final report volume ii

Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central AsiaLot No 4 -Sectorial and project evaluations - CONTRACT FOR SERVICES No. 2006/129514 Version 1

Final report

Volume II

Client: European Commission

ECORYS Nederland BV

Arto ValjasErik KlaassensEmilio ValliChnara MamatovaNemat Makhmudov

Rotterdam, 22 May 2007

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ECORYS Nederland BV

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Table of contents - Volume I: Main Report

1 Project Evaluation Report A 101.1 Project data 101.2 Summary of conclusions 101.3 Description of actual situation 111.4 Brief description of the project objectives 111.5 Relevance and quality of design 121.6 Effectiveness 121.7 Efficiency 131.8 Expected impact 141.9 Potential sustainability 141.10 Strength / weaknesses 15

2 Project Evaluation Report B 162.1 Project data 162.2 Summary of conclusion 162.3 Description of actual situation 172.4 Brief description of the project objectives 172.5 Relevance and quality of design 182.6 Effectiveness 182.7 Efficiency 192.8 Expected impact 192.9 Potential sustainability 192.10 Strength / weaknesses 192.11 Other observations / recommendations 19

3 Project Evaluation Report C 213.1 Project Data 213.2 Summary of conclusions 213.3 Description of actual situation 223.4 Brief description of the project objectives 223.5 Relevance and quality of design 233.6 Effectiveness 243.7 Efficiency 243.8 Expected impact 253.9 Potential sustainability 253.10 Strength / weaknesses 253.11 Other observations / recommendations 26

4 Project Evaluation Report D 27

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4.1 Project data 274.2 Summary of conclusions 274.3 Description of actual situation 284.4 Brief description of the project objectives 294.5 Relevance and quality of design 294.6 Effectiveness 304.7 Efficiency 304.8 Expected impact 314.9 Potential sustainability 314.10 Strength / weaknesses 314.11 Other observations / recommendations 31

5 Project Evaluation Report E 335.1 Project data 335.2 Summary of conclusions 335.3 Description of actual situation 345.4 Brief description of the project objectives 355.5 Relevance and quality of design 365.6 Effectiveness 375.7 Efficiency 385.8 Expected impact 385.9 Potential sustainability 385.10 Strength / weaknesses 385.11 Other observations / recommendations 39

6 Project Evaluation Report F 406.1 Project data 406.2 Summary of conclusions 406.3 Description of actual situation 416.4 Brief description of the project objectives 416.5 Relevance and quality of design 426.6 Effectiveness 436.7 Efficiency 456.8 Expected impact 456.9 Potential sustainability 456.10 Strength / weaknesses 466.11 Other observations / recommendation 46

7 Project Evaluation Report 487.1 Project Data 487.2 Summary of Conclusions 487.3 Description of actual situation 487.4 Brief description of the project objectives 497.5 Relevance and quality of design 497.6 Efficiency 507.7 Effectiveness 507.8 Expected impact 527.9 Potential sustainability 52

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7.10 Strength / weaknesses 527.11 Other observations / recommendations 52

8 Project Evaluation Report H 538.1 Project Data 538.2 Summary of Conclusions 538.3 Description of actual situation 538.4 Brief description of the project objectives 548.5 Relevance and quality of design 558.6 Effectiveness 558.7 Efficiency 578.8 Expected impact 578.9 Potential sustainability 578.10 Strength / weaknesses 588.11 Other observations / recommendations 59

9 Project Evaluation Report I 609.1 Project Data 609.2 Summary of Conclusions 609.3 Description of actual situation 619.4 Brief description of the project objectives 639.5 Relevance and quality of design 639.6 Effectiveness 649.7 Efficiency 659.8 Expected impact 659.9 Potential sustainability 669.10 Strength / weaknesses 66

10 Project Evaluation Report J 6710.1 Project Data 6710.2 Summary of Conclusions 6710.3 Description of actual situation 6710.4 Brief description of the project objectives 6910.5 Relevance and quality of design 6910.6 Efficiency 7010.7 Effectiveness 7010.8 Expected impact 7110.9 Potential sustainability 7110.10 Strength / weaknesses 7210.11 Other observations / recommendations 72

11 Project Evaluation Report K 7311.1 Project Data 7311.2 Summary of Conclusions 7311.3 Description of actual situation 7411.4 Brief description of the project objectives 7611.5 Relevance and quality of design 7611.6 Efficiency 77

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11.7 Effectiveness 7711.8 Expected impact 7811.9 Potential sustainability 7811.10 Strength / weaknesses 78

12 Project Evaluation Report L 8012.1 Project Data 8012.2 Summary of Conclusions 8012.3 Description of actual situation 8112.4 Brief description of the project objectives 8112.5 Relevance and quality of design 8212.6 Effectiveness 8312.7 Efficiency 8412.8 Expected impact 8412.9 Potential sustainability 8512.10 Strength / weaknesses 86

13 Project Evaluation Report M 8713.1 Project Data 8713.2 Summary of Conclusions 8713.3 Description of actual situation 8813.4 Brief description of the project objectives 8813.5 Relevance and quality of design 8913.6 Effectiveness 9013.7 Efficiency 9113.8 Impact 9113.9 Potential sustainability 9113.10 Strength / weaknesses 9113.11 Other observations / recommendations 91

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1 Project Evaluation Report A

1.1 Project data

Project name Addressing social consequences of Transition in the Ferghana Valley –UNDP

Reference number 85399

Source of financing TACIS Central Asia Action Programme 2002

Project location Ferghana Valley, Kyrgyzstan

Starting date 14 April 2005

End date Planned: 14 February 2007 Actual: 31 December 2006

Budget Contracted: € 2,239,098 Disbursed: €1,446,197 (per 15/12/06)

1.2 Summary of conclusions

1. Relevance and quality of design B2. Effectiveness B3. Efficiency B4. Expected impact C5. Potential sustainability C

Note: a = very good; b = good; c = problems; d = serious deficiencies

Key observations

The project scope was ambitious: the three components (water, agriculture and social safety net) were implemented in parallel but not always in coordination with each other.

Start-up delays (mostly related to recruitment difficulties) were mostly overcome in the 2nd year, but the pressure to carry out most activities in one year forced the project to concentrate on output delivery (especially hardware) rather than on the supporting ‘software’. It was therefore uncertain which project results will prove sustainable and which will collapse after a short life.

Project was helpful in strengthening relationships between local government and more remote village communities.

The project suffered from inflexible positions and sometimes confusing interventions from both EC and UNDP, and the ambiguous position of the Tacis Monitor vis-à-vis the project.

The continuing presence of UNDP in the region gave some assurance as to the sustainability of project results

Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia10

1.3 Description of actual situation

The project partner UNDP is implementing a Poverty Reduction Programme in Kyrgyzstan. The Programme supports the priorities set forth by the Government for economic development and poverty reduction through i) providing policy support to the Government in developing and implementing pro-poor socio-economic strategies and policies; and ii) increasing access of the poor in urban and rural areas to employment and economic resources.

Project statusThe project was financed under the TACIS AP2002 and implemented under a direct agreement with UNDP. As a result of start-up delays, project implementation was only able to make progress from September 2005 onwards. However, during the last year the project managed to achieve the majority of results, although this had some implications for sustainability. The project was closed as of 31 December 2006, although some controversy surrounds the closing date. According to the contract the project ends on 15 February 2007. However, the TACIS AP 2002 stipulates that all activities financed under the programme cannot extend beyond 2006. Altogether, this project was lacking the necessary flexibility to become fully feasible.

1.4 Brief description of the project objectives

According to ToR, the project was launched to increase the standard of living in a recently created oblast in the Ferghana valley and to contribute to internal and cross-border stability between Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It was implemented in 30 target villages in the Batken and Leylek rayons of the Batken oblast. The project consisted of three interconnected components together with their sub-components: i) Agriculture Development; ii) Water Management; and iii) Social Safety Net.

The overall objective of the project was to alleviate poverty, especially amongst more vulnerable groups including women and youth in selected rural areas, through improvements in their socio-economic situation, better health and sanitation and increased employment and incomes. The project’s purpose was to improve rural livelihoods through the provision of better on-farm advice and the construction and rehabilitation of potable and irrigation water supplies as well as the reduction of unemployment in Batken and Leylek rayons of the Batken Oblast.

Each of the project’s components stood rather like a separate project with its own Overall Objective, Specific Objective and Outputs. For the three components, the overall objectives were as follows: The agricultural component was to support the design of a coherent action plan on

Agricultural development as integral part of the Batken Oblast poverty reduction strategy.

The water component was to improve rural livelihoods in Batken and Leylek rayons of the Batken Oblast through the provision or rehabilitation of village potable water supplies and the rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage infrastructure.

Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Scheme in Central Asia 11

The social safety net component was to improve livelihood in the Batken oblast through reduction of unemployment and to improve the capacity of vocational training system.

1.5 Relevance and quality of design

The project was conceived in the framework of the UNDP Poverty Reduction Programme to assist the Kyrgyz Government and communities in realizing the Millennium Development Goals. The project addressed four development priority needs: poverty reduction through sustainable development; promoting good governance; strengthening human security; and enhancing regional cooperation. The project objectives were relevant and fully in line with the country’s guiding policy documents on economic and social development, such as the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and PRSP. The project was also highly relevant to the situation in the targeted areas.

In general, the project purpose was ambitious, and although the project has been able to deliver the majority of results (see below), a less ambitious project may have been more effective in terms of ownership and sustainability. The design in terms of expected results and activities was less relevant in relation to the project’s expected contribution to security in the region and regional cooperation between Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The project was designed around three components, each with their own overall objective, specific objective (results) and outputs. This design appeared first in the documents shared between the EC and UNDP during the period before the project contract was signed. This format (3 parallel components) did not follow the Logframe methodology (which at the time was not a requirement). Although the individual components provided for some logic between the three levels of intervention, there was no logical connection between the components. In addition, the design contained too many results and associated activities to become an effective instrument for implementation, and it failed to define (quantifiable) OVIs. This latter defect was remedied in September 2005, when the project drafted three separate documents on component indicators: some of these were quantified but others were not (about 50% was quantified).

Following recommendations of a monitoring visit, there was also an attempt on the part of UNDP to streamline the components and to create a unified logical framework with 11 results. However, the proposed project revisions (that had originally been welcomed and accepted by the EC) could not be affirmed by an amendment to agreement since there had been no amendment to the budget which had been submitted simultaneously.

1.6 Effectiveness

The project was able to deliver the majority of outputs and the target population had ample access to the delivered project results. Villagers benefited from the small infrastructural grant projects using roads, bridges, electricity, pure drinking water etc.


Participation in training courses allowed them to launch their own businesses such as bakery, sewing workshops, hairdressers etc. 395 Local Self Help Groups (LSHG) received micro-credit through the UNDP funded micro-finance facility. The amount of the micro-credits was between 300 and 400 €. Each LSHG consisted in average of 7 persons. Loans were mainly used for animal feeding. These actions were well complemented by access to non-collateral credits from KaFC, MCAs and internal saving funds, created within associations of LSHGs (6 revolving seeds funds were established in the Leylek district, each with a start-up capital equal to 6.000 EUR). Only in a few cases, such as the business incubator in Batken and the restructuring of a vocational school in Leylek, results were still not achieved by the time of the Evaluation. According to the ARIS Regional Office manager in Batken, the impact of the small grants could have been enhanced through co-ordination with ARIS in selecting priorities for small rehabilitation projects.

However, given the rather ambitious scope of the project, it failed to reach the specific objectives as described in the original “3 component” structure. In case of Agricultural development, the recently completed infrastructures could not contribute much to the improvements of “agricultural income and households' livelihoods in the targeted areas”. In addition, the training courses which were delivered to the rural field advisor staff of AICs were found to be too short. Also, the draft strategy on Water Management was not (yet) able 'to increase capacity of the government to design, implement and monitor policies and programmes for water supply and management'. Thirdly, the actual level of improving ‘the capacity of vocational training system in terms of jobs creation' remained very modest.

According to the Akim of the Batken district, the Project had contributed to strengthened relationships between the local government and more remote village communities. This can be seen as an ‘unplanned’ positive result.

1.7 Efficiency

There were serious delays during the first year of the project and the delivery of project inputs fell behind schedule (at least 3 months). However, the project managed to increase the implementation pace and by December 2006, most of the inputs had been delivered.

The day-today management of the project was executed by a Project Management Unit in Batken. The first year saw severe problems in terms of hiring staff of adequate quality. With the appointment of a UNDP staff member as project manager towards the second year, the situation improved and implementation speed picked up.

It should be mentioned that the relationship between the Bishkek offices of UNDP and EC have been strained during much of the implementation period. Although there are many reasons for this, the Evaluation Team limits its assessment to two observations: i) there had been little previous experience in dealing with a direct contract between the EC and UNDP and ii) the project would have gained significantly by more flexibility on both sides. What has clearly been difficult for UNDP was to interpret the authority of the various “voices” from the EC, as there were the EC Task Manager in Bishkek, the EC


Delegation in Almaty and the EC external Monitors. Particularly in the case of the Monitors, the EC Delegation should have made the role and mandate of the Monitors clearer to the UNDP and should not have allowed the Monitors to establish an advisory relationship with UNDP, as this is what seems to have occurred. In a number of cases, UNDP referred to FAFA as the ruling agreement between the two organisations, whereas the EC viewed the contract as the binding agreement.

The strained relationship had a negative effect on the timely delivery of results, especially where the two organisations disagreed on the interpretation of project instruments or expected results. A case in point has been the attempt of the EC to lower the interest rate charged to the potential beneficiaries by the selected micro-credit institution. The issue took almost two months to resolve, a very long period, in view of the overall life-span of the project.

There is little evidence that the project Steering Committee convened on a regular basis in the first year. Only in the second year did it become active. It is not clear why this occurred. According to the Monitor’s report, good communication had been established with the EC Task Manager but the relation did not go beyond information and participation in the SC meetings. The Evaluation Team was not able to verify this observation.

Project beneficiaries provided for substantial co-financing (up to 50% in small grant projects). This strengthened the level of ownership and made a major contribution to enhancing sustainability. As far as the evaluators can judge, UNDP also provided funds in access to their agreed contribution.

Visibility of project materials and sites was very clear, but at times the EC could have played a more active role in presenting itself as a major funding partner for the project (in terms of publicity).

1.8 Expected impact

There were noted improvements in areas such as access to clean water, electricity and improved infrastructure, and a notable result was the reported drop in intestinal diseases, typhoid and hepatitis as a result of availability of cleaner water combined with the promotion of hygiene rules. However, in most other cases it was too early to expect impact. In the case of credit, the investments will only start yielding tangible results after a few years, and some other activities such as the business incubator were still in the process of being set up.

1.9 Potential sustainability

The late start of the project forced management to ‘speed up’ implementation and concentrate on concrete outputs (hardware) rather than the supporting ‘software’. It is therefore uncertain which project results will prove sustainable and which will collapse


after a short life. The continuing presence of UNDP in the area and its commitment to maintain, use and build on project outputs is encouraging in terms of sustainability.

The strength (and sustainability) of self-help groups is often determined by their ability to obtain credit. In Kulundu, out of a total of 21 LSHGs created with the project support, 7 dissolved after the rejection of their credit applications.

1.10 Strength / weaknesses

Strengths of the project Choice of a contractor which was already active in the area and which was able to

carry forward the results of the Project. Effective management (in the 2nd year) in terms of implementation (‘getting things

done’). The practical use and application of project outputs.

Weaknesses of the project The project proposal did not provide a clear analysis of the issues and bottlenecks to

be addressed. It remained at a fairly general level of noting the shortcomings of the region in general and referred to a number of policy documents in place.

Inter-linkages between components were weak or not present. Inflexibility in managing relations between the contractual partners. Unclear ‘lines of communication’ from EC to UNDP and role of Tacis Monitors.


2 Project Evaluation Report B

2.1 Project data

Project name Creation of a Regional Web-Portal and Development

of a Communication Strategy



Project location Batken Oblast, Kyrgyzstan

Starting date September 2006

End date June 2007

Budget 188 300

2.2 Summary of conclusion

1. Relevance and quality of design D2. Effectiveness C3. Efficiency C4. Expected impact D5. Potential sustainability D


Key observations

The decision to split a larger project into three small ones, among them this Project, was a risky one and at

the end the three small projects suffered from the lack of synergies between them.

The ToR were badly formulated and the link to the overall poverty reduction objectives of the EC was

missing in the Project concept and ToR.

While internet can be an appropriate mean to inform potential investors and donors, it can hardly be used

to inform rural population in general.

The delay in the procurement process meant that cooperation with the two other FWCs became

complicated.



The Project had initially been an integral part of a larger “cross-border trade facilitation project” which was to be financed from the 2003 Action Programme with a contracting deadline of 25 August 2006. Due to the change of personnel in charge of the larger project in the EC Delegation and the transfer of project files to the newly opened EC Office in Bishkek, there was no time to organise a tender for a service contract before the deadline. In order not to lose the funds, the EC decided to split the larger project into three Framework Contracts (FWCs) and a supply tender (see also Interregional Trade Facilitation Project number 131392). One of the three FWCs maintained the original project location on both sides of the Kyrgyz/Tajik border and two FWCs, among them this Project, decided to operate only on the Kyrgyz side.

Within this evaluation, the three FWCs were looked at separately as per the EC decision to split the original larger project. The three FWCs were supposed to complement each other and be implemented in parallel.

The Project started in September 2006 and was originally supposed to be completed in March 2007. An Inception Report was presented in November 2006. The Inception Report introduced minor changes to the work plan. The duration was however extended by 2 months until June 2007 in order to allow time for the procurement of two computers in line with the EU procurement rules. The computers were purchased in April 2007. During the visit of the evaluators to the Batken oblast in March 2007, the counterpart person of the oblast administration could not elaborate on the contents of the portal. The international expert was supposed to return to Batken with a ready-made design of the portal. The evaluators were told that the portal would be operational by May 2007.

As the project was on-going by the time of the evaluators’ visit and most of the planned outputs were still to be delivered, the evaluation was limited to the original project design and to what could be concluded in terms of implementation prospects.


There was no clearly defined overall objective in the ToR. Under “Gobal Objective” the ToR referred to the consolidation of existing web-sites into a single web-portal for the use of farmers and for agribusiness development in Ferghana Valley, both in the Batken and Soghd Oblasts. In addition, the Inception Report referred to increasing access to information that foster transparency of local government administration, including access to information on procedures, legal base and administrative structure of the local government.

The specific objectives were described as (i) the establishment of a single and unified web-portal, (ii) the dissemination of information on legal and administrative framework, (iii) the development of a Communication Strategy to support the dissemination of information, and (iv) the creation of a section on training for farmers in the portal, including the results of the agribusiness training project 124292.



The development of the agriculture and processing enterprises is considered as a high priority for the Kyrgyz economy as per national policy documents, e.g. Draft Country Development Strategy and Draft Agriculture Development Strategy. In this context, provision of information and extension services are relevant. Such link, however weak, between project level objectives and the national ones, was not discussed in the ToR as there was no overall objective defined for the Project.

The Batken administration seemed to have considered the web portal important in order to provide people with access to information on Batken administration activities and the government regulation framework. Another justification for the project was that farmers require market information in a consolidated format and in one place. Thirdly, the international donor community and potential investors should be able to find information easily on regional and local project initiatives.

The link between the above information activities and poverty reduction in the rural areas is weak. Secondly, the choice of technology can be questioned: reliance on internet is odd as the people in the rural areas do not have access to it. While potential investors and businessmen might eventually use internet to seek information on the Batken oblast, farmers and small businessmen do not normally have access to internet. If they travel considerable distances to visit the oblast administration, they will appreciate more personal assistance than the possibility to use a computer in the office of the administration.

With regard to cooperation with the two other FWCs, the agricultural training materials of project 124292 were in the possession of the Batken administration by the time of the evaluators’ visit. They could thus be inserted in the portal when it becomes operational. The single administrative window project 125379 was in delay and its eventual contribution to the portal appeared to be limited.

2.6 Effectiveness

As project activities were largely dependant on the availability of computers and an internet connection, there had been a slowdown in project implementation prior to the procurement of the two PCs. The procurement had been implemented in accordance with the EU procedures which meant that 2 months were required to purchase the two PCs. It was hence too early to assess the effectiveness of the Project. However, the Project would have gained greater effectiveness via synergies with and complementarities from activities envisaged within the original larger project.

From the time of the evaluators’ visit until the end of the Project, the focus seemed to be on two outputs, the single web-portal and a strategy for its development. They were supposed to be completed by June 2007. While the first output was a tangible product and dependant mainly on the Project itself, the second required a clear vision by the Batken oblast administration on the future role and objectives of the portal. The evaluators could not find evidence of this during their visit.


2.7 Efficiency

In general, the Project was implementing the ToRs as efficiently as they could. However, the ToR were badly formulated and the Project neither provided value for money nor contributed substantially to poverty reduction.

2.8 Expected impact

It was too early to assess the impact of the Project but considering that effectiveness, efficiency and relevance were weak, there would most probably not be a positive impact either.


Sustainability was also a concern. It was envisaged that the Interregional Trade Facilitation Project (IRTF, project number 131392) would provide the required internet connection for the oblast administration. However, the up-dating of the portal with new information was still an unresolved issue. The Project had intended to train a few people from the oblast administration and from the IRTF project so that they could insert new information in the portal. However, the Team Leader was concerned that the oblast administration might not have appropriate staff who were computer literate enough.


Strengths of the project-

Weaknesses of the project Unclear ToR, including a missing link of project objectives to the general poverty

reduction objective of the EC and a missing overall objective. Potential synergies with the other FWCs were lost when the projects were not

implemented simultaneously. Choice of inappropriate technology, internet, for informing rural population. Sustainability of the portal and lack of local capacity to implement the web-portal

strategy. Delays caused by the procurement of computers which complicated cooperation with

another FWC.

2.11 Other observations / recommendations

The decision to split the original larger project into three FWCs and a supply tender was a controversial one. The prospects of the three separate FWCs to achieve the original objectives were meagre from the beginning and the split was difficult to undertake. The ToR for the three FWCs became unclear. Due to delays in procurement, the subject


Project was delayed and there were doubts whether the planned results could be produced. The Project risked harming the image of EC assistance in the region. In the future, careful consideration should be given to the prospects of individual projects to be successful, without letting administrative considerations such as the risk to lose the money, to determine the course to be taken.


3 Project Evaluation Report C

3.1 Project Data

Project name Development of a Farming and Agribusiness Oriented

Training and Capacity Building Programme



Project location Batken Oblast/Kyrgyzstan, Sughd Oblast/Tajikistan


End date March 2007

Budget 199 800


1. Relevance and quality of design C2. Effectiveness C3. Efficiency B4. Expected impact C5. Potential sustainability C


Key observations

The decision to split a larger project into three small ones, among them this Project, was a risky one and at the end the three small projects suffered from the lack of synergies between them.

The ToR were not clear: e.g. the link to the overall poverty reduction objective of the EC Scheme was missing.

The planned training activities of the Project were delivered efficiently and the Project exceeded the targets set in terms of farmers trained. It excelled in the participatory identification of subjects for training and in cooperating with other projects (except for the two other small projects).

The effectiveness of the training suffered from the lack of means to put the knowledge gained into practice. The choice of internet technology for farmers’ follow-up activities was inappropriate. Being a short-term intervention with a limited scope and time-frame, the project’s impact and sustainability

at the level of the two target regions were limited.



Originally, the project had been an integral part of a larger “cross-border trade facilitation project” which was to be financed from the 2003 Action Programme with a contracting deadline of 25 August 2006. Due to the change of personnel in charge of the larger project in the EC Delegation and the transfer of project files to the newly opened EC Office in Bishkek, there was no time to organise a tender for a service contract before the deadline. In order not to lose the funds, the EC decided to split the larger project into three Framework Contracts (FWCs) and a supply tender (see also Interregional Trade Facilitation Project number 131392). Among the three FWCs, this Project was the only one to maintain the original project location on both sides of the Kyrgyz/Tajik border. The other two FWCs decided to operate only on the Kyrgyz side.

Within this evaluation, the three FWCs were looked at separately as per the EC decision to split the original larger project. The three FWCs were supposed to complement each other and be implemented in parallel.

The project was completed in March 2007 and a Final Report was submitted to the EC and the local Partner, the Batken oblast administration. Unlike the two other Framework Contracts, this project did not have major complications in implementation. Time wise, it was finalised as foreseen in the original Terms of Reference. However, it suffered from the delays of the two other FWCs as they were not ready for the kind of collaboration this project would have required from them (see next chapters).


The overall objective of the Project was not clearly defined in the ToR. During the inception phase, the overall objective was described as to develop a farming and agribusiness orientated training and capacity building programme for both Sughd and Batken Oblasts which was aimed at (i) training individual operators including farmers and agribusiness men; and (ii) training, as far as possible, professional association managers and local community leaders as trainers, in order to ensure the sustainability of the Project.

Specific Objectives of the Project were to (i) establish a farmers’ capacity building educational programme to develop vocational training in farmer business techniques (input procurement, production, packaging, storage, transport, distribution); in business management forecasting and planning; and in the research and development of export outlets; (ii) developing and managing an interactive website which would allow the participants of the training events to continue their exchanges and consultations after the conclusion of the various workshops.

At the beginning of the Project, it was agreed that the most appropriate implementation structure was based on three phases, (i) Consultation Phase (identification of the target groups, of topics to be covered, and assessment of level of knowledge), (ii) Planning and


Development Phase (design of training programmes), and (iii) Implementation Phase (carrying out the training, monitoring and evaluation, development of the interactive web-site).


According to the relevant Kyrgyz and Tajik national policy documents such as the PRSPs, the draft Country Development Strategy and Agriculture Development Strategy in Kyrgyzstan, poverty reduction in the countries is strongly linked to the growth of the agricultural sector. Such growth should be based on increased productivity in agriculture. That in turn is dependant on the use of modern knowledge and innovations. Following this rationale, training in agriculture and agribusiness practices could be considered as a relevant element of poverty reduction. This link was however unclear in the ToR as there was no overall objective defined for the Project.

Increased modern and innovative knowledge of farmers is considered to be very important by the donor community in general. However, the local administration and the farmers themselves view activities creating such knowledge from a different angle. This difference in appreciation may be explained by the different states of the economies: while in the transition economies like those of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, access to capital and other inputs (seeds, machinery, etc) is still restricted, in western market economies such access is relatively easy. Thus, it is easier to apply the increased knowledge in the case of the developed marked economies than it is in the transition economies. This came clearly out from the farmers’ assessment of the training programme: although they had themselves identified the subjects of the training, they considered that the training alone was still not enough as long as they did not have access to farming and processing inputs which would allow them to apply in practice what they had learned. Some of them went even further by suggesting that the per diems, travel costs, lunches and coffee-breaks at the end became more important reasons to attend the training than the possibility to learn modern and innovative techniques.

Another flaw in the project design was its reliance on internet technology while the rural people do not in general have access to internet. While potential investors and businessmen might eventually use internet for searching information on the Batken Oblast (as foreseen within the web-portal project), farmers do not have access to internet in rural villages and they will not travel to the oblast administration to use an interactive web-site there. The technology chosen originally during the project design phase was thus inappropriate.

The Project was supposed to be implemented simultaneously with the two other FWCs “Setting up of a Single Administrative Information Window” (contract number 125379) and “Creation of a Regional Web-Portal and Development of a Communication Strategy” (contract number 124274). For example, the training and capacity building programme established through the Project was supposed to “strongly support the regional information and orientation business centre” to be organised through project 125379. Similarly, the interactive training website mentioned above was supposed to be established in close cooperation with project 125379. As the implementation of projects


125379 and 125379 was delayed, the training programme of this Project was set up and implemented independently from them. The Project did however collaborate closely with other EC and donor funded projects such as the extension service providers of the ACTED-MEDO Project in Tajikistan, the managers of the Resource Centres developed by the EC-UNDP Projects and the Rural Advisory Services (RAS) Field Advisors supported by the Swiss Government and the World Bank.

3.6 Effectiveness

In general, it can be considered that the Project fulfilled its Terms of Reference to the extent possible without being able to rely on synergies with the two other FWCs. The Project would have gained greater effectiveness via synergies with and complementarities from activities envisaged within the original larger project.

The Project was required to train at least 20 Tajik and 20 Kyrgyz trainees in each identified topic in order to disseminate the farmers’ capacity building educational programme and to ensure a sustainable standard level knowledge in farming business techniques, business management forecasts and planning and exports outlets research and development. The Inception Report anticipated that at least 20 separate training courses would be held, encompassing some 30 training days, for a total of 300 participants. Based on the Final Report, 25 training courses were completed by the end of the Project. 17 of these courses were conducted in Kyrgyzstan and 8 in Tajikistan. A total of 42 training days were provided. A total of 468 participants attended the various training courses. The participants came from 82 different villages in Kyrgyzstan and from 27 different villages in Tajikistan. Most of the participants came from villages where other EU funded Projects were operational.

The Project was required to develop and manage an interactive website allowing the participants of the training events to continue their exchange and consultations after the workshops in order to enhance the sustainability of the Project. This was supposed to be done in cooperation with the project "Creation of a regional web portal and development of a communication strategy". As the web-portal project was delayed, the Project developed the training materials and left them with the Batken administration so that the administration could later on transmit them to the web-portal. There was however no evidence of the planned interactivity of the training package. The Final Report fell short of explaining what happened with the planned interactive training web-site: this specific objective appears to have been somehow forgotten during the course of the Project. This may be explained by the inappropriateness of the technology chosen.

3.7 Efficiency

In general the Project implemented the requirements of the ToRs efficiently. However, the splitting of the original larger project into three small ones undermined the efficiency of the EC assistance.


3.8 Expected impact

Human resources development and capacity building in general have considerable time-lag in having an impact on poverty reduction, hence it is too early to assess the impact of the Project. The Final Report mentions that “there is a major requirement for training within both Sughd and Batken Oblasts. It is obvious that this Project has made a small contribution towards satisfying this need but at present, the demand for training considerably exceeds the supply of training courses”. In other words, training of a limited number of farmers and other stakeholders within a short period of time could not be expected to have a great impact at the level of the two oblasts. The limited impact prospects were further aggravated by the fact that the farmers did not have access to the required agricultural inputs to put their enhanced knowledge into practice.


There were concerns that the training had limited practical use due to the fact that the instruments to utilize the training were not in place. The Final Report refers to the increased interest in the subjects of training and recommended that larger interventions, such as Interregional Trade Facilitation Project number 131392 would “be able to follow-up this work and convert this interest into concrete activities”. This was to some extent being realised through a supply tender which would provide the kind of processing equipment (e.g. for tomato drying) the farmers had been trained on to the Business Incubator in Batken. It remained however open how the trained farmers could access this equipment as they largely came from outside the Batken town.


Strengths of the project The timing of the Project seems to have been well chosen as it did allow farmers to

pay full attention to the training without being distracted by agricultural activities in their fields.

The Project cooperated with other EU (except the other FWCs) and donor projects which allowed it to achieve synergies with them.

The Project tried as much as possible to tailor training provision to the needs of the target group.

Weaknesses of the project Unclear ToR including a missing overall objective and link to the general poverty

reduction objectives of the EC. Potential synergies with the other FWCs were lost when the projects were not

implemented simultaneously. Choice of inappropriate technology, interactive web-site, for farmers to continue

exchanges and consultations after initial training. Lack of practical training and lack of instruments and/or incentives to utilize the

skills and knowledge gained.



The Project made the following observations which are supported by the evaluators: (i) the two countries must be treated separately, even when it comes to training, due to the differences in the reform agenda and their implementation, (ii) budget of such projects must be carefully designed, as in the case of this Project the geographical coverage for training was two Oblasts in two countries and it increased travel budget significantly compared to initial allocations, (iii) in the future, the training must be provided in a sustainable manner, i.e. with attached practical part to it and with designed mechanisms to make the training practical and applicable (i.e. credit or grant mechanism, equipment and machinery leasing, etc).

The decision to split the original larger project into three FWCs and a supply tender was a controversial one. The prospects of the three separate FWCs to achieve the original objectives were meagre from the beginning and the split was difficult to undertake. The ToR for the three FWCs became unclear. The subject Project managed to deliver the planned training but by the time of the evaluation the other two projects had not yet been completed. This affected negatively the subject Project.


4 Project Evaluation Report D

4.1 Project data

Project name Setting up of a Single Administrative Information

Window in Batken Oblast of the Kyrgyz Republic



Project location Batken Oblast, Kyrgyzstan

Starting date October 2006

End date June 2007, possibly extension until September 2007

Budget 199 962


1. Relevance and quality of design D2. Effectiveness D3. Efficiency D4. Expected impact D5. Potential sustainability D


Key observations

The decision to split a larger project into three small ones, among them this Project, was a risky one and at the end the three small projects suffered from the lack of synergies between them.

The ToR were badly formulated, in particular they foresaw the physical establishment of a business centre but no funds for the purpose.

Even the revised outputs seemed to have been abandoned and the Project was going to achieve very little or nothing.

Without funding from sources other than the Project, the Project risked not having impact and sustainability at all.



The Project had initially been an integral part of a larger “cross-border trade facilitation project” which was to be financed from the 2003 Action Programme with a contracting deadline of 25 August 2006. Due to the change of personnel in charge of the larger project in the EC Delegation and the transfer of project files to the newly opened EC Office in Bishkek, there was no time to organise a tender for a service contract before the deadline. In order not to lose the funds, the EC decided to split the larger project into three Framework Contracts (FWCs) and a supply tender (see also Interregional Trade Facilitation Project number 131392). One of the three FWCs maintained the original project location on both sides of the Kyrgyz/Tajik border and two FWCs, among them this Project, decided to operate only on the Kyrgyz side.

Within this evaluation, the three FWCs were looked at separately as per the EC decision to split the original project. The three FWCs were supposed to complement each other and be implemented in parallel.

The Project started in October 2006 and an Inception Report was submitted to the EC Delegation by the end of the month. The Inception Report was approved only after 4 months of consideration by the EC due to the changes proposed to the work plan.

In particular, the ToR of the Project originally referred to the physical and legal setting up of a business centre in Batken, including the hiring and training of local staff for the centre and equipping it with all relevant information tools, so that the centre would be able to perform as a One-Stop-Shop for small-business support. In the Inception Report, the Contractor stated that there was no budget provision to cover the related costs. The EC Delegation argued that at least some of these costs should be covered from the contractor’s overheads. As a result, project implementation was delayed. By the time of the evaluators’ visit, the contract was being considered to be extended, either to June or September 2007.

As the physical establishment of the centre was impossible with the project funds only, the Inception Report proposed as revised outputs (i) the preparation of all the documentation necessary for the establishment of the business centre in Batken, (ii) the preparation of a business and work plan for the first two years of operation for the centre, and (iii) the facilitation of the establishment of the centre and its promotion. Accordingly, the experts were supposed to return to the Project area in April-May 2007 in order to start working on these outputs.

As the project was on-going by the time of the evaluators’ visit and most of the planned outputs were still to be delivered, the evaluation was limited to the original project design and to what could be concluded in terms of implementation prospects.



The Overall Objective of the Project as defined in the ToR was “the creation of a regional single information and orientation window used as a bilateral Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan regional information and orientation business centre”. In the Inception Report, the Overall Objective was described as “to facilitate the improvement of the overall business climate in the Batken oblast of the Kyrgyz Republic, by establishing the Single administrative window in Batken city”.

The Specific Objectives included (i) improved access to information on cross-border trade by farmers and entrepreneurs of Batken Oblast of the Kyrgyzstan, Isfara Raion of Tajikistan, and the Soghd enclave of Uzbekistan, (ii) improved access to other related information for the development of commercial activities (e.g. access to credit, access to grants, etc). However, the specific objectives as described in the ToR were not very clear.

The original outputs included (i) the establishment of an operational regional information and orientation business centre giving free access to farmers and other economic operators from, but not limited to, Sughd and Batken oblasts, (ii) technical information and orientation advisors are trained and will provide basic legal information and orientate operators to appropriate public or private service suppliers recorded on custom made data bases, (ii) to establish and maintain close cooperation with the project "creation of a regional web portal and development of a communication strategy" in order to assure wide promotion of the single administrative information window. As described above, the original outputs were revised in the Inception Report.


The development of agribusinesses and other small enterprises is considered a high priority for the Kyrgyz economy as per national policy documents, e.g. Draft Country Development Strategy and Draft Agriculture Development Strategy. In this context, provision of information and orientation services could be considered relevant. Such link, however weak, between project level objectives and the national ones, was not discussed in the ToR as the overall objective of the Project was defined at a much lower level.

A survey by UNDP identified cumbersome and bureaucratic procedures of trade operations and lack of information on customs rules and regulations as one of the main obstacles for cross-border trade in the region. The provision of information to businesses on import and export rules, as well as the provision of help in filling necessary documents, could thus be of significant help to local enterprises. The local entrepreneurs seemed to have welcomed the establishment a business centre providing such services in Batken. The survey could thus be considered to confirm the relevance of the Project.

The project design however did not foresee who would finance the centre. The Inception Report referred to local and central government institutions as well as to private partners and international donors as potential sources of funding for the centre. While the


commitment to fund the centre’s activities had not been clearly stated by any of them at the time of the Inception Report, the Report presumed that the positions of these stakeholders might become more positive after the preparation of a concept and a budget for the centre.

Because of the above-mentioned delay in the approval of the revised work plan, the Project was lagging behind its original schedule by the time of the Evaluation. However, the other FWC number 124274 “Creation of a Regional Web-Portal and Development of a Communication Strategy” with which the Project was supposed to coordinate was also in delay. As a result, the two projects could still be completed in parallel. In particular, the project 124274 was about to deliver two computers to the oblast administration. The Inception Report assumed that the computers were to be used for the business centre.

Although the idea of the business centre appeared to have been relevant to the target groups, the Project design had not sufficiently considered who would fund the centre. This should have been set as a precondition or at least as an assumption or risk in the project design. There was a risk that nothing tangible was going to come out from the Project.

4.6 Effectiveness

In the Inception Report, the Project was proposed to go ahead with the preparations for the centre on the assumptions that (i) there was an interest among the beneficiaries and the target groups to establish the centre, and that (ii) the administration of the Batken oblast, alone or together with other stakeholders, were ready to establish and initially fund the centre. In addition, the EC Delegation expected that the Contractor would contribute to the establishment of the centre with some office furniture to be paid from the Contractor’s overheads.

Later on, it seemed to have been decided to drop the idea of the centre completely. Instead, the Project should together with the web-portal project concentrate on establishing the web-portal physically, on making it operational and on training the staff of the oblast administration to use it. The value added to the web-portal project seemed marginal.

The Project team was collecting legislative and other documentation necessary for the portal and there were no constraints for this. Whether it was still necessary to prepare a business plan and a work plan for the single administrative window for two years (the second output) was not clear. The effectiveness of the Project seemed to be highly questionable.

4.7 Efficiency

As stated earlier, there had been a four-month-delay in the approval of the Inception Report. The ToR were revised and the major part of the project activities were still to be delivered by the time of the Evaluation. At the end, it seemed that the Project might


deliver only a tiny fraction of the planned outputs. Even the revised limited outputs, such as the concept and work plan for the centre, risked not to be delivered as nobody would take any use of them. The Project represented very low if no value for money at all for the EC.

4.8 Expected impact

As the Project was not yet finalised it was too early to assess its impact. As there was no commitment to fund the centre and the Project seemed to achieve very limited results, there was a risk that it would not have any impact at all.


Without the funding commitment, the Project was lacking sustainability. It could happen that project outputs became “another” report on the shelves of the local administration. The weak project design, combined with the Government’s restrictive budgetary policy and other donors’ limited funding possibilities, undermined the sustainability prospects of the Project.


Strengths of the project -

Weaknesses of the project Weak project design, including the overall and specific objectives and the lack of

consideration of preconditions and assumptions/risks. Weak ToR which foresaw physical establishment of the business centre but no funds

for the purpose. Even the revised outputs, preparation of a concept and a work plan for the centre,

seemed to have been abandoned and the Project was going to achieve very little. Risk for not having impact and sustainability at all, as additional funding for the

centre could not be found.


The decision to split the original larger project into three FWCs and a supply tender was a controversial one. The prospects of the three separate FWCs to achieve the original results were meagre from the beginning and the split was difficult to undertake. The ToR for the three FWCs became unclear. The subject Project was supposed to establish the centre physically but no funds were allocated for the purpose within the Project. The Project risked achieving very little. It also risked harming the image of EC assistance in the region. In the future, careful consideration should be given to the prospects of


individual projects to be successful, without letting administrative considerations such as the risk to lose the money, to determine the course to be taken.


5 Project Evaluation Report E

5.1 Project data

Project name Rehabilitation of drinking water supplies, irrigation and

melioration systems in Osh Province



Project location Village communities Kyrgyz Ota and Kenesh, Naokat

district, Osh region, Kyrgyzstan

Starting date 22 August 2006

End date 21 August 2007

Contract value 100.000 EUR


1. Relevance and quality of design C2. Effectiveness B3. Efficiency C4. Expected impact C5. Potential sustainability B


Key observations

The scope of the project design, combining small infrastructure rehabilitation, local institutional development and participatory planning, was in line with the approach required by the call for proposals but it was too ambitious for the limited duration of the Project.

The project purpose was not clearly and logically formulated and not all project results were appropriate for the purpose and achievable within the project duration.

Implementation of activities was lagging behind, mainly because of delays in the procurement process. Potential sustainability was good as relevant cross-cutting issues, notably environmental issues, were

adequately addressed both in the design and implementation of activities. The visibility of the actions was weak, notably the EC visibility.



The applicant and partner one is the international NGO Deutsche Welthungerhilfe/German Agro Action (GAA). GAA has a total of 183 employees. Its role in the current project is chiefly procurement of materials/equipment, supervision and reporting.

Implementation of activities is the main responsibility of partner two, i.e. the local NGO Agro-Foundation for Development (AFD), which also led identification and formulation of the project proposal. AFD has a total of nine employees.

AFD has been GAA’s partner in two previous projects, namely “Agricultural rehabilitation Project in Osh, Djalal-abad and Batken 2002-05” and “Assistance to private farmers through creation of marketing co-operatives”. Both projects were entirely funded by GAA.

This EC-funded intervention is part of a broader on-going multi-annual programme implemented by GAA in partnership with AFD, GTZ and HIVOS (NL) in Southern Kyrgyzstan, including the target communities of Kyrgyz Ota and Kenesh. The programme aims at increasing the incomes of local farmers mainly through the development of new potato seed varieties and the establishment of potato seed co-operatives and of two marketing co-operatives.

Project status, Activity 1- Rehabilitation of the irrigation system in Kyrgyz-Ota and Kenesh

The activity aims at rehabilitating a 1.5 km canal for irrigation which would benefit 1.134 farmers working on 512 ha of land and at developing local institutional capacity for water management through the establishment and training of a Community Interest Group (CIG). The CIG was established for the revision of the construction plan of the canal. However, there is no evidence that a PRA session had been carried out before the formation of the group, as anticipated in the work plan of the Project.

The revised construction plan was submitted and approved by local authorities. Preparatory works (cleaning of the sections of the old canal to be rehabilitated) were being implemented under the supervision of the CIG. All labour inputs were being provided by non-remunerated community work (“ashar”). However, trainings in water management and efficient water use for the members of the CIG had not yet taken place and a training schedule was not available.

Construction works were not yet initiated, pending implementation of a local tender for the procurement of cement. The tender was first launched during Autumn 2006, but the contract with the selected supplier was not finalised requiring the tender to be re-launched, which was scheduled again for mid-Spring 2007. A factor which partially explained the delay in the conclusion of a supply contract after the first tender, was the uncertain instructions received by the applicant and concerning the requirement of a certificate of origin for the cement.


Activity 2- Rehabilitation of the Drinking Water Supply System in Kenesh

The activity aims at rehabilitating the health threatening and polluting drinking water supply system of the village of Arbin (3.300 inhabitants) and at developing the local institutional capacity to manage the rehabilitated system through the establishment and training of a Drinking Water Users Association (DWUA).

A Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) session was carried out in Arbin by the project partner resulting in the establishment of a CIG which later developed into a DWUA. Training in water management, sanitation and hygiene was provided by the project partner to the members of the DWUA (70 persons). DWUA was subsequently legally registered as a Public Association.

The plan to rehabilitate the drinking water system received authorisation by the appropriate local authorities. Nevertheless, works had not yet started as of end March 2007 due to protracted bad weather conditions. Equipment (i.e. plastic pipes, materials and tools for wells rehabilitation) had been delivered during the winter season when construction works could not be implemented, and bad weather conditions were still affecting the area at the end of March. The members of the DWUA were confident, however, that works could be started in late April and be completed by June 2007.

Activity 3- Melioration of 24 ha of land

The activity aimed at draining high ground waters in the agricultural land surrounding the village of Kyrgyz Ota (80 farming families), enabling cultivation of 24 ha of arable land.

An excavator was rented by the project partner and drainage works started in mid-March 2007. At the time of the visit by the Evaluation Team, drainage works were at an advance stage and completion of the works was scheduled by mid-April 2007.


The overall objective of the project was to improve the livelihood of the people living in the village communities of Kyrgyz Ota and Kenesh, i.e. two rural municipalities (ayil-okmotys) in the district of Naokat, in the Osh region.

The purpose was twofold: first to increase yields and incomes of the target populations through enhanced water management and land melioration and second, to improve hygienic conditions through rehabilitation of the drinking water supply system.

Four results had been identified:

The income of 1134 farmers has increased by 50% after the irrigation system is fully functioning and water management has been introduced

3.300 persons in Arbyn (Kenesh) use the drinking water supply system and improve their hygienic conditions

80 farming families take advantage from the melioration of 24 ha land


CIGs and WUAs have been organised. They have achieved a legal status and function.


The project objectives support the Scheme objective ‘to strengthen local economies’ as they aim at increasing yields and income of small farmers through enhanced water management, melioration of land (drainage of high ground waters) and rehabilitation of drinking water system (hence reduction of water borne diseases -and assumingly higher labour productivity- and of soil erosion).

The objectives also address the priority issues of access to safe drinking water and to irrigation water highlighted in the relevant project fiche for track 3 of the Tacis Action Programme 2003. Moreover, the work programme of the project supports the type of activities outlined in the instructions of the call for proposals. The project contributes towards the achievement of the overall priority goals of the Country Development Strategy (CDS) which are ‘poverty reduction and enhancement of living standards’ of the population. The project is also in line with one of the priority focuses of the government strategy which is to support agriculture development including through enhanced water management and village community mobilisation. Agriculture development is also the main focal area for support identified by the CDS for the region of Osh.

The target groups were clearly identified and the project intervention was designed to benefit directly over 4500 persons, mainly small farmers and their families, out of a total population in the target areas of approximately 25000 persons. The final beneficiaries of the project were estimated at over 10000 persons.

The project objectives address clearly identified needs of the target groups. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence from interviews with the target groups and local authorities that the needs addressed by the Project intervention are highly relevant to the target groups. This was mostly clear in the communities where a PRA had been implemented, notably in the village community of Arbyn.

Only three results are appropriate in order to achieve the project purpose. The project purpose is not clearly and logically formulated in the project application. One result, i.e. that the income of 1134 farmers has increased by 50 %, is not appropriate. The result should have been formulated as “1134 farmers have stable access to sufficient water supply for irrigation”. Moreover, the result “the income of 1134 farmers has increased by 50%” is not achievable within the duration of the project because the time schedule for the construction of the irrigation canal was not designed to coincide with the seasonal cycle of the crops and vegetables production in the target areas. Finally, the logical framework was not presented in accordance with the EC PCM guidelines.


5.6 Effectiveness

With the exception of output 4, which had been partially achieved by the eight month of the Project, all the other outputs were not yet achieved. Outputs 2 and 3 were however likely to be achieved by the end of the Project. Achievement of output 1 within the timeframe of the Project remained highly unlikely.

In general, the project had so far positively contributed to the building of the local institutional capacity in water management and sanitation in the targeted communities through the establishment and training of two CIGs and a DWUA. However, much was still to be done in terms of institutional development and capacity building of the WUAs, notably the second WUA for irrigation water was yet to be established.

Output 1- The income of 1134 farmers has increased by 50% after the irrigation system is fully functioning and water management has been introduced. Progress towards the achievement of this result was significantly delayed by the fact that the tender (see above) for the procurement of materials (notably cement) had to be repeated. The delay accumulated because of the procurement process had coincided with a rapid rise in transport costs which in turn put in risk the procurement of the needed quantities of cement, i.e. the financial feasibility of the approved construction of the irrigation canal.

Output 2- 3.300 persons in Arbyn (Kenesh) use the drinking water supply system and improve their hygienic conditions. Construction of the drinking water supply system was significantly delayed by the untimely delivery of equipment, which coincided with the winter season, and by the prolonged bad weather conditions well into the spring season. Nevertheless, the community was highly mobilised to start rehabilitation works immediately after the weather conditions improved. It could be safely assumed that the works will be completed well before the project end date, thus providing access to safe drinking water for the local population.

Output 3- 80 farming families take advantage from the melioration of 24 ha land. The excavator for draining the high ground waters was rented seven months later than originally scheduled in the work programme without apparent justification for the delay. Nevertheless, drainage works after two weeks of implementation were half way through and the output was likely to be achieved by the project end date.

Output 4- CIGs and WUAs have been organised. They have achieved a legal status and function.Two CIGs and one DWUA were established. The DWUA had a statute and was legally registered. Training was provided to the members of the DWUA in sanitation and water management. There was no evidence however that the DWUA had a work plan and that training was provided in financial planning as anticipated in the project work programme. A training manual for the CIGs and the DWUA was not available. No evidence was provided that the second WUA for irrigation water was established. The output could be fully achieved by the end of the project if the work programme and schedule of project activities were appropriately revised. However, there were no indications that this was being addressed.


5.7 Efficiency

Project management appeared to be weak and an internal monitoring system was not in place. Moreover, the project management had difficulties in coping with the EC procurement procedures due to, as it appeared, an inflexible interpretation of the procurement rules by the EC Delegation. This had resulted in significant delays in the implementation of project activities. No further data were available on inputs utilisation.

5.8 Expected impact

The potential impact of the project was significant in terms of numbers of the final beneficiaries but the actual impact to date was much lower due to slow progress of implementation towards achieving the planned outputs.


The potential sustainability was high and the project had adequately addressed cross-cutting issues, notably environment (soil erosion) already at the stage of design and later during implementation. The PRA and capacity building activities had undoubtedly reinforced the sense of ownership of the target groups and their institutional capability. The communities visited showed a readiness to pay in cash to the WUAs in order to allow for the payment of the services of a water engineer and in order to create a special fund for maintenance requirements.


Strengths of the project The project objectives supported well the Scheme and CDS objectives The project objectives addressed clearly identified needs which were relevant to the

target groups The potential sustainability of the expected results was high as the Project had

adequately addressed environmental issues and local institutional capacity building

Weaknesses of the project One result is neither appropriate to the project purpose nor achievable within the

project time frame i.e. ‘the income of 1134 farmers has increased by 50 %’. The other three project results remained largely unachieved due to delayed

implementation of activities. Project management lacked sufficient experience with EC procurement procedures. No internal project monitoring system was in place. Impact to date was very limited due to slow progress in achieving results. EC visibility guidelines were not being implemented.



It is recommended that future guidelines and instructions for small infrastructure rehabilitation grants were designed to adjust the required approach with the project duration, by narrowing the scope through putting an emphasis on rehabilitation activities. The guidelines should also require that the proposals were self-contained i.e. with objectives achievable within the project duration. Proof of adequate local institutional arrangements and participatory planning should instead be pre-conditions for selection. It is also recommended that periodical briefings were organized for the grantees by the EC Contract and Finance team.


6 Project Evaluation Report F

6.1 Project data

Project name ASCoT – Addressing the social consequences of

Transition in the Ferghana Valley



Project location Ferghana Valley (Batken and Sughd), Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan

Starting date 18/11/04

Implementation start date 08/01/05

End date 18/11/06

Budget € 830.535 (€ 543.035 in KG and € 287.500 in TJ)


1. Relevance and quality of design C2. Effectiveness B3. Efficiency B4. Expected impact C5. Potential sustainability C


Key observations

The project suffered from a delayed start-up due to weak project management, political disturbances in March 2005 (Kyrgyzstan) and difficulties in recruiting staff willing to work in a remote area.

In the context of the reduced timeframe and scope, the project was able to achieve good results. Management had been efficient in ‘recapturing’ the project implementation after a lost first year The project was not able to follow-up on the base-line monitoring exercise at the beginning of year 2. Sustainability was good at village level (organisation of grass root organisations and technical support) but

less good at regional level and for business and marketing related efforts. In some areas, the project is expected to make a marked difference in income for farmers (such as those

with apple varieties), but overall the impact is expected to be modest given the reduced scope of the project, the patchy geographic approach and the commercial failure of some pilots.

The project produced ample documentation that is now widely available. Project visibility was good on most locations.



The project which had its kick-off meeting on 8 January 2005 was closed since December 2006 and a final report was available. The current evaluation was done in relation to the changes that were formally agreed between the EC and the contractor in the course of 2006. A mid-term review of the Project and a second kick off meeting were implemented in January 2006 following the appointment of a new team leader at the end December 2005. An adjusted project strategy/synopsis with amended ToRs were drafted early 2006 and the related contract addendum was signed on 26 July 2006. Project activities in the Batken oblast were suspended for 3 weeks between 18 March and 7 April 2005 due to the perceived risks posed by the unfolding of the political events in the Kyrgyz Republic.


The overall objective of the project was “to support economic and social development of vulnerable populations in the Ferghana Valley in a participatory and sustainable way”, and the specific objective “poor livelihoods in the selected rayons of Jabor Rasulov and Isfara in the Sughd oblast in Tajikistan and in the Leylek and Batken rayons in the Batken oblast in Kyrgyzstan are improved thanks to income generating activities, social service rehabilitation and improved capacity of the local authorities”.

Before the contract was signed, a corrigendum to the ToR reduced the incidental budget from €200,000 to €100,000. In addition, the Small Grants Facility was withdrawn and the related result 4 was cancelled. The following expected results remained:1. Local government staff is fully able to determine and implement strategies and devise

operational plans to reduce the incidence of poverty (Capacity building); 2. Small and micro businesses derive additional turnover and profits together with an

increase in employment through developing linkages between producers (and producer groups) and final or intermediary markets (SME development).

3. Farm sales and incomes have increased thanks to better marketing channels (Agricultural marketing and processing);

4. Poverty reduction and development models will be developed, which may be replicated in other areas of the Ferghana Valley and beyond (Poverty reduction and development models).

After the mid-term review at the end of 2005 and the change of Team Leader, the project scope was further reduced. The rayon of Jabor Rasulov was no longer included, results 2 and 3 were merged considering a close linkage of both results to increased income of farmers through marketing and micro-business activities, and one of the three project offices located in Isfana (Kyrgyzstan) was closed. Finally, the development of poverty reduction and development models, was also abandoned. Instead, the Project was to issue a number of technical reports (i.e. fruit gardening, meat cutting etc).



The scope of the original project design was too ambitious and the process of reducing it already started before the contract was signed (see above). This process was intensified as a result of weak management in the first year. The remaining project results represented a realistic approach to accomplish a number of tangible outputs that would have a reasonable chance at contributing to the project objective.

There were some concerns with reducing the scope of the capacity building, in particular the training of rayon and regional government officials. Although they remained involved in the process of strategy developments of rural associations (RAs), there had been no direct training of government officials. This would have strengthened their capacity to support the process of developing strategies at community level as well as their capacity to engage in strategic and policy discussions at rayon and regional levels.

According to comments received by the evaluation team from Tajik government representatives, the project was expected to have focussed more on restructuring the Soviet style agricultural enterprises. When it became clear that the project was not equipped to do this, their interest in the project was somewhat reduced.

The execution of a project on both sides of the border allowed a common approach to issues that affected populations on both sides of the border. The exchange of information between communities had been beneficial to increased stability in the region. As a regional project the scope was limited to issues that could be addressed at the regional level, which left some important issues outside the scope of the project, such as administrative issues related to customs and transport. The project supported the objectives of the EC Action Programme for 2002. The three (remaining) results clearly contributed to the objectives objective of reducing the potential for social conflict, strengthening local economies; and improving the equality of wealth distribution and to a lesser extent to strengthening local governments’ capacity to respond to community concerns.

The relevance to the national development policy was equally clear, as poverty reduction was one of the overriding concerns of the Project.

In terms of target groups, three levels could be distinguished. First the community-level organisations which received project support to develop their capacity for strategic development and for service delivery. Second, the SME sector which was supported with a focus on start-up businesses. Third, individual farmers received assistance in their management of crops and livestock activities improving their potential for income generation.

In summary, the redesigned project was relevant to the problems addressed although the adjustments in scope were made in response to efficiency issues rather than in response to the new situation which emerged on the Kyrgyz side after the March 2005 unrest. The latter would have benefited from more cross border activities.


6.6 Effectiveness

The assessment was made against the revised project objectives as conceived by the February 2006.

The project made an important contribution to strengthening and consolidating existing local structures and schemes in the pilot areas and in providing advice and training. Through these services, farmers are now better able to formulate needs and identify resources, have access to innovative small-scale techniques and management practices for agricultural production. However, the revised specific objective "to contribute to the improvement of poor rural livelihoods in the target districts through new income-generating activities and capacity building of local authorities and rural communities" was achieved only to a limited extent, mainly due to the delays which occurred during the first year.

Result 1. Local government staff is fully able to determine and implement strategies and devise operational plans to reduce the incidence of poverty (Capacity building) At village level the project actively supported the establishment and capacity building of four “umbrella” village Rural Associations (RA) and of one “umbrella” RA for two villages (one less than planned). The organisations all formulated a work plan and the ‘umbrella’ RA of the villages of Aikol and Gordoi raised the equivalent of 2000 USD from its members. Training only took place in the final months of the project. At regional level, representatives from the village RAs to the RAC were selected and 2 RACs were set up and are working.

Training topics included strategy development and capacity building of RAs during which a number of case studies in strategy planning were developed. As a result, at least 2 meetings (4 had been planned) were held with district administration and a number of petitions were presented (o.a. to the district administration, the Minister of Culture, and potential donors.

Result 2 Sales and incomes of small farmers and agricultural businesses in the selected pilot areas are increased thanks to better market integration (Agricultural marketing and processing). To support the diversification and enhancement of agricultural products, agro-seminars were implemented at the demo-station in Kara-bulak on good practices in fencing and pruning fruit orchards, and on nutrition management, irrigation and plant protection in which 120 farmers participated (20 more than planned). Tests of prototype solar dryers for fruits, tomatoes and peppers were carried out but test results were mixed, and – more importantly - no additional value could be obtained in the market.

Testing of the European varieties of the apple young trees and rootstocks in the fruit demonstration and experimental gardens showed good results, and in combination with improved pruning techniques, the trees are expected to yield significant better yields than the local varieties. Some 535 persons (35 more than planned) participated to the project seminars on “small business management” and “financial planning”, representing start-up small rural businesses (510), farmers’ co-operative groups (6), credit unions (2), and rural associations (5).


The project assisted with building the capacity of selected co-operative groups. Groups participated in the agro-seminars delivered by the project and trainings were delivered on the development of rural associations and farmers co-operatives in Europe. One co-operative of fruit growers was established and registered, and a meat processing and sales initiative group was formed and registered with the “umbrella” RA of the village of Kara-bulak. A fruit-tree demonstration-site in Kulkent, managed by the collective farm ‘Bogiston’, was supported but the demo garden seemed to be quasi abandoned and did not have any visibility when the evaluators visited the location.

Strengthening information, training and advisory of 2 Advisory Information Centres was carried out according to plan. In Kulkent, an interim management board for the AIC was set up, the business plan was adjusted and the legal registration of the Centre was completed. Already, the AIC trainer was contracted by a Tacis framework project to develop and deliver a training module. However, by the time the evaluation team visited the AIC in Kulkent, there seemed to be few activities going on and fees charged to individual farmers were too high for most of the (poor) farmers in the area. There were ongoing negotiations with a Russian supplier of inputs who had shown interest to use the centre for distribution and advice. The AIC in Toguz-bulak was registered November 2006 and was awarded a small grant from DFID to deliver training in ‘transparent budget management’. A representative office of the AIC was opened in Isfana. However, the two centres had not been included in the Strategic Plan for the area, which can be seen as an omission on the part of the Project. They should now be included in the network of ACTED/ UNDP/ MEDA, but there they compete for contract based on public tenders.

The project assisted in the development of pilot micro-finance schemes through the design of financial simulations for the setting up of a credit scheme to farmers to build rotating storage facilities for apples and potatoes and the results were submitted to the OXUS micro-credit bank. Although OXUS is now considering providing these services this result falls short of the planned 4 farmer groups who were to receive a micro-loans through the project’s supported schemes.

Result 4 Poverty reduction and development models will be developed, which may be replicated in other areas of the Ferghana Valley and beyond (review and dissemination). Although the wording of result 4 remained unchanged when the Project was adjusted in the second year, the interpretation had shifted to issuing and disseminating technical documents. By the end of the Project, a large number of documents had indeed been archived in the AICs. These documents covered agriculture, management and financial topics, all targeted at farmers and their (community based) organisations.

In terms of the dissemination and visibility, a number of actions had been undertaken, among them video-materials, press-releases and printed and electronic versions of the Village Development Plan and Social Economic Development Strategy Paper. These were disseminated widely among local government executive and elected officials in Sughd and Batken oblasts. Apart from printed and electronic materials available to the public, the project also gave consideration to the visibility of the EC in the field by placing stickers, banners and placards on buildings and in demonstration plots, and equipment financed with EC project funds.


6.7 Efficiency

During the first half of the project, little progress had been achieved due to weak project management, the difficulty in recruiting staff in the Batken area and the March 2005 events in Kyrgyzstan. With the appointment of a new Team Leader (December 2005) and approval of a new approach to the project implementation for the remaining period by the Steering Committee (the February 2006 ), the project took a turn for the better. Among others, project offices in Leylek were closed, reducing the geographical scope, and thereby making coordination easier.

On the other hand, previously planned coordination efforts with UNDP did not work out. Initially, a MoU was signed stipulating the inclusion of AICs in the UNDP network and making available credit from ‘their’ credit scheme. However, with the change of the UNDP Project Coordinator, these two elements did not continue.

During the first year, the project’s Steering Committee met only once but this was increased to five times during the second year. According to the EC Project Team Leader, this contributed to a more efficient implementation of the Project.

6.8 Expected impact

It was too early to assess impact, and at this stage even the potential for impact was difficult to assess. In this regard, no follow up was given to the PRA carried out in November 2005, where community level information was collected.

Overall, it was likely that impact will be more modest than expected at the start of the project, due to the reduced number of activities (after the restructuring of the project), and the limited geographical scope of the project. The concentration of project activities on a smaller geographical scale would have had a positive effect on synergies between project components and could have potentially increased impact. However, project support for demand driven activities in selected communities still resulted in a patchy coverage, reducing overall impact and sustainability of the Project. This issue was not unique to the present Project but applies to many rural development projects where coverage is not extended to all communities within a clear geographical area.


The project's support to the organisations at community level and its role in the provision of simple and accessible technologies was important for the local farmers, and will continue to benefit the specific needs of rural communities long after the project was closed.

Links developed through the project with existing networks providing rural services e.g. with the Rural Advisory Services (RAS) in Kyrgyzstan and with the network of ACTED, MEDA, UNDP networks of Advisory Information Centres (AICs) in Tajikistan, ensured


some measure of sustainability for the projects results. Furthermore, the selection and utilization by the Project of local experts contributed to ‘twinning’ of their organization of origin with the Rural Associations (RAs) and enhanced the prospect that support for the institutional development of the RAs will continue.

However, in a number of other areas, potential sustainability of the project remained weak. Five issues are pointed out here:i) At the fruit garden, there is concern regarding the institutional capacity of the

Management Board, and the demonstration garden need technical support until the trees have fully matured;

ii) The micro-credit component failed to ensure access of poor farmers to existing micro-credits schemes;

iii) The experiment with the solar drying equipment did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that they will be able to improve marketing of produce and increase farmers’ incomes;

iv) The cooperative groups (fruit garden, meat, solar drying equipment) received support for their operations, but given the time and resources available, there are concerns that the depth of technical assistance in these areas was insufficient to a healthy future for these groups;

v) Since the project did not support capacity building of officials at regional level, embedding grass-roots results into the wider institutional structures did not take place.


Strengths of the project Strong involvement and good results at community level, for both organisational and

technical aspects. Practical and accessible approach to agricultural issues. Frequent linkages to other (existing) organisations that support rural communities.

Weaknesses of the project Limited geographical scope and patchy approach in the remaining areas. Insufficient embedding in regional administrative structures. Limited sustainability of project results.

6.11 Other observations / recommendation

It is recommended that future Calls for Proposals ask potential tenderers to link with or build on the success of the organisational work achieved by previous projects.

The wisdom of travel to Europe for (representatives of) farmers should be closely examined in the light of resources required and the long term benefits expected. It is often more advantageous to visit countries in the region that may be a little more advanced, but that have clear similarities in agronomic, institutional and economic set-up.

The project ‘piloted’ a number of agricultural techniques. Although this is potentially valuable, it is less appropriate in a 2-year project with a target group of very poor farmers.


There is a tendency to overestimate the capacity of existing organisations such as the Collective Farms in Tajikistan. In future tenders, all assumptions regarding capacity should be proven beyond reasonable doubt and realistic and verifiable evidence should be included in the tender.


7 Project Evaluation Report

7.1 Project Data

Project name Support to the development, implementation and evaluation of agricultural policy



Project location Dushanbe, Tajikistan

Start date (actual) 21/06/06

End date 31/12/07

Contract value € 1,049,580

7.2 Summary of Conclusions

1. Relevance and quality of design C2. Effectiveness B3. Efficiency B4. Expected impact C5. Potential sustainability C


Key observations

The project was very relevant in the present policy context. However, there was a risk that it operated in a policy vacuum, with little support from the political establishment.

The short duration of the Project did not provide for the long-term involvement that overall objective would have required. Therefore it was recommended to concentrate on limited/distinctive policies or issues.

The Project should start working on an exit strategy.


The Project had been ongoing for less than a year, and a number of concrete outputs had been produced. However, given that there were only 9 more months left, it was questionable whether the Project was going to succeed in achieving its the expected


results. The major factor impeding project progress had been the lack of power of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the complete absence of an official agricultural policy or strategy.

The Project was implemented by WYG international, a consultancy firm, in cooperation with IMC, another consulting firm. The local partner was Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), represented by the First Deputy Minister.


The overall objective of the Project was to contribute to long-term food security and poverty alleviation by promoting key institutional reforms in the agricultural sector towards increased agricultural production and competitiveness.

The two specific objectives of this Project were i) to strengthen the capacity of the MoA to develop, implement, evaluate and regularly update a sound agricultural policy in line with the priorities laid down in the National Development Strategy and PRSP in coordination with the other agencies concerned; and ii) to develop the necessary policy instruments that will be used by the relevant units of the MoA to ensure that the development of agriculture is planned and conducted within the framework of a well managed policy framework.

To accomplish this dual purpose, the following seven results had been defined: 1. Establish and support a Policy and Strategy Unit integrated within the MoA structure

operating under an agreed programme for the period 2006 – 2008.2. Support to agricultural policy and strategy development based upon the NDS.3. Define medium term priority actions in the agriculture sector and develop the chain:

policy, budget and cash flow calculation and budget performance indicators.4. Undertake a functional review of the key parts of the MoA implicated in priority

actions in agriculture.5. Capacity building through training and systems upgrades within the MoA and

selected regional agricultural departments.6. Capacity building of the finance and payroll dept. to prepare and present

(programme) budgets.7. Priority action programmes and budgets are defined, detailed and reflected in the

provisions of the State and in the policy.


The project had been designed in the context of the ongoing EC Food Security Programme within which a need for policy support was defined. This put the project outside the Track 3 context and linked it directly to Track 2. However, it could be argued that there were important - if indirect - links to poverty reduction in general and to the creation of a more rational agricultural policy environment in particular.


The project was highly relevant in the context of the ongoing efforts to strengthen policy work in general and capacity building of the line ministries in particular.

The choice of the project target group was relevant, given the low capability and lack of experience of the MoA staff in policy related work. However, the Logical Framework was not clear in terms of the expected numbers and the level of the trainees.

The project scope appeared ambitious in terms of the ongoing policy efforts, especially given the absence of existing strategy work in the agricultural sector (one of the assumptions). Furthermore, there was some doubt as to the power of the MoA in decision making concerning agricultural strategies, as the Ministry did not hold full responsibility for policy formulation and defining of an agricultural strategy. This put the final results under risk.

The design did not foresee the recruitment of a policy expert as this task was to be covered by the team leader. At the moment of the evaluation, a policy expert had been recruited for which funding was found through the reduction of the number of man-days for the agricultural expert (from 10 months to 5 months).

The Logical Framework failed to provide OVIs in terms of the actual capacity of the MoA in developing, evaluating and updating agricultural policy.

7.6 Efficiency

The main input in this project was technical assistance. Given the slow start of the Project and the difficult policy environment, the efficiency of the resources used to date had been limited. Replacing some of the time of the agricultural expert with a policy expert had made a positive impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Project (the actions and possible outputs of the Project had become more focussed and realistic).

7.7 Effectiveness

Output 1 Establish and support a Policy Strategy Unit (PSU) integrated within the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and operating under an agreed programme for the period 2006 – 2008 The PSU had been established in the Ministry and specialist staff had been identified and recruited. One staff member of the Ministry had been seconded, but in general more efforts were needed to integrate the work of this unit in the MoA.

Output 2 Support the development of agricultural policy and strategy by ensuring adequate involvement of the farming population and their organisations and of the local administration A number of steps had been taken to accomplish this output, although much work remained to be done. The Project design assumed the existence of an agricultural strategy, but in reality, although some donors made efforts in this direction, no such strategy was ever adopted. It was questionable if such a policy/strategy was going to be developed in the life-time of the Project given the dearth of ongoing policy work within the MoA.


Output 3 Support the definition of medium-term priority actions in the agriculture sector and the development of the chain: policy; budget and cash flow calculation; budget performance indicatorsCapacity building was underway to support this output, although it was not certain to what extend the Project was going to be able to support the MoA in the actual drafting of the above mentioned policy instruments. Four manuals had been prepared to support MoA staff in their future work. Topics covered were accounting and payroll, budget, internal audit, and international public sector accounting standards. The Government only recently (January 2007) passed legislation to introduce a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) initiative to be used by all Ministries.

Output 4 Undertake a functional review of the key parts of the MoA and of the agriculture departments in the Sughd, RRS and Khatlon Oblasts, analysing key constraints and proposing suitable solutions to the development, implementation and evaluation of policy related actions, including necessary reform measures of the MoA and its regional structures A functional review had been undertaken and presented to high level policy makers. The functional review placed the MoA in the context of the overall structure and activity of the Government of Tajikistan, surveyed the Ministry’s units and their activities, and suggested a new structure that would make the Ministry more effective in carrying out its tasks. However, the review had not analysed the Ministry’s regional structures in detail, neither had it provided a clear pathway for making the transition from the existing Ministry structure and functions to the recommended ones. A steering Committee meeting was going discuss the continuation of the work on the functional review.

Output 5 Provide capacity building support through training and systems upgrades within the MoA and the selected regional agricultural departments A training needs assessment was carried out in the first month of project implementation. Training (both formal and on-the-job) had since been provided to relevant staff of the Ministry.

Output 6 Provide capacity building support to the finance and payroll department of the MoA to prepare and present (programme) budgets as an initial step towards the future development of a medium term budget framework;Support was being provided to the financial and payroll department of the MoA, both in terms of IT equipment and in terms of training.

Output 7 Ensure that priority action programmes and budgets are defined, detailed and reflected in the provisions of the state budget and in the policy matrices of the EC-FSP 2007-2008.No action related to this output had yet taken place.


7.8 Expected impact

It was too early to assess impact, but the expected impact was going to be modest at most, given the present weak position of the MoA in terms of policy formulation and implementation. Achieving change in the policy framework was going to be a long term effort.


The potential for sustainability was good in terms of staff capacity, but weak in terms of the Ministry’s capacity for policy formulation and implementation. There was a need to continue this work beyond the project’s lifetime and an exit strategy should be designed with this in view.


Strengths of the project

The Project was very relevant in the present policy context. It was to provide the tools that allowed for a more effective agricultural policy and therefore it contributed to a more efficient organisation of the agricultural sector.

The Project had been able to attract competent Ministry staff to work in the new Policy Unit.

Weaknesses of the project There was a risk that the Project operated in a political vacuum, with little support

from the political establishment. The design of the Project (short duration and firmly established results and activities)

did not provide for the flexibility and long-term involvement that the overall objective of Project would have required.

The design failed to provide clear guidance on some of the expected outputs (i.e. quantifiable OVIs).

The absence of statistical data had made it (even more) difficult to formulate policies.


A functional review of MoA was one the most important outputs of the Project. It should be used as a link to producing the other results.

The Project should identify distinctive policy areas (such as land reform) or issues (such as transport infrastructure) and concentrate on these instead of trying to cover the entire agricultural policy field.


8 Project Evaluation Report H

8.1 Project Data

Project name Poverty reduction through social safety net, agriculture and water management in the Sughd oblast



Project location Jabbor Rasulov and Isfara Districts, Sughd Region, Tajikistan

Starting date March 2005

End date December 2006

Contract value 787,500


1. Relevance and quality of design B

2. Effectiveness B

3. Efficiency B

4. Expected impact B

5. Potential sustainability B


Key observations

Project implementation in the areas of revolving funds and drinking and irrigation water infrastructure was efficient and these components achieved tangible results with good impact.

Other components in particular direct assistance to the social services was much less effective. Although the Project on paper was based on an area based approach, its components in practice were

implemented too separately from each other so that no synergies could be achieved between them. Adjustments to the original project design were not always made when necessary.


The Project was implemented as part of the Communities Programme of UNDP. Since 2001, the Programme has been setting up and supporting Jamoat Resource Centres (JRCs)


across Tajikistan. Jamoats are the local administration entities of which districts (raions) are composed of. Each jamoat normally comprises several villages. The JRCs are local level organisations, a kind of local NGOs, which are close to the local authorities and have close relations with the village communities. Other implementation partners of UNDP included local, district and regional authorities, regional and/or district level government organisations for social protection, vocational training, modular education etc. as well as local non-governmental organisations specialised in agriculture and gender issues.

Six jamoats were selected as target areas prior to the signing of the cooperation agreement between the EC and UNDP, three in the Isfara district (Surkh, Lakkon, Vorukh) and three in the Jabbor Rasulov district (Yangihayot, Uzbekkishlak, Gulhona). They all bordered either Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan: this seems to have been one selection criterion although the criterion was not spelled out clearly in the cooperation agreement. The total number of beneficiaries in the six jamoats was estimated at 75.500 people, around 41,700 in the Isfara district and 33,800 in Jabbor Rasulov district.

The implementation of the Project started in March 2005. UNDP first conducted meetings with the above mentioned stakeholders and beneficiaries to discuss needs and possible interventions. The intervention areas mentioned in the cooperation agreement were confirmed through these discussions. There was no inception report or major adjustments made to the original project design. As per the agreement with the EC, UNDP proceeded with the establishment of JRCs in the six target jamoats, including the setting up of revolving funds within the JRCs. UNDP started to carry out capacity building activities for the JRCs and proceeded with the detailed planning and implementation of other project activities (see next chapter).

The project was completed at the end of 2006. UNDP followed the initial plan and delivered the outputs foreseen in the agreement with the EC. By the time of the evaluators’ visit to the Project in April 2007, a Final Report had not yet been submitted. The evaluators requested UNDP to submit at least a draft Final Report: it was received in mid-May and could thus still be reviewed before the submission of the draft evaluation report to the EC.


The project had three components, each of them with 3-4 results. Each component had its own specific objective: (i) to improve rural livelihoods through the provision or rehabilitation of village drinking water supplies and the rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage infrastructure; (ii) to improve rural livelihoods through the provision of better on-farm advice, and (iii) to improve both urban and rural livelihoods through the reduction of unemployment through vocational training and job creation.

The planned results of the (i) water management component were: (1) a water supply management strategy formulated; (2) drinking water systems rehabilitated; and (3) awareness raised on health and sanitation issues.


The planned results of the (ii) agricultural management component were: (1) an agricultural strategy formulated for improved and sustainable production; (2) improved on-farm advice services for poor farmers, (3) revolving funds to support poor farmers; and (4) irrigation and drainage networks rehabilitated.

The planned results of the (iii) social safety component were: (1) an unemployment reduction strategy formulated, (2) targeted vocational training delivered, (3) social workers’ capacities improved.

A diagnostic study was conducted at the beginning of the Project. It provided baseline data on the target districts and listed the output indicators which had already been used in the original cooperation agreement between the EC and UNDP. Impact indicators, disaggregated by target jamoats, were limited to the drinking water component (waterborne diseases) and vocational training (employment figures).


The project objectives were in line with the general objectives of the EC’s poverty reduction scheme, as defined in the relevant Tacis Indicative Programme 2002-2004 and the Tacis Action Programme 2002 from which the project was financed. As the first Tajik PRSP for 2002-2006 covered a wide variety of issues, including the three areas of project intervention, it can be concluded that the Project was also in line with the Tajik PRSP for 2002-2006.

Poverty in the target jamoats is a result of complex problems, comprising low incomes, limited access to land and water, poor social infrastructure and services, lack of human capacities and a high level of insecurity due to the establishment of international borders which create tension between communities and hinder trade. The Project objectives were thus relevant to the needs of the population in the target jamoats.

The terminology used in the cooperation agreement differed from that of the EC’s PCM Guidelines and there were no risks or assumptions identified. Inter-linkages between the three components were not clear in the document and the components seemed to have been conceived separately from each other.

Two years elapsed between the drafting of the original ToR by the EC in 2003 and the start of the Project in 2005. There were changes in the project environment during this period, e.g. a new legal framework on microfinance was introduced in 2005. There was no inception report or other attempt to revise the original project design accordingly. UNDP interpreted the agreement with the EC rigidly and focused on implementing the activities as originally foreseen.

8.6 Effectiveness

The planned formulation of a water supply management strategy was translated into developing of project implementation approaches with the representatives of local


authorities and communities. The limited availability of funds forced the Project to choose 6 drinking water supply projects out of the 12 requests received from the village communities. Implementation focus was clearly on the physical rehabilitation of these 6 water supply systems. As a result, over 19.000 people got access to clean water from taps. Moreover, 60 women from the target communities attended training on hygiene and sanitation and 6 hygiene promotion groups were established.

The planned agricultural strategy with recommendations was prepared and presented to the stakeholders. However, it seems that there was no systematic follow-up and the implementation of the strategy remained in doubt. The Project focused on more concrete activities: 60 specialists from the target areas were hired and trained as extension agents and over 5000 farmers received advice from them. 6 revolving funds with a total credit portfolio of 167.938 USD were established within the JRCs. Over 5000 beneficiaries (over 38 % of them women) received soft loans for livestock, agricultural production, small-scale trade and SME development. Following changes in legislation, one of them (Vorukh) became an independent micro-finance institution and the other five were included in a regional scheme. With regard to irrigation and drainage, over 800 ha of land was provided with irrigation water, 4 new water users associations were established and 2 existing ones were strengthened.

The Regional Employment Centre conducted the survey which was foreseen within the social safety net component and two meetings were organised to disseminate the findings. Again, there is little evidence of what this has led to. 250 unemployed people participated in short term vocational education courses, 70 % of them were reported to be employed by the time of the Evaluation. After the courses, participants received certificates which were recognised both nationally and internationally, allowing them to use them also in the neighbouring countries and Russia. Two job clubs, which concentrated on improving the unemployed people’s communication and presentation skills, were established: the one in Proletarsk town (with the staff of 5) reported 456 clients in 2006 out of which 191 got jobs in Tajikistan (out of them 73 were women). Finally, 10 social workers were trained and 90 disadvantaged people benefited from the improved social services. The premises of the job clubs and social protection departments were repaired and equipped.

In terms of effectiveness, it seems that were considerable differences between the components. While the Project was very effective in the areas of micro-credit, drinking water systems and irrigation (with the planned output targets exceeded), the effectiveness was less good within the social safety net component and with regard to the implementation of the strategies/surveys. The latter were prepared by the implementation partners for the districts/jamoats/communities and not by the districts/jamoats/communities with the assistance of the implementation partners. Also, for the Project to be more effective the trained social workers should have trained other social workers (train-the-trainers), vocational education should have been carried out in closer coordination with the job clubs’ services and the trained unemployed could have received start-up kits, small grants or loans after having participated in the short courses.


8.7 Efficiency

The Interim Report covering the period from March 2005 to December 2005 and the draft Final Report did not allow for an easy assessment of project efficiency. Based on the draft Final Report, it can be concluded that the project implementation followed the original plan and the planned outputs were produced with the agreed means. Only minor adjustments were made in the allocation of resources. When payments by the EC were delayed, UNDP used its own resources in order to avoid delays in implementation.

Project management by UNDP was efficient, proved also by the fact that the change of the closing date did not pose problems to the Project. However, UNDP considered the cooperation agreement too strict: it opted for sticking to the original plan in order to avoid problems with EC. However, the efficiency of the Project would have gained from a revision of the implementation plan. In particular at the beginning of the Project, the two organisations were struggling to understand each other’s way of working: UNDP’s non-compliance with the EC reporting format did not facilitate the understanding.

8.8 Expected impact

As stated earlier, the diagnostic survey provided mainly output indicators except for the drinking water component and with regard to employment in the target jamoats. There was a clear impact of the access of over 19.000 people to clean water on the prevalence of waterborne diseases such as diarrhea, hepatitis and dysentery. The evaluators did not have access to full employment figures: the office in Proletarsk town however reported that 191 unemployed got jobs thanks to the project activities. This can be considered to have an impact at the level of a single community but the impact must be considered limited if looked at the level of all six target jamoats. Although the indicators used in the agriculture component weree based on outputs, their magnitude was such (over 5000 beneficiaries of soft loans, over 800 ha of irrigated land, etc.) that they can be assumed to have an impact at the level of the six jamoats. This conclusion was also supported by the poverty reductions trends (so-called “poverty pyramids”) the evaluators saw in the target jamoats. The same cannot be said about the social workers’ training activities which were already at the outset too limited to have an impact.


A total of 60 agricultural extension agents were trained by the Project, 10 in each jamoat. Only part of them could be retained by the JRSs after the Project, in most cases 4 out of 10 (but only one out of 10 in Vorukh). The rest returned to their usual agricultural activities where they used the acquired skills and knowledge for their own purposes. Whether the ones retained by the JRCs can be continued to be paid for providing advice to farmers, will depend on the general financial sustainability of the JRCs.

The interests generated through the revolving funds provided the JRCs with financial independence until the revolving funds had to be separated from the JRCs based on the new microfinance law. One of the revolving funds (Vorukh) became an independent


micro-finance institution and the other five were included in a regional scheme. The JRCs were supposed to continue receiving a financial contribution from the microfinance institutions but by the time of the Evaluators’ visit the amounts were not yet known by the JRCs. The future financial sustainability of the JRCs was dependant on these contributions.

With regard to infrastructure, the beneficiary communities had participated in the initial works mainly through the provision of land and labour. There had been some initial misconceptions concerning who was responsible for the operation and maintenance but these had been rectified and the communities now understood their role and responsibilities in maintaining the infrastructure. Four new Water Users’ Associations were formed and two existing ones were strengthened.

The cooperation agreement did not mention the state of the environment or its improvement as an objective. The drainage infrastructure however should reduce water logging and prevent salinization and alkalization. The Project should thus have “unintentional” positive impact on the state of the environment.

With regard to gender, the Project had tried to reach the UNDP standard requirement of at least 40 % of the beneficiaries being female. In the case of the revolving funds, 38% of the beneficiaries were women. However, the fact that up to 80% of adult males had emigrated from the rural communities implied that the percentage of beneficiaries within male population was much higher that that within the female population. In terms of the drinking water infrastructure, the whole communities benefited but the benefits were even greater for women and children who carried water to houses.

In terms of visibility, the Project used standard banners and signposts wherever possible. In some cases, the visibility of UNDP was more evident that that of the EC.



Straight-forward, timely and efficient implementation of project activities in the areas of micro-credit, drinking water and irrigation infrastructure.

Clear effects and potential impact of the revolving funds and the infrastructure projects.

Weaknesses of the project

Project components were in practice planned and implemented separately from each other, thus undermining the potential synergies of an area based approach.

Considerable differences in effectiveness between the project components. Limited adjustment of project activities to changes in its external environment.



Within the drinking water component of the Project which was one of the most successful ones, only 6 of the 12 projects identified in the target jamoats could be financed because of the limited funds reserved for the purpose in the Project. This should have been seen as an opportunity to reallocate funds within the project or a new project could have been launched, possibly through a direct negotiation with UNDP. This would have improved the impact of EC assistance in the target jamoats. Alternatively, the EC call for proposals for the Sughd oblast which was launched in 2006 should have covered more explicitly drinking water so that UNDP could have presented these projects through it.


9 Project Evaluation Report I

9.1 Project Data

Project name Improvement of the production, processing and sale of medicinal, spicy and perfumery herbs and plants; recovering of rare and vanishing plants, fruit trees, legumes and ornamental trees



Project location Districts of B. Gafurov, Ganchi, Shahristan,

Istaravshan, Sughd region, Tajikistan

Starting date 1 July 2006

End date 31 December 2007



1. Relevance and quality of design D

2. Effectiveness C

3. Efficiency C

4. Expected impact C

5. Potential sustainability C


Key observations

The project design was only marginally linked to the poverty reduction objective of the Scheme. The project scope and results were too ambitious for the timeframe. Implementation so far fell well short of expectations. The Project was not financially viable and economic returns for the target groups were expected only after

several years. A relatively high number of local consultants were employed by the Project and their tasks and level of

involvement should be clarified. Co-ordination between different components was weak and visibility in the target communities was low. Transparency was a concern in the implementation of the processing and marketing activities, notably with

regard to the laboratory of analysis. Initial feedback on impact was mixed



The applicant was a local NGO “Jovid”. It was registered in 2002 and had currently a staff of 17 employees, of whom 15 were full-time. Since the beginning of its operations, Jovid’s activity had mainly focused on seed development and on the establishment of seed banks as well on the provision of private agriculture extension services (information, consulting, training, agricultural inputs) to small farmers.

In partnership with the German Agro Action (GAA), Jovid had already been directly involved in the implementation of a previous EC action grant in Shahristan and Ganchi where it established 2 Agricultural Advisory Centres and 2 demonstration plots. It also participated as the main partner of GAA in the implementation of a food security project in Zeravshan Valley. Jovid had been one of UNDP’s implementation partners in the UNDP/EC project 85400 and it also participated in the implementation the new UNDP/EC grant project 121786. The present action grant was the first in which Jovid was the lead applicant.

The other partner was a local NGO APiK (Association of enterprises and co-operatives). It had 4 full-time employees. APiK is the oldest NGO in Tajikistan and has been operating since 1992, with a focus on providing advice and training to small start-up rural businesses and on supporting the institutional development of farmer co-operatives.

The Project was approved through the Tacis call for proposals “Social Inclusion and Income Generation in Soghd Region of Tajikistan” which had a deadline for the receipt of applications on 24 March 2006. Prior to participating in this call for proposals, Jovid and APiK had been co-operating already for several years on developing a multi-annual strategic programme to revive the cultivation, and to promote processing and marketing, of high income generating plants, herbs and trees. During Soviet times, these used to be cultivated in the Soghd region mainly for the Russian market but the production receded significantly, or vanished for some species, after the independence and the ensuing disintegration of the traditional market channels. Within this framework, a significant body of research and surveys, particularly on traditional medical plants, had already been developed to support the application for the EC grant.

The activities planned under the action grant actually started in April 2006 immediately following the notification of the grant award and before the contract signature with the EC (which occurred in July 2006). These activities comprised the establishment of one nursery in Istaravshan, one greenhouse in B. Gafurov and two demonstration plots, one in Ganchi and one in Sharistan. The decision to anticipate the start date of the activities was taken by the applicant in view of ensuring that planting of the seeds and young trees occurred within the natural cycle of the planting season. The nursery, the greenhouse and the two demonstration plots were so far endowed with 25 different varieties of plants, herbs and trees out of a total originally planned number of 30 varieties. The deviation was explained with the unavailability of seeds for the remaining target varieties in the Sughd region.


The plantations were located on private ‘dekhan’ farms selected for their proximity to water supply and traditional local markets for seedlings. The land where the plantations were established had been leased by Jovid for a duration of 10 years. At least 4 agronomists were employed full-time on the grant budget to develop the seedlings and to provide training and advice to recipient individuals and institutions whenever appropriate.

The nursery in Istaravshan, visited by the Evaluation Team, was established on a 1ha surface, was fenced and an information board was standing with the EC logo but no information attached. Only few labels to identify name and sort of seedlings were noted, and no explanations on seedlings characteristics and properties were visible.

According to the applicant, 80% of the seedlings varieties had been distributed to 500 farmers in the 4 target districts, of which 200 to female heads of ‘dekhan’ farms. This represented approximately 20% of the project target group number.

Criteria for eligibility to receive the seedlings included presentation of a business plan by the farmer and farmer participation in an introductory agro-seminar organised by the Project in each district. However, interviews with a group of recipients of the seedlings in the rural municipality of Nijoni (Istaravshan district) showed that the criteria were being applied loosely and that out of a total of 30 farmers (all men) who received the seedlings, only 23 had actually participated in the training.

In B. Gafurov district, a blind and deaf children’s boarding school had received young fruit trees from the Project and had planted them instead of the usual potato seeds. This shift raised concerns about the wisdom of this choice induced by the Project, considering that the first harvest from the fruit trees was not expected before five years, compared with the annual harvest of potatoes.

Other on-going activities included the following: notably 8 processing and marketing farmer co-operative groups were initiated in the 4 districts, of which one group comprised 20 women farmers. However, the prospect for the institutional development of the groups into fully-fledged co-operatives was questionable due to the restrictive and outdated state co-operative law and the current obstacles encountered in the legal registration of the groups as co-operatives.

A marketing advisor was hired in Chkalovsk to assist the target groups with the preparation of business plans, partners and customers search, business licensing, customs registration, and applications for micro-credit. The advisor was also responsible for issuing letters of intention aiming at guaranteeing individual farmers and recipient institutions against potential market risks.

Laboratory and processing equipment had been procured and stored in the premises of Jovid in Chkalovsk but none had yet been installed. All equipment was planned to be installed in the laboratory and training centre premises, located near the Jovid office, which were in the process of being refurbished. A laboratory analyst had been hired on a part-time basis and given the task to prepare an application for the accreditation of the laboratory. It appeared, however, that the analyst was also a member of the regional board for accreditation, therefore raising the issue of a conflict of interest.


A four-wheel drive car (Niva Chevrolet) had been procured under the grant equipment budget and was being used by Jovid staff in Chkalovsk.

Apart from the reference of recipients of seedlings to the introductory agro-seminars prior to planting, no information was received from Jovid on training activities and an overall training plan was not available.


The overall objective of the Project was to improve the livelihood of the rural population in Northern Tajikistan by involving them into income generating activities on cultivating, processing, sale and use of medicinal, spicy and perfume herbs and plants, recovering of rare and vanishing sorts of plants and trees.

The stated project purpose was fivefold. First, the improvement of nurseries for relevant herbs and plants, second, the transfer and dissemination of relevant know-how, third, the development of marketing structures, fourth, the creation of and assistance to producer associations, and fifth, support to relevant health institutions.

Five results had been identified:

High production varieties of medicinal plants, spice and perfume herbs and rare and vanishing varieties of plants are grown in nurseries and prepared for future distribution to farmers and interested persons.

Relevant processing technologies are introduced and relations with potential producers are developed

Agricultural producers cultivate medicinal plants, spice and perfume herbs or collect them

Producer units process and sell the products on national and international markets The rural population is trained to use medicinal plants to improve their diet,

health and to protect from diseases.


At face value, the project objectives seemed to support the Poverty Scheme’s objective of local economic development: first, through support to the development of agriculture extension services (nurseries), second, through income generating activities centred on the diversification, processing and marketing of agriculture production (co-operatives) and third, through promoting healthy diets among the target rural populations (hence reducing diseases and increasing the potential for higher labour productivity).

The objectives also appeared to be in line with two of the priorities of the call for proposal, notably support to local economic development initiatives (notably agricultural extension and marketing services) and social mobilisation of rural population, including women and marginalised groups, into income generating activities. Accordingly, the


objectives were also consistent with the overall priority goals of the National Development Strategy, and the PRSP 2002-06 as well as the draft PRSP 2007-09.

However, beneath this seemingly serene justification of the Project there were disturbing aspects that the Evaluators could not avoid considering. The starting point of the Project seemed to be rather a mixed academic and commercial interest in reviving a soviet-era trading scheme than poverty reduction among the targets groups. Without having assurances of the success of this trade in the future, the Project had embarked on changing farming practices of poor rural populations. The associated risks, including for the EC as the project financier, were considerable.

The target groups were only broadly defined. They included 2500 farmer families scattered among the four target districts and 10 rural institutions ranging from rural schools through medical centres and co-operative groups to small private businesses. Final beneficiaries were estimated at just over 10000.

Problems had been analysed almost exclusively from a commercial perspective and this was reflected in the selection of the seedlings varieties. Assumptions and risks were not identified.

The resource and cost schedule indicated that the Project was not financially viable and would produce positive economic returns only after several years because many of the seedling varieties required a long gestation period before the first harvest.

9.6 Effectiveness

Progress towards the achievement of the results was mixed and only in relation to output 1 clear progress had been achieved to date.

Output 1 High production varieties of medicinal plants, spice and perfume herbs and rare and vanishing varieties of plants are grown in nurseries and prepared for future distribution to farmers and interested persons. All planned nurseries were established and 25 varieties of herbs, plants and trees seedlings were grown in the nurseries. 500 farmers and 1 rural school had already received and planted the seedlings and basic technical training on planting and growing the seedlings had been provided to the recipients. Advisory services to the farmers were available through the nurseries which employed 4 agronomists full-time.

Output 2 Relevant processing technologies are introduced and relations with potential producers are developed. Processing equipment was procured and the plan was to install the equipment in the training centre of Jovid in Chkalovsk to train the target groups in the techniques of first-line processing of herbs and plants. Laboratory equipment was also procured to set up a laboratory to certify the quality of the farmer products. The laboratory was also to be established in Jovid premises. A marketing centre, staffed with 1 advisor, had been established in Jovid premises in Chkalovsk to assist farmers with the preparation of business plans, customer search, etc.


Output 3 Agricultural producers cultivate medicinal plants, spice and perfume herbs or collect them. 500 farmers and 1 rural school were supplied with an average of 4 varieties of seedlings each. Basic training on planting and growing the seedlings was provided and seedlings planted.

Output 4 Producer units process and sell the products on national and international markets. The project had been supporting the creation of processing and marketing co-operative groups. Eight were so far established. Registration of co-operatives was encountering some difficulties from limitations in current co-operative law. No progress was reported in facilitating access to micro-finance by co-operative groups.

Output 5 The rural population is trained to use medicinal plants to improve their diet, health and to protect from diseases. No evidence of on-going activities in this area was noted except for the participation of 1 rural school in the project activities.

9.7 Efficiency

The operational plan and timetable for the implementation of activities were incomplete. The resource and cost schedule indicated that the project was not financially viable and would produce positive economic returns only after several years because many of the seedling varieties required a long gestation period before the first harvest. An internal monitoring system was not in place.

Co-ordination between different components was weak and communication and information activities were mainly carried out by word of mouth.

Moreover, a relatively high number of local consultants were apparently involved in the project activities, including medical plants, laboratory and marketing experts. The majority of them were based in the Jovid office. Their level of involvement and tasks in the Project were not always clear. The level and stage of project activities did not seem to justify the full-time involvement of the local consultants in the Project, if this was to be the case.

9.8 Expected impact

It was too early to say whether the Project was contributing to the improvement of the livelihood of the target groups, not to mention that of the wider rural population in the target districts. It was noted, however, that the quantities of seedlings distributed to farmers were too small to deliver sufficient produces to be marketed. In addition, there were indications of potentially negative effects on participating rural institutions, notably the above-mentioned school in B. Gafurov (but possibly others as well) where there had been a shift towards the cultivation of agricultural produce with a much longer gestation period as a result of the Project.



The varieties of plants, herbs and trees promoted by the project were certainly in need of less water than cotton production but, with the exception of grapes, were nevertheless requiring access to adequate irrigation water and could not be grown in marginal, non irrigated land. And water could be considered a scarcely available resource in the target districts.

From an economic and financial perspective, the sustainability of the nurseries by the end of the Project had not proved as the demand for the seedlings could remain marginal. It was unclear how the costs of the technical staff (agronomists) would be covered once the grant was going to end.

Little was planned to strengthen the institutional and management capacity of the nurseries which will remain property of Jovid. Many public information activities were planned to raise policy support from local decision-makers but there was no evidence yet of their implementation.



Weaknesses of the project The starting point seemed to be rather a mixed academic and commercial interest

in reviving a soviet-era trading operation than poverty reduction among the targets groups. This raised concern about the risks of changing farming practices of poor rural populations.

Target groups were not clearly identified. Economic returns for the target groups were expected only after several years. Co-ordination between different project components was weak and visibility in

the target communities was low. A relatively high number of local consultants were employed without clear job

descriptions. The planning of the processing and marketing activities raised concerns of

transparency, notably with regard to the location of the laboratory and processing equipment.

Initial feedback on impact was mixed, with neutral or possible negative effects on target groups.


10 Project Evaluation Report J

10.1 Project Data

Project name Establishment of social reintegration centres for vulnerable women in Sohgd Region



Project location Soghd Region, Tajikistan

Starting date 30 June 2006






Key observations

Contractor should pay more attention to employment opportunities and find ways to assist the graduates in finding jobs.

The component of capacity building received little attention. Especially the link with employment creation office should be strengthened.


The grant was obtained through a call for proposals financed out of the TACIS Action Programmes 2003 and 2004. The Netherlands Red Cross was the applicant and the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST) the local (implementing) partner. Further


collaborating partners were Employment Centres at District level, Women committees of local Khukumats and Jamoat (community) Development Committees. In addition, there were links with the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection.

The RCST is an active organisation mainly geared towards providing disaster preparedness and mitigation services, medical and social development services. The organisation has a strong local presence with 2,300 volunteers in the Soghd district. It should be noted that the current project was their first venture into the area of social and economic development.

By the time of the evaluation, the Project was at the middle of its implementation period: management arrangements had been set up, training venues had been rehabilitated and experienced trainers had been hired. At the moment of the Evaluators’ visit, three different courses were ongoing.

Implementation of the Project was progressing well. This was at least partly attributable to the straightforward objectives of the Project and the experience of RCST as the local implementing partner.

Objective 1: Creating conditions for reintegration and mobilization of vulnerable women in Tajikistan.

To achieve this objective, five social reintegration centers (Isfara, Kanibadam, Gafurov, Spitamen) and Khujand city) had been established, equipped and supplied with necessary tools. Training curricula and educational schedule for training had been developed. The format of Certificates approved by Soghd Regional Centre of Employment of Population had been used to perform training courses. Necessary agreements had been signed with the regional and districts authorities, and local communities.

Objective 2: Improving the social status of vulnerable women in Tajikistan

Beneficiary women were to get opportunities to acquire new knowledge and skills through short vocational training courses (sewing and cooking in all five centres; computer courses in Kanibadam and Isfara). Participants also received gender training which included family planning, how to start one’s own business, and how to create conditions for applying the obtained skills. To date, 1030 female trainees out of a projected 2972 had been trained.

Objective 3: Strengthen the Partner’s capacity in project management and poverty alleviating issues. The Project was to provide institutional support and capacity building for local development structures and to enable the Partner to improve its internal management capacities. However, apart from coordination between Partner staff and the national and regional level administration not much had been carried out in terms of capacity building.

The Project beneficiaries were invited to become involved voluntarily in the Red Crescent activities as RCST volunteers. A number of trainees had indeed taken up this


opportunity, thereby extending the RCST network among the different age and gender groups of the population.


The project overall objectives presented in the Grant Application were: i) to create conditions for reintegration and mobilization of vulnerable women; ii) to improve the social status of vulnerable women; and iii) to strengthen the Partner’s capacity in project management and poverty alleviating issues. To achieve this goal the project was to empower vulnerable women in Soghd Region of Tajikistan for social reintegration by providing professional job qualifications and practical gender knowledge.

The final results of the project were going to be i) conditions created for reintegration and mobilization of vulnerable women; ii) vulnerable women who have knowledge on new professional qualifications and gender, and opportunities for social reintegration; and iii) strengthened capacity in project management and poverty alleviating issues of the partner (Red Crescent Society Tajikistan - RCST).


The project was in compliance with the EC Action Programme 2003-2004 objectives and the National Development Plan as it contributed to a stronger local economy through creating improved employability of women and was targeted at a vulnerable portion of the population. However, there were no activities in the project to “improve administrative skills of local governments (oblast and rayon level)” as stated in the Action Programme 2004.

It appeared that at the beginning of the project the Oblast Administration had insisted on a concentration of activities (training) in the Oblast Employment Centre, but this was resisted by the Netherlands Red Cross, the RCST and the EC Delegation as it would have made the distance from the communities too far. According to the project manager “it is already difficult to convince the women to visit the courses in the district towns”.

Officials met in relation to this project confirmed the importance of addressing the issue of training (and employment) for women as they are in a particular vulnerable position when the majority of the able bodied male members of the family are away in Russia for work.

At the moment of the evaluation, there was no formal relationship between the project and the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection. Given the importance of the MoL&SP as a partner in the project, the parties should explore the possibilities of establishing a MoU between them (even if it is too late for the project, it may be important for future initiatives).


It was not clear why the Project (and the logical framework) did not include strengthening of (local) administrative structures as they could have had a clear – if modest - role to play in organising training and finding employment for this target group.

The Project foresaw a number of paying persons per course. However, the proposal contained no indication of how and when this was to be introduced and RCST seemed to be reluctant to advance quickly on this aspect. The argument used in application to justify payments for courses (apart from the financial sustainability) was that other courses (private) were also paid for and seemed to attract sufficient trainees. However, there were also similar schemes run by Governmental and Non-Governmental Organisations who provided free training. Considering the focus of the project on the most vulnerable, it was not clear if this represented a good approach.

The quality of design was strong on aspects of approach to training: not only technical skills but also ‘live skills’ we being transferred and the women met by the evaluators (both current trainees and graduates) clearly showed an understanding (and appreciation) of these skills which also helped them in their daily life, both in the household and in society at large.

The logframe matrix reviewed by the evaluators showed some confusion as to the correct levels of intervention, as it seemed that the overall objectives and the specific objective had been mixed up.

10.6 Efficiency

The Project was managed by the EU project applicant but the day-to-day running of the project was with RCST. This organisation was well equipped for the task and had the advantage of a wide network of volunteers at all levels (e.g. volunteers were used to spread the news of the Project to the targeted areas).

In the 1st year, 65% of the funds had been spent (€224,000). It was mentioned that they were trying to save money on some budget lines in order to expand activities funded from other budget lines but that the EC Delegation had told them recently that there were no possibilities for changes any more. There was not much evidence of contacts with other projects and/or donors (although UNDP facilitated a press conference) in the region and this was justified with the argument that “this is a unique project”.

10.7 Effectiveness

The project effectiveness could be assessed as satisfactory. With 1030 trainees out of the projected 2972, the project was on schedule and was expected to reach the targets.


The project started on June 30 2006 for a period of 18 months. The initial period was used to rehabilitate training venues, to design training courses and to select and contract trainers.

The courses were assessed as good for two reasons. They had managed to attract competent teachers and the teachers saw their role as more than teaching the technical topics (also “life lessons”). Separate lessons were provided by a gender specialist and this made the centre a “social centre for women”.

Less successful elements were i) the ability of the Project to reach remote communities; and ii) the short duration of the courses. In case the distance exceeded approximately 12 km, the transport cost (or time) became prohibitive for the women to attend. The targeting of vulnerable women was slightly adjusted in favour of younger women who were recent entries on the labour market. As for the duration, please see the section under impact.

The concept of paying for courses was originally foreseen, but it was introduced only gradually. It led to an immediate drop in applications. The RCST did not seem to have a definite position on this aspect and seemed to be reluctant to raise barriers for entry.

In summary, the project had mostly achieved expected results 1 and 3 and was on schedule with the expected result 2.

10.8 Expected impact

It was too early to assess the impact of the Project; however, there seemed to be few cases where the women had found employment after the training. There was potential positive (unintended) effect on the household in the case of cooking (where also aspects of hygiene and safety were taught). Besides, all trainees had acquired the more general gender skills which could be used (and shared) in society.

There was a concern regarding the training courses: since they were short (48 hours), their effect on the skills was necessarily modest. Although it was feasible that the women would benefit financially from the courses, it was equally clear that a longer training would have benefited the women better. The argument heard that trainees cannot spare more time away from their domestic chores was not convincing as women who live in similar conditions manage to attend longer trainings such as those of organised by UNDP where they raised no objections to the length of their courses.


The training venues and equipment will remain available after the project ends. It was not clear how the project partners were going to continue financing the trainers and other staff involved. It was learned from RCST that they planned to have a two-year continuation of donor funding to achieve sustainability.


The graduates received no start up capital or start-up kits which made it hard for them to start their business immediately after graduation. There was no follow-up system to monitor impact.

The Training Centres produced business plans for the future and most centres expected to cover their costs for 50% but could not hope to cover more, even with paying trainees.


Strengths of the project Good image of RCST Linkages/ unintended (good) effects Potential of trainees to become involved in RCST as volunteers Low standard of skills ensures low barriers to entry.

Weaknesses of the project Sustainability in terms of courses (see above) A constraint in developing business opportunities (for the beneficiaries) Unreliability or unavailability of electricity


Their seemed to be room for extending the duration of the courses. Although the courses should not be extended for the sake of having longer courses, this type of training should seek a balance between length and acquired skills.

There could be more attention paid to actual job creation. Providing graduates with start-up kits could be considered.


11 Project Evaluation Report K

11.1 Project Data

Project name Social Inclusion through Income Generation in Soghd Oblast



Project location District of B. Gafurov (Ovchi-Kalacha, Kistakuz),

District of Isfara (Surkh, Chorkuh), Soghd region,

Tajikistan

Starting date 1 July 2006




1. Relevance and quality of design B

2. Effectiveness C

3. Efficiency B

4. Expected impact B

5. Potential sustainability C


Key observations

The Project was managed efficiently and in accordance with plans. However, transparency could be enhanced by separating management of the revolving fund (established under previous projects) from that of other funds (development, small grants) of the Project.

Synergies between different project results and services were not systematically exploited which reduced access of target groups, notably the most vulnerable, to project benefits

Prospects for impact were encouraging, notably thanks to the access to wider networks (e.g. national JRCs network) provided through the project to local institutions.

The assumption made on the financial and economic sustainability of project results was unlikely to materialize and the project needed an exit strategy to address sustainability issues.

Visibility of EC funding was not ensured in all JRCs



The Project was approved through the Tacis call for proposals “Social Inclusion and Income Generation in Soghd Region of Tajikistan” which had a deadline for the receipt of applications on 24 March 2006. The applicant was the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Tajikistan.

Four target rural municipalities (jamoats) were selected which are all bordering Batken region in Kyrgyzstan and are commonly affected by land and water disputes with neighbouring Kyrgyz settlements.

Project activities started in July 2006 with information sharing meetings with the relevant local authorities at regional, district and municipal levels. The series of meetings confirmed the validity of the proposed approach to make use of the already existing Jamoat Resource Centres (JRC) as the vehicles for community mobilisation. In November 2006, formal agreements of co-operation were signed between the Project and the JRCs in the 4 target jamoats. Nevertheless, the understanding of the project objectives differed between the JRCs. For instance, in the jamoat of Chorku, unlike in other jamoats, the Director of the JRC appeared to have understood that the purpose of the project´s small grant and development funds was to supplement the existing micro-credit revolving fund.

The project consists of 3 main components; social integration of marginalised groups into income generating activities, improvement of agriculture and livestock productivity, and channelling of migrants remittances towards local economic development projects, which were being implemented by a number of local partners selected by UNDP.

Under component 1 (social integration of marginalised groups) two business advisory centres were established in Chorku and Ovchi Kalacha under the umbrella of the JRCs. These were now operational and staffed with 1-2 consultants each whom were trained by a local NGO. The centres had a strong focus on providing legal assistance for the registration of start-up businesses. In Chorku, for instance, over 400 start-up businesses were being assisted with their legal registration.

The second activity under this component was the delivery of vocational training, namely three to four months duration workshops in specialised skills (including welding, carpentry, sowing, cooking, hair dressing) which were identified through a survey carried out by the Project with local employers. The workshops (8 in total) were established by and were managed through the JRCs, which received from the project a small grant of EUR 5000 for each workshop established. The majority of selected participants were young unemployed and female head of households. Approximately 40% of the selected participants to the workshops in Chorku and Surkh were women. At the end of the course, each participant received a training certificate issued by the JRC. However, the certificate was not formally recognised by the Employment Centres as equivalent to state sponsored vocational training courses. According to UNDP, diplomas were not a determinant issue for local employers and customers demanding rather specialised skills than diplomas. This could not be verified by the Evaluation Team (in project 85400,


UNDP used the Centre for Modular Training to conduct similar courses. The Centre issued state certificates and that was considered a positive aspect in that project).

Under component 2 (improvement of agriculture and livestock productivity), two Farm Field Schools (FFS) were created under the JRCs in Surkh and Ovchi-Kalacha in order to promote best agricultural practices and raise awareness of land-use rights. 20 extension workers were to be trained by a local NGO. Also within the framework of the FFS sub-component, two demonstration plots were being established and sown with crops for animal feeding in both Surkh and Ovchi Kalacha. The selection of demonstration crops followed a survey on activities of farm households carried out by the implementing local NGO. The location of the demonstration plot in Surkh, which was meant to serve farmers in both jamoats of Chorku and Surkh, was along a main road and accessible. However no attention was paid to visibility of the demo plot, including in particular EC visibility.

In terms of infrastructure rehabilitation, the sub-project on the rehabilitation of the irrigation water supply system in Ovchi Kalacha was initiated in December 2006 and 85% of the works had been realised by April 2007. The tender for the rehabilitation of the irrigation infrastructure in Chorku was on-going. As for the other two selected sub-projects in Kistakuz and Surkh, technical assessment was still ongoing at the beginning of April 2007.

Four Water Users Associations (WUA) were also established in each of the target jamoats under the umbrella of the JRCs. The WUA were equipped and technical, financial and management training was being delivered to them by the Water Management Department.

No activities could as yet be recorded on introduction of bucket drip fed irrigation for most marginal farm lands.

Under component 3 (channelling of migrants remittances towards local economic and social development projects) the project aimed to support the establishment of 10 Migrant Household Initiative Groups (MHIGs) under the umbrellas of the JRCs in order to leverage migrants’ remittances for local economic development projects (i.e. start-up of income generating activities), for rehabilitation of villages social infrastructure (e.g. rural schools, hospitals, etc.) and to facilitate the transfer of remittances from diasporas.

Within this framework, the Project had allocated small development funds of EUR 7.000 to each JRC in the target jamoats, which were to be allocated for topping-up financial contributions by MHIGs in rehabilitation works or start-up of new income generating activities. The approach was new in the target areas and was first applied by UNDP jointly with IOM in the Khatlon region. One of the first initiatives under this component was the organisation of 2 study tours to expose the target groups to the experience of MIHGs in Khatlon. This activity involved about 60 local target groups, mainly wives of migrants. The concept was well received by the local communities and authorities. In Surkh, the MHIGs were in average contributing about 1/3 of the total cost of the on-going and planned social infrastructure rehabilitation works, with 1/3 being contributed by the local authorities and 1/3 from the JRC small development fund. A minimal threshold of


50% in cash for each project was required from the other parties before releasing the contribution from the small development fund.


The project overall objective was to reduce the poverty level in Sughd region through innovative economic development initiatives based on existing community-based organisations.

Three results were identified. The first was social integration of marginalised groups into income generating activities. The second was improved agricultural and livestock productivity. The third was remittances channelled for local economic development initiatives.


The project objectives supported the general objective of reducing poverty in the Ferghana Valley through low-risk community initiatives promoting local economic development and social stability. The Project was also fully consistent with the geographical and activity type priorities outlined in the call for proposals.

The project intervention was designed to benefit directly about 9000 individuals and indirectly 45000 persons. The latter figure was equivalent to 40% of the total population in the 4 target rural municipalities (jamoat) and roughly 15% of the estimated total rural population in the two target districts. The target groups were marginalised and most vulnerable groups (i.e. young unemployed, female head of households, small farmers on marginal lands, people with disabilities).

Problems of the target groups had been analysed through surveys and participatory planning activities implemented by the JRCs in each of the target jamoats. The grass-root participation of the individual village communities in the process of identification of priority needs had been balanced in some of the target jamoats by the crucial contribution to final decision-making on priorities of the local intellectual leadership (the so called ‘intelligentsia’, an informal forum made up of religious, political and civil society leaders at jamoat level). Where applied, this input had positively contributed to mediate consensus among different village communities in establishing an order of priority needs at jamoat level, resulting in a more balanced outcome in terms of priorities, and in leveraging adequate community contributions for addressing the priority needs.

The logical framework approach was not fully respected as specific objectives and results were identical, making one of the two levels obsolete. Most of the identified assumptions were likely to be realised though not all. Some key assumptions were left out (e.g. those related to the development of synergies between the different components or related to sector and donor co-ordination). Indicators were generally appropriate and complete. Results were achievable, and management and financial arrangements were clear and supportive to capacity-building of local institutions and local ownership.


Experience and results of previous projects implemented by UNDP in the target areas (i.e. SIDA/DFID financed Conflict Prevention Project, TACIS financed Poverty Reduction through Social Social Safety Net, Agriculture development and Water Management in Soghd Region) and in other regions (i.e. Support to Wives of Migrants in Khatlon region) as well as linkages with other on-going projects (i.e. BOMCA, FARMS) and planned projects under the UNDP Country Strategy, were adequately assessed and incorporated in the strategy (with the exception of the above-mentioned difference in the delivery of vocational training for the Evaluation Team could not find justification).

11.6 Efficiency

The work programme was being implemented in accordance with the original timetable. Resources for the implementation of activities were made available on time and at the planned costs. A project monitoring system was in place and regularly used by the project management and corrective measures could therefore be timely implemented if required.

The project services were generally perceived as of good quality and the commitment of the local partners and their contributions were high.

Nevertheless, there was ground for improving communication between the Project and some JRCs (namely Chorku) on issues of project management, notably in relation to the intended purpose of the small grant fund and the small development funds made available to the JRCs by the Project, and the need to keep the management of these funds separate from the revolving funds established under previous projects.

11.7 Effectiveness

The likelihood that the projects results were achievable would be strongly enhanced if the project management developed appropriate linkages and synergies between the different activities (vocational training, business advice, extension services, small infrastructure rehabilitation, community mobilisation) with the aim of facilitating the access of the target groups to more than one project service.

Many of the planned target groups had access to the project services with the notable exception, as observed during the site visits, of the most vulnerable and dislocated populations which did not always benefit from access to services, as for example in the case of vocational training workshops.

While the project actively promoted its services through the JRCs, the criteria for selection should be adjusted in the case of skills training. Appropriate incentives should be provided with a view to facilitating the access of the most marginalised segments of the target populations to project services.



The most notable effect of the project on its wider environment was in the sphere of community mobilisation. This was evidenced through the fast developing contribution of some of the project community initiatives, notably the MHIGs, to poverty reduction, through co-funding of crucial small infrastructure projects (e.g. safe drinking water supply system in 2 villages of the jamoat of Chorku) and of income generating activities.

Impact prospects of the Project were high thanks to the strong potential for multiplication through UNDP’s access to a capillary network of 84 JRCs across the country. In October 2006, a national conference with all JRCs was held in Dushanbe on the topic of labour migration. During the conference, some of the JRCs in the target jamoats (notably the JRC in Kistakuz) established a direct contact with the Centre for Labour Migration (CLM) of Moscow and as a result, received detailed information on employers’ demand for the specialised skills covered by the vocational training courses managed by the JRCs under the Project.


The financial and economic sustainability of the Project was problematic as the assumption that the beneficiaries can afford to pay for the continuation of the project services (e.g. business advice, vocational training, farms field training) was overoptimistic. Moreover, future funding for the project services from the JRC revolving funds was unlikely, particularly after steps to consolidate all revolving funds in a regional Micro-Finance Fund were taken in order to meet the requirements of the existing micro-finance legislation. Some of the technologies introduced by the Project were low-cost and could not be maintained and replaced in the future by the target groups. In Chorku, for instance, the cooking workshop was equipped with sophisticated electrical ovens and pots from Turkey which could hardly be maintained or replaced.

There was also ground for some concern that, although the Project had been strongly embedded in the local institutional structures, the JRCs were mostly dependent for their financial viability on the revolving funds. The consolidation of the revolving funds into a regional Micro-Finance Fund was likely to put under jeopardy the future financial and economic sustainability of the JRCs. In general, the Project did not have but would need to develop an exit strategy to address the sustainability issues.


Strengths of the project The project design built on lessons learnt and results of previous projects.


The work programme was being implemented efficiently and in accordance with original timetable

Prospects for impact were high, not least because of the potential multiplication effects which were enhanced by the access of project institutions to wider UNDP networks (e.g. JRCs national network)

Weaknesses of the project Synergies between different project results/services were not systematically

exploited which reduced access of target groups, notably the most vulnerable, to project benefits.

The assumption of the financial/economic sustainability of the project results was unlikely to materialize.

Visibility of EU funding was not ensured in all JRCs (notably Chorku).


12 Project Evaluation Report L

12.1 Project Data

Project name Inclusive Agricultural Development in Sughd: Supporting Socially Responsible Growth of the Farm Economy in Isfara and Kanibadam



Project location Isfara and Kanibadam districts, Sughd Region, Tajikistan


End date August 2008

Contract value 499,675




Key observations

The maximum project duration allowed within the call for proposals did not allow enough time for the implementation of this type of participatory rural development projects.

The detailed participatory planning of project implementation at the beginning of the Project however enhanced prospects for the project to be successful.

The full geographic coverage of all the villages in the targeted jamoats will increase the impact of the Project.

Coordination with other EC projects and those of other donors should not focus on avoidance of overlapping but on synergies between the projects.

Success in procurement should be guaranteed by ensuring that the ACTED procurement rules the Project referred to and the EC procurement rules do not contradict each other.



The Project was approved through the Tacis call for proposals “Social Inclusion and Income Generation in Soghd Region of Tajikistan” which had a deadline for the receipt of applications on 24 March 2006. The applicant was an international NGO, ACTED from France, which has a lot of experience in the Soghd region and an office of around 80 staff in the regional capital city Khojand.

The kick-off meeting of the Project took place in September 2006. The period until December 2006 was considered an inception phase at the end of which an inception report was submitted to the EC. A series of preparatory activities were carried out during the inception phase, such as the selection of target jamoats (local administration entities).

The selection of the target jamoats was very carefully done. Beneficiary jamoats were first pre-selected based on a number of cross-cutting criteria related to vulnerability and market potential. Then, data was collected on the pre-selected jamoats using a number of indicators related to their human, physical and social capital. Four jamoats were excluded as similar projects were already present there (including the Tacis/UNDP project no. 121786). The index number which was obtained this way for each jamoat was then weighted according to a predetermined scale. As a result, ACTED finally selected the four beneficiary jamoats of Hamrabaev, Lakkon, Sharipov and Khonobod. They comprised 19 villages while the number of target villages in the application had been estimated at 18. All the 19 villages were included in the project in order to ensure full coverage of project activities in the selected target jamoats.

Also during the inception period, ACTED conducted participatory rural appraisals (PRAs) and a participatory mapping exercise of the existing soviet-era irrigation and drainage systems. Then, after the end of the inception period, capacity building activities (agricultural extension, awareness raising on land reform) and the preparation of village development plans started. The project invested time and resources in the planning process, including the development of innovative solutions such as the participatory mapping exercise. An international marketing consultant will be fielded in May-June 2007 in order to develop a marketing strategy for linking farmers to markets and in order to train two local marketing specialists and farmers.


The overall objective of the Project is to structurally reduce poverty in Tajikistan and to contribute to medium term regional economic growth and stability.

The specific objective is to increase the income of small-scale farmers in Isfara and Kanibadam disctricts through inclusive agricultural development.

The range of activities is wide. Village-based organisations called Social Community Councils (SCCs) are established and trained to draft a Village Development Plan (VDP)


which serves as the basis for project activities. Then, the project engages in the rehabilitation of small-scale irrigation and drainage infrastructure in order to increase the production of individual farmers’ plots. Moreover, the project supports the land reform process through awareness raising activities and legal support for farmers who wish to obtain their land certificate.

In parallel, the Project aims to tackle other obstacles for increased production and sales, such as the lack of agricultural and marketing know-how. The agricultural extension activities are supposed to build on the extension services that have been created or are being created under other EC-funded projects, such as the Tacis/ASCoT project no. 85395 and Tacis/UNDP project no. 121786. The marketing component should provide farmers with subsidized access to post-harvest technology such as storage, processing and packaging equipment. The farmers should be trained in marketing aspects so that they can formulate a village marketing strategy as part of their VDP.

Three new Advisory Information Centres (AICs) should be created and registered at the municipal level: up to 20 Staff members of the AICs and the Regional Advisory Centre should receive training on advanced teaching methodology and on specific fruits and vegetable production techniques. One demonstration plot per each new AIC and one learning field per each selected village should be set up. Over 500 series of agricultural trainings should be provided to vulnerable farming households.

With regard to marketing, the 2 regional marketing advisors trained by the project should continue providing marketing training and consultancy to farmers and assist them in the preparation of the 19 village marketing plans. Out of the total of 19 farmers’ groups to be formed under the project, at least 9 should register as an association of private farms so that they could eventually take over the post-harvest equipment provided by the project. At least three training sessions per village should be organised on how to use the equipment.


The Project has adopted a holistic approach. It aims to unleash the potential for small-scale agricultural development, particularly in fruits and vegetables, through the creation of sustainable extension services, by community-supported irrigation and drainage rehabilitation, by improving farm-to-market linkages and access to shared assets as well as through more participatory rural governance. Problems in these areas have been identified as the main constraints on local small-scale agricultural production. Thus, the Project is relevant to the needs of the local population.

Results to be produced to achieve the objectives are numerous, ranging from the establishment of 19 SCCs and VDPs and the training of up to 60 jamoat representatives in municipal governance to physical infrastructure rehabilitation: 36 small-scale irrigation and drainage rehabilitation projects with the creation of the respective Water User Groups. Moreover, the selected 19 villages should all receive land reform trainings, with at least 10 new private farms created in each village and in position of their land certificate.


Synergies are sought with other projects e.g. by sharing training resources with the MEDA NGO which is providing agricultural extension services in the same jamoats. However, the planned use of the training capacities built within the Tacis/ASCoT project no. 85395 (e.g. the AIC established in Kulkent) may not materialise as ACTED plans to tender out the implementation of training. Also, the exclusion of those jamoats from the ACTED project where similar projects were already present (including the Tacis/UNDP project no. 121786) could be viewed rather as avoidance of overlapping than an attempt to seek synergies.

The Project responds relatively well to the EC programme objectives as stated in the 2004 Tacis Action Programme Project Fiche for “addressing social issues in the Sughd oblast” (1 M€): (i) to improve social welfare through rehabilitation of social services infrastructures, (ii) to increase rural livehoods through support to agricultural productivity and markets improvement, and to (iii) improve administrative skills of local governments.

With regard to whether the Project targets the most vulnerable groups within the Soghd region, it has to be noted that the EC instructions for the call for proposals directed the applicants to choose the target areas “preferably in the rural parts of districts – Isfara, Kanibadam, Ghafurov and Nau”. These districts are not the poorest in the oblast but rather border districts which have potential for cross-border trade. The Project endeavoured to target the most vulnerable jamoats within the “predefined” districts of Kanibadam and Isfara. Considering its holistic and participatory approach and the project duration of 24 months (which was the maximum within this call for proposals), the wide range of activities makes the project design very ambitious. The implementation schedule presented in the application was to some extent overoptimistic and deviations had to be made from it already during the first six months of the project (see next chapter). Otherwise the project design, as presented in the application (including a logical framework with 13 indicators), is very professionally done and demonstrates a good planning capacity and local knowledge of ACTED.

12.6 Effectiveness

The project invested time and resources in careful planning of implementation, including the development of innovative solutions for mapping, drainage problems and agricultural marketing. Hence some preparatory activities, including the selection of the target jamoats, took longer than expected.

As the preparatory activities took longer than planned, most of the irrigation and drainage works which were originally planned to start within three months from the project commencement date, i.e. during the first winter when the irrigation channels and drainage canals are dry, will need to be carried out during the second winter. This implies a loss of one agricultural season over the first summer which otherwise could have been used for irrigated production of fruits and vegetables and for demonstration purposes. However,


the project may still be able to implement the planned rehabilitation projects by the end of the project implementation period.

Within the training activities, both ACTED staff trainers and external consultants are used. Participants pay a fee which, even if symbolic, promotes comprehension that training is something valuable and worth paying for. Based on discussions with a group of trainees, subjects such as production methods of fruits and vegetables and legal aspects of the land reform are relevant for the trainees. The trainees also expressed their satisfaction with the trainers and the training methods used. There is no doubt that the planned number of agro trainings could not be reached by the end of the Project.

The Project had good prospects for being able to produce the other planned outputs as well, at least in the long-term. The negative effects of the initial delays could in fact be expected to be out-weighted by the benefits of the careful planning in the long-term. Those benefits however will only materialise after some time after the end of the Project.

12.7 Efficiency

The ACTED staff appeared to be very committed to their participatory way of project implementation. The general feeling was that the duration of the project should rather be extended than the implementation methodology changed. In principle, the evaluators agree with this observation: participatory rural development projects with a range of activities this wide would require a longer implementation period. But if a longer duration is not possible for administrative reasons, then the project implementation methodology and scope should be adapted to the time available.

With regard to procurement, ACTED representatives referred to "ACTED World Procurement Guidelines" which had been designed to represent the strictest requirements of all of ACTED's donors around the world. First, a procurement plan will be created based on the needs of each village. Some villages require very simple procurements while others will require the procurement of specialised equipment from abroad. Each procurement will be broken down by category and then each category of equipment will be purchased together. Certain ACTED thresholds will determine the procurement method to be used (direct purchase, quotations from a number of suppliers, national or international tender etc.). The reconciliation of these ACTED procurement guidelines with those of the EC appear not to be as straight-forward as the ACTED management thinks. The project is recommended to double-check this with the EC and the ACTED office in Kyrgyzstan in order to avoid problems in the procurement of project equipment as these could jeopardise the already tight implementation schedule of the project.


As less than one third of the implementation period had elapsed by the time of the evaluators’ visit, it was still too early to assess the impact of the Project. The initial impression of the evaluators was however that the Project could have an impact in its


limited target area of four selected jamoats, in particular because it covers all the 19 villages in them.


Sustainability is mainly sought through the establishment of the SCCs, AICs and Water Users Groups (WUGs). The goal is that these achieve financial sustainability before the end of the project. According to an ACTED study, the SCC model has proved to be sustainable in elsewhere in Tajikistan, in Uzbekistan and in Southern Kygyzstan. The AICs should be able to generate sufficient income through fee-based agricultural extension services if they had a client base of at least 2000 households, out of which 10 % fee-paying farmers. The WUGs should cover the maintenance needs of the irrigation canals mainly by providing labour.

The assumptions made on the potential sustainability appear overly optimistic. The experience shown by previous TACIS projects in the region does not support them. AIC type of institutions have achieved financial sustainability only if they have engaged in microcredit in addition to agricultural extension. In general, agricultural extension can seldom be financed through fees without Government or other subsidies. The experience with the sustainability of WUGs is more positive as the availability of irrigation water is a tangible result and people are thus more willing to provide in-kind contributions.

Wherever possible, the project seeks financial and other contributions from the final beneficiaries. This is naturally positive and promotes the sustainability of project activities. VDPs seem to be an effective way to promote self-mobilisation and self-help. The knowledge gained through the training remains in possession of the trainees even if the training activities did not continue. The same applies to the legal advice and the marketing links created by the project. Hence, the limited sustainability of the new institutions does not necessarily undermine other results of the project.




Careful planning process which enhances the relevance, effectiveness and to some extent the sustainability of the project

Potential to have an impact on the limited geographic target area of four jamoats, thanks to the full coverage of the 19 villages in them

Innovative approaches such as the participatory mapping exercise and planned technical solutions to drainage problems


Mismatch between the ambitious project design and the limited project implementation period

Tendency to focus on avoiding over-lapping with other projects rather than on creating synergies with them

Risks of the procurement process becoming complicated if EC and Acted procurement rules are not reconciled


13 Project Evaluation Report M

13.1 Project Data

Project name Inter-Regional Trade Facilitation



Project location Batken, Kyrgyzstan

Starting date January 2007

End date January 2009

Budget 1.129.696 €


1. Relevance and quality of design D

2. Effectiveness C

3. Efficiency B

4. Expected Impact D

5. Potential sustainability D


Key observations

The project design demonstrated serious short-comings such as the lack of evidence of a problem analysis, weak hierarchy of objectives and activities, as well as inaccuracy in subject matters.

Through its inception report, the Project tried to compensate for the weak design by refocusing on concrete actions. This resulted in an improved work programme although all design mistakes could not be corrected.

The legacy of previous EC financed projects, in particular the three FWCs, also hampered efforts to put the Project on the right track. Close follow-up of the Project will be needed, also because the Project will be viewed for some time ahead as the main EC Project in the region.



Project implementation started in January 2007 and the first Steering Committee meeting was organised on 20 April. This marked the end of the inception period. Although the Terms of Reference did not mention such requirement, an Inception Report was presented to the meeting and approved by it. A number of modifications were made to the original ToR.

During the inception period, the Project focused on the following activities: collection and analysis of information, preparation of the Inception Report, establishment and mobilisation of the project office, meetings with other donors, recruitment of local staff and preparation of technical specifications for a supply tender to be launched by the EC Delegation (contracting deadline 19 July 2007).

The ToR of the Project did not mention this last activity: it was partly a remnant from previous projects and partly related to the IRTF project itself. The first “cross-border trade facilitation project” which was supposed to be financed from the 2003 Action Programme had been split into three FWCs (contract numbers 124292, 125379 and 124274) and a supply contract, due to lack of time to launch a tender for a service contract. This last supply contract was tendered in 2006 but, by the time of the Evaluation, the equipment (mini-laboratories, IT equipment, etc.) was still in boxes as none of the FWCs was responsible for it. Moreover, one of the FWCs, contract number 124292, had identified further procurement needs. The IRTF project was seen as an occasion to purchase the required additional equipment (for onion production, tomato drying, etc.).

The preparation of the technical specifications for the supply tender became a major project activity during the Inception Period: the equipment varied from vehicles and IT equipment to plant protection and car repair workshop equipment. Altogether eights lots were foreseen with an indicative budget of 300.000 €.


The overall objective of the Project, as stated in the ToR and the Inception Report, is poverty alleviation in the Ferghana Valley. Both documents stated that the final beneficiaries of the Project were the poor living in the Batken oblast. The ToR defined the intermediary beneficiaries as regional and local authorities and civil society structures that will participate in the Project, as well as the farmers and SMEs that will benefit from project actions. The Inception Report referred to the oblast and raion authorities, finance and credit institutions, farmers and SMEs, as the intermediary beneficiaries.

The specific objectives, as stated in the ToR and the Inception Report, were (i) to help raise rural livelihoods in Batken and the Ferghana Valley through support for agricultural productivity and improved access to domestic and international markets, and (ii) to improve business environment in Batken. The ToR mentioned a third possible objective, support to an incubator in Batken, as being conditional on the results of a cost-benefit analysis which should be conducted during the inception phase of the Project.


In addition to these objectives, it is important to note the planned results of the Project as they were revised in the Inception Report. As per the original ToR, the most important planned results were:

Introduction of compulsory standards requirements for business, to raise the quality and productivity of regional agriculture.

Provision of a technical assistance and supplies related to a testing laboratory. Assisting the department of control at the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism

(MITT) to fully implement its mandate in the Batken region to reduce rent-seeking activity by official agencies.

The development of a Business Environment Model to all Ferghana Regions and/or all other regions in Kyrgyzstan.

Assessment of provision of supplies and TA to the department of control at the MITT for its expansion to Batken and/or the entire Ferghana Valley of the successful pilot undertaken in the capital to reduce rent-seeking activities of licensing agencies.

Establishment and functioning of an incubation unit if the cost-benefit analysis mentioned above showed a real rate of return for it (alternatively this amount could be allocated to technical support in terms of IT infrastructure to be set up at the rayon and federal levels).

As per the Inception Report, the planned outputs of the Project were:

Assistance delivered to introduce standards for and to facilitate certification of selected agricultural products in compliance with the legislation of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

Food testing laboratories are operating transparently, to the benefit of their clients, in-line with international standards, following international approved methods and certified products for the national and international market.

A selected business incubator is operating as a business advisory service unit addressing the needs of SMEs.

Access to finance has been improved. Advise to public authorities undertaken, i) the Ministry of Economic Development

and Trade (MEDT) is successfully implementing its mandate and anti-rent-seeking strategies ii) Oblast Administration has received technical assistance.

By the time of the evaluation, the Project was yet to deliver basically all these outputs. Hence the evaluation was limited to the project design and to the activities and outputs of the inception period. Based on that, the evaluators drew some conclusions on the implementation prospects of the Project.


The contribution of the Project to its overall objective, poverty alleviation in the Ferghana Valley, can be questioned. Similarly, it appears to be an overstatement to say that the final beneficiaries of the Project are the poor living in the Batken oblast. However, it may be possible to construct the link between the needs of the poor and the objectives of the Project but there was no evidence of a problem tree or other analysis in the ToR. The project documentation also left unclear how serious a problem lack of certification and standards for agricultural production and marketing is, compared with other problems of


the producers in the region. In general, the Project concept as presented in the ToR was unprofessionally formulated.

The original project design in terms of outputs and activities was also very weak. For example, the development of standards (referred to in the ToR as “compulsory” although one of the main EU principles is that standards are voluntary) and of a certification system should be initiated at the national level rather than at the regional level as proposed in the ToR. The related Kyrgyz national level legislation was in fact changed prior to the commencement of the Project and a related World Bank project was started at the national level.

The ToR also stated that a cost-benefit analysis should be conducted in order to decide about the establishment of a new business incubator in Batken. There were in fact already nine such incubators active in the region at the beginning of 2007, among them the “Jetigen” incubator which had been refurbished and equipped by TACIS project 85399. Moreover, planned conceptual activities such as the development of a business environment model could not be considered relevant as they risked not producing any tangible results. During the inception period, the Project quickly abandoned such ideas and refocused on concrete actions which could produce tangible results during its life-time.

After the revisions made through the inception report, the Project will focus on the further development of the existing “Jetigen” business incubator, on introducing the use of standards and technical certification for selected agricultural products, on the development of local laboratory testing capacities, on policy advice to MEDT and the oblast administration, and on improving access to finance for SMEs. Within the policy advice component, the donor coordination unit of the oblast administration will be assisted. The MEDT will benefit e.g. from the setting-up of a computerised SME data base.

The Project will continue to support some of the activities initiated under the three FWCs. In particular, equipment will be provided through the incubator to farmers’ groups on a leasing basis (follow-up to project 124292). Cooperation with the one-stop-shop project 125379 and the web-portal project 124274 was mentioned in the Inception Report although the Report was not very clear on how this would be pursued in practice. In particular, the future of the one-stop-shop was highly uncertain.

13.6 Effectiveness

As the Project had just started, it was too early to assess its effectiveness. However, it was clear that the above mentioned design flaws had negatively effected the prospects of the Project to be effective. During the Inception Phase, the Project did its best to revise the project design in a way that would make it more effective. However, the legacy of previous projects in some cases still affected it negatively. E.g. in case of the procurement tender, the Project had to prepare the technical specifications without having time to analyse the financial sustainability of the different equipment items.


13.7 Efficiency

The starting point of the Project was difficult. The expectations of the project partners differed from those presented in the ToR. The Project managed this situation quite well. Detailed project planning however suffered from the “additional” tasks of the Project, such as the preparation of the technical specifications for the supply tender.

After the inception period, the Project will be staffed with international experts on a part-time basis and the day-to-day project management and implementation will depend largely on the local experts. The Project had faced difficulties in the recruitment competent local experts. It was yet to be seen how the ones contracted would manage to implement the planned activities.

13.8 Impact

It was too early to evaluate the expected impact of the Project.


It was too early to evaluate the potential sustainability of the Project.



Despite the difficult starting point, the Project managed to refocus on concrete actions during the inception period.


No evidence of a problem analysis leading to the formulation of the Project. Weak project design, including the hierarchy of objectives, outputs and activities. Inaccuracies in subject matters and resulting flaws in the project design.


The Project should be followed-up very carefully as the changes introduced through the Inception Report may still not be sufficient to bring it on the right track. After the completion of the other service contracts 85395 and 85399, this Project will be viewed for some time ahead as the main EC project in the region. After the weak performance of the three FWCs, the Project faces a great challenge to improve the image of EC assistance in the region.


It was risky to prepare the technical specifications for the supply tender without having time to analyse the financial sustainability of the different equipment items. As in case of splitting the first “cross-border trade facilitation project” into three FWCs, the risk to lose the money was put ahead of quality considerations. In the future, careful consideration should be given to the prospects of individual projects and tenders to be successful, without letting such administrative considerations to determine the course to be taken.


final report volume ii

Documents