finding the presidency's place in european crisis management policy [isa paper]

8/7/2019 Finding the Presidency's place in European Crisis Management policy [ISA paper]

1/26

International Studies Association Annual Convention 2009Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future

15-18 February 2009, New York (USA)

Finding the Presidencys place in

European Crisis Management Policy1

Natlia LealPhD Candidate

Department of Politics and International RelationsUniversity of Kent at Canterbury, UK

[email protected]

[Draft version; do NOT quote without authors permission.]

Abstract

European crisis management is an unusual policy area which, in spite of itsrelative novelty, has evolved considerably in the last decade. Its institutionalarchitecture in particular is relatively complex but the EU Council Presidency isoften forgotten in it, since it tends to be characterized as a powerless institution,deprived of any real influence.

Unlike mainstream literature, I argue that the Presidency can be a veryrelevant actor in crisis management policy-making. The aim of this paper is to find

the Presidencys place among this crisis management institutional framework, andto explore its potential roles in policy-making. Hence, after an overview of thispolicy field and its institutional structure, we look at the Presidencys evolution andmain functions to question where it fits in this architecture and what can it do onwhat concerns policy-making.

In the end, I argue that the Presidency should not be forgotten in this crisismanagement context since it is an actor that can potentially play a very relevantrole in policy-making in this field (as in many others).

With the support ofFundao para a Cincia e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal.

1 This paper builds partially on a paper previously published by RIEAS in August 2008. See Leal 2008,available in http://rieas.gr/images/RIEAS123.pdf.
http://rieas.gr/images/RIEAS123.pdfhttp://rieas.gr/images/RIEAS123.pdfhttp://rieas.gr/images/RIEAS123.pdf


2/26

ISAs 50th Annual Convention 2009Natlia Leal Univ. Kent [email protected]

2

I. INTRODUCTION

The European integration process has for long amazed many, some with

satisfaction, others with surprise. Whether a believer or a sceptic, the Union has

proved to all to be a successful peace project, at least so far and at least within its

borders. But as some older objectives get closer to being fulfil, new ones arise.

Indeed, [t]he momentous events of 1989 created both opportunity and

widespread expectations for change. Hence, in face of the new post-Cold War

security context, during the 1990s the EU as many other national and international

actors took the opportunity to rethink its security role, and gradually began to clarify

its new aspirations. For instance, in the 2001 European Commissions Communicationon Conflict Prevention, the Union clearly underlined its achievement and the new

enlarged scope of its ambitions:

The EU is in itself a peace project and a supremely successful one Through

the process of enlargement, through the Common Foreign and Security Policy,

through its development co-operation and its external assistance programmes the EU

now seeks to project stability also beyond its own borders. (European Commission

2001: 5)

Indeed, one of the major novelties of the 1990s was the EUs ambition to export

peace and security beyond its borders2. This was one of the if not the general goals

underlying the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in

1999 and with it the birth of a new policy field: Crisis Management. It may not be a

clearly defined policy field or a very consistent or coherent one, but slowly decisions,

structures and ultimately actions began to bear this label of Crisis Management.

Some have stated that [c]risis management has become a new frontier for the

functions of the European Union (Emerson and Gross 2007: 1). But this is not

entirely true. If its first crisis management missions only appeared in 2003, the EU has

been dealing with crisis for much longer.

Yet, in spite of its novelty, or perhaps precisely because of it, the EUs crisis

management system has became a very complex one, particularly but not only in its

2

Trying to explain what it does, the European Union refers to exporting peace and stability as oneof its major activities (http://europa.eu/abc/panorama/whatdoes/index_en.htm#peace, accessed 01-03-2008).
http://europa.eu/abc/panorama/whatdoes/index_en.htm#peacehttp://europa.eu/abc/panorama/whatdoes/index_en.htm#peacehttp://europa.eu/abc/panorama/whatdoes/index_en.htm#peacehttp://europa.eu/abc/panorama/whatdoes/index_en.htm#peace


3/26


3

institutional dimension. Ultimately contemporary European crisis management

activities are a result of the EUs institutional framework and of the growing interest

that this (still divided) policy sphere generates. In a sense, it only exists because

decisions were taken specifically about this topic by concrete policy-making actors.

And yet, among this complicated institutional framework, one actor is often

underestimated: the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Union (or

simply the Presidency). In fact, mainstream literature tends to neglect or diminish its

importance in the European process overall. The specific role of the Council

Presidency, as Ole Elgstrm (2003: 4) complains, has so far attracted relatively little

scholarly interest. Nonetheless, some other authors have pointed to its potential

relevance arguing that the Presidencies are central yet slightly invisible actors in EU

decision-making (Schout and Vanhoonacker 2006: 1073).

The challenge of this paper is to make the Presidency somewhat more visible by

discussing where it fits in the EUs Crisis Management architecture and exploring its

potential roles in policy-making.

Before doing that, however, we must first clarify what exactly crisis

management means for the purposes of this paper. Within the European Unioncontext, crisis management has been sometimes defined in a more restricted way

(only as a specific instrument within the framework of ESDP), other times as a

broader and more comprehensive concept (much like others such as conflict

prevention or peace-building, for example). The fact is that continuous internal

arguments over the precise meaning of crisis management, with especially both the

European Commission and the Council vying for competences in this area, do not

contribute to the clear demarcation of this policy field. The result is a complex policy

field that, depending on the definition, can spread over the EUs three pillars,

involving several institutions with sometimes mixed and often ambiguous and

expanding competences.

This happens in large part because over time the EU has developed an unusually

vast number of tools from softer to harder ones that allow the EU to intervene

in different phases of a conflict. These range from development co-operation and

external assistance, trade policy instruments, [or] social and environmental policies,

[to] diplomatic instruments and political dialogue, co-operation with international


4/26


5/26


5

subsequent evolution, as well as at the structures created to support crisis management

decision-making and actions in order better to discuss the place of the Presidency

among it.

II. EUROPEAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION

The European Union has been dealing with situations of conflict and crises for

decades. The European Commission in particular has been involved in conflict

prevention and some forms of crisis management for quite a long time now4. But, as it

is being used in this paper, the origins of European crisis management go back only

the 1990s and the changes and events of the post-Cold War international security

context5.

In 1992 and 1997, the European Treaties of Maastricht (TEU) and Amsterdam

(ToA) had already opened the door for a common defence policy6. But the turning

point in this process would occur later, in December 1998, following a conference

held at St. Malo, between the French President and the British Prime Minister at the

time, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair respectively. At the end, a Joint Declaration was

issued in which it was stated that

the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible

military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to

respond to international crises.7

More than 40 years after the failure of the European Defence Community, this

Declaration paved the way to what would become the first security and defence

structures within the European Union. Thus, in June 1999, with the entry into force of

the Treaty of Amsterdam, the ESDP was established as an integral part of Common

4 This is reflected in the EUs concern with broader conflict prevention and development almost fromthe onset of the integration process. In this context, the EU has been giving economic aid to third-countries at least since the 1960s, when the Yaound Agreements were signed (1964 and 1969). Laterthese were followed by several Lom Conventions (in 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990) and by the CotonouAgreement (2000).5 For an overview of the basis of the ESDP rationale see, for example, Shepherd, Alistair J. K. 2008.From Kosovo to Kosova? The Transformation of ESDP and its Contribution to Global ConflictManagement. Paper read at ECPR 2008 Joint Sessions, 11-16 April 2008, at Rennes, France.6 Cf. namely article 17 which evolved from the reference to the eventual framing of a common

defence policy in the TEU to a more explicit reference to the progressive framing of a commondefence policy in the consolidated version after the ToA. Italics added.7Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit in St. Malo, France, 4 December 1998.


6/26


6

Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and soon after it was directly and explicitly

linked to crisis management:

In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives and theprogressive framing of a common defence policy, we are convinced that the Council

should have ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis

management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the Petersberg tasks.

(European Council 1999) 8

With ESDP, the EU had created one more tool to contribute to the overall

prevention, management and resolution of international conflicts. In the past decade

several documents and different specific instruments, both in the military and civiliandimensions, were developed in order to progressively endow the Union with its

necessary (though still insufficient) resources9. Among the key documents, it is worth

naming a few such as the Helsinki Headline Goal10 and the NATOs Berlin Plus

Arrangements11 from 1999, the 2003 European Security Strategy, or the

developments achieved in several European Council meetings12, as well as the

adoption of a (military) Headline Goal 2010 (HLG 2010) and the Civilian Headline

Goal (CHG 2008) initially approved in 200413

. By then the momentum created sinceSt. Malo was clear.

8 By 1999 the Petersberg tasks initially defined in 1992 under the WEU and encompassingHumanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management,including peacemaking (art. 17.2 TEU as amended by ToA) had already been incorporated into theEU.9 For a more detailed account of the most relevant EUs Crisis Management documents and activities,including the EUs civilian missions and military operations see, for example, Leal, Natlia. 2008.European Conflict Prevention: Is there a role for the European Union Presidency in policy-making?RIEAS Research Paper n 123.10

The Helsinki Headline Goal established in particular the military goal of voluntary cooperationamong its Member States in EU-led operations, for which Member States must be able, by 2003, todeploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,00060,000 personscapable of the full range of Petersberg tasks. See Helsinki European Council,Presidency Conclusions,10-11 December, 1999, SN 300/1/99, Brussels.11 This allowed the European Union to build on NATO resources to further develop its own crisismanagement capabilities.An Alliance for the 21st Century, Final Communiqu, North Atlantic Councilsummit. Washington, D.C. on 24 April 1999.12 Note for example how decisions taken in the European Council of Santa Maria da Feira, in June2000, complemented the Helsinki Headline Goal by broadening the area of intervention of ESDP tocivilian aspects. It identified 4 priority areas for this civilian crisis management domain, namely: police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection. Santa Maria da Feira EuropeanCouncil,Presidency Conclusions, 19-20 June, SN 200/100, Brussels, 2000.13

These two Headline Goals sought to establish concrete targets for the development of ESDP crisismanagement capabilities. In addition, the HLG 2010 proclaimed Member states commitment to beable by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole


7/26


7

But it was not only the field of crisis management strictu sensus that was

undergoing development. Particularly after the start of the new millennium, the

broader sphere of European conflict prevention had also been receiving more

attention. This is well illustrated by the many documents that the EU adopted in the

last years, such as the already mentioned April 2001 European Commissions

Communication on Conflict Prevention or the EU Programme for the Prevention of

Violent Conflicts adopted by the Gteborg European Council in June 2001.14

Actually, it is curious to observe how often EU official documents and

statements recurrently refer to crisis management and conflict prevention

simultaneously, which further promotes confusion between the two. It is never clear if

for the EU this implies that these are somewhat equivalent expressions that should fall

mainly within the same sphere of policy-making and implementation (as the

Commission advocates), or if these are separate although complementary fields whose

decision-making and implementation competences should be clearly divided between

different institutions (as the Council tends to uphold). In this case, ambiguity seems to

serve the purpose of at least satisfying all interested actors.

On what concerns its operational aspects, 2003 was the first time the EU was

able to put its men on the ground: it marked the first ESDP civilian mission theEuropean Union Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) and the first

EU-led military operations in Europe (Operation Concordia in FYROM) and outside

its borders (Operation Artemis to Burnia in D.R. Congo). Many other crisis

management missions and operations have followed since and in 2005 it went as far

as Aceh, Indonesia. The current record, which has recently expanded to include a new

(and the biggest ever) mission in Kosovo and a (test-case SSR) mission in Guinea

Bissau, includes a total of 6 military operations and 12 civilian missions (2 mixed), 11of which are still ongoing.15

spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union. The CHG2008, on its turn, became recognized as the EUs main tool for planning the development of civiliancrisis management capabilities for preventive action in ESDP (Council of the European 2006b: 23). Itexplicitly included two more priority sectors for civilian crisis management in addition to the original 4identified in 2000 monitoring missions and support for EU special representatives. In November2007, a new Civilian Headline Goal (CHG 2010) along with a new methodology for the developmentof civilian crisis management capabilities was approved by the Council, providing a new and updatedstrategic document to promote greater coherence between the EUs civilian capabilities and its

ambitions.14 For a better account of the evolution of the field of European conflict prevention see Leal 2008.15 For a better account of the EUs military and civilian operational record see Table 1 in Leal 2008.


8/26


8

In addition, the European Commission has also promoted several activities in

view of the management of crisis, including the establishment of the EU Border

Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine) in 2005. It also has a

considerable record and list of ongoing/regular activities concerning conflict

prevention16, as well as different financial mechanisms to support its interventions17.

Along with all these initiatives, the Union has been deeply committed in

promoting the development of crisis management instruments with and in other

organisations, such as the United Nations and the African Union18.

In short, in spite of the strong and repeated arguments about its lack of

coherence and its capability-expectations gap (Smith 2003; Hill 2001), a lot has been

done by the EU in the area of crisis management (as in the broader field of conflict

prevention), from key documents to concrete activities.

However, in order to understand where the Presidency steps in in all this, we

must look at some of the specificities of the European crisis management system,

namely its institutional framework.

III. THE COMPLEX EUROPEAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Where the EU Council Presidency stands and how far its role can go in crisis

management policy depends mostly on which EU pillars we are referring to. It has

been clarified earlier that the focus of this paper is on the ESDP dimension of crisis

management. Still, it is useful to briefly analyse the larger framework that underpins

this field.

16 These include the elaboration of Region and Country Strategy Papers (RSP/CSP) that then underlieall its development and external aid policy, as well as peace-building initiatives (such as rehabilitation),and Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. The EU has also been paying close attention to the so-called cross-cutting issues,particularly, those related to small arms and light weapons, landmines, drugs, conflict diamonds and themanagement of other natural resources.17 The Instrument for Stability (IfS), established in 2007, is worth a special mention here. It covers awide range of actions within the area of conflict prevention and crisis management, and it can betriggered in situations of crisis or emerging crisis, situations posing a threat to law and order, thesecurity and safety of individuals, situations threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilizethe country(cited in Villa 2007).18 See for example, the Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management (signed 24

Sept. 2003, in NY) and the Council Conclusions on Strengthening African Capabilities for thePrevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, Brussels, 13 November 2006 (available inhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/91615.pdf).
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/91615.pdfhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/91615.pdfhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/91615.pdf


9/26


9

The EU is divided into three different areas, the so-called pillars. The field of

crisis management is quite unusual in the sense that it is not restricted to one single

pillar (as most other policies), but it can spread across all of them, with a higher

emphasis on the second and third pillars. A similar claim, actually an even stronger

one, can be made regarding conflict prevention. This cross-pillared character of

European crisis management originates an extremely odd situation, since European

crisis management instruments and activities can be ruled by different institutions,

decided and voted according to different procedures, and implemented in diverse

ways. Furthermore, the resources (human and financial) available to each are quite

different.

The first pillar relates to the Communitarian issues, those inherited from the

previous European Communities in 1993, and those that have been transferred to this

domain since. Its logic rests on what many have called the community method,

initially devised by Jean Monnet and other founding fathers of the European

integration process. It is in this first pillar that we find development and aid policies,

trade issues, social and environmental activities, and other instruments, all related to

the broader notion of EU conflict prevention. The most relevant institution within this

pillar is the European Commission, the only one that has the right of initiative and isresponsible for policy-implementation (not to mention its budgetary powers). Here

decisions tend to be adopted by a majority rule, giving Member states merely a

secondary role.

The second and third pillars work on a considerably different basis and

rationale. They appeared only with the 1992 TEU and even tough they are different in

their subject matters and respective policies, they share fairly the same working

method: they are the intergovernmental pillars. The second pillar is the one thatrelates to the CFSP. The third pillar has suffered some slight changes, mainly due to

the progressive transferences of some of its competences into the Community pillar:

initially the Justice and Home Affairs, it is now officially called the pillar on Police

and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. Policies that fall within any of both

these pillars depend mainly on the EU Member States and the Council, and hardly at

all on the Commission or other Communitarian institutions. When it comes to the

topic of this paper, the CFSP pillar is the most relevant one: it encompasses the


10/26


10

activities related to defence and security (namely ESDP), including crisis management

(even though some police topics fall within the third pillar).

In these intergovernmental pillars the institutional roles seem to reverse: the

Commission has only a consultative role and, in theory, decisions need to be taken

unanimously by Member States, even if in reality a form of consensus is usually

applied. Unlike Jean Monnets philosophy, here it is realpolitikthat runs the show.

This only makes it more interesting: it is here, in the 2 nd pillar, that most of the

important decisions regarding civilian or military crisis management missions are

taken, it is here that the annual reports on conflict prevention (which include an

overview of crisis management activities) are approved and it is here that Member

States express their common positions on this matter. Surely, this means that what is

done in crisis management is the result of minimum common denominators but it

equally reveals that there is such a common denominator or no action would be taken

at all. Crisis management matters to at least enough Member States to keep it going.

Moreover, this pillared-structure has an impact on what concerns financial

resources. Activities run by the European Commission are financed usually through

Commission mechanisms, while ESDP activities are financed mainly by the CFSP

budget, although the implementation of this latter budget is actually controlled to agreat extent by the Commission itself19. Therefore, crisis management budgets and

respective financial sources vary according to the pillar-area at stake.

The result of the coexistence of these pillars is a complicated framework, where

different institutions and actors have different (and sometimes ambiguous)

competences, where diverse rules are applied and where different commitments are

assumed towards others. Consequently, the powers and role of the Council Presidency

also vary considerably across each of these pillars. We must, then, take a closer lookat the institutional architecture that deals with crisis management issues to better

understand who is who in this specific policy field.

19 The EUs budget for 2007 only allocated 0.2 billion Euros for CFSP, less than 0.16% of the total126.5 billion Euros, whereas development cooperation for example had a total of 2.2 billion Euros(around 1.74%) and the European Neighbourhood instrument had 1.4 billion Euros (around 1.1%). This

illustrates well the relative deprivation of financial resources available for ESDP crisis management,even if we were to take into account the Instrument for Stability, which had a total of 0.1 billion Eurosin 2007.


11/26


11

Figure 1 The EUs broader Crisis Management Architecture

European UnionEuropean Union

European

Commission

(President)

European

Commission

(President)European CouncilEuropean Council

Council SG /

HR for CFSP

Council SG /

HR for CFSP

Commissioner for

External Relations

Commissioner for

External RelationsPrivate Office

SG/HR

Private Office

SG/HR

Directorate-General E

External and Politico-

Military Affairs



Military Affairs

Policy Unit /

PPEWU

Policy Unit /

PPEWU

EUMSEUMS

Directorate VIII

(Defence Aspects)

Directorate VIII

(Defence Aspects)

Directorate IX

(Civilian CrisisManagement)

Directorate IX


DG RELEX

(External Relations)

DG RELEX


Directorate A

Crisis Platform -Policy Co-ord. CFSP

Directorate A


Deputy Director-

General DGA-1

Deputy Director-

General DGA-1

Council of Ministers

(GAERC)


(GAERC)

COREPERCOREPER

PSCPSC

CIVCOMCIVCOM

EUMCEUMC

Deputy Director-General DGA-3

Deputy Director-

General DGA-3

Deputy Director-

General DGA-2

Deputy Director-

General DGA-2

European UnionEuropean Union

European

Commission

(President)

European

Commission

(President)European CouncilEuropean Council

Council SG /

HR for CFSP

Council SG /

HR for CFSP

Commissioner for

External Relations

Commissioner for

External RelationsPrivate Office

SG/HR

Private Office

SG/HR



Military Affairs



Military Affairs

Policy Unit /

PPEWU

Policy Unit /

PPEWU

EUMSEUMS

Directorate VIII

(Defence Aspects)

Directorate VIII

(Defence Aspects)

Directorate IX


Directorate IX


DG RELEX


DG RELEX


Directorate A


Directorate A


Deputy Director-

General DGA-1

Deputy Director-

General DGA-1


(GAERC)


(GAERC)

COREPERCOREPER

PSCPSC

CIVCOMCIVCOM

EUMCEUMC

Deputy Director-General DGA-3

Deputy Director-

General DGA-3

Deputy Director-

General DGA-2

Deputy Director-

General DGA-2

The scope of this paper does not allow for a detailed analysis of each of the

bodies involved in larger (that is, non-ESDP) crisis management and Figure 1

illustrates only a part of the complexity of this field. If we were to properly illustrate

the structures involved in the even broader field of conflict prevention several other

entities would have to be added to those above. Nevertheless, Figure 1 still shows thatthere is one Directorate-General in particular within the European Commission, DG

RELEX, that deals with conflict prevention, although issues related to ESDP crisis

management would be dealt with only by one of its Directorates, Directorate A which

is responsible for policy co-ordination in CFSP.

Since this paper focuses on ESDP crisis management and its structures, the most

relevant ones are those related to the Councils and its Secretariat General. As we can

see in greater detail in Figure 2 below, within this Council structure, the highestdecision-making institution dealing with ESDP crisis management issues is the

Note: Although this Figure might suggest it, we do not intend to imply, for example, that the Council Secretariat is atthe same level as the European Council; merely that it constitutes one other among the EUs main three sets ofstructures dealing with crisis management.


12/26


12

European Council, in charge of establishing the general political guidelines of the

European Union (Council of the European Union. N/d (a)).

Figure 2 The Councils Crisis Management Structures

One level beneath it we find the Council of Ministers (or simply the Council).

Legally one single institution, the Council is actually divided into nine different

configurations20 that gather the Minister of each Member State responsible for the

topics under discussion. On what concerns crisis management, it is the General

Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), composed of the Ministers of

Foreign Affairs and a representative of the European Commission, that matters21.

But both these Councils meetings only take place on a rather seldom basis: the

European Council meets twice or three times a year on average and the GAERC once

a month. Both are too far from the daily reality of policy-making, and if the EuropeanCouncils work is mostly restricted to the definition of broader strategic goals, the

GAERC is usually confined to endorsing or agreeing decisions that have been

20 These include the following Councils: General Affairs and External Relations; Economic andFinancial Affairs (or ECOFIN); Justice and Home Affairs; Employment, Social Policy, Health andConsumer Affairs; Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry and Research); Transport,Telecommunications and Energy; Agriculture and Fisheries; Environment; and Education, Youth andCulture. In the past there have been more.21 GAERC is responsible for matters on external relations, including CFSP, ESDP, trade and

development cooperation, as well as for ensuring coherence across EUs external action. Therefore,depending on the issues on the agenda, the Foreign Affairs Ministers are sometimes accompanied bytheir colleagues responsible for European Affairs, Defence, Development or Trade.

European Council

GAERC

COREPER

PSC

CIVCOM EUMC PMG


13/26


13

thoroughly discussed in the lower levels, where each Member State has their own

representative(s) to whom they tend to regularly send instructions about their specific

(national) interests and goals in each dossier22. Only if a very important matter is still

controversial are the Ministers or Heads of State or Government called to take a (real)

decision.

The coordination of this preparatory work is the main responsibility of the

Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), which meets on a (bi)weekly

basis23. Furthermore and though it rarely needs to deal with it, COREPER has the

competence to agree on decisions relating to crisis management, which are then

simply forwarded to higher levels if their relevance justifies a higher blessing.

However, the fact is that none of these entities is specifically dedicated to crisis

management. It was only after the February 2000 Brussels General Affairs Council

and the March 2000 Lisbon European Council that a decision was adopted in view to

establish a new set of structures purposely for ESDP matters. Initially interim, by the

end of 2001 all these structures had become permanent.

Within the Council hierarchy, the most relevant of these bodies is the Political

and Security Committee (PSC). The PSC is a standing committee and, apart from

COREPER, the only other equally composed of representatives at the level ofAmbassador or equivalent (and their deputies), which demonstrates the importance

that the Member States attribute to it since its inception24. It is responsible for a wide

range of tasks within crisis management but its main function is to exercise, under

the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis

management operations.25 In reality, the PSC is the highest body dedicated

specifically to ESDP Crisis Management.

22 It should be noted however that the margin of manoeuvre given to national representatives and theprecision of the instructions sent vary considerably from Member State to Member State and even fromone policy area to another.23 Composed of Member States Permanent Representatives (usually Ambassadors), COREPER isactually divided into COREPER-I and COREPER-II. On average each of these COREPERs meets oncea week, that is, the Permanent Representatives see each other at least twice a week, even though fordifferent topics.24 For some, it is not clear whether the PSC is subordinate to COREPER or not. CfQuaker Council forEuropean Affairs. 2007.Peace and Peacebuilding: Some European Perspectives, p. 27.25 Art. 25 TEU (as amended in Nice). Other tasks include monitoring the international arena and theimplementation of agreed policies, as well as delivering opinions to the Council in order to help define

policies and examining its draft conclusions, coordinating the different working parties in the area ofCFSP that assist its work, and conducting the political dialogue with the SG/HR for CFSP and the EUsSpecial Representatives.


14/26


14

Then, we find several working groups and committees that assist the PSC in its

work. These include namely, the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis

Management (CIVCOM), the Military Committee (EUMC), and the Politico-Military

Group (PMG). CIVCOM, which works at a national delegates level, is responsible

for the civilian aspects of ESDP, including the planning and conduct of civilian

missions (assisted by the Council Secretariat). It provides information, delivers

opinions and drafts recommendations to PSC on these matters. The Military

Committee (EUMC) is somewhat the counterpart of CIVCOM for the military

dimension of ESDP. Officially it is composed of the Member States Chiefs of Staff

but these are often represented by their permanent Military representatives. Set up in

2001, this is the supreme military body within the Council of the EU [and] it is the

forum for military consultation and cooperation between the EU Member States in the

field of conflict prevention and crisis management (European Commission, N/d (b)).

Figure 3 The Council Secretariats Crisis Management Structures

SG/HR for CFSPSG/HR for CFSP

Private Office

SG/HR

Private Office

SG/HR

DG E


Military Affairs

DG E


Military Affairs

PPEWUPPEWU

EUMS

(inc. Civil-Military Cell)

EUMS


SITCENSITCEN

DG E VIII

Defence Aspects

DG E VIII

Defence Aspects

DG E IX

Civilian Crisis

Management

DG E IX

Civilian CrisisManagement

Police UnitPolice Unit

Civil Aspects of

Crisis Management

Civil Aspects of

Crisis Management

CPCCCPCC

SATCENSATCEN

ISSISS

Deputy SGDeputy SG

SG/HR for CFSPSG/HR for CFSP

Private Office

SG/HR

Private Office

SG/HR

DG E


Military Affairs

DG E


Military Affairs

PPEWUPPEWU

EUMS


EUMS


SITCENSITCEN

DG E VIII

Defence Aspects

DG E VIII

Defence Aspects

DG E IX

Civilian Crisis

Management

DG E IX

Civilian CrisisManagement

Police UnitPolice Unit

Civil Aspects of

Crisis Management

Civil Aspects of

Crisis Management

CPCCCPCC

SATCENSATCEN

ISSISS

Deputy SGDeputy SG

The other part of this architecture crucial to understand ESDP crisis

management, illustrated in further detail in Figure 3, is that associated with the High


15/26


15

Representative (HR) for the CFSP, which accumulates its functions with those of

Council Secretary-General (SG). The Council General Secretariat (or simply

Secretariat) is a body that is supposed to assist the Councils and mostly their

Presidencies in the conduct of every-day work in the area of CFSP, through

contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of European policy

decisions (Council of the European Union, N/d (b)). It could be said in this sense,

that legally it should be just a Secretariat. But reality is far different. Since Javier

Solana was nominated for both these positions in June 1999, the functions of the

HR/SG and mostly of its Secretariat have grown considerably. Nowadays, the Council

Secretariat is a de facto actor in crisis management policy-making and

implementation, even if it is not always legally recognised as such. With its own

military and civilian structures26 and composed of both EU officials and experts

seconded by Member states, the Secretariat is responsible for tasks as important as the

preparation, implementation and monitoring of all the military and civilian crisis

management missions, not to mention others.

In addition, the SG/HR has a Private Office, which can formulate policy on

CFSP matters, and includes the SG/HRs Personal Representatives27, as well as

several other departments, like the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWUor Policy Unit), the Military Staff (EUMS)28, the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) or

the Communications Centre.

Finally, though not on these Figures, at least a brief reference should be made to

some EUs agencies such as the EUs Institute for Security Studies, the European

Defence Agency and the Satellite Centre and to the EU Special Representatives,

26 Within its DG-E, the Directorate-General responsible for External and Politico-Military Affairs, the

Council Secretariat has completely separate military and civilian structures in the sense that twodifferent Directorates were dealing with each area. DGE-VIII is responsible for defence affairs (andtherefore, for the military aspect of any operation), while DGE-IX is in charge of the civilian missions.In 2007, however, there was a slight change with the creation of a new permanent structure, theCivilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Under the supervision of PSC and authority of theHR/SG, the CPCC ensures the effective planning and conduct of civilian ESDP crisis managementoperations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks (Council of the EuropeanUnion, available at http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=EN, accessed 23-07-2008).27 Currently there are Personal Representatives for Human Rights, Non-Proliferation, Terrorism andrelations with the European Parliament.28 The EUMS is composed of both military and civilian experts seconded my Member States to theCouncil Secretariat that perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning of

Petersberg tasks [] and all EU-led operations (European Commission, available athttp://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00006.htm, accessed 23-07-2008). It also includes a Civilian-Military Cell.
http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=ENhttp://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=ENhttp://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00006.htmhttp://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00006.htmhttp://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00006.htmhttp://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=EN


16/26


17/26


17

that the Presidency now gave the Member States an opportunity to actually influence

the agenda of the Communities, something very difficult to do before in just three

months.

The office of the Presidency kept evolving in the following decades, especially

in response to the political developments associated with the integration process. The

1970s marked the beginning of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) and were a

decade particularly crucial for the evolution of the Presidency. After new burdens,

functions and opportunities for leverage which were not explicitly part of the initial

institutional design had been ascribed to it, the Presidency gained a more pivotal

role (Wallace 1985: 3).

The 1980s brought a new entity, the Troika, charged with the external

representation of the EU. The Troika also meant that each Member State that was to

hold the Presidency of the Council would be involved in these issues (and therefore

have a word about its agenda) not merely for six months, but for one year and a half.

The aim of the Troika, in fact, was to ensure a greater degree of continuity and

smother hand-over between Presidencies30. The Single European Act, signed in 1986,

put an added emphasis on the Presidencys political and representational roles further

increasing its importance in the European political arena.The following Treaties (TUE, ToA, and of Nice), in different degrees, further

increased the relevance of the Presidency and continued the formalization process of

some of its functions. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty prevented some new

provisions that would have affected the Presidency from entering into force, but the

recently approved Lisbon Treaty brings back some of those and goes even further to

the point of proposing probably the biggest change ever in the nature and functioning

of the Presidency. Nevertheless, we will still have to wait some more to see whetherthese provisions will actually become a reality.

As it is now, the Presidency is characterised by the Council Guide on The

Presidency Handbook(Council of the European Union 2006: 3-5) as being a single

and neutral entity, deploying national resources and always in the hands of the

Council.

30

In CFSP matters, negotiations held between the Presidency, Commission representatives and theHigh Representative for CFSP (and other external actors) are also referred to as Troikanegotiations/conversations.


18/26


18

The Presidency is held by each of the Member States of the Union, for periods

of six months, on a rotational basis previously agreed by the Council. However, in

spite of the several configurations of Council meetings, the fact is that legally there is

still only one Council and, therefore, one single Presidency. In theory, it is expected

that the Member State holding this office will strive to promote and defend the

common European interests with the highest degree of impartiality, and not his own

national priorities (although these can match), and it is always presumed that it will

use its own national human and financial resources to do so. Still, the last word does

always belong to the Member States, as represented in the Council, in the sense that

the Presidency always needs the Councils approval to adopt substantive decisions

and even the procedural ones can be challenged.

But there is no doubt that the office of the Presidency gives each Member State

the opportunity to directly influence the conduct of European affairs, including in the

area of crisis management. The extent to which this opportunity is taken and the

reasons underlying it vary. For many, what usually happens is that every six months a

different set of national interests and priorities are brought in and shift the position of

the Presidency. However, by holding the Presidency, Member States are equally

invited to take on the common interest of the Union and protect its shared values andunderstandings, promoting even further coordination and integration. In the end, then,

this office simultaneously gives Member states an avenue to control the Union, and it

challenges them to protect this supranational outlook and share these community

ideals (see Wallace, 1985).

But what exactly is the Presidency supposed to do?

V. MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY

The formal tasks currently assigned to the Presidency are mainly three:

- Organizing and chairing all meetings of the European Council, the Councilof the European Union and its preparatory committees and working groups

- Representing the Council in its dealings with other EU institutions andbodies, such as the European Commission and the European Parliament [and]

- Representing the European Union in international organizations andrelations with countries outside the European Union31

31

This has been an explanation repeated in several Presidency websites, such as the former 2007German Presidency (available online athttp://www.eu2007.de/en/The_Council_Presidency/What_is_the_Presidency/index.html) or the 2008
http://www.eu2007.de/en/The_Council_Presidency/What_is_the_Presidency/index.htmlhttp://www.eu2007.de/en/The_Council_Presidency/What_is_the_Presidency/index.htmlhttp://www.eu2007.de/en/The_Council_Presidency/What_is_the_Presidency/index.html


19/26


19

At first sight, it could seem that these grant the Presidency very little space to

exert its influence. Indeed, due to its nature and formal functions, the Presidency has

been repeatedly described as a virtually powerless institution (responsabilit sans

pouvoir), with no explicit decision or policy-making power. Critics claim that it does

not have any powers of initiative, it simply inherits the agenda of its predecessors, is

bond by external events beyond its control, and it runs for merely a short period of six

months (in Tallberg 2003). However, such claims rely on a very narrow interpretation

of the functions and powers of the Presidency, and its potential influence, namely on

the adoption and content of certain decisions, far surpasses what is written in official

documents. Wallace even noted that the few rules that have been institutionalised tend

to result themselves merely from long established practice and that Member States

are a lot more reluctant to formalise the Presidencys more political roles (Wallace

1985; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). Therefore, a considerable margin is left for

different interpretations of the extent of the Presidencys functions and powers.

Elgstrm, for example, has a wider interpretation and based on several other

authors proposes that the Presidencys tasks comprise 4 main functions:

administration and co-ordination, setting political priorities, mediation, and

representation (Elgstrm 2003: 4-7)32. The first and last ones reflect what is stated inthe formalRules of Procedure, but the other ones are somewhat unwritten functions

based on practice rather than legal obligations, and yet constitute very crucial means

for influence. Apart from preparing and chairing all the Council meetings and

representing the Council (internally) and the EU (externally), the Presidencies are also

expected to provide a sense of leadership to the overall Union (cf. Metcalfe 1998) as

well as promotethe general search for consensus over the topics on the agenda.

In the end, these functions confer a considerable margin of manoeuvre to thePresidency, although member states will not use it in the same way and will give

priority to some functions over others in different policy areas and in different

moments in time.

Slovenian one (available online athttp://www.eu2008.si/en/The_Council_Presidency/What_is_the_Presidency/index.html).32 Other authors have divided these functions in different ways. For instance, Hayes-Renshaw and

Wallace (2006) propose that the Presidencys main functions include the following: business manager,manager of foreign policy, promoter of initiatives, package-broker, liaison point, and collectiverepresentative.
http://www.eu2008.si/en/The_Council_Presidency/What_is_the_Presidency/index.htmlhttp://www.eu2008.si/en/The_Council_Presidency/What_is_the_Presidency/index.htmlhttp://www.eu2008.si/en/The_Council_Presidency/What_is_the_Presidency/index.html


20/26


20

VI. THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY: INFLUENCING CRISIS

MANAGEMENT POLICY-MAKING

So what is the relation between all these functions and what the Presidency can

do in Crisis Management policy-making? To put it very bluntly,any decision taken by

the Union, no matter in which policy area, needs to be put forward by someone,

discussed by someone and finally approved by someone before it holds any real (and

legal) meaning. Even though the extent of its influence varies considerably across

pillars in question, the Presidency can play a role in all these phases of policy-

making33 (initiation, discussion and approval), particularly by resorting to some policy

tools related to its main functions.Among the most relevant of these tools are: each

Presidencys strategic priorities and working programmes; its ability to negotiate on

behalf of the Union; the control that Presidencies have over the Councils agenda; and

its crucial role as a broker and compromise seeker.

The wide range of policy areas whose governance comes (at least partially)

under the responsibility of the Union presupposes that not all of them can be a main

concern all the time. Providing leadership implies choosing and establishing a

hierarchy among topics; ranking priorities. The Presidency does this using several

instruments. One of them are the multiannual strategic programmes, a fairly recentinstrument, introduced in 2004 and running for 3-years cycles, also expected to

promote closer coordination between the working programmes of each of the six

presidencies included (gh 2008). There is also a new annual operational programme,

a more detailed account of the topics and priorities that guide the two Presidencies of

each year, one other instrument to strengthen cooperation. More recently, the new

system of team Presidency programmes was implemented, its first cycle starting in

2007 with the German-Portuguese-Slovenian team presidency. According to gh(2008), these seek to promote an integrative balancing approach by grouping in a

single programme Member States that include both old and new, small and bigger

countries. Finally, each Presidency issues their own working programme and

priorities some time before their Presidency begins, namely in their ESDP Mandate

included in the bi-annual Presidency Report to the Council on ESDP. All these

documents are issued and made public before (in some cases well before) a member

33 According to David Metcalfe (1998: 413), the Presidency plays a crucial leadership role in policymaking negotiations in the Council of the European Union.


21/26


21

State takes hold of the Presidency, but they represent blueprints of their intentions on

what concerns policy-initiation (or continuation or termination in some cases). This is

the first clue to infer how high each Presidencys ranks crisis management policies.

The German-Portuguese-Slovenian programme, for example, explicitly stated that

[t]he future Presidencies will ensure that the EU continues to work effectively in

support of global peace and stability, in particular through cooperation with the UN.

() Work will continue on ensuring that all the external instruments available to the

Union are used in a coherent and effective manner. This will help guarantee that the

Union is able to respond effectively in conflict prevention, crisis management and

post-conflict rehabilitation situations in order to secure peace and stability.34(Council

of the European Union. The future German Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies 2006)

The Presidency also has the power to negotiate agreements with states and

International organisations related to the implementation of CFSP issues, if the

Council so authorises35. The Presidency is supposed to use these opportunities to

promote and defend specific European (and/or national) policy interests. As

mentioned before and as the above citation also indicates, cooperation with other

international actors and political dialogue are important crisis management tools36.

Furthermore, these negotiations are often preceded by internal discussions among the

Member states to define the common position of the Union, in which the Presidency

can also play a significant role.

In fact, one of its most crucial tools and venues for influencing policy-making is

in the Presidencys ability to control the agendas for the meetings and to guide the

discussions of each Council body. Tallberg refers to it as the Presidencys agenda-

shaping powers. For him, this is based on at least 3 dimensions: its agenda-setting

ability, its agenda structuring potential and its agenda exclusion powers. In this sense,

agenda-setting is the introduction of new issues on the agenda, while agenda-

structuring reflects the varying emphases [that the Presidency] put[s] on the issues

already on the agenda and agenda exclusion represents the deliberate barring of

issues from the agenda (Tallberg 2003: 2). Finally, it is the responsibility of the

34 Underlined in original.35 The Commissioner for External Affairs and the High Representative for CFSP may also have a

saying in these matters.36 One other example is the Joint Statement on EU-UN Cooperation in crisis management signed on7th June, 2007.


22/26


22

Presidency to prepare the documents necessary for each meeting (directly assisted by

the General Secretariat of the Council)37, but also to be an honest broker and

promote compromises. The German and Portuguese 2007 Presidencies, for example,

both pressed for the launched of new crisis management missions, namely in

Afghanistan and Guinea Bissau, by including these topics on the agenda on a very

regular basis. On the contrary, other aspects, such as those related to mission support,

were often delayed and marginalised, at least during the Portuguese Presidency. The

role of the Presidency in the drafting of the annual Conflict Prevention Report, which

includes an overview of the EU crisis management missions and activities, is also a

good example of a situation in which negotiating skills are often demanded from the

Presidency.

So, the Council Presidency can not only have a procedural and substantive

influence over the process of policy formulation as it holds the key to the vital fact

that they are indeed taken.

VI. CONCLUSION: THE PLACE OF THE PRESIDENCY IN EU CRISIS

MANAGEMENT POLICY

So far we have seen that crisis management is an area which has undergonesignificant developments in the last decade, that it does not represent one single or

common policy area and in a broader definition could spread across the EUs threee

pillars. We have equally seen how the Presidency emerged and how its functions

evolved over time, focusing on its current ability to influence ESDP crisis

management policy-making (not to mention other policy fields). But the main

challenge of this paper still hasnt been addressed: where does the Presidency fit in

this institutional architecture?Most authors do not even try to place the Presidency within the overall EU

institutional architecture. It is not easy to properly represent it, even less within the

ESDP Crisis Management structures. If this is the Presidency of the Council, it should

perhaps be placed above the Councils or in a top section within the Councils cell,

though higher than the Secretariat, which is supposed to simply assist the Presidency.

Still the place of the HR/SG himself in relation to the Presidency is not so clear.

37 Presidencies often include on the agenda documents entirely drafted, at least initially, by theirBrussels and/or capital staff.


23/26


23

But the European Council is presided by the same Member State that holds the

Presidency of the Councils. And, the Presidency has its representatives in each

Council working body and committee, apart from a few exceptions. It is not only the

Presidency of the Council but of that entire institutional branch. In that sense, it might

appear slightly invisible and hard to place if you try to draw it in a figure, but it is an

ever present entity. Perhaps Figure 4 can better represent its actual position in Crisis

Management policy, though in a simplified form (see previous figures for more

complete structures).

Figure 4 Finding the place of the Presidency among the EUs Structures for

Crisis Management Policy: A proposal

Though the Presidencys functions have changed over time and will likely keep

evolving (particularly bearing in mind the proposals in the Lisbon Treaty), Figure 4 is

supposed to depict its current situation and illustrate the Presidencys presence is all

Council Crisis Management-related structures, and its direct relation with the Council

General Secretariat, as well as more specifically with the HR/SG.

All Presidencies want to be perceived as good and above all successful

Presidencies. For that reason, Presidencies tend to define their priorities carefully,

bearing in mind the overal context and balancing their own interests with those of

EUROPEAN

UNION

European

CommissionEuropean

Council

Council Secretary-

General/

HR for CFSPCommissioner for

External Relations

DG EExternal and Politico-

Military AffairsDG RELEX


(GAERC)

COREPER

PSC

PRESIDENCY

DGE IX

DGE VIII

Council Gen.Secretariat


24/26


25/26


25

more coherent and consistent crisis management policy. The Presidency has, however,

a more limited role over the implementation of the Councils decisions, a crucial step

to assess the real effectiveness of decisions: in the first pillar these tasks fall almost

entirely to the Commission and in the intergovernmental pillars the Councils bodies

have mostly a monitoring responsibility.

We hope to have demonstrated that, even though Presidencies may tend to be

slightly invisible, they are indeed central [] actors in EU decision-making

(Schout and Vanhoonacker 2006: 1073) and to have shown that much of what

happens in Crisis Management only happens because it is promoted (or at least

tolerated) by the Presidency.

REFERENCES

gh, Attila. 2008. Reform (the) of European governance by the team presidencies:EU challenges in the early 21st century: EU-CONSENT.

Council of the European Union. N/d (a). European Council, in Consilium/Europa ,available athttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=429&lang=EN , accessedin 14-01-2009.

Council of the European Union. N/d (b). Welcome to the Homepage of JavierSolana, in Consilium/Europa, available athttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/Solana/default.aspx?id=246&lan g=EN&lang=en, accessed in 14-01-2009.

Council of the European Union. 2006. Council Guide: The Presidency Handbook.Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

Council of the European Union. 2006b. Civilian Headline Goal 2008 - Draft progressreport 2006. In Doc. 14982/06. Brussels, 8 November 2006: Council of theEuropean Union.

Council of the European Union. The future German Portuguese and SlovenianPresidencies. 2006. 18-month Programme of the German, Portuguese andSlovenian Presidencies. In Doc. 17079/06. Brussels, 21 December 2006.

Elgstrm, Ole. 2003. Introduction. In European Union Council Presidencies: AComparative Analysis, edited by O. Elgstrm. London & New York:Routledge, an imprint of Taylor & Francis Books Ltd.

Emerson, Michael, and Eva Gross, eds. 2007. Evaluating the EU's Crisis Missions inthe Balkans. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

European Commission. N/d (a). Conflict Prevention and Civilian CrisisManagement, Overview of Conflict Prevention, in Europa, available athttp://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp.htm , accessed on08-03-2007.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=429&lang=ENhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/Solana/default.aspx?id=246&lang=EN&lang=enhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/Solana/default.aspx?id=246&lang=EN&lang=enhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp.htmhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp.htmhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/Solana/default.aspx?id=246&lang=EN&lang=enhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/Solana/default.aspx?id=246&lang=EN&lang=enhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=429&lang=EN


26/26


European Commission. N/d (b). Military Committee of the European Union(EUMC), in Europa, available athttp://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00007.htm , accessed on 18-05-2008.

European Commission. 2001. Communication from the Commission on Conflict

Prevention. Brussels.European Commission. 2002? The Conflict Prevention Guidelines / IQSG

Programming Fiche on Conflict Prevention, in Europa, available athttp://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/doc/cp_guide.pdf,accessed 04-02-2008.

European Commission. 2007 (last update). European Union Special Representatives(EUSRs), in Europa, available athttp://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/fin/pja_eusr.htm , accessed on 18-05-2008.

European Council. 1999. Declaration of the European Council on Strengthening theCommon European Policy on Security and Defence. In Cologne EuropeanCouncil Presidency Conclusions, 4 June 1999

Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona, and Helen Wallace. 2006. Taking Turns at the Wheel: thePresidency. In The Council of Ministers, edited by F. Hayes-Renshaw and H.Wallace. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hill, Christopher. 2001. The EU's Capacity for Conflict Prevention. EuropeanForeign Affairs Review 6:315-333.

Kronenberger, Vicent, and Jan Wouters. 2004. Introduction. In The European Unionand Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal Aspects, edited by V. Kronenbergerand J. Wouters. The Hague: TMC Asser Press.

Leal, Natlia. 2008. European Conflict Prevention: Is there a role for the European

Union Presidency in policy-making?RIEAS Research Paper n 123. Availableat http://rieas.gr/images/RIEAS123.pdf.Metcalfe, David. 1998. Leadership in European Union Negotiations: The Presidency

of the Council. International Negotiation3:413434.Schout, Adriaan, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 2006. Evaluating Presidencies of the

Council of the EU: Revisiting Nice. Journal of Common Market Studies 44(5):1051-77.

Smith, Karen Elizabeth. 2003.European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World.Cambridge: Polity Press.

Tallberg, Jonas. 2003. The agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council Presidency.Journal of European Public Policy 10 (1):1-19.

Villa, Alessandro. 2007. Instrument for Stability (IfS): RELEX A2.Wallace, Helen. 1985. The Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the EuropeanCommunity: Task and evolution. In The Presidency of the European Councilof Ministers: impacts and implications for national governments, edited by C.O'Nuallain. London, Sydney & Dover, New Hampshire: Croom Helm.
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00007.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/doc/cp_guide.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/fin/pja_eusr.htmhttp://rieas.gr/images/RIEAS123.pdfhttp://rieas.gr/images/RIEAS123.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/fin/pja_eusr.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/doc/cp_guide.pdfhttp://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00007.htm

finding the presidency's place in european crisis management policy [isa paper]

Documents