five years of development of new sources of information for a canadian brigade

Land Force Doctrine and Training SystemLand Force Doctrine and Training System

Five Years of Development of New Sources of Information

for a Canadian Brigade

Five Years of Development of New Sources of Information

for a Canadian Brigade

Fred Cameron and Roger Roy

Operational Research Team

Kingston, Canada


IntroductionIntroduction• 1997 -- LGen Jeffery (Commander of the Army)

established “Future Army Team” in Kingston– Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC)– Operational Research Team (from Operational Research Division

- ORD, Ottawa)– Scientific Advisor– Army Experimentation Centre (AEC)– Army Simulation Centre (ASC)– Directorate of Army Doctrine (DAD)– Royal Military College

• Concepts of Command, Command Support, and ISTAR• DAD tasked OR Team and AEC to

– Study implications of introducing advanced sensors


Command and Command SupportCommand and Command Support• Military Command

– Leading, decision-making, motivating, directing– Vision, understanding, art, assessing, evaluating

• Command Support– “Integrated system of resources to enable

Command”– Information Management

• Collection, processing, storing, displaying, disseminating

– System Management• Policies, procedures, tools, personnel, structures


Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance ISTAR

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance ISTAR

• To integrate the intelligence process with the surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance assets in order to improve the Commander’s Situational Awareness (SA) and to cue manoeuvre and strike assets.

• ISTAR is fully integrated with the Land Force Command and Control Information System

• ISTAR is a component of Command Support

Army Experiment 1Integration and Management

ISTAR sensors

Army Experiment 1Integration and Management

ISTAR sensors

• Seminar War Game• Previous Results –

Reassess: –Composition of Recce,

ISTAR–Counter-recce, UAVs,

Logistics

• Main Issues:–Doctrine, Organization–Passage of Information–Materiel, Training–Modeling and Simulation–R&D


Army Experiment 2Anti-Personnel Mine

Replacement

Army Experiment 2Anti-Personnel Mine

Replacement

• ModSAF–Modeling of entities as

expected• Results:

–No significant C2 component

–Discussion of issues like:–morale–unit cohesion– leadership skills


Army Experiment 3SAS User Trial

Army Experiment 3SAS User Trial

• Ease of use and utility of Situational Awareness System (SAS) in field environment

• Direct observation, Interviews, Questionnaires, and Focus Group (AAR)

• 3 Key Functions– Ability to send traces and

overlays– Ability to pass Op Orders,

Reports and Returns– Tracking of friendly and

enemy locations

Army Experiment 4Brigade ISTAR Organization

Army Experiment 4Brigade ISTAR Organization

• A-Status Quo• B-ISTAR Coordination Centre • C-ISTAR Unit• Results

– Red situational awareness – A weakest, B and C equal

– Detections – Higher for B and C– Recce Casualties –Lower for B

and C

• Recommendations– Longer and different scenarios

needed– Battle Procedures/Battlefield

Management System– Need to assess sensor-to-

shooter links– Actual brigade commander and

staff as players


Army Experiment 5LAV III in Company and Combat Team

Army Experiment 5LAV III in Company and Combat Team

• Combination of constructive and (subsequent) live trials• First major ModSAF experiment

– 3D visualization, data capture tools (ModIOS)

• Data Analysis, Questionnaires, AARs• LAV III provides a significant enhancement to both offensive

and defensive operations.

Army Experiment 6Land Force Command and Control Information System (LFC2IS) at Battle Group and Brigade

Army Experiment 6Land Force Command and Control Information System (LFC2IS) at Battle Group and Brigade

Tactics Techniques and Procedures validated in user trials

• AE6A: 1-week Ex Sleeping Tiger at battle-group level in March 2001– ModSAF used to stimulate SAS through SATIDS– SAS displays similar to actual operations

• AE6B: 2-week Ex Athene Warrior at brigade-group level in May 2002– Command and Staff Trainer (CAST) used to

stimulate Athene Tactical System (ATS) through VCCI


Army Experiment 7AERSTA in a Helo Recce Section

Army Experiment 7AERSTA in a Helo Recce Section

Army Experiment 7A (cont)Army Experiment 7A (cont)

• Evaluation of Electro-optical Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (ERSTA) on Griffon Helicopters

• 2 × ERSTA significantly improved:– Number of detections– Rate of detections– Quantity and quality of situational awareness– Survivability of helicopters and ground troops


LAV III/Leopard Field TrialsLAV III/Leopard Field Trials• Many lessons learned• Better experimental

methods• Impact of M&S on

future combat dev.• MAIS runs showed:

– Value of force-on-force training

– Better understanding of LAV capability

– Location of commanders and succession issues


Coalition Interoperability Demonstration BOREALIS

Coalition Interoperability Demonstration BOREALIS

• ABCA biennial interoperability exercise– America, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand

• Technical testing of Comms and Information Systems (CIS)

• Over 400 soldiers and civilian technicians• Results

– Comms links worked as advertised, or– Minor adjustments in settings/procedures, or– Need to address changes (equipment, training,…)


Other ExperimentationOther Experimentation

• – Feb 1998: Exercise BROAD PAWS

• Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts– June 2001: Operations in the Extended

Battlespace 2020– April 2002: Operations in Urban Terrain

2020


Experimentation CapabilityExperimentation Capability

ModSAF

(ie AE 2, 4, 5)

Stage 1- Constructive Simulation Only

Stage 2: Stimulate

Operational Systems

(ie AE6A, 6B)

(ie AE7A Griffon/ERSTA)

Stage 3:

Virtual Simulation

Field Trial

InterfaceConstructive, Virtual & Live

Simulations


“System of Systems”“System of Systems”

Models, Complexity, and ErrorModels, Complexity, and ErrorE

rror

Complexity

SpecificationError

Err

or

Complexity

MeasurementError

Err

or

Complexity

Model ErrorMinimize

Model Error

Models, Complexity, and ErrorModels, Complexity, and Error

Minimize Model Error

Err

or

Complexity

SpecificationError

Err

or

Complexity

MeasurementError

Err

or

Complexity

Model Error

The Decision Making ProcessThe Decision Making Process

MISSIONANALYSIS

IPB - STEP 1DEFINE THE

BATTLESPACE

STEP 2DESCRIBE THEBATTLESPACE

EFFECTS

STEP 3EVALUATE

THE THREAT

STEP 4DETERMINE

THREAT COAs

DEVELOPFRIENDLY

COAs

PRELIMINARYSTAFF CHECKS

FOR ADMINAND SUPPORTING

PLANS

INFORMATIONBRIEF

REFINEFRIENDLY

COAs

DETAILEDSTAFF

CHECKS

COMPARISON OFFRIENDLY

COAs

COAW ARGAME

DECISIONBRIEF

PLANW ARGAME

ISSUE OFORDERS

COMMANDER’SPLANNINGGUIDANCE

STAFFPLANNINGDIRECTIVE

OUTLINEFRIENDLY

COAs

OUTLINESUPPORTING

PLANS

REFINEDFRIENDLY

COAs

REFINEDSUPPORTING

PLANS

DECISION

OPORDER

INFORMATIONCOLLECTION

PLANDST SYNC H RO N IZA TIO N

M A TRIXAGM

ISTARPLAN

DRAFTDST

FRIENDLYCOAs

DRAFTSYNCHRONIZATION

MATRIX

DRAFTHPTL

UPDATEDHPTL

SELECTEDCOA

DETAILED PLANAND

SUPPORTINGPLANS

SUPPLEMENTARYW ARNING

ORDER

INITIALW ARNING

ORDER

CCIRS

AO, AIR

AIInitial PIRs

RECEIPT OFTASKS

EXTANTINFORMATIONCOLLECTION

PLAN

ENEM Y COASITUATION

TEMPLATES

EVENTTEMPLATES

EVENTMATRIX

DRAFTISTARPLAN

UPDATEDHVTL

AIR AVENUEOF APPROACH

OVERLAY

W EATHEREFFECTSMATRIX

LIGHTTABLESTERA

UPDATEDINFORMATIONCOLLECTION

PLAN

INITIALHVTL


PLAN


PLAN


PLAN

DECISION/ACTIONCYCLE

OPP

IPBOPPSTEP 1RECEIPT OFTASK

STEP 2M ISSIO NANALYSIS

STEP 3COADEVELOPM ENT

STEP 4DECISION

STEP 5PLANDEVELOPM ENT

STEP 6PLANREVIEW

DIRECTI

ON

CONSIDERATI

ON

DECISI

ON

EXECUTI

ON

CO MD ’SPR OC ESS

STAFFPR OC ESS

CO MD ’SPR OD UC T

LEGEND

STAFFPR OD UC T

CO OR DIN ATION

IN PUT / O UTPU T

THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS

The Operational Planning ProcessThe Operational Planning Process


Critical Path AnalysisCritical Path Analysis

2

3

2

1

2

3

2

3

3 2

3


Lessons from Five YearsLessons from Five Years• NATO Code of Best Practice invaluable!• Scenarios critical at each stage• Keep M&S as simple as possible• “Value of information” better understood now

than in 1997… but “more work needed”• Mixture of OR Techniques is required:

– constructive, virtual, and live simulation– data collection: judgements and insights, as well

as ‘numbers’


Questions?Questions?

five years of development of new sources of information for a canadian brigade

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