom. The following section provides that information, thereby

addressing the issues raised by local people in this regard during the

evidence gathering sessions.

The Erne System and Operating Regime

6.30 The statutory arrangements for the operation of the Erne System are

set out in ‘The Erne Drainage and Development Act (Northern Ireland)

1950‘. This legislation prescribed higher and lower water levels for the

loughs; trigger levels for control; and the extensive works required to

facilitate the Erne Summer Relief Scheme to improve drainage in the

area and give effect to the lowering of lough levels.

6.31 The works carried out in the 1950s entailed major improvements to the

inter-lough and Belleek channels and the construction of new dams

and hydro power stations at Cliff and Ballyshannon in County Donegal.

A new control structure was also constructed on the inter-lough

channel at Portora in Enniskillen, primarily to prevent the upper lough

draining down under the improved drainage regime. Each element of

the scheme was designed to accommodate sufficient flow so that,

combined with the storage in the system, flooding would occur only

during extreme rainfall events. Such events would have to be of

significant duration and would almost certainly be restricted to winter

when the impact on crops or livestock would be minimal.

32



6.32 In terms of lough management, the statutory upper limit for the Lower

Lough is that it should not exceed 46.33 metres (152 feet) above

Ordnance Datum (OD) Poolbeg, Dublin1. There is no statutory upper

limit for the Upper Lough but the legislation states that the water level

should not, if reasonably preventable, exceed 46.94 metres (154 feet)

above OD Poolbeg in summer and 47.24 metres (155 feet) above OD

Poolbeg in winter.

6.33 The Rivers Agency and the Electricity Supply Board endeavour to

control the loughs within operational bands that have been set within

the wider legislative limits. Water levels are monitored daily and

regular contact is maintained between the Electricity Supply Board and

Rivers Agency. The operating regime adhered to has been agreed

with various interest groups since the 1950s. Essentially, water levels

are maintained at a level during the summer months to take account of

boating interests - these water levels are then lowered in October to

maximise storage prior to autumn/winter when rainfall is generally

greater. It is important to note that it is not always possible to draw

down the lough levels in October as this is dependent on rainfall,

although the minimum level (that is to say the statutory level in the

Upper Lough and the operational level in the Lower Lough) was

achieved in October 2009.

6.34 The outflow from the system is controlled at Cliff where some 230 m3/s

can be passed through the turbines. Additional flow of 100m3/s can be

passed through spillways which act as a safety valve and are designed

to accommodate a 1 in 10,000 year event ie the structure at Cliff (and

Cathaleen’s Falls) is capable of passing greater flows than can actually

be delivered by the channels.

6.35 Flow in the Belleek channel is determined by the head differential

between the lower lough and the water level immediately upstream of

1 To convert Poolbeg OD to Belfast OD deduct 2.82 metres (9.25 feet).

33



the dam at Cliff. The water level at Cliff is drawn down to the lowest

possible level when it is required to maximise flows in the outfall

channel. When the lower lough is in the low to medium range the flow

produced in the channel can be accommodated through the turbines.

The Act defines trigger levels for spilling at Cliff and Cathaleen’s Falls -

the legislative trigger level is reached when the lower lough is within six

inches of its upper statutory limit and flow in the channel has

significantly exceeded the capacity of the turbines. Spilling could occur

earlier but this would have little impact on peak lough levels during

extreme events. Flow in the Belleek channel increases as the head

differential between the lower lough and Cliff increases.

6.36 The capacity of the channels, namely the inter lough channel and the

Belleek Channel, is the major restricting factor in the discharge of water

from the Erne System. Both have capacities that accommodate

sufficient flow under normal circumstances and this, combined with the

storage in the lough system, means that significant flooding occurs only

in extreme circumstances. Works to increase the capacities of the

channels would cost tens of millions of pounds and would not be

economically or environmentally viable.

6.37 In summary the design capacities of the power stations at Cliff and

Cathaleen’s Falls coupled with the spillage capacities at the dams are

such that they can effectively disperse the maximum amount of water

that can be conveyed to them through the Belleek Channel. In practice,

during the November flooding some 385m3/s were actually being

discharged from the system due to the unprecedented head differential

across the system.

6.38 It is worth noting that had the rainfall event of October and November

2009 occurred prior to the current regime being in place, lough levels

would have reached even higher levels.

34



Operation of the Erne System in October – November 2009

6.39 The operation of the Lough Erne system during October and November

2009 is reported in detail in the Rivers Agency Report annexed to this

report, but it is important to outline here the chain of events which

occurred during that period, and what actions were taken to alleviate

the effects of the flood waters at each step.

6.40 Higher minimum lough levels are maintained during the summer

months to facilitate navigation and other interests. Levels are reduced

to the lowest achievable level from 1 October to allow for winter

storage. While this is not always possible due to autumn rainfall

patterns, it was achieved in October 2009 because the first half of the

month was virtually dry.

6.41 The overall rainfall in Fermanagh during October was only 1 % higher

than the Long Term Average for that month. However, it is important to

note that the bulk of the rainfall, some 95%, occurred after 16 October

2009.

6.42 From 1 October – 17 October 2009, which was the period just prior to

the persistent rainfall, lough levels were managed by opening the

gates at Portora fully from 1 October to assist in drawing down the

Upper Lough level to maximise winter storage. The gates were then

closed between 7 and 14 October to maintain the Upper Lough above

the minimum prescribed level and were then gradually opened again

from 14 October to control flows between the loughs.

6.43 From 18 October to 4 November 2009, which was a period of

persistent rain, the inflow to the Erne System exceeded the outflow and

the water levels in both loughs continued to rise. The gates at Portora

were fully opened on 25 October.

35



6.44 On 4 November both loughs were below the targeted winter levels and

no flooding occurred other than from the Sillees River at Boho, which

was not caused by rising lough levels.

6.45 As conditions for spilling from the lough were reached on 5 November

2009 ESB in consultation with Rivers Agency commenced spilling at

Cliff from that date. With the gates at Portora open and spillage and

generation of power being undertaken to maximise possible outflow,

this had the desired effect of slowing down the rise of the water level in

the Upper Lough. Initially the spilling caused the levels in the Lower

Lough to reduce but then the rainfall intensified from the 14 November

with some 53.2mm recorded at Portora in the following five days.

Consequently the level of the Lower Lough started to rise again and

exceeded its upper limit on 19 November 2009 before peaking some

0.4m above this level on 27 November 2009.

6.46 The initial lowering of the Lower Lough eventually stabilised the level in

the Upper Lough just below the winter limit but the increase in intensity

of rainfall from 14 November caused the level in the Upper Lough to

rise sharply, eventually peaking on 26 November (some 1.03m above

the prescribed limit).

6.47 This sharp and exceptional rise in levels resulted in flooding, with

Roads Service reports indicating the occurrence of road flooding

mainly around the Upper Lough and the Boho area from 18 November

2009.

6.48 From 27 November 2009 both the Upper and Lower Lough levels

started to fall.

Reduction of Water Levels

6.49 The rationale for the Erne System and the current operating regime isthat it provides a suitable level of flood protection while considering and

36



accommodating the widespread interests across the Fermanagh

community from farming to the water-based tourism industry. It also

takes into account the need to prevent exposure of building

foundations in Enniskillen.

6.50 Waterways Ireland (WI) is the navigation authority with the statutory

function to manage the navigation for the Upper Lough, Inter-lock

Channel and Lower Lough and is opposed to lowering of the summer

operational level of Lough Erne. Advice from WI indicates that any

significant lowering of water levels would have a severe impact on

facilities both public and private, and would in particular have a

catastrophic effect on boating related tourism activities with some

5,000 boats on Lough Erne and a further 7,000 on linked waterways.

Reduced recreational activity would cause economic decline in some

areas.

6.51 WI has assessed that the main impacts of lowering Lough levels would

be:

• the widespread fragmentation and isolation of navigational

infrastructure located around the mainland shore and on some

islands, as a result of inadequate depths for navigation in critical

areas;

• the need for dredging works in an environmentally sensitive area to

re-establish connectivity between channels which would introduce

significant financial demands. Where the extent of work required is

prohibitive, sections of the navigation may have to be abandoned

and access to the islands on the Upper Lough could be severely

restricted;

• the requirement to modify numerous public and private navigational

facilities (marinas, boat hire bases, slipways, jetties) developed

37



since the Shannon – Erne Waterway was opened as the water-line

retreats. Public and private slipways on the Erne System, the

Woodford River (Shannon Erne Waterway) up to Lock 1 and on the

River Erne (and on any other tributaries that may have such

services) would be affected;

• changes to the navigation of the River Erne. The lowering of the

water level would create additional shallow areas which would

require navigation markers and possibly relocation of the existing

markers. Foalies Cut, which was opened at considerable expense

in the 1990’s would be affected and would have to be re-excavated

or abandoned. Abandonment would mean that boats would have

to travel around by Crom to travel from the River Erne and Quivvy

Waters to the Shannon – Erne Waterway. This detour would also

inconvenience future users of the Ulster Canal link to Clones;

• the lock at Enniskillen would require major works to ensure that

navigation is maintained to existing depths;

• there would be a direct impact on the Shannon-Erne Waterway up

to Lock 1 which is partially in Fermanagh and Cavan. The channel

would become shallower and dredging would therefore probably be

required up to Lock 1. The lock itself would be impacted as

lowering the water level in the lough would decrease the depth over

the lower sill and floor of the lock chamber - the navigation criteria

for this important link waterway would thus be affected. The lock

would have to be deepened to maintain the existing draft criteria;

• the public facilities by WI at Aghalane (jetty, slipway) would be

impacted and the slipway there would have to be modified. The

ground at the Aghalane facility is already very weak and the banks

of the river would be under threat at lower levels. This could

require major civil engineering works to stabilise the banks and

38



excavate the bed in difficult conditions and would add further to the

maintenance requirement in the future; and

• the shallower depths of the loughs and rivers would lead to

increased aquatic weed growth which would restrict navigation and

create a significant maintenance burden in an environmentally

sensitive area.

6.52 The view that any reduction to the statutory levels would have a

detrimental effect on boating and water-related tourism was also

expressed by representatives of the Inland Waterways Association of

Ireland at the public evidence session on 11 January 2010.

6.53 Furthermore, Inland Fisheries of the Department of Culture Arts and

Leisure has advised that any significant lowering of levels could have a

detrimental impact on fish stocks and angling tourism, as low water

levels are generally much more detrimental to fish survival than high

levels. In addition the viability of existing fishing jetties would also be

compromised.

6.54 Rivers Agency has advised that it would be possible to draw Lough

levels down towards the lower statutory limits in the summer. This

would provide additional storage throughout the summer and would

increase the probability of having maximum storage available for the

winter period. However, this would increase the risk of extremely low

water levels should drought conditions arise, would severely damage

the water based leisure and tourism in the terms described above, and

would have a detrimental impact on the natural environment, the

importance of which has been recognised by environmental

designations around the Lough. Alternatively, the Agency has advised

that consideration could be given to bringing the winter drawdown

forward to improve the chances of achieving maximum storage.

39



6.55 The Lough Erne Management Co-ordinating Committee is chaired by

Fermanagh District Council and comprises representatives from

government departments and public bodies with responsibilities and

interests in Lough Erne. The Lough Erne Advisory Committee

comprises representatives from a broad spectrum of user groups.

These two committees represent all interests and activities associated

with Lough Erne, and they should be actively engaged in any

consideration of change to water level management of the Erne

system.

Watercourse Maintenance and Dredging

6.56 The Rivers Agency inspects the Lough system and conducts essential

maintenance required to ensure free flow in accordance with the

arrangements set out in the Rivers Agency Watercourse Maintenance

Manual. The Agency also has an established maintenance cycle in

place for the Finn, the Sillees and the Colebrooke rivers, where

desilting is undertaken as required to facilitate drainage. The water

storage capacity between the upper and lower levels in the Lough

system is not affected by siltation, as any water displaced by siltation

or infilling during dry conditions would simply flow out of the Lough at

its outlet. The volume of storage in the Lough refers to the capacity to

hold water above the normal water level. Inflows in the Erne during

wet spells can greatly exceed the possible outflow, the net short term

result of which is that water levels will rise and the additional volume of

water will be stored in the Lough until the rain stops, the inflow reduces

to match outflow and the Lough returns to its normal dry weather level.

6.57 Much of the Lough, particularly the Upper Lough, is covered by natural

conservation designations, either as Natura 2000 Special Areas of

Conservation (SACs) or Special Protection Areas (SPAs) under the EU

Habitats Directive, and Areas of Special Scientific Interest (ASSIs)

under the Environment Order. It is important that all maintenancecarried out takes account of these designations. In addition, flood

40



alleviation work could have the ecological impact of reducing fish

stocks, and could detrimentally affect angling tourism. Of particular

concern would be dredging of rivers that support trout spawning and of

lake margins that support pike and coarse fish spawning.

6.58 Given the varied ecological and environmental impacts Rivers Agency

has an in-house conservation team which provides advice on these

aspects of its routine maintenance programme. In addition, the Rivers

Agency consults the NI Environment Agency on the annual planned

maintenance programme. Because of this close liaison between the

two agencies and adherence to the legislative requirements, the NI

Environment Agency has not turned down any request from Rivers

Agency in relation to river / lough maintenance to reduce flood risk in

the past two years. In addition, Rivers Agency in consultation with the

NI Environment Agency has drawn up eight agreements in relation to

ten watercourses within the Lough Erne catchment area. The

Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure is also consulted by Rivers

Agency regarding possible impact on fish stocks.

6.59 Rivers Agency is not responsible for dredging works for navigation

purposes, which now rests with Waterways Ireland. Waterways

Ireland has confirmed that since it was established in 2000 it has not

carried out any dredging works on the Erne system but that some

isolated spots may require attention in the future to remove silt from the

navigation channel and restore navigation depth.

Flood Mitigation

6.60 As highlighted earlier in this report, the main impact of the November

2009 flooding was the loss of critical transport routes as a

consequence of flooded roads and the resultant severe congestion in

Enniskillen as traffic converged on the town as other routes became

impassable. Many of those giving evidence called for significantimprovements to the roads infrastructure to ensure that a number of

41



key routes were kept open and passable.

6.61 The frequency of flooding in Fermanagh was also mentioned by some

of those giving evidence. In particular, the residents of Boho stated

their strongly held view that the Sillees River should be diverted via

Bunahone and Churchill into Lough Erne in an attempt to mitigate the

repeated flooding in the area. In a similar vein the traders at

Derrychara Link Road, Enniskillen, suggested that a dyke be erected to

protect the road from the frequent inundation from Lough Erne.

Roads Infrastructure

6.62 Over the course of the last ten years the Department for Regional

Development Roads Service has invested in excess of £200,000 in

managing flood risk in various areas of Fermanagh. In addition, in 2007

the agency contributed £180,000 to a £540,000 scheme (the remainder

was privately funded) to provide piled foundations for the roundabout at

Erneside Shopping Centre, Enniskillen to prevent progressive

settlement and reduce flood risk.

6.63 Some of the roads identified during the evidence gathering were

actually raised previously in an attempt to alleviate flooding. However,

there has been a tendency for the roads to sink back down to the

original level again as a consequence of poor underlying ground

conditions. For example, the Samsonagh Road has been raised on

three occasions in the last 15 years, most recently in 2009. In cases

such as this the additional weight of the material used to raise the road

accelerates future settlement. This is not always the case however -

the road at Cloghane Bridge for example was raised in around 2000

and has remained at its elevated level without subsequent problems.

6.64 Following the November 2009 flooding Roads Service carried out an

assessment of the merits of raising the various flood affected roads inthe area, including a comparison of the impact of such works so that in

42



the event of specific additional funding being made available it can be

targeted at those projects that would yield most benefit. In the absence

of such funding, Roads Service has stressed that it cannot justify

diverting existing limited roads funding to elevate roads that are

vulnerable to flooding for a few days in the year but are otherwise in

reasonable condition, at the expense of other roads that are in poor

condition for 12 months in the year.

6.65 The assessment by Roads Service was based on a number of factors

– the cost of associated works; ground conditions; traffic volumes using

the road and inconvenience when closed. In the event of funding being

made available to alleviate hardship resulting from a similar flooding

event in the future, this prioritisation may be used as a guide to identify

those roads where the greatest benefit may be derived.

The schemes regarded by Roads Service as higher priority based on

the above factors are:

1. B127 New Bridge Road at Share Centre

This road carries approximately 3,000 vehicles per day and is a

strategic east-west link across Upper Lough Erne. It is used by many

businesses in the area and it is important that in the event of a similar

flood event such disruption should not be experienced.

2. Quay Pass at Erneside / Derrychara

This road leading to the Erneside area of Enniskillen is a major link for

retail shoppers and if closed can quickly cause gridlock across the

town. This is a concern for emergency services and results in a loss of

business trade. In November 2009 it was necessary to create a

temporary causeway to raise the road above the level of the flood

water when it became clear that pumping operations would eventually

fail. It is proposed that the final surfacing should be established at this

43



level, raising footpaths and incorporating measures to prevent flood

inundation in a similar flood event.

3. B533 Wattlebridge Road at Derrykerrib

This is a major cross border arterial route for south Fermanagh,

carrying approximately 5,000 vehicles per day. It is also an east – west

link of particular importance to business traffic and cross-border

shoppers. It is proposed to raise the road sufficiently to prevent a

recurrence of the problems encountered in November 2009.

4. C436 Inishmore Road

This is also a key link road across the River Erne and used by many

commuters. Its closure, especially when other river crossings must also

be closed, causes major disruption to many road users. It is proposed

to have this short section of road elevated to prevent a recurrence.

5. B36 Monaghan Road, Roslea

This road frequently floods at a location close to the entrance into

Springdale Estate, as a result of water levels in the River Finn. The

only convenient diversion route is by unsuitable minor roads which

causes difficulty for road users.

6. Derrychara Link Road

This road was severely flooded during this period causing severe

disruption for those businesses located on the road. It also caused

considerable disruption to school transport services where access to

regular bus embarkation points was prevented. The relocation of these

services also adversely impacted on traffic around Enniskillen. In 2005

Derrychara Link Road was raised by up to 450mm - to a level

exceeding previous flood levels. Unfortunately the flood of 2009

significantly exceeded all previous floods and resulted in the road being

impassable for several weeks. The road is supported on a former lake

bed so ground conditions along the road are exceedingly poor, with theresult that adding additional weight is not considered a good use of

44



funds. The estimated cost of piling the road is in excess of £1m, and

would not be cost effective.

It may be feasible to isolate the Derrychara / Erneside area from Lough

Erne in the event of a repeat flood event to prevent flood inundation of

the area. A feasibility study of this option by Rivers Agency and Roads

Service is proposed for 2011. In the meantime, some containment

measures are proposed prior to winter 2010.

7. The Sillees River (Boho Area)

The community of Boho, situated on the flood plain of the Sillees River,

is in a different situation to the other flooding locations. While the 2009

flood on the Erne system was a one in a hundred year event, the

Sillees River comes into flood most years - often on more than one

occasion. The flooding of surrounding roads has caused major

disruption, including the temporary closure of the local Primary School.

Some of the roads have previously been raised at locations prone to

flooding and have been successful, while others quickly settle back to

their ‘normal’ level. The Samsonagh Road has been raised on three

occasions in the last 15 years, most recently in 2009. It has always

been recognised that it was not feasible to raise the road sufficiently to

remain clear of all floods, such is the swell of the river at this point. The

works have however greatly reduced the number of days the road

proved impassable.

It is not considered feasible to raise the Samsonagh Road any further

at this stage. However, it is proposed to raise two sections of the

Lisdead Road and also the Crott Road and the Drumanure Road,

which are the main feeder roads to Killyhommen Primary School.

8. The Finn River (Newtownbutler Area)

The Finn River is also prone to come into flood most winters, affectinga number of roads in the border region south of Newtownbutler. In

45



2009 as many as nine sections of public road were under water,

causing considerable hardship for the residents. It is proposed to raise

a number of the following roads where the greatest inconvenience was

experienced:

Cloncallick Road at Farmhill Cloncallick Road at Keelaghy Carra Road at Clonfad Teer Road at Teer Teer Road at Clonrye Derrykerrib Road near Derrykerrib Bridge Annies Bridge Road near the bridge Clonelty Road at Leitrim Clonkee Road at Cavanagh Drumboghanagh Road at Drumboghanagh Drumcrin Road at Clonshannagh.

9. Rossmacaffry Road

Although not a ‘through-road’ the Rossmacaffry Road serves

approximately 12 families and several farms/businesses. During the

2009 floods this road was flooded at three locations. The first two

locations were relatively shallow (approx 450mm) over a short length

but disrupted a large number of people. The third location was flooded

over 1 metre deep over a longer distance but inconvenienced fewer

people.

It is proposed to raise the level of the road at the first two locations, but

given the length and depth of road affected it is not cost effective to

raise the road at the third location. However, it is proposed to put in

place some measures to ease the inconvenience to users of this

section of the road in the event of any future flooding. Specifically, it is

proposed to create an earthen bund between the road and the river

where it runs close to the road to prevent the type of ‘cross current’ that

46



was experienced during this flood. It is also proposed to plant a row of

trees along the verge at this location to serve as road markers.

10. Other roads

The following roads were also affected by flooding and will be

considered for treatment, subject to the availability of funding:

C448 Glennashaaver Road at Churchill

C431 Teemore Road at Derrymacausey

U9408 Kinmore Road

U9247 Innishrooske Road

U9445 Rossmacole Road

U8530 Drumanure Road

B81 Caldrum Road

U9249 Geaglum Road

U8183 Graffy Road

U9136 Ballyhoe Road

6.66 Traffic congestion in Enniskillen itself was greatly exacerbated by the

loss of key transport routes during the November flooding and so there

were calls during the evidence sessions for the construction of a

southern by-pass for Enniskillen to be completed by 2014. A proposal

for a southern by-pass road is included in the Department for Regional

Development’s Investment Delivery Plan for Roads 2008-2018 with

construction envisaged in the 2014 to 2018 timeframe. The route

selection process is currently underway and it is intended that the

Preferred Corridor for the proposed Southern By-Pass will be

announced later this year.

Drainage Infrastructure

6.67 The Rivers Agency, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development,

has invested significantly in major flood alleviation and drainageinfrastructure schemes in the Fermanagh area. Examples include:

47



• the Maguiresbridge Flood Alleviation Scheme (2001/02) - cost

£1.3 million;

•the Enniskillen, Drumgay Lake Drain (2004/05) - cost £450k;

• the Enniskillen, Killynure Lough Drain (2007/08) - cost £3 million.

6.68 In addition, approximately £1 million is spent annually on the

maintenance of assets, the regulation of watercourses and the

provision of advice to reduce flooding risk in Fermanagh.

6.69 The frequent flooding at Boho is a result of the Sillees River going out

of bank. The Sillees River rises in the hills north west of Derrygonnelly

and flows for the most part through a relatively flat valley to discharge

into the River Erne a short distance from Enniskillen. The river

catchment is a naturally scenic area. The upper few kilometres of the

river have a good hydraulic gradient but there is a stretch of the river

about 6 kilometres long with a very slack gradient (estimated at

1:6000). This causes a slow flow of river waters with the surrounding

land becoming inundated with floodwater on a regular basis and the

consequent problems of roads becoming impassable for a number of

days/weeks. The gradient over the final few kilometres of the river is

quite good and consequently the level of the Erne System has a

minimal effect on the rate of discharge.

6.70 The recurring flooding in the area is caused by a prolonged period of

rain or an intense short duration storm coinciding with already high

water levels. The frequency of these periods of flooding causes

serious disruption to the local community. Rivers Agency previously

conducted a feasibility study to investigate the potential to relieve the

flooding difficulties in the Boho area associated with the Sillees River.

Solutions to upgrade the watercourse and to divert headwaters into the

Lower Lough Erne were examined. It was concluded however that this

solution was not viable as the works involved would require extensive

48



tunnelling in an area of porous limestone geology with costs in the

region of £6-10 million. However, as detailed at paragraph 6.65 it is

possible that works to the roads infrastructure in the Boho area could

be conducted to mitigate the impact of flooding in the area.

6.71 More widely, the Taskforce notes that Fermanagh is part of the North

Western River Basin District, and a Flood Risk Management Plan will

be developed for the entire River Basin District (RBD). As this is also

one of our two International RBDs this work will involve cross-border

co-ordination. It is envisaged that a sub-plan will be developed for

Fermanagh in the longer term.

Essential Services

6.72 There was considerable concern expressed by those who gave

evidence about the difficulties in ensuring emergency / health and care

services for vulnerable people; continued education provision for local

children; postal deliveries; and other essential services from locations

isolated by the flooding. Questions were asked about how the

responsible authorities would ensure the continued provision of such

services during times of severe flooding. In light of the problems with

service delivery, some residents and traders have requested a rebate

of their rates for the period of the flooding.

6.73 In addition, there were calls for remedial action to be taken in respect

of the resilience of the Killyhevlin Water Treatment Works. This arose

from fears that the Treatment Works was almost overwhelmed by the

flooding and had this happened much of Enniskillen would have been

without drinking water.

6.74 Poor mobile phone coverage in rural areas was also mentioned in

terms of the safety of people necessarily travelling through the floods

49



becoming stranded but unable to call for assistance due to poor phone

reception.

Emergency Services and Care of the Vulnerable

6.75 The NI Fire and Rescue Service (NIFRS) has contingency plans in

place for major flood events. All operational personnel have received

training in Level 1 Water Rescue Response and all front-line pumping

appliances carry water rescue equipment for initial response to

stabilise and/or rescue persons in distress. In addition, 48 personnel

have received specialist training to perform swift-water rescue

operations across NI in the event of flood emergencies.

6.76 The NIFRS also has a Specialist Rescue Team, acknowledged as one

of the premier specialist teams in Europe, and this team is capable of

performing high risk search operations and water rescue in all

conditions. This team is equipped with a range of water rescue boats,

rescue sleds and water rescue equipment in addition to high-risk

search equipment including night vision goggles, thermal imaging

search cameras and specialist GIS and mapping equipment.

6.77 The NIFRS was actively involved during the November 2009 flooding.

Members of the Specialist Rescue Team (full-time firefighters from

Belfast) were deployed to Fermanagh to stand-by in Lisnaskea Fire

Station for 6 days. During their time in Fermanagh they carried out a

number of reconnaissance and high-risk search operations. In

addition, all the fire stations in Fermanagh were called out to assist with

public safety, pumping out flooded property and generally providing a

reassuring presence in the areas worst affected.

6.78 The NI Ambulance Service (NIAS) deployed 4x4 vehicles to the

flooded areas to ensure that response times for the provision of 24/7

emergency medical care were met. In addition, a station officer in ahigh sided four wheel drive vehicle was temporarily moved into Omagh

50



Station, to manage the situation as it changed on an hourly basis. An

Assistant Emergency Planning Officer was tasked to co-ordinate with

the Emergency Service partners and social services on patient rescues

and to participate in teleconferences with all responding agencies.

6.79 The Western Health and Social Care Trust experienced difficulties

during the flooding in gaining access to vulnerable people in the

community. The Trust maintains various lists on which vulnerable

clients are noted and these are held by the relevant Directorate

Managers and can be accessed when required. During the

Fermanagh flooding a daily review of vulnerable clients within the

affected area took place. The Trust has reviewed its Major Emergency

Plan and awareness sessions for those staff with roles to play within a

major emergency and exercises to test the revised Plan are proposed

for later in the year. In the event of an emergency occurring in the

community, depending on the type of incident and the people involved,

the Trust will appoint a designated senior member of staff as a contact

point within the Trust. During the Fermanagh flooding a senior

member of staff participated in multi-agency Task Force meetings. The

Trust will also appoint a designated senior member of staff in the

locality of the incident, as it did during the Fermanagh Flooding, to

ensure the safe removal of vulnerable people. Trust staff will liaise and

work with the NIAS and NIFRS (and other agencies as appropriate) to

ensure that for its client groups, it could utilise any relevant externally

held and managed equipment. The Trust is currently exploring an

initial Memorandum of Understanding with the British Red Cross and is

continuing to work closely with NIAS and NIFRS and local Councils in

multi-agency planning groups to ensure preparedness. In addition, the

Trust has appointed a full-time Emergency Planning Officer to help with

all aspects of emergency preparedness.

51



Supply of Potable Water

6.80 Northern Ireland Water (NIW) owns and operates the Killyhevlin Water

Treatment Works and has advised that they closely monitored the

levels in Lough Erne from mid-November onwards as they rose above

the Upper Lough Erne winter limit. On 20 November 2009 the levels

were only 75mm lower than the Clear Water Tank overflow level and

predicted to rise further. Significant ingress of water was visible into

the basement of the plant through ducts where seals were leaking due

to the excessive head of water. Without intervention there was the

distinct possibility of plant closure and the loss of the water supply to

Enniskillen and surrounding areas. Consequently, NIW took steps to

protect the works from the developing situation and successfully

managed through the period of the flood to ensure that output was

maintained. NIW intend to implement a programme of work during

2010 to remove the temporary works where appropriate and install

permanent infrastructure to allow future extreme flood events to be

better managed.

Education Provision

6.81 Contingency arrangements for the education of children in Teemore

were put in place when the Western Education and Library Board

(WELB) in conjunction with the Moat Primary School, Lisnaskea

established a temporary school in a local church hall while the main

route from Teemore to Lisnaskea was impassable due to flooding. The

WELB has confirmed that it has robust emergency and contingency

plans in place to facilitate the continuation of education provision within

WELB schools during any future serious flooding event.

Refuse and Fallen Animal Collections

6.82 In terms of industrial and commercial refuse collection the Departmentof the Environment (DOE) has advised that the timely collection of

52



refuse from domestic and industrial premises during prolonged and

severe flooding would, in accordance with the relevant legislation, be

the responsibility of local authorities and private sector waste

operators. Accordingly, it is for local authorities to address the risk of

flooding and the impact on waste into their contingency arrangements.

The Department and the NI Environment Agency (NIEA) maintain close

contact with councils and will monitor the effectiveness of their

contingency arrangements in the event of further flooding, with a view

to issuing further guidance if necessary. The DOE, through NIEA,

would have a role to play in considering possible variations to waste

management permissions, authorisations or exemptions for waste

collectors and operators to allow timely collection, temporary storage

and movement of waste. This would have to be decided on a case by

case basis at the time, with the aim of minimising the impact on the

environment.

6.83 Fermanagh District Council has a Corporate Business Continuity Plan

detailing how the Council will respond in a major disruption to services,

and it has identified refuse collection as one of its priority areas in

these circumstances.

6.84 The Department for Agriculture and Rural Development has advised

that it received anecdotal evidence from the rendering plants which

dispose of fallen animals that there was no increase in the number of

fallen animals received during the flood period or immediately

afterwards, which suggests that this was not a significant problem.

However, it is acknowledged that individual farmers may have had

problems in having their fallen animals collected.

Mobile Phone Coverage

6.85 The Department of Enterprise Trade and Investment (DETI) has

advised that mobile phone coverage is poor in parts of Fermanagh as aconsequence of a combination of factors including topography, which

53



limits the range of the cellular masts, and the low population density

which makes the area commercially unattractive to the private sector

mobile phone companies. There is no legal obligation to provide a

universal mobile phone service.

6.86 However, as part of current DETI plans to put increased pressure on

the regulator and mobile phone companies to improve coverage, and

separate to the work of the Flooding Taskforce, the Minister for

Enterprise, Trade and Investment has written to the communications

regulator OFCOM about mobile phone coverage in rural areas

generally.

6.87 OFCOM is currently undertaking research into this issue in conjunction

with interested stakeholders, including the mobile phone industry, to

scope creative solutions. However, providing improved mobile phone

coverage in Fermanagh is likely to require very substantial investment,

the extent of which is not yet known although each new mast can cost

£100,000. There may also be continued local resistance to the

construction of additional masts.

6.88 Given that there is no legal requirement for mobile phone companies to

provide universal coverage and that technically this would be both

difficult and very expensive to achieve it is unlikely that the mobile

operators would be able to justify the cost of providing complete

coverage of Fermanagh.

Refund of Rates

6.89 The Rates Collection Agency of the Department of Finance and

Personnel has advised that in terms of domestic rates there is no

provision within rating legislation to remit or reduce rating liability

unless the ratepayer finds himself/herself with a reduced income, in

which case he/she may be eligible for low income rate relief or rate

54



rebate as part of Housing Benefit.

6.90 In terms of business premises, the Hardship Relief Scheme which

came into effect from 31 December 2005 allows the Department to

reduce rates to assist a business recover from a temporary crisis,

financial or otherwise as a result of exceptional and unforeseen

circumstances. The flooding in Fermanagh during November 2009

would fall into this category. However, it is extremely difficult to qualify

for this relief because the ratepayer must prove financial hardship,

which goes beyond calculation of loss and consideration must be given

to whether the ratepayer is in a financial position to recover.

6.91 In terms of the farming sector, as agricultural land and buildings are not

rated any rate relief would not benefit this sector.


6.92 In terms of the response to the flooding the view was expressed that

there could have been better communication between the responding

organisations and the public. There were calls for arrangements to be

put in place to ensure the provision of adequate and timely information

to the public and that the responding organisations should ensure that

the public can access relevant officials at all times.

6.93 Some local traders accused the media of presenting a picture of a

‘siege mentality’ in the press and that this had discouraged trade by

giving potential customers that it was not ‘business as usual’. The view

was expressed that better liaison was required with the media to

prevent this from happening.

6.94 It was recognised by some of those giving evidence that there was a lot

of conjecture within the local community about the reasons for theflooding and what might feasibly have been done to prevent or alleviate

55



it. In light of this it was suggested that an education programme on

Lough Erne and the management of the Erne System should be

developed and delivered to the local community, including school

children.

Public Contact Arrangements

6.95 Rivers Agency has advised that it assumed the lead role in dealing in

communications during the response to the flooding, giving some

thirteen interviews to television and radio and issuing thirty-two press

statements. The Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development also

gave six interviews and made three press statements. Roads Service

also participated in interviews and issued statements particularly in

regard to road closures. The Fermanagh Office of the Rivers Agency

received some 100 calls from the public seeking advice or information

about lough levels.

6.96 The Emergency Planning Officer (EPO) for the Western Group of

councils, in liaison with Fermanagh District Council’s Emergency

Planning Implementation Group, played a pivotal coordination role

during the flooding, including facilitating and chairing a co-ordinating

group via daily conference calls with all relevant agencies. The daily

conference calls proved to be a useful tool in keeping all organisations

up to date on the current status of the flooding, and ensured that the

public had access to the full range of advice and assistance available.

They also ensured that a co-ordinated response was provided to any

requests for information or assistance from those affected by the

flooding. The EPO prepared and issued press statements on behalf of

the multi-agency response group.

Media Liaison

6.97 In terms of dealing with traders’ concerns about media portrayal of asiege mentality during the flooding, the Executive Information Service,

56



OFMDFM has advised that as was the case here key cohesive

communication messages should be developed as early as practicable

during the flooding incident and agreed with all stakeholders to ensure

commonality of communication. Those being interviewed and

providing information to the media could then actively promote and

reinforce the positive message that the town is open for business.

Raising Awareness about the Erne System

6.98 The Western Education and Library Board has indicated that it would

welcome working with Rivers Agency to prepare an educational

advisory teaching pack for schools on the Erne System. This will

facilitate the introduction and explanation of this subject within teaching

programmes for Fermanagh schools.

6.99 The Rivers Agency has already agreed to present to interested groups

on the operation of the Erne system and is considering the possibility of

drawing up a short brochure explaining how the Erne System works for

distribution in schools.

57



7. CONCLUSIONS

7.1 It was clear that the extensive flooding in Fermanagh during November

2009 had a profound impact on the lives of those local people directly

affected at the time. Furthermore, the potential lasting impact of future

flooding was recognised.

Impacts of the Flooding

7.2 The large volume of evidence received graphically illustrated the very

considerable difficulties experienced in accessing homes, shops,

schools, farmland and businesses; problems in caring for the

vulnerable; public health concerns; animal welfare issues and wider

economic impacts. The potential for lasting damage from future

flooding to the viability of rural communities; the reputation of

Fermanagh as a tourist destination, and as a good place to do

business, was also evident. Given such substantial and potentially

long lasting consequences it is important that more is done to alleviate

the impact of future serious flooding in Fermanagh.


7.3 In preparing for the future, it is important to be clear about why the

flooding occurred. Put simply, the flooding was as a direct

consequence of the very heavy and persistent rainfall in Fermanagh

during October and November 2009 which caused the volume of water

flowing into the Erne System to exceed that which could be stored and

discharged to the sea. It is of particular note that while the October

2009 rainfall was around average for the month, 95% of that rain fell

after 16 October.

7.4 The fact that the flooding occurred does not mean that the Erne

System itself is inadequate or that it was not properly managed at the

time of the flooding. The Erne System complies with the standards set

in the legislation. These standards establish a level of protectionagainst the likely or anticipated level of flooding for the area. It is

58



possible that this level will be exceeded during extreme events and this

is what happened in November 2009. It would not be economically or

environmentally feasible to increase the capacity of the existing system

to a level where flooding from such extreme events could be

prevented. Neither does the balance of argument support the proposal

put forward by some residents to lower the existing Lough levels, given

the detrimental impact this would have on the natural environment and

on water-based tourism.

7.5 DARD Rivers Agency and the Electricity Supply Board managed the

System during October and November 2009 in accordance with the

Erne Drainage and Development Act (Northern Ireland) 1950 and the

parameters of the Operating Regime applied under the Act. However,

given the impact of the November flooding event, an in depth review of

the Regime should be conducted to ensure that it adequately meets

modern day needs. This review should include the feasibility of

bringing forward the winter drawdown of Lough levels to maximise

storage.

Flood Mitigation

7.6 In recent years there has been investment in flood mitigation works to

protect people and property in Fermanagh. However, these works

should be enhanced to further alleviate the impact of serious flooding in

the area. This enhancement should, subject to sufficient funding being

made available, include works to key roads infrastructure (as detailed

at paragraph 6.65) in order to protect important transport and access

routes and to mitigate disruption in the Boho area. In addition the

feasibility of options for reducing flood risk at Derrychara Link,

Enniskillen should be examined.

Essential Services

7.7 Even though steps are taken to alleviate flooding risk in Fermanagh, it

cannot be prevented altogether and from time to time some flooding islikely to occur. Established practice is that areas prone to flooding are

59



not developed. It is important that this practice should be maintained in

order to manage residual flood risk. In addition, while the efforts of the

responding organisations involved in dealing with the aftermath of the

November flooding are fully recognised, it is imperative that emergency

planning arrangements and networks are maintained. These should be

further developed where necessary to ensure that leadership

responsibilities are clear and fully understood in respect of future

flooding emergencies.

7.8 In mitigating the impact of future flooding on people’s daily lives steps

must be taken to protect essential service provision. This will include a

programme of works at the Killyhevlin Water Treatment Works to

protect the public drinking water supply in Enniskillen. In addition,

steps must be taken to ensure robust contingency arrangements for

the continued provision of emergency / health care, education and

refuse collection are in place.


7.9 Finally, it is key that the local community is as prepared as possible to

deal with any future flooding. It is important that the public have

accurate information about flood risk in the area, know what to do in a

flood situation and how to access help. All agencies involved in

managing flood risk and responding to flood emergencies should

continue in their efforts to provide easily understandable and

accessible information to the public in advance of and during flood

emergencies. In addition, current public concerns and misconceptions

about the Erne System must be addressed. This can best be done

through the provision of an education programme for local school

children, presentations and talks to local interest groups, and the

production of an Erne System information leaflet for distribution to

households in the Fermanagh area.

60



8. RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 After examining all the evidence provided and considering the detailed

assessment of this evidence by the appropriate NI departments and

agencies the Flooding Taskforce has made the following

recommendations for action by the end of 2011. It is recommended

that:


• An in depth review of the Operating Regime for the Erne System

should be conducted to ensure that the arrangements and

parameters for the management of the Erne System are adequate

to meet modern day needs. The Lough Erne Management Co-

ordinating Committee and the Lough Erne Advisory Committee

represent all interests and activities associated with Lough Erne,

and so should be actively engaged in this review process.

Flood Mitigation

• Subject to sufficient funding being secured, a programme of road

improvement works should be undertaken to include all the roads

identified in Section 6 paragraph 6.65 to reduce the likelihood of

loss of key transport and access routes.

• A feasibility study should be conducted to consider options for

reducing flood risk at Derrychara Link, Enniskillen. In the interim,

containment measures should be put in place prior to the coming

winter.

Essential Services

• A programme of work to be undertaken to improve the level of

protection from flood risk of the Killyhevlin Water Treatment Works.

61



• All organisations involved in the response to and recovery from the

November 2009 flooding in Fermanagh should maintain and further

develop their emergency planning arrangements and networks to

ensure they are as prepared as possible to deal with any serious

future flooding which may occur.

• All organisations responsible for the provision of essential services

to the local community, especially emergency / health care,

education and refuse collection must ensure that robust

contingency arrangements are in place to protect the provision of

these vital services to areas affected by serious flooding.


• An education and public awareness programme should be

developed to inform the local community, including school children

about flooding in the Fermanagh area and how to deal with it. This

should specifically include information on the Erne System.

62



ANNEX 1

List of Taskforce members

Bruce Robinson Head of the NI Civil Service (Chair)

Noel Lavery Office of the First Minister and deputy First

Minister (OFMDFM) (Deputy Chair)

Michelle Gildernew MP MLA Minister for Agriculture & Rural

Development

Arlene Foster MLA Minister for Enterprise, Trade and

Investment

Conor Murphy MP MLA Minister for Regional Development

Edwin Poots MLA Minister for the Environment

Keith Jagelman OFMDFM (Secretary)

Philip Mehaffey Rivers Agency, Department of Agriculture

and Rural Development (DARD)

Wendy Johnston DARD

Wesley Shannon Department of the Environment

Brian Daly Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure

Owen Doody Western Education and Library Board

Dave Foster Northern Ireland Environment Agency

Mike Beare Department of Finance and Personnel

Andrew Elliott Department of Health, Social Services and

Public Safety

Brendan Duffy Western Health and Social Care Trust

Pat Doherty Roads Service, Department for Regional

Development

Gordon Smyth NI Water

Mervyn Adair Social Security Agency

Paul Major Northern Ireland Housing Executive

Julie Cuming OFMDFM

John Murphy OFMDFM

63



ANNEX 2

Lough Levels, Gate State and Discharge at cliff for the period

1 May 2009 to 31 December 2009

UpperLough Portora Lower Lough

TotalDischarge

At Cliff RainfallBelleisle u/s d/s Roscor Gate state Spilling m3/s Portora

1/5/2009 46.54 46.26 46.19 46.21 Fully open No 106.54 5.4

2/5/2009 46.56 46.25 46.18 46.18 Fully open No 166.58 1.4

3/5/2009 46.51 46.22 46.16 46.10 Fully open No 182.00 2.6

4/5/2009 46.51 46.18 46.13 46.12 Fully open No 102.04 3.2

5/5/2009 46.48 46.20 46.14 46.12 Fully open No 116.54 8.8

6/5/2009 46.56 46.30 43.22 46.24 Fully open No 63.33 9.67/5/2009 46.66 46.40 46.30 46.33 Fully open Yes 195.86 4.4

8/5/2009 46.67 46.34 46.25 46.23 Fully open Yes 285.91 12

9/5/2009 46.75 46.27 46.19 46.17 Fully open Yes 282.75 6.2

10/5/2009 46.77 46.21 46.14 46.10 Fully open Yes 276.35 2.6

11/5/2009 46.72 46.13 46.08 46.03 Fully open Yes 231.79 0

12/5/2009 46.64 46.06 46.03 46.00 Fully open Yes 200.58 0

13/5/2009 46.54 46.02 46.00 45.97 Fully open Yes 200.40 0

14/5/2009 46.45 45.98 45.96 45.90 Fully open Yes 129.08 1.2

15/5/2009 46.38 46.03 46.00 45.96 Fully open No 71.42 9.6

16/5/2009 46.39 46.03 46.00 45.99 Fully open No 92.79 7.5

17/5/2009 46.42 46.07 46.04 46.04 Fully open No 83.17 7.6

18/5/2009 46.43 46.12 46.07 46.02 Fully open No 80.96 6.419/5/2009 46.45 46.14 46.09 46.07 Fully open No 84.13 1

20/5/2009 46.47 46.16 46.11 46.09 Fully open No 88.71 1

21/5/2009 46.47 46.18 46.13 46.11 Fully open No 83.17 1

22/5/2009 46.47 46.19 46.13 46.13 Fully open No 108.29 1.2

23/5/2009 46.45 46.17 46.12 46.12 Fully open No 125.67 1.6

24/5/2009 46.47 46.14 46.09 46.08 Fully open No 179.63 5.6

25/5/2009 46.43 46.08 46.05 46.02 Fully open No 174.08 0

26/5/2009 46.37 46.05 46.02 45.94 Fully open No 163.92 1

27/5/2009 46.33 46.02 46.00 45.93 Fully open No 126.17 4.2

28/5/2009 46.30 46.01 45.99 45.94 Fully open No 53.75 2.4

29/5/2009 46.26 46.01 45.99 45.98 Fully open No 61.71 0

30/5/2009 46.22 46.04 46.01 45.99 Fully open No 59.00 0

31/5/2009 46.20 46.05 46.02 46.00 Fully open No 63.21 0

1/6/2009 46.17 46.05 46.02 46.00 Fully open No 56.00 0

2/6/2009 46.15 46.05 46.02 46.00 Fully open No 20.29 0

3/6/2009 46.13 46.07 46.04 46.02 Fully open No 11.92 0

4/6/2009 46.14 46.09 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 12.83 0

5/6/2009 46.14 46.12 46.08 46.04 Fully open No 13.08 0

6/6/2009 46.15 46.10 46.07 46.03 Fully open No 10.67 0

7/6/2009 46.15 46.11 46.07 46.06 Fully open No 12.83 1

8/6/2009 46.15 46.11 46.07 46.07 Fully open No 14.58 0

9/6/2009 46.14 46.11 46.08 46.07 Fully open No 37.50 0

10/6/2009 46.13 46.09 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 25.50 011/6/2009 46.13 46.10 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 25.50 0

12/6/2009 46.12 46.07 46.05 46.05 Fully open No 23.33 0

64



13/6/2009 46.10 46.07 46.05 46.05 Fully open No 24.90 4.2

14/6/2009 46.09 46.08 46.05 46.03 Fully open No 16.79 3.4

15/6/2009 46.11 46.09 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 28.00 0.4

16/6/2009 46.10 46.09 46.04 46.04 Fully open No 26.67 0

17/6/2009 46.09 46.09 46.06 46.02 Fully open No 24.29 22.8

18/6/2009 46.15 46.09 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 22.21 0.4

19/6/2009 46.15 46.12 46.08 46.03 Fully open No 27.45 0.4

20/6/2009 46.16 46.12 46.08 46.04 Fully open No 24.88 0.8

21/6/2009 46.16 46.13 46.09 46.05 Fully open No 20.86 0.2

22/6/2009 46.15 46.12 46.08 46.03 Fully open No 27.83 0.2

23/6/2009 46.15 46.11 46.07 46.07 Fully open No 61.45 0.2

24/6/2009 46.12 46.08 46.05 46.04 Fully open No 62.54 0

25/6/2009 46.08 46.05 46.03 46.02 Fully open No 89.88 0

26/6/2009 46.04 46.00 45.98 45.98 Fully open No 12.21 0

27/6/2009 46.02 46.00 45.99 45.97 Fully open No 13.21 0

28/6/2009 46.02 46.00 45.98 45.98 Fully open No 13.17 0

29/6/2009 46.01 46.01 45.99 45.97 Fully open No 0.92 0


2/7/2009 46.04 46.04 46.02 46.00 Fully open No 0.92 7.8

3/7/2009 46.06 46.05 46.03 46.01 Fully open No 0.92 3.2

4/7/2009 46.08 46.06 46.03 46.03 Fully open No 8.17 15

5/7/2009 46.14 46.09 46.06 46.06 Fully open No 9.08 19.4

6/7/2009 46.21 46.15 46.11 46.10 Fully open No 37.58 0

7/7/2009 46.28 46.17 46.12 46.11 Fully open No 94.21 0

8/7/2009 46.28 46.16 46.12 46.08 Fully open No 113.00 1.2

9/7/2009 46.24 46.12 46.08 46.04 Fully open No 116.00 0.2

10/7/2009 46.20 46.07 46.04 46.01 Fully open No 121.46 0

11/7/2009 46.13 46.02 46.00 45.97 Fully open No 23.54 0

12/7/2009 46.08 46.05 46.03 46.02 Fully open No 28.00 7.613/7/2009 46.09 46.06 46.03 46.03 Fully open No 57.04 1

14/7/2009 46.10 46.06 46.04 46.02 Fully open No 26.67 6

15/7/2009 46.12 46.08 46.06 46.03 Fully open No 23.75 2.8

16/7/2009 46.15 46.09 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 23.50 0.4

17/7/2009 46.14 46.14 46.10 46.05 Fully open No 26.58 0.6

18/7/2009 46.17 46.12 46.08 46.06 Fully open No 54.75 0

19/7/2009 46.14 46.12 46.09 46.03 Fully open No 54.04 2

20/7/2009 46.14 46.09 46.06 46.04 Fully open No 56.38 1.2

21/7/2009 46.11 46.05 46.03 46.06 Fully open No 111.88 2.4

22/7/2009 46.10 46.04 46.01 45.99 Fully open No 56.13 6.4

23/7/2009 46.08 46.05 46.02 46.00 Fully open No 60.46 0.824/7/2009 46.10 46.06 46.03 45.97 Fully open No 56.92 9.4

25/7/2009 46.11 46.04 46.02 46.01 Fully open No 23.67 0.2

26/7/2009 46.11 46.06 46.03 46.04 Fully open No 25.37 11.2

27/7/2009 46.14 46.10 46.07 46.06 Fully open No 62.42 1

28/7/2009 46.14 46.09 46.06 46.07 Fully open No 60.63 1

29/7/2009 46.19 46.09 46.06 46.03 Fully open No 88.37 3.6

30/7/2009 46.19 46.04 46.01 45.97 Fully open No 140.75 2

31/7/2009 46.16 45.97 45.96 45.95 Fully open No 79.79 0.4

1/8/2009 46.13 45.98 45.98 45.93 Fully open No 28.83 10

2/8/2009 46.13 46.02 46.01 45.98 Fully open No 23.92 4.2

3/8/2009 46.14 46.04 46.03 46.02 Fully open No 24.21 8.8

4/8/2009 46.18 46.10 46.06 46.01 Fully open No 56.12 10.25/8/2009 46.19 46.08 46.05 46.06 Fully open No 57.71 0.2

65



6/8/2009 46.17 46.08 46.05 46.04 Fully open No 65.96 0

7/8/2009 46.16 46.07 46.05 46.03 Fully open No 59.79 0.4

8/8/2009 46.13 46.06 46.04 46.00 Fully open No 28.25 0

9/8/2009 46.13 46.07 46.05 46.02 Fully open No 21.13 0.2

10/8/2009 46.11 46.08 46.05 46.02 Fully open No 56.54 2.2

11/8/2009 46.11 46.04 46.02 45.99 Fully open No 38.17 0.2

12/8/2009 46.09 46.07 46.04 45.98 Fully open No 23.25 0.2

13/8/2009 46.10 46.05 46.03 46.01 Fully open No 25.96 0.4

14/8/2009 46.09 46.04 46.02 46.02 Fully open No 25.96 1

15/8/2009 46.14 46.10 46.07 46.03 Fully open No 21.63 16.2

16/8/2009 46.15 46.11 46.08 46.05 Fully open No 31.08 1

17/8/2009 46.19 46.13 46.09 46.08 Fully open No 42.46 5.6

18/8/2009 46.20 46.11 46.07 46.08 Fully open No 79.79 8

19/8/2009 46.21 46.13 46.09 46.07 Fully open No 57.83 4

20/8/2009 46.35 46.17 46.13 46.12 Fully open No 101.21 20.8

21/8/2009 46.50 46.21 46.16 46.15 Fully open No 123.33 1.6

22/8/2009 46.50 46.19 46.13 46.13 Fully open No 166.38 0.4

23/8/2009 46.56 46.18 46.13 46.13 Fully open Yes 219.66 2224/8/2009 46.92 46.27 46.20 46.17 Fully open Yes 287.25 28.4

25/8/2009 46.91 46.22 46.16 46.11 Fully open Yes 269.18 1.6

26/8/2009 46.90 46.19 46.13 46.06 Fully open Yes 255.83 9.2

27/8/2009 46.91 46.14 46.09 46.02 Fully open Yes 228.09 0.2

28/8/2009 46.88 46.17 46.12 46.02 Fully open Yes 209.83 12

29/8/2009 46.89 46.17 46.11 46.03 Fully open Yes 193.21 2.4

30/8/2009 46.83 46.16 46.10 46.05 Fully open Yes 194.13 0.4

31/8/2009 46.83 46.16 46.11 46.07 Fully open Yes 200.38 16.8

1/9/2009 46.89 46.17 46.15 46.11 Fully open Yes 182.75 6.4

2/9/2009 46.87 46.18 46.12 46.07 Fully open Yes 210.78 0

3/9/2009 46.82 46.16 46.11 46.03 Fully open Yes 204.77 11.8

4/9/2009 46.80 46.14 46.10 46.02 Fully open Yes 199.86 15/9/2009 46.75 46.11 46.07 45.98 Fully open Yes 206.67 1.8

6/9/2009 46.69 46.06 46.04 45.97 Fully open Yes 213.76 4.6

7/9/2009 46.67 46.05 46.02 45.85 Fully open Yes 172.15 6

8/9/2009 46.65 46.09 46.06 46.03 Fully open No 114.42 7.6

9/9/2009 46.66 46.12 46.08 46.05 Fully open No 130.29 0.8

10/9/2009 46.62 46.14 46.09 46.07 Fully open No 115.21 0.2

11/9/2009 46.57 46.14 46.09 46.06 Fully open No 112.63 0

12/9/2009 46.52 46.15 46.09 46.06 Fully open No 118.04 0.2

13/9/2009 46.46 46.14 46.09 46.05 Fully open No 116.25 0.2

14/9/2009 46.41 46.12 46.08 46.05 Fully open No 74.58 0


17/9/2009 46.28 46.05 46.03 45.99 Fully open No 115.17 0

18/9/2009 46.23 46.03 46.01 45.99 Fully open No 23.29 0

19/9/2009 46.17 46.04 46.04 46.00 Fully open No 25.63 0.4

20/9/2009 46.17 46.06 46.03 46.02 Fully open No 25.04 0

21/9/2009 46.16 46.08 46.05 46.04 Fully open No 24.63 1.4

22/9/2009 46.16 46.09 46.06 46.05 Fully open No 26.29 4.8

23/9/2009 46.17 46.11 46.08 46.06 Fully open No 48.04 0.4

24/9/2009 46.16 46.09 46.06 46.05 Fully open No 61.04 1

25/9/2009 46.15 46.07 46.04 46.03 Fully open No 60.79 0

26/9/2009 46.13 46.04 46.03 45.99 Fully open No 64.46 0


66



29/9/2009 46.06 46.00 45.99 45.93 Fully open No 59.75 0

30/9/2009 46.04 45.98 45.97 45.90 Fully open No 61.96 0

1/10/2009 46.02 45.96 45.96 45.90 FO No 115.10 0

2/10/2009 45.97 45.88 45.89 45.83 FO No 118.20 0.2

3/10/2009 45.92 45.86 45.88 45.80 FO No 59.30 1.4

4/10/2009 45.90 45.82 45.84 45.78 FO No 55.90 0.2

5/10/2009 45.88 45.80 45.84 45.77 FO No 100.90 0

6/10/2009 45.82 45.75 45.79 45.68 FO No 134.20 0.2

7/10/2009 45.78 45.66 45.72 45.62 FO No 114.80 0.2

8/10/2009 45.81 45.80 45.66 45.53 FC 10.00 No 29.60 0.2

9/10/2009 45.86 45.87 45.60 45.53 FC No 12.80 0.2

10/10/2009 45.89 45.88 45.62 45.52 FC No 25.10 7.8

11/10/2009 45.92 45.90 45.64 45.49 FC No 25.90 0.2

12/10/2009 45.95 45.93 45.60 45.48 FC No 49.30 0.4

13/10/2009 45.96 45.95 45.57 45.45 FCFC1&2,3&4

No 31.80 0

14/10/2009 45.98 45.97 45.56 45.42 1'Open

FC1&2,3&4

No 12.80 0.2

15/10/2009 45.97 45.92 45.57 45.43 1'OpenFC1&2,3&4

No 11.80 1.8

16/10/2009 45.95 45.92 45.57 45.44 1'OpenFC1&2,3&4

No 12.30 0

17/10/2009 45.96 45.91 45.58 45.45 1'OpenFC1&2,3&4

No 11.70 0.2

18/10/2009 45.93 45.91 45.57 45.45 1'OpenFC1&2,3&4

No 13.80 0.8

19/10/2009 45.95 45.93 45.57 45.46 1'Open1,2,3,4 Open 2'

No 12.00 6.8

20/10/2009 45.99 45.98 45.58 45.50 12.00 No 24.70 5.2

21/10/2009 46.02 45.91 45.61 45.52 1,2,3,4 Open 2'1,2,3,4 open 4'

No 59.75 4.6

22/10/2009 46.03 45.92 45.63 45.54 12.30 No 59.79 20

23/10/2009 46.23 45.87 45.70 45.61 1,2,3,4 open 4' No 120.96 12

24/10/2009 46.23 45.86 45.69 45.65 1,2,3,4 open 4' No 78.88 5.4

25/10/2009 46.40 46.05 45.83 45.74 FO 10.00 No 81.00 21.8

26/10/2009 46.40 45.89 45.89 45.80 FO No 168.92 1.4

27/10/2009 46.37 45.90 45.90 45.87 FO No 78.63 5.6

28/10/2009 46.37 45.95 45.94 45.87 FO No 157.62 5.8

29/10/2009 46.35 45.92 45.92 45.86 FO No 143.25 0.2

30/10/2009 46.31 45.91 45.91 45.86 FO No 124.33 3.231/10/2009 46.47 45.96 45.95 45.87 FO No 168.79 19

1/11/2009 46.50 46.02 46.00 45.88 FO No 162.12 14.4

2/11/2009 46.76 46.11 46.07 46.01 FO No 150.88 6.4

3/11/2009 46.82 46.15 46.10 46.03 FO No 185.38 6.4

4/11/2009 46.95 46.27 46.19 46.14 FO No 178.54 16.4

5/11/2009 47.11 46.46 46.35 46.26 FO Yes 227.37 7.8

6/11/2009 47.19 46.39 46.29 46.26 FO Yes 296.63 6.2

7/11/2009 47.21 46.42 46.30 46.30 FO Yes 293.04 5.8

8/11/2009 47.21 46.42 46.31 46.28 FO Yes 317.50 4.8

9/11/2009 47.19 46.35 46.25 46.24 FO Yes 310.46 0.2

10/11/2009 47.22 46.36 46.27 46.21 FO Yes 306.15 11.2

11/11/2009 47.19 46.32 46.23 46.17 FO Yes 291.58 0.212/11/2009 47.17 46.29 46.21 46.15 FO Yes 298.23 8.4

67



13/11/2009 47.25 46.30 46.21 46.15 FO Yes 295.80 10.4

14/11/2009 47.24 46.32 46.23 46.14 FO Yes 294.65 11.6

15/11/2009 47.29 46.29 46.20 46.13 FO Yes 293.86 0

16/11/2009 47.30 46.30 46.21 46.14 FO Yes 299.02 15.2

17/11/2009 47.42 46.40 46.29 46.24 FO Yes 310.36 9.2

18/11/2009 47.52 46.44 46.33 46.27 FO Yes 314.73 17.2

19/11/2009 47.69 46.50 46.36 46.31 FO Yes 313.33 13.8

20/11/2009 47.93 46.60 46.45 46.37 FO Yes 334.95 14

21/11/2009 48.03 46.61 46.45 46.44 FO Yes 336.65 0.6

22/11/2009 48.08 46.64 46.48 46.47 FO Yes 353.21 5.4

23/11/2009 48.15 46.76 46.58 46.55 FO Yes 355.17 17.6

24/11/2009 48.19 46.82 46.62 46.62 FO Yes 377.13 9

25/11/2009 48.25 46.90 46.69 46.68 FO Yes 377.50 6.6

26/11/2009 48.27 46.92 46.71 46.72 FO Yes 374.90 3.2

27/11/2009 48.24 46.93 46.72 46.73 FO Yes 386.60 3.8

28/11/2009 48.21 46.92 46.71 46.73 FO Yes 375.80 0.4

29/11/2009 48.14 46.92 46.71 46.71 FO Yes 372.80 0.2

30/11/2009 48.06 46.86 46.67 46.67 FO Yes 368.20 01/12/2009 48.01 46.79 46.60 46.65 FO Yes 365.20 0.2

2/12/2009 47.97 46.77 46.59 46.61 FO Yes 357.30 6.2

3/12/2009 47.85 46.72 46.56 46.55 FO Yes 353.10 1.8

4/12/2009 47.76 46.66 46.51 46.52 FO Yes 346.40 1.6

5/12/2009 47.72 46.64 46.49 46.48 FO Yes 344.30 8

6/12/2009 47.76 46.60 46.46 46.47 FO Yes 342.30 5.6

7/12/2009 47.69 46.60 46.45 46.45 FO Yes 339.90 2.2

8/12/2009 47.62 46.54 46.41 46.42 FO Yes 336.10 0.6

9/12/2009 47.56 46.51 46.38 46.37 FO Yes 329.50 4

10/12/2009 47.47 46.47 46.35 46.33 FO Yes 327.30 0.6

11/12/2009 47.36 46.42 46.31 46.27 FO Yes 317.00 0.8

12/12/2009 47.24 46.34 46.25 46.20 FO Yes 308.70 0.213/12/2009 47.13 46.28 46.20 46.13 FO Yes 292.10 0.2

14/12/2009 47.02 46.22 46.15 46.05 FO Yes 283.10 0.2

15/12/2009 46.91 46.13 46.08 45.99 FO Yes 229.40 0.8

16/12/2009 46.80 46.09 46.05 45.97 FO No 194.00 0

17/12/2009 46.69 46.06 46.03 45.94 FO No 193.80 0.2

18/12/2009 46.60 46.01 45.98 45.91 FO No 190.80 0.2

19/12/2009 46.50 45.96 45.95 45.86 FO No 183.40 0.2

20/12/2009 46.41 45.81 45.91 45.80 FO No 190.70 1.8

21/12/2009 46.33 45.85 45.86 45.76 FO No 163.00 2.6

FO Gates closed

22/12/2009 46.26 45.80 45.82 45.71 to 6' Open 1600 No 180.20 423/12/2009 46.19 45.81 45.76 45.67 All 6' Open

6' Open FullyNo 188.10 3.6

24/12/2009 46.12 45.74 45.71 45.60 Closed 10.00am No 165.90 0

25/12/2009 46.17 46.13 45.61 45.48 Fully Closed No 164.80 0

Fully Closed All26/12/2009 46.24 46.20 45.53 45.38 Opened 2' at 14.30 No 129.10 0.2

27/12/2009 46.24 46.02 45.52 45.30 All Open 2' No 130.50 6

28/12/2009 46.24 46.03 45.47 45.30 All Open 2' No 87.70 0

1 & 2 Open 2' 2 &29/12/2009 46.21 46.00 45.46 45.30 3 Open 3' at 12.00

1 & 4 Open 2' 2 &No 116.50 0

30/12/2009 46.16 45.82 45.45 45.28 3 Open 3' No 73.10 0.2

68



1 & 4 Open 2' 2 &31/12/2009 46.23 45.89 45.48 45.32 3 Open 3' No 53.80 4.2

LEGEND

FO = FULLY OPEN

FC = FULLY CLOSED

69



ANNEX 3

RIVERS AGENCY REPORT – FERMANAGH FLOODING

70



FERMANAGH FLOODINGOF NOVEMBER 2009

Prepared by:-

Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Rivers Agency Hydebank 4 Hospital Road BELFAST BT8 8JP January 2010



CONTENTS PAGE NO

1. Executive Summary .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 – 2 2. Introduction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 – 4 3. Background .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 – 8 4. Preparedness .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11 – 15 5. Influencing factors .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16 6. Response .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17 – 20 7. Communications with the press and public .. .. .. .. .. .. 21 – 22 8. Flooding from the Sillees River .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 23 – 24 9. Aspects which worked well .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 25 – 27 10. Challenges .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 28 – 29 11. Suggestions for further improvements .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 30 12. Lessons learnt .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 31 13. Conclusions .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 32 – 33 14. Recommendations .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 34 – 35

Annex 1 List of Participants at Structured Debrief

Annex 2 Aspects which worked well (Record of structured debrief)

Annex 3 Challenges (Record of structured debrief)

Annex 4 Improvements (Record of structured debrief)

Annex 5 Lessons Learnt (Record of structured debrief)

Annex 6 Tables and Hydrographs

Annex 7 Photographs



1

Review of the Response to Flooding in Fermanaghin November 2009

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 The flooding in Fermanagh in November 2009 was an extreme event as a

result of persistent rainfall throughout late October and November 2009.

The water levels in Lough Erne reached record levels.

1.2 Only 3 properties were flooded but many more were isolated by the

floodwaters and rural life was severely disrupted as roads became impassible.

Vast areas of farmland were inundated although few stock were in the fields.

1.3 Water levels in the Loughs were drawn down in early October 2009 to

increase storage capacity for the autumn and winter months and spilling of

water at Cliff and Ballyshannon was carried out in accordance with legislation.

1.4 Co-ordination and communication between the different organisations

involved worked well and substantial efforts were made to try to minimize the

disruption to the public.

1.5 Construction of properties on higher ground significantly reduced the number

of properties flooded.

1.6 Works to significantly increase the capacity of channels and control structures

are not economically viable.

1.7 Rivers Agency in partnership with ESB will review operational arrangements

within the existing legislation and also review the performance of the existing

regime since its introduction in the 1950s.

1.8 Roads Service will examine the viability of raising critical roads including

those at Boho where flooding from the Sillees River occurs.



2

1.9 All agencies will draw on the lessons learnt from this event and seek

improvement in all areas of Emergency Response including communication

with the public.

1.10 Consideration should be given to establishing an agency to provide a strategicoverview to the management of flooding.



3

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 Due to persistent rainfall throughout late October and November 2009 water

levels in Upper and Lower Lough Erne rose above prescribed upper limits and

extensive flooding occurred in Fermanagh particularly around the area of theUpper Lough.

This report outlines the current water management system for Lough Erne,

and how this was applied during the event. It also examines the response by

different agencies to the flooding event and makes recommendations for

improvements in the future.

2.2 A meeting to review the multi agency response to the flooding in Fermanagh

was held in Enniskillen on 19 January 2010. The debrief was facilitated and

chaired by Rivers Agency, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development.

Fermanagh District Council hosted the meeting. A list of attendees is

included in Annex 1.

In advance of the debrief all responders were asked to re-examine their

preparedness and response to the flooding event and to submit a short

overview to Rivers Agency.

This report reflects both the inputs from these overviews and points raised

during the debrief. This document will be fed into the Fermanagh Task Force

to assist it in its deliberations. The Task Force, led by OFMDFM, aims to

produce an interim report by the end of February 2010.

2.3 The report considers two separate flooding events in Fermanagh in November

2009. Whilst the main elements of this report are related to the flooding post

19 November 2009 as a result of outflow from Upper and Lower Lough Erne,

some reference is made to the situation at Boho which was as a result of

inundation of the natural floodplain of the Sillies River on 4 November

(See Photograph 1 – Section 8).

More detail on the Sillees flooding is referenced in Section 8 page 24.



4

2.4 The purpose of holding a review both from Rivers Agency perspective and the

other responders is to try to capture any lessons learnt and for each

organisation to then apply these points to further develop their own

emergency planning arrangements for the future.

2.5 Participants at the review represented a wide range of public organisations, all

of whom had been involved in the response to the flooding event or whose

services had been impacted upon as a result of the flooding.

The review did not take evidence from members of the public as this falls

within the Terms of Reference of the Fermanagh Task Force. However some

statutory authority representatives at the structured debrief had been presentat the evidence gathering sessions.

2.6 The fundamental principles of emergency management are that processes

are followed which assess, plan, prepare and respond to events and that the

various activities of the responding organisations are joined up and co-

ordinated to provide a service to those affected by an incident.

2.7 Any lessons learnt are detailed in this report and recommendations made as

to how these should be taken on board.



5

3. BACKGROUND

3.1 There was limited control over water levels in Lough Erne and regular flooding

occurrences until the Government interceded in 1941. However the World

War II flying boat base on the Lower Lough made it necessary for levels to bekept up and while local farmers accepted this, they continued to press for a

drainage scheme.

In October 1947 the Prime Minister announced that cross border negotiations

had started and the Erne Drainage and Development Act (Northern Ireland)

1950 was passed on 27 June 1950. This legislation and corresponding

legislation in the south defined the current responsibilities of Rivers Agencyand Electricity Supply Board (ESB) with respect to the management of water

levels within the Erne System.

3.2 The River Erne, which rises from Lough Gowna in County Cavan, flows

through County Fermanagh and to the sea at Ballyshannon in County

Donegal. The river, which is some 100km long, drains an area of around

4,350km2, of which 1,850km2 is in Counties Fermanagh and Tyrone.

There are a large number of lakes in the catchment area upstream of

Enniskillen. The largest is Upper Lough Erne which has a surface area of

some 38km2. Discharge from the Upper Lough passes through the inter

lough channel to Lower Lough Erne (Surface Area approximately 111km2)

and onwards through the Belleek Channel to Cliff where the first of two power

stations is located. The second power station is located approximately 5km

downstream at Cathaleens Falls (more commonly known as Ballyshannon).

Sluice gates, (which can be used to control the water level in the Upper

Lough) are located at Portora (See Map 1 and Photograph 2 at end of this

section) in the inter lough channel. These are used primarily to maintain water

in the Upper Lough above the lower prescribed limit.

The water level of the Loughs is drawn down in October each year in order tomaximise storage capacity in the Loughs to cope with the expected increase

in rainfall during the autumn and winter months.



6

The Loughs provide storage in the system which is particularly important

during winter as rainfall generally increases. When inflow is too great water

can be spilled at Cliff (usually during the winter) and if inadequate to sustain

Upper Lough levels it can be held up by closing the Portora gates. Whererain is persistent a situation can be reached, as was the case in this instance,

where the inflow of water from the catchment into the Loughs substantially

exceeded the amount that could be conveyed by the channels and passed

through the system to the sea.

The Erne catchment has a slow response to rainfall due to its size and

the number of lakes and prolonged periods of rain give rise to floodingdue to high lough levels. This is different from an urban area and the

floods of June 2007 and August 2008 where periods of heavy rainfall

over a relatively short period of time caused widespread flooding across

the province.

Flooding was mainly restricted to the Upper Lough area in November

and early December 2009. This is because the Upper Lough is small

with relatively low lying ground adjacent whereas the Lower Lough is

three times the size with higher ground surrounding the Lough.

3.4 As a result of the Erne Drainage and Development Act (Northern Ireland)

1950 extensive works were undertaken on the Erne System which included:

• Deepening 6.4km of channel from Lower Lough Erne to Belleek

• Deepening 18.4km of channel between Upper and Lower Lough Erne

• Removal of the sluice gates at Belleek and regulation of the flow at Cliff

• Construction of a new control structure with navigation lock to facilitate

passage of boats at Portora, Enniskillen

• Construction of a new dam and hydro power station at Cliff

• Construction of a new dam and hydro power station at Cathaleens Falls

(Ballyshannon)

• Total power output 65Mw of hydro power.



7

3.5 The Agreement enshrined in the 1950 Act set statutory water levels for Lower

Lough Erne to Ordnance Datum (OD) at Poolbeg, Dublin as follows:-

Lower Lough: Not to exceed 46.33m (152 feet) or fall below 44.81m (147feet)

No absolute statutory upper level was set for the Upper Lough but the

following was included:

(a) “during the period from April to September inclusive the water level of

the Upper Lough, shall not, as far as reasonably preventable, exceeda level of 154 feet above OD” (46.94m).

(b) “during the period from October to March inclusive the water level of the

Upper Lough shall not, as far as reasonably preventable, exceed a

level of 155 feet above OD” (47.24)m.

In addition the inter lough Channel was not to fall below 150 feet (45.72m).

Effectively the limit of the inter lough channel determines the lower limit of the

Upper Lough. The level at Cliff cannot be drawn below 143 feet (43.59m)

although the realistic minimum level is 144 feet 4 inches (44.0m).

During an extreme event ESB is obliged to maintain the level at Cliff at

43.59m (143 feet) and it is the limiting capacity of the Belleek Channel which

has the main influence on the level within the Lower Lough. In practice the

minimum level for Cliff is 44.0m (144 feet 4 inches) as below this level the

increase in discharge of water achieved in the Belleek Channel is minimum,

around 5.0m3 /s and as discharge increases this is reduced. In addition as the

level approaches 44.0m (144 feet 4 inches) or below, the discharge becomes

hydraulically unstable and it becomes difficult to maintain a steady headrace

at Cliff.

To convert Poolbeg OD to Belfast OD it is necessary to deduct 9.25 feet

(2.82m).



8

For convenience upper limits for the Loughs are summarised at top of pages

11 to 13.

The Agreement also states that between October and March when the waterlevel of the Upper Lough has risen to 154 feet above OD and is in the opinion

of a Rivers Agency Engineer or an ESB Engineer likely to rise above 155 feet

OD, then the water level of the Lower Lough (if it is above 151.5 feet above

OD) shall as rapidly as reasonably practicable be reduced by ESB to

such a level no lower than 151.5 feet above OD. This is to ensure that the

water level of the Upper Lough may be prevented from rising above or be

brought down to 155 feet above OD.

‘As rapidly as reasonably practicable’ effectively means that water should be

directed through the turbines to generate hydroelectric power and the

spillways at Cliff and Ballyshannon utilised to dissipate the maximum flow that

the Belleek channel can accommodate.

Water levels within the Erne system are monitored daily and regular

contact is maintained between Rivers Agency and ESB. Met Office and

Met Éireann rain forecasts and weather warnings provide essential

information and are a vital tool in the decision making process.



LOWER LOUGH ERNE

MAP 1

CLIFF

BALLYSHANNON

INTER

LOUGH

CHANNEL

UPPER

LOUGH

ERNE

9



To prevent level of Upper Lough falling below 150ft to• clay foundations in Enniskillen• navigation & boating interests

PHOTO 2 – Sluice gates at Portora



11

Lower Lough – Not to exceed 46.33m (152 feet)Upper Lough – No statutory upper limit

Not, if reasonably preventable, to exceed 46.94m (154 feet) – summerNot, if reasonably preventable, to exceed 47.24m (155 feet) – winter

4. PREPAREDNESS

4.1 Navigation and other interests require higher minimum lough levels

during the summer months but the intention is always to try to reduce

levels to the lowest achievable level from 1 October to allow for winter

storage. While this is not always possible due to autumn rainfall

patterns, in October 2009 it was achieved as the first half of the month

was virtually dry.

The rainfall in October was 101% in County Fermanagh compared to the

Long Term Average. 125mm was recorded at Portora against an average of

117.45mm (See Table 2). Only 5% of October’s rainfall fell up to 16

October 2009. 95% of this rainfall fell after the 16 October 2009.

4.2 Lough Levels – period prior to persistant rainfall

1 October – 17 October 20094.2.1 The gates at Portora were fully open on 1 October to assist in drawing down

the Upper Lough level to maximise winter storage. They were closed

between 7 and 14 October to maintain the Upper Lough above the minimum

prescribed level and were gradually opened from 14 October to control flows

between the loughs. .

Date Upper Lough Lower Lough

1 October 46.02m (151 feet)

7 October 45.78 (150 feet 2 inches)

45.9m (150 feet 7½ inches)

45.62m (149 feet 8 inches)

4.3 Lough Levels – period with persistent rain prior to spilling(18 October – 4 November 2009)

4.3.1 Inflow to the system exceed outflow and both loughs continued to rise. The

gates at Portora were fully opened on 25 October.



12



4.3.2 On the 4 November both loughs were below the targeted winter levels and no

flooding was occurring other than from the Sillees River at Boho which is notcaused by rising lough levels.


18 October 45.93m (150 feet 8 inches)

4 November 46.95 (154 feet 1 inch)

45.45m (149 feet 1 inch)


4.4 Lough Levels - period prior to peak when spilling(5 November – 27 November 2009)

4.4.1 Conditions for spilling were reached and ESB in consultation with Rivers

Agency commenced spilling at Cliff on 5 November.

4.4.2 With the gates at Portora open and spillage and generation of power being

undertaken to maximise possible outflow, this had the desired effect ofslowing down/stablising the rise of the water level in the Upper Lough.

Reference Hydrograph 1 which illustrates the slowing of the rate of rise

between Points A and B. Point C illustrates the lowest level reached on

7 October and Point D illustrates the peak reached on 26 November

2009.

4.4.3 Spilling initially caused the levels in the Lower Lough to reduce between

Points A and B on Hydrograph 2 but rainfall intensified from the 14 November

and 53.2mm was recorded at Portora in the following five days. The Lower

Lough started to rise again and exceeded its upper limit on 19 November.

(Point C Hydrograph 2) before peaking some 0.4m above this level on

27 November (Point E).



13



4.4.4 The initial lowering of the Lower Lough eventually stablised the level in the

Upper Lough just below the winter limit but the increase in intensity of rainfallfrom 14 November caused the level to rise sharply eventually peaking on

26 November some 1.03m above the prescribed limit (Point D Hydrograph 1)

4.4.5 Reports from Roads Service covering 15-16 November 2009 indicated there

was no road flooding in Fermanagh although heavy rain had caused road

flooding in other parts of the North. By 18 November reports from Roads

Service were starting to indicate road flooding around the Upper Lough mainlyand the Boho area.

From 27 November 2009 both the Upper and Lower Lough levels started to

fall.


5 November 47.11m (154 feet 7 inches)

14 November 47.24m (155 feet)

26 November 48.27m (158 feet 4 inches)

46.26m (151 feet 9 inch)


46.72m (153 feet 3½ inches)

4.5 Sandbag Stores and Pumps

4.5.1 As is normal prior to any anticipated flooding, Rivers Agency replenished

sandbag supplies in both Fermanagh and Omagh, and several thousand

sandbags were available for delivery and placement. Pumps were checked to

ensure that they were in good working order. Grilles and culverts were also

checked and cleared.

4.6 Contact with Others

4.6.1 Regular contact was maintained prior to the event with staff in ESB. This is

normal practice in management of the Lough Erne levels.



14

4.6.2 On 2 October 2009 an email was sent to Waterways Ireland advising that as it

was October, Rivers Agency would be seeking to reduce the water levels in

the Loughs to provide storage for winter rains and that the control structure

and lock gates at Portora would be adjusted accordingly. Waterways Ireland

is the navigation authority for the Erne System.

Further contact was made with Waterways Ireland on 4 November to advise

them of the rising lough levels. Fermanagh District Council was also alerted

by telephone in early November that Rivers Agency was becoming concerned

by the rising levels in the loughs and of the distinct possibility of flooding,

particularly around the Upper Lough and Enniskillen itself.

In mid-November contact was also made with Roads Service specifically in

relation to the strong possibility of flooding.

4.6.3 Fermanagh District Council was contacted by Rivers Agency on 16 November

2009 and advised that the caravan park at Lisnaskea was in danger of

flooding. The Caravan park was sub-let but contact was made with the

leasee which allowed the caravans to be moved out to safety.

Contact was also instigated on 18 November with the Western Group

Emergency Planning Co-ordinator to advise about the strong possibility of

extensive flooding.

The Emergency Planning Co-Ordinator relayed this information to Fermanagh

District Council. On 19 November a telephone conference call was held

between Rivers Agency, Roads Service and Fermanagh District Council. An

Emergency Planning Implementation Group meeting, with representation from

each council department, was held in the Council offices and each

department ensured that Business Continuity Plans were up to date.

On Friday 20 November Castle Parks Centre, Lisnaskea was organised as

temporary provision for Share Centre residents.

The Emergency Planning Co-Ordinator contacted all relevant organisations as

listed in Annex 1. This also included the Met Office and Marine Coastguard



15

Agency. A telephone conference call pool was organised to ensure that a co-

ordinated multi-agency response to the situation was followed. This

conference call arrangement was continued over the weekend and allowed

each organisation to inform each other what their response capacity was and

other proposed actions they were planning to take.



16

5. INFLUENCING FACTORS

5.1 The major influencing factor in the flooding event was the amount of rain that

fell from mid-October through to late-November 2009. Between 17 October

and 27 November 2009 336.8mm of rain were recorded at Portora. Duringthis period, 15 November 2009 was the only day when no rain was recorded.

For the month of November the rainfall was recorded as 226.40mm against a

long term average of 103.25mm (See Table 2 – Rainfall records from 1988).

The rain in late October and November 2009 in Fermanagh was a rainfall

event well in excess of a 1 in 100 year event. A 1 in 100 year event means

there is a 100 to 1 chance in any one year of an occurrence happening.

5.2 The heavy rain in mid to late October 2009 caused the ground in the

catchment to become saturated by early November. Met Éireann’s website

confirms this. This effectively meant that from early November all rain falling

in the catchment ran off into the rivers and loughs.

5.3 The other major restricting factor during the flooding event is the capacity of

both the inter lough channel which connects the Upper Lough to the Lower

Lough and the Belleek Channel. These are sized to accommodate sufficient

flow, that when combined with storage in the lough system, significant

flooding only occurs during extreme events.

A similar restriction occurs in the channel through Belleek which runs towards

Cliff.

The Cliff dam controls the water levels in the Lower Lough. The design

capacity of the power station combined with spillage can effectively disperse

the maximum amount of water that can be conveyed by the Belleek Channel.

All these restrictions means that, between spillage and water required for

generation, the amount of water that could normally be discharged is 330m3 /s.

At some stages during the flooding event 385m3 /s were being discharged dueto the unprecedented head differential across the system.



17

6. RESPONSE

6.1 Telephone Calls

6.1.1 During November telephone calls were received by the three drainage

agencies as detailed below:-

Organisation Calls received fromFlooding Incident Line

Calls received directlyinto offices

Rivers Agency 18

Road Service 44

NI Water 6

TOTAL 68

29

43

15

87

Some of the calls were related to flooding from the Sillees River.

In addition to the above approximately 100 calls were received by Rivers

Agency from the public seeking advice on the levels within the Loughs.

The total calls requesting assistance was less than 200. In an urban area in a

large flooding event this figure would be much higher. This low level of calls

may be attributable to the resilience of the existing population in and around

the Lough.

6.2 Sandbags and Pumping

6.2.1 As part of the response several hundred sandbags were delivered to two

nursing homes and left on site although they were not required to be placed

as the homes did not flood.

Fermanagh District Council technical staff worked with Translink and the

Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service (NIFRS) to ensure that the Bus

Depot did not become impassable and also that the Lakeland Forum car park

could be kept partially open. Fermanagh District Council employed

approximately six tonnes of sandbags and a portable water pump to ensure

the flood levels were kept to a minimum. The NIFRS also deployed a



18

pumping appliance to aid this process. Fermanagh District Council also

negotiated with the business owners in the Derrychara link to provide

pedestrian access to the worst affected properties from Tesco end of the Link.

Signage and pedestrian guard rails/crowd control barriers were used to

enable this.

Sandbags were also delivered by Rivers Agency and Roads Service to

Quay Pass (near Erneside Shopping Centre) and placed. On Friday 20

November one pump was delivered to the site and by Tuesday 24 November

2009 this had been increased to five pumps. By Tuesday 24 November 2009

it had become evident that pumping alone would not keep the road open.

Therefore between Tuesday night and Wednesday morning over 700 tonnesof stone and bitmac were brought in by Roads Service to raise the road level.

The principle objective of the works was to avoid traffic gridlock in the town.

The roads between Derrylin and Lisnaskea and at Carrybridge, which are the

only two east-west crossing points on the Upper Lough, were not passable to

normal traffic. The main roads through Enniskillen became the alternative

shortest route for commuters. If Quay Pass had closed traffic would have had

to go through Gaol Square and Derrychara Road junctions. This would have

caused the Wellington Road and Dublin Road to be grid locked and in

addition would have created a major problem for Blue Light services to

respond to any other emergency.

6.2.2 A similar exercise was considered but ruled out on the Derrychara Link road

as it was impracticable to isolate the area to allow pumping.

6.3 Conference Calls

6.3.1 From 20 November right through to and including 9 December 2009 a daily

telephone conference call was held at noon each day and the following

organisations participated:-

BT

Emergency Planning Co-ordinator Western Group of CouncilsFermanagh District Council

Marine Coastguard Agency



19

Northern Ireland Ambulance Service

NIE

Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service

Northern Ireland Housing Executive

NI WaterPolice Service of Northern Ireland

Rivers Agency

Roads Service

Western Education and Library Board

Western Health and Social Care Trust

During the telephone conference call each day organisations were updated onthe situation and daily actions were allocated to each appropriate

organisation.

6.3.2 Meetings were held and chaired by Fermanagh District Council or the

Emergency Planning Co-ordinator on 23, 25 and 27 November 2009 and 2

December. These meetings were also attended by Western Health and

Social Care Trust, Rivers Agency, Police Service for Northern Ireland, Roads

Service, NI Water and Northern Ireland Ambulance Service. The meetings

were arranged for 10am so that any actions could be relayed to the other

organisations on the daily telephone conference call at 12pm.

These meetings highlighted that due to the rurality of the area and the fact

that some families were “cut off” that distribution of essential supplies may

become an issue. On 27 November Fermanagh Council delivered food

supplies to one family and Rivers Agency offered to provide staff and boats to

carry food and supplies to any member of the public due to the extreme

nature of the event.

6.4 Aerial Photographs

Aerial photographs were taken of the extent of the flooding on three dates

throughout November 2009. The area around the Sillees River was flown on

9 November and the area around Upper Lough Erne particularly was flown on20 and 26 November 2009. 20 November was the date that roads were



20

starting to become impassable and 26 November was when the levels in the

Loughs peaked.

These were available to all participants to target assistance to those cut off by

floodwaters. Aerial photography is important in identifying the extent offlooding for historical records and future developments and will aid in the

delivery of the EU Floods Directive.



21

7. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC

7.1 More than 50 media queries and interview requests relating to the November

2009 flooding were dealt with by the Minister for Agriculture and Rural

Development and Rivers Agency officials prior to and for the duration of the

flooding event. Similarly Department of Regional Development (DRD)

Officials dealt with more than 20 media queries and interview requests.

These are summarised in the table below.

Type ofmediaoutlet

Number ofRiversAgency

statements

issued

Number ofRiversAgency

interviews

completed

DARDMinister

interviews

Number ofDRD

statementsissued

Television 2 5 3 -

Radio 6 8 3 -

Dailynewspaper

12 2 1 7

Regionalnewspapers

12 1 2 6

Sub Total 32 16 9 13

TOTAL: 75

Number ofDRD

interviewscompleted

4

6

-

-

10

The content of the statements and interviews were tailored to individual

requests but typically included the following information:

- explanation of the Erne system and the rainfall event

- advice to the public on what to do in the event of the flooding and relevant

contact numbers, for example, Flooding Incident Line

- update on Lough levels and current flooding situation

- details of work that Rivers Agency and others were undertaking to help

alleviate flooding

In addition Fermanagh District Council, Rivers Agency and the Western

Health and Care Trust jointly released two press releases.



22

The Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Minister,

Michelle Gildernew MP, MLA, visited Fermanagh on 24 November to see the

extent of the flooding. Furthermore the Minister returned to Fermanagh on

27 November with the Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness MP, MLA to

again see the situation first hand and to meet with local people. Thesemeetings were also attended by senior officials from Rivers Agency.

The Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Investment, Arlene Foster MLA and the

First Minister Peter Robinson, MP, MLA visited the area on 28 November

2009 to assess the situation.

The Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Minister also made astatement to the Assembly on 30 November 2009 concerning the flooding in

Fermanagh.

As the flooding event moved from the response to the recovery phase,

Fermanagh District Council assumed the lead role from Rivers Agency and

this was formally handed over on 4 December 2009.



23

8. FLOODING FROM THE SILLEES RIVER

8.1 Flooding from the Sillees River around Boho occurred in early November

2009. (See Photograph 1 overleaf) The flooding, which happens regularly in

times of heavy rainfall, inundates farmland and roads which are constructedacross the natural floodplain of the river. No property was flooded but local

road communication was extremely difficult and affected access for primary

school children attending Killyhommon Primary School at exam time.

8.2 Feasibility studies to try to resolve the problem have been undertaken by

Rivers Agency, most recently in 2008. Solutions to upgrade the watercourse

and options to divert headwater into Lower Lough Erne were examined.Conclusions were that the costs of diverting headwaters were prohibitive

because works would require extensive tunneling in an area of porous

limestone. Works were estimated to cost of the order of £6m to £10m well in

excess of the benefit afforded, primarily due to the alleviation of road flooding.

No cost beneficial scheme re-routing the line of the river is feasible.

8.3 The Sillees catchment is a natural and beautiful area and extensive

engineering works would cause considerable modification to a natural river. It

is likely this would raise considerable environmental opposition if proposed.



PHOTO 1 – Out of bank and road flooding at Sille



25

9. ASPECTS WHICH WORKED WELL

9.1 Aspects which worked well, identified at the structured debrief and attributed

to different organisations, are detailed in Annex 2. The comments received

from the various organisations were collated as follows:- Preparedness,Communication, Co-ordination, Response and Information to the Public and

the Media.

9.2 Preparedness

9.2.1 Agencies were able to instigate contingency plans as the conference calls had

given warning of extensive flooding. Fire and Rescue Service had been able

to maintain operational response to fires and rescues and had relocated itsSpecialist Rescue Team to Lisnaskea.

ESB had been able to maintain water levels at Cliff at 44m (144 feet 4 inches)

throughout the duration of the flooding event, to maximise flow accrued

through the system.

Western Education and Library Board was able to utilise other premises so

pupils attending Moat Primary School in Lisnaskea and who lived on the

western side of Upper Lough Erne were able to be facilitated resulting in only

one school day being lost throughout the period of the flooding. Pupils

attending other schools in the Lisnaskea area who were unable to get to

school were able to be facilitated by their schools through use of Internet

access. (Staff and pupils had to make extraordinary efforts to achieve this).

Rivers Agency put staff on call and ensured sufficient supplies of sandbags

were available.

9.3 Communication between organisations

9.3.1 Overall communications between the different organisations/agencies worked

very well. A number of responders found the daily conference calls which

updated water levels in the loughs and road closures particularly useful.

These conference calls highlighted the fact that the BT Network in Fermanaghwas working well. This had been a concern as the number of telephone calls

from the public seeking assistance was low.



26

9.4 Co-ordination

9.4.1 Many organisations stated that co-ordination between the different agencies

had been very good. Notification of the possibility of widespread flooding had

allowed Fire and Rescue Service to liaise and establish the level of additionalresources that were available from southern colleagues in Belturbet,

Ballyconnell and Clones.

9.4.2 The conference call arrangements were highlighted by a number of

organisations as an effective means of sharing information and being kept up

to date on the situation.

9.4.3 NI Water was able to take pro-active measures at Killyhevlin Water Treatment

Works as result of the provision of water levels and prediction data from

Rivers Agency. If the Treatment Works had flooded, there would have been

the potential for a pollution incident on the Lough and the water supply to

Enniskillen and the surrounding area would have seen substantial disruption.

Rivers Agency had previously given advice on construction levels for the

Treatment Works as part of the Planning process.

9.5 Response

9.5.1 Staff goodwill was commended by participants where it was noted that local

staff had worked long hours to assist in the response. It was recognised that

good local knowledge had been of invaluable assistance and Fermanagh

District Council noted that where a problem had been identified prompt action

was taken to try to alleviate it. Roads Service noted that although its

resources had been stretched, it had managed to borrow signs indicating

flooding and road closures from other depots to ensure that all key flooding

locations had been signed to alert the public to the danger.

9.5.2 ESB recorded that they had managed unprecedented water discharges

through Cliff and Ballyshannon.

9.6 Information to the Public and the Media9.6.1 The fact that timely information was provided to the media was seen as a

success. The DARD Minister and Rivers Agency had responded to more



27

than 50 media requests. This included participating in TV and radio

interviews.

The First and Deputy First Ministers and the Enterprise, Trade and Investment

Minister also visited the area.

Roads Service had regularly updated the traffic watch website with the lists of

roads that were impassable and DRD officials also responded to more than

20 media requests including broadcast interviews.

9.7 It should also be noted that in areas close to Upper Lough Erne, farming

neighbours helped each other and assisted in transporting children to schooland delivering of groceries.



28

10. CHALLENGES

10.1 Comments relating to future challenges were also collated and grouped into

the same five categories, namely Preparedness, Communication, Co-

ordination, Response and Information to the Public and the Media.

10.2 Preparedness

10.2.1 The Emergency Planning Co-ordinator noted that wider issues had arisen that

are not currently covered in the multi agency flood plan.

Housing Executive will review its plans if a housing estate was to be flooded.

10.3 Communication within and between organisations

10.3.1 Although communications between the different responders had worked well

the Ambulance Service believed that dissemination of information internally

could be reviewed to seek improvement.

The Education and Library Board stated that they had made available canoes

and inflatables complete with trained staff and this facility while not needed

during this event, could be put to use in future incidents. Therefore an

inventory of these resources should be made available and included in an

area Flood Plan.

10.3.2 BT noted that interaction between the Council, Rivers Agency and themselves

was verbal. A short written situation report may have been useful.

Housing Executive suggested that it needs to explain its statutory role to offer

temporary accommodation in these situations more widely including that

payment is required.

10.4 Co-ordination

10.4.1 It was noted that although co-ordination was very good between the different

agencies there maybe should have been a round table meeting between all

those involved rather than just the core responders eg Housing Executive, BTand NIE should also have been included.



29

10.4.2 The issue of possible over dependence on local knowledge was raised and

the PSNI mentioned that at the very early stages of the incident there were no

lines of responsibility on who should take the lead.

Western Health and Social Care Trust highlighted that there was someconfusion with clarity of roles particularly internally.

10.5 Response

10.5.1 Roads Service, Western Health and Social Care Trust and the PSNI all

mentioned that their own vehicles had limitations in working in floodwaters.

More access to 4 x 4 vehicles would have been useful.

10.5.2 The Emergency Planning Co-ordinator noted that identification of vulnerable

people had not been carried out until 25 November 2009. Education and

Library Board recorded that although not many houses had been flooded,

several were cut off and they had no immediate specific details or locations on

the pupils affected.

10.6 Information to the Public and the Media

10.6.1 Rivers Agency suggested that there was some public misperception regarding

the operational restrictions of Lough Erne, particularly in relation to the

drawing down of Lough levels.

10.6.2 There was a general feeling that more single multi-agency press releases

should have been issued on behalf of the wider group of agencies involved.

Emergency Planning Co-ordinator mentioned that a public relations role may

be required from the Council to ensure that the public are made aware of the

prolonged nature of the floods and precautions to take.

Flooding Incident Line (FIL) mentioned that more promotion of the Flooding

Incident Line number was required.



30

11. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS

11.1 Local Resilience Fora were identified as having a key role in future

arrangements. The only current forum in place is Belfast Resilience Forum

which is led by the PSNI and the Council and whose members includerepresentatives from all appropriate public sector organisations and the

voluntary sector.

11.2 Several organisations highlighted that improved public relations/

communications would help develop multi-agency relationships for any future

events.

11.3 The possibility of a central location for a co-ordination centre should be

explored.

11.4 The majority of the organisations believed it would be beneficial to have a

lead agency for co-ordination of widespread flooding events. This role had

initially been filled by Rivers Agency and at recovery phase had been passed

to Fermanagh District Council.



31

12. LESSONS LEARNT

12.1 A number of lessons learnt were mentioned including the benefits of local

knowledge and early identification of a lead agency.

12.2 The historical high levels of the Upper Lough, in particular,prior to the ‘Erne

Summer Relief Scheme’ in the 1950s, has restricted development in the

floodplain. Recent Planning policy has also restricted developments and

these combined, significantly reduced the likelihood of flooding of property.

12.3 The importance of a pro-active approach and early communication with the

media was acknowledged.

12.4 The social impact of a flood of this magnitude was mentioned as well as the

benefits in the inter agency co-operation.



32

13. CONCLUSIONS

13.1 The flooding event in Fermanagh was as a consequence of persistent rainfall

from mid-October through November 2009, with 336.8mm of rain falling in this

timeframe. The water level in the Upper Lough peaked at 48.27m (158 feet5 inches). This was the highest level recorded since the Erne Drainage

Scheme was completed, some 0.5m above the previous record.

13.2 Bearing in mind that the rainfall event was well in excess of a 1 in 100 year

event and taking account of the lough records, this flooding event was

extreme. There is also no doubt that if the lough levels had not been drawn

down in early October 2009 that more extensive flooding would haveoccurred.

13.3 Water level control was exercised in accordance with the current legislation.

13.4 Co-ordination and co-operation between the different responders was sound.

13.5 This type of event is only likely to happen in winter during periods of persistent

rainfall. There are few animals or crops in the field at this time of the year.

13.6 Two houses and the Share Centre were actually flooded, although a

significant number of properties were cut off for a period of weeks. Whilst the

Western Health and Social Care Trust has a record of vulnerable people, a

more systematic record of establishing which homes are cut off should be

examined.

13.7 The number of houses flooded was relatively low, partially due to the

application of Planning policy which restricts carrying out development in the

floodplain. The floodplain is normally defined as the extent of land that would

be flooded by a 1 in 100 year flood event. Many of the houses in Fermanagh

are sensibly sited on higher ground, some of which predate the 1950s

Drainage Scheme, which considerably lowered Lough levels.

13.8 The response to this type of extensive flooding is limited as placing of

sandbags is not a viable option to contain the rising lough levels. The focus



33

should be to protect critical infrastructure and keep the road network open as

far as possible. In this case at an early stage there was good co-ordination

between all the responding agencies.

13.9 Flooding in the area of the Sillees River happens more regularly but no costbeneficial scheme to re-route the river is available. Roads Service may wish

to consider raising the roads locally to help access but it is appreciated that

ground conditions pose difficulties.

13.10 To significantly increase the capacity of the system the inter lough and

Belleek channels would require major works and subsequent loss of land due

to channel widening. Costs of at least £20 million could be anticipated asthere are extensive areas of rock in the channel.

13.11 The Structured Debrief itself was worthwhile and all participants engaged in a

positive manner. The points made by organisations should assist them in the

further development of their emergency arrangements.



34

14. RECOMMENDATIONS

Control of Water Levels

14.1 The operating regime, applied within the current legislation should be

reviewed by Rivers Agency and ESB to investigate if there is any scope forimprovement.

14.2 The performance of the existing regime which has been in place since the

1950s should be reviewed. This will inform the need for a review of the

current legislation.

14.3 Any further review of levels must take account of the environmentaldesignation particularly on the Upper Lough. The Upper Lough is a Special

Protection Area (SPA) and a Special Area of Conservation (SAC). The

Habitats Directive, which is European legislation, applies to SPAs and SACs.

The Upper Lough also has nine Areas of Special Scientific Interest (ASSIs) of

which Belleisle, Trannish and Crom are arguably the three most important.

The Upper Lough is also a RAMSAR site.

14.4 Any review of levels must also take account of the navigational interests

which involve Waterways Ireland, (the responsible authority for navigation

within the Erne system). Water based recreation and tourism generate vital

income in Fermanagh.

Emergency Response

14.5 It is recommended that all organisations involved in the response to and

recovery from the flooding in Fermanagh use the lessons learnt from the

review to further develop their own emergency planning arrangements.

Opportunity should also be taken to further develop contact.

14.6 A structured process should be established to carry out ‘desk top’ exercises

every two to three years to ensure that agencies maintain contact and co-

ordination arrangements between each other.



35

14.7 Facilities to obtain rainfall information for the whole catchment should be

examined.

Government Response

14.8 Consideration should be given to establishing an agency to provide a strategicoverview to the management of flooding in Northern Ireland particularly in the

medium to long term. This agency may also be responsible for ensuring that

all agencies and organisations have adequate emergency arrangements and

plans in place should a similar flooding event occur in the future as will be

required by the Floods Directive within Flood Risk Management Plans.

14.9 Planning Policies restricting developments in the floodplain should be strictlyapplied to help eliminate the risk of property flooding should a similar event

occur in the future.

Improvement Works

14.10 Consideration should be given to examining the viability of raising critical

roads.

14.11 Rivers Agency and Roads Service should examine whether joint

improvements can be made to the Derrychara Link area.

Awareness

14.12 Rivers Agency, in conjunction with ESB, should draw up a short brochure

explaining how the Erne system works and this should be distributed to

schools in Fermanagh. Rivers Agency should also examine opportunities to

add to previous presentations they have given on the Erne system to improve

public awareness.



ANNEX 1

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT STRUCTURED DEBRIEF

Electricity Supply Board (ESB) Fermanagh District Council (FDC) Flooding Incident Line (FIL) Northern Ireland Ambulance Service (NIAS) Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service (NIFRS) Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) Northern Ireland Water (NIW) Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) Rivers Agency (RA) Roads Service (RS) Western Group of Councils - Emergency Planning Co-Ordinator(Western Group EPCO) Western Education and Library Board (WELB) Western Health Trust (WHSCT) In addition although not able, to attend the debrief written comments were receivedfrom:-

BT (BT) Northern Ireland Electricity (NIE)



Annexes 2 to 5 record the comments received from different

organisations at the structured debrief

ANNEX 2

ASPECTS WHICH WORKED WELL

PREPARDNESS

• Kept water levels at Cliff down at 44.0m AOD for the duration of the flood event(ESB)

• Contingency planning to enable operational response to fires and rescuesmaintained as far as possible during the flooding period (NIFRS)

• Draw down of water levels in loughs had already been carried out in preparation(Rivers Agency)

• Planning policy PPS15. Although many roads closed and properties had beencut-off, very little properties actually flooded. (Rivers Agency)

• Plans in place to closely monitor the weather conditions and numbers of faultscaused by flooding. Local incident centre based at Lackaboy Industrial Estate inEnniskillen can be escalated within less than an hour. We also have contactnumbers for local boat owners who are agreeable to help if and when required.(NIE)



ANNEX 2 cont’d

COMMUNICATION

• Daily updates, conference calls and allocation of actions (Western Group EPCO)

• Regular updates from Roads Service detailing roads closed due to flooding(NIFRS)

• Internal communications worked well (WHSCT)

• Good communication between all agencies (NIHE)

• Prompt communication with Emergency Planning coordination from local council(WELB)

• Daily water level updates from Rivers Agency (WELB)

• Daily weather forecasts (WELB)

• Road service updates (WELB)

• Road closure updates from Roads Service (PSNI)

• Updates on what roads closed was essential for core business (NIAS)

• Updates on the state of the BT network in the Fermanagh area, includinginformation on any cable faults, together with general level of customer faultreports. Joan expressed some concern that as the council was not receivingmany telephone calls from the public, there may be a problem with the telephonenetwork. I assured her that this was not the case. (BT)

• Participation in a number of conference calls during the flooding and raised aconcern about whether or not the telephone exchange in Enniskillen was indanger of flooding. If this had happened, this would have had a potentiallycatastrophic effect on communications in the Fermanagh area. Happily this didnot occur and thanks to an on-site meeting with the Rivers Agency we were able

to have reassurance on this important subject. (BT)



ANNEX 2 cont’d

CO-ORDINATION

• Prompt action from Friday 20th. (Western Group EPCO)

• Notification and all agencies aware of problems over the weekend prior toMonday 23rd (Western Group EPCO)

• Good local knowledge of responding agencies – Rivers Agency, NIFRS andCouncil (Western Group EPCO)

• Cross border liaison with resources in Belturbet, Ballyconnell and Clones (NIFRS)

• Lines available 24hours every day to take calls from public, raising incidents thentransfer to relevant flooding responding agency (Flooding Incident Line)

• No difficulty dealing with volume of calls. 44 incidents recorded in Fermanagh(Flooding Incident Line)

• Liaison with NIAS, NIFRS, PSNI and Rivers Agency good (WHSCT)

• Willing co-operation of all agencies to share information and participate inconference calls (Fermanagh District Council)

• Conference calls were very successful (NIHE)

• Provision of water levels and predictions from Rivers Agency to allow pro-activeresponse to events at Killyhevlin Water Treatment Works (NIW)

• Notification and coordination and effective action by Emergency Planning group(WELB)

• Local knowledge invaluable (WELB)

• Daily conference call (WELB)

• On site coordination between PSNI, Roads Service and Rivers Agency (WELB)

• Daily interagency conference call (PSNI)

• Anticipation of daily effects and consequences (PSNI)

• Boat deployments in conjunction with NIFRS (PSNI)

• Interagency communication and partnership working through daily teleconference(NIAS)



ANNEX 2 cont’d

RESPONSE

• Managed unprecedented discharges through the stations (ESB)

• Forward deployment to County Fermanagh of NIFRS specialist rescue team(NIFRS)

• In spite of the volume of flooding locations that able to manage to place roadsigns to the key floods to alert the public to the danger (Roads Service)

• Good local knowledge of area staff (Rivers Agency)

• Good local knowledge of managers (WHSCT)

• Local knowledge was imperative (Fermanagh District Council)

• Where a problem had been identified prompt action was taken to try to alleviatethe problem. eg pumping at Derrychara Link, Bus depot (Fermanagh DistrictCouncil)

• Staff were prepared to take whatever action was required to assist (NIHE)

• Made provision for temporary accommodation for 10 families (NIHE)

• Provided permanent accommodation for one family (NIHE)

• Contractor put on standby and available if required (NIHE)

• Positive action by school principals resulted in net loss of only one school day(WELB)

• Community action including parents in Teemore, Lisnaskea, Roslea and Boho(WELB)

• NIE had only one fault in Fermanagh which was most likely caused by theflooding. On 23 November 2009 a fault on an underground electricity cable in theShore Rd area of Enniskillen caused 135 customers to lose supply at 13:25. Themost likely cause was water damage. Repairs were completed & suppliesrestored to 135 customers by 16:00 and remaining three customers by 04:10 on24 Nov. (NIE)



ANNEX 2 cont’d

INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC AND THE PRESS

• Number of media requests received many with tight deadlines. RA respondedwith timely information, tailored to each request. (Rivers Agency)

• RA facilitated numerous requests for interviews – TV, radio, press, all whilecontinuing to respond operationally to the actual event (Rivers Agency)

• DARD Minister also attended and gave interviews (Rivers Agency)

• Traffic watch website was regularly updated with roads deemed impassable(Roads Service)

Joint press releases were circulated by Rivers Agency, WHSCT and FermanaghDistrict Council.



ANNEX 3 CHALLENGES

PREPAREDNESS

• Need to review and be better prepared should one of NIHE housing estates be

flooded, - lucky this time (NIHE)

• The usefulness of the multi-agency flood plan – Centered around opening restcentre and administration financial assistance scheme. A lot of wider issues thanthose stipulated within the plan (Western Group EPCO)



ANNEX 3 cont’d

COMMUNICATION

• How to disseminate information internally, lots of info received daily (NIAS)

• Not good at alerting other agencies to resources available eg outdoor equipment,Canadian canoes, inflatable’s and trained staff (WELB)

• Improve communications, what NIHE can and can’t do. Not everyone knows roleand how the NIHE can help and statutory duty to supply temporary housing(NIHE)

• Not prompt relaying of information from Hydrometrics (Rivers)

• The interaction between BT, the council and Rivers Agency was verbal. A regularshort situation report from BT possibly would have been more useful orappropriate. (BT)



ANNEX 3 cont’d

CO-ORDINATION

• Very dependant on local knowledge, over reliance on local contacts with controlcentre out in Knockbracken, Belfast (NIAS)

• Early stages of incident no clear lines of responsibility on who should take lead(PSNI)

• No clear contact person for initial alert – Who should it go to internal (WHSCT)

• Some confusion with clarity of roles (WHSCT)

• Conference pool should have met particularly on the 23/11/09. Although coregroups met in council offices there should have been a regular round tablemeeting of conference pool (Western Group EPCO)

• Should have had a central location for a coordination centre. Maybe council / PSNI with maps / internet accessibility. Core groups could then meet at any stage(Western Group EPCO)

• Quicker contact with Local Government Division at DOE to ensure council areaware of cost recovery issues eg work men diverted to other duties, as overtimenot included (Western Group EPCO)

• FIL should have been invited on conference call (Western Group EPCO)



ANNEX 3 cont’dRESPONSE

• Poor access to 4x4 vehicles. Shogun not effective in floodwaters (PSNI)

• Disproportionate reliance upon a small group of officers internally (WELB)

• Not many houses were flooded but several cut-off. No specific details of pupilsaffected, names, location etc (WELB)

• Could have had better initial response, mobilisation to address emergencysituation never previously encountered at Killyhevlin WTW (NIW)

• Accessibility of vehicles – Unable to use vehicles / offers of help because of risksinvolved. (WHSCT)

• Over reliance on a small number of local staff (Rivers)

• Limitations on their own vehicles to work in floodwaters (Roads)

• Lack of training on staff for boat handling (Roads)

• Identification of vulnerable people not carried out until Wednesday 25th (WesternGroup EPCO)



ANNEX 3 cont’d

INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC AND THE PRESS

• No press release response / strategy for all agencies (PSNI)

• Better promotion of 0300 2000 100 number (FIL)

• Dual numbers still in existence with FIL number and individual floodingresponders (FIL)

• Review ability to respond during the early stages of the flooding period toquestions from members of the public on flood related queries that didn’t fallwithin the remit of NIFRS (NIFRS)

• More proactive approach would have helped in regard to public relations / issuingof press statements including cross border eg Cavan was also in flood (ESB)

• Knee jerk reaction to queries. For regular queries one statement would havecovered all (ESB)

• Consider a single website where statements from RA, ESB, Waterways Irelandetc could be uploaded (ESB)

• There was some incorrect local understanding in relation to the operation ofLough levels. This could have resulted in some incorrect reporting in the mediafrom uninformed sources. (Rivers)

• Only 2 joint press releases issued between Rivers, Roads and WHSCT. Shouldhave been a single multi agency press release made on behalf of the group.(Western Group EPCO)

• Council officers should have been out on the ground eg when the food deliverywas made to ensure press where aware of the ongoing work of FermanaghDistrict Council in response to the situation. (Western Group EPCO)

• Collective need for multi-agency perspective to ensure public where aware of theextent of the prolonged nature of the floods to ensure public self help (Western

Group EPCO)



ANNEX 4 IMPROVEMENTS

WESTERN GROUP EPCO

• Conference pool should have physically met on the 23 November 2009. Coregroups met it may have been more productive to organise a regular meeting oflarger conference pool

• Councils should have been more PR savvy, eg only 2 joint press releases issued.Should have a single multi agency press release / statement. Council PR officesshould have been out on the ground, council should have attended delivery offood as they were involved in getting a lot of the background work done

• Consideration should be given to the central location for a coordination centre,with sufficient ITC capabilities, maps etc and location for core groups to meet.

• Expectations of roles and responsibility of council’s roles. Council participation inRally Ireland, and various table tops previously gave them a perspective of whatresources and actions may be required.

• Flooding Incident Line should have been on the conference call

ESB

• More proactive approach would have helped in regard to public relations / issuingof press statements including cross border

• Consider a single website were statements from RA, ESB, Waterways Ireland etccould be uploaded

NIFRS

• Consider indentifying lead before flooding started

ROADS

• Better PR. Traders at Quay Road complaining that raising of road was increasingrisk of them flooding when not the case

FIL

• Identify of Government Lead for coordination of widespread flooding



ANNEX 4 cont’d

• Better and more frequent communication. Develop policy and protocol on crossagency / organisation communication

RIVERS

• Regular exercises / networking for maintaining contacts established during theflooding

WHSCT

• Training / increased awareness on roles and responsibilities both internally andexternally

• Further develop multiagency relationships that have now been established duringflooding

• Contact numbers need to be more accessible. Both internal leads and multiagency contacts

FERMANAGH DISTRICT COUNCIL

• Improve PR / Communications

• Clarification of roles and responsibilities and expectation of other agencies

NIHE

• Improve PR / Communications

• Clarification of roles and responsibilities

• Action taken was reactive. What can some agencies do to be more proactive

• What practical work can be done to prevent or minimize the same happeningagain

NIW

• Coordinated approach on communication to general public, close down publicspeculation



ANNEX 4 cont’d

WELB

• Formalisation of the inter agency group for the area along the lines of localresilience forum. This would ensure future emergencies could be responded to

effectively

PSNI

• Communications, with interagency meetings starting earlier in anticipation of theproblem

NIAS

• Early identification of lead agency

• Creation of a multi agency control room with maps, communications, IT resourcesand would allow face to face contact



ANNEX 5 LESSONS LEARNT

NIAS

• Early identification of Lead

PSNI

• Someone identified to take lead and setup coordination centre

NIHE

• More proactive role

RIVERS

• Appreciation of DLO and local knowledge, benefits and cooperation

ROADS

• Cost implications to raise roads

NIFRS

• Role of subgroup

ESB

• Be prepared

WESTERN GROUP EPCO

• Multi agency PR / Media strategy required to get message to the public



ANNEX 6

Tables and Hydrographs



Upper Lough Portora Lower Lough Total Discharge

Belleisle u/s d/s Roscor Gate state Spilling At Cliff m3/s

1/10/2009 46.02 45.96 45.96 45.90 FO N

2/10/2009 45.97 45.88 45.89 45.83 FO N

3/10/2009 45.92 45.86 45.88 45.80 FO N

4/10/2009 45.90 45.82 45.84 45.78 FO N

5/10/2009 45.88 45.80 45.84 45.77 FO N

6/10/2009 45.82 45.75 45.79 45.68 FO N

7/10/2009 45.78 45.66 45.72 45.62 FO N

8/10/2009 45.81 45.80 45.66 45.53 FC 10.00 N

9/10/2009 45.86 45.87 45.60 45.53 FC N

10/10/2009 45.89 45.88 45.62 45.52 FC N11/10/2009 45.92 45.90 45.64 45.49 FC N

12/10/2009 45.95 45.93 45.60 45.48 FC N

13/10/2009 45.96 45.95 45.57 45.45 FC N

14/10/2009 45.98 45.97 45.56 45.42 FC1&2,3&4 1'Open N

15/10/2009 45.97 45.92 45.57 45.43 FC1&2,3&4 1'Open N

16/10/2009 45.95 45.92 45.57 45.44 FC1&2,3&4 1'Open N

17/10/2009 45.96 45.91 45.58 45.45 FC1&2,3&4 1'Open N

18/10/2009 45.93 45.91 45.57 45.45 FC1&2,3&4 1'Open N

19/10/2009 45.95 45.93 45.57 45.46 FC1&2,3&4 1'Open N

20/10/2009 45.99 45.98 45.58 45.50 1,2,3,4 Open 2' 12.00 N

21/10/2009 46.02 45.91 45.61 45.52 1,2,3,4 Open 2' N

22/10/2009 46.03 45.92 45.63 45.54 1,2,3,4 open 4' 12.30 N

23/10/2009 46.23 45.87 45.70 45.61 1,2,3,4 open 4' N

24/10/2009 46.23 45.86 45.69 45.65 1,2,3,4 open 4' N

25/10/2009 46.40 46.05 45.83 45.74 FO 10.00 N

26/10/2009 46.40 45.89 45.89 45.80 FO N

27/10/2009 46.37 45.90 45.90 45.87 FO N

28/10/2009 46.37 45.95 45.94 45.87 FO N29/10/2009 46.35 45.92 45.92 45.86 FO N

30/10/2009 46.31 45.91 45.91 45.86 FO N

31/10/2009 46.47 45.96 45.95 45.87 FO N

1/11/2009 46.50 46.02 46.00 45.88 FO N

2/11/2009 46.76 46.11 46.07 46.01 FO N

3/11/2009 46.82 46.15 46.10 46.03 FO N

4/11/2009 46.95 46.27 46.19 46.14 FO N

5/11/2009 47.11 46.46 46.35 46.26 FO Spilling 227.37

6/11/2009 47.19 46.39 46.29 46.26 FO Spilling 296.63

7/11/2009 47.21 46.42 46.30 46.30 FO Spilling 293.04

8/11/2009 47.21 46.42 46.31 46.28 FO Spilling 317.50

9/11/2009 47.19 46.35 46.25 46.24 FO Spilling 310.46

10/11/2009 47.22 46.36 46.27 46.21 FO Spilling 306.15

11/11/2009 47.19 46.32 46.23 46.17 FO Spilling 291.58

12/11/2009 47.17 46.29 46.21 46.15 FO Spilling 298.23

13/11/2009 47.25 46.30 46.21 46.15 FO Spilling 295.80

14/11/2009 47.24 46.32 46.23 46.14 FO Spilling 294.65

15/11/2009 47.29 46.29 46.20 46.13 FO Spilling 293.86

16/11/2009 47.30 46.30 46.21 46.14 FO Spilling 299.02

17/11/2009 47.42 46.40 46.29 46.24 FO Spilling 310.36

18/11/2009 47.52 46.44 46.33 46.27 FO Spilling 314.73

19/11/2009 47.69 46.50 46.36 46.31 FO Spilling 313.33

20/11/2009 47.93 46.60 46.45 46.37 FO Spilling 334.95

21/11/2009 48.03 46.61 46.45 46.44 FO Spilling 336.65

22/11/2009 48.08 46.64 46.48 46.47 FO Spilling 353.21

23/11/2009 48.15 46.76 46.58 46.55 FO Spilling 355.17

24/11/2009 48.19 46.82 46.62 46.62 FO Spilling 377.13

25/11/2009 48.25 46.90 46.69 46.68 FO Spilling 377.50

26/11/2009 48.27 46.92 46.71 46.72 FO Spilling 374.90

27/11/2009 48.24 46.93 46.72 46.73 FO Spilling 386.60

28/11/2009 48.21 46.92 46.71 46.73 FO Spilling 375.80

29/11/2009 48.14 46.92 46.71 46.71 FO Spilling 372.80

30/11/2009 48.06 46.86 46.67 46.67 FO Spilling 368.20

1/12/2009 48.01 46.79 46.60 46.65 FO Spilling 365.20

2/12/2009 47.97 46.77 46.59 46.61 FO Spilling 357.30

3/12/2009 47.85 46.72 46.56 46.55 FO Spilling 353.10

4/12/2009 47.76 46.66 46.51 46.52 FO Spilling 346.40

5/12/2009 47.72 46.64 46.49 46.48 FO Spilling 344.30

6/12/2009 47.76 46.60 46.46 46.47 FO Spilling 342.30

7/12/2009 47.69 46.60 46.45 46.45 FO Spilling 339.90

8/12/2009 47.62 46.54 46.41 46.42 FO Spilling 336.10

9/12/2009 47.56 46.51 46.38 46.37 FO Spilling 329.50

10/12/2009 47.47 46.47 46.35 46.33 FO Spilling 327.30

11/12/2009 47.36 46.42 46.31 46.27 FO Spilling 317.00

12/12/2009 47.24 46.34 46.25 46.20 FO Spilling 308.70

13/12/2009 47.13 46.28 46.20 46.13 FO Spilling 292.10

14/12/2009 47.02 46.22 46.15 46.05 FO Spilling 283.10

15/12/2009 46.91 46.13 46.08 45.99 FO Spilling Stopped 9.00 229.4016/12/2009 46.80 46.09 46.05 45.97 FO

17/12/2009 46.69 46.06 46.03 45.94 FO LEGEND

18/12/2009 46.60 46.01 45.98 45.91 FO FO = FULLY OPENFC = FULLY CLOSED

TABLE 1 - LOUGH LEVELS, GATE STATE AND DISCHARGE AT CLIFF



1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

JAN 182.70 86.30 143.30 109.20 82.00 146.50 140.40 167.80 73.90 33.00 FEB 118.70 105.40 208.50 56.30 92.30 31.70 107.60 132.50 132.60 136.10 MAR 143.60 140.40 72.80 127.60 139.30 70.40 155.30 135.60 49.70 48.90 APR 36.20 100.90 71.50 122.00 108.70 126.10 103.20 33.10 55.90 50.50 MAY 66.30 32.00 47.60 8.70 43.80 79.20 39.60 69.80 58.00 76.90 JUN 33.60 33.50 133.80 99.40 30.90 79.10 67.40 26.40 59.80 97.30 JUL 172.00 28.70 50.80 65.60 89.70 125.70 77.20 89.10 86.90 100.20 AUG 126.00 100.80 115.10 35.90 195.90 75.70 72.10 7.20 128.80 73.80 SEP 125.00 59.20 53.90 51.60 80.70 79.20 71.30 80.10 48.90 49.50 OCT 122.20 145.60 204.50 93.50 90.10 17.00 53.20 193.30 158.80 90.00 NOV 49.10 55.90 67.00 141.90 158.20 46.80 90.90 137.40 123.00 98.90 DEC 92.30 74.40 134.00 164.10 89.80 222.00 152.80 52.50 63.20 138.20 TOTAL 1267.70 963.10 1302.80 1075.80 1201.40 1099.40 1131.00 1124.80 1039.50 993.30

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 JAN 154.10 74.50 90.40 138.70 91.60 101.40 149.20 59.00 159.80 175.80 FEB 86.80 136.70 55.80 235.80 75.80 47.00 44.60 33.60 77.20 56.60 MAR 62.00 69.80 64.90 89.90 67.80 74.60 77.60 110.20 75.00 142.00 APR 94.10 105.20 93.20 106.60 61.60 68.30 93.00 60.60 51.60 63.00 MAY 65.20 60.30 60.90 163.80 122.00 48.40 99.60 135.20 80.70 19.60 JUN 64.30 48.90 64.60 120.80 87.90 113.30 54.80 30.00 78.50 72.20 JUL 55.70 62.50 66.10 78.50 101.40 90.90 37.20 61.00 144.90 97.40 AUG 112.40 116.10 109.90 50.60 18.00 67.60 87.40 74.60 73.40 158.60 SEP 130.10 115.70 54.80 46.90 71.90 83.40 88.20 128.40 54.00 106.00 OCT 36.30 177.30 89.00 204.30 39.90 114.00 111.10 128.40 60.00 156.20 NOV 126.90 134.90 74.10 155.10 117.20 53.80 61.20 97.40 53.60 54.60 DEC

247.20 121.90 92.40 95.40 80.00 100.30 84.60 162.50 114.40 71.20 TOTAL 1235.10 1223.80 916.10 1486.40 935.10 963.00 988.50 1080.90 1023.10 1173.20

TABLE 2 - YEARLY RECORD OF RAINFALL SINCE 198



Point B

Point C

HYDROGRAPH 1 - UPPER LOUGH LEVELS FROM JULY



Point A

Poin

HYDROGRAPH 2 - LOWER LOUGH LEVELS FROM JU



ANNEX 7

Photographs



PHOTO 3 – Property cut-off in Upper Lough



PHOTO 4 – Road flooding near Lisnaskea



PHOTO 5 – Flooding at Share Centre, Lisnaske



PHOTO 6 – Inter lough channel at Bellanaleck



I n t e

r l o u g h

C h a n n e

l

PHOTO 7 – Line of Inter lough Channel



PHOTO 8 – Flooded roadway, Derrychara Link



PHOTO 9 – Flooding at Enniskillen



PHOTO 10 – Belleek channel



PHOTO 11 – Power station and spillway at Cliff



PHOTO 12 – Sluice gate spillway at Ballyshann

flooding taskforce report on the fermanagh flooding nov2009

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