Download - Russian Democracy in Peril
Russian democracy in peril Despite the high hopes of a decade ago, post -communist Russia has clearly not
emerged as a liberal democracy. Why has it not done so?
GV100
Spring 2011
Hasan M. Zulfiqar
Word Count: 2,831
1
When, in May 1985, in the then city of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), Mikhail
Gorbachev announced reforms in the USSR, both economic and structural, there were high
hopes in the West of a prolonged period of détente. By 1991, however, the Soviet Union had
ceased to exist and those who had before expected only structural reform, now hoped that
glasnost and perestroika would eventually lead to ‘liberal’ demokratizatsiya.1 Two decades after
the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Russian Federation is still a powerful global player, but has the
hope of liberal democracy transpired?
The title question of this essay asks why Russia has not emerged as a liberal democracy
despite more than twenty years of reform. To begin to answer this question we must first
ascertain whether the expectations of Russia transforming into a liberal democracy were
justified. Why did politicians and political scientists in the West take it for granted that a post-
communist state would inevitably move towards liberal democracy when no proven models were
available? Surely there are other factors besides simple multi-party electoral reform that need to
be taken into account when determining processes of systematic change, to allow for any firm
teleological view to be convincing.2
Russia came, in what Samuel P. Huntington called the ‘third-wave of democratization’,
by a process termed as ‘replacement’, in which the authoritarian regime collapsed leaving a
quasi-vacuum in political authority.3 Though the transformation is considered by some to be
towards a democratic system of government in theory, the final destination is a matter of debate.4
In this work, we will first seek to establish what conditions are necessary for the establishment
and consolidation of liberal democracy, and why Russia has not met these requirements. In this
short analysis, it would be impossible to discuss in great detail all the reasons but the most vital
will be dwelt upon. We will analyze the crucial years of transition after the fall of communism
and determine what steps were taken in the process of democratization. We will also look at the
1 Glasnost (openness), perestroika (reconstruction), and demokratizatsiya (democratization) were some of the policies pursued by
Mikhail Gorbachev in order to reform the failing economy of the USSR.
2 Carothers, Thomas. "The end of the transition paradigm." Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 5-21.
3 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1993.
4 Murrell, G.D G. Russia's transition to democracy: 1989-1996. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1997.
2
political actors, institutions and interests which ushered Russia into the twenty-first century.
Thus, with the aid of models of democratic transition this work will establish the core reasons as
to why Russia has not emerged as a liberal democracy and thus hope to provide a definitive
analysis of the question posed.
Models
Sanford Lakoff, in his detailed analysis of democratic reform, provides us with five
different proven ‘modes of transition’ to liberal democracy.5 Of these five, the ‘transformation
from above’ method fits best with the process of reform that has been prevalent in post-
communist Russia. Democracy was not the call of the people in Russia, who had wished in 1990,
for more political and economic freedom, at best. The initial process was begun by the ruling
elite of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), more specifically by Gorbachev.
Though his reforms did not include any transition to democracy from communism, the process
was hijacked by ‘democrats’ within the higher echelons, forcing him at last to concede. These
‘democrats’, as they were known, instituted a gradual move towards a more representative form
of government, aided by an oligarchical elite.6 Though in no way did these men see the final goal
of Russia as liberal democracy. And for all the ‘hopes’ of NATO members, those who were close
to the reformists in Russia, themselves did not envisage liberal democracy as seen in the West.
Even today, calls for liberal democratic reform have only been heard from isolated sectors of the
Russian academia, and are not representative of the majority of the Russian populace.7
For, as Richard Sakwa has argued, the Russian psyche is not ready or willing for liberal
democracy.8 The multinational Russian peoples have always had strong, federal centers of power
and the concept of a decentralized government is quite unappealing to the majority. Fareed
Zakaria has argued that, for this reason, those who are at the helm of the reform process have
5 Lakoff, Sanford. Democracy: History, Theory, Practice. Oxford: Westview Press, 1996.
6 Ibid.
7 Hassner, Pierre. "Russia's Transition to Autocracy." Journal of Democracy 19, no. 2 (2008): 5-15. Accessed February 20, 2011.
http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Hassner-19-2.pdf.
8 Sakwa, Richard. Russian politics and society. 4th ed. Oxon: Routledge, 2008.
3
been unwilling to share power with other political parties or involve the public in decision-
making and thus Russia can be said to be a democracy ‘in theory and not in practice’ - an
illiberal democracy.9
A related issue that has oft been debated is the way in which this ‘transformation from
above’ is being instituted. Most scholars of democracy will agree that a country which has
recently emerged from communism needs to reform both its economic and political policies to be
able to move towards democracy.10
However, the order in which these should be reformed is
contentious. Observers of China say that its policy, in recent decades, of economic restructuring
towards a more open market policy before any political reform is the most stable method of
approaching democracy. Russia is in the process of reforming its politics before economics, and
many question if this viable, for stable and lasting political change in a country is best permanent
when the economic conditions are healthy and cannot be exploited by opponents of democracy to
advocate for more autocratic methods of government.11
Though the push towards capitalism has
been accompanied by economic successes, such as the increase in Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI), foreign markets are still quite closed for domestic producers and recent trends towards
protectionism have somewhat reversed this process of economic liberalization. Another
drawback of any successes in the economic sphere is the monopolization of the markets by the
elite who are close to the Kremlin. Because access to this newly acquired prosperity has not been
shared amongst a wider base of Russians, with economic activity being heavily influenced by
closed business interests, it has provided little opportunity for true democratic participation.
A ‘managed’ democracy
The Russian Federation, since Boris Yeltsin’s constitution of 1993, has been a semi-
presidential political system with separately elected executive and legislative branches. Though
9 Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal democracy at home and abroad. New York: Norton, 2007.
10 Nagle, John D., and Alison Mahr. Democracy and Democratization. London: Sage Publications, 1999.
11 Gibson, James L. "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition."
American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (2001): 51-68. Accessed February 18, 2011. Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669359.
4
the controversial constitution embodies a separation of powers, this is not the case in practice.
Both Yeltsin and his successor Putin, have regularly acted unilaterally to curb legislative and
even judicial powers, enacting ‘presidential decrees’ which carry the force of law.12
If we take
the United States as an example of a liberal democracy, then the concept of a separation of
powers, with each of the three branches of government acting as legal checks on one another and
accountable to each other, is essential. From the outset, this has not been the case in Russia, with
the so called ‘democrats’ acting as autocrats. Lakoff points out that though the ‘transformation
from above’ method has been successful in countries such as Portugal, the endgame of those
instituting the reforms must be liberal democracy.13
In the case of Russia, the current power
behind the government, Vladimir Putin, has always been ambiguous as to what the aim is. Thus,
many argue, that the steps taken by Yeltsin in the 1990’s were not helpful to establishing liberal
democracy, and that this has been continued by Putin and Medvedev. However, to fully
understand how and why Russia has failed, we must analyze the important developments in post-
communist Russian politics so as to ascertain which aspects of the system are hindering a
possible advent to liberal democracy.
The hegemonic presidency
The office of the Russian president can be viewed as the primary source of power in the
federation. Russia’s first post-communist president, Boris Yeltsin, set the agenda for the post in
his time in office. Though his election was seen by foreign observers as ‘mostly fair’, the actions
he took whilst in power significantly harmed any prospects for future liberal democratization.
Vladimir Putin has gone further and consolidated this power in the presidency, to the point where
the post has become ‘too powerful’.14
This centrism is reminiscent of Tsarist Russia and is little
different in its functions. Putin has ruled from the top through his party loyalists in United
Russia, and the parliament or Duma, has been no more than his tool for implementing his
policies. Even after Medvedev took the presidency and Putin became Prime Minister, he is still
12 Jack, Andrew. Inside Putin's Russia. London: Granta, 2004.
13 Lakoff, Sanford. Democracy: History, Theory, Practice. Oxford: Westview Press, 1996.
14 Ross, Cameron. Russian politics under Putin. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004.
5
the dominant power broker, though the constitution gives precedence to the president. This
brings into disrepute the question of the rule of law, and if it is indeed being adhered to. Since
the early 2000’s Putin has repeatedly cut down the powers of the lower elected house of
parliament, the Duma, and has filled it with his supporters.15
The way in which this has been
achieved is nothing short of autocracy. In the 2007 Duma elections, the ability of anti-Kremlin
parties to effectively run for seats in the lower house was significantly diminished by various
kinds of restrictions which were imposed on them by the administration.16
Though early
elections in the Russian Federation were thought to be competitive, this has reduced significantly
during Putin’s time in office. The lack of any viable opposition to Putin’s rule is a negating
factor which hampers any prospects of encouraging a transition to a representative liberal
democracy.
Putin has also been active in reducing the powers of provincial governors of the oblasts17
,
putting in their place his own supporters. These deputies proved to be a threat to Putin and over
the course of the past ten years, more than twenty six elected governors have been forced out of
office either through blackmail, threats or false accusations which have led to impeachment.18
Like Yeltsin before him, Putin has also installed his associates in places of power, men he has
known from his St. Petersburg days, the ‘Pitertsy’ and the remnants of the ‘family’.19
The
judiciary has fared no better with accusations of bribery and intimidation rife in the Russian
newspapers. It is perhaps by this route that Putin has most successfully fought the oligarchs,
those wealthy Russians who gained from the collapse of communism, as they were considered a
prime threat to his dominance. The continuance of ‘imperfect legislation’, laws from the
communist era, also does not help in this regard, as they are not compatible with democratic
15 Colton, Timothy J., and Cindy Skach. "The Russian Predicament." Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 26-113.
16 White, Stephen, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa. Developments in Russian Politics 6. 6th ed. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005.
17 Oblasts are administrative divisions within the Russian Federation.
18
Jack, Andrew. Inside Putin's Russia. London: Granta, 2004
19 Kahn, Jeffrey. Federalism, democratization, and the rule of law in Russia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
6
values.20
The power lost by the communist regime in 1991 was not effectively gained by the
people but instead a new elite came to the fore.
This has all been possible due to the 1993 constitution which gave the president
enormous powers of decree-making. With this constitution still in place, any hopes for a liberal
democracy in the making will surely be dashed. Because the dominant branch of government is
not the legislature, accountability in the system is virtually non-existent.
Putin and his supporters have justified this emphasis on strong central government by
arguing that a weak regime is detrimental to the prospects of democracy. Polls conducted show
that a majority of Russian people agree with him.21
However this is a disturbing trend in the
search for liberal democracy. If the Putin camp is really aiming for representative democracy
then it is high time that they started to give back some power to the legislature as two decades is
more than enough for power consolidation. The fear of communist resurgence in the mid 1990’s
which prompted Yeltsin to consolidate power in the presidency, is gone now, the successors of
the disbanded CPSU are a threat no more.
The Criminal State
In October of 2006, Anna Politovskaya, a prominent journalist and critic of the Putin
administration, was shot dead outside her apartment building in what many have called an
assassination ordered ‘directly’ from the Kremlin. She was not the only journalist to have been
killed in Putin’s Russia, more than three hundred have died in suspicious circumstances or
disappeared since 1998, and there is strong evidence that a majority of the incidents have a
‘Kremlin connection.’22
Today, Russia has more than forty television media outlets, with half of
them being state-owned and most of the others towing the state line.23
The independence of the
20 Ross, Cameron. Federalism and democratization in Russia. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002. 21 Horvath, Robert. "Dissident Legacies." In Democracy and Myth in Russia and Eastern Europe, Ed. Alexander Woll and
Harold Wydra, New York: Routledge, 2008.
22 Satter, David. Darkness at Dawn: The rise of the Russian criminal state. Yale: Yale University Press, 2003.
23 Ibid.
7
media that was sought after has been continuously hampered by the repeated oppression of the
press. Alexander Litvinenko, another outspoken dissident and former KGB agent, before his
death from alleged radiation poisoning in 2006 by the FSB, authored two books on life in Putin’s
Russia. In them, he exposed why the Kremlin has close ties to underground criminal gangs and
how Putin uses these organizations to further his control over Russia.24
The lack of a viably
independent media has been cited as a strong precondition for transition to liberal democracy and
this may be an important reason why liberal democratic values have not fostered in Russia.25
Freedom of speech in Russia is also a concern, as protesters have routinely been
summarily arrested for expressing public dissatisfaction with the regime. The Muscovite police
have had a strong hand in this as they are known to be strongly loyal to Putin. High levels of
corruption in the state machinery also do not help to instill popular confidence in the institutions.
This is indeed a worrisome prospect for any path towards liberal democracy and has been a
serious obstacle for progress towards it.
Civil participation
The active participation of civil society in all areas of government is considered to be the
most important prerequisite for the making of a liberal democracy. One of the most eminent
political scientists of the twentieth century, Robert A. Dahl has repeatedly cited this as a
necessary condition present in many of the polyarchies of the world.26
However, the above
mentioned factors in this essay, in relation to Russia, have not allowed for any comprehensive
civil participation and thus democracy itself has been under duress. Without the presence of any
viable civil participation and representation in Russia, liberal democracy has not been allowed
the platform from which to grow.
24 Felshtinsky, Yuri, and Alexander Litvinenko. Blowing up Russia: Terror from within. London: Gibson Square, 2007.
25 Barany, Zoltan. Russian politics: challenges of democratization. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
26 Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition. London: New Haven/Yale University Press, 1971.
8
-Conclusion-
It has been a matter of debate as to the extent to which those who have been in power in
Moscow during the past two decades have wanted liberal democracy. If it is indeed the case that
liberal democracy is a goal of the policy makers then the method by which this transition is
trying to be achieved is seriously flawed. Autocratic leadership for the reasons of power
consolidation must cease when the country has been stabilized. It is then that liberal reforms
must take place. According to some scholars such as Kulik, the democratic transition is over and
Russia has very little chance of emerging as a viable liberal democracy.27
However, the question
posed in the introduction to this essay has, as we have seen a simple answer, that Russia has not
emerged as a liberal democracy because it has not instituted the necessary preconditions for such
a system. Russian democracy is at the stage where it must choose either to continue with the
delegative democracy in place or liberalize and move towards representative liberal democracy.
The status-quo must not continue, and only then, will the hopes of a decade ago be fulfilled.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
27 Kulik, Anatolli. Perspektivy razvitiya partiino-politicheskoi sistemy v Rossii: kruglyi stol 'Ekspertiza'. Moscow: Gorbachev-
Fond, 2001.
9
Bibliography
Barany, Zoltan. Russian politics: challenges of democratization. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001.
Carothers, Thomas. "The end of the transition paradigm." Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1
(2002): 5-21.
Colton, Timothy J., and Cindy Skach. "The Russian Predicament." Journal of Democracy 16,
no. 3 (2005): 26-113.
Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition. London: New Haven/Yale University
Press, 1971.
Felshtinsky, Yuri, and Alexander Litvinenko. Blowing up Russia: Terror from within. London:
Gibson Square, 2007.
Gibson, James L. "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's
Democratic Transition." American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (2001): 51-68.
Accessed February 18, 2011. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669359.
Hassner, Pierre. "Russia's Transition to Autocracy." Journal of Democracy 19, no. 2 (2008): 5-
15. Accessed February 20, 2011. http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Hassner-19-
2.pdf.
Horvath, Robert. "Dissident Legacies." In Democracy and Myth in Russia and Eastern Europe,
Ed. Alexander Woll and Harold Wydra, New York: Routledge, 2008.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.
Jack, Andrew. Inside Putin's Russia. London: Granta, 2004.
Kahn, Jeffrey. Federalism, democratization, and the rule of law in Russia. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Kulik, Anatolli. Perspektivy razvitiya partiino-politicheskoi sistemy v Rossii: kruglyi stol
'Ekspertiza'. Moscow: Gorbachev-Fond, 2001.
Lakoff, Sanford. Democracy: History, Theory, Practice. Oxford: Westview Press, 1996.
Murrell, G.D G. Russia's transition to democracy: 1989-1996. Brighton: Sussex Academic
Press, 1997.
10
Nagle, John D., and Alison Mahr. Democracy and Democratization. London: Sage Publications,
1999.
Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. Democracy and its alternatives.
London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998.
Ross, Cameron. Federalism and democratization in Russia. Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2002.
Ross, Cameron. Russian politics under Putin. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004.
Sakwa, Richard. Russian politics and society. 4th ed. Oxon: Routledge, 2008.
Satter, David. Darkness at Dawn: The rise of the Russian criminal state. Yale: Yale University
Press, 2003.
White, Stephen, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa. Developments in Russian Politics 6. 6th ed.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal democracy at home and abroad. New York:
Norton, 2007.
Cover design courtesy of MS Office.com Publications.
All effort has been made to track the sources referred to in this article, however the author wishes to
apologize if any breach of intellectual property law has unknowingly taken place.