flash crowds & denial of service attacks

23
Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites Jaeyeon Jung MIT Laboratory for Computer Science Balachander Krishnamurthy and Michael Rabinovich AT&T Labs-Research

Upload: dangdieu

Post on 31-Dec-2016

228 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Characterization and Implications for CDNs and Web sites

Jaeyeon JungMIT Laboratory for Computer Science

Balachander Krishnamurthy and Michael RabinovichAT&T Labs-Research

Page 2: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Motivation✔ Flash crowd is a sudden, large surge in traffic to a

particular Web site

– September 11, Ken Starr’s report, Victoria’s

Secret webcast

✔ Denial of Service (DoS) attack is an explicit attempt

to prevent legitimate users of a service from using

that service

– HTTP request flooding, attack to crack

password-protected web pages, ���� ���

worm, TCP SYN flooding, etc.

Slide 1

Page 3: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Questions✔ Part I: Flash events vs. DoS attacks

– What properties differentiate DoS attacks from

flash events?

– How can we use them to identify and separate

DoS attacks from flash events?

✔ Part II: Flash crowds and CDNs

– What is the locality of file reference like during

flash events and its implication for CDNs?

– How can we improve protection of Web servers

from flash crowds using CDNs?

Slide 2

Page 4: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Network-Aware Clusters [KW00]

✔ Clustering uses a large collection of unique

network prefix from BGP tables

✔ Classify all the IP addresses that have the same

longest matched prefix into a cluster

✔ It helps determine topological distribution of

clients in FE and DoS

Slide 3

Page 5: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Flash Events

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

0 20000 40000 60000 80000

Num

ber

of r

eque

sts

per

seco

nd (

rps)

Time (second)

Play-along

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000

Num

ber

of r

eque

sts

per

seco

nd (

rps)

Time (second)

Chile

Trace Requests Documents Clients Clusters

Play-along Total 13,018,385 7,084 53,745 14,100

FE 71.0% 68.9% 63.9% 61.6%

Chile Total 2,634,567 10,302 20,532 1,739

FE 88.2% 90.2% 89.0% 86.6%

Slide 4

Page 6: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

DoS Attacks

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000

Req

uest

rat

e

Time

Trace Requests Documents Clients Clusters

bit.nl 35,657 1 11,092 6,155

✔ ���� ��� : In the earlier variant, each instance

uses the same random number generator seed to

create the list of IP addresses it scans [CERT].

Slide 5

Page 7: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Part I: Flash Events vs. DoS Attacks

Slide 6

Page 8: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Client Characteristics

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

0 20000 40000 60000 80000

Num

ber

of d

istin

ct c

lient

s or

clu

ster

s pe

r se

cond

Time (second)

Play-along

clientsclusters

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000

Num

ber

of d

istin

ct c

lient

s or

clu

ster

sTime

bit.nl

clientsclusters

✔ [FE] Clients can be effectively aggregated into

clusters

✔ [DoS] Distribution of DoS attackers is broad

Slide 7

Page 9: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Client Characteristics - contd.

✔ [FE] Many old clusters are represented in flash

events

Play-along : 42.7% and Chile: 82.9%

✔ [DoS] Very few previously seen clusters are

involved in DoS attacks

creighton: 0.6%, fullnote: 0%, spccctxus: 1.8%,

and rellim: 14.3%

Slide 8

Page 10: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Per-client Request Rate

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0 20000 40000 60000 80000

Ave

rage

per

-clie

nt r

eque

st r

ate

Time (second)

Play-along

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000

Ave

rage

per

-clie

nt r

eque

st r

ate

Time

bit.nl

✔ [FE] There is a decline in per-client request rate

during the flash event

✔ [DoS] The per-client request rate does not change

during the surge in requests

Slide 9

Page 11: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Server Strategy✔ Monitor the clients that access the site and their

request rate

✔ Periodically perform network aware clustering over

the client set accumulated over the past period

without flash or DoS events - old clusters

✔ When performance degrades to a threshold level,

discard packets that come from clients that do not

belong to old clusters as well as from non-proxy

clients whose request rate deviates significantly

from average

Slide 10

Page 12: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Part II: Flash Crowds and CDNs

Slide 11

Page 13: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

File Reference Characteristics✔ Large number of documents are accessed only

during FEs (Play-along : 61% and Chile: 82%)

➔ Many cache misses at the beginning of FEs

✔ 10% of popular documents account for more than90% of requests.

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Fra

ctio

n of

req

uest

s

Fraction of documents

Play-alongChile

Slide 12

Page 14: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Flash Events and CDN

CDN node CDN node

CDN nodeCDN node

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

OriginServer

✔ CDN with 1,000+ cache nodes might not be able to

provide an absolute protection against FE due to the

peaks in the beginning of FE

Slide 13

Page 15: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Flash Events and CDN

CDN node CDN node

CDN nodeCDN node

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

OriginServer

✔ Limiting the number of caches would increase the

load on individual caches

Slide 14

Page 16: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Flash Events and CDN

CDN node CDN node

Client

Client

Client

CDN nodeClient

Client Client

Client

Client Client Client

Client

Client

OriginServer

✔ Limiting the number of caches would increase the

load on individual caches

Slide 14

Page 17: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Flash Events and CDN

CDN node

Client

CDN nodeClient

Client Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client

Client Client

Client

OriginServer

✔ Limiting the number of caches would increase the

load on individual caches

Slide 14

Page 18: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Adaptive CDN

✔ Lower the peak rate forwarded to an origin server

while spreading load over cache nodes

Delegate

Delegate

Primary

Primary Primary

Primary

Client Client

DNS

1

2

3

OriginServer

Slide 15

Page 19: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Adaptive CDN

✔ Lower the peak rate forwarded to the origin server

while spreading load over cache nodes

Delegate

Delegate

Primary

Primary Primary

Primary

Client Client

DNS

12

3

OriginServer

Slide 15

Page 20: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Adaptive CDN

✔ Lower the peak rate forwarded to the origin server

while spreading load over cache nodes

Delegate

Delegate

Client Client

Primary

Primary Primary

Primary

Client

DNS1

2

OriginServer

Slide 15

Page 21: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Dynamic Delegation

lhl <

lll <

ll lh< l <

lh, l(d) >

OverloadedUnderloaded

; release delegates ; redirect request to; add a new one if

; process requests

l > lh

of the lowest loadd

; HTTP request redirect to; add delegate d

d

d

✔ Load on primary cache, �, is computed as requests

per second averaged over two-second interval.

✔ Cache is assigned based on cluster and used for ttl

period.

Slide 16

Page 22: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Simulation Results

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

0 20000 40000 60000 80000

Num

ber

of r

eque

sts

per

seco

nd (

rps)

Time (second)

Play-along

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0 20000 40000 60000 80000

Num

ber

of r

eque

sts

per

seco

nd

Time (second)

Play-along

✔ Peak request rates are reduced by a factor of 50

(Play-along), and 20 (Chile)

✔ It ensures that load on each cache remains low (50

rps) and that proximity-based cache selection is not

compromised.

Slide 17

Page 23: Flash Crowds & Denial of Service Attacks

Conclusion

✔ Client clustering technique is useful for source

identification and for distinguishing legitimate

requests and malicious attacks.

✔ Per-client request rate drops and remains lower

during the FEs unlike DoS attackers who generate

requests independently of a server load

✔ Adaptive CDN is effective in terms of reduction of

flows from the main server and dynamic load

distribution over cache nodes.

Slide 18