A COMPARISON BETWEEN US--SOVIET MILITARY
DOCTRINE FROM AN EGYPTIANPOINT OF VIEW
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College i n partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
by
LTC ABDEL HkElID SALEH HAFIZ The Egypt$an Army
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1981
FROM
AN EGYPTIAN POINTOF UIGW
MASTER O F MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE
Name of ndi d be Lieutenant Colonel Abdel Hamid Saleh Haf iz
T i t l e o f t h e s i s A Comparison of U.S. - Sovie t M i l i t a r y Doctrine--An Egyptian View
Approved by:
, Thesis Committee Chairman James A . Fenlon, B.S.
, Member, Graduate Faculty MAJ Charles E . Heller, M.A.
, Member, Consulting Faculty COL Richard D. H i r t z e l , P h d
~
Accepted t h i s -d4& day o f :381 by I
Director, Graduate Degree Prog ms
The' opinions and conclusions expressed herein a re those o f the student au tho r and do n o t necessarily represent the views of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. iReferences t o t h i s study should include the foregoing statement.)
i i
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE
1 . INTRODUCTION . a . Statement of the Problem. 1 b. The Soviet Population . c . The Soviet Geography , d . The Sovie t History , 3 e . The Soviet Resources and 'Agridulture 5 f . The Soviet Mili tary Forces 6 g . The Soviet Foreign Relationship : 7 h . The People of U.S. , 8 i . The U.S. Geography and Ldcatidn 9 j . The U.S. History , 10 k. The U.S. Government. 14 1 . The U.S. Agriculture , 15 m. The U.S. Army . 15 n . The U S . Foreign Reiatiois 16
2 . THE DEFENSE OPERATIONS , 20
a . The Organization o f t he U,S. Divisions . 21 b.. The Organization o f the Soviet Divisions . 24 c. Section I : The U.S. Defensive Operations , 30 4. The U.S. Strengths , 41 e . The U.S. Weaknesses, 42 f . Section 11: The Soviet i e fen i ive dperaiions : 43 g . The Soviet Strengths , 52 h . The Soviet Weaknesses , 54
3. THE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS , 65
a . Section I : The U.S. Offensive Operations , 65 b. The U S . Strengths , 77 c . The U.S. Weaknesses, 79 d . Section 11: The Soviet i f f en i ive dperaiions: 81 e. The Soviet Strengths , 95 f . The Soviet Weaknesses , 96
4. THE MARCH A N D ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS , 109
a. Section I : The U.S. March and EngagementOperations , 110
b . The U.S. Strengths , 114 c . The U.S. Weaknesses, 117 d . Section 11: The Soviet iarch'and t%gag&nent'
Operations . 119 e . The Sovie.:: Strength;: 130 f . The Soviet Weaknesses . 132
5. THE CONCLUSION , 141
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
1-2 The Conduct of the Covering Force Operations 58 2 -2 The Organization o f the Main Bat t le Area 59 3 -2 The Maneuver in the U.S. Active Defense Doctrine 50 4-2 The Frontage and Depth of the Soviet Division 61 5-2 The Organization o f the Recon Act iv i t ies a t the Soviet 62
Division Level and Below 6-2 The S o v i e t Counterattacks a t Division Level and Below 63
1-3 U.S. Division Attacks Enemy Positions 99 2-3 U.S. Method o f Penetration 1QQ 3-3 U . S . Division Penetrating Positioned Enemy 101 4-3 U.S. Division Bypassing Enemy Posit ions 102 5-3 U.S. Division Bypassing Enemy Positions After Fixing 1a3
H i m W i t h Indirect Fire and Smoke 6-3 The Hasty Attack 104 7-3 The Soviet Frontage in the Offensive Operations 105 8-3 The Soviet Doctrine o f Sending Envelopment Detachment 106 9-3 The Sovie t Frontage and Echelons i n Breaking Through 107
Operations (Division Level)
1-4 The Organization o f March/U.S. Division 134 2-4 The larch Organization/Soviet Divis ion 135 3-4 The Distance Between Columns a t the Soviet Division 136
Level 4-4 The Soviet System o f Deployment 137' 5-4 The Meeting Engagement 138 6-4 The Soviet System of Connnit t ing t he Division 139
Second Echelon
A COMPARISON OF U.S. - SOVIET DOCTRINE FROM AN EGYPTIAN POINT OF VIEW, by LTC Abdel Saleh Hafiz , Egypt, 1 4 7 pages.
This s tudy analyzes t h e ground f o r c e t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e of t h e armed f o r c e s of t h e United States and the Sovie t Union. It focuses on d i v i s i o n and lower level u n i t s and a t tempts t o h i g h l i g h t t h e s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses of each coun t ry ' s doc t r ine .
S i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and t a c t i c a l philosophy of t h e army of each country. Sovie t r e l i a n c e on t h e i r experience i n World War I1 l e a d s them t o p l ace heavy r e l i a n c e on armor, a r t i l l e r y , and t h e mechanization of o t h e r arms t o achieve h igh ly mobile u n i t s . The d e n s i t y of systems on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d l e a d s them t o employ a l i m i t e d span of c o n t r o l for t h e i r commanders, which r e q u i r e s a h igh ly orches- t r a t e d and c o n t r o l l e d b a t t l e w i t h i n a c e n t r a l i z e d command and c o n t r o l s t r u c t u r e . The United S t a t e s , on t h e o t h e r hand, having p a r t i c i p a t e d i n two wars since 1945, has developed r e l i a n c e on s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons and o t h e r systems which they b e l i e v e w i l l o f f s e t a q u a n t i t a t i v e i n f e r i o r i t y . In a d d i t i o n , t h e i r system of command and c o n t r o l , compared t o t h e Sov ie t s , p l a c e s h igh r e l i a n c e on decisionmaking a t lower eche lons .
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In t h i s paper I plan t o invest igate b o t h United States (US) and
Soviet mi l i ta ry doctr ine in order t o discover strengths and weaknesses
of each system. I am par t icu lar ly in te res ted in the way they intend t o
apply their doctrine on the modern ba t t l e f i e ld especial ly a t divis ion
level and below. Before t h a t I will glve a general background of the
two super powers i n c l u d i n g their pol i t ica l and mi l i ta ry interests.
My discussion will be conducted throughout three main chapters.
These chapters will deal with defensive, offensive and march and engage-
ment operations, the main t ac t i ca l maneuver on the modern b a t t l e f i e l d .
In my discussion, I wi l l i n i t i a l l y draw on my personal experi-
ence i n the October war of 1973; the Soviet Chief o f Reconnaissance
Course a t d iv i s ion level (G2) taken a t Vestriel Academy from 1974 t o
1976; and the US Army Command and General S t a f f College a t Fort Leaven-
worth from 1980 t o 1981,
The Soviet population:
The Soviet Union ranks t h i r d in the world population, a f t e r the
People’s Republic o f China and India. Moscow and Leningrad are the most
populous c i t i e s : Kiev, Tashkent, B a k u , Kharkov, Gorky, Novosibirsk,
Odessa, Omsk, T i b i l i s i and Chelyabinsk each have more t h a n one mill ion Iinhabitants.
More t h a n 170 separate ethnic groups l i v e i n the Soviet Union.
Almost seventy f ive percent of the to ta l population a r e Eastern Slavs.
More than seven-tenth of the Slavs ( s l i g h t l y more than half the to t a l
population) are Russians; the r e s t are Ukrainians and Belorussians who
live i n the South-western and Western sec tors of the European par t of
the Soviet Union. The remainder of the population includes peoples be-
1o n g i n g t o Turki c, Finno-Ugric, Caucasian, other Indo European, and 1ess
numerous ethnic groups, such a s Eskimos.
Although each group speaks i t s own d i a l e c t or language, Russian
i s the most widespread and i s taught a s a second language t o non-Russians.
Geography :
The Soviet Union i s the la rges t country in the world. I t s terri-
tory s t re tches from the Bal t ic Sea t o the Bering S t r a i t , where an island
belonging t o the Soviet Union l i e s only three miles from an island t h a t
i s part o f Alaska. Most of the Soviet Union i s above f i f t y degree north
l a t i t u d e . The l a t i t u d e o f Moscow is the same as t h a t o f southern Alaska.
In the west, from the Pripet Marshes near the Pol ish border is
the Ural Mountains, Soviet t e r r i t o r y s t re tches over broad plain broken
only by occasional low h i l l s . Crossing this plain t o the south a re a
number o f rivers, of which the most important a re the Dnieper, which emp-
t ies in to the Black Sea, and the Volga, which empties i n t o the Caspian
Sea. Between the Black and Caspian Seas l i e the scenic Causasus Moun-
t a i n s .
The low Urals mark the t rad i t iona l divis ion between European and
Asiat ic Russia. To the eas t a re the vast Siberian lowlands and the deser t
o f central Asia. Beyond a re the barren Siberian highlands and the moun-
t a in ranges o f the Sovie t Far East. Farther t o the eas t l i e higher moun-
t a i n ranges, including the Damirs, A l t a i , and Tien Shan.
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H i s tory:
Modern Russian history dates from March 1917 when Czar Nicholas
I 1 abdicated under pressure from representatives of the national l eg i s l a -
ture, who formed a provisional government. Like the Czarist regime, the
new government continued i t s par t ic ipat ion in World War I ( W W I ) , which
led t o widespread economic and social dislocation and p o p u l a r discontent.
On November 7 , 1917, her government was overthrown by a revolutionary
group known as the Bolshevik (majority) wing o f the Russian Social Demo-
c r a t i c Labor Party.
Vladimir I lyich Lenin, leader of the Bolshevis, was named head
of the f i r s t Sov ie t government. The new regime concluded the t r ea ty of
Brest Litovsk with Germany and the other Central powers on March 3 , 1918.
a . The Revolution:
The new Soviet government declared a l l land the property of
the S t a t e , and a rapid succession of decrees nationalized f ac to r i e s ,
banks, ra i l roads and other sectors of the economy.2 A bit ter c i v i l war
ensued and lasted unt i l 1921. The US, the United Kingdom, France, and
Japan sent mil i tary forces t o Russia f o r a var ie ty of reasons, b u t w i t h -
drew them a f t e r i t became apparent t h a t the Bolshevik government would
survive.
b . The S t a l in e ra :
In 1924 Lenin died and t h i s event intensif ied an intra-par ty
struggle between a group led by Joseph Sta l in and other Soviet leaders.
S ta l in defeated these r i v a l s in the l a t e 1920's and l a t e r had them
executed or assassinated. Untold members of other Soviet p o l i t i c a l ,
mi l i ta ry , economic, and cul tural leaders were imprisoned, and many died
in the l a t e r purges of the 1930's.
3
In the interwar years , the Soviet Government t r i ed t o gain
acceptance by other European countr ies . I t succeeded only p a r t i a l l y , how-
ever , because o f a c t i v i t i e s of the Soviet-led Thi rd Community Internation-
al (Commitern) , founded i n March 1919. The Comi tern attempted, t h r o u g h
local Communist organizations, t o undermine West European governments.
Although Soviet Russia was recognized by a number of European countries
in 1924 and by US i n 1933, re la t ions w i t h these countries were often
s t ra ined .
c . World War 11:
I n the spring of 1939, S ta l in made ten ta t ive overtures t o
Nazi Germany, and i n August o f t h a t year the Molotov-Ribbentrap pact was
signed i n Mowcow. This two year non-aggression t r ea ty included secre t
provisions for the division o f Poland, Romania, and the Bal t ic S ta tes .
Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1 , 1939, and the
Soviets followed on September 17. By the end o f t h a t month Poland had
been divided once again.
On November 28, 1939, the Soviet Government abrogated i t s
non-aggression pact w i t h Finland, attacking i t two days l a t e r . B i t t e r
F i n i s h res is tance stemmed the Soviet advance. Peace negotiations were
concluded on March 19 , 1940, resul t ing in the cession of a large part
of eastern Finland t o the Soviet Union.
In June 1940, Soviet troops occupied Estonia, Latavia, and
Ll’thuania. In July 1940 the t e r r i t o r y of the Bal t ic s t a t e s was incorpo-
rated in to the Soviet Union, I n July the Soviet Union a l so annexed two
eastern provinces o f Romania - Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.
Before dawn on June 2 2 , 1941, H i t l e r attacked Russia, German
troops advanced to the gates o f Moscow before being driven back. The f o l -
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lowing four years of f ight ing brought heavy casua l t ies and l e f t wide-
spread devastation in the European par t of the Soviet Union. By the end
of the war the Soviets paid twenty mill ion murders as a pr ice o f the vic-
tody . The Communication Party: Form and Function:
In the Soviet system o f government ultimate power i s exercised by
the leaders of the Communist party. The party has a membership of approx-
imately sixteen mil l ion, o r about six percent o f the t o t a l population.
Party membership is the main avenue t o posit ions of real authori ty i n t h e
Soviet Union. Bound by r ig id d i sc ip l ine , party members are expected t o
carry out , f a i t h f u l l y , those pol ic ies set by the party leaders .
The party operates through a government apparatus which has l i t t l e
independent authori ty . The l eg i s l a t ive organ i s the Supreme Soviet , which,
in theory, i s the highest s t a t e authority in the Soviet Union. I t has
two coequal houses - the Council o f the Union, presently w i t h 767 members
elected on the basis of popu la t ion , and the Council of Nat ional i t ies w i t h
750 members elected on the basis o f t e r r i t o r i a l un i t s . Elections are
cal led for every f ive years. Only one deputy, approved by the party runs
from each constituency.
The Council of Ministers, which a t present has about one hundred
members i s considered the Soviet highest executive organ and t h e most im-
portant par t of the government s t ruc ture ,
Resources and agricul ture :
Because of the great size o f the country, some supplies of vir-
tua l ly every na tura l resources are available i n the country. Energy re-
sources, f u e l , and waterpower are estimated t o be a t l e a s t twenty f ive
percent o f the world's t o t a l , b u t d i f f i c u l t i e s in explo i ta t ion , as well
5
as inconvenient location of reserves, hamper development, Timber and
manganese resources a re the l a rges t i n the world. The Soviet Union also
has more than adequate supplies of lead, z inc , nickel , mercury, potash,
and phosphate.
Agriculture; despi te increased investment and r i s e s i n real i n -
come the agricul tural sector remains the Soviet Union's g rea tes t econo-
mic problem. Sown crops occupy ten percent of the t o t a l land area.
The agricul tural sector i s organized into about 28,000 col lec-
tive farms and 18,000 state farms.2 S ta t e farms function as "agricul-
tura l factor ies ' ' on which farm workers and peasants are permitted t o use
pr ivate p lo ts , most of them smaller t h a n an acre . Although these p l o t s
account for only three percent of the to ta l sown area, they produce
t h i r t y three percent o f the country's meat, mi lk , eggs, and vegetables,
and sixty percent o f i t s potatoes.
Mili tary:
The Soviet goal of possessing a large mi l i ta ry force, places
a heavy burden on the economy and limits potential growth of the stan-
dard o f l iving and the economy as a whole. I t i s estimated t h a t the
Soviet mil i tary budget 1i e s i n the range of eleven t o th i r teen percent
out of the Soviet t o t a l budget.
The armed forces of the Soviet Union number more than four and
one-half million members drawn through universal conscription. I n addi-
t ion t o large modern mechanized ground forces , the Soviet Union possesses
an air force equipped w i t h advanced in te rceptors , fighter-bombers, and
long-range s t r a t eg ic bombers. The Soviet Union has the l a rges t navy i n
the world, includes c ru i se r s , destroyers, f r i g a t e s , and submarines, many
of which a re nuclear powered. Missiles are the primary armament of
6
Soviet warships. The Soviet a l so possesses a f u l l range of rockets, in-
cluding nuclear intercontinental - and intermediate - range bal l i s t i c
missi les .
The Warsaw Pact, established in 1955, i s a Soviet dominated mi l i -
t a ry a l l iance j o i n i n g the Sov ie t Union and i t s East European Communist
a l l i e s , Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland , and Romania. The pact has a j o i n t command headed by a
Soviet o f f i c e r , which coordinates, plans, and ca r r i e s out j o i n t opera-
t ions .
The Soviet foreign relat ionship and policy:
Soviet foreign policy i s a complex mix of continuity and change.
Policy makers must deal with a rapidly changing world and evolving domes-
t i c conditions. The increasing d ivers i ty of the international arena,
the c lear Western commitment t o secur i ty and a s t ab le East-West balance,
and the increasing inter-dependence of the world's economlcs have affected
Soviet policy op t ions . While the Soviet leadership continues t o aspire
t o exert and expand po l i t i ca l and mi l i ta ry influence in countries f a r
from i t s borders, there a re indications t h a t t h e leadership increasingly
perceives t h a t the fur ther modernization and secur i ty of the Soviet s t a t e
i s ltnked w i t h the development of a more s t ab le , prosperous international
order.
Three broad in te r re la ted areas of Soviet foreign policy concern
are the West, the Third World, and the Communist world.
In re la t ion with the West, including the US and Japan, the Soviet
Union has modified i t s hos t i le a t t i t u d e and has sought t o normalize re la -
t ions in order t o reduce the risk of war, gain prest ige by playing a large
ro le i n world affairs, and improve i ts access t o the industr ia l ized coun-
7
3t r i e s ' technology through increased trade.
In the T h i r d World, the Soviet Union has moderated i t s advo-
cacy of communist-led revolutionary s t ruga les and has attempted t o es-
t ab l i sh and maintain good s t a t e t o s t a t e relations w i t h individual coun-
t r ies .
Within the Communist World, the mono1 i t h i c character of inter-
national communism has diss ipated a s nationalism has become more impor-
t an t than ideology. Communist-ruled countries have become more re-
s i s t a n t t o , and i n some cases def ian t o f , Soviet au thor i ty and cont ro l .
Nonruling communist pa r t i e s a re a l so l e s s subservient t o Moscow's d i -
rec t ion . A t the same time Moscow has attempted, w i t h varying degrees of
success, t o press fo r c lose r po l i t i ca l , economic, and mi l i ta ry t i es w i t h
i t s Eastern European a1 1ies.
Because successful extension of i t s spheres of po l i t i ca l , eco-
nomic, and mi l i t a ry influence requires continuous US prestige, the Soviet
Union pract ices a policy of ind i rec t harassment of the US through in t e r -
ference i n countries of Middle East, Afr ica , Asia, Europe and South
America: this interference i s described a s economic and mi l i t a ry a i d t o
combat "international imperial ism". The Soviets a l s o r ea l i ze t h a t u n -
s t a b l e conditions i n the Middle East, South Africa, and elsewhere in
Africa, c rea te a su i tab le atmosphere f o r expand ing Soviet influence.
Another a id t o Soviet foreign policy is the US human rights doc-
trine: US insis tence on maintaining t h i s doctr ine i s interpreted a s
weakness and, therefore , no hindrance t o Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
o r Soviet t h rea t s against Poland, Somalia, Sudan and Egypt.
The United S ta tes of America: the people of the U S :
The to t a l population i n April 1977 was estimated t o be 215,892,000,
8
excluding US Forces stationed abroad , 4
The composition of population refers t o i t s distribution i n re-
spect t o physical t r a i t s such as race, age, and sex and with respect t o
social and economic variables such as re l ig ion and occupation.
In 1970, of the 203.2 mill ion persons residing in the US, 177.7
mill ion (87.5 percent) were c l a s s i f i ed i n the census as white, 22 .6 mil-
l ion (11.1 percent) as black, and 2.9 mill ion ( 1 . 4 percent) as members
of other races , including 0.8 mill ion American Indians. The population
of Spanish o r ig in , most of whom a re white, numbered 2.9 mil l ion, or 4 .5
percent of the US population.
Geography and locat ion:
The US locat ion: The US occupies nearly a l l t h a t portion of the
North American continent between the Atlant ic and Pacif ic oceans, and a t
i t s northern boundary lays Canada and on the south Mexico.
The general coas t l ine of the f i f t y states i s 2,069 miles on the
Atlantic, 7,673 miles on the Pac i f ic , 1,060 on the Art ic and 1,631 miles
on the Gulf of Mexico.
The principal r i v e r i s the MIssissippi - Missouri - Red Rock,
t ravers ing the whole country from north t o south, and having a course
o f 3,710 miles t o i t s mouth in the Gulf o f Mexico. 5
The Rocky Mountain chain separates the Western portion o f the
country from the remainder. Travel i s t h r o u g h cer ta in elevated passes
several of which a re traversed by rai l roads and major highways. West of
the Rockies, bordering the Pacif ic Coast, the Cascade Mountains and
Sier ra Nevada form the outer edge of a h i g h tableland, consis t ing in par t
of stony and sandy desert and par t ly of grazing land and forested moun-
t a i n s , including the Great S a l t Lake, which extends t o the Rocky Moun-
9
t a in s . Eastward the country i s a v a s t , gently undulating p la in , with a
general slope southernwards towards the par t ly marshy f l a t s of the Gulf
of Mexico, extending t o the A t l a n t i c , in terrupted only by the Appalachain
Mountains i n the Eastern S ta t e s . Nearly the whole o f t h i s p la in , from
the Rocky Mountains t o some dis tance beyond the Mississippi cons is t s of
inunense p r a i r i e s . In the Eastern S t a t e s , which form the more s e t t l e d
and more thickly inhabited portion of the country, l a rge forests of
valuable timber, such as beech, birch, maple, oak, pine, spruce, elm,
a sh , walnut; and the sou th , l i v e oak, magnolia, palametto, t u l i p s t i l l
e x i s t i n the remnants of the fo re s t s which formerly extended over a l l
the Atlant ic s lope, b u t i n t o which grea t inroads have been made by the
advance o f c i v i l i z a t i o n . The mineral deposits cons is t of i ron , copper,
l ead , and zinc. Non-metallic minerals include large quan t i t i e s of coa l ,
petroleum, stone, s a l t , and phosphate rock. The highest p o i n t i s i n
Mount McKinley i n Alaska, 20,320 f e e t above sea l e v e l , and the lowest
p o i n t i s in Death Valley, Cal i forn ia , 282 f e e t below sea l eve l .
W i story :
The nineteenth Century - expansion and conf l i c t :
The US entered the nineteenth century a s a s t ruggl ing new nation
on t he f r o n t i e r s of c i v i l i z a t i o n ; i t l e f t as a world power. Many fac tors
contributed t o t h i s transformation, including the development of an arqy
t h a t was small , in keeping w i t h the na t ion ' s resources, b u t uniquely
sui ted t o i t s need. In over nineteen major wars, expeditions, campaigns,
occupations, and other disturbances, this small army provided the security 6t h a t made national expansion and progress possible.
The Civil Uar:
The expanding country was n o t y e t one hundred years o ld , when t h e
10
C i v i l War between Nor th and South broke o u t ( A p r i l , 1861). One main
cause of t h a t war was the s lave ry problem. The war was ended i n 1865 and
t h e t h i r t e e n t h amendment t o the US C o n s t i t u t i o n , made s l a v e r y i l l e g a l
throughout t h e Un i ted S ta tes ,
The American-Spanish War, 1898:
This war was a r e s u l t of s i n k i n g o f an American b a t t l e s h i p i n the
harbor of Havana, Cuba i n February 1898.7 The war ended i n December w i t h
the s i g n i n g of a peace t r e a t y i n P a r i s and under i t s p rov i s ions , t h e terms
o f cease- f i re were formal ized, ceding Puer to Rico and t h e P h i l i p p i n e I s -
lands t o t h e US.
K o r l d War I (KW I )
I n 1918 the US Forces were f u l l y committed t o the w a r i n Europe.
E a r l y i n the y e a r Germany had v i r t u a l l y e l im ina ted the Russians and
I t a l i a n s f rom t h e war, and thus had t roops a v a i l a b l e t o move t o t h e
Western f r o n t f o r a massive ons laught t o break the a l l i e s l i n e s . I n
March, t h e German fo rces breached t h e B r i t i s h and French l i n e s a t the
Some and i n the f o l l o w i n g month staged a massive a t t a c k i n F landers.
Under e x t r a o r d i n a r y pressure, t h e A l l i e s succeeded i n s t a b i l i z i n g t h e i r
l i n e s , US t roops fought w i t h t h e B r i t i s h i n Be lg ian and w i t h the French
du r ing the Meuse-Argonne o f f e n s i v e . A t t h e end of t h e year , t h e A l l i e s
accepted Pres ident Wilson as t h e i r spokesman i n t h e a r m i s t i c e negot ia -
t i o n s , then t h e a r m i s t i c e was signed i n November 1918, t o p u t an end t o
ww I .
World War I1 and a f t e r :
I n 1939 Germany moved i n t o Czechoslovakia, c l a i m i n g d i s o r d e r i n
t h a t count ry threatened t h e s a f e t y o f German n a t i o n a l s . L a t e r , H i t l e r
announced the annexat ion of Memel, L i t huan ia , a B a l t i c p o r t near Danzig.
11
A t the same time I t a l y crossed the Adriatic t o occupy Albania. Hi'tler
demanded access t o Oanzing across the Polish Corridor, b u t Bri ta in and
France agreed t o protect Poland i f attacked. Germany and the Sovie t Union
signed a pact , which was revealed as a scheme t o divide u p Poland between
Germany and the Soviet U n i o n , and i n September the Germany b l i tzkr ieg
overwhelmed Pol and ,* Therefore, England and France declared war on Ger-
many, and President Roosevelt asked for leg is la t ion t o bo ls te r the na-
t ion's defenses.
On December 7 , 1941 the Japanese attacked the US f l e e t i n the
Hawaiian Islands. Then in 1942 the US committed herself t o the war, men
and a few women were mobilized in to the Armed forces and the en t i r e popu-
la t ion was mobilized. The US regained the i n i t i a t i v e by involving
Guadalcanal , while the infantry entered the European thea te r by way of
North Africa and US bombers raided targets i n France and I t a l y .
In 1943, with increasing US part ic ipat ion the All ies won North
Africa and S ic i ly i n Europe, while advancing in the Pacif ic . In 1945
Germany surrendered and signed documents a t Reims, followed by the sur-
render i n Tokeyo 'Jay, by the Japanese. The victors conferred a t Yalta
and Potsdam." In a l l this the US played a leading r o l e , b u t i t s spokes-
men changed, f o r President Roosevelt, who had seen the country th rough
depression and war, died shor t ly before the war ended. President Truman
was in charge of t he opening of the f i r s t meeting i n San Francisco of
the United Nations. He had ordered the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagazaki in Japan. For most Americans, demobjlization and an end of
bloodshed and rationing were evidence t h a t their way of l i f e was vindi-
cated and assured.
12
The Korean War:
In 1951, US forces in Korea slowly recovered from the communist
Chinese onslaught and by the end of March most of Korea south of the
t h i r t y eighth paral le l was recaptured. B u t when the American General
Douglas MacArthur announced t h a t the solution t o the Korean c o n f l i c t
was t o a t tack Communist China, President Truman, who believed t h a t such
a course would lead t o war w i t h b o t h China and Russia, relieved Mac-
Arthur of his command.
Later, i n November 1952, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected
a s President of the US, and just s i x months a f t e r he took his o f f i c e , he
car r ied o u t his promise t o the US people d u r i n g his elect ion campaign,
t o b r ing the Korean Ilar t o an end.
Vietnam War:
I n 1965 the Americans became increasingly concerned as the US
extended i t s mi l i ta ry commitments overseas i n the Dominican Republic and
Vietnam - i n keeping with i ts policy of containing the spread of communism.
In February 1965 President Johnson ordered a i r strikes against North Viet-
namese t a rge t s and a f t e r April the number of US ground troops grew rapidly
and reached 500,000,
In the US two diverse groups protested the war. Some cal led for
an a l l -ou t a t tack against the North, i nc lud ing the bombing of Hanoi and
the use of nuclear weapons i f needed. Others f e l t t h a t the US should
end the bombing and leave the Vietnamese t o solve their own problems.
The expansion of the war increased d issent . Conservatives,
labor leaders , and others continued t o support the Administration's Viet-
nam policy or ca l l f o r a s t i l l la rger US e f f o r t . B u t l i b e r a l s , blacks,
s tudents , and many in t e l l ec tua l s - groups t h a t overwhelmingly supported
13
Johnson in 1974 turned from h i m . Therefore Johnson i n 1968 announced
t h a t he would n o t run for another turn, President Johnson was followed
by Richard Nixon, (1968), whose pol i t ica l career was thought t o be ended
a f t e r his defeat i n 1960 by the l a t e President Kennedy. I I
In t ha t era the Americans learned tha t they had already l o s t
30,000 young men on Asian b a t t l e f i e l d s , therefore Nixon s t a r t ed t o w i t h -
draw the American troops from Vietnam i n conjunction w i t h conducting
negotiations w i t h the North Vietnamese,
Government of the US:
In the US Government, the executive power i s vested i n a presi-
dent , who is elected every four years , and i s e l i g i b l e for re-election
f o r one more additional term. The president must be a t l e a s t t h i r t y
f ive years of age and a native c i t i zen of the US.
The Congress :
The l eg i s l a t ive power i s vested by the Constitution in a Con-
gress , consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives." The Senate
consis ts o f two members from each s t a t e , chosen by popular vote for six
years , one-third r e t i r i n g or seeking re-election every two years . Sena-
to r s must be not l e s s t h a n t h i r t y years of age and must have been a c i t izen
of the US for nine years , as well as be residents in the s t a t e s f o r which
they are chosen.
The House of Representatives consis ts of 435 members elected
every second year. The number of each s t a t e ' s representatives i s deter-
mined by the decennial census, in the absence of spec i f ic Congressional
leg is la t ion a f fec t ing the basis .
The US resources:
Throughout most of i t s history the US has owed much of i t s pros-
14
per i ty t o the abundance of i t s natural resources. These included metals
and minerals, energy sources, water, rich s o i l s and timberlands. Par-
t i c u l a r l y important among the metals and minerals were iron o re , copper,
lead and zinc, phosphates f o r f e r t i l i z e r s , and industr ia l minerals such
as limestone for cement. Energy material - coal , petroleum, and natural
gas were so plent i ful tha t they were used w i t h l i t t l e thought of con-
servat ion,
Immediately after WW 11, the US began t o change from a nation
t h a t exported mtals and minerals t o one t h a t imported these commodities.
Agriculture:
The farmlands in the US make u p a b o u t twelve percent of the
arable lands in the world. They are among the r iches t and most pro-
ductive in the world. Of 930 million hectares of land in the f i f t y
s t a t e s an estimated 120 mill ion hectares are planted annually. The trend
i n the US continues t o be toward la rger farms, w h i c h , with the applica-
t ion of good management, abundant f e r t i l i z e r s , and advanced mechaniza-
t i o n , are f a r more e f f i c i e n t than smaller units.
Until 1974 a US government "soil bank" program paid farmers t o
keep p a r t of their lands out of cu l t iva t ion in order t o prevent over-
production and decreases i n pr ices . Then, because of world food shor-
tages and consequent price increases, t h i s r e s t r a i n t was removed and f a r -
mers were encouraged t o produce as much as possible.
The US Army:
The US mil i ta ry i s based upon possession of a small number of
volunteer troops equipped w i t h sophisticated weapons and supported by
an a i r force and navy in a h i g h s t a t e . o f readiness.
The la rges t commands in the US are the theater army and the corps.
15
The typical t hea t e r army may cons is t of a variable number o f corps; com-
bat forces o f armour and infan t ry ; a i r defense a r t i l l e r y ; f i e ld a r t i l l e r y ;
combat support forces of av ia t ion , engineer and signal elements; and com-
bat service support forces of l o g i s t i c and maintenance uni t s . A typical
corps consis ts of a var iable number and mixture of in fan t ry , mechanized
infan t ry , armored, airmobile, and airborne d iv is ions ; one or more sep-
a r a t e infantry brigades; one or more armored cavalry regiments; corps
a r t i l l e r y and air defense elements and target aquis i t ion u n i t , as well
as combat support and combat service support u n i t s ,
US Army Divisions have a common base (containing command, avia-
t ion , divisional a r t i l l e r y , combat, combat support un i t s and combat ser-
vice support units) and a varying mixture o f combat maneuver ba t ta l ions
(usua l ly ten or eleven in number in three brigades) t o make u p a i rborne,
in fan t ry , armored, mechanized infantry and a i r mobile d iv is ions . US
divis ions can in t h i s way be ta i lored t o f i t a var ie ty of s t r a t e g i c or
t ac t i ca l s i t ua t ions .
The Foreign re la t ions :
Despite former Secretary of S t a t e Kissinger 's suggestion for a
new Atlant ic Charter s t ress ing reforms in economic, monetary, and de-
fense po l i c i e s , Europe was suspicious of the new superpower r e l a t ion -
ships. Nixon who had establ ished close personal re la t ions with many
world leaders , came under the cloud of Watergate scandal and f i n a l l y re-
signed in 1974.
American pres t ige in the Middle East soared b r i e f ly when Kissinger
achieved a separation of Arab-Israeli forces (1974)- B u t Kissinger, who
had been named Secretary of S ta t e i n 1973 and who continued in t h a t o f f i c e
under President Ford, was unable in 1975 t o achieve permanent sett lement
16
i n the Middle East. Another war between Arabs and I s r a e l i s was only one
of the new potential dangers. The o i l producing s t a t e s of the Middle
East had already imposed a br ie f o i l embargo on the US, and had a l so
sharply increased the prices charged f o r petroleum products as a means
o f rega in ing their r i g h t s ,
The Carter administration (1976-1980), car r ied forward the policy
of detente w i t h the Soviet Union. B u t f u r the r attempts t o broaden and
extend the terms of the SALT agreements were frustrated by delay. Car-
te r ' s insis tance t h a t the Soviet Union observe i t s human rights obliga-
t ions met with Soviet protests t h a t Carter was in te r fe r ing i n i t s i n t e r -
nal a f f a i r s . US-Soviet re la t ions a l s o were clouded by Soviet support of
Cuban armed intervention in Angola and Horn o f Africa. The Carter ad -
minis t ra t ion scored a foreign policy success, however, when t h e Senate
ratif ied the Panama Canal treaties ea r ly i n 1978. Carter gained wide-
spread praise by successfully acting as mediator between Egypt and
Israel a t Camp David, i n September 1978.
As mentioned before ,Carter ' s human r i gh t s policy and his prag-
matic foreign policy were rejected by the Americans who viewed him as
a weak president.
In November 1980 Ronald Reagan was elected as President of the
US, Many Americans believe t h a t he i s the man who will return the coun-
t r y t o her former position as undisputed leader o f the f r ee World. There-
fore world a t ten t ion i s focused on the Reagan administration; wondering
if i t will be able t o negotiate an equitable solut ion t o t he Arab-Israeli
problem, despi te the I s r a e l i government's pos i t ion and the lack of a
United Arab posit ion. Will he be able t o a id the people of Afghanistan
in the same way the Soviets supported North Yietnam? Will he be able
17
t o support the African countr ies who a re facing the th rea t by surrogate
Soviet forces?
Summation :
I have in t h i s introduction presented the background of the US and
the Soviet Union, i n order t o give the reader a c l e a r picture of the
countries I intend t o discuss .
I will f i r s t focus on US-Soviet mi l i ta ry doctrine, paying atten-
t ion t o how each appl ies defensive, offensive, march, and engagement
operations, a t d ivis ion level and below,
18
CHAPTER I
FOOTNOTES
'Collier's Encyclopedia, 1978 ed., "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (New York: Macmillan Educational Corporation, 1978).
2Collier's Encyclopedia, 1978 ed., "United States of America" (New York: Macmi 1 1 an Educational Corporation, 1978) .
3Egyptian Ministry of Information. The Year Book, Cairo; State Information Service, 1977,
4Encyclopedia Americana, 1979 ed., "United States" (Danbury, Connecticut: Americana Corporation, 1979).
5Encyclopedia Americana, 1979 ed.; "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (Danbury, Connecticut: Americana Corporation, 1979).
6Colonel Richard G, Head, "Soviet Military Education" Air Uni-versity Review, 30 (November-December 1978) pp. 45-56.
7J. C. Hurewitz, ed., Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), pp. 198-227.
'Je0ffre.y KemD, Robert L. Pfaltzsraff, Jr., and Uri Ra'anan, eds.,The Superpowers in'a Mu1 tinuclear Worjd (Lexington, Massachusetts : Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1974), pp. 2-14, 20-25, 27-43.
9Colvin J. Linton, The Bicentennial Almanac (New York: Thomas Nel-son, Inc., 1975), pp. 167, 186, 250-253, 288, 290, 294, 346, 350, 356, 374, 386, 402-4-3, 408,413.
loJohn Paxton, ed., The Statesman's Year-Book (New York: St. Mar-tin's Press, 1977), pp. 580-584, 1395-1402, 5-1404-1415.
llW. Scott Thompson, Power Projection (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1978), pp. 10-19, 69-83.
12Joseph Whitaker, Whitaker's Almanac 1980 (London: William Clowes Limited, 1979), pp. 794-796, 803-804, 959-960, 962.
19
CHAPTER I1
DEFENSE OPERATIONS
There i s no doubt t h a t t h e po l i t i ca l i n t e re s t s and circumstances
of the country, including the nature o f the threat and the t e r r a in usual-
l y have strong impacts on mi l i ta ry doctrine as well as the shape, s i ze
and organization of an army.
One of the purposes of this researcher's thesis i s t o invest igate
the s t rengths and weaknesses of the US and Sovie t doctrine. In d o i n g so
I will use the divis ion which i s considered an in te rna t iona l ly recognized
t a c t i c a l un i t . Discussing the organizational d i f fe rences , strengths and
weaknesses, which a re considered a necessary background f o r the emphasis
on t a c t i c s a t the division l e v e l , i s appropriate before undertaking an
analysis o f defense operations.
20
The US Division Organization
The capabilities of the American divisions;
1. The Armored division;
a. Conduct sustained combat operations.
b. Accomplish rapid movement, deep penetration and pursuit.
c. Disperse over great distances and concentrates rapidly from
widely separated areas. 21
d . Exploit success, t o include the e f f ec t s of nuclear, biological ,
chemical and conventional f i r e s .
e . Conduct covering forces operations,
f . Conduct act ive defense operations.
g. Operate as a mobile counterattack forces .
h . Provides organic a i r defense against low-altitude hos t i l e a i r -
c r a f t .
i . Can command and control up t o f i f t een maneuver bat ta l ions through
the command and s t a f f elements of the divisional headquarters company.
This d i v i s i o n has the following 1imitations:
(1) Heavy equipment can n o t be l i f t e d by army a i r c r a f t .
(2) Mobility is r e s t r i c t e d by jungle defense, f o r e s t , s teep ,
rugged t e r r a in and water obstacles.
2 . The Mechanized Division:
a , Conducts sustained combat operations,
b. Accomplishes r ap id movement, deep penetration and pursui t .
c . Operates as mobile counterattack force.
d . Disperses over great distances and concentrates rapidly from
widely separated a reas ,
e . Conducts l imited airmobile operations,
f . Exploit success, t o include the e f f ec t s of nuclear, b io logica l ,
chemical and conventional f i r e s ,
g . Conducts covering force operations.
h. Conducts ac t ive defense operations,
i , Provides organic a i r defense against low-altitude hos t i l e a i r -
c r a f t .
j . Can command and control up t o f i f t een maneuver bat ta l ions t h r o u g h
22
the command and s t a f f elements of the divisional headquarters and head-
quarters company.
This divis ion has a l so the following l imi ta t ions :
(1) Heavy equipment can n o t be l i f t e d by the army a i r c r a f t .
( 2 ) Mobility i s restricted by j u n g l e , dense forest, s teep, rugged
terrain and water obstacles .
( 3 ) Requires heavy l o g i s t i c support t o include r a i l or highway
t ransport o f tracked vehicles fo r long administrative moves.
23
\ I I i i
\ I I i 1
I I ii i /
2 Y
.
The S o v i e t Tank D i v i s i o n :
'DZD MISS1 E S V E H I C L E >RO*l*
25
The Soviet organization a t division level, includes an a n t i t a n k
guided missile battalion, which consists of twelve antitank guided mis-
s i l e vehicles "BRDM" plus a n t i t a n k gu ided missile companies a t the mo-
torized r i f l e regiments and t h e t a n k regiment as shown below:
a . The motorized r i f l e division:
2 MR regiments"BTR"
MR regiment"BMB I'
~k regiment Division troops Total
~
Antitank guidedmissile compan(five vehiclesf plus one vehi-cle "BRDM" for command and con-trol
None because most of the regi-mental vehi- cl "BMB" equippedw i t h a n t i -
Anti t a n k guided mis- s i l e com-pany (fivevehicles)plus one vehicle
A n t i t a n k guidedmissile b a t -tal ion (twelve ve-hicles)
t a n k for com- guidedmissile
mand and control
Two regiment None Five anti- Twelve anti- X five ve- t a n k guided tank guidedhicles = missile ve- missile ve- Ten a n t i t a n k hicles. hicles guided mis- "BRDM" "BRBM" s i l e vehi-cles "BRDM"
b. Tank division:
The Soviet tank division has the same antitank guided missile
battalion as in the motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n organization in another
d is t r ibu t ion as shown below:
26
Three tank regiments Divis ion t roops Total
E lAntitank guided missi le Antitank guided mis- Y
m .rcompany "f ive vehicles" s i l e ba t t a l ion , u s plus one vehicle "BRDM" twelve vehicles .ru >a
f o r command and con- E m a t ro l . s *r
F
al VI-> vlEal .rL3Three regiments X f ive y1 E X
vehicles = f i f t e e n 3; = M
antitank guided 8-0a'.- v)amissi le vehicles 3 =r-I- m u
c. The main functions o f these ant i tank guided missi le subordinate uni ts
a r e :
I t can be u t i l i zed as an ant i tank reserve of the regiment/di-
vision commanders t o direct i t independently or i n conjunction w i t h a
tank reserve and movement obstacles detachment in counterattack.or block-
ing act ions. I t can be u t i l i zed a l so in conjunction w i t h movement ob-
s t a c l e s detachments d u r i n g offense operations t o secure flanks and gaps,
a s well as pa. r t of an anti-airmobile reserve t o destroy the enemy's Lo-&he1 icopters . \v
The ant i tank guided missile takes par t i n a counterattack.
27
r i
/-
I'I 4:
The anti tank guided missi le units secure flanks dur ing offense operations.
The Soviet organization has the following strengths:
The motorized r i f l e division i s in f a c t a combat arms forma-
t ion. I t includes 214-265 medium t a n k (T62) and 117 armored infantry
combat vehicles (BMB) as well as 196 a r t i l l e r y guns i n various c a l i b e r ,
which give the division the capabi l i ty t o operate independently. The
characteristics of BMB make the motorized r i f l e division a l so extremely
e f f ec t ive as i t doubles as a personnel c a r r i e r and a combat vehicle. I t
a l so possesses strong ant i tank asse ts and tremendous f i r e power as well
as a good a n t i a i r c r a f t system, par t icu lar ly the 23m gun (7SU) which i s
considered an e f f ec t ive weapon a g a i n s t the a t tack he l icopter .
The following a re considered weaknesses of the Soviet divisional
organization :
The Soviet divis ion does n o t have aviat ion asse ts in i t s own
28
organization. Close air support is usually considered by Soviet com-
manders as a waste of time, because the request should go through the
command channels up to the army or the front and the response often is
too late. The Soviet division also does not have attack helicopters
initially in the organization and reinforcing it by the attack heli-
copters is usually considered beyond the capacity of the commander's
control. The Soviet battalion has weak combat weight, particularly the
tank battalion in comparison to the American tank battalion, for in-
stance the Soviet tank battalion consists of thirty-one tanks, while the
American consists of fifty-four tanks. Also the Soviet division does not
have the ability for airborne operations,
The noticeable strengths of the US division organization are: The US division has elements of close air support which facilitate im-
mediate air support for the division's units. It also has attack heli- copter units which are highly combat effective. The US armor battalion,
within the division organization has double combat weight as compared to
the Soviet armor battalion excluding the Soviet independent battalion.
The US division also has technological devices, which facilitate easy
fire control and accurate shooting. In addition, its organizational
structure facilitates flexibility in task organizing, and forming bri-
gades according to the combat situation. The following are weaknesses of the US division organization:
The US division organization has a noticeable lack of artillery assets and inadequate air defense weapons. The M 113 is considered only a
personnel carrier not comparable to the Soviet BMB, which doubles as a fighting vehicle. Having also too much organizational flexibility may
cause command and control problems as well as difficulties in coordi-
nating the efforts of brigades.
29
-SECTION I The United States Army's objective i s t o w i n the l a n d b a t t l e , t o
f i g h t and w i n in b a t t l e s , l a rge or small , against whatever foe, and where-
ever i t may be sent t o war. The US leaders consider the next b a t t l e they
have t o f i g h t can not be known, where or when, b u t they do assume t h e po-
t e n t i a l enemy will possess weapons generally as e f f ec t ive as t h e i r own.
The US leaders a l so ca lcu la te t h a t the enemy will have them i n greater
numbers than they will be able t o deploy, a t l e a s t in the opening stages
of c o n f l i c t , because the l e t h a l i t y of modern weapons continues t o in-
crease sharply. US planners a l so expect very h i g h losses t o occur i n
short periods of time, and entire uni t s could be destroyed quickly i f
they a r e improperly employed. Therefore the United States Army today
must, above a l l e l s e , prepare t o win the f i r s t b a t t l e of t h e next war.
The US leaders a l so consider success will depend on t h e i r a b i l i t y t o
assess cor rec t ly the dynamics of modern b a t t l e ; t o reassess them contin-
ual ly i n peace with the ever changing nature of the modern b a t t l e f i e l d ,
and t o communicate an e f f ec t ive b a t t l e doctrine t h r o u g h o u t t h e i r forces .
Changes in in tens i ty and l e t h a l i t y of modern ba t t l e and the need
t o f i g h t outnumbered present t o the United States Army challenges grea te r
than those faced on previous b a t t l e f i e l d s . The objective however, re-
mains unchanged: To win the land b a t t l e . Therefore, t h e US leaders view
t h a t t he army must obtain the maximum combat effect iveness of a l l forces
i n the combined arms team. To achieve this effect iveness the United S ta tes
Army depends on sound doc t r ine , This doctr ine must be derived from an
accurate assessment of dynamics of modern b a t t l e , and an understanding of
a l l i t s implications. Then t o be e f f ec t ive , t h i s doctrine must be d i s -
seminated t h r o u g h o u t their forces .
To w i n the b a t t l e , there are four prerequis i tes t h a t must be met:
30
Adequate forces and weapons must be concentrated a t the c r i t i c a l
times and places. The ba t t l e must be controlled and directed so t h a t
the maximum effectiveness of f i r e and maneuver i s a p p l i e d a t the decisive
time and location. The b a t t l e a l so must be fought using cover, conceal-
ment, suppression of enemy f i r e and combined arms teamwork t o maximize
t h e effectiveness of the United States weapons and t o minimize the e f -
fectiveness of enemy weapons. The United States leaders a lso view tha t
t he teams and crews must be trained t o take advantage of maximum capa-
b i l i t i e s of their weapons.
These are the American general I s principles t o win the land
b a t t l e , wh ich are spelled o u t i n defense, offense and movement t o com-
bat doctr ine.
The defense fundamentals (doctrine) includes: Knowing the enemy.
The US leaders visuai ize t h a t i n Europe t h e i r army, together with the
NATO a l l i e s , will engage the combined armies of Warsaw Pact, i f war
breaks o u t . Elsewhere in the world they a l so m i g h t face forces or-
ganized , trained and equipped by the Warsaw Pact countries. Therefore,
i t i s necessary t o study t h e i r weapons, and the t a c t i c s and techniques
f o r them. In order t o o f f se t the numerical superior i ty of t h e at tackers the
United States leaders consider seeing the ba t t l e f i e ld continuously as an
important fac tor t o defeat the enemy, pr ior t o the s t a r t of the attack
and unt i l the end of the b a t t l e .
The US commander must a l so decide exactly when and where he will
concentrate his forces based upon the r e su l t s o f his in te l l igence opera-
t ions (seeing the b a t t l e f i e l d ) and his analysis of t ha t information. He
should a l so decide how much force will be required t o cope with the
enemy at tack w i t h i n the t e r r a in and the space l imitat ions of the defensive
31
area. As a r e s u l t he seeks no t t o be outweighed more t h a n three t o one
in terms of combat power.
The US commanders emphasize f ight ing a s a combined arms team.
They organize t h e i r forces f o r combat according t o the s i z e and density
o f the enemy a t t ack , the cha rac t e r i s t i c s o f the t e r r a in t o be defended,
and the mix of the defending un i t s , Generally, tanks and long range
anti tank guided missi le (ATGM) are employed on open t e r r a i n , mechanized
infantry in u r b a n , wooded or l e s s t r a f f i c areas . However, the decision
on how t o cross-reinforce, or even whether t o do so, depends upon how
the commander decides t o f i g h t the b a t t l e .
The US leaders consider a l so the exploitl'ng of the defender 's
advantages are necessary t o win the b a t t l e and depend upon how well the
jun ior comnanders (companies, platoons, crews, commanders) exploi t a l l
the bui l t - in advantages of the defender. These commanders should see
t h a t each weapon i s sited t o take advantage of i t s range and purpose and
t o minimize i t s vulnerabi l i ty t o counterf i re or suppressive f i r e . Their
f ight ing vehicles must be covered, or a t l e a s t hull down. They must f i r e
f i r s t . The t e r r a in must be exploited and reinforced when necessary with
mines and obstacles t o slow down the enemy and improve the effect iveness
of the weapons of the defense. Each b a t t l e position must combine the
cha rac t e r i s t i c s of a defense and an ambush . Several b a t t l e posit ions in
mutual support should multiply the strength and value of each. The com-
bination of a l l these advantages repeated i n each set of posi t ion, i n
d e p t h , supported by f i e l d a r t i l l e r y , c lose a i r support and a t tack he l i -
copters , should eas i ly i n f l i c t very high losses on an attackinq enemy.
The US leaders believe the defender enjoys many advantages such
as the opportunity t o know the t e r r a in and carefu l ly empl ace weapons and
uni t s t o maximize t h e capab i l i t i e s and minimize the vu lne rab i l i t i e s , so
the following a re some reasons t o go on a defense:
32
To cause an enemy a t t a c k t o f a i l , t o ga in t ime, t o preserve
fo rces , f a c i l i t i e s , i n s t a l l a t i o n s , a c t i v i t i e s o r t o r e t a i n t a c t i c a l ,
s t r a t e g i c o r p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s , and t o c o n t r o l e s s e n t i a l t e r r a i n .
To wear down enemy fo rces as a pre lude t o o f f e n s i v e opera t ions , t o f o r c e
t h e enemy a l s o t o mass so t h a t he i s more vu lnerab le t o our f i repower .
The Americans b e l i e v e i n a c t i v e defense and they view i t as a
d e c i s i v e way t o de fea t an outnumbered enemy. They a l s o cons ider it as
t h e way t o have t h e i n i t i a t i v e on t h e enemy. The d i v i s i o n is considered
the bas i c o rgan iza t i on t o c a r r y o u t t h i s k i n d o f defense.
To achieve t h e defens ive miss ion, t h e d i v i s i o n commander d i -
v ides t h e de fens ive area i n t o : Cover ing f o r c e area, main b a t t l e area and
r e a r area as shown below:
I
n Main b a t t l e area x x Y
D i r e c t Support Area L:::! The cover ing f o r c e area (CFA) begins a long t h e l i n e o f c o n t a c t
and extends rearward t o t h e foreward edge o f t h e main b a t t l e area (MBA).
The miss ion o f t h e cover ing f o r c e i s t o go l o c a t e t h e enemy and f i g h t him
33
with su f f i c i en t force t o cause him t o deploy, plan an a t t ack , concentrate
forces t o a t t a c k , and thus r w a l the location and the direct ion of his
main e f f o r t . This must be done su f f i c i en t ly f a r forward t o permit forces
in the main b a t t l e area t o concentrate t o destroy the enemy main e f f o r t .
I n order t o do t h i s , the covering force must s t r i p away enemy recon-
naissance units, defeat the advance g u a r d , force the enemy t o deploy his
main body, and cause the enemy t o b r i n g u p a r t i l l e r y and second echelon
forces t o organize a de l ibera te a t tack . As the enemy s h i f t s forces ,
brings u p a r t i l l e r y and masses for a main a t tack , he will reveal his
strength and where he intends t o a t t ack . A covering force a l so seeks t o
hide the actual location of the main b a t t l e area from the enemy. To do
this the covering force may have t o f i gh t forward of the main b a t t l e
area, unt i l a specif ied time so t h a t the main b a t t l e area preparations
can commence.
The covering force takes u p the f ight ing as f a r forward o f the
main ba t t l e position as possible. I t s bat ta l ions and squadrons f igh t
from a s e r i e s of coordinated, mutually supporting b a t t l e posit ions.
These posit ions are s i t ed t o make maximum use of protection offered by
t e r r a in and a re designated t o minimize the vulnerabi l i ty of the de-
fender 's weapons systems while maximizing t h e i r effect iveness , There-
Fore, t o units i n the covering force i t s e l f , the b a t t l e i s very much
l i k e the action of any bat ta l ion in the main b a t t l e area, When directed
t o do so , the covering force hands off the enemy t o main b a t t l e area
forces , then moves t o a designated area in the ma in b a t t l e area and pre-
pares f o r operations there . Normally, t h i s will be a b a t t l e position
deeper in the main b a t t l e a rea , where there will be some time t o rearm,
r e f u e l , reorganize and prepare t o f i gh t again, Thus, we f ind the cover-
34
i n g force has a d i f f i c u l t mission. I t must f i r s t f ind the enemy, then
draw him in to the f i g h t in such a way t h a t his main body must deploy.
To do t h i s , i t i s necessary t o disrupt the basic elements of the offensive
doctrine of the enemy forces , which i s mass and momentum, Bo th can be
denied the enemy, b u t i t is qui te c l ea r t h a t the task will no t be easy.
Indeed, i t may well be necessary for t h e covering force t o a t t a c k
vigorously, e i t h e r to destroy reconnaissance or advance guard elements,
or t o d ive r t enew pressure from one area t o another, thus d iss ipa t ing
mass and moderating momentum,
The s i z e and composition of the covering force usually depends
on the mission, enemy, terrain, and forces avai lable , These fac tors
take on added significance and complexity depending the a t tack mode
chosen by the enemy, depth of the area avai lable f o r covering force OD-
era t ions , and the time required by the main ba t t l e area forces t o get
s e t f o r act ion. The covering force i s normally t a n k heavy. A covering
force operating in f ront of a division could well consis t of up t o four
or f ive t a n k heavy bat ta l ion task forces or cavalry squadrons, a t tack
hel icopter , f i e l d a r t i l l e r y , air defense, and engineer un i t s . The cover-
ing force may be controlled by e i the r the division o r corps. Provision
must be made t o change command arrangements in the course of ba t t l e as
enemy strength and intentions are deployed. (see f igure 1 )
A division covering force may be controlled in several ways:
The divis ion commander may.contro1 i t , u s i n g a t ac t i ca l command post, o r
he may designate an a s s i s t an t d i v i s i o n commander t o command the force and
provide a small s t a f f t o a s s i s t h i m , or brigade commanders nay control
t h a t por t ion of the covering operating forward of t h e i r main b a t t l e area
posit ions.
35
The main b a t t l e area is considered the place i n w h i c h the de-
c i s ive b a t t l e is fought, where forces a re concentrated t o destroy t h e
enemy main a t tack . As a result o f concentration, forces will usually
be unequally d is t r ibu ted l a t e r a l l y . There will be differences i n the
way combat forces f i g h t the defensive b a t t l e , depending upon whether they
a re i n the area where forces a re concentrated o r i n the area where forces
a r e economized. In the main b a t t l e area, tank heavy task forces a re con-
centrated i n depth along the major avenues of approach into the area t o
be defended. However, some main ba t t l e area brigades can expect t o be
organized i n i t i a l l y w i t h mechanized infantry heavy task forces i n s i t u a -
t i o n s where a strong covering force i s established. Taskforcesfrom the
covering force j o i n the f igh t in the main ba t t l e area when they become
avai lable . (see f igure 2)
The division controls the area behind brigades, which i s cal led
the rear area. The divis ion command post and suppor t ing units a re not
located i n the main ba t t l e area, They a r e normally located in the d i -
vision rear a rea . Since units i n reserve will usually be committed t o
f i g h t i n the main b a t t l e area by placing them under the operational con-
t ro l of brigades, they will normally be located in the main b a t t l e area
from outset .
Sometimes i t may be necessary t o es tab l i sh boundaries t o f a c i l i -
t a t e command control . However, brigades often f i g h t i n b a t t l e a reas ,
which a r e , i n turn, composed of bat ta l ion b a t t l e areas or b a t t l e posi-
t i ons . Therefore, brigade boundaries may not have t o be established a t
a l l . Position areas designated t o be the rear brigade b a t t l e areas may
be establ ished. These position areas will serve t o designate the location
o f units, a c t i v i t i e s , agencies, and f a c i l i t i e s located there .
36
How the US commanders organize the defense: When the division
takes u p an ac t ive defense, forces must be f i t t e d t o the t e r r a i n . To do
th i s , i t i s necessary t o thoroughly study the terrain over which the
b a t t l e is expected t o be fought. Personal reconnaissance i s e s sen t i a l .
A l l avenues of approach in to the division area should be c l ea r ly ident i -
f i e d . Terrain which can slow or block l a t e ra l and forward movement of
enemy forces i s a l so ident i f ied . Also the threa t a t tack doctr ine must
be carefu l ly studied. Once avenues of approach and the l i ke ly action
o f the enemy have been ident i f ied , i t i s necessary t o determine the num-
ber of weapon systems required t o defeat enemy forces t h a t can be deployed
along each avenue of approach. This determination i s based on two
f ac to r s :
Maximum number of weapon systems the enemy can deploy a t one time on a
given avenue of approach, and the length of time this t a rge t array will
be exposed ( this evaluation i s based upon tho rough knowledge of enemy
organization and t a c t i c s , careful study of the t e r r a in along each avenue
of approach, and a reasonable estimate of the e f f e c t of obstacles in the
a rea ) . This determination i s a l so based on the r a t e s of f i r e and the
capab i l i t i e s o f defending weapon systems t o k i l l enemy vehicles a t ranges
within which they wil l be exposed.
Based on the general number of weapon systems necessary t o de-
f e a t the enemy, ba t ta l ions and squadrons are al located i n task organized
defending forces.
Not o n l y so , b u t a lso the United States commanders use the f o l -
lowing matrix t o make sure t h a t the avai lable forces a re enough:
37
D/U SECOND ECHELON
REGIMENT S 6 0 u O ECHE.0.U I mf+1I AEGIAENT FIRST fCHEL0,U
PVENMF LETTER A 5 C D
Assuming t h a t t he enemy forces a v a i l a b l e a re 3 b a t t a l i o n s , so the com-
mander has enough f o r c e s t o f i g h t t he b a t t l e .
Th i s e s t i m a t i o n based upon a r a t i o o f 1:3
The a c t i v e defense f rom t h e US p o i n t o f v iew m igh t be fought i n
38
three phases: Covering force act ions, main ba t t l e within the main b a t t l e
area and counterattack act ions.
The covering force ac t ion usually takes place forward of the main
ba t t l e area. Even before the covering force establ ishes contact , the
enemy s h o u l d be harassed and weakened by a i r a t t a c k s . As soon as the
enemy comes within range, a r t i l l e r y f ire will be b r o u g h t t o bear. To
achieve this capabi l i ty a t the earliest possible time, some a r t i l l e r y
may have t o be deployed forward i n the covering force area.
A S soon as the enemy advances into the covering force a rea , the
covering force should make contact and should f igh t an action of such
in tens i ty t h a t the enemy will have t o launch his breakthroujh at tack
prior t o reaching the main defense area. The covering force must s t r i p
away enemy reconnaissance, advance guards and forward a i r defense e l e -
ments and make contact w i t h the main thrust ear ly . Accordingly, the
covering force must have the strength t o f r ' g h t a ba t t l e of such magni-
tude t h a t the corps and divis ions will be able t o see the b a t t l e as
ear ly as possible. The covering force should destroy as much of the
enemy as possible without losing freedom t o maneuver. They should be
predominantly armored cavalry, or the national equivalent, reinforced
by tanks, anti-tank weapons, a r t i l l e r y , a i r defense a r t i l l e r y , engineers,
and anti-tank he1 icopter forces t o i n f l i c t the maximum d is t rac t ion of
the enemy from the outse t .
I n the main b a t t l e area the conduct of the defenses must be e las -
t i c , act ive and f l ex ib l e , with combat power well forward. Units must be
prepared t o s h i f t forces to concentrate combat power a t the enemy's point
of main e f f o r t t o stop the enemy well forward. The enemy's intent ions
39
must be ant ic ipated in order t o force h i m t o f i g h t the defender on the
ground of the defender 's choosing. The extended frontages which have t o
be defended and the concentration of combat power a t the point of main
effort will inevi tably lead t o gaps in the defense or high r i s k area on
the f lanks. Combat power which can be concentrated most rap id ly , such
as a r t i l l e r y f i r e , remotely delivered mine, t a c t i c a l a i r and ant i - tank
he l icopters , should be brought t o bear quickly while armor, mechanized
and infantry forces move.
The act ive defense or ien ta tes on destroying the enemy forces , and
posit ions are establ ished in d e p t h in order t o a l low continuous concen-
t ra t ion of combat power t o wear down, weaken and destroy the enemy. Ter-
rain should n o t be yl'elded w i t h o u t a compelling reason such as m a i n t a i n -
ing the effect iveness of a f i g h t i n g force by avoiding being overrun.
S t r o n g points can be establ ished; however, they a re the exception rather
t h a n the ru l e because of the l ikelihood t h a t a strong p o i n t may be by-
passed and cu t o f f . Judgement will be the key as t o when t o es tab l i sh
strong points .
A t a l l times in the main defense area, the offensive s p i r i t of de-
fense must be maintained, and local counterattacks should be executed by
f i r e and maneuver whenever a high degree of success can be ant ic ipa ted .
Barr iers and minefields are used t o increase the advantages of the de-
fender.
The counterattack should be conducted only when the gains t o be
achieved are worth the r i s k s involved i n surrendering the innate advan-
tages of the defender. Because counterattacking forces give u p most
advantages of the defense, they must protect themselves from enemy ob-
servation and f i r e by judicious use of t e r r a i n , smoke, night and bad wea-
40
ther and they must be supported by d i r ec t and ind i rec t suppressive f i r e s
on every weapons system t h a t can bring f i r e on them. Reserve slopes and
l imited objective a t tacks should be the rule rather than the exception.
Often, counterattacks will consis t of moving tanks and anti-tank quided
missi le (ATGM) t o the flanks or even t o the rear of exposed enemy e le -
ments. From these posi t ions, enemy armored vehicles can be destroyed
by long range f i r e s alone. I f i t i s necessary t o close w i t h the enemy
positions, the counterattack force should move by routes, which protect
i t from the enemy's overwatching elements. Sometimes i t will be neces-
sary t o counterattack t o recapture c r i t i c a l t e r r a i n , In these cases a l l
the pr inciples of the at tack should be b r o u g h t in to play.
Reviewing t h i s explanation of t h e US pr inciples and fundamentals
and the way the US leaders apply them, the following appear t o be strengths
and weaknesses i n their doctrine of the defensive operations :
1 . The strengths:
a . This k i n d of defense offers the defender a l l the defensive ad-
vantages such a s terrain, cover and concealment, Not only so, b u t a lso
of fe rs the defender the i n i t i a t i v e because of the contact operation o f
the covering force and by attacking the enemy a l l the way u p t o the ba t t l e
area, the enemy m i g h t lose the i n i t i a t i v e , because he m i g h t be forced t o
d ive r t from his p lans .
b . Active defense doc t r ina l ly concentrates on causing the enemy
casua l t ies , which eventually make i t easy t o regain t e r r a in or even w i n
a new t e r r a i n .
c. I t is not easy t o bypass or cu t o f f the US defenses because they
have mobility, and are n o t r e s t r i c t ed t o fixed areas .
d . Attacking the enemy w i t h a reasonable strength in the covering
41
force area f a c i l i t a t e s discovering the main e f f o r t of the enemy and h is
main d i rec t ions of advances. I t will be easy then fo r t h e forces in the
main b a t t l e area t o reac t cor rec t ly i n order t o stop and destroy him.
e. This k i n d of defense doctr ine indeed gathers most of the defense
area and the mobile defense doctrine. Some of these s i m i l a r i t i e s are:
The select ion of the defensive pos i t i on i n both ac t ive defense and area
defense i s based upon the s u i t a b i l i t y of the t e r r a in by offer ing the de-
fender good observation and f i e l d s o f f i re t o get the maximum effect of
a l l a v a i l a b l e weapons. Both of the mi l i t a ry doctrines allow the defender
t o s e t u p excel lent obstacle systems in f ront of t he main b a t t l e area
or the FEBA. The extending o f constructing a l t e rna t ive posit ions gives
the defender the advantage of f igh t ing from posit ions t o canal ize the
penetration.
f . Active defense doctr ine depends upon building up the e f f o r t i n
the threatened areas , according t o the b a t t l e ' s dynamics (progress) .
g . Active defense pr inciples avoid wasting forces by d i s t r ibu t ing
them on the g round , and emphasize se t t i ng up su i t ab le s i z e forces in
the proper place, according t o an analyzing process for b o t h the enemy
and the terrain.
h . Active defense doctrine gives a lso jun ior commanders of ba t t a l -
ions and below the complete freedom t o ac t and r eac t according t o the
development of the ba t t l e in their d i rec t ions .
i . Brigade level controls i t s capabi l i ty t o accept a d d i t i o n a l suppor t
such as a t t a c k he1 icopter , c lose a i r support and others par t icu lar ly d u r -
ing the f igh t ing periods.
2 . The weaknesses:
a . The potential dangers of the US defensive doctrine areapparent in
42
the lack of the defensive d e p t h . For example, i f the enemy succeeds in
penetrating the main b a t t l e a rea , he will no t face a real reserve a t the
brigade level or even a strong divisional reserve,
b . The US doctrine of well forward defense causes t h e divis ion com-
manders t o keep u p a small reserve which i s not able t o react e f fec t ive-
l y .
c , The ac t ive defense emphasizes doing a great maneuver a l l over
the frontage in c r i t i c a l times, which might cause the defender problems
(see f igure 3 ) .
d . Lack of troops and extended frontage might cause the commanders
problems, pa r t i cu la r ly in the enemy’s main d i r ec t ions ,
e . The cavalry tasks a c t as a covering force t o deny them achieving
their main mission of gathering information, especial ly under the enemy
pressure.
f . Defending of a large frontage c rea tes great gaps, which g i v e
the enemy the opportunity f o r easy penetrat ion, and spreading out i n to
the defensive zones.
Section I 1
The Soviets view the mi l i ta ry doctrine on the nature of the modern
combined arms as the use of armed forces and the requirements fo r war
preparedness. The two essent ia l components of mi l i ta ry doctrine a re
po l i t i ca l and mi l i ta ry technology.
Spec i f ica l ly Soviet mi l i ta ry doctr ine determines the s t ruc tu re
o f the Soviet Armed forces , a l loca tes the resources and o u t p u t and
orients research and development efforts t o support the armed forces .
Mili tary forces a l so i s the blueprint drawn up by the highest Soviet
leaders, which describes the shape and the way t o use t h e i r armed forces
43
i n d e t a i l .
The Soviet mil i tary doctrine includes the component of mi l i ta ry
science (mi l i ta ry a r t s ) , which i s the theory and pract ice of engaging in
combat operations and armed conf l i c t . I t is a l so concerned with the use
of armed forces and with the support of combat a c t i v i t i e s from a l l na-
t ional resources,
In the Sov ie t mi l i t a ry art there a re three main categories:
1 . S t ra teg ic - national and thea t re l eve l ,
2 . Operational - Fronts and armies.
3. Tactical - divisions.
A t the operational and t a c t i c a l l e v e l s , there are l i s t s of p r i n -
c ip les pertaining t o mi l i ta ry art i n general and t ac t i ca l doctr ine i n
par t icu lar . They are considered the basic guidance for those levels a n d ,
sometime, they are invio la te although the Soviet leaders say t h a t they
may be updated when applicable.
Sov ie t principles have been influenced by World War I1 experien-
ces , t ra in ing experiences and the probabili ty of conducting conventional
and unconventional war. Throughout the Soviet mi l i ta ry his tory prin-
c ip l e s have a degree of f l e x i b i l i t y . Also the Soviet mi l i ta ry leaders
c l a s s i fy mi l i ta ry pr inciples i n t o the following priorities:
1 . Concentration of main e f f o r t s and creation of superior i ty of forces
over the enemy a t the decisive place and time (MASS).
2 . Mobility and h igh r a t e s of advance i n a l l combat operations.
3 . Achieving surprise and m a i n t a i n i n g secur i ty .
4 . Preservation of the combat effectiveness o f f r iendly forces .
5. Conformity of the goal,
6 . Conunand and control coordination,
44
Those are the Soviet general pr inciples , which usually s p l i t o u t
into defense, offense and march and engagement pr inc ip les ,
Defensive doctr ine, based on the vast defensive ba t t l e s of World
War 11, a re demonstrated i n a thorough recognition o f the impact o f wea-
pons of mass destruction and in the conventional posture of the defensive
use of armored combat vehicles , ground a i r defense weapons, and anti-tank
guided missi les . This i s based upon the f o l l o w i n g pr inciples:
1 . Concentrate a l l weapons f i r e i n the decisive direct ions and areas.
2 . Hold firmly the v i t a l areas and positions which control the enemy's
avenues of approach,
3 . The great maneuver by f i r e s , troops and means.
4 . S t rong counterattacks.
5 . Great use on obstacles.
6. Clever exploi ta t ion of the defensive feature of t e r ra in and the en-
gineer preparation for i t .
Although the Soviets see tha t the only means t o achieve decisive
victory is the offense, there a re s ta ted reasons f o r going on the de-
fense:
1 . To consolidate gains of the advance elements,
2 . To await additional resources when temporarily halted by the enemy
d u r i n g the course of an offensive,
3 . To protect flanks of a formation, or along a sea coast ,
4 . To repulse an enemy counter-thrust .
5. To regroup a f t e r severe losses .
6 . To protect the withdrawal of troops.
7 . As a r e s u l t of a f a i l u r e offensive operations.
In organizing and establ ishing the defensive operation, the Soviet
45
leaders take i n t o consideration the nature of the mission, the enemy's
s i t u a t i o n , the t e r r a in features , t roops avai lable and the avai lable time.
Therefore the defense may take one of the fo l lowing forms:
1 . According t o the poss ib i l i t y of contact w i t h the enemy;
a . Defense under the circumstances of d i r e c t combat w i t h the enemy.
b . Defense w i t h o u t d i r ec t contact w i t h the enemy.
2 . According t o the frontage;
a . Defense on a large frontage.
b. Defense on a normal frontage.
3 . According t o the engineer preparation and the time avai lable for the
occupying;
a . Deliberate defense.
b . Hasty defense which can be turned into de l ibera te defense.
4 . According t o the time;
I t can be conducted dur ing daylight o r n i g h t .
5 . According t o the fea ture of t e r r a i n ;
I t can be organized and conducted i n dese r t , mountain, cu l t iva ted
or cold weather area. I t a l so can be adopted along sea coast o r water
bar r ie rs and b u i l t up areas .
The Soviet leaders describe the defense as an ac t ive defense,
which has the a b i l i t y of causing the enemy heavy casua l t ies by us ing a l l
f i r e resources avai lable , by conducting f i r e , means and troop maneuver
from the depth t o the threatened d i rec t ions , and a l so by using obstacles
and launching strong counterattacks. A t the same time t o counter the
modern attacking forces , the defense should include ant i - tank, a n t i a i r -
c r a f t , a n t i - a r t i l l e ry and anti-airborne resources.
The Soviet leaders recognize the b a t t l e location ( b a t t l e posi-
46
tions) as a t roop grouping , which should be taken according t o the f a r -
seeing and t he nature of the defensive b a t t l e . The b a t t l e posit ions
should be prepared according t o the t roop grouping, which was adopted be-
fo re , and should be adjusted t o the troop location in order t o meet the
protection against the nuclear weapons. I t should include the t o t a l
capab i l i t i e s of means and equlpment of un i t s and subordinates during the
defensive b a t t l e . Because o f these f ac to r s , Soviet defensive area a t
divis ion level i s divided in to :
1 . S t rong points a t the company and platoon l eve l s .
2 . Defensive area a t bat ta l ion l eve l .
3. Defensive sec tor a t regimental l eve l .
4 . Defensive zone a t divis ional l e v e l ,
The defensive sec tor a t the regimental level consis ts of the
d e p t h of ba t t a l ions ' f i r s t and second echelons and the distance between
them. Bat ta l ions ' f i r s t echelon are located on the dep th , which should
f a c i l i t a t e the use of a l l means of f i r e in f ront of t he FEBA, t o cause
casua l t ies as much as possible, and deny the enemy opportunity t o pene-
t r a t e .
Because o f the importance of the FEBA from the Soviet point of
view, the Army commander determines i t .
The second pos i t i on i s b u i l t u p on a depth two kilometers or more
and on dis tance of four t o six Kms from the FEBA, and occupied by b a t -
t a l i o n s ' second echelon t o prevent the enemy, who succeeds i n penetrating
the f i r s t echelon. I t c rea tes a suitable circumstance for going on coun-
terattack. The basic deciding factor o f the distance of location of the
ba t t a l ions ' second echelon i s t o support t h e b a t t l e of ba t t a l ions ' f i r s t
echelon by the f i r e of the primary weapons and by c lose air support,
47
which includes the covered maneuver to the flanks and to the depth, be-
sides launching the counterattacks.
Division second echelon is usually sited at the distance which
will deny the enemy use of his artillery fire against it, and guarantee
cover and concealment: also to allow the maneuver element to launch a
counterattack or go into blocking positions.
(for frontage and depth norms see figure 4)
Establishing security zone at the division level, is necessary
from the Soviet point of view. The depth of the security zone is twenty
to thirty Kms which includes the following elements;
1. Platoon size element as forward fighting point of the battalion level.
2 . Company size unit as forward fighting point at the regimental level.
3 . Battalion size unit as forward combat detachment at divisional level
(see figure 5).
The mission of these elements are:
a. Delay the enemy's attack.
b. Force the enemy to deploy early,
c. Discover the enemy's strength and the direction of the main
attack.
d. Protect the defenders against the sudden attack.
e, Cause the enemy casualties before his arrival to the FEBA,
The conduct of the defensive battle is characterized by being
positivity, activity and maneuverability as well as struggle spirit and
initlative, All these elements can be achieved throughout by carrying
out air reconnaissance, distributing the troops in the defensive zone,
keeping up a suitable second echelon and reserve. (See figure 5).
The Soviets organize and conduct the defensive battle according
4a
t o the followin9 phases.
1 . Conduct the defensive b a t t l e against the enemy on the avenues o f
approach,
a . Since the at tack can be launched a f t e r occupying i n i t i a l posi-
t ions or from march the Soviets should discover the enemy preparing f o r
the at tack and his main grouping especially his armored uni ts and a r t i l -
l e ry , a l so the starting time of the enemy's a t tack direct ion o f the
a t tack and the l ines o f deployment.
b. As soon as discovering the enemy's grouping and his deploying
for the a t tack , the close a i r support and the a r t i l l e r y from temporary
position begin t o suppress h i m while moving across narrow areas , cross-
roads and bridges, i n order t o force h i m t o deploy his forces ear ly and
t o cause h i m a great a t t r i t i o n i n ccnjunction w j t h the forward elements.
This a l so i s t o reveal the direct ion of his main thrust. The forward
elements sp l it^ from the second echelon of the same level they wcrk for ,
and they withdraw only by the order o f the d i v i s i o n cow.ander, they a l so
are reinforced by tanks, a r t i l l e r y , engineer and anti-tank weapons.
c . Counter-fire preuaration s t a r t s by the order of the army cowander
a g a i n s t the enemy's supporting f i r e , second echelon and reserve t o cause
the enemy casual t ies and t o e f f e c t troop morale, Counter-fire prepara-
t i o n ' s time depend upon the means of f i r e and amnunition avai lable , and
i t could be, as l o n g as t h i r t y t o for ty minutes.
d . During the counter-fire preparation, the defenders concentrate
f i r e t o destroy tanks, armored personnel ca r r i e r s and e lec t ronic wrfare
as se t s .
2 . Conducting the defensive ba t t l e t o ha l t the enemy in front o f the FESA
1 ine:
49
a. The defenders usually put emphasis on the time of the attack to
allow the opportunity for the subordinates to be ready to stop the enemy
and destroy him. The Soviets consider the time of transferring the
threat's preparatory fire to the second echelons as the time of attack-
ing.
b. As soon as the enemy starts the attack the subordinate units be-
gin to engage him with all available means of fire at the effective
ranges, in order to destroy his tanks, which usually accompany the infan-
try. At the same time the close air support starts attacking the second
echelon, reserve artillery and comand and control posts.
c. The division commander usually concentrates artillery fire on
areas which are more threatened.
d. The enemy who attacks throughout the g a p must be destroyed by
coordinated fires, tank ambushes and artillery ffre.
e. After preventing the enemy penetration o f the FEBA, the Soviet
leaders emphasize rearranging the fire systems and restoring ammuni -tion, then reestablishing the destroyed positions,
3 . Stopping the enemy penetration.
a. When the enemy penetrated the FEBA, commanders take prompt mea-
sures to stop and canalize the enemy's major grouping and prevent him
spreading out into the depth o f the defense, dividing him into subgroups
to facilitate destroying him in detail by all weapons, antitank reserves
and the second echelon to secure future action should be taken by re-
serves.
b . At the same time the commander keeps an eye on the enemy's second
echelon and reserves, particularly their locations, direction of movement
and line of departure, not only so, but also the appearance of any new
50
troops in the vicinity of the penetrated areas.
4. Launching the counterattacks:
a. Soviet leaders place some conditions on launching counterattacks:
(1) The penetrated enemy must be completely stopped,
( 2 ) The ratio should be in the best interest of the counter- attacking forces, especially in tanks.
( 3 ) They must cause the enemy casualties just before launching
the counterattack.
(4) Soviet fire preparation must precede launching of the
counterattacks,
(5) Direction of movement and the lines of deployment should
be secured.
b. If the enemy succeeds in penetrating in various directions, the
priority of the counterattack must be given against the major enemy
grouping.
c, The counterattack at the regimental level is launched against
the main grouping whlch did not completely penetrate the defensive area ,
(battalion's, first echelon) (see figure 6),
d. The counterattack at the divisional level is launched against
the enemy's main grouping which did not succeed in penetrating the regi-
mental defensive sectors,
e. If the defenders failed to stop the enemy in either the defen-
sive areas or the defensive sectors. The division reserve should occupy
blocking positions to stop the enemy and cause him as many casualties
as they can and to secure future operations of the higher second eche-
lons and reserves.
Throughout the discussion of the Soviet doctrine and principles,
51
and how the Soviet leaders apply them in the battlefield, the following
observed strengths and weaknesses are noticed in defensive operations:
1. The Strengths in the Soviet military doctrine;
a. The Soviet defensive system offers a strong defense along all
the depth of the defensive sectors and zones.
b. The Soviet defensive system offers a good observation of the
enemy's activities from a long distance in front of the FEBA of the
flanks and in the depth of the defensive sectors and zones. This ob-
servation system consists of engineer, artillery and chemical observa-
tion posts, besides the radar sets,
c. The Soviet defensive system offers the defenders a second echelon
and reserve at battalion, regiment and division levels. The motorized
rifle regiment keeps a reinforced tank battalion as a reserve-plus a
motorized rifle battalion as a second echelon, meanwhile the motorized
rifle division maintains a tank regiment as a reserve and up to a motorized rifle regiment as a second echelon, which almost equals one
third or more of the total strength of the Soviet regiment or division.
In addition to keeping these reserves the Soviet regiments and divisions
might also include an anti-airborne reserve, which consists o f infantry
and tank elements.
d. The Soviet defensive system offers the defenders quick control
to successfully destroy the enemy's airborne or sabotage in the depth
of the defensive zones. In the Soviet operational documents, there is
a separate plan, called guard and security which discusses in detail the
likely action of the enemy in the depth, particularly against the command
posts and logistic areas. This plan includes subordinates with a mission
of suppressing these actions, besides a complete cooperation among all
52
combat and combat support units, which are sited in the vicinity of
these areas.
c. The Soviet engineer preparation for the defensive sectors and
zones is characterized by effectiveness and the ability to bear the
enemy fires and offers the defenders cover and concealment. The Soviet
defensive areas, sectors and zones consist of main positions, alter-
native positions (flank and rear) and dummy positions, Other engineer
activities, such as the preparation of the command and control posts,
observation posts and artillery main and alternative positions, are
also carried out.
f. As a result o f World War I1 the Soviet leaders have seen the im-
portance of using minefields on a great scale in integration with en-
gineer preparations to decrease the enemy's attack momentum, and to re-
inforce his troops going into prepared directions (killing zones). They
also use minefields to secure the exposed flanks and the gaps, and they
use them as part of the counterattacks strength, by allocating them on
the vulnerable flanks.
g. The Soviet system of firmly holding the terrain could be an ad-
vantage, particularly if this terrain is a vital objective, such as
straits, sea ports, bridges.
h. The integration between the fire system and the system of ob-
stacles is considered a Soviet advantage of defense operations.
i. The Soviet defense doctrine of using the reserves in conjunction
with engineers units and anti-tank units is considered an advantage for
the defenders. The Soviet comnanders consider the integration among the
combat elements, engineer elements and antitank elements necessary to
canalize the enemy and secure the counterattacks actions.
53
j. The Soviet organization of defensive positions and alternative
positions, both integrated with the fire system, offers the defenders the
capabilities of controlling the enemy penetration not only within the
FEBA area, but also in the depth.
2. The Weaknesses:
a. It is obvious that the Soviet military principles lack a degree
o f flexibility, in other words, the Soviet leaders have set priorities
to achieve the military doctrine and principles. For example mass is
the first priority to achieve, then the mobility and high rate of com-
bat operation, after that achieving surprise, security and so on.
b. Soviet leaders insist on firmly holding terrain, rather than des-
troying the enemy. An example is the use of counterattacks which ini-
tially aim at restoring lines, positions or areas instead of destroying
the enemy as a first priority.
c. The Soviet engineering structure of the defensive areas, sectors
and zones, generally takes a normal shape (lines) which are based on
World War I 1 experiences. Not only so but also the defensive echelons
are built up according to norms, For instance, the distance between
the battalions first echelon and the battalions second echelon, should
be two to three Kms, and the distance between the battalion second eche-
lon/regiment first echelon and the regiment second echelon/division should
be five-six Kms and so on.
d. The Soviet leaders once put the reserves just behind the units in
the main efforts, and usually put the main efforts in the middle o f the
formation. This kind of technique makes it easy to discover the entire
defensive plan just from discovering the locations of the reserve. It
also denys the reserves complete free maneuver to the flanks,
54
----
c . The strong points par t icu lar ly in the defensive area (ba t ta l ions
f i r s t echelon) have very limited a b i l i t i e s t o maneuver except by f i r e .
I t i s easy t o bypass some of them under the preparatory f i r e and by u s i n g
smoke screens. The strong points in the defensive second echelon (bat-
t a l ions second echelon/regiments f i r s t echelon/division) have the a b i l i t y
of limited maneuvers into a l te rna t ive posit ions i n the v i c in i ty of the
major area.
a MAMEUWER BY OCCUPYING
ALTERNATf VE POSISlONS.
f . The borders between subordinate uni ts and un i t s are unchangeable,
55
espec ia l ly a t the same level. For instance, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o f ind a
regimental reserve launching a counterattack in another defensive sec tor .
B u t the d i v i s i o n reserve has the freedom t o go anywhere wi th in the d i -
vision zone.
g . The Soviet counterattack a t a l l l eve l s aims a t res tor ing posi-
t i o n s r a the r t h a n following the enemy t o destroy h i m t o r e a l i z e a t o t a l
victory. Namely the counterattack forces have no mission t o follow the
56
enemy to completely destroying him beyond the FEBA, and the FEBA is con-
sidered an iron fence. So, Soviet leaders usually need time to stop
at the FEBA, then estimate the situation to make a decision to consoli-
date these areas or to continue (although the time is a major key in
such cases).
h. The lack o f coordination between units is considered a disadvan-
tage, particularly between regiments and divisions, and the gaps between
them are weak areas, if the attackers concentrate on them. Usually the
regiments and the division commanders protect these gaps, initially by
artillery fire and tank ambushes, which consist o f no more than teams.
i. Because of the military norms, which go into any Soviet decision
at all levels, it is obvious that the Soviet leaders, particularly at
regimental level and below might face problems to confront any unfore-
seen situation.
57
A
CD1 xi
cn co
59
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I I- -x
m 0
iI
m N
\ ' \
cn W
CHAPTER I1
FOOTNOTES
'ATP-35, Letter of Promulqation d td 3 Apr 78, pp. 2-1 - 2-7, s tand-a r d i z a t i o n , H Q , North A t l a n t i c Trea ty Organiza t ion , Brusse l s , Belgium.
2Department of the Defense: Soviet Arm.y Operat ions, ( V i r g i n i a : US Army I n t e l l i g e n c e and Threat Analysis Center , April 1978) , pp. 1-1 -1-10, 2-12 - 2-16, 2-37, 4-1 - 4-13.
3DDB-1100-197-78, The Sovie t Motorized R i f l e B a t t a l i o n , US Army,Defense Intell igence Agency. December 1977, pp . 3 , 5-6, 90-96.
4DDB-1120-79, Sov ie t Tank Regiment T a c t i c s , US Army, Defense I n t e l l i -gence Agency, May 1979, pp. 71-74.
5DDB 1120-12-79, Sovie t Motorized Rifle Regiment, US Army, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, March 1979, p p . 71-/5.
6FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized I n f a n t r y Ba t t a l ion Task Force,Headquarters , Washington. Department of the Army, 30 June 1977 , PP. 5.2 - 5.4 , 5.16 - 5.19.
7FM 71 -3, Armored and Mechanized Brigade, Headquarters , Washington, Department of the Army, 25 J u l y 1980, pp. 4-3, 4-17, 4-26 - 4-32.
8FM 71-100, Armored and Mechanized Division Operat ion, Headquarters , Washington. Department of the Army, 30 March 1979, pp. 5-2 - 5-21.
gFM 100-5, US Army Operat ions, Headquarters , Washington. Departmentof the Army, 1 J u l y 1976, pp. 1 -1 , 5-2 - 5-14.
1°Hafiz, Notes on Vestrel Academy, Moscow, 1974-1976.
"HB 550-2, Organization and Equipment o f the Sovie t Arm.y. US Com-bined Arms Combat Developments A c t i v i t y , Deuartment of t he Armv, Leavenworth,KS: CACDA, J u l y 1980, p i . 2-1 - 2-3, 2111 2-13, 3-1, 3-3. -
1 2 V . G . Reznichenko, Technical Report. (V i rg in i a : Defense Techni-ca l Information Center , October 30, 1967). pp. 3-5, 13-16, 208, 209-224.
64
CHAPTER I11
THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION
Section 1 : The US offensive operational doctrine:
Questions of mi l i ta ry doctr ine and force s t ruc ture may seem some-
what esoteric t o many o f f i ce r s . B u t doctrine and force structure are
n o t h i n g more than the method of f igh t ing and the number and type of
forces t h a t method requires . Doctrine and force s t ruc tu re ult imately
define the j o b o f every o f f i c e r , and the correctness of t h a t def in i -
t ion determines whether each o f f i c e r ' s e f f o r t will lead t o success or
f a i l u r e .
The US ground force doctrine i s generally d i v i d e d in to two basic
a reas : Firepower/attr i t ion and Maneuver. B o t h employ the same ele-
ments, f i r e and maneuver, b u t firepower a t t r i t i o n doctrine uses maneuver
primarily as a way t o move and pos i t i on delivery systems so t h a t f i r e -
power can physically destroy the enemy by a t t r i t i o n . According t o cu-
rent doctr ine regarding firepower a t t r i t i o n , the objective of mil i tary
action i s physical destruction fo r enemy. This i s n o t the objective
s ta ted in the maneuver doctrine, where firepower i s used only when
necessary t o c rea te opportunities f o r maneuver. The objective expressed
i n the doctrine i s t o break the s p i r i t and the will of the enew com-
mand by using surpr ise t o place enemy forces i n a dangerous operational
or s t r a t e g i c s i t ua t ions .
The primary objective of the US offensive operations i s t o des-
t roy the enemy by breaking through his defensive system and driving
rapidly and violent ly in to his rear t o destroy a r t i l l e r y , command posts,
65
air defense, l o g i s t i c support, and command systems.
From time t o time, offensive operations may a lso be conducted t o
secure key t e r r a i n , t o gain information concerning enemy strength and dis-
posit ions and occasionally t o deceive the enemy, Even t h o u g h defensive
operations are often necessary and sometimes preferred, as a general ru le
offensive action i s the only way t o achieve decisive r e su l t s on the b a t -
t l e f i e l d ,
Since the threa t forces can n o t be equally strong everywhere, i t
is usually possible t o concentrate su f f i c i en t combat power t o outweigh
them a t a place decided on by the attacking commander. Even during de-
fensive operations, the commander should never miss an opportunity t o
a t tack .
The US mili tary leaders have established c r i t e r f a f o r the commander
in the conduct of offensive operations. Although the a p p l i c a t i o n of each
of the following criteria may vary from time t o time and from the situa-
tion t o another, they are the same f o r any offensive operation:
The US leaders believe C h a t t o be successful i n offensive opera-
t ions , i t is f i r s t necessary t o know the enemy (see the b a t t l e f i e l d )
t h a t i s having knowledge of his organization f o r defense; the capab i l i t i e s
of his weapon systems; and how he customarily disposes his forces on the
ground.
Battalion task force and small uni t commanders, for example must
understand how the enemy normally defends from a se r i e s of strongpoints
i n d e p t h , attempting t o draw the at tacker i n t o f i r e traps.
Division comanders and their s t a f f must know much more. They
must understand how the enemy uses f i e l d and a i r defense a r t i l l e r y t o
support the defense; how d iv is ions , regiments, bat ta l ions are control led;
66
how the defensive b a t t l e i s l o g i s t i c a l l y supported a t the d i v i s i o n level
and below; and where the tank reserves are usually located and when they
a re deployed. The d i v i s i o n commander must a l so t e l l his information
gathering agencies w h a t e l s e he needs t o know, such as where the enemy
.is weak or can be weakened.
In the a t tack , the bat ta l ion task force commander can seldom see
the te r ra in or the enemy beyond the te r ra in feature t o his immediate
f ront . The division commander has the means avai lable t o see the te r ra in
and enemy a t a distance and provide the information gained t o brigades
and bat ta l ion task forces .
The second offensive fundamental the US mili tary adheres t o i s
creat ing an overwhelming concentration of combat power. While the enemy
weaknesses may be known from outse t , most a t tacks begin w i t h a movement
t o contact , often on a broad f ron t . Once contact i s made and an area
where the enemy i s weak or can be weakened i s f o u n d , i t i s necessary t o
move quickly t o concentrate superior forces i n t ha t par t icu lar area.
Tanks and mechanized infantry forces a re concentrated on a narrow front
t o breakthrough enemy forward defenses. Field and a i r defense a r t i l l e r y
concentrate t h e i r f i r e s t o protect advancing t a n k and mechanized infantry
forces a t the p o i n t where the main e f f o r t i s t o be made. Engineers con-
cent ra te t o a s s i s t in breeching and clear ing minefields as well as ob-
s t ac l e s , such as bar r ie rs or f o r t i f i c a t i o n s which can slow or stop advanc-
i n g tanks and mechanized infantry, Electronic support measures are con-
centrated t o locate enemy emitters so they can be attacked by f i r e or
jammed by electronic countermeasures, These actions will disrupt enemy
weapon systems and break down his command and control
Mobility of armored and mechanized forces allows them t o move 67
rapidly from one place t o another and f i g h t on a r r iva l I However, in con-
centrat ing forces the thinning of units elsewhere involves some r i sk . As
a consequence, i t i s necessary t o deceive the enemy as t o the d iv i s ion ' s
intent ion; the location of i t s main e f f o r t and t he strength of i t s un i t s .
The suppresslon of enemy defensive f i r e i s a l so considered one of
the fundamentals of the offense t o US mil i ta ry leaders . Attacking forces
are concentrated and therefore are vulnerable t o enemy f i r e s . I t i s neces-
sary t o suppress enemy weapons by obscuring the vision of enemy gunners
t o preclude t h e i r interference of advancing tanks, mechanized infantry
at tack helicopters and close a i r support operations, Gunners o f d i rec t -
f i r e weapons are usually suppressed by bat ta l ion task force weapons and
d i r ec t support f i e l d a r t i l l e r y . More important t o the division commander
i s suppression of f i e l d a r t i l l e r y units which can slow or s top the d i -
vision at tack and i n t e r f e re with command post and combat service support
operations. Field a r t i l l e r y counterf i re and sometimes US Air Force (USAF)
offensive a i r support so r t i e s are concentrated in su f f i c i en t numbers and
are of adequate duration t o subs tan t ia l ly degrade the enemy's f i e l d a r -
t i l l e r y capabi l i ty t o i n t e r f e re with the main effort .
For a t tack helicopter and USAF a i r c r a f t t o operate , enemy a i r de-
fense systems must be suppressed. Electronic support measures and other
ta rge t acquisit ion means can be used t o locate enemy a i r defense weapons,
Field a r t i l l e r y , and sometimes electronic countermeasures can also be
used t o suppress o r disrupt a i r defenses, a t tack helicopters and close
air support . I t i s a lso important t o destroy enemy e lec t ronic warfare
assets t o avoid disrupting f r iendly command and control .
Once the at tack i s launched, the US commanders p u t in to e f f e c t
or action shock t a c t i c s t o overwhelm and destroy the enemy. Therefore
68
they carefu l ly coordinate the action of t h e i r commands t o ensure maximum
speed, surpr ise and violence. Maneuver uni ts cross exposed areas as
rapidly as possible, t h e i r advance timed t o coincide with intense sup-
pressive f i r e s suppor t ing the a t tacks. Close a i r support (CAS) , elec-
t ronic warfare, a i r defense support , and other operations. These actions
build u p in in tens i ty for maximum effectiveness during c r i t i c a l moments
of t he a t t a c k . The at tack must be narrow and in d e p t h . The enemy's
s t a l l ed or disorganized uni t s must be bypassed by fresh formations
pressing on t o deeper objectives. Once the i n i t i a l a t tack takes e f f ec t
on the enemy, there must be no le t -up, I n i t i a l success should cause
dislocation and redisposit ion of enemy forces , and this in turn destroys
the in t eg r i ty of his defensive system.
Attack the enemy rear: The US commanders consider enemy combat
support un i t s , engineers, s igna l , a r t i l l e r y , and enemy command and con-
t ro l f a c i l i t i e s as l e s s well protected and usually l e s s capable of s e l f -
defense than maneuver uni t s . Least l ike ly t o be protected, l e a s t well
armed, and weakest overall a r e enemy combat service s u p p o r t elements,
including supply, maintenance, t ransportat ion, and administrative units
which usually exist in the rear areas, Once the forward combat elements
are penetrated, the at tacker should seek out the enemy r e a r , destroying
headquarters, combat support and combat service suppor t assets. Attacks
should aim a t wide destruction among these a s se t s , Disrupting enemy com-
mand and control , in terrupt ing the flow of f u e l , ammunition, repair par t s ,
food and other necessi t ies and in te r fe r r ing w i t h enemy a i r defense and
a r t i l l e r y , supports, weakens or destroys the e n t i r e system o f defense and
makes i t possible t o overpower the enemy with fewer forces , Successful
a t tacks in to the enemy real will often force an abandonment o f the advan-
69
tages of prepared defensive positions, and will force the enemy to commit
his maneuver units to hasty countermoves where they are significantly
more exposed. In general, the most decisive offensive is one which
strikes with overwhelming force into the enemy's rear, and destroys or
captures his service support, combat support and disrupts command and
control.
A successful attack requires continuous combat support and com-
bat service support to sustain the weapon systems essential for the mo-
mentum of the attack.
Field artillery, engineers, air defense, and another combat sup-
port and combat service support elements must carefully plan forward
movement to keep pace with the maneuver units. The weapon systems must
not run out o f ammunition or fuel. When combat vehicles break down in
use, or are damaged, they must be repaired quickly or replaced. The
deeper the attack strikes into enemy controlled territory, the more dif-
ficult it is to maintain support and keep lines of communicatfon open.
Imaginative planning, vigorous execution, and flexibility of
response must be as characteristic of support commanders as of combat
comnanders: they must work together as a team.
The US division commander prepares for offensive operation based
on intelligence information concerning the enemy and terrain. He then
estimates the situation and this staff provides appraisals. The com-
mander then decides on and announces his concept of the operation to his
staff and subordinate units connnanders.
The commander should describe his concept of the operation in
sufficient detail to clarify the time and place of the attack, scheme
of maneuver for the force as a whole, task organization and control mea-
sures. 70
Time of attack might be provided by higher headquarters. If the
commander is free to choose the time, he must consider the time required
to reconnoiter the terrain, to gather additional information about the
enemy if needed, and time required by subordinate units to prepare for
combat.
Often, when opposing an enemy in strength, it may be best to
attack under cover of darkness or during other periods of limited visi-
bility - fog, snow, or rain - even though control may be somewhat more
difficult,
The place to attack is that location which offers the greatest
likelihood of success. The weak points in the defensive system are
usually the places to consider as an initial objective. If no weak
point can be found, then one must be created, This can be done by
fire, fire and maneuver, or deception such as a feint or demonstration
to cause the enemy to shift his forces or concentrate elsewhere.
The commander's intentions and the best direction of approach
to the enemy will determine the scheme o f maneuver used by the divi-
sion. The commander's intentions can be described in one of four ways:
Overrun and destroy a weaker enemy in position, fix or hold an enemy
force in position, rupture and pass through enemy defenses to secure a
deep objective, or pass around enemy main defenses to strike him from
flanks and rear - causing him to fight in an unexpected direction or
perhaps more than one direction.
Enemy positions can be approached in three directions: from
the front, the flanks or the rear.
In the attack, subordinate units may maneuver differently. A
division attack may be conducted with one brigade fixing enemy units
71
i n posi t ion, another brigades passing around those posit ions t o s t r i k e
deep, while a t h i r d brigade i s poised t o move t h r o u g h the hole created
(see f igure 1 ) .
In an envelopment, the at tacker passes around enemy strength
t o s t r i k e on a l i g h t l y guarded flank or i n t o the r ea r of the enemy de-
fense. I f no open flank or gap i n the enemy defense system e x i s t s ,
gaps can be created by f i r e , f i r e and maneuver or deception operations.
Nuclear weapons are par t icu lar ly useful f o r creat ing gaps, while chemi-
cal weapons can be used t o protect the flanks of the enveloping force.
Success often depends on speed and on preventing the enemy from
reacting i n time w i t h su f f i c i en t force t o slow the at tack. I t may be
necessary t o f i x the enemy i n place, from the front by a suppor t ing
a t tack , or by some other means which will delay enemy reaction t o the
enveloping force. The enemy then i s forced t o f i gh t i n several direc-
tions or abandon his posit ions.
In a penetration the at tacker concentrates t o s t r i k e a t an
enemy's weak p o i n t , breaks through the posit ions t o rupture his de-
fense, holds the shoulders of the gap created, and advances rapidly t o
the objective (see f igure 2 ) ,
A successful penetration depends upon the a b i l i t y of the at tacker
t o suppress enemy weapons, t o concentrate forces su f f i c i en t ly t o over-
whelm the defender a t the point of a t tack , and t o pass su f f i c i en t force
through the gap t o quickly secure the objective. Once this i s accompl-
ished, the comander has two options. He may continue forward t o
rupture successive defense 1ines, and ultimately enter enemy rea r areas ,
or he may turn forces t o roll u p enemy posit ions from the f lanks.
To succeed i n the a t tack i t i s necessary t o concentrate combat
7 2
forces on a narrow front , however, a t times i t may be a l so necessary i n i -
t i a l l y t o advance on a wide front until an enemy weakness i s found.
There are several ways t o do t h i s :
Two brigades make the main e f f o r t while one brigade i s held,
ready t o pass t h r o u g h the gap created and widen the f l a n k s so other
forces can pass through. This type of' operation i s usually conducted
against strong well prepared enemy defenses (see f igure 3 ) .
One brigade makes the main effor t ; one brigade makes a support-
l'ng a t tack t o f i x the enemy's forces i n posi t ion, and one brigade i s
h e l d ready t o re inforce success, Sometimes a smaller force can be used
t o f i x enemy forces i n posit ion when la rger forces are not avai lable
(see figure 4 ) .
One brigade at tacks while the remaininq two brigades a re held
ready t o pass through the lead brigade, Under these circumstances, i t
may be necessary t o f i x enemy forces elsewhere by ind i rec t f i r e s or
by deception operations. This type o f operation may be conducted when
attacking a f lank, or when the enemy is weak, and his forward defenses
can be quickly penetrated (see f igure 5 ) ,
Task Organization; the US divis ions are organized t o destroy
the enemy, To d o this the division has a var ie ty of weapons systems -tanks, anti-tank weapons, infantry, f i e l d and a i r defense a r t i l l e r y ?
and sometimes, a t tack hel icopters , Close a i r support i s provided by
the USAF.
Tank and mechanized ba t ta l ions a re grouped by the division com-
mander t o f i g h t under a brigade headquarters, The brigade commander
organizes for combat by grouping tanks and mechanized companies under a
tank or mechanized bat ta l ion headquarters. This organization I s cal led
7 3
a bat ta l ion task force.
A brigade may be organized as a tank heavy, mechanized heavy, or
balanced, depending upon the mission, enemy, t e r r a i n , and forces ava i l -
able .
The armored cavalry squadron general l y reconnoiters screens,
guards, or covers the d i v i s i o n advance.
-Control.~measures; the divis ion commander usually determines the
following main measures t o assume control over the d i v i s i o n formation,
from the assembly areas u p t o the limited object ive.
Route(s) o f advance t o show the assigned route of march. In-
d ica tes number, l e t t e r or name on i t and s t a r t p o i n t (SP) and release
point ( R P ) . Assigns the l i n e of departure ( L D ) t o coordinate the departure
of the a t tack elements, indicates boundaries ( sec tors ) of respons ib i l i ty
and coordination p o i n t s . Determines contact points , where two or more
units are required t o make physical contact and coordinating f i re l i nes
(CFL) which f i e l d a r t i l l e r y may f i r e a t any time w i t h o u t any additional
coordinations. The divis ion commanders must a l so determine the axis of
advance, which shows the general direct ion of the movement o f attacking
un i t s , or zone o f a t tack .
The divis ion at tacks under a variety of circumstances. Most
of ten, i t a t tacks from defensive posit ions a f t e r an enemy at tack has
slowed or s topped, as an extension of a movement t o contact , or follow-
ing a passage of l i nes through an attacking or defending force.
Once contact i s made, information about the s i t ua t ion must be
reported t o higher headquarters a s quickly a s possible. I t is necessary
t o determine as rapidly a s possible whether the enemy can be bypassed
74
or must be attacked and destroyed. Bypassed enemy forces must be reported
t o the next higher headquarters which then assumes respons ib i l i ty f o r
t h e i r destruct ion, suppression, or containment,
As a general r u l e , i f a leading bat ta l ion task force cannot
quickly defeat , bypass, or f igh t t h r o u g h the enemy, the d i v i s i o n com-
mander must decide whether t o conduct a hasty a t tack , or i f i t i s neces-
sa ry , t o take more time to develop the s i tua t ion and conduct a carefu l ly
planned de l ibera te a t tack. I n any event, a hasty at tack may be con-
ducted t o insure t h a t the division is n o t being held u p by in fe r io r
forces conducting a delay.
I f a hasty at tack i s t o be conducted, fragmentary orders are
issued immediately. Those orders s e t in motion bat ta l ion task forces ,
supporting f i e l d a r t i l l e r y , a t tack hel icopters , and offensive a i r sup-
port in su f f i c i en t strength t o f i x enemy forward elements i n place,
break u p weak polnts o r open flanks and move fr iendly forces quickly
through. Speed i s most important f o r i f the momentum is l o s t the hasty
at tack can f a i l (see f igure 6 ) .
When enough information i s avai lable a b o u t the enemy, the at tack
may be del iberate from the outset . Such an at tack usually starts w i t h
the passage of uni ts through a force I n contact. In any case when a
division encounters a strong enemy force in well prepared posit ions tha t
can not be overcome by a hasty a t tack , i t must take su f f i c i en t time t o
prepare and conduct a de l ibera te a t t a c k . However, only t h a t amount of
time absolutely necessary should be taken t o prepare for the a t tack.
The US mil i ta ry leaders believe i t i s unlikely t h a t t e r ra in can
be seen or reconnoitered in de ta i l more than four t o f ive kilometers
in to enemy t e r r i t o r y , Therefore, detailed planning of maneuver and
15
fires will usually be limited t o t h i s area. Planning fo r act ions beyond
this limit must be more general w i t h the maneuver of forces and f i r e s
sketched o u t i n broader terms. Units must be prepared t o explo i t any
opportunity presented by t e r r a in and enemy weakness.
Two broad options will normally be present when a de l ibera te
a t tack has successful ly breached enemy defenses. The f i rs t i s t o press
forward w i t h committed forces toward the next echelon of the enemy de-
fenses . This i s done t o encounter and defeat the second defensive b e l t
(second echelon) as rapidly as possible , relying heavily on the disrup-
tive e f f e c t s of speed, violence, and continuous at tacks t o carry t h r o u g h
second echelon defenses. The second i s t o turn l e f t or right t o roll
u p additional enemy posi t ions, one a f t e r another, from the f lank , while
another force exploi ts the breach.
When employing t h i s course of ac t ion , US commanders a re aware of
the f a c t t h a t enemy second echelon defenses are usually s i t ed t o support
and back u p f i r s t echelon defenses. The rol lup operation must be con-
ducted within the range of a t l e a s t the f i r e s of the second echelon and
pose a potential t h rea t . This means the r o l l u p force can become en-
gaged t o the extent t h a t i t cannot support forces moving t o explo i t the
breach. US leaders a l so consider h o l d i n g and widen ing the breach es-
pecial ly a t the shoulders i s essent ia l and can be accomplished by at tack-
i n g or following echelons. As a general ru l e i t i s b e t t e r t o press home
w i t h the a t tacking force , seeking t o destroy the cohesiveness of the
enemy defense w i t h the violent disrupt ing e f f e c t s of a coordinated armored
a t tack .
Exploitation: The US purpose of exploi ta t ion i s t o prevent the
enemy from reconstituting an organized defense or conducting an orderly
76
withdrawal. The US mil i t a ry leaders see t h a t this can be done success-
f u l l y , by rapid advance toward the enemy rea r a rea , bypassing small
pockets of res i s tance , and by destruction of l i g h t l y defended and u n -
defended in s t a l l a t ions and a c t i v i t i e s . The US division normally will
explo i t on a broad f ron t , usually with brigades moving abreast ( a s one
echelon). They see a l so t h a t exploi ta t ion i s continued day and night as
long as the opportunity permits. Exploitation may be l imited more by
vehicle breakdown and by fuel than by combat losses and ammunition.
As the exploi t ing force penetrates deeper in to enemy rea r a reas , the
length of supply l i n e s increases. Adequate stocks of f u e l , ammuni-
t i o n , food , and spare parts should accompany the force so momentum i s
no t l o s t for lack of suppor t (four t o s i x days of supplies should be
c a r r i e d ) ,
The following are the main strangths of the US doctr ine and f u n -
damentals in offensive operations:
The US i s a b l e t o concentrate f i r e suppor t and maneuver units
from dispersed posit ions in a short period o f time t o accomplish a pene-
t r a t i o n . Rather t h a n consol ida te forces immediately forward in the
area of penetration, the US will a t tempt t o concentrate as the units
advance and achieve the penetration without massing j u s t forward o f
the l i n e of deployment.
US offensive operations permit a great deal of f l e x i b i l i t y on
the par t of the commander. I t i s easy fo r US commanders t o red i rec t
t he main e f f o r t from one area t o another during the course of the b a t t l e .
This f l e x i b i l i t y i s not l imited t o the conduct of the b a t t l e , i t i s a lso
evident during planning. The commander has the a b i l i t y t o organize his
maneuver un i t s , f i r e support and other combat suppor t and combat service
suppor t within very wide l i m i t s , T h e US r e l i e s on mission type orders
77
qui te frequently, and subordinate commanders are expected t o be able
t o transform general instruct ions in to an e f fec t ive detai led operation
order.
Inherent in the f l e x i b i l i t y enjoyed by the US commander i s the
a b i l i t y t o use his i n i t i a t i v e t o the utmost. While the senior commander
can d i r e c t the spec i f ic actions t o be taken by the subordinate commander
t o accomplish his mission, this i s almost never done. The senior de-
pends on the subordinate t o use his i n i t i a t i v e t o accomplish the mission
and overcome any unexpected occurrences. For example, d u r i n g a pene-
t r a t ion the senior commander will require the subordinate t o accomplish
cer ta in spec i f ic object ives . However, once these objectives are ac-
hieved the senior expects t ha t the subordinate can continue the mission
w i t h minimum guidance. He r e l i e s on the subordinate t o make appropriate
decisions and he also depends on the i n i t i a t i v e of the subordinate t o
explo i t the success of the operation.
US offensive operations require a thorough integrat ion of f i r e
and maneuver. Due t o l imi ta t ion o f men and equipment i t i s incumbent
upon the US Commander t o e f fec t ive ly in tegra te his f i r e support and
maneuver uni ts t o accomplish h i s objective. As was mentioned e a r l i e r
he has maximum f l e x i b i l i t y t o accomplish his end, and he has the capa-
b i l i t y t o reor ien t his f i r e and maneuver units to take advantage of
enemy weaknesses as they revealed d u r i n g the course of the b a t t l e .
Offensive operat ims enable the commander t o deceive the enemy
as t o the t rue nature of the at tack. Therefore the US emphasizes sup-
porting at tacks and deception operations to hold the enemy reserves and
insure the success o f the main a t tack . These can be conducted by as
small a force as bat ta l ion or as large as brigade depending upon the
78
tactical situation.
The US division commander usually assigns the least number o f
control measures possible to his brigade commanders. Often these are
limited to an objective and an axis of advance. This allows the brigade
commander to analyze the situation in his own way and apply his re-
sources to their best advantage, It allows the brigade comnander the
flexibility to exploit the terrain and enemy weaknesses within his
sector and to accomplish the objective in the most effective way.
The following are perceived as weaknesses in US doctrine and
fundamentals in the offensive operations:
A US division suffers from a lack of organic reconnaissance.
Although the cavalry squadron is available, it is usually assigned
flank security or screening missions and is often committed after the
penetrations are accomplished, This lack of organic reconnaissance re-
quires the comander to depend on intelligence from higher headquarters,
which may be neither timely nor relevant to the conduct of the di-
vision engagement.
Excessive flexibility on the part of subordinate commanders can
undermine the division commander's ability to accomplish his mission.
Maintaining control of division assets during the battle will severely
tax the command control and communication means of the commander and
make it possible for him to actually lose control of the battle. There-
fore, the price of flexibility may be the inability t o finish the enemy
once penetration is achieved.
At times deliberate attacks are conducted by tank heavy forces.
This type operation is not suited for such forces, They are needlessly
exposed to enemy anti-tank weapons and dug in infantry. Penetration of
79
a prepared position should be made by infan t ry units. I f an armored
division i s required t o make a quick penetration, i t should be assisted
by elements of the u n i t t h r o u g h which i t is passing, This u n i t can seize
key positions t o ass is t i n the penetration and insure the success of the
operation.
The shortage of a r t i l l e ry l imits the division's abi l i ty t o sup-
press the defending enemy i n order t o achieve a penetration. The dura-
t i o n o f US preparatory f i res ," ten t o f i f teen minutes", i s n o t suff ic ient
t o significantly destroy a well dug i n enemy. In addition, there i s
insufficient a r t i l l e ry t o attack c r i t i ca l targets o f oppor tun i ty w h i c h
may ar ise d u r i n g the course of the engagement.
Enemy units bypassed by the penetrating force will severely ham-
per operations in depth of the enemy's defenses. Bypassed enemy strong
points could t i e u p US reserves and disrupt the flow o f combat service
support items needed i n the forward area. I t also provides the enemy
a base from which t o launch counterattacks.
Concentration on deception operations and supporting attacks
could divert necessary forces from the main attack. This may resul t in
the main attack n o t being powerful enough t o accomplish the penetra-
t i o n . The lack of forces requires the US l imit i t s s ize and number o f
suppor t ing attacks.
Due t o the lack of maneuver and a r t i l l e r y units the US i s very
dependent on attack helicopters and close air suppor t t o accomplish i t s
mission. Neither of these means has the capability for a l l weather and
n i g h t operations. This fact severely l imits the U S I S a b i l i t y t o con-
duct offensive operations d u r i n g adverse weather and periods of limited
v is ib i l i ty .
80
US divisions have extremely 1 imited nuclear, biological and
chemical (NBC) capabilities. Decontamination teams have a 1 imited capa-
city, individual protective clothing is 1 imited, and available equip-
ment is not issued to the soldiers. Also the training rarely includes
a realistic simulation of an NBC environment.
Section 11. The Soviet offensive operation doctrine:
The Soviet military consider doctrine as a state's officially
approved system to solving the problems of war. Their military doc-
trine covers the nature of future war and the methods for waging war,
as well as the organization and preparation of the armed forces for war.
In the USSR, the basic principles o f doctrine are determined by the
political leadership. Military strategy is an elaboration of the forms
and methods for conducting and directing war, the problems regarding
comprehensive strategic support of combat operations, the training ob-
jectives of the armed forces as a whole, and the strategic employment
of the individual force components in war. Both the political and mili-
tary leaderships are involved in developing stratey,
Strategy from the Soviet point of view is subordinate to doctrine.
Military doctrine is the overall policy in principles using doctrine as
a starting point, military strategists amp1 ify and investigate concrete
problems regarding the nature of future war, the methods of warfare,
and the organization and preparation of the armed forces for war.
The Soviets view the following as main principles for offensive
oueratidns: mass, dispersion, cooperation, continuous combat action,
initiative, surprise and the total security for the troops.
Mass is the basic principle for offensive operations from the
81
Soviet point of view. It is the timely concentration of troop and means
against enemy weaknesses.
The Soviets usually encounter problems in matching massing with
the use of dispersion therefore they consider that the modern mass can
be accomplished by grouping forces and means from movement state,
TifE A M # EFFORT
um -
\
SECONDARY DlRECTto/vJ /
The continual Soviet development of conventional weapons, the
probability of their using unconventional weapons, and their superiority
in manpower and equipment, give the dispersion doctrine great impor-
tance among the Soviet military leaders. . Soviet leaders usually assign
units initial and alternative positions as well as assigning a number
o f artillery position for each artillery battery. They also emphasize
the establishment of command posts and alternative command posts to avoid
the possibility of having a unit totally disabled because of the destruc-
tion of its command situation,
Cooperation among combat elements is considered a necessary fac-
tor to achieve victory over the enew. In training,Soviet commanders
emphasize working as a team to achieve the maximum effect of supporting
fires and the maneuver elements. A good example is the Soviet system
a2
of guarding exposed flanks. The Soviet commanders use a combination of
f i r e power, engineer elements, anti-tank weapons and maneuver units i n
conjunction w i t h c lose a i r s u p p o r t , and reconnaissance agencies t o obtain
the maximum offensive flank protection.
Surprise , which i s considered one of the Soviet offensive prin-
c ip les comes in the fourth p r io r i ty of achieving these pr inc ip les . The
Soviet leaders view surprise a s , carrying an unexpected ac t ion , surprise
may a l so mean applying a new f ight ing technique u s i n g a new weapon sys-
tem. .An example o f t h i s may be seen i n the 1973 war on the Egyptian
front. The Egyptians used the anti-tank guided missi les a s infantry
weapons against I s r a e l i armor,
The Sov ie t leaders consider keeping the momentum of the at tack
u p a s a necessary f ac to r t o defeat the enemy and t o disrupt his defen-
sive system. The Soviet commanders carry o u t t h i s pr inciple by commit-
t i n g f resh forces (second echelons and reserves) i n to the engagement,
a s well as the maximum exploi ta t ion of a r t i l l e r y support c lose a i r
s t r i k e s . The Soviets see no reasons t o reduce the speed of the a t tack
or t o s top day o r n i g h t , even d u r i n g conditions of poor v i s i b i l i t y ,
The Soviet concept of t ac t i ca l operations i s based upon se iz -
ing and maintaining the i n i t i a t i v e . The Soviet leaders believe the
i n i t i a t i v e can be gained by maintaining contact with the enemy t o keep
h i m under continuous pressure and t o allow h i m t o a c t , not t o reac t .
Soviet commanders a re paying a grea t deal t o achieve t o t a l
secur i ty for the troops on the b a t t l e f i e l d , which offers the troops com-
bat and combat service support. The to t a l securi ty for troops aims a t
creat ing su i tab le circumstances f o r u s i n g a l l the weapon and means ava i l -
able t o destroy the enemy in su f f i c i en t power, and t o maintain forces
83
i n a h i g h combat readiness s t a t e . This includes carrying o u t recon-
naissance actions against the enemy i n the l i k e l y operational a r eas ,
es tab l i sh ing a l l defense systems t o cover a l l ground forces par t icu lar ly
against the nuclear weapons and organizing the medical, technical and
l o g i s t i c system t o support the maneuver units.
Besides the main pr inciples which were mentioned e a r l i e r , the
Soviet leader considers the following items as necessary fac tors t o
gain victory on the enemy: A comprehensive study of the enemy s i t u a -
t ion and capab i l i t i e s by the use of a l l reconnaissance elements ava i l -
able . Correct determination of the direct ion of the main thrust and
the massing o f superior troops against the enemy weaknesses. The cor-
r e c t use of the support f i r e in s u f f i c i e n t quantity and the successful
carrying out of troop maneuvers du r ing the offensive b a t t l e as well as
the timely committment of the second echelons.
The Soviets ident i fy three basic forms of offensive operations
on the modern b a t t l e f i e l d ; the de l ibera te a t t ack , the meeting engage-
ment and the pursui t .
The Soviets a t t r i b u t e such importance t o the meeting engagement
t h a t mi l i ta ry authors usually organize discussions of combat operation
i n t o three phases: the defense, offense and the meeting engagement.
Also the meeting engagement cannot occur a s par t o f e i t h e r a large o f -
fensive o r defensive operation for divis ion level and below i ts place
i n Soviet doctr ine will be discussed l a t e r .
The Sovie t offense against a defending enemy i s d iv ided i n t o
several p o s s i b i l i t i e s : an a t tack from d i r e c t contact w i t h the enemy,
either by forces on the move, o r from forces occupying posi t ions i n
d e p t h t h r o u g h defending forces , or by regrouping forces , t o take on a
84
new mission and at tack a f t e r moving forward,
Besides the types of a t tack mentioned e a r l i e r , there i s another
type of a t tack which i s l i t e r a l l y the at tack a f t e r short preparation.
I t i s usually carr ied out a f t e r the f a i l u r e o f one of the other types.
In this case the Soviets p u l l out the main forces from unsuccessful
engagement place, f a r t h e r t o the r ea r (ten k i l o m t e r s a t the d i v i s i o n
l eve l ) t o reorganize, rearm and r e fue l , A t the same time the commanders
determine another direct ion t o a t tack based on reconnaissance informa-
t ion and the enemy s i tua t ion . The new direct ion of a t t ack , a t the d i -
vision l e v e l , should be somewhere around ten kilometers from the pre-
vious d i r ec t ion .
a;\\
\
\ \
\ . \ \
\
\ \ ELEfiE N 7 \
\ .-\
\ \ .
The organizations f o r combat, the dis tances , and frontages a re
a l l from the Soviet point of view w i t h i n l imi t s .
In a movement t o contac t , the Soviet divls ions (MRD, tank div)
55
are assigned a sector of responsibility up to twenty to thirty kilomet-
ers. The division second echelon usually consists of a regiment size
unit.
A reserve, is usually created when enemy defensive system and
reserves are not known. In this case the Soviet commanders do not es-
tablish a second echelon, because the second echelon must be given a
limited mission. Also reserves can be established when the attack
frontage is narrow. Reservescan be established also in addition to
second echelon. The reserve commander does not receive a 1 imited mission, but he should prepare for a general mission which he thinks
will be assigned. The general miss ion which the reserve i s supposed to
receive is usually to exploit the attack and to keep up the momentum of
the attack. When conducting actual offensive operations however, the
division may engage the enemy on a wide frontage or as narrow as eight
kilometers, depending upon prevailing conditions. If the division is
deployed in a secondary direction its frontage can be sixteen kilo-
meters, or more. This frontage is usually spelled out into regiment's
frontage. The regiment in the main attack can be assigned frontage of
four to six kilometers, meanwhile the regiment moving in a secondary
direction can be assigned frontage of six to eight kilometers. A regi-ment which is assigned to the division penetration sector i s asslgned
a frontage of three to four kilometers, The regiment's second echelon
or reserve is assigned a line o f committment o f three to four kilometers
or m r e (see figure 7 ) .
The Soviet terms of "first and second echelon" and "reserve" are
often misused in studies o f their tactics,
The first echelon consists of up to two-thirds of the total
86
force. I t i s the f i r s t part of the u n i t t o be committed in an opera-
t i o n . The d i v i s i o n ' s f i r s t echelon m i g h t cons is t of two or three re-
inforced regiments according t o the given mission, t e r r a i n and enemy
s i tua t ion .
The second echelon when created, normally cons is t s of u p t o a
third of the to t a l force or more, I t recelves a t a c t i c a l mission simul-
taneously w i t h the f irst echelon forces. The Soviet leaders es tab l i sh
a second echelon as a rule, when the enemy s i tua t ion i s known i n depth,
The second echelon commander, upon receiving his mission, organizes and
plans for fu ture operations just l i k e the f i r s t echelon,
In addition t o the combat reserve, the Sov ie t ' s emphasize es-
tab1 ishing combat support reserves, such as anti-tank reserve, engineer
reserve, and chemical reserve, The divis ion might a l so es tab l i sh an
anti-airborne reserve, which usually cons is t s of a reinforced bat ta l ion
o r company.
The divis ion task organization f o r an offensive operation, might
include a forward detachment of a regiment o r ba t ta l ion s i ze u n i t re-
inforced by a r t i l l e r y , anti-tank weapons and engineer units, as well as
a n t i - a i r c r a f t and chemical elements, A forward detachment i f formed,
would f o l l o w the reconnaissance element of dis tance of ten t o fourteen
kilometers for a forward detachment of regjment s i z e u n i t , or a t e ight
t o ten kilometers for a forward detachment of bat ta l ion s i ze un i t ,
In addition t o es tabl ishing a forward detachment, the divis ion
commander m i g h t form an envelopment detachment i n reinforced bat ta l ion
o r company s i z e . An envelopment detachment moves out of the divis ion
combat formation t h r o u g h an enemy forces ' exposed f lanks, o r gaps t o
a t tack enemy command posts, communication centers , or t o occupy c r i t i -
a7
cal areas . This is done t o prevent the enemy reserve from launching a
counterattack against the divis ion formation dur ing a c r i t i c a l period.
I t i s done i n conjunction w i t h a r t i l l e r y f i r e support and a i r s t r i k e s .
The d i v i s i o n commander himself or his deputy exercises control on t h i s
element (see f igure 8 ) .
The Soviet concept of g i v i n g commanders various depths for offen-
s ive missions is based upon general s tud ies of the Soviet un i t ' s capa-
b i l i t i e s and th rea t capabil t i e s as well as the way they organize and
conduct defense operations. These depths are dependent a lso on the
organic a i r defense capabil t y and the capabi l i ty of the t ac t i ca l a i r
support. Soviet mi l i ta ry t e o r i s t s expect mechanized units t o advance
t h i r t y t o f i f t y kilometers per day i n conventional operations, and u p
t o eighty kilometers per day i n a nuclear environment. The Soviet
leaders see operations t o be continuous under a l l various circumstan-
ces day^ and n i g h t " regardless of weather conditions. The Soviets con-
s ide r t h a t the offensive affords the a t tacker the advantage of se lec t ing
the d i rec t ion , time and method o f combat, They appreciate the f a c t
t ha t the a t tacker does not necessar i ly need numerical super ior i ty i n
manpower o r equipment as long as he makes e f fec t ive use of supporting
nuclear o r conventional f i r e and rapid maneuver against the enemy's
flanks and r ea r areas .
The Soviet d iv is ion , which i s employed i n the army's f i r s t eche-
lon is given the mission o f destroying elements of the enemy's securi ty zone,
making contact w i t h the enemy's main defenses, penetrating the enemy's
f i r s t echelon posit ions t o the depth of a ba t ta l ion , destroying a brigade's
f i r s t echelon, and occupying a l i n e a t a distance of e ight t o twelve ki lo-
meters from the FEBA as a primary mission. These missions include de-
88
stroying the enemy's f i e ld a r t i l l e r y and a i r defense a s s e t s , This d i -
vision a l so i s given the mission of developing the at tack and destroy-
i n g enemy's divis ion second echelon or reserve and occupying a l i n e a t
a distance of twenty kilometers from the FEBA, as a subsequent mission,
Also i t i s given a general direct ion f o r exploi ta t ion toward the d i -
v i s ion ' s f inal objective (approximately t h i r t y kilometers from the
FEBA. The i n i t i a l mission must coincide w i t h the armjv's immediate
!:ask. The d iv i s ion ' s f ina l objective i s cal led the i n i t i a l t a sk , The
d iv is ion , which i s employed in t i e army second echelon or reserve i s
always given the mission of exploit ing the a t tack , I t i s committed
a f t e r carrying out of the army's immediate mission or before. I t i s
usually g,iven the mission of destroying the threa t reserves (corps
reserve) , and occupying a line a t a distance of f i f t een or twenty k i l o -
meters as an immediate mission and a general direct ion of exploi ta t ion
t o the f inal objective ( i n i t i a l mission o r the mission o f day) a t a
distance of t h i r t y t o f i f t y kilometers from the FEBA. The division i s
always supported by an airborne assaul t and t ac t i ca l a i r support,
The Soviet d i v i s i o n might be given a separate direct ion t o
launch a n independent a t tack , therefore i t i s given e i t h e r immediate
and subsequent missions or an immediate task and then a general d i rec-
t ion of a t tack depending upon how much infomation the Soviet army com-
mander has about the enemy.
When the division commander receives a mission, he usually
breaks i t down into regimental missions ( t a s k s ) .
Regiments f i r s t echelon i s g iven the mission of enemy main l i n e
o f resis tance, destroying the enemy ba t ta l ions ' f i r s t echelon and occupy-
'ing a l i n e a t a distance of s i x t o e ight kilometers, This task includes
89
a l so destroying the enemy's f i e l d a r t i l l e r y which exists within this
area. Then they a re assigned the mission of ha l t ing ant ic ipated enemy
counterattacks destroying the brigades' reserves and holding a 1 ine a t
a dis tance of twelve t o f if teen kilometers, They a r e a l so given a gen-
eral direction t o explo i t i n the at tack toward the d i v i s i o n ' s i n i t i a l
mission . A regiment's second echelon i s given a mission of complete des-
t ruc t ion of the enemy reserves and occupying a l ine a t a dis tance of
fifteen t o twenty kilometers and a general d i rec t ion of a t tack toward
the d iv i s ion ' s i n i t i a l mission,
In sho r t , the Soviet mission a t a l l l eve ls a r e in t e r r e l a t ed .
For instance, a divis ion assigns i t s f i r s t echelon regiments the im-
mediate task o f penetrating the US main b a t t l e area (MBA) and the sub-
sequent task of securing a 1 ine tha t coincides with the divis ion 's
immediate mission. T h u s , the subsequent task of the f i rs t -echelon
regiments accomplishes the immediate task of the d iv is ion , Likewise,
the subsequent task of the divis ion coincides with the army's imnediate
task .
The e f f e c t created by t h i s type of offensive organization i s
an a t tack in waves. I f the enemy has a well organized defense i n d e p t h ,
the offensive i s constructed t o throw _. fresh troops (wave) against each
subsequent l ine o r area of defense. I f the defense i s organized w i t h most
forces forward, offensive forces in the second echelon, or second wave,
a re prepared t o advance quickly t o objectives located f a r beyond the
enemy main defenses (main b a t t l e area) a f t e r the penetration i s achieved.
An army f o r example, i s prepared t o advance t o a d e p t h of one hundred
kilometers or more, w i t h i t s second echelon d iv is ions .
go
The Soviet leaders believe t h a t the r a t e of an offensive opera-
t i on must be governed by l imited norms t o maintain the momentum of the
at tack a t a l l l eve ls and under the various circumstances:
The penetration r a t e through f o r t i f i e d posit ions should be half
kilometer per hour , meanwhile t h i s r a t e t h r o u g h well prepared posi t ions,
should be one t o two kilometers per hour. The rate of attacking unpre-
pared posit ions should be two t o three kilometers per hour.for the in-
farrbnjrwihitand four t o s ix kilometers for the t a n k and motorized
uni t s .
The r a t e of the advance between the enemy posit ions (ba t ta l ion
posi t ions) must be two t o three kilometers per hour, meanwhile i t should
be four t o s ix kilometers for the advance between defensive sec tors and
ten kilometers or more between defensive zones.
Comnand and control : Soviet leaders believe t h a t comvanders
a t a l l l eve ls must be located forward t o see the b a t t l e f i e l d and con-
trol t h e i r units' a c t i v i t i e s .
In this aspect the Soviets believe t h a t the divis jon commander
must be located w i t h his chief of operations, chief of reconnaissance
and the a r t i l l e r y commander i n a forward command post on a distance of
approximately s i x kilometers from the f i r s t at tacking forces .
The chief of staff located w i t h t h e r e s t of the s ta f f except
the chief of the l o g i s t i c s a f f a i r s and the chief of personnel a f f a i r s
i n the main command post which is located on a dis tance of ten t o twelve
kilometers from the f i rs t a t tacking forces .
The chief of l o g i s t i c a f f a i r s and chief of personnel a f f a i r s
a re located in a r ea r command post a t a dis tance of twenty-five t o
t h i r ty kilometers from the f i r s t at tacking forces ,
91.
A l l these command posts move d u r i n g the f i g h t i n g s teps . The main
command post might move two t o three times u p t o the end of the f ight ing
day, meanwhile the r ea r command post mi?ht move once or twice,
The Soviet doctr ine gives the divis ion commander the r igh t t o
move independently or w i t h some of his s t a f f o f f i ce r s t o wherever he
believes t h a t he might see the ba t t l e f i e ld be t t e r d u r i n g c r i t i c a l times
such as committment of the second echelon or facing serious counter-
a t tacks ,
Soviet mi l i ta ry leaders recognize the value of the time between
the l a s t stages of the organization of the combat actions and zero hour ,
They believe t h a t this period of time i s considered a c r i t i c a l time f o r
the a t t acke r ,
I f the at tack i s conducted from the i n i t i a l contact with t h e
enemy the commander must regroup his uni ts from a defense frontage i n -
t o an at tack frontage. As a ru le the division i s regrouped in to regi-
mental posi t ions, and the regiment i s a lso regrouped i n t o bat ta l ion
posit ions . If the at tack is conducted by forces from the rear a f t e r sub-
s t i t u t i o n w i t h the defenders, the divis ion substitutes a defendlng regi-
ment and the regiment subs t i tu tes a defending bat ta l ion and so o n ,
The’se measures m i G h t take two t o three nights a t divis ion l eve l ,
and one t o two nights a t regiment l eve l .
I f the a t tack i s conducted by a divis ion from waiting posi t ions,
the u n i t leaders , u p t o company commander, must be given the opportunity
t o see the enemy posit ions and h i s objective before the at tack svill be
launched. Also the divis ion commander sends the necessary reccnnaissance
element t o the force which i s i n ohysical contact w i t h the enemy t o share
92
observation of the enemy and inform the commander of any change in the
enemy s i tua t ion within the d i v i s i o n ' s a t t a c k i n g zone,
How t o the Soviets see --and conduct _.I__ +-- --a breakthrough opera t ion?
The Soviet concept of a breakthrough operation envisages the
destruction of an enemy force in ?repared posit ions i n a small sec tor
of the FEBA, and subsequent penetration and reduction of posi t ions in
depth. Breakthrough operations are conducted as a l a s t resort by con-
centrat ions of maneuver elements and firepower a t selected points. The
Soviets seek t o es tab l i sh decis ive super ior i ty in the breakthrough sec-
t o r , while maintaining pressure a l l along the enemy's f ron t , Divisions
take part in breakthroughs as part of an army operation. Each divis ion
normally i s organized in to two echelons,or two echelons and reserve,
for the operation, and i s reinforced with four t o s ix a r t i l l e r y b a t -
t a l i ons engineer ba t ta l ion , and others. Regiments i n turn may be or-
ganized in one or two echelons. A divis ion may attempt t o breakthrough
i n one or two sectors within i t s zone of respons ib i l i ty . I n e i t h e r case,
the a t tack from the Soviet point of view i s generally led by tanks ( see
f igure 9 ) .
The divis ion a r t i l l e r y i s usually augmented from army or f ront
un i t s . The Soviet doctr ine envisions s ix ty t o one hundred tubes per
kilometer of f ron t . This f igure includes a l l i nd i r ec t f i r e weapons
w i t h i n the d iv i s ion ' s organization.
The divis ion usually begins an at tack just before the end of the
preparatory f i r e which allows i t t o approach the FEBA sa fe ly .
During the secur i ty zone operation the Soviet d i v i s i o n ' s f i r s t
echelon t r ies t o employ a s many small units as possible t o f i g h t the
enemy's securi ty zone elements and t o achieve quick contact with the
93
enemy main posi t ions. Meanwhile the r e s t of the force is moved i n pre-
combat formation.
As soon as the main body of the d iv i s ion ' s f i r s t echelon make
contact w i t h the enemy main posit ions ( M B A ) , the f i r s t echelon regi-
ments, l e d by tanks begin attacking the enemy's weak p o i n t s and concen-
t r a t e t h e i r e f f o r t s t o make a quick penetration of the enemy's MBA, i n
conjunction w i t h f i r e suppart , bypass enemy resis tance.
The d iv is ion ' s second echelon may be committed i n t o action to
reinforce the attack of the f i r s t echelon force , t o destroy the bypassed
pocket of res i s tance , t o repel the enemy's counterattacks o r t o re-
place heavily decimated f i r s t echelon uni t s .
Generally, when the f i r s t echelon is halted o r repulsed on a
main axis an attempt may be made t o c o m i t the second echelon on a more
weakly defended axis or on a f lank , while a t the same time, maintain-
i n g pressure on the or iginal axis w i t h the f i r s t echelon. When the
f i r s t echelon achieves i t s i n i t i a l object ives , the second echelon may
be committed as planned (normally from the march) t o widen the breach
and i n i t i a l l y t o explo i t success.
The d iv is ion ' s reserve, which i s usually composed o f a rein-
forced bat ta l ion o r regiment, i s assigned the mission of destroying the
enemy airborne/air assaul t elements, defeating at tacks on flanks o r rear
and par t ic ipat ing i n exploi t ing the a t tack .
After the immediate mission is achieved and i n i t i a l t a c t i c a l
gains consolidated, most f i r s t echelon units, i f they are s t i l l com-
b a t e f f ec t ive , will continue the at tack with new uni ts of t h e i r second
echelon. I f the e n t i r e second echelon and reserve are committed, a
combined arms reserve will be formed from f i r s t echelon forces .
94
The fo l lowing are the main strengths of Soviet doctrine and prin-
c ip les i n the offensive operations:
Reconnaissance capability-: Soviet doctrine requires each eche-
lon t o send a un i t from the next lower echelon on a combat reconnaissance
pa t ro l , t o supplement the d iv i s ion ' s reconnaissance elements. The man-
euver bat ta l ions send a company and the platoons send teams. This pro-
vides the division with tremendous intel l igence g a t h e r i n g capabi l i ty .
Strength of numbers: The Soviet armed forces has many divisions
which allow f o r attacks i n waves o r echelons, (even a t division l e v e l ) .
The division commander i n s i s t s on organizing his action i n t o echelons
t o maintain the momentum of the a t t a c k .
Weather conditions: Soviet offensive doctrine i s t o maintain
the rate of the at tack and i t s momentum regardless of weather condi-
tions and hours of darkness.
Ar t i l l e ry support: The Soviet division has a large number of _.
organic a r t i l l e r y pieces. This allows them t o f i r e extensive prepara-
tory barrages, and strongly support maneuver units in a course of
act ion. Additionally, the organic a r t i l l e r y i s augmented by the next
higher echelons' a s se t s , e i t h e r physically or through f i r e coordination.
For instance, the division a r t i l l e r y group (DAG) consis ts of four t o s i x
a r t i l l e r y ba t ta l ions , and the regimental a r t i l l e r y group a lso has two
t o three a r t i l l e r y bat ta l ions or more, depending upon the s i tua t ion .
Planning: Detailed planning a t division level gives each sub-
ordinate commander a thorough understanding o f what will happen and how
t o f igh t . The 62 estimate, and the commander's decision, based on t h a t
estimate, provides subordinates with the da ta needed t o accomplish exact
missions a l l the way t o the d iv i s ion ' s objective of the day. When a
95
d i v i s i o n comander ' s dec i s ion i s communicated t o the subordinates, each
i n d i v i d u a l knows e x a c t l y what h i s tasks are f o r t h e remainder o f t h e day.
! l o rk ing as a team: Sov ie t d i v i s i o n s have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o
t r a i n toge the r o f ten , which develops teamwork, p a r t i c u l a r l y a t r e g i -
ment and b a t t a l i o n l e v e l s . The low tu rnove r r a t e i n Sov ie t commanders
a l lows each u n i t commander t o ge t t o know and understand h i s own j u n i o r
commanders and t h e h i g h e r commanders.
Nuclear chemical -environment: The S o v i e t d i v i s i o n t r a i n s f o r
a nuc lear , b i o l o g i c a l and chemical (NBC) environment, T h e i r o rgan iza-
t i o n and i n d i v i d u a l equipment i s designed t o operate i n NBC env i ron-
ments, and t r a i n i n g inc ludes ex tens ive NBC war fa re s imu la t i on ,
The f o l l o w i n g migh t be some weaknesses o f t h e Sov ie t d o c t r i n e
and p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e o f f e n s i v e p p e r a t i o n s :
Massing: Extens ive massing o f t roops prov ides a good t a r g e t
f o r t h e opposing f o r c e ' s f i r e weapon systems, and i t prov ides i n d i -
c a t i o n o f where t h e main a t t a c k w i l l be launched. Support u n i t s a re
massed t o a s s i s t t h e main a t tack , so it can a l s o reveal t h e main e f f o r t .
The S o v i e t d o c t r i n e o f moving t h e second echelon and reserve
migh t reveal t o an a l e r t 62 tk w c t l o c a t i o n o f t h e in tended penetra-
t i o n and the general d i r e c t i o n o f t h e main e f f o r t . The S o v i e t leaders
see t h a t t h e second echelon and reserve move j u s t behind t h e
u n i t s which are a t t a c k i n g i n t h e main e f f o r t t o augment i t and t o be ab le
t o e x p l o i t i t s success.
It became poss ib le i n modern war fa re t o l o c a t e t h r e a t command
posts, which i n t u r n and accord ing t o t h e S o v i e t doc t r i ne , makes it easy
t o revea l t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e Sov ie t main e f f o r t . The Sov ie t d o c t r i n e
emphasizes l o c a t i n g the command post behind the u n i t s i n the main a t t a c k .
96
I n f l e x i b i l i t y : The Sovie t commanders a t d ivis ion level and be-
low might face serious problems, because of re l iance on the at tack plan-
n i n g and will have d i f f i c u l t y meeting an unexpected reaction of the op-
posing forces. During the course of planning and due t o the Soviet doc-
trine, the Commanders are obliged t o give the subordinates a complete
picture as t o what wil l happen including the act ion, react ion, and the
counter-reaction. Therefore the Sov ie t subordinates normally have de-
t a i l ed and exact missions t o carry o u t .
Restr ic t ive boundaries: - -The boundaries normally a t divis ion
level and below are r e s t r i c t i v e and the commanders do not cross them.
'This in f lex ib le border can cause f a i l u r e t o explo i t success or t o receive
help from neighbors. For instance the commander o f divis ion "A" can
n o t use space maneuver throughout the division "6"s zone, even though t h i s
divis ion i s meeting strong resis tance and is n o t able t o carry out i t s
- ~~mission.
The divis ion commanders depend mainly upon army f o r hel icopter
97
and a i r c lose support . Therefore, time l ag between perceived need and
ar r iva l of hel icopter or c lose a i r support may be excessive.
These a re the main US and Soviet s t ren2ths and weaknesses i n
organizing and conducting offensive operations, There i s no doubt
t h a t each has s ign i f i can t s t rengths in mi l i ta ry doc t r ine , !which we as
developing count r ies , can use as guidance for our own doct r ine . A t
the same time, b o t h o f the super powers have some weaknesses which we
should avoid.
98
&MF%/Y FORCES F l x F o BY
( F I G U R E 5-3)
103
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CHAPTER 111
FOOTPIOTES
'Department o f t h e Defe_nse: Sov ie t A r m a e r a t i o n s , ( V i r g i n i a : US Arm.v-h-reat Ana lys is Cynter, A m 9 7 8 ) , up.1-3 - i - 1 1 , 3 - i - - 3-14, 3-64 - 3-85
2DD6-110-1-79, The Sov ie t Motor ized R i f l e D i v i s i o n , US Army, De-Fense I n t e l l igence Agency, S e ~ t * ~ ~ ~ p ~ - ~ ~
3DD6-1120-12-79, Sov ie t Tank Regiment Tac t i cs , US Arnly, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y I E r l a y - 1 9 7 9 , - 5 3 ,5 G 5 8 7
4DDb 1120-12-79, Sov ie t Motor ized R i f l e Regiment, US Army, De-fense m i T e n c e Agency, March 1979.
5Egypt ian Defense Min is t ry Of fens ive Operat ion: (Ca i ro : Comnand and General S t a f f Co l lege, 1 9 / / ) , PP. 52-98.
6FM 71-2, The Tank and Nechanized In fan t . r y S a t t a l i o n Task Force, Headquarters, k!ashington, Department of t h e A r m y , - J i i i m p p . 4-1 - 4-4, 4-24 - 4-25.
7FM 71 -3, Armored and Mechanized Br igade, Headquarters , WashingtonDepartment o f t h e Amy, 15 Ju l y 1980 , pp. 3-2 - 3-3, 3-8 - 3-14,
3-18 - 3-27. 8FM 71-100, Armored and Mechanized D i v i s i o n Operat ion, Headquarters,
Washinqton, Department o f t h e Army, 30 Ma rch 1979 , pp. 4°F - 4-4, 4-8 -4-21 , 4-25.- 4-26.
9FM 100-5, US Army Operat ions, Headquarters, Washington, Depart- ment o f t h e Army, 1 July 19/6, pp. 4-2 - 4-6, 4-9 - 4-12.
1°Hafiz, notes on Egypt ian Command and General S t a f f Col lege, Ca i ro 1977.
11Haf iz , notes on V e s t r i e l Academy, Moscow, 1974-1976,
12HB 550-2, Organ iza t ion and Equipment of t h e Sov ie t Army, US Com-b ined Arms Combat B e v B w , Leaven-worth, KS: CACDA, J u l y 1980, pp. 4-1 - 4-3, 8-15 - 8-18.
I3Major Richard Har t S innere ich , "Tac t i ca l Doc t r ine o r Dogma",Army (September 1979), pp. 16-19.
108
CHAPTER I V
MARCH AND ENGAGENENT OPERATIONS
During the p t several decades, the nature of ba t t l e h changed--
not abruptly b u t nonetheless s ign i f icant ly . Today's b a t t l e f i e l d presents
challenges beyond those any army in the world has ever faced. Great
numbers o f weapons o f advanced destructiveness are provided by major
powers t o c l i e n t s t a t e s ; arms purchased by small b u t a f f luent nations
have fur ther spread the l a t e s t mi l i ta ry technology t h r o u g h o u t the world.
Recent wars between small nations have developed intense conf l ic t s
formerly considered only w i t h i n the capab i l i t i e s o f large s t a t e s .
The war in the Middle East i n 1973 might well portend the nature
of the modern b a t t l e f i e l d . Arabs and I s r a e l i s were armed with the l a t e s t
sophis t icated weapons, and the conf l i c t approached destructiveness once
a t t r i bu ted only to nuclear arms. The use o f a i r c r a f t for close support
of advancing armor, i n the fashion generally practiced s ince 1940, was
grea t ly reduced by advancing surface- to-air missiles and a i r defense
guns. In clashes o f massed armor such as the world had n o t witnessed fo r
a t l e a s t t h i r t y years , b o t h s ides sustained devastating losses approaching
f i f t y percent of the forces engaged in l e s s than two weeks of combat.
The 1973 war showed the importance o f achieving maneuver s ide by
s ide with the firepower. For instance, Egypt, during the phase of prepa-
ra t ion for t h i s war, carr ied out massive movements o f units from rea r
areas toward the Suez Canal. The Egyptian Army a lso , i n order t o face the
I s r a e l i s troops on the West Bank of the Suez Canal, was required t o
acconplish complicated maneuvers t o canalize the I s r a e l i forces and t o
109
deny them the o p p o r t u n i t y t o spread o u t or develop t h e i r operation in
the direct ion of the major c i t i es .
On the other side, the I s r a e l i Headquarter was forced to carry ou t
incredible maneuvers a f t e r the Egyptian crossing of the Canal. Most of
the I s r a e l i armored forces were pushed forward from mobilization centers
a t the internat ional borders immediately t o the Suez Canal in order t o
attempt t o destroy the Egyptian forces a n d deny them the accomplishment
of a successful operation. O n 14 October, d u r i n g the course o f developing
the at tack on the Egyptian f ront , the l s r a e l i leadership was a l s o forced
t o t r ans fe r major uni ts from the Syrian f ront to the Egyptian f ront ( t h i s
distance i s over three hundred kilometers).
A l l the above g ive a strong indication o f what kind o f war i s
coming and the importance of successful carrying out march and engagement
operation (movement t o contact) on the modern b a t t l e f i e l d .
US mil i ta ry leaders do n o t see an urgent need t o conduct engage-
ment operations and they view these kinds of operation as movement t o con-
t a c t . The Americans a l so do n o t see t h a t the march i s o f g rea t importance
and must be taught and troops trained t o conduct i t as an individual type
o f operation. However, they view i t as a measure which must be organized
by the commanders a t a l l l eve ls i n the conduct o f defensive and offensive
operations.
Movement t o contact: whenever units o f the US Army conducts an
offensive operation, and are moving , b u t are n o t i n contact with the
enemy, they a re sa id to be "moving t o contact." Most a t tacks begin with
a movement t o contact . The purpose o f the movement t o contact i s t o
gain or regain contact w i t h the enemy and t o do i t in such a way t h a t
r i sks the smallest possible part of the force while the remainder i s
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a v a i l a b l e t o immediately respond when c o n t a c t i s made. Once c o n t a c t is
made, t h e commander can f u r t h e r develop t h e s i t u a t i o n , maneuver, concen-
t ra te forces, and a t t a c k . When o u t o f contac t he can do none o f t h e s e
a g a i n s t t h e enemy. Two s i t u a t i o n s can e x i s t : the more conmion s i t u a t i o n
i s one i n w h i c h a US d i v i s i o n i s a t t a c k i n g and t h e lead ing b a t t a l i o n t a s k
f o r c e s a r e moving t o c o n t a c t . Armored cava l ry ( reconnaissance u n i t ) may
be employed t o screen forward of the l ead ing b a t t a l i o n t a sk forces or t o
screen or guard the f l anks o f the d i v i s i o n . S u p p o r t i n g forces a r e
employed much the same a s when t h e e n t i r e d i v i s i o n conducts a movement
c o n t a c t .
F ie ld a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r i e s may be dedica ted t o l ead ing company teams
or b a t t a l i o n t a s k forces when considered necessary by t h e br igade com-
mander and his d i r e c t support f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n commander. Vulcan
platoons may a l s o ope ra t e w i t h t h e lead ing b a t t a l i o n t a s k f o r c e s .
The o t h e r s i t u a t i o n occurs i f t h e entire d i v i s i o n i s o u t o f c o n t a c t
and t h e d i s t ance between f r i e n d l y and enemy fo rces i s many mi les . A
formal movement t o c o n t a c t ope ra t ion may then be conducted. In a formal
movement t o c o n t a c t , t h e d i v i s i o n may organize f o r combat w i t h a covering
fo rce , an advance g u a r d , a main body, f lank guards, and a r e a r guard
(see f igue 1 ) .
The d i v i s i o n covering fo rce i s normally organized around t h e armored
cava l ry squadron o r a tank heavy ( r e in fo rced t a n k b a t t a l i o n ) , o r balanced
( r e in fo rced mechanized b a t t a l i o n ) b a t t a l i o n t a s k f o r c e . I t i s usua l ly
r e in fo rced w i t h f i e l d and a i r defense a r t i l l e r y and engineers . A n a t t a c k
h e l i c o p t e r company i n suppor t may a l s o ope ra t e under t h e ope ra t iona l con-
t r o l of t h e covering f o r c e . More o f t e n , a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r units a r e
r e t a ined under d fv i s ion c o n t r o l . A covering fo rce may be used t o :
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1. Locate the enemy, develop the s i t ua t ion , and penetrate the
forward defenses of a n enemy force deployed or deployinq to defend.
2 . Destroy enemy reconnaissance and advance guard uni ts and force
f i r s t echelon regiments of the enemy forces t o delay.
A n advance guard may be used t o a s s i s t the covering force and t o
prevent premature deployment o f the main body. I t develops the s i t ua t ion
along designated routes or axis of advance.
The advance guard i s usually a tank heavy or balanced bat ta l ion task
force moving i n f ront of the leading brigade. I t operates within range
of f i e l d a r t i l l e r y , which moves within the main body.
Flank and rear guard may be used to protect the ma in body from
ground observation, surpr i se , and d i r ec t f i r e . A flank or rear guard
usually consis ts of one to two company teams or sometimes armored cavalry
troops. Pure mechanized forces may be preferred for rear gua rd operations.
The remainder of the division moves with the main body. The main
body normally moves with a t l e a s t two brigades leading on generally paral le l
axis . When enemy forces are not organized i n depth, i t may be preferable
for a l l brigades t o move abreast .
Direct support f i e l d a r t i l l e r y bat ta l ions move with supported
brigades w i t h some ba t te r ies pos i t ioned well forward i n the column. The
rest of the division a r t i l l e r y moves on multiple routes and i s dispersed
throughout the maln body. A s previously described, some f i e l d a r t i l l e r y
may operate w i t h the covering force. I n any case, f i e l d a r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t
fo r covering and guard forces must be provided.
CHAPARRAL bat te r ies operate in general support of the main body
while VULCAN bat te r ies operate in d i r e c t suppor t of the covering and
guard forces.
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Engineers operate w i t h l e a d i n g u n i t s . An engineer company o r com-
pany minus may be a t tached t o the cove r ing f o r c e and eng ineer p la toons t o
the 1 eading b a t t a l i o n task fo rces .
The combat i n t e l l i g e n c e and e l e c t r o n i c w e l f a r e b a t t a l i o n operates t o
l o c a t e the enemy s t reng th . I t s c o l l e c t i o n and jamming p la toons and ground
suppor t r a d a r teams u s u a l l y opera te w i t h t h e cove r ing f o r c e and w i t h the
f l a n k guards. E l e c t r o n i c countermeasures can be used a g a i n s t enemy com-
mand c o n t r o l and f i r e suppor t nets . E l e c t r o n i c decept ion may be used t o
deceive the enemy as t o the l o c a t i o n o f the main body and I t s a c t i v i t i e s .
Meet ing engagement: American m i l i t a r y l eaders b e l i e v e t h a t a meet-
i n g engagement occurs when a moving f o r c e makes con tac t w i t h a moving o r
s t a t i o n a r y enemy force about which i t has l i t t l e o r no i n f o r m a t i o n . The
a c t i o n ceases t o be a meet ing engagement when the s i t u a t i o n has developed
and o t h e r ac t i ons a r e undertaken, such as a has ty a t t a c k o r defense.
The pr imary goal , once c o n t a c t i s made, i s t o g a i n t h e upper hand
by t a k i n g ac t i ons t o overcome the enemy before the enemy can e f f e c t i v e l y
r e a c t . To do t h i s , the commander must have h i s f o r c e i n a good pos ture
a t t he t ime o f con tac t , must have good i n f o r m a t i o n as t o the s i t u a t i o n ,
e i t h e r through good r e p o r t s o r personal observa t ion , and must immediate ly
i ssue i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r B course o f a c t i o n .
Ifthe enemy force i s a l s o moving, which i s f requen t l y t h e case i n
the e x p l o i t a t i o n , t h e countera t tack , and even i n t h e defense, speed, i n
bo th d e c i s i o n and execut ion, i s most impor tan t . The commander must make
a very qu i ck es t imate o f enemy s t r e n g t h and e i t h e r adopt a has ty defense
o r implement a h a s t y a t tack , o u t f l a n k the enemy, and des t roy him.
I n s h o r t , t h i s k i n d o f combat a c t i o n (meet ing engagement) i s r a r e l y
found among the American m i l i t a r y manuals. The US commanders are n o t
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concerned a b o u t th i s type of a c t i o n , so t h a t they desc r ibe i t a s a n
acceptab le condi t ion which can happen a t b a t t a l i o n o r task fo rce l e v e l .
This concept may r e f e r t o t h e nature o f t h e European t h e a t e r ,
which does n o t offer space t o o rgan ize and conduct such ope ra t ions . A t
t h e same t ime, t h e Sov ie t s a r e much concerned about march and meeting
engagements a s will be d iscussed throughout t h e following s e c t i o n .
The fol lowing a r e the main s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses o f the US
o rgan iza t ion and conduct o f march a n d meeting engagements.
The s t r e n g t h s :
During t h e movement t o c o n t a c t , t h e use o f o rgan ic and a l l o c a t e d
airpower g ives the US d iv i s ion two signi f i c a n t s t r e n g t h s :
--Organic a i r cava l ry and a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r companies.
- -Allocated c l o s e a i r support.
The d i v i s i o n a i r cava l ry t roop is most o f t e n deployed under t h e
cont ro l o f the armored cava l ry squadron and conducts an a i rbo rne screen
forward o f the covering f o r c e and t o the f l anks a long t h e a x i s o f
advance. This ae r i a1 screen extends the reconnai ssance capabi l i t y o f the
cover ing f o r c e and provides t h e commander o f the main body add i t iona l
time t o maneuver his fo rces a g a i n s t the enemy p r i o r t o c o n t a c t between t h e
advancing guard u n i t and t h e enemies i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n s . The information
provided by t h e a i r cava l ry u n i t i s passed, n o t on ly to the main body, b u t
a l s o t o the commander o f t h e d i v i s i o n ' s combat a v i a t i o n b a t t a l i o n , who
provides t h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e t o his a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r companies.
T h e a i r cava l ry has a l i m i t e d c a p a b i l i t y t o ensage t a r g e t s w i t h
i t s platoon o f a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r ; however, the un i t ' s main o b j e c t i v e
is t o provide i n t e l l i g e n c e , and i t should avoid dec i s ive engagement.
Should t h e d iv i s ion commander d e s i r e t o i nc rease the c a p a b i l i t y o f t h e
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u n i t t o engage enemy t a r g e t s fa r f oward , he can p lace one of h i s a t t a c k
h e l i c o p t e r companies under the opera t i ona l c o n t r o l o f t h e cove r ing fo rce
commander.
In making t h i s d e c i s i o n t h e commander may consider :
--Enemy s t rengths and d i s p o s i t i o n s ( s t a t i c o r moving).
--Enemy a i r defence a r t i l l e r y (ADA) t h r e a t .
- -Ter ra i n.
--Reaction t ime f o r r e f u e l and rearm.
- -Ava i l ab le a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r assets .
Should t h e enemy fo rces be occupying prepared p o s i t i o n s , a t t a c k
h e l i c o p t e r u n i t s a re bes t r e t a i n e d under d i v i s i o n c o n t r o l f o r use a t a
more opportune t ime.
When a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r u n i t s r e a c t t o t a r g e t l o c a t i o n s prov ided
by t h e a i r cava l ry , the c a v a l r y scouts should ma in ta in c o n t a c t w i t h the
enemy u n t i l the t a r g e t i s engaged by the a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r u n i t . I f t h e
t a r g e t i s company s i z e o r sma l le r t h e a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r may use the one-
t h i r d r u l e . One p la toon engages, w h i l e one p la toon rearms and r e f u e l s
and the t h i r d i s enroute t o the b a t t l e l o c a t i o n .
Should the t a r g e t be o f s u f f i c i e n t s i z e , the comander may have
h i s a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s a t t a c k i n mass w i t h one o r bo th companies. This
technique w i l l p rov ide t h e g rea tes t d e s t r u c t i o n o f the enemy force,
however, the pr ime cons ide ra t i on i s the t ime r e q u i r e d f o r the a t t a c k
h e l i c o p t e r s t o rearm and r e f u e l f o l l o w i n g such an engagement.
Close a i r suppor t p rov ided t o t h e US d i v i s i o n i s o f two types:
immediate and pre-planned. For immediate s o r t i e s , c lose a i r suppor t
elements r e a c t t o the enemy s i t u a t i o n fac ing the d i v i s i o n based on the
p r l o r i t i e s es tab l i shed by the corps. The most common use o f the
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immediate so r t i e s i s the use of A-10's t o augment the a t t a c k helicopters.
When the at tack helicopter un i t makes contact , the ta rge t data i s relayed
t h r o u g h a i r force channels t o the A-10 uni t w h f c h i s e i t h e r airborne or
on s t r i p a l e r t . The use of A-10's and cobras together for the same
t a rge t i s cal led a j o i n t a i r a t tack team (JAAT) operation.
Fighters enroute t o pre-planned missions may also be diverted
enroute to reac t t o enemy ta rge ts engaged by the divis ion. These diverted
so r t i e s are also considered immediate a i r s t r i k e s .
The division i s a l located a cer ta in number of preplanned a i r s t r i k e s
based on the u n i t p r i o r i t y a n d the number o f so r t i e s avai lable . Division
planners a l loca te these s t r i k e s against projected enemy t a rge t locations
o r against nonmobile, p o i n t type t a rge t s . These pre-planned s o r t i e s
may be diverted t o other target locations within the d i v i s i o n sector as
directed by the commander. The pre-planned system gives the commander a
spec i f ic number o f s t r i k e s o r t i e s upon which he can plan. I t i s important
to remember t h a t these s o r t i e s may be diverted to another area by higher
headquarters and may also d iver t t o a l t e rna te ta rge ts should weather
conditions in the division area be below required minimums.
Another s ign i f i can t advantage enjoyed by US commanders i s f l ex ib i l -
i t y . The commander will t a i l o r the composition of his forces, t h e distance
between uni t s , and the routes over which they will advance. Soviet doc-
t r i n e i s very r ig id concerning the s i z e and composition of the advance
guard units a n d the main body. Soviet doctrine also spec i f ica l ly describes
the distances to be maintained between uni t s , location of the reserve
and the routes t o be used. US commanders may place the units on multiple
routes, reduce or increase the distance between units and may place the
reserve a t any posit ion within the maneuver plan. These techniques allow
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a more f lex ib le response t o unsuspected enemy movements a n d reduces
confusion caused by a deviation from the operations p l a n .
As the US division moves forward i t has an important advantaGe
in the d is t r ibu t ion of combat support elements, spec i f ica l ly a r t i l l e r y
uni ts . These d i r ec t support and reinforcing elements are placed within
the maneuver plan based on p r i o r i t i e s and are n o t massed a t any one
locat ion.
Direct support a r t i l l e r y battalions key on the maneuver of the
units they support a n d may be located on multiple routes. The remainder
o f the d iv is ion ' s reinforceing a r t i l l e r y i s echeloned within the main
body and i s spread from the f ront of the column t o the rear . Some
a r t i l l e r y may be moved forward t o augment the covering force a n d other
untis will provide suppor t t o the advance, f lank, and rear guard uni t s .
The weaknesses:
The only reconnaissance u n i t w i t h i n the US division dedicated t o
the gathering of intel l igence i s the armored cavalry squadron. Each
maneuver bat ta l ion has, as a part of i t s organization, a scout element;
however, these units are normally regulated t o duties other than gather-
ing intel l igence and providing information t o the maneuver commander.
"hey often control routes, d i r ec t t r a f f i c , a n d provide route information
by or ien t ing on the movement of the fr iendly uni t ra ther t h a n the movement
of the enemy forces.
Another s ign i f icant disadvantage i s the lack of su f f i c i en t
a r t i l l e r y within the divis ion. Ar t i l l e ry i s a l located by habitual com-
mand relat ionships and the number of tubes avai lable to the commander
may be su f f i c i en t t o deal with the force encountered. As a r t i l l e r y
support i s shif ted t o c r i t i c a l points, other units may lose t h e i r dedi-
cated a r t i l l e r y for periods of time.
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A s imi la r s i t ua t ion ex i s t s r ega rd ing a i r defense a r t i l l e r y . The
current mix of mobile ADA weapons i s i n su f f i c i en t t o adequately cover
a l l uni ts within the d iv is ion . Therefore, the US commander must consider
a t rade off between which uni ts receive a i r defense a r t i l l e r y support.
I f the mass of ADA weapons i s moved forward, then the r ea r uni ts
are exposed. I f t he r ea r units are adequately covered, then the combat
uni ts a re exposed. When the ava i lab le ADA asse ts a r e spread from f ront
t o r ea r , then l e s s than to t a l coverage ex i s t s t h r o u g h o u t the divis ion.
The Vulcan, twenty milimeters, a i r defense g u n is espec ia l ly c r i t i c a l as
i t has a range of only 1500 meters and has radar fo r range finding only.
Fb1 71-100 describes an advance guard as a tank heavy or balanced
ba t ta l ion task force. With the t a n k heavy force the advance guard would
have a force of a b o u t f i f t y - fou r t anks . Since i t must operate under
supporting a r t i l l e r y f i r e , i t would be located n o t more t h a n eighteen
kilometers from the a r t i l l e r y supporting i t . These requirements cu t down
the distance between the advance gua rd and the main body, which i n turn
reduces the reaction time avai lable t o the divis ion commander. Additionally,
the tank ba t ta l ion might be in su f f i c i en t t o decis ively engage the enemy
force when encountered. The Soviets have la rge numbers o f ant i tank
weapons within t h e i r BMB regiments, and they possess the capabi l i ty t o
mass these l o n g range weapons. As the t a n k ba t ta l ion normally advances
within a three t o f i v e kilometers a rea , i t i s highly vulnerable t o the
f i r e of massed ant i tank missi les and a r t i l l e r y .
The meeting engagement i s defined as an operation which occurs
when a moving force co l l ides w i t h another moving or s ta t ionary force
about which i t has l i t t l e or no information. The meeting engagement ends
when reaction movements such as hasty a t tack or defense a re made i t i s
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considered unwise t o app ly t h i s concept t o o f f e n s i v e opera t ions . When
a commander wishes t o secure an o b j e c t i v e o r t o des t roy an enemy fo rce ,
such as a second echelon o r reserve force, a g r e a t deal o f p r i o r p lann ing
shou ld be conducted. The t e r r a i n and enemy s i t u a t i o n should be c a r e f u l l y
cons idered so t h a t t h e enemy's r e a c t i o n and eventual engagement occurs
a t a t ime and p lace which i s most s u i t a b l e t o t h e f r i e n d l y force. When
cons ide r ing the enemy's r e a c t i o n t o f r i e n d l y movement, t h e most c r i t i c a l
aspect I s accura te i n f o r m a t i o n about the enemy. Only by ana lyz ing h i s
c a p a b i l i t y t o reac t , when, and i n what s t reng th , can t h e main purpose o f
t h e meet ing engagement be conducted--the d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e enemy fo rce
o r t he a t ta inmen t o f the des i red o b j e c t i v e .
Sec t i on 11. The S o v i e t !larch and Meet ing
Engagement Operat ions
S o v i e t d o c t r i n e c a l l s f o r h igh r a t e s o f movement w h i l e ma in ta in -
i n g a deployment balance which a l lows the r a p i d commitment o f t h e u n i t
i n t o combat,
The S o v i e t u n i t s u s u a l l y move under cover o f darkness o r i n
c o n d i t i o n s o f l i m i t e d v i s i b i l i t y whenever p o s s i b l e . Populated areas are
bypassed t o a v o i d t r a f f i c congest ion, bu t roads are used t o ma in ta in a
h i g h speed. Areas contaminated by r a d i a t i o n o r chemicals a re avoided
unless i t i s impera t i ve f o r t a c t i c a l reasons t o cross them. I n the
l a t t e r case, they a re crossed w i t h the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e speed.
The S o v i e t l eaders b e l i e v e t h a t t he t a c t i c a l movement must be
organized and conducted t o t r a n s f e r t roops and equipment f rom p o i n t t o
p o i n t on t i m e and i n a good shape i n o rde r t o c a r r y o u t an assigned
miss ion . Therefore, t roops can move by the use o f mechanzied equipment
( tanks and armored c a r r i e r s ) o r on f o o t i n columns ove r roads and cross
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country r o u t e s . Also movement o f tracked veh ic l e s ( t a n k , s e l f - p r o p e l l e d
arti 11 e ry equipment) i s poss ib l e on heavy-duty 1 ow bed t r a c t o r t r a i 1 e r s . March movements: Troops may be t r anspor t ed by r a i l , a i r and
wa te r . Movement by ral’lroad and water ways preserves t h e s t r e n g t h o f
personnel , p r o t e c t s machines from wear and saves o t h e r resources . Air
t r a n s p o r t , ensures speed o f t roop movement over cons ide rab le d i s t a n c e s .
The movement, from the S o v i e t po in t of view, can be a l s o conducted by a
combination o f march and t r a n s p o r t o f t roops . One o r ano the r method i s
a p p l i e d , depending upon t h e problem a t hand, t h e number of t r o o p s , t h e
number o f t ropps , the d i s t a n c e they must t r a v e l , t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f
t r a n s p o r t , weather condi t ions and the condi t ion of movement r o u t e s . All
t roops l e a r n t o move by any method and a r e c o n s t a n t l y ready for whatever
mode i s r equ i r ed .
In this a s p e c t , t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s be l i eve t h a t when
b o t h s i d e s , on the b a t t l e f i e l d , are moving toward c o n t a c t , a meeting
engagement i s t h e expected r e s u l t .
Therefore , this s e c t i o n will be d iv ided i n t o two por t ions - - the
march, and the meeting engagement.
The march i s i n i t i a l l y accomplished a f t e r considering t h e capa-
b i l i t y o f personnel and combat mater ie l t o s u s t a i n def ined loads f o r a
prolonged per iod . Any march, e s p e c i a l l y one nade on f o o t , i s a s r e a t
s t r a i n on the physical s t r e n g t h o f a l l personnel . I f t roops move on
v e h i c l e s , then the g r e a t e s t load must be borne by t h e drivers of the
t a n k s , armored c a r r i e r s , t r a c t o r t r a i l e r s and o t h e r motor v e h i c l e s .
A march to c o n t a c t may occur a t the o u t s e t o f a war, when columns
move from a concen t r a t ion area t o c ros s a border , when uni ts move through
or between f r i e n d l y units i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the enemy, when a f o r c e ,
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having penetrated enemy defenses, i s ordered t o pursue a withdrawing
enemy, and when a force must re locate t o meet a probable counterattack.
The march t o contac t may be required i n any type o f offensive
act ion, or when making the t r ans i t i on from defense t o offense.
In any march t o contact, the problem facing the S o v i e t commander
is the proper disposi t ion of his combat, combat support, and combat
se rv ice support elements w i t h i n the column, w i t h the end goal t h e defeat
o f the enemy. The column o rgan iza t ion , t o include the proper disposi t ion
o f combat, combat support , and combat service support elements, must be
accomplished prior t o i n i t i a t i n g the march. This minimizes or precludes
any reorganizing prior t o commitment. In whatever form the actual engage
ment may take, the commander faces a multitude of considerations and
potential hazards.
The following i s an explanation of the plans fo r , and conduct o f ,
the march-to contact a t d ivis ion l eve l .
A t a c t i c a l movement by a Soviet divis ion must accomplish two
fundamental goals: the division must move from one location t o another
while matntaining uni t i n t e g r i t y , and i t s march organization must
es tab l i sh the organization f o r combat. As a r e s u l t , Soviet doctrine
gives divis ion commanders several basic factors for consideration when
planning a march.
In order t o protect the divis ion on the march, the Soviet com-
mander adopts measures t o reduce vulnerabi l i ty t o nuclear weapons, con-
ventional a r t i l l e r y , a i r s t r i k e s , and surpr i se a t tacks . Such measures
include secrecy, marching d u r i n g periods of l imited v i s i b i l i t y ,
dispersion, a n d marching a t the maximum r a t e of speed possible for
ex is t ing conditions. Maintenance o f u n i t i n t eg r i ty requires the
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commander t o e s t a b l i s h c o n t r o l measures and t o organize the march t o
f a c i l i t a t e c o n t r o l .
I f the d i v i s i o n encounters the enemy d u r i n g the march, o r i s
expected t o a t t a c k from t h e march, the u n i t s o f the d i v i s i o n must be
p laced i n a fo rmat ion t h a t permi ts them t o deploy q u i c k l y i n t o t h e
r e q u i r e d combat format ion. I n most s i t u a t i o n s , t ime f o r d e t a i l e d
t a s k i n g o r combat t a i l o r i n g i s n o t a v a i l a b l e . As a r e s u l t , march o rgan i -
z a t i o n es tab l i shes o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat. The commander must cons ider
t e r r a i n , p o s s i b l e areas o f con tac t , and avenues o f approach when organ-
i z i n g f o r the march.
March p lann ing and o rgan iza t i on : s p e c i f i c march o r g a n i z a t i o n
which i s s e l e c t e d by any S o v i e t commander depends i n i t i a l l y upon the
commander's concept t o accomplish t h e miss ion , t h e s i t u a t i o n , t e r r a i n
fea tures , and the rou tes a v a i l a b l e . As a r u l e , a d i v i s i o n marches
w i t h i n boundaries ass igned by the h i g h e r headquar ters . The area between
t h e boundar ies i s c a l l e d "a movement zone" ( twen ty t o t h i r t y k i l omete rs
wide), and i s wide enough f o r the d i v i s i o n t o maneuver. The d i v i s i o n
commander decides how h i s d i v i s i o n w i l l t r a n s i t through the zone.
The S o v i e t d i v i s i o n may be assigned two t o th ree routes t o move
on and sometimes i t i s assigned one r o u t e accord ing t o t h e road n e t
a v a i l a b l e and t h e r o l e of the d i v i s i o n i n t h e expected b a t t l e . I n
general , a d i v i s i o n moves on m u l t i p l e rou tes . Commanders, where poss ib le ,
s e l e c t rou tes which avo id urban areas, road junc t i ons , d e f i l e s , and
p o i n t s c l o s e t o r a i l r o a d s t a t i o n s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , routes shou ld be
severa l k i l omete rs a p a r t t o ensure d i spe rs ion . From the S o v i e t p o i n t o f
view, t h e rou tes se lec ted must be a t a d is tance o f f i v e k i l omete rs from
each o t h e r t o o f f e r f i r e and t a c t i c a l coopera t ion w i t h i n the d i v i s i o n .
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The commander conveys his dec is ion concerning the march, t o
subord ina tes i n the form of an opera t ion o r d e r , known as a march o rde r .
The march o rde r i n i t i a l l y includes a v a i l a b l e information on the enemy,
poin ts o f poss ib l e con tac t w i t h the enemy, composition o f the d i v i s i o n ' s
march column and r a t e o f movement, t ime of passing the i n i t i a l cont ro l
po in ts o r l i n e s , communication procedure, and the l o c a t i o n o f command
posts . The commander organizes the d i v i s i o n f o r t he move i n t o t he
fol lowing elements : reconnaissance, march s e c u r i t y , advance guard , f l a n k
and r e a r guards, and main body. The s t r e n g t h and composition o f t hese
elements varies according t o the commander's decision. In some i n s t a n c e s ,
f o r example, t h e commander may a t t a c h a r t i l l e r y and s p e c i a l units t o t h e
reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n , o r augment an advance guard regiment w i t h
a r t i l l e r y from the d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y regiment ( s e e f i g u r e 2 ) .
The d iv i s ion commander uses his reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n a s a
screen i n f r o n t o f t he d i v i s i o n which provides a continuous and t imely
flow of information on the enemy and t e r r a i n . Reconnaissance i s con-
ducted o f t en by p la toon-s ize groups which may ope ra t e from f i f t y t o
one-hundred ki lometers i n front o f t h e main body. Regimental reconnais-
sance companies ope ra t e behind this sc reen , and u p t o f i f t y ki lometers
i n f r o n t o f t he main body o f t h e i r regiments. General ly , reconnaissance
units do n o t engage i n combat. A t tines, however, t he d iv i s ion commander
may r e in fo rce the reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n i n i t i a l l y by tanks and o rde r
i t t o s e i z e and hold key t e r r a i n .
A d i v i s i o n ususa l ly marches w i t h a motorized r i f l e o r tank r e g i -
ment r e in fo rced by add i t iona l a r t i l l e r y a s advance guard. The advance
guard ' s l ead i s twenty to t h i r t y ki lometers i n order t o g ive the main
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body room t o maneuver when t h e advance guard makes c o n t a c t w i t h the enemy,
a s well as g i v i n g t h e d i v i s i o n commander an accu ra t e p i c t u r e o f t h e
enemy s t r e n g t h and maneuverabi l i ty . The advance guard i s expected to
preempt t h e enemy i n opening f i r e , t o s e i z e key t e r r a i n , and t o n e u t r a l i z e
enemy reconnaissance a n d s e c u r i t y forces while t h e main body maneuvers a
When the loca t ion and strength o f the enemy are known, the
d i v i s i o n commander may a s s i g n a c l e a r l y def ined mission t o t h e advance
guard. This may be , for example, t o bypass c e r t a i n enemy p o s i t i o n s and
s e i z e a key o b j e c t i v e i n the enemy's r e a r . When the mission is c l e a r l y
def ined i n t h i s manner, S o v i e t terminology f o r t h e lead ing regiment
changes from "advance guard" t o "forward detachment." In some c a s e s ,
t h e d i v i s i o n commander may form a forward detachment from units o t h e r
than t h e l ead ing regiment , and may send o u t a forward detachment ahead
o f the advance guard. An example could be a r e in fo rced b a t t a l i o n oper-
a t i n g independent ly ahead o f t h e advance guard to hold a br idge or a
r i v e r ford .
The advance gua rd or forward detachment may be supported by a
detachment c o n s i s t i n g of an engineer company augmented by chemical and
motorized r i f l e t roops .
March s e c u r i t y e lements p r o t e c t t h e f r o n t , r e a r , and f lanks o f
the march column. S e c u r i t y i n f r o n t o f t h e column is provided by an
advance detachment and may be up t o r e in fo rced b a t t a l i o n d ispa tched by
the advance guard or forward detachment. The advance detachment moves
on the march rou te twenty t o t h i r t y ki lometers ahead of t h e advance
guard o r forward detachment. I t i s a s e c u r i t y screen f o r the movment
o f the main body, prevents s u r p r i s e enemy a t t a c k , prevents ground
reconnaissance by the enemy, and helps c r e a t e favorable cond i t ions f o r
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t he deployment o f t he main body. Flank s e c u r i t y i s s e n t o u t by u n i t s
i n t h e d i v i s i o n . The d i v i s i o n main body sends o u t company s i z e u n i t s
t h a t opera te a t l e a s t t h ree t o f i v e k i l o m e t e r s f rom the march column.
The r e a r guard i s no rma l l y re in fo rced company up t o b a t t a l i o n s i z e u n i t ,
r e i n f o r c e d by a n t i a i r c r a f t weapons, and tanks which f o l l o w t h e l a s t
e lement o f t h e march column by th ree t o f i v e k i l omete rs o r more.
The main body cons is t s o f d i v i s i o n headquarters and a l l combat,
combat suppor t , and combat s e r v l c e suppor t u n i t s . The o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t he
main body depends on t h e miss ion . There are two bas i c s i t u a t i o n s which
must be considered. F i r s t , t he d i v i s i o n may be moving t o a t t a c k an
enemy i n prepared p o s i t i o n s . Second, the d i v i s i o n may be moving under
cond i t i ons when t h e p o i n t o f a t t a c k and s t r e n g t h o f t h e enemy are known.
I n e i t h e r case, t he commander s e l e c t s the number o f rou tes and the sequence
o f u n i t s i n the march t o b e s t accomplish the miss ion .
I n most cases, t h e t a n k reg iment marches i n t h e r e a r . When
the d i v i s i o n i s a t t a c k f n g a defending enemy, the tank reg iment g e n e r a l l y
i s used, i n the second echelon, as an e x p l o i t a t i o n fo rce . In a n t i c i p a -
t i o n o f a meet ing engagement, t he tank reg iment is expected t o conduct
t h e w ides t maneuver and a t t a c k the f lank and r e a r o f t he enemy.
Regiments march i n column o f b a t t a l i o n s . Regiments may be
separated by a d i s tance o f f i v e t o t e n k i lometers. , w h i l e b a t t a l i o n s move
a t an i n t e r v a l o f t h ree t o f i v e k i l omete rs . The reg iment which does n o t
move on the same r o u t e w i t h i t s advance guard m igh t send a b a t t a l i o n o r
company s i z e u n i t as an advance guard f o r t h i s rou te . (See f i g u r e 3 . )
D i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y marches a t t he head o f t h e d i v i s i o n main
body. The a n t i t a n k guided m i s s i l e s b a t t a l i o n moves j u s t behind t h e
reg iment advance guard t o t a k e p a r t i n i t s ope ra t i on .
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The a n t i a i r c r a f t regiment's weapons are dispersed t h r o u g h o u t
the main body, pa r t i cu la r ly t o protect the command posts. Additionally,
aircraft missfles or guns a re found l'n the advance detachment, the
advance guard (forward detachment), the r ea r guard, and flank secur i ty
elements,
A small chemical reconnaissance g roup from the chemical defense
ba t ta l ion supports the march by monitoring radiat ion leve ls on the march
route, marking contaminated a reas , and locat ing su i t ab le routes a round
or through contaminated areas . Chemical defense personnel are found in
a l l un i t s of the divis ion march organization.
Combat se rv ice support units, control led by the deputy com-
mander fo r the r ea r , move in column formation behind the maneuver uni ts
with the following exceptions: Vehicles t h a t provide repa i r and mainte-
nance ass i s tance , refuel ing capabi l i ty , and medical aid are interspersed
w l t h the maneuver un i t s , a re generally i n the rear of maneuver ba t ta l ions .
Conduct of the march: The divis ion commander controls the
march. When moving i n f ron t o r army rear area, however, the divis ion
must follow t r a f f i c control procedures es tabl ished by h igher commanders.
In t h i s instance, the most important factors are the speedy and e f f i c i e n t
movement of the divis ion, and the t a c t i c a l formation i s o f secondary
importance. However, passive defense measures, such as dispers ion, a r e
s t i l l enforced.
The chief of s t a f f i s responsible t o the division commander for
movement control. He organizes a g r o u p of divis ion s t a f f o f f i ce r s who
man checkpoints a t phase l ines and the s t a r t and release l i nes . These
o f f i ce r s are accompanied by a small party of en l i s ted men from the t r a f f i c
and control company and have radio communications w i t h the appropriate
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divis ion command post.
Once the u n i t moves forward of the army's area i n t o regions
where contact i s l i k e l y , the division must deploy i n t o a t ac t ica l forma-
t i o n . In t h i s s i t ua t ion , i t i s impossible t o send forward s t a f f o f f i ce r s
and a command post t o control the march. The division commander controls
the march from a position near the front of the main body. Bat ta l ions
usually move from assigned assembly areas t o reach a specified s t a r t i n g
p o i n t or s t a r t i n g l i ne a t the a p p o i n t e d time. Additionally, intermediate
phase l i nes along the route are assigned, and scheduled r e s t and mainte-
nance ha l t s fur ther help the commander control the operation. Phase
l i nes are scheduled for every two hours march.
When the division i s marching, the Soviets attempt to maintain
radio s i lence as much as possible, w i t h the exception of short codeword
messages t o report phase 1 ine crossings o r emergencies. Therefore, the
Soviets depend on messengers, l i a i s i o n o f f i ce r s , hel icopters , and visual
s igna ls . When division makes contact with the enemy they break the radio
s i 1 ence . Columns of tanks and motorized r i f l e units usually move a t
f i f t een t o twenty kilometers per hour a t night and t h i r t y kilometers per
hour by daylight. Normally, a dlvision plans t o move for e ight hours,
w i t h twenty to t h i r t y minute halts every two to three hours movement.
I f the d i v i s i o n i s marching to a t tack a defending enemy, the
d iv i s ion commander usually forms the division in to approach march
formation ten t o twelve kilometers from the l i n e of contact. The
approach march i s simply a formation from which the division deploys t o
a t tack . The division disperses l a t e r a l l y and in depth. A t a pre-
arranged l i n e o f deployment, the troop columns deploy in to combat
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formation, Regiments deploy into ba t ta l ion columns a t a distance o f
e ight t o twelve kilometers. The ba t ta l ions deploy in to company columns
a t a distance of four t o s i x kilometers and i n to platoons columns a t one
and ahalf t o three kilometers. A t l e s s than one thousand meters, the
Sovtets assign an "assaul t l i ne , " which i s roughly equivalent t o the US
f lna l coordination l i n e (see figure 4 ) .
Nhen enemy disposi t ions are not known, the d i v i s i o n marches in
a n t i c i p a t i o n of a meeting engagement unt i l contact i s made.
I f the commander believes the enemy to be o f comparable s t rength ,
or even s l i g h t l y superior s t rength , he conducts a meeting engagement. I f
the divis ion encounters an enemy w i t h overwhelming s t rength, the commander
must organize a defense to delay and disrupt the enemy force u n t i l o ther
units can defeat i t or achieve a su i t ab le r a t i o t o a t t a c k i t .
The meeting and engagement: the Soviet mi l i ta ry leaders view
the meeting engagement as one which will be the most common form of combat
a n d , therefore, i s a logical extension o f the Soviet concept of the
offensive.
The Soviets believe t h a t the offensive wil l develop unevenly
over a wide f ron t . For a var ie ty of reasons, some divisions will achieve
greater ra tes of advance than others . This s i tua t ion will r e s u l t in
numerous gaps, exposed flanks, and a confused and varying enemy response.
The cha rac t e r i s t i c features of the resu l t ing meeting engagements a rapid
approach by the two opposing forces , an unclear f lu id s i t ua t ion , and a
r e l a t ive ly shor t b u t intense combat over a wide f ront with room t o
maneuver (see f igure 5).
Under these conditions the Soviets believe, the s i d e t h a t most
aggressively seizes the i n i t i a t i v e will win. When contact i s l i k e l y ,
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the Soviets march i n ant ic ipat ion o f meeting and t h u s are organized for
combat before contact with the enemy.
The concept of a meeting engagement i s based on the following:
the advance guard aggressively at tacks when the enemy's leading elements
a re encountered. This stops the enemy advance and drives i n his reconnais-
sance and secur i ty elements. While the enemy is attempting t o c l a r i f y
the s i t ua t ion , the main body attacks on the flanks and rear ( see f igure 6 ) .
The Soviets require units marching in ant ic ipat ion of meeting
engagement t o conduct a vigorous and deep reconnaissance t o c l a r i f y the
s i t ua t fon in order to f a c i l i t a t e a command decision. The Soviet com-
manders emphasize, however, t h a t tfme i s o f the essence and t h a t the u n i t
should assume the offensive without waiting for c l a r i f i ca t ion of the s i t u -
a t i o n . A u n i t t h a t blocks the enemy advance and at tacks the flanks and rear
of a s t i l l undeployed o r p a r t i a l l y deployed force can defeat an equal or
l a rge r foe.
The Soviet commanders recognize the r isks en ta i led i n a t tacking
when enemy strength and exact locations are unknown, b u t they believe
the very nature of the meeting engagement demands aggressive action and
t h a t conditions will be unclear, n o t only a t the start b u t t h r o u g h o u t
the course of the b a t t l e . The ga ins o f aggressive act ion, they believe,
f a r outweigh the r i sks .
The commander must be a l e r t to sudden changes in the s i tua t ion
and be prepared to s h i f t f i r e s , change d i rec t ion , and es tab l i sh new
object ives . I f he f a i l s t o se ize the i n i t i a t i v e , he must be prepared
to organize a defense, h a l t the enemy, and launch a counterattack. I f
the enemy a t tacks with superior forces, the commander must be prepared
t o organize a defense i n depth t o conta in the enemy a t tack u n t i l other
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u n i t s can a t t a c k t h e f l a n k s and r e a r o f t h e enemy.
The f o l l o w i n g a re the main S o v i e t s t reng ths and weaknesses i n
o r g a n i z i n g and conduct ing march and meet ing engagement opera t ions :
The way the Sovl’ets deploy t h e l o n g range reconnaissance e l e -
ments d u r i n g t h e phase o f t h e march and meet ing engagement ope ra t i on
can be cons idered an advantage f o r t he d i v i s i o n commander. S o v i e t doc-
t r i n e emphasizes us ing these elements on the key t e r r a i n a t a d is tance
o f e i g h t y k i l o m e t e r s , f rom the main body i n o rde r t o g i v e the d i v i s i o n
commander a c l e a r v i s i o n o f t h r e a t a c t i v i t i e s a t l e a s t two t o th ree hours
e a r l y . When the d is tance becomes s h o r t e r than f o r t y t o f i f t y k i l omete rs ,
t he d i v i s i o n G2 i s respons ib le f o r sending the long-range reconnaissance
reserve (wh ich u s u a l l y c o n s i s t s o f two t o th ree groups) forward t o p ro-
v i d e the d i v i s i o n commander w i t h two t o th ree hours advance warning.
He1 i c o p t e r s and l i g h t t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , such as l i g h t general purpose
v e h i c l e s a re u s u a l l y used by t h i s type o f reconnaissance u n i t .
The S o v i e t d o c t r i n e o f keeping t h e tank regiment, as a r u l e , i n
the second echelon and on the most f l e x i b l e d i r e c t i o n i s cons idered an
advantage. S tudy ing the t e r r a i n i s cons idered one o f t he main f a c t o r s ,
t he d i v i s i o n d e c i s i o n t o deploy based on. Therefore, t h e d i v i s i o n com-
mander i s u s u a l l y concerned about the l o c a t i o n o f t h e tank reg iment
column w i t h i n t h e d i v i s i o n march fo rma t ion . He n o r m a l l y a l l o c a t e s the
tank reg iment t o a d i r e c t i o n which o f f e r s i t easy deployment and maneuver
space, i n o r d e r t o a l l o w qu ick a c t i o n i n t o t h e t h r e a t f l a n k s and r e a r .
The S o v i e t d o c t r i n e o f moving t h e d i v i s i o n command p o s t a t the
head o f t h e d i v i s i o n main body i s cons idered an advantage. Moving the
d i v i s i o n commander a t t he head o f t h e main body g ives h im the o p p o r t u n i t y
t o assume c o n t r o l o f t h e d i v i s i o n main f o r c e and t o keep cont inuous c o n t a c t
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w i t h t he advance guard regiment and the reconnaissance elements. Also,
i t gives him the opportunity fo r quick movement t o the advance guard
area once the actual contact w i t h the th rea t i s made i n order t o super-
vise the advance guard combat action and reemphasize his previous
decision or change i t according t o the s i tua t ion . Durlng t h i s period of
time the division chief of s taff assumes control of the division main
body.
The Soviet commanders usually employ a reinforced motorized
r i f l e regiment, as an advance guard.
The motorized r i f l e regiment has the capabi l i ty to se ize t e r r a i n
and t o destroy up t o two hundred tanks and armored vehicles. The S o v i e t
motorized r i f l e regiment includes ninety-eight BMP's which carry ant i tank
guided miss i les . One BMP has the capabi l i ty to destroy two tanks o r
armored vehicles. The motorized r i f l e regiment a lso includes an an t i -
t a n k guided missi le company ( f i v e vehicles) with the same capabi l i ty as
the BMB. These a re i n a d d i t i o n t o the a n t i t a n k weapons i n the motorized
r i f l e ba t ta l ions .
The method by which the Soviets move the anti tank guided missi les
asse ts behind the advance guard i s advantageous t o the division commander
and the advance guard commander. The anti tank guided missi le ba t ta l ion
usually marches four t o f lve kilometers b e h i n d the advance g u a r d . T h i s
gives the division commander the opportunity for the immediate deployment
of these asse ts to the most vulnerable flank. A t the same time, i t gives
the advance guard commander the opportunity to coordlnate w i t h these a s se t s
t o ensure the maximum effect iveness of t h e i r f i r e s . The an t i tank guided
missi les a re always employed i n conjunction w i t h an engineer company
operating as a forward mine detachment.
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The weaknesses :
In march a n d meeting engagement, the Soviets a re overly depend-
ent on a h u g h number o f reconnaissance elements. These elements could
give the other s ide an indication a b o u t where and when the ma in body
arrives i n l imited areas or l i nes . The Soviets normally send these e le -
ments a t a distance o f s i x t y t o eighty kilometers or three t o four hours
from the main forces . This could give the o p p o s i n g side the opportunity
to organize a hasty defense, from the march, depending on the t e r r a i n
fea tures , i n order t o await t h e Soviet main forces i n a su i tab le place
and circumstances, t o i n f l i c t a la rge number of casualt ies--a prelude
t o their complete des t ru t t ion .
The Soviet march and meeting engagement operation needs a i r
super ior i ty along the routes o f advance and over the l i k e l y area o f con-
f l i c t . This area might extend t o more than a hundred kilometers due t o
the length o f the divis ion columns. On the other hand, the Soviet
organization does n o t include any kind of a v i a t i o n , and the army usually
does not provide the division with enough aviat ion for a i r super ior i ty
or even for close a i r support.
The way the Soviet commanders ca lcu la te the l i k e l y area of the
meeting and engagement i s a disadvantage. The Soviet calculat ion depends
l n i t i a l l y on speed and dis tance, as well as the th rea t locat ion and his
normal speed. T h i s m i g h t lead the Soviet commanders t o f i g h t the enemy
in an area unsuitable fo r his forces , and t h i s calculat ion should contain
key t e r r a i n fea tures , and should be calculated based on the actual speed
o f the th rea t .
The way the Soviets move t h e i r main body I s an advantage. The
Soviets usually march the main force on the same route taken by the
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advance guard. Therefore, i t gives the o t h e r s ide an easy way t o de ter -
mine t h e i r d i r e c t i o n and fo l low t h e S o v i e t main s t r i k e .
The d is tance between t h e l a s t v e h i c l e i n t h e advance guard and
t h e f i r s t v e h i c l e i n the main body i s es t imated t o be a t twenty t o
t h i r t y k i lometers . This gives the o t h e r s ide a t l e a s t one t o two hours
t o c a r r y o u t any spec ia l ac t i on , such as a i rmob i l e o r a i r a s s a u l t oper-
a t i o n s i n o rde r t o i s o l a t e o r de lay the S o v i e t d i v i s i o n main body as
w e l l as causing ser ious a t t r i t i o n be fore the ac tua l engagement.
The way t h e Sov ie ts march t h e i r combat s e r v i c e suppor t u n i t s on
one r o u t e and f i v e t o ten k i l omete rs behind t h e combat forces, i s a
disadvantage. I n the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e march opera t ion , t h e S o v i e t
commanders compose what they c a l l a l o g i s t i c t a i l . The d i v i s i o n l o g i s t i c
t a i l u s u a l l y cons i s t s o f most o f the d i v i s i o n ' s combat s e r v i c e suppor t
u n i t s except smal l r e p a i r teams moved forward t o suppor t the combat u n i t s .
The d i v i s i o n does n o t ass ign any c lose guards t o t h e l o g i s t i c t a i l except
those assigned f o r the o v e r a l l march. Therefore, t h e S o v i e t l o g i s t i c
t a i l i s u s u a l l y exposed t o enemy sabotage a c t i o n which m igh t de lay o r
i s o l a t e i t from the march columns o f the d i v i s i o n .
There i s no doubt t h a t the march and engagement ope ra t i on i s a
r e l a t i v e l y recen t means t o conduct maneuver.
It should be w e l l organized, secured and pro tec ted . Engagement
opera t ions shou ld a l s o be seen as an impor tan t type o f m i l i t a r y ac t i on ,
and should be w e l l pre-organized and foreseen. The march and engagement
opera t ions are d e f i n i t e l y n o t acc identa l opera t ions o r opera t ions which
can be conducted when t h e r e i s l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n about the enemy.
Indeed, i t i s considered a major type o f the modern m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , and
i t requ i res a l o t o f i n f o r m a t i o n about enemy a c t i v i t i e s .
133
134
1-1
+-
135
U
d
w m
Y P
A\ \ \ \ \ \
\
\
\
(FIGURE 6-41
CHAPTER r v
FOOTNOTES
lDepartment o f t h e Defense: S o v i e t Amy Opera t ions , ( V i r g i n i a : US Army I n t e l l i g e n c e and Threa t Analysis Center, April 19781, p p .3-15, 3-18 - 3-19, 3-22 - 3-23, 3-27, 3-28 - 3-40, 3-49 - 3-52, 3-55, 3-58 - 3-59.
20DB-1100-197-78, The S o v i e t Motorized R i f l e B a t t a l i o n , US Army,Defense, I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, December 1977. p p . 6-7, 71-82.
3DDB-1120-79, S o v i e t Tank Regiment T a c t i c s , US Army Defense, I n t e l -l i gence Agency, May 1979, p p . 33, 35-37, 52-57.
4DDB-1120-12-79, S o v i e t Motorized R l f l e Regiment, US Army, Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, March 1979, p p . 3-35, 50-53.
5UDB-1110-1-79, The Sov ie t Motorized R i f l e Div is ion , US Army,Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, 1 J u l y 1979, p p . 25-27, 29-30, 40-43.
6FM 17-95, Cavalry, Heqdquarters, Washington, Department o f t h e Army, 7 January 1980, p p . 4-15, 4-16 , 5-27 - 5-28, 5-45 - 5-46.
'FM 71-2 , The Tank and Mechanized B a t t a l i o n Task Force, Headquarters , Washington, Department o f t h e Army, 30 Jun 1977 , p p . 4-10 - 4-11.
8FM 71-3, Armored and Mechanized Brigade, Headquarters , Washington, Department o f the Army, 25 Ju ly 1980, 3-18 3-21.~
'FM 71-100, Armored and Mechanized Division Opera t ions , Headquarters , Washington, Department of the Army, 30 March 1979, p p . 4-20 - 4-24.
l0FM 100-5, US Army Opera t ions , Headquarters , Washington, Department o f the Army, 1 J u l y 1976, pp . 4-9 - 4-11.
l l H a f i z , Notes on Vestrel Academy, Moscow, 1974-1976.
140
CHAPTER V
Conclusion:
Over the preceeding pages I have attempted to provide the reader
with a broad comparison of US and Soviet doctrine as i t a p p ies t o
divis ion s i ze uni ts engaged i n offensive, defensive, march and engagement
operations. As an observer and student o f b o t h na t ions ' mi l i ta ry doc-
t r i n e as well as experiencing the application of Soviet t ac t i ca l doc-
trine i n combat d u r i n g the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, I believe
1: possess unique credent ia ls t o accomplish this unbiased comparison now
f o r the reader.
I t i s readi ly apparent t h a t there are important differences i n the
organization, equipment, t ra in ing , command/control and t ac t i ca l doctr ine
of the armies o f the Soviet Union and the US. These differences, as I
have hopefully indicated, a re the product of the h is tor ica l past,
p o l i t i c a l system, geography, industr ia l capacity, technology, demography,
and w h a t I would l i k e t o refer to as national will as described i n
chapter I . All of these are ingredients which have gone i n t o shaping
the armed forces of these two super powers. These individuals in
government and mi l i ta ry commands responsible f o r the deployment of t h e i r
respective armies, have analyzed t h e i r forces and come t o conclusions
regarding t h e i r own strengths and weaknesses as well as those of
potential enemies. They have, I assume, taken i n t o consideration these
conclusions i n the development of t ac t i ca l doctrine governing offensive,
defensive, march and engagement operations discussed i n t h i s paper.
There a re a number of d i s t i n c t differences which, I hope, I have
b r o u g h t t o the reader 's mind as I have discussed the s t rengths and
141
weaknesses o f the appl lcable t a c t i c a l doctr ine. On one h a n d , the
Soviets have paid close a t ten t ion t o the lessons learned i n World War 11.
Their h i g h r a t i o o f a r t i l l e r y and t h e i r emphasis on armored forces,
ant i tank and a n t i a i r c r a f t asse ts can be a t t r i bu ted to their pas t experi-
ence i n Europe. The unwillingness t o allow subordinate commanders f ree-
dom of act ion and the concern f o r de ta i led operational plans both mirror
the p o l i t l c a l system o f their country. On the other hand, the US Army
has had a var ie ty o f combat experiences s ince World War I 1 i n the limited
and counter-insurgency wars i t has engaged i n . The US awareness o f t h e i r
weaknesses i n the numbers o f b o t h men and materials and the f a i t h
Americans have always had i n technology to solve problems has led them
t o place a g rea t deal of re l iance on sophis t icated weapons systems such
as f i r e cont ro l , advanced a t tack hel icopters , and nuclear weapons. The
US, fo r example, has i n i t s wars addi t ional ly enjoyed a i r super ior i ty .
This has led t o the present neglect of a n t i a i r c r a f t assets. The US
experience from the ea r ly days of the creat ion of the nation has bred
i n i t i a t i v e and independence i n i t s so ld ie rs and commanders. There i s also
the f a i t h and willingness t o trust subordinates t o carry t h r o u g h t a c t i c a l
missions w i t h only the minimal guidance.
I hope t h a t i n studying this comparative study t h a t the reader will
gain a c l e a r understanding of the composition of a US o r Soviet divis ion.
The reader should also have a c l e a r picture o f the t ac t i ca l doctrine
governing the respective offensive, defensive, march and engagement
operations of the two nations. I have, i n no way, attempted to ind ica te
which forces I believe superior i n regard t o t ac t i ca l doctr ine, although
I have pointed to what I perceive as their respective s t rengths and
weaknesses.
142
Flnal ly , the determination of super ior i ty can be decided by the
tnformed reader. Hopefully, fo r the sake o f world peace, the f ina l proof
of doctr inal super ior i ty wil l never have t o be determined by these two
nations on the f i e l d o f b a t t l e .
143
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