finally on the way to replace paper charts and stubby

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After forty-five years, automation is finally on the way to replace paper charts and stubby pencils. New Tools for Mission Planners S CENE 1: Late 1944, Eighth Air Force bomber and fighter bases in England, shortly before a mission to Germany. Action: Aircrew members plan the mission. Their tools: fragmen- tary operations orders, target data, and intelligence on the enemy from higher headquarters; aeronautical charts for the route to Germany and back; aircraft performance charts and tables with weapons load fac- tors; pencils, lined tablets, E-6B cir- cular slide rules; and lots of hot cof- fee. Scene 2: Early 1953, Far East Air Forces bases in South Korea, be- fore a strike against Chinese forces and installations in North Korea. Action: Aircrews plan the mis- sion. Tools: same as 1944. Scene 3: Mid-1960s through 1972, Seventh Air Force bases in Thai- land, before strikes against enemy targets in North Vietnam. Action: Aircrews plan the mis- sions. Tools: same as 1944 and 1953. Even for the USAF air strike against Libyan targets in April 1986, aircrews' planning tools were about the same as in 1944. Between 1944 and the mid-1980s, 46 the technology of airpower cas- caded through several generations. Military aircraft advanced from pistons to jets, and the speed of air warfare leaped from 150 knots to Mach 2. Man leaped from the earth to the moon. Sensors of many kinds vastly expanded the volume ofinfor- mation on friend and foe. High- speed computers transformed infor- mation processing, navigation, and communications. Yet through all these advances, the tools for mission planning didn't keep pace. Aircrews of the Air Force and sister services were able to fly faster and farther and to fight better. The tools for mission execu- tion advanced with technology. But the tools given the crews to plan missions for the 1980s were those used in the 1930s and 1940s. Visits to reconnaissance and fighter wings in the early 1980s ver- ified that reality. In the squadron ready rooms before a mission, air- crew members cut aeronautical charts into strips and pasted them together with rubber cement. They calculated their headings and times for waypoints along the flight route by using slide rules and handheld BY F. CLIFTON BERRY, JR. New devices such as the Mission Support System" (above) are bringing about startling change in USAFmission planning. Computers, optical disk storage techniques, fiber optics, and other high technologies integrate vast amounts of data in usable form such as map printouts (right). With MSS II, complex strike missions can be planned in minutes rather than days, as in the past. AIR FORCE Magazine / August 1989

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After forty-five years, automation isfinally on the way to replace papercharts and stubby pencils.

New Tools forMission Planners

SCENE 1: Late 1944, Eighth AirForce bomber and fighter bases

in England, shortly before a missionto Germany.

Action: Aircrew members planthe mission. Their tools: fragmen-tary operations orders, target data,and intelligence on the enemy fromhigher headquarters; aeronauticalcharts for the route to Germany andback; aircraft performance chartsand tables with weapons load fac-tors; pencils, lined tablets, E-6B cir-cular slide rules; and lots of hot cof-fee.

Scene 2: Early 1953, Far East AirForces bases in South Korea, be-fore a strike against Chinese forcesand installations in North Korea.

Action: Aircrews plan the mis-sion. Tools: same as 1944.

Scene 3: Mid-1960s through 1972,Seventh Air Force bases in Thai-land, before strikes against enemytargets in North Vietnam.

Action: Aircrews plan the mis-sions. Tools: same as 1944and 1953.

Even for the USAF air strikeagainst Libyan targets in April 1986,aircrews' planning tools were aboutthe same as in 1944.

Between 1944 and the mid-1980s,

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the technology of airpower cas-caded through several generations.Military aircraft advanced frompistons to jets, and the speed of airwarfare leaped from 150 knots toMach 2. Man leaped from the earthto the moon. Sensors of many kindsvastly expanded the volume ofinfor-mation on friend and foe. High-speed computers transformed infor-mation processing, navigation, andcommunications.

Yet through all these advances,the tools for mission planning didn'tkeep pace. Aircrews of the AirForce and sister services were ableto fly faster and farther and to fightbetter. The tools for mission execu-tion advanced with technology. Butthe tools given the crews to planmissions for the 1980s were thoseused in the 1930s and 1940s.

Visits to reconnaissance andfighter wings in the early 1980s ver-ified that reality. In the squadronready rooms before a mission, air-crew members cut aeronauticalcharts into strips and pasted themtogether with rubber cement. Theycalculated their headings and timesfor waypoints along the flight routeby using slide rules and handheld

BY F. CLIFTON BERRY, JR.

New devices such as the MissionSupport System" (above) are bringingabout startling change in USAFmissionplanning. Computers, optical diskstorage techniques, fiber optics, andother high technologies integrate vastamounts of data in usable form such asmap printouts (right). With MSS II,complex strike missions can be plannedin minutes rather than days, as in thepast.

AIR FORCE Magazine / August 1989

AIR FORCE Magazine / August 1989 47

calculators. They transferred routeinformation to charts by hand withcolored pens. They filled out mis-sion cards with vital informationand then were ready to go.

Using such methods, missionplanning took a long time. It couldrange from an hour or so for a sim-ple mission up to ninety-six hours toprepare a single Strategic Air Com-mand mission folder. Planning forEl Dorado Canyon, the 1986 strikeon Libya, took many days.

Given its multiple missions,scarce resources, and requirementsfor fast action worldwide, the AirForce of the late 1980s and early1990s finds that it can no longer tol-erate use of such antiquated missionplanning systems, if pencils andpasted charts can be dignified withthe title "systems."

Making Up for Lost TimeWell before El Dorado Canyon,

aircrews and commanders through-out the Air Force knew that some-thing better was needed for missionplanning. They knew, for example,that personal computers could do

the job at the crew level and thatthey were available. Thanks to tech-nology, the Defense Mapping Agen-cy was able to convert maps of mostof the world's topography to a dig-ital format and maintain databasesin that form. Plenty of informationabout the locations and characteris-tics of enemy weapons was avail-able. But the Air Force as an institu-tion had done very little to pulltogether the technologies and op-erational aircrew requirements intoaffordable systems capable of auto-mated mission planning.

Within the tactical air forces, Hq.TACIDRI was tasked to be the sin-gle focal point for mission planning.One of the many stimuli to improveautomated mission planning camechiefly from US Air Forces in Eu-rope (USAFE), then commandedby Gen. Charles L. Donnelly, Jr. In1984 and 1985, General Donnellyand his Deputy Chief of Staff forOperations, Maj. Gen. William L.Kirk (later CINCUSAFE), heededcalls from aircrews for somethingbetter and began pushing the sys-tem to respond.

Armed with advanced equipment, planners will soon be able to inspect a missionarea from the perspective of different altitudes, as shown in the photo above. Thisand other types of information will help determine optimum routes to the target,waypoints, navigational aids, target locations, where and when to expect SAMattacks, and best return routes.

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The awesome and onerous task ofplanning El Dorado Canyon early in1986 brought matters to a head.General Donnelly, now retired, re-members shuttling C-12 courier air-craft from USAFE and other loca-tions in Germany to bases in the UKin the weeks before the mission.They ferried load after load of aero-nautical charts, intelligence esti-mates, aerial photos, and othertypes of imagery to flying units foruse in their mission planning.

After the Libya strike, it becameobvious at all levels of the tactical,strategic, and airlift forces that im-provement was needed fast. To be-gin the process, a review group ofUSAF leaders convened at head-quarters in Washington, D. C., tofocus automation at the unit levelwith emphasis on automated mis-sion planning. Its title: SquadronOperations Automation ReviewGroup (SOARG).

This special group worked fromJune 1986 to February 1987. Itfound that USAF squadrons hadplenty of computers; indeed, it con-cluded that they probably had toomany. Each of the major commandshad recognized the need and hadbegun its own fix, as had USAFE.Commands were acquiring comput-ers for everything, mission planningincluded. The SOARG review foundthat a single squadron might be fit-ted with up to forty-four separatecomputer systems, each for a differ-ent purpose, and that virtually all ofthe systems ran on different operat-ing systems that couldn't talk to oneanother.

This was chaos with a capital C.The central SOARG recommenda-tion was intended to bring someorder. It was simple: The Air Forceshould address computer-assistedmission planning with a singlevoice. It should and could do thiseven while recognizing that differ-ent commands might have vastlydifferent requirements or find dif-ferent applications in executingtheir particular missions.

Maj. Jim "Snake" Clark was in-volved in SOARG work and con-tinues to serve as the chief of USAFmission planning systems on the AirStaff (USAF/XOOOE). He told amid-1989 conference on automatedmission planning, sponsored by theAerospace Education Foundation-New Jersey (see box), what hap-

AIR FORCE Magazine / August 1989

pened next. The Air Force initiateda survey of USAF systems andfound a number of prototypes, suchas one the wizards at the ElectronicWarfare Center had developed-an"improved many on many" modelusing off-the-shelf computers, soft-ware, and interconnections. Mean-while, a rational strategy was devel-oped.

What emerged was a three-trackapproach to the challenge. Firstcame immediate action to get a sys-tem out to the field as soon as possi-ble, though of limited capabilitiesand in minimal numbers. The sec-ond track was use of that limitedsystem to provide hands-on experi-ence for aircrews and thus promotefeedback to permit quick repro-gramming and identification of op-erational and support problems.This led to the third track: long-termacquisition. Experience on the firsttwo tracks permitted the Air Staff,working with users, to define long-term requirements and work out anacquisition strategy to integrate au-tomated mission planning intoUSAF force structure.

Formalizing the EffortThe three-track approach worked

and began to produce practical re-sults. A program element manager(at first, Lt. Col. Rich LeClaire andnow Lt. Col. Jim Wisneski) was es-tablished in USAF's acquisition

AIR FORCE Magazine / August 1989

secretariat in the Pentagon. Thatstep ensured that mission planningrequirements could be validatedand compete for funds within theacquisition process.

Air Force Systems Command es-tablished a systems program office(SPO) for automated mission plan-ning, independent of any particularaircraft and dedicated to meetingthe users' needs quickly and at areasonable cost. The SPO for Auto-mated Mission Planning (AMP), es-tablished within Aeronautical Sys-tems Division in March 1988, relo-cated to Electronic Systems Divi-sion six months later to incorporatemission planning into the Air Forcebattle management program. It isnow the focus of USAF develop-ments in automated mission plan-ning and the point of contact forindustry.

While organizational changeswere under way, USAF also impor-tuned operational commands tomake their true needs known. Theyfell into four major areas: tactical,strategic, airlift, and special opera-tions. When those commands com-piled and forwarded their require-ments, the senior USAF structurehad the raw materials it needed toorchestrate a cohesive effort.

There was much to orchestrate.The tactical air forces alone, for ex-ample, identified and justified ap-proximately sixty requirements.

Meanwhile, the first missionplanning systems began movinginto the field for the required hands-on experience and feedback. Thefirst sixty-five units of the system,called Mission Support System I(MSS I), were delivered in late 1987and early 1988.

Even as these first-generationsystems were being delivered, earlylessons from their developmentwere incorporated into MissionSupport System II (MSS 11). A con-tract for MSS II systems went toFairchild Industries. Between Octo-ber 1988 and December 1989, Fair-child is to produce 138 of the sys-tems and also provide maintenanceand support during their servicelives.

Field users of MSS I and MSS IIhave been quick to respond withrecommendations drawn from op-erational use. At the same time, de-velopmental work by USAF labora-tories and contractors has producedadditional progress. Promising ap-plications are available for the nextgeneration of mission support sys-tems, known as MSS III.

The request for proposals (RFP)for MSS III will call for 560 sys-tems. ESD is expected to issue theRFP this fall. MSS III will be thebaseline system for the future, a log-ical upgrade of earlier systems thatwill incorporate new technologies.Intense competition is sought andexpected. At present, the acquisi-tion strategy is on schedule andwithin budget.

The goals for automated missionplanning systems are simple, yetcan yield significant beneficial re-sults in utility, cost, and in the appli-cation of new technologies. One keygoal is to fashion a system that canmeet the needs of the several differ-ent types of potential users, all thewhile using databases that are bothcommon and interoperable. Othergoals are simplicity, sensible con-ception and execution, upwardcompatibility, an open-form systemarchitecture, and redundancy incombat use.

Using the SystemsEven now, the difference between

old ways of mission planning andthe methods made possible by thedevelopment of MSS II is nothingshort of startling. Planning for acomplicated F-16 strike mission. for

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instance, can be completed in min-utes rather than the full day that ittraditionally has taken. SAC mis-sion folders can be updated in twohours instead of the usual ninety-six.

Much like the first time one saw atelevision broadcast or watched theoperation of a Polaroid camera, wit-nessing the MSS II system in actionmakes a deep and lasting impres-sion. The interrelated workings ofnumerous technologies create theillusion of sorcery.

for the mission. Then come param-eters such as takeoff roll, fuel con-sumption, and optimum airspeed.They now have been recorded onhard or floppy disks at the squadroncenter.. Routes to and from the targetmust be considered. Data on start-ing points, waypoints, navigationalaids, target locations, and returnroutes are essential. Once the crewwould have been issued paper aero-nautical charts that would cover theroute. Now the Defense Mapping

Proposed mission route superimposed on a satellite image of local terrain. Onceready to fly, the aircraft crew can enter essential information in a special datatransfer module, plug it into the craft's computer system, and call it up for use duringflight. Information can be updated en route to target.

First is computing power, takingadvantage of existing capabilities.Next is the capability for linkingcomputers in networks and trans-mitting data via paths such as satel-lites, wires, and fiber optic cables.Also included is massive memorycapacity, taking advantage of op-tical disk storage media. Colorgraphics displays and color printersround out the ensemble. The con-ductor of this multidisciplinary or-chestra can be found in the integrat-ed software that has been madeportable and interoperable withother software.

Contemplate, for a moment, all ofthe variables that must be consid-ered, processed, and displayed tobe useful to a crew about to set outon a mission.

First and foremost are the aircraftcharacteristics and weapons load

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Agency has converted those chartsand their data to digital form onhigh-capacity, portable memorymeans, such as optical disks.

A massive amount of intelligenceabout the enemy must be consid-ered. Again, that is either on a stor-age medium (such as a disk) in thesquadron, or instantly availablefrom a central data source. Informa-tion includes target data, location ofdefenses along the route and in thetarget area, and their lethality.

Because all of this information isavailable and can be manipulated,crews can plan their missions fasterand more prudently. They can ex-amine tradeoffs between fuel con-sumption and exposure to enemyradar or SAMs, for example. It isthe "what if?" of civilian financialplanning spreadsheets carried tolife-and-death considerations. Theaircrew can speculate, "What if wedropped 200 feet lower at this point?What would be the added safetyfrom SAMs and increased hazardsfrom terrain?"

Even better, thanks to the mar-riage of simulators and digital im-ages from the automated missionplanning systems, aircrews can"rehearse" missions before flyingthem. This procedure can be espe-cially useful for special operationscrews.

Finally, the warriors can take theknowledge along for the ride. Onceready to fly, the crew can enter es-sential information into a data trans-fer module, take it to the aircraft,and plug into the aircraft's comput-ers and other systems. Informationfor navigation, communication,threat avoidance, and other mis-sion-essential functions is readilyavailable for use during the mission.Such information can be updatedduring the mission, as the situationchanges and as new information iscommunicated to the crew.

The upshot is that, howeverbelatedly, high technology is nowbeing thrown against a problem thathas bedeviled air-combat operationsfor decades. Dollar amounts ex-pended seem puny when comparedto those spent on such glamorousweapon systems as the B-IB andB-2 bombers. Those weapons of the1990scannot be employed effective-ly with the planning technology ofthe 1940s. Money spent now on au-tomated mission planning couldwell make the difference betweensuccess and failure in the air combatof tomorrow. -

F Clifton Berry, Jr., is a former Editor in Chief of AIR FORCE Magazine. He sawUSAF service in the Berlin Airlift, 1948-49. Later, he was a paratrooper andofficer in the 82d Airborne Division. He commanded airborne and infantry unitsin the US and Korea and saw Vietnam combat as operations officer of a lightinfantry brigade. His most recent article for AIR FORCE Magazine was "It's Time toWorry About Technical Manpower" in the July '89 issue. The author extendsspecial thanks to Maj. Jim "Snake" Clark, USAF, who assisted in the preparationof this article and who is a spark plug and catalyst in automated missionplanning.

AIR FORCE Magazine / August 1989