financial contagion seminar
DESCRIPTION
FInancialTRANSCRIPT
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Financial Contagion: Financial Contagion: What do we Mean?What do we Mean?What do we Know?What do we Know?
Mardi DungeyAustralian National
Universityand CERF
Demosthenes TambakisPembroke College
Cambridge Universityand CERF
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Roadmap for seminarRoadmap for seminar
1. Introduction – Definitions of Contagion2. Why does Contagion arise: Theory3. Contagion Case Studies4. Empirical Evidence5. Generalisations by Asset Market6. Contagion in Developed and Developing Markets7. Summary and Policy Implications
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1.Introduction and background1.Introduction and background
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Background factorsBackground factors
• Financial crises seem to occur together• Observe big shifts in financial markets
– Large changes in exchange rates: SE Asian crises 1997-1998
– Large changes in equity prices (October 1987 DJIA crash, 2000 dot.com bubble burst)
– Shifts in bond markets: Russian crisis 1998, Brazil 1999
• Policy concern is that they occur across many countries – HOW?
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Some important recent datesSome important recent dates
• Devaluation of Mexican peso – 20 Dec 1994• Devaluation of Thai baht – 2 July 1997• Russian default – 17 August 1998• LTCM recapitalisation begins – 23 Sept 1998• Hong Kong stock market crash – 28 Oct 1998• Brazil devaluation – 13 Jan 1999• Collapse of Argentine currency board – Dec 2001• Brazil – runup to presidential election – 2003
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And some that didn’t seem to And some that didn’t seem to attract as much attentionattract as much attention
• US and EU dot.com collapse – April 2000• Brazilian election – October 2002• Turkey banking and currency crises – 2000
• What will be the final outcome for the current Argentine problems – seems no contagion
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Thai baht against US dollar
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Jan-97 Apr-97 Jul-97 Oct-97 Jan-98 Apr-98 Jul-98
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Indonesian rupiah against US dollar
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
Jan-97 Apr-97 Jul-97 Oct-97 Jan-98 Apr-98 Jul-98
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Korean won against US dollar
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Jan-97 Apr-97 Jul-97 Oct-97 Jan-98 Apr-98 Jul-98
10
East Asian currencies against USD
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03
Indonesia rupiah
Thai baht
Korean won
index: Jan 1 1997 =100
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East Asian equity indices 1990-2003
0
50
100
150
200
250
Jan-90 Jan-92 Jan-94 Jan-96 Jan-98 Jan-00 Jan-02
Thailand
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Index: Jan 1997=100
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Returns: Hong Kong equity index 1996-1999
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Jan-96 Jul-96 Jan-97 Jul-97 Jan-98 Jul-98 Jan-99 Jul-99
%
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Returns: Indonesian equity index 1996-1999
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Jan-96 Jul-96 Jan-97 Jul-97 Jan-98 Jul-98 Jan-99 Jul-99
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Returns: Thai equity index 1996-1999
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Jan-96 Jul-96 Jan-97 Jul-97 Jan-98 Jul-98 Jan-99 Jul-99
%
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Bond spread: Russian sovereign - US Treasury
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
Feb-98 Apr-98 Jun-98 Aug-98 Oct-98 Dec-98
basis points
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Bond spread: Bulgarian sovereign - US Treasury
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Feb-98 Apr-98 Jun-98 Aug-98 Oct-98 Dec-98
basis points
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Bond spread: Argentinian sovereign - US Treasury
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Feb-98 Apr-98 Jun-98 Aug-98 Oct-98 Dec-98
basis points
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Policy makers’ and market Policy makers’ and market participants’ viewsparticipants’ views
• “Malaysia is concerned that the risks of contagion from the Asian crisis have increased….” Mustapa Mohamed
Malaysian Finance Minister 4/10/98
• “It’s like there are two businesses here. The old business, which works fine under normal conditions, and this stand-by business, when the world goes mad.” Eric Rosenfeld of Long-Term Capital,
New York Times Magazine, January 24, 1999[1]
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Why is contagion a ‘problem’?Why is contagion a ‘problem’?
• Contagion is seen as a feature of financial crises.
• Internationally diversified portfolios to protect against country risk.
• In times of financial crisis the relationships used to diversify break down through unanticipated shocks = CONTAGION
• How do we cope with this?
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Defining contagionDefining contagion
• Myriad of definitions• Problems across theory and empirical work• Attempt to draw this together using the
World Bank’s definitions• First, taxonomies of transmission paths
during crises
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Financial linkages
Flight to Safety
Cash in effects
Portfolio adjustment
Herd behavior
Shifts in Investor
sentiment
Wake up callDemonstration Effects
Heightened Awareness
Spillovers
Competitive Dynamics
Demand Effects
Competition Effects
Economic Linkages
IMF 99Goldstein 98Perry & Lederman 98
Lowell et al 98
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Broad definition of contagion Broad definition of contagion (World Bank)(World Bank)
• “Contagion is the cross-country transmission of shocks or the general cross-country spillover effects”
• This is very broad. Includes fundamentals linkages such as due to trade, terms of trade effects, things which we can name.
• Most of the literature distinguishes ‘fundamental’ linkages from contagion.
• Eg Lowell, Neu and Tong (1998), Reside & Cochoco-Bastista (1999), Calvo and Reinhart (1996) ‘fundamentals-based’ contagion, Kaminskyand Reinhart (2000)
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Restrictive Definition Restrictive Definition (World Bank)(World Bank)
• “Contagion is the transmission of shocks to other countries or the cross-country correlation, beyond any fundamental link among the countries and beyond common shocks.”
• Excludes herding behavior and so forth.• Fundamental links include:
– Financial - Real (- Political)more on these later
Eg. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995,1996)
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Very Restrictive Definition Very Restrictive Definition (World Bank)(World Bank)
• “Contagion occurs when cross-country correlations increase during ‘crisis times’ relative to correlations during ‘tranquil times.’”
• This needs to control for general volatility rising during financial crises (Forbes and Rigobon (2002))
• The fundamental linkages are again not acknowledged• Only increases in correlation are recognized as contagion
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Our preferred version Our preferred version –– akin to akin to the restrictive definitionthe restrictive definition
• The transmission of shocks beyond the fundamental linkages
• Other terms:‘unwarranted contagion’, ‘pure contagion’ • Closest in the empirical literature is Eichengreen, Wyplosz
and Rose (1995,96) and Pesaran and Pick (2003) who want to control for a large variety of fundamentals first.
• Measured contagion may be relative to the particular fundamentals chosen
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2. Why does contagion arise? 2. Why does contagion arise? Theoretical modelsTheoretical models
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MicroMicro--foundations of contagionfoundations of contagion
• The cross-section dimension as opposed to the time domain.
• Investors’ actions do not reveal their private information.
• Herds arise when Information gets trapped: underlying signals driving investment decisions are not revealed.– For example, when traded asset prices are not market-
determined.• Investors can then rationally decide to mimic the
behavior of others.
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Rational herding Rational herding behaviorbehavior by by international investorsinternational investors
• Herding arises when there is incomplete information about a country’s fundamentals and investors are free to choose when they move.
• Different classes of investors may change positions at the same point in time:– Banks, corporates, multinationals, hedge funds
• The potential for destabilizing collective action by herding investors.
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How to prevent herding?How to prevent herding?
• In a bad equilibrium, bank runs or speculative attacks on a currency can be unrelated to fundamentals.
• Therefore unpredictable! • The importance of enlarging the amount of public
information available.• Need to enhance the transparency of institutions,
objectives and governance (see also policy implications I).
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International illiquidity International illiquidity and ‘sudden stops’and ‘sudden stops’
• Capital account reversals have become more severe for developing economies.
• The availability of a rescue package (country bailout option) can make the problem worse because of moral hazard.
• Reliance on short-term financing can lead to sharp real slowdown if capital inflows stop.
• International creditors covering losses in other markets can lead to contagion (portfolio links).
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The international debate on the speed The international debate on the speed of capital account liberalization: Iof capital account liberalization: I
• Comparing the costs and benefits of capital market integration.
• Against the costs, arguments for less capital controls include: – Increase the overall availability of funds for financing
socially valuable projects– Promote transparency and accountability– Reduce moral hazard and liquidity problems– Improve the functioning of the financial system (though
not necessarily deepening it!)
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The international debate on the speed The international debate on the speed of capital account liberalization: IIof capital account liberalization: II
• The conventional view: the benefits outweigh the costs (Rogoff (1999)).
• The recent microstructure view: more market interconnectedness is bad because it leads to cross-market hedging and contagion (Kodres and Pritsker (2002)).
• The middle way: phasing in of opening up capital short-term flows
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The role of fundamentalsThe role of fundamentals
• Control variables – spillovers.• Fundamentals-based contagion – Calvo and
Reinhart (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).
• Usually there is a unique equilibrium for each possible set of fundamentals.
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The role of beliefsThe role of beliefs
• Control variables – expectations.• Hard to measure and even harder to manipulate.• Beliefs-based contagion – Calvo and Reinhart
(1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).• There can be multiple equilibria even with
complete and symmetric information if investors are sufficiently forward-looking (Jeanne and Masson (2000)).
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3. Contagion Case Studies3. Contagion Case Studies
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The European Monetary System’s ERM The European Monetary System’s ERM crises: 1992crises: 1992--9393
• Germany’s problems at the ‘center’ affected ‘periphery’ countries: UK, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, France.
• A case study for the self-fulfilling crisis view? (Contagion unrelated to fundamentals)
• Not really: in most crisis countries, high unemployment and interest rates were very undesirable, including politically. Also systemic banking sector problems in Scandinavia
• Need to distinguish the credibility of policies from the credibility of policymakers.
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The Mexican peso crisis 1994The Mexican peso crisis 1994
1. Driven by fundamentals- role of weak banking, weak reserves
2. Evidence of contagion - coined the term ‘Tequila effect’- tests provide mixed results
3. Was it regional- largely confined to Latin America
4. Which asset markets were affected- currency and equities
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The East Asian crises: 1997The East Asian crises: 1997--9898
1. Driven by fundamentals- terms of trade effects due to export competing nations
2. Evidence of contagion- mixed evidence from formal testing- much commentary says that Indonesia particularly was contagion
3. Was it regional- largely- relatively little spillover to developed markets
4. Which asset markets were affected?- questions as to whether the crisis started in the equity rather than currency market as commonly presumed
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The Russian and LTCM crises: 1998The Russian and LTCM crises: 1998
1. Driven by fundamentals- liqudity crisis and credit crisis- promulgated by hedging
2. Evidence of contagion- were these crises connected by contagion
3. Was it regional- very widespread- Russia affects developing markets, LTCM affects developed- did Russian crisis prompt the Brazilian crisis
4. Which Asset Markets were affected- bonds, equities
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Recent Latin American financial crisesRecent Latin American financial crises
1. Driven by fundamentals– Brazil 1999– Argentina 2001
2. “Twin crises”: spillover from currency to banking and vice versa
3. Little evidence of international contagion 4. Was it regional?5. Which financial markets were affected?
- primarily currency and bonds
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4. Empirical Evidence on 4. Empirical Evidence on Financial ContagionFinancial Contagion
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Methods of testing for contagionMethods of testing for contagion
A taxonomy loosely based on the World Bank’s classification:
• Unexpected shocks or news– Dungey et al (2002,2003), Favero and Giavazzi (2003)
• Correlation tests– Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Baig and Goldfajn (1999)
• Probability tests– Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000)
• Extreme returns tests– Bae, Karolyi and Stultz (2003), Baur and Schulze (2002)
• Other tests– Glick and Rose (1999), Lowell, Neu and Tong (1998)
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Empirical Tests for ContagionEmpirical Tests for Contagion
1. Contagion as ‘unexpected shocks’ or news– contagion arises because transmission arises over and
above the anticipated links– the reaction is beyond what could have been expected
beforehand– Sometimes links are so complex so as to behave as if
there is contagion (Kiyotaki and Moore (2002))
Egs. Dungey et al (2002,2003), Favero and Giavazzi (2002)
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Empirical tests for contagionEmpirical tests for contagion
2. Correlation TestsContagion as a significant increase in the correlation between assets during a period of crisis, compared with a period of calm
Eg. Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
- consistent with World Bank’s ‘very restrictive’ definition
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Empirical tests for contagionEmpirical tests for contagion
3. Probability Tests- if the probability of a domestic crisis is affected by the occurrence of a foreign crisis this is consistent with contagion
Eg. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995,1996)
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Empirical tests for contagionEmpirical tests for contagion
4. Extreme Returns Tests- the transmission between asset markets is different in times of extreme returns (crisis times) from that of normal times
Eg. Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003)
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Empirical tests for contagionEmpirical tests for contagion
5. Other Tests- encompassing spillovers (fundamental linkages)
Glick and Rose (1999) tradevan Rickjem and Weder (2001) financial links
- other thingsLowell, Neu and Tong (1998) fundamentals
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Some key practical issuesSome key practical issues
• How to define the crisis sample period?– Practically either ad hoc or data driven
• How to define the threshold at which a crisis occurs?– Sample dependence
• How to deal with different time zones?• How to deal with missing observations?
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5. Generalisations on contagion 5. Generalisations on contagion by Asset Marketsby Asset Markets
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Foreign exchange marketsForeign exchange markets
1. Fundamentals- often in conjunction with a banking system crisis; exchange rate pressure often leads banking problems- a large devaluation is often a trigger – used as a critical date, eg float of Thai baht, devaluation of Mexican peso
2. Evidence of contagion3. Regional
- crises seem to spread across wide range of currencies, both spillovers and contagion
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Equity marketsEquity markets
1. Fundamentals2. Evidence of Contagion
- Forbes and Rigobon result that ‘no contagion, only interdependence’- Other methods wide ranging evidence of contagion
3. Regional nature of crises and contagion- That developed markets act as a conduit for crises between developing regions
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Fixed income marketsFixed income markets
1. Fundamentals2. Evidence of contagion
- Much more limited evidence, lack of data
3. Regional effects - seem less pronounced- Less evidence that developed markets act as
conduits
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CrossCross--market studiesmarket studies
• No clear causation from one market to another
• Most work concentrated on geographical separation (Bayoumi et al (2003))
• Evidence not yet systematic enough to be sure
• Growing area of research, and certainly important for the policy agenda
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Mexican and Argentine peso against Mexican and Argentine peso against the USD: 1994the USD: 1994--19951995
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Jan-94
Mar-94
May-94
Jul-94
Sep-94
Nov-94
Jan-95
Mar-95
May-95
Jul-95
Sep-95
Nov-95
Mexican peso
Argentine peso
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The equity indices of Mexico and The equity indices of Mexico and Argentina during the 1994Argentina during the 1994--1995 crisis1995 crisis
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Jan-94
Mar-94
May-94
Jul-94
Sep-94
Nov-94
Jan-95
Mar-95
May-95
Jul-95
Sep-95
Nov-95
Index: 1994:1=100
Mexican equity
Argentinian equity index
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-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Jan-94
Mar-94
May-94
Jul-94
Sep-94
Nov-94
Jan-95
Mar-95
May-95
Jul-95
Sep-95
Nov-95
Mexican equity index - blueArgentinian equity index- red
Equity index returnsEquity index returns
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Country 1
Equity market
Currency market
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Country 1
Equity market
Currency market
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60
61
62
63
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• Bonds, equities and currencies
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6. Contagion in Developing and 6. Contagion in Developing and Developed Financial MarketsDeveloped Financial Markets
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Relating the stage of financial Relating the stage of financial market development and market development and
contagioncontagion• Developed markets seem less affected• Developing markets have largest contagion
effects• Regional nature of contagion and crises
usually involves regions of developing –and opening - financial markets (Latin America, Eastern Europe, East Asia)
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The Russian and LTCM crisesThe Russian and LTCM crises
• Did – Russian crises mainly affect developing
markets and – LTCM mainly affect developed marketsAs claimed by BIS (1999) ??
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Volatility Decomposition: Bond spreads in Volatility Decomposition: Bond spreads in Russian and LTCM crisesRussian and LTCM crises
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%Arg
ent
Brazil
Mexico Indo
Korea
Thail
and
Bulgari
aPola
ndRus
siaNeth
er UK US
World Idiosyncratic Regional Contagion from Russia Contagion from LTCM
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0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
US UKNeth
erlan
ds
Poland
Indon
esia
South
Korea
Thaila
nd
Mexico
Argenti
na
Contagion from U.S. Contagion from Russia
Contagion in basis points- the smaller contributions
70
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
Argentina Brazil Russia Bulgaria
Contagion from U.S. Contagion from Russia
Contagion in basis points - the larger contributions
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7. Summary and Policy 7. Summary and Policy ImplicationsImplications
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Summary of questions and Summary of questions and evidenceevidence
1. Contagion is an important problem• Statistically significant contagion occurs• It is not usually the dominant cause of volatility (cost-benefit
trade off required)2. Contagion is a regional issue
• Varies across crises (and asset markets)• Some evidence that developed markets operate as a conduit
between regions3. Asymmetry: developing countries are more
affected by contagion than developed countries• True in terms of the levels effect• Not clear in terms of proportionate effect on volatility
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Policy Implications IPolicy Implications I
If contagion is statistically significant:
- Implications of responding – moral hazard- How can we improve the outcomes
- improved transparency (information)- improved fundamentals (policy formation)- improved public institutions (infrastructure,
bankruptcy laws)
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Policy Implications IIPolicy Implications II
If contagion is regional:
- Argument for greater regional cooperation in terms of shared information - concern that the current focus of the international institutions does not adequately reflect regional concerns- disadvantage could be parochialism
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Policy Implications IIIPolicy Implications III
If developed markets transmit crises between developing regions:
- Do developed markets then have some responsibility to the developing regions in helping to cope with this effect- Possibly transmitted through portfolio rebalancing effects- Repeated prisoner’s dilemma game: better outcome for all participants if they cooperate
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Policy Implications IVPolicy Implications IV
If developed and developing markets are proportionally both affected:
- What is more important, the proportion or level of the effect?
If developing markets see the larger levels effects:
- developing markets provide profitable capital opportunities for capital, settling for lower global capital allocations ultimately means lower global growth
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More resources:More resources:
• http://www.cerf.cam.ac.uk/links/index.php
Mardi Dungey Demosthenes [email protected] [email protected]