flexibility: past experiences, the clean energy … · a new aim: flexibility …. but why and how?...
TRANSCRIPT
FLEXIBILITY: PAST EXPERIENCES, THE CLEAN ENERGY PACKAGE, AND OPEN ISSUES
WORKSHOP “FLEXIBILITY IN EU ELECTRICITY MARKETS” UNIVERSITY OF ANTWERP AND BAEE
ANTWERP, 13 DECEMBER 2019
Paul Giesbertz, Statkraft
The 4th package – the Winter package – Clean Energy for EU citizens package (30 Nov 2016)
…
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Commission proposes new rules for consumer centred clean energy transition
This is an unprecedented step in empowering consumers
Our proposals provide a strong market pull for new technologies
A new aim: flexibility …. But why and how?
Challenge: increasing sharing of intermittent RES generation
General perception: We have to increase flexibility, e.g. by promoting demand
side response
Article 1 of the Regulation (CEP):
- This Regulation aims to: (a) set the basis for an efficient achievement of the objectives
of the Energy Union and in particular the climate and energy framework for 2030 by
enabling market signals to be delivered for increased efficiency, higher share of
renewable energy sources, security of supply, flexibility, sustainability, decarbonisation
and innovation;
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A new aim: consumer empowerment …. But why and how?
CEP introduces many “new” concepts:
- Active customer
- Aggregation
- Independent aggregator
- Demand response
- Citizen energy community
- Renewable energy community
- Renewables self-consumer
- Sharing of electricity
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Definitions: capacity and flexibility
Capacity: is the ability (or option) the deliver or offtake (sell or buy) electrical
energy
Flexibility: is the ability to use/exploit capacity with few limitations
- Flexibility is a characteristic of capacity
- Flexibility has many different time dimensions
- Example: A battery has short-term flexibility, but no longer term flexibility
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Flexibility is not a separate commodity
One can’t carve out a “flexibility market”
Capacity is used on power market, optimising its flexibility
across the different times
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Gene-ration
Storage Demand
Energy market Capacity MarketForward
marketsDay
aheadIntra-day Balancing
Key: equal treatment of all capacity providers
Gene-ration
Market Access provider
Demand
Supplier
= aggregator!
= aggregator!
Base-load
Peak-load
Y-ahead
Q-ahead
M-ahead
W-ahead
Day-ahead Hourly
Intra-day 15 Min
FCR
aFRR & mFRR
RR
ProfilesCap-futures
Capacity certificates
Products emerge following needs of
market parties
Capacity is used on power market, optimising its flexibility across the different times.One can’t carve out a “flexibility market”.
The reservoir capacity of Lake Blåsjø is 7.8 TWhNorway’s total reservoir capacity is 85 TWh (of which 35 TWh Statkraft)
That is 8.5 million batteries (of 10 MWh each)Or 6 billion Tesla Powerwalls (of 14 kWh each)
Statkraft offers flexible capacity
Statkraft needs flexible capacity
“Direktvermarktung“ of renewables by Statkraftcurrently 11.8 GW (mainly wind) all remote controlled
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Deviations from Day-ahead forecasts are traded at Intraday market
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Quelle: Statkraft Portfolio Donnerstag 17.05.2018
Higher generation must be sold …
…. a lower price…. a lower price
… wind generator receives day-ahead price for actual/meteredgeneration
Do not over-estimate the value of flexible capacity
There is overcapacity
There is a lot of storage
There is a lot of demand response
The reserves–market (FCR, FRR, RR) is a small market / not increasing
Intermittent generation is controllable
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Total installed dedicated storage capacity in the EU (plus CH and NO) is almost 50 GW *)Plus about 27 GW seasonal storage capacity: 77 GWPlus batteriesPlus batteries not yet battery-to-grid*) Source: EASAC policy report 33 “Valuing dedicated storage in electricity grids”
There is a lot of storage
Do not over-estimate the value of flexible capacity
There is overcapacity
There is a lot of storage
There is a lot of demand response
The reserves (FCR, FRR, RR) – market is a small market / not increasing
Intermittent generation is controllable
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the intermittency challenge
Contrary to common believe
is not in the balancing time frame
but in the forward time frames (intraday – seasonal)
There is a lot of (implicit) demand response
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About 3 GW every day
Source: http://www.rte-france.com/fr/eco2mix/eco2mix-consommation
Do not over-estimate the value of flexible capacity
There is overcapacity
There is a lot of storage
There is a lot of demand response
The reserves–market (FCR, FRR, RR) is a small market / not increasing
Intermittent generation is controllable
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Decreasing prices for primary reserve (PRL) in GermanyEuro/MW per week
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Increasing share of RES: decreasing activation of operating reserves & increasing use of intraday market
17Graph: Volumes in the activated reserve markets (green) versus intraday market (red) in GermanySource: Statkraft
Do not over-estimate the value of flexible capacity
There is overcapacity
There is a lot of storage
There is a lot of demand response
The reserves–market (FCR, FRR, RR) is a small market / not increasing
Intermittent generation is controllable
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Renewables are controllable
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A new aim: consumer empowerment …. But why and how?
CEP introduces many “new”
concepts:
- Active customer
- Aggregation
- Independent aggregator
- Demand response
- Citizen energy community
- Renewable energy community
- Renewables self-consumer
- Sharing of electricity
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How to implement?
Regulators are struggling:
- Enable benefits of communities,
while being compatible with 3rd
package principles
- Communities should not be
vehicle to circumvent market
principles, passing costs to
wider customer base
Consumer empowerment? Give consumer same rights & duties as any other “grid connected entity”
Basic right should NOT be
right to switch supplier,
… but, by having access to
the grid, right to enter into
any transaction with any
market participant
Basic duty: balance
responsibility
- Can be outsourced
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In practice this means that
community needs to become
supplier
License conditions for such
“suppliers light” need to be
revised
- Consumer needs less
protection as it wants to
become active
• Rest is non-regulated• “Sharing” is a concept where prosumers
mutually agree on terms for exchanging energy• This is a commercial arrangement
Only one requirement:correct imbalance price (= an open issue)
Imbalance price is THE basis for price formation in all market segments
Scarcity prices (signal for improving flexibility) can only materialise if imbalance
price can spike up to VoLL
Methodology to set imbalance price is not harmonised. ISH (one element of the
Electricity Balancing Guideline) is still open, but
- … it only rules which components can be used
Take marginal bid price for balancing energy, but
- What about costs for balancing capacity?
- ISP (15 min) can be much longer than activation time of a balancing energy bid
Take VoLL assessment into account in case of load-shedding
Cap needed???
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So far for the value of flexible capacity in matching demand and supply
But what about the grid?
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Gene-ration
Storage Demand
Energy market
Forwardmarkets
Day ahead
Intra-day Balancing
Gene-ration
Market Access provider
Demand
Supplier
The grid (operated by TSOs and DSOs)
facilitates the market.
DSOs/TSOs need to manage congestions (in a
coordinated way) and thus interact with
generation, demand & storage.
• “Grid connected market party” (consumer/prosumer/generator/storage) is at the centre
• He owns its flexible capacity and decides on its use (self-dispatch)
• Market signals are leading. Congestion management should be reimbursed without distorting the market.
Congestion management (sometimes called flexibility market) is not a market.
Congestion costs are transmission costs.
• If that “classical” paradigm remains valid,• - and why wouldn’t it? -• then there is no stacking of revenues from
providing grid support!
Back-up slides
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Intraday price developments: Highest volumes and volatility close to delivery30 April 2017 (long weekend, negative prices)
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Data: EPEX
Expected wind generation: Comparison of purelyweather-based and forecast with real-time data
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the intermittency challenge is not so much in the balancing time frame but in the forward time frames (intraday – seasonal)
Imbalance price is crucial!All delivery takes place in the real-time market. Market participants will anticipate and make forward decisions based on expectations
about real-time prices.
Active System ManagementBackground
DSOs are faced with
- increasing share of variable generation connected to DSO grid : congestions (a new phenomenon
for DSOs)
- electrification: need for grid expansion
- perception that demand response is needed for integration of renewables
Solution for DSOs: smart grids & local flexibility markets
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TSOs are concerned that local markets conflict with integrated wholesale markets
DSOs are concerned that TSO controls decentralized assets for balancing that cause
congestions in DSO grids
Limited unbundling of DSOs is also concern
• For the market there is no difference between T and D• Cooperation between TSOs and DSOs necessary to
ensure level playing field
Concerns
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Congestion management is seen as “market” next to “energy market”.Instead CM is supporting grid and grid is facilitating market
Idea that market participant can choose between “energy market” and “CM market” to optimise the value of its flex capacity sounds nice
But it means new market design!Withholding capacity from the energy market to offer it for grid support at a higher price, would classify as a REMIT violation!
Balancing Market is seen as regulated marketAlthough “special” it is integral part of the “energy market”
Freedom of dispatch means that market participant is free to change its consumption/generation pattern or sell flex capacity to TSO for balancing
Focus on balancing is too narrow• Congestions are managed as
early as possible• The challenge of “RES
variability” is not so much in balancing time frame
Idea of combined MOL and a central, regulated platform is worrying
CM should always be compensated and should leave affected parties financially indifferent
Conclusions (1)
Positive: joint effort of TSOs and DSOs
Scope is too limited
Some recommendations are premature (e.g. on product design, flex register, combined MOL)
Avoid confusing terminology (flexibility is vague, congestion management is precise)
Start with fundamental principles, like:- Grid users are owner of their flexible capacity and are free to exploit their flexible capacity at the market (including
the balancing market). The grid (operated by TSOs and DSOs) is facilitating the market. In case of congestions,
TSOs/DSOs procure congestion management services. Delivery of congestion management may become
mandatory (especially in emergency situations) however must always be compensated. Compensation may be price
based (preferably) but can be cost based, in any case the principle is that the dispatched grid user is left financially
indifferent (compared to the case where this grid user is not affected by congestion management).
… only then do problem analysis before to propose solutions
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Conclusions (2)
Market can manage integration of weather dependent generation
Correct imbalance pricing is crucial
Intermittent RES is not mainly causing a balancing challenge
Congestion management is an issue since liberalisation and unbundling. It is
increasingly becoming an issue in Distribution grids. But there is no prove that
a market redesign would be needed.
Flexibility should not be a new target next to reliability, efficiency and
decarbonisation.
Also the other D’s (decentralisation, digitalisation and dynamic regulation)
should not become objectives in itself.
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Installed dedicated (grid connected) storage capacity in the EU (plus CH and NO) in 2016: mainly PHS
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Source: EASAC policy report 33 “Valuing dedicated storage in electricity grids”
Different types of storage with different capabilities
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Source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2016
Types of Demand Side Response
ImplicitResponse on retail price
ExplicitResponse on market prices
Directby consumer
• Well known for decades• Already active to large extent• No regulatory barriers• No involvement/compensation
of supplier• Will further develop with roll-
out of smart meter
• Already active (largerconsumers)
• Should be allowed (consumer should have right for this model)
• Requires agreement consumer-supplier. Commercial terms to be negotiated.
Indirectby aggregator (on behalf of consumer)
• No regulatory barriers • No involvement/compensation
of supplier• Likely to develop with
technological developments
• Relatively new business model• Should be allowed (consumer
should have right for this model)
• Requires agreement consumer-supplier-aggregator. Commercial terms to be negotiated.
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ImplicitResponse on retail price
ExplicitResponse on market prices
Directby consumer
• Well known for decades• Already active to large extent• No regulatory barriers• No involvement/compensation
of supplier• Will further develop with roll-
out of smart meter
• Already active (largerconsumers)
• Should be allowed (consumer should have right for this model)
• Requires agreement consumer-supplier. Commercial terms to be negotiated.
Indirectby aggregator (on behalf of consumer)
• No regulatory barriers • No involvement/compensation
of supplier• Likely to develop with
technological developments
• Relatively new business model• Should be allowed (consumer
should have right for this model)
• Requires agreement consumer-supplier-aggregator. Commercial terms to be negotiated.
IndirectBy supplier (with consent of consumer)
- Not relevant • Well know for decades• No regulatory barriers
Types of Demand Side Response
VoLL (Value of Lost Load)
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If market participants are exposed to the real risk that the imbalance price will be set at least at the:
Then scarcity prices can materialise and market participants will invest in flexibility
Conclusions
Correct imbalance pricing is crucial
Intermittent RES is not mainly causing a balancing challenge
Flexibility should not be a new target next to reliability, efficiency and
sustainability
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