fixing the transitional process final
TRANSCRIPT
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Fixing the Transitional Process for Somalia (2000-2011)Assessing the Structural Limitations that undermine the
transitional institutions and proposals for resolving
Ahmed Abdisalam Adan
Mogadishu, Somalia
27th March, 2011
I. IntroductionSuccessive Somali Transitional National Governments established since 2000 have all been
characterized by incessant internal conflict among the top leadership, lack of progress on the
key transitional tasks and the failure to build functioning institutions. These transitionalnational governments formed through the Arta Peace Process in 2000, Kenya Peace Process
in 2004 and Djibouti Peace process in 2009, all encountered similar challenges that severely
undermined their fragile institutions, eroded the confidence and support of the people and
eventually forced them to disintegrate. Meanwhile, in the absence of viable alternatives,
Somali political forces and international actors concerned about the evolving situation in
Somali continue to scramble to assemble various political actors for yet another peace
conference outside the country and try to fill the impending institutional void by extending
the transitional process for national governance in Somalia.
a. Persistent political wranglingThe Transitional National Government ( TNG) established through the Arta ( Djibouti)
Peace process in 2000 was hampered by the row between the President Abdiqasim Salad
Hassan and his Prime Ministers Dr. Ali Khalif Galeydh and Hassan Abshir respectively.
While the President managed to remove both PMs through the Parliament his government
was severely weakened by these internal discords and thus unable to carry out its tasks andfulfill its mandate. With the imminent collapse of the TNG barely 3 years into its term,
preparations for a national peace conference started in Nairobi to fill the vacuum in the form
of alternative transitional government for Somalia.
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Similarly, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) established through the Kenya Peace
Process in 2004 was hampered by sharp divisions between its top leaders President
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan soon after its inception.
The President managed to oust the first speaker in 2006, but soon became embroiled in
another political row with the then Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Geedi. After Months of
tension, political impasse and public divisions within the Transitional Federal Institutions
(TFIs), Prime Minister Geedi was pressured to resign late 2007. By the time the new Prime
Minister took office in early 2008, the TFG was already in the final year of its term and
displayed the scars of the previous internal power struggle of its leadership. Expectedly, the
TFG and its international sponsors could only use the remaining year of its mandate to
initiate a process that could extend the transitional mechanism for additional period.
Unfortunately, the TFG leadership could not avoid the internal wrangling that has alreadyfragmented the fragile transitional institutions. By the end the year the public row between
the President and Prime Minister Nur Adde concluded with the forced resignation of the
President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed eight months before the end of his term.
The 2009 Djibouti Peace Agreement which extended the life of the TFG led by Sharif
Sh.Ahmed under the presidency has also been plagued by the same mistrust and political
discord among the leadership of the TFIs over the past year. A serious rift between the
former speaker, Sh. Adan Madoobe and former PM, Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke over
differing interpretations of the authority and power of their respective institution, led to the
forced removal of Sh. Adan from the Speaker. This was immediately followed by intense
power struggle between the President and PM Sharmarke that concluded with the
resignation of the PM in September 2010. Unsurprisingly, the showdown shifted to the two
remaining leaders of the TFIs, the President and the Speaker, over the process of selecting
and endorsing the executive branch, namely the Prime Minister and the cabinet. Like the
previous rows, this conflict is aggravated by the apparent mistrust between the two leaders,which makes the choice of the new PM much more critical to their political survival in the
zero-sum game of present day Somali politics. In the end, a compromise cabinet provided
both sides some assurance to move forward, concluding the two month long bitter
wrangling among the TFG leadership. Predictably, the row between the President and the
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Speaker re-ignited as the end of the government mandate approaches, and discussions shift
to post transition arrangements.
While there are marked differences between the successive transitional Somali governments
established since 2000, in terms of time, actors involved, process and circumstances, etc.
they were all weakened by persistent internal political conflict between the leaders of the
various transitional institutions
II. Structural defects in the Development Process of the TransitionalGovernments
A closer examination of how the transitional governments for Somalia were established in
the past provide some clues that may help explain the source of the recurring internal power
struggles that consistently manage to run-down the fragile experiment to the ground before
it takes-off. Key components of the development process include; conference participation
/ delegates, the conference agenda and program, arrangements and agreements reached and
the international/regional sponsors that help manage, fund and provide legitimacy to the
process and its outcome.
1) The Political Actors ( Conference Participants/delegates)Once the call for the reconciliation conference is announced, self-appointed political leaders,claiming to represent clan/ sub-clans, regional authority, political organization/ factions,
social movement, interest group and Diaspora associations generally converge to the site of
the peace conference. While the majority of these individuals come from outside the
country, they skillfully use their connections and affiliations to the local clans, groups,
sponsors, etc and manage to include themselves into the official conference delegates, and
hence a seat at the decision-making table. Naturally, once the political elites and Diaspora
delegates dominate the conference program and committees, the agenda shifts away from
the critical issues of security and stabilization, local administrations, institutional building,
humanitarian crisis, addressing deep seated grievances, past crimes and impunity, etc.
Instead, the deliberations move to superficial reconciliation, political power sharing
arrangements and intense campaigning for top seats in the newly formed institutions, as was
rightly observed by scholars, to the frustration of external moderators, the Somali delegates
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showed no interest in resolving conflict issues and only became engaged when the subject
turned to power-sharing.
Expectedly, participants of these conferences manage to occupy the top political positions,
utilizing all the means necessary, including corruption and political deal making. However,
once in office many of these political actors show their limitations in terms of understanding
the dynamics on the ground, as well as lack of critical political base and support from local
populations. These limitations often force leaders of the respective transitional governments
to rely more on external support, rather than seeking local legitimacy and indigenous
solutions to the critical challenges on the ground.
2)The Process of the Peace conference
Since 2000, three national governments were reconstituted for Somalia through elaborate
peace conferences organized outside the country. The Arta Peace Process in Djibouti
produced the Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000, the Kenya Peace Process
established the Transitional Federal Government in 2004, and the Djibouti Peace Process
extended the TFG for another 2 years in 2009. In the process, the objectives /goals,
participation, agenda, agreements and expected outcome for the conference is outlined.
While the main objectives of the past national peace processes remained the same
reconciliation among the Somalis and creation of transitional government there has been
little success in either of these goals for the past eleven years of transitional period. On the
contrary, the country has largely descended further into localized conflict and destruction,
with diminishing hope for the return of functioning state institutions in Somalia.
a. Lack of genuine reconciliation among the Somali peopleDuring the past two decades, the nature of the conflict in Somalia has been shifting from
macro level, between national groups and clans, and transforming more into localizedhostilities and rivalries between sub-clans and communities within the same territories. This
requires the peace processes not only to bridge the gap between the political leaders in the
conference, but also to develop a meaningful plan to heal the deep seated mistrust and local
grievances that fuel continued rivalries and fragmentation within the communities.
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However, it seemed that in the past peace discussions, little effort were devoted to resolving
conflict issues, and to restore the needed trust and confidence among the local populations
and communities. Instead, the deliberations were often dominated by superficial
pronouncements of reconciliation, forgiveness and idealistic pledges for cessation of all
hostilities. While these rather simplistic proclamations can have positive effect on the
ongoing peace process, there has been limited success to implement such constructive
resolutions at the local level.
During the Peace Process of the past decade, it was quite clear that neither the political
conflict between the warring parties at the national level was resolved, nor the internal
grievances of local communities addressed. For instance, during the Arta, Djibouti 2000
Peace conference, it was obvious the absence of the armed factions warlords from thepeace agreement could undermine the newly established transitional institutions once they
are relocated back to the country. Once in office, the TNG leadership failed to continue the
reconciliation process and bring the armed opposition into the transitional process,
precipitating its downfall. The Kenya conference tilted the pendulum to the other side,
practically empowering the armed faction leaders at the expense of the other stakeholders,
including the civil society, opposing political actors, etc. Predictably, the outcome of the two
years long Kenya peace negotiations only added more fuel to the deep divisions and
competing rivalries among the Somali political factions and clans, as was rightly alerted by
the ICG report soon after the conclusion of the conference in late 2004. The declaration, in
Kenya, of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in October 2004 was heralded as a
breakthrough in Somalia's protracted crisis of statelessness and civil strife. But the peace process has
gone largely downhill since then. The Transitional Federal Parliament's choice for interim president,
Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed, is divisive and controversial. To many Somalis, his election
represents not a step toward peace but continuation of the war by other means.
Similarly, the Djibouti 2008 peace discussions which sought to incorporate the armed
insurgency into the transitional process went into political campaigning and election process
without arresting the violence on the ground and addressing the internal rifts within the two
camps of the ARS and the TFG. Despite the considerable challenges of implementing the
security agreement between the two parties and unifying the TFG and ARS forces in
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Mogadishu, the entire peace process shifted into a leadership contest for replacing President
Abdullahi Yusuf following his unexpected resignation in December 2008. Expectedly, the
election euphoria and raised expectations from the Djibouti process began to wear down as
the realities on the ground and conflicts previously avoided (ignored) started to confront the
newly renewed institutions once they were relocated back to the country. Definitely,
externally driven peace processes for Somalia failed to consider the relevance and value of
addressing local grievances among the Somali communities and political factions, and as a
result prolonged the conflict and statelessness for the country.
The fact that the election of the leaders marked the conclusion of peace process further
highlights the disconnection between the externally driven peace process and the realities on
the ground. In all the past Somali conferences, the entire reconciliation process abruptlycame to an end once the leadership of the transitional institutions are elected / selected,
shifting the responsibility for the Somali nation entirely to the newly designated individuals.
To make matters worse, soon after the celebrations and self-congratulations for a job well-
done, the embryonic transitional institutions are shipped back to the country, with no
preparations, resources, support base or foundation to build on.
b. Fragile Legal BasePeace Agreements andTransitional CharterThe second major problem in the Somali peace processes is the consistent failure to develop
a comprehensive agreement with detailed implementation plan, including the realistic
timeline, resources allocation and clear roles and responsibilities. Indeed, the legal
instruments that served the basis of the peace agreements in the past were often relegated to
a secondary role during the conference proceedings, and generally developed in haste, with
limited input and involvement from the participants of the reconciliation process. As a
result, the produced documents Transitional Charter or Peace Agreement usually do
not reflect the local realities and challenges on the ground, lacks clarity and often containsinconsistent or contradictory articles that leave room for different interpretation,
disagreement and manipulation.
Another major weakness in all the previous peace agreements was the absence of arbitration
or enforcement mechanism that could hold the parties accountable and ensure the full
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implementation of the terms of the agreement. Given the fragile nature of peace agreements
in conflict societies such as Somalia, it would have been useful to develop, during the peace
process, a credible, independent institution that is authorized to monitor the implementation
of the agreement, and provide necessary clarification when there are differences in
interpretation of clauses of the peace accord.
Successive transitional governments have consistently and deliberately violated the spirit and
the letter of the agreements they signed during the peace process. In defense for their
autocratic behavior and disregard for the peace settlements, leaders of the transitional
institutions often assert their sovereignty rights and claims of internal affairs, despite their
over-reliance of external support for existence. In fact, the deliberate misuse and
manipulation of the Transitional Charter and other legal instruments for personal andpolitical interests contributed to the widening legitimacy-gap and increasing mistrust of the
public towards the successive transitional governments. Furthermore, TFG leaders have
consistently and willfully manipulated the judiciary institutions for their narrow political
motivations. Expectedly, such cynical intrusions of the legal mechanisms basically
compromised the credibility, independence, and effectiveness of the fragile justice system at
this critical transitional period. The on-going squabble of the TFIs over the appointment of
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court only confirms the extent of the deepening
exploitation of the justice system by the leadership.
3) The role of International Actors in the Peace Process.The international community is the third important ingredient in organization of the Peace
conference outside the country to reconstruct the transitional governments for Somalia. The
international actors play multiple roles, including providing neutral space for the warring
parties, sponsoring and hosting the conference, as well as backing and legitimizing the
1`outcome. In short, the international community make it possible for the conference tosucceed and is expected to show similar commitment and resolve to the ensuring the
implementation of the peace agreements and the execution of the transitional tasks.
However, it seems that the international community fell into the same trap as the Somali
political elites, overtaken by the high-level political campaigns and hollow rhetoric of
reconciliation at the conference deliberations.
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Obviously, the significant presence and involvement of international community
representatives at the peace conferences attests to their interest and commitment to helping
the Somalis resolve the crisis that has plagued their country. But, it is also apparent that the
international community has not adequately utilized its facilitation role in the peace process
to appropriately guide the deliberations to the critical issues in the country, pressure the
Somali parties to consider the challenges on the ground, and ensure that the transitional
mechanisms produced had the capacity to carry out the tasks and responsibilities outlined
within the mandate. In short, it seems international actors often opt for the shortsighted
quick-fix propositions from the Somali political elites as a solution to the very complex and
protracted problems of Somalia.
Furthermore, the role international community is not well defined in the implementation
phase of the peace agreements. Even though the international community provides the
political legitimacy, financial support and in some cases security protection to assist the
newly developed transitional institutions function, their involvement did not go far enough
to serve as Guarantors for the effective implementation of the accords reached. The
International Communitys response was tested when the Somali political actors showed
their disregard for the Transitional Charter when they failed to meet the required 12%
representation for women MPs, soon after it was approved in the 2004 Peace conference.
The feeble response from the international diplomats to hold the Somali leaders accountable
to their legal commitments only encouraged TFI leaders to manipulate existing legal
instruments for their own use. Recent examples include President Sharif Sh. Ahmeds open
violation of the power sharing arrangement between the TFG and ARS under Djibouti
Peace Agreement, with the tacit consent of the international community. When in late
November 2010, the speaker of the TFP single handedly confirmed the new Cabinet without
the required MPs vote of confidence, the international community cheered quietly. In thiscase, the international actors were more concerned with breaking of the political stalemate
within the TFIs, rather than the deliberate breach of the Transitional Charter that lay the
foundation of the TFIs. But, when the Members of Parliament (MPs) recently extended their
term for three more years, following the IGAD, AU and UN suggestions, the response from
many international actors was quick, critical and unusually harsh in tone. In return, the MPs
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immediately highlighted the conflicting approaches of the international community, shifting
the blame to the International actors and asking them to refrain from their internal matters.
Obviously, these specific examples point to a broader problem of the emergent Transitional
institutions for Somalia, where the decision making process is often driven by personalities
and their self-serving motives, rather than by the rule of law, consensus and common
interests. In reality, such wanton disrespect for legality and legal mechanisms within the TFI
leadership may help explain the dismal failure of successive governments to revive some
elements of the judiciary systems at the district, regional or national levels for more than a
decade.The apparent inconsistencies of the international communitys approach to the
Somali institutions, coupled with the absence of effective accountability mechanisms that
can hold the signatories and especially the leadership of the TFIs responsible for theiractions contributed to widening deep mistrust of the public towards the transitional
government, persistent internal rows among the leadership and the failure to make any
progress on the transitional tasks during the term in office.
III. The Outcome / Result:Somali transitional governments produced outside the country consistently demonstrated
their inherent limitations to manage and overcome the serious challenges that confront them
soon after their relocation back to the country. Some of these recurring deficiencies can be
traced back to the organization of the peace processes that facilitated the creation of the
transitional institutions. Critical defects in these reconciliation processes include; weak
representation, legitimacy and broad-based support; emphasis on power-sharing over
genuine reconciliation; focus on political campaigning rather than negotiating viable
settlement on key issues and challenges; inconsistencies and contradictory roles and
approaches of the international community towards the TFIs.
Expectedly, the products from these subsequent processes, the transitional institutions,
come with significant drawbacks that undermined their effectiveness, paralyzed their
performance and contributed to their predictable failures. Successive transitional institutions
established in the past decade consistently manifested numerous structural defects including,
persistent conflict among the leadership; deliberate misuse of legal instruments; emphasis on
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group loyalty and tribal solidarity over principles, laws, agreements, institutions and systems;
over reliance on external support to compensate for internal legitimacy-gap and
disconnection from local realities; superficial and quick-fix tactics over indigenous, genuine
problem solving strategy; corruption, misappropriation and mismanagement of public
resources; and leadership driven by selfish political motives and personal ambitions, etc.
IV. The Way ForwardEven though, a diverse group of political actors, including seasoned politicians, warlords,
intellectuals and moderate Islamists took the helm of the tentative project to create
transitional institutions in the past decade, they all managed to self-destruct the fragile
experiments. Of course, those in charge ofthese transitional initiatives cant escape their
share of the blame and must take ownership for their incompetence and poor leadership.But, it would be rather simplistic and shortsighted to put the blame for the repeated
dysfunction solely on the behavior of individual leaders, without considering other
contributing factors. This brief analysis clearly demonstrates that the biggest challenges that
destabilized the transitional institutions in question can be generally associated with
structural deficiencies of the peace processes that produced them. The inherent limitations
of these processes in terms of involving legitimate representation, achieving genuine
reconciliation and developing viable agreements, among others, continuously hamper the
newly formed transitional institutions to launch effectively and start functioning, soon after
their relocation back to the country.
It is therefore, quite critical that any effort to develop a meaningful strategy for the way
forward for the country be built on solid principles, agreed by all the national as well as
external stakeholders. These basic principles include;
1)
Legitimacy and ownership of the political process.Over 15 attempts of external national peace conferences for Somalia have failed to revive
the collapsed central state, produce functioning institutions and restore peace and stability
for the country for more than 20 years. A major reason for the recurring failure is the
limited participation and genuine representation by the relevant stakeholders in the
conferences and lack of ownership of the political process by the Somalis. Since the
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prolonged conflict and statelessness in the country lead to disintegration and fragmentation
of the society, it is quite critical to ensure a broad-based participation in the political process
and that all the segments of the society are truly involved. It is only when the legitimate
representatives of the Somali communities come together, properly asses their situation,
negotiate practical solutions and take collective responsibility for achieving it, that
meaningful progress can be expected. The agenda and issues deliberated must be determined
by the Somalis and reflect their genuine concerns and aspirations. In short, Somalis must be
in charge of their destiny and in the process restore their trust in each other and regain their
pride and dignity.
2) Security improvement linked to political progress.The prolonged conflict and statelessness in Somalia for more than two decades is not due tothe insecurity and lawlessness in the country, but is the result of the lack of viable political
solution for the nation. Indeed, the deteriorating security situation along with the shifting
conflict dynamics, from clan conflict, factional and warlords, extremist militancy to external
intervention all point to the absence of a meaningful political settlement among the Somalis.
There were a number of times in the past 20 years when the various political authorities of
the day managed to overpower their rivalries militarily, but failed politically to win over
accommodate their rivals and broaden their legitimacy. That is why the tangible international
support to the Somali security sector for the past few years have failed to materialize, in the
absence of corresponding political progress. In fact, there is a growing recognition that the
Shabaab extremists represent a political challenge, rather than security threat. And, therefore,
any effort to strengthen security and create stability in Somalia, must consider parallel
progress on the political front to ensure lasting solution.
3) Bottom-up approach to peace and state buildingDecade long efforts to create durable peace and stability in Somalia through top-downcentral governance approach have so far failed. The externally sponsored peace processes
have not managed to reestablish functioning centralized institutions and restore order in the
capital city, let alone expand to the regions and districts of the country. The only exception
has been in Somaliland and Puntland where local communities have managed to restore
some level of order and administration in their areas. Unfortunately, the leadership of the
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successive transitional governments failed to see the relevance of strengthening local
administrations as a way to broaden their authority and legitimize their institution.
As a result, a major segment of the Somali population living in the districts, villages and rural
communities outside the capital city remained largely disconnected from the governance
experiments, along with the limited resources that came with it from the international
community. Expectedly, this gap facilitated effortless takeover of much of South-Central
Somalia by the radical Shabaab forces. Any attempt to reconnect to these communities,
create stability and broaden governance must combine the current top-down approach for
centralized state-building with grass-roots level community mobilization strategy to build
localized institutions from the bottom-up. Somalis do not have to go far to see the
difference. In both Somaliland and Puntland, local leaders and elders have alreadydemonstrated that the bottom-up approach to peace-building is a viable model for
reconciling local clans, strengthening local security and stability, and building legitimate
institutions for service delivery, resource management and political expression. This
administrative decentralization approach has been consistent with the growing demand of
Somalis for a federal system of governance, in the latest national reconciliation conferences
of Arta and Kenya, respectively.
An effective bottom-up strategy must be built around the four interlinked pillars of
reconciliation, security, administration and economicdevelopment at the local level in
a systematic and well-coordinated approach.
a. Localized community level reconciliationThe Somali conflict is no longer between the major Somali clans along the so- called 4.5
segments. Instead, the mistrust and suspicions is between the sub-clans who share common
dwelling and settlement. The collapse of the state institutions, coupled with the weakenedtraditional institutions left deep seated disputes and grievances among these groups
unresolved, contributing to further fragmentation and tension at the local communities.
These grievances among the local communities and sub-clans that generally live in the same
localities provided Shabaab militants with the most effective tool in their takeover and
control of much of South Central Somalia.
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A simple scan of the districts and regions throughout the country clearly show direct link
between the strength of Shabaab militants in the area and the level of grievances and
mistrust among the local communities. Examples of territories where Shabaab extremists
have skillfully exploited the discord and lingering suspicions among local communities
include, Hawadle vsGaaljelsub-clans in Hiiraan region,Marehan vs Ogadensub-clans in
Kismayo region,Murusade vs Hiraabin Central regions, Hadamo vs Ligsaysub-clans in
Bay/Bakoolregions, and Reer Mataanvs Harti -Abgaalin Banadir region, to name a few. In
all these cases, local sub-clans with claims of past injustices against other local communities
have tactically opted to endure the occupation and collective punishment of Shabaab
militants, until their grievances are redressed through genuine reconciliation and trust
restored.
Local level reconciliation among the clans and sub-clans of the targeted areas would be a key
step to bridge the gap, regain trust and restore the unity and cooperation among local
community members. The purpose of this local reconciliation is to bring an end to all active
hostilities and tensions, to resolve internal conflicts at the community level, and to pave the
way for genuine collaboration on strengthening security and establishing functioning
administrations in their local setting. Somali traditional leaders and religious elders are well
equipped to facilitate such crucial discussions among their populations using their
indigenous systems. Indeed, Somali traditional systems have well developed tools, for
resolving disputes through mediation, managing local conflicts and maintaining peace.
However, the prolonged conflict and continued lawlessness throughout the country
weakened the indigenous mechanisms of the Somali people, leaving them vulnerable to the
misuse and exploitation of political actors and faction leaders. It is, therefore, quite
important that credible, respected political leaders from the communities affected, get
involved in the reconciliation process and contribute to its successful conclusions. Theconstitutional making process can be adequately utilized to facilitate dialogue and
reconciliation among the various clans and populations in local communities.
b. Building security at the community level
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The collapse of the central state in early 1990s, and the ensuing clan warfare forced large
numbers of Somali families to seek refuge in areas identified with their clansmen and to
return to the safety and the protection of their kinship territories. Consequently, this massive
re-settlement led to the creation of exclusive clan enclaves, which in effect, consolidated the
inherent loyalty to kinship affiliations. As a result, traditional leadership has taken over the
added responsibilities for the security and survival of local communities, following the
collapse the central state. Twenty years later and countless efforts to revive the decomposed
centralized governance; the country is largely segmented into clan territories, with authority
and decision-making practically entrenched with local traditional elders and community
leaders.
Repeated attempts by successive transitional governments to reestablish the Somali NationalForces and restore peace and security throughout the country have all been unsuccessful to
date. The reason is mainly due to the central authorities failure to take into account the
dramatic transformations that forced this clan-based society to resort back to their
indigenous social structures in administering matters of common concern to their local clans
such as peace and security. Clearly, efforts aimed to promote effective security need to
properly utilize the proliferation of local clan militias that is already operating in these
communities, largely serving as defense forces for clan territories. Surely, this localization
approach to security is already in place in much of the country. The TFG forces in the
capital are predominantly Banadir Regional Forces,whereas the Kenya trained forces
belong to the Southern-Jubba regions, the Ethiopian trained forces currently stationed along
the South-Westren border belong to the Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions, and ASWJ and
Hiiraan forces belong to the central regions. This de facto regionalization approach to
developing functional security must be reinforced as part of a broader strategy to reconstruct
Somalias national security system. Besides, this localized security approach responds
effectively to the parallel shifts in todays warfare. Clearly, the conventional warfare betweennation-states that relied on heavy artillery, tanks and aircrafts is now replaced by irregular
warfare that is decentralized in nature and skillfully utilizes social exclusion, political
marginalization, ideological appeal, and targeted violence as their preferred weapon of
choice. Organizing and empowering local militias to defend their communities against
invading extremists, and promote peace and stability in their localities would be a more
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effective and realistic undertaking, than the current top-down approach that have repeatedly
failed to deliver, despite the considerable resources invested.
The advantages of this bottom-up approach to security development include the conduct of
simultaneous operation s in multiple fronts; increased local community appreciation,
ownership, involvement and support to the security operations; reduced risk of defections
and weapons sale to the enemy; enhanced intelligence and collaboration from the local
populations; and improved effectiveness and success rate. The experiences of self-governing
administrations of Somaliland and Puntland have already proven the success of this bottom-
up strategy. More recently ASWJ community leaders in Central regions have amply
demonstrated that local clan militias, once organized, can effectively defend their
communities from the incursions by external forces such as Shabaab extremists, despite theirlimited resources. Local militias can effectively maintain security, provided they are properly
organized, trained and adequately remunerated, and most importantly, afforded the
necessary leadership and support from the local communities.
The central government would have a critical role of coordinating the training; equipping
and organizing them into professional local police forces that effectively manage the internal
security of the districts and regions of the country. In addition, the central authority drawing
from these regional forces, can integrate them into national, rapid deployment units that can
respond to emergencies and crisis. Furthermore, this bottom-up parallel approach to security
development would also allow a more equitable distribution of resources to the various parts
of the country, thereby contributing to the confidence building and trust among the various
constituents that make up the nation.
c. Local AdministrationsThe lack of functioning local administrations contributes to the continued lawlessness,recurrent conflicts and absence of basic services through much of the country. Developing
local governance institutions is a key step in the process of building durable peace and
stability in local communities. Once the shattered relations among the local populations is
restored and inter-community confidence and cooperation is revived through the
reconciliation process, it is important to quickly follow-up with the establishment of broad-
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based , representative local administrations . Community-based administrations provide
much needed coordination of community efforts, deliver essential public services, maintain
law and order; stimulate local economy and foster development; promote community
cohesion, unity and collaboration, etc.
These days, the proliferation of grass-roots experiments aimed at establishing local
governance mechanisms in many parts of the country is a positive step, but requires timely
support to make them successful. An increasing number of emergent local administrations
exist only in name, but lack the necessary capacities and resources to make them functional.
Adequate support in terms of capacity building, organizational skills, financial management,
service delivery and running the day-to-day affairs of citizens are critical to making local
governments perform. Given the total erosion of state institutions at all levels ofgovernance, restoring functioning local authorities require serious commitment and
investment from the international partners as well as the national government.
d. Community economic developmentThe fourth pillar in this bottom-up approach to state reconstruction involves the
development of the local economy, rehabilitation of the local infrastructure, creating
employment and other economic opportunities for the local populations. There is growing
recognition that the rampant unemployment and hopelessness in the country is forcing
hundreds of thousands of Somali youth to abandon their homes in villages, districts and
towns throughout the country in search of a better life. Consequently, their deepening
desperation pushed thousands into extremism, criminality and piracy, while many more
voted with their feet in a mass exodus through the high seas. All of these options come with
high risk and diminishing returns, but for these youth, they offer a better alternative than the
enduring poverty, desperation and hopelessness that trap them in their communities. Clearly,
reestablishing security and basic governance alone in districts cannot guarantee durablestability and peace, without improvements in the lives of the people through gainful
employment, economic opportunities and investment in local infrastructure.
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4) Strengthening the Co-ordination Role of the Central StateThe proposed bottom-up approach to peace building is not aimed at replacing the role and
functions of the Central State. On the contrary, the co-ordination role of the central state
needs to be strengthened and legitimized. The distribution of power and responsibilities
between the Central government and local State Administrations is clearly defined in the
Transitional Federal Charter. What seems to be missing is the genuine attempt to implement
these institutional arrangements by the emergent leadership at both levels of governments.
Indeed, the critical challenge to the fragile state building experiment in Somalia has been the
failure to achieve the right balance between the top down efforts of the central authority and
the bottom-up local initiatives and to recognize their interdependence for the realization of
durable solution.
5) Independent monitoring and arbitration mechanismIn the absence of functioning judiciary and effective legislatures to counter-balance the
excessive powers of the executive branch, during this Transitional phase, it is essential to
setup independent mechanism that can steer the transitional government towards a culture
of accountability, transparency and responsibility. The cynical manipulation of rules and
laws, disregard for agreements, abuse of power, and rampant corruption remain at the
forefront of the persistent charges leveled against the TFG leadership, giving rise to
credibility gap and reduced confidence in the TFIs. Hence, the creation of this mechanism
is intended to compensate for the apparent shortcomings of the transitional processes.
The functions of this monitoring and arbitration mechanism include:
i. To promote full compliance of the Transitional Charter and other applicable laws of theTFIs, and the implementation of agreements entered. The committee will serve as an
independent, credible, mechanism to adjudicate and arbitrate the disagreements by senior
TFI leadership over the interpretation of the Transitional Charter and other applicablelaws and regulations. The committee will have responsibility for making final decisions
that are binding.
ii. To strengthen good governance, equity, transparency and accountability of theTransitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). In this capacity, the committee will monitor the
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institutional culture, administrative procedures and dealings with external partners of the
TFIs, with the view to identify potential problems, and make corrective measures and
appropriate interventions in a timely manner.
iii. To mediate disputes over functions, roles, responsibilities and distribution of powerbetween the central government and emerging regional states. One of the major
challenges facing political authorities in the country is finding the right balance between
the need to empower local citizens through decentralization and devolution of powers to
local authorities, with the desire for the unifying approach of strong centralized
governance. So far, attempts to reach acceptable power distribution arrangements for the
two levels of governments have only managed to intensify the internal conflict between
the respective political leaders. This commission could play a pivotal role in facilitatingthe delicate negotiations between these levels of governments.
iv. To monitor the timely completion of the transitional tasks. Successive transitionalgovernments have consistently failed to undertake the necessary tasks during their
mandate. Hence, the pressure for term extension of the transitional mechanisms to avert
imminent institutional void becomes justified, despite the lack of credible plan to
complete the tasks within the new mandate. This independent commission could
provide external oversight and support to the relevant TFIs as they carry out the
required activities as planned. The committee could also identify factors and
circumstances that impede the implementation of the transitional mandate to allow for
proper intervention and necessary adjustments in a timely manner.
The proposed mechanism can be an independent commission, comprising of prominent
Somali nationals with the relevant expertise and credibility to undertake such crucial
responsibilities. The TFIs, existing regional and local administrations, as well as relevantstakeholders such as civil society, business groups, Diaspora, etc. can be part of the process
of identifying and selecting members of this commission. The international community can
allocate the necessary resources for the proper functioning of this commission. Clearly, such
an instrument is expected to contribute to curtailing the deliberate misuse and manipulation
of laws, reduce the recurring leadership disputes, facilitate better cooperation and
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coordination of efforts between various levels of governments and restore confidence,
credibility and support for the TFIs. Needless to say, this independent mechanism is not
aimed to replace the critical roles of a functioning judiciary and effective legislators to offset
the increasingly disproportionate power of the executive branch. Instead, this instrument is
intended to fill the apparent credibility gap of the existing TFIs during this transitional phase.
V. Proposed Steps for Action:Obviously, there are no quick-fix solutions to the myriad of difficulties attributed to the
persistent failures of the transitional processes for Somalia. The goal is to better understand
the challenges and to undertake practical measures to address these limitations incrementally.
1)
The end of the transitional mandate in August presents an opportunity tointerject meaningful reform to the TFIs.
Since the Transitional Parliament voted to extend their mandate, the political discourse, both
inside and outside the country, shifted the focus away from attending to the present-day
challenges of the nation. Precious time and resources seem to have been diverted to shaping
the future political course of the transitional process, motivated largely by selfish political
ambitions. A year has now passed since the internal political struggles of the leaders
managed to destabilize the current government, and indeed, all indications point to further
escalation of the political tension with the approaching end of the term. It is, therefore, more
realistic to close the current chapter and concentrate efforts on adequately preparing for the
extension of the transitional period. Suggestions for the reform of the parliament may
include;
a) Term of Parliament extension to correspond to the level of meaningfulreforms implemented by the TFP.
Engagement with the Parliament will be more productive if the discussions are centered onaddressing its weaknesses through a bold reform agenda and a detailed implementation plan.
Such strategy would shift the burden of proof to the Parliament and would force the
members to look inward and engage in the process of internal development. If the
Parliament fails to undertake the necessary reforms and meet the agreed benchmarks, then
their term could be justifiably curtailed.
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i) Legitimize and strengthen representation of parliamentarians to theirconstituents
Facilitating meaningful connection of the members of the parliament to their constituents /
communities that are relatively peaceful is crucial to making the current parliament function
regardless of the term of their extension. The role and functions of federal MPs to the
communities they represent must be redefined in partnership with the local authorities. A
realistic work plan, with clear benchmarks and specific outcomes should be developed for
MPs to accomplish in their constituents. These activities could include, local level
reconciliation, forming caucuses to advocate for regional interests, or specific issues andinterest groups such as minority rights, facilitating discussions on the constitutional making
process, etc. MPs support package can be directly linked to their constituency involvement.
ii) Enhance the leadership of the TFPThe persistent dysfunction of the TFP can be attributed in large measure to the deficiencies
of its leadership. This can be rectified by removing the restrictions placed in the selection
process for the leadership of the TFP. Currently only MPs can run for the leadership of the
parliament. Opening the competition for the leadership of the TFP to both internal (MPs)
and external candidates, similar to all the other senior offices of the TFIs, should raise both
the profile and competences of the elected officials.
iii) Serious reform to the Parliamentary Committees.Parliamentary Committees need to be reorganized, redesigned and redeveloped to enable
them share responsibilities and duties with the leadership of the TFP. Once membership of
various committees are selected based on their capacities and skill sets, they will be able to
undertake their monitoring and oversight roles as well as initiating and developing relevant
legislations.
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b) Election of the President and Speakership offices before the end of the termmust be settled.
The current escalation in the political wrangling between the President and the Speaker is
driven, in part, by the struggles of the current leadership to manipulate the post transitional
arrangements in their favor as the mandate of the current government ends. If the leaders of
the transitional governments are allowed to hold onto power and extend their term of office
without a consensus and acceptable inclusive process, it could revive armed power struggle
as a means to office and undermine the peace agreements.
c) Establish Independent Election CommissionTo compensate for the lack of confidence and poor credibility of the current Transitional
Federal Parliament, it would be wise to create an indigenous Independent Election
Commission to manage the upcoming election process for the leadership of the TFIs.
Setting-up such a credible and neutral body should reduce the incessant charges of bribes
and payoffs that have tarnished the reputation of the parliament institution and tainted the
election process and its outcome.
2) Constitution making process must be re-activated with the vigorous involvementand full participation of the relevant national stakeholders.
While the Constitutional making Process has been underway for the past several years, its
utility as a viable tool to facilitate constructive dialogue among the Somali people and
reconstruct the fragmented nation back together has not been fully exploited. The continued
lingering questions and cynical manipulation of this mechanism by the leadership of the
TFIs undermine its relevance and prolong the results anticipated. The constitutional making
process can be skillfully employed by local communities in the process of reconciling their
diverse populations and developing functioning local administrations.
3) Strengthen bottom-up approaches and indigenous local solutions.It is critical to adjust the centralizing tendency of the successive transitional governments
and support local initiatives that attempt to create stability, promote reconciliation,
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strengthen local administrations and promote economic development. ASWJ efforts in
central Somalia and the current localized security operations in Gedo region should be
promoted as an effective alternative to the domination of the Shabaab extremists. The
disappointing experience of ASWJ in drawing modest financial and political support from
the central government and the international donor community for the past two years,
despite their remarkable success in defending their communities from the extremists, doesnt
inspire confidence and encourage others to follow.
4) Establish credible monitoring and arbitration mechanism.The use and relevance of this independent mechanism has been amply explained above. It is
only noted here to stress that it is now timely to introduce this instrument as part of the
broader reform and re-activation of the transitional institutions following the end of themandate.
5) Imposing sanctions and punitive measures.When all other interventions fail, sanctions have proven effective in the past to persuade
Somali political leaders to act responsibly. The sooner the message of their availability and
potential use as a last resort is effectively conveyed, the better the chance for positive
political settlement. All indications of the present political discourse in Mogadishu point out
that the international community may have to resort to punitive measures in order to exertpressure on the political leaders of the TFI and force compliance.
Mr. Ahmed Abdisalam Adan is former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Information of the
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. Mr. Adan headed the government negotiating team of the
Djibouti Reconciliation Conference that successfully concluded with the formation of a National Unity
Government and the election of the current President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed in 2009. In 1999, Mr.
Adan co-founded Somalias first independent broadcaster, HornAfrik Media Inc. in Mogadishu, Somalia
serving as its Managing Partner and Director of Programs until 2007. HornAfriks growing public support
attracted global recognition including 2002 CJFE Press Freedom Award for its work in the face of
adversity. After decade long operation, HornAfrik became victim 0f the incessant violence, lawlessness and
extremism in Somalia and was shut down by Al-Shabaab insurgents in 2010, following targeted
assassinations of a number of its journalists and management, including one of the co-founders.
Ahmed can be [email protected]